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THE UNDERGRADUATE, AUTUMN 2016, Vol. 4, No. 1. Published by THE UNDERGRADUATE ACADEMIC JOURNAL. Printed and bound in the UNITED KINGDOM by WILLIAM POLLARD & CO LTD, Exeter, Devon. ISSN 2054-8478


Middle Eastern Studies


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Focus Feature:

How has the political and cultural landscape changed with trends of globalisation and nationalism?

Iris Gioti

Thibault le Forsonney



Davide Scarpignato Subject Editor

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F O R E W O R D I would like to first of all thank The Undergraduate team, and congratulate them on completing this edition of the journal. This is a bitter-sweet moment for us all; our journal is finally ready to be distributed to our fellow students, but this also marks the end of our time with The Undergraduate, as we usher in a new team for the next academic year. This edition of the journal continues in the tradition of our previous editions, in promoting undergraduate, interdisciplinary research. We hope that with the selection of essays we have chosen for the print and online editions that we are not only giving undergraduate students the chance to be heard and to read excellent pieces of academic writing, but also the opportunity to open up the conversation and encourage debate within the student community at Exeter. I have personally been involved with The Undergraduate for two years now, and I can honestly say it has defined and shaped my undergraduate degree in ways I could not imagine. It has been a true labour of love, a challenge and a learning experience all bundled into a unique journal, a unique group of people and an overall unique experience. As my time with the journal comes to an end, I would like to thank Cherrie Kwok and Cameron Ho for seeing something in me as a first year and letting me join the team, as well as Rosemary Lennie, Caroline Hughes and Pria Rai who gave me the opportunity to grow and change as a person as I faced the challenges of a leadership role within the journal. I would also like to thank the journal’s Advisory Board who have been a vital support system, as well as our Academic Advisor Dr. Regenia Gagnier who has provided her invaluable advice and insight on multiple occasions. As the journal moves forward into a new phase, I look forward to seeing what direction the incoming team decides to take for the next academic year. I wish The Undergraduate, our incoming President and Editor-in-Chief, Ilona Weir and Chloe Jaques, the best of luck in all their future endeavours, and that their time with the journal shapes up to be as educational and fun for them as it was for me.

Iris Gioti

President 2016/17

The Undergraduate has so far achieved remarkable things. In just four years, the journal has established itself as a high-quality publication on campus. We see a range of strong submissions for each issue, and believe it is important to provide an accessible platform for interdisciplinary academic work. As heads of the incoming committee, we hope to further this success, and believe the time is right for the journal to develop and expand its presence in the undergraduate community. It has been a wonderful experience to be part of this collaborative undergraduate project. We have both enjoyed our current positions in the committee and greatly valued the opportunity to interact with such impressive and well-communicated ideas. It has been a privilege to benefit from the groundwork set out for the journal by previous committees. As the incoming President and Editor-in-Chief we are hoping to bring the journal to a new phase in its life, and build an academic hub across the humanities online and in print. Our hope is to create an extensive online forum dedicated to current undergraduate research and use this to foster discussion and academic debate across disciplines and departments. We hope that the journal will grow and change across the course of our time leading this committee. We are looking forward to introducing new ideas, from exploring the careers of faculty academics to stimulating debates across campus and making links with more societies. We are both very excited about working with our new team and hope to leave behind an established and well-regarded publication to promote undergraduate work for years to come. We look forward to reading your essays and hearing your ideas.

Ilona Weir and Chloe Jacques

President and Editor-in-Chief 2017/18

ANCIENT HISTORY AND CLASSICS Subject Editors: Davide Scarpignato & Helena Leslie

What is the point of Odyssey IX? written by ellie small Odyssey IX contains one of Odysseus’ most iconic adventures: the Cyclopeia, in which he blinds the monster and frees himself and his companions using ‘the trick of Nobody’. On closer inspection, however, this episode functions as a demonstration of Odysseus’ fallibility as a leader, guest and epic hero. Though he ultimately saves the day with his cunning, Odysseus’ acquisitiveness, arrogance and attempts to apply an Iliadic mindset to a postwar reality threaten his life and nostos throughout Book IX. The practice of xenia, and its violation, is highly significant to Book IX. The book begins with presentday Odysseus enjoying the exemplary hospitality of the Phaeacians. Somewhat nostalgically, he compliments his host Alcinous on the singer and banquet: τοῦτο τί μοι κάλλιστον ἐνὶ φρεσίν εἴδεται εἶναι (9.11). With this “most beautiful” (κάλλιστον) scene of xenia, the poet sets the bar for any instances of hospitality that follow in Book IX — primarily that of the Cyclops Polyphemus, of whom Odysseus falls afoul shortly after leaving Troy. Present-Odysseus narrates to the Phaeacians his arrival on the Cyclopes’ island and his decision to wait in Polyphemus’ cave for its inhabitant, anticipating guest-presents (ξείνια, 9.229). On discovering Odysseus and his companions, Polyphemus addresses them as ξεῖνοι (9.252), thus identifying them as guests (though ξεῖνοι also connotes ‘strangers’ or ‘foreigners’). In a distorted version of the xenia-ritual, he proceeds to ask the right questions — τίνες ἐστέ; πόθεν πλεῖθ’ (0.252) — albeit in a crude and un-formulaic manner; Homeric laws of hospitality stipulate that guests be fed before being questioned about their identity . Fearing Polyphemus’ monstrous size, and perhaps sensing his hostility towards his unwanted guests, Odysseus scrambles to claim the protection of guest-friendship. He emphasises their position as suppliants (ἡμεῖς… κιχανόμενοι τὰ σα γοῦνα ἱκόμεθ’, 9.266-7; ἱκέται… εἰμεν, 9.269) and directly references xenia five times in as many lines (9.267-71), simultaneously invoking Zeus, “guardian of guests” (ἐπιτιμήτωρ…ξείνων, 9.270), who “protects revered guests” (ξείνοισιν…

αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ, 9.271). The clumsy repetition lends a sense of desperation to Odysseus’ speech even as he threatens Polyphemus with the wrath of Zeus, god of guests, betraying his bravado for what it is. Yet Odysseus’ invocation of ξείνων θέμις (“the law of hospitality”, 9.268) is ultimately in vain; his conversation with Polyphemus culminates in an egregious breach of xenia when their host eats three of his companions. According to “Homeric or any other morality” , Polyphemus receives his comeuppance by being blinded by his guests. However, the scene can be read differently. While Polyphemus undoubtedly violates the code of xenia, Odysseus arguably struck the first blow by entering the Cylops’ cave uninvited and taking his cheese and livestock for food and sacrifice. The poet alludes to Odysseus’ and company’s self-serving actions with αὐτοι τυρῶν αἰνύμενοι: the demonstrative pronoun αὐτοι indicates that they were literally “helping themselves to the cheeses” (9.231-2). When Odysseus then tries to invoke xenia, he has already compromised his position by breaching the code himself. In addition, Polyphemus has technically, if inadvertently, already fed Odysseus and company, and has thus exhibited the behaviour expected of the Homeric host; his rude enquiry as to their identity becomes reasonable, and Odysseus is left the sole violator of xenia. Though none of this justifies Polyphemus in eating his guests, his monstrous behaviour can be viewed as merely “another in a long series of breaches of the xeneiaritual…initiated not by Polyphemus but by Odysseus himself ” . If “the archaic concept of justice” stipulates that “the first offender must be punished, regardless of the extent of the crime” , perhaps it is Odysseus who deserves his comeuppance in the form of Poseidon’s curse.


Here Odysseus’ fallibility as a leader becomes clear. He and his crew venture onto the Cyclopes’ Island due not to necessity but Odysseus’ characteristic “inquisitiveness and acquisitiveness” . Odysseus is opportunistically seeking xenia, specifically guestpresents, and says as much: he forbids his companions

to loot Polyphemus’ cave and leave, first to see the Cyclops (satisfying his inquisitiveness), then discern, acquisitively, whether he might receive gifts (ὄφρ’ αὐτον τε ἴδοιμι, καὶ εἴ μοι ξείνια δοίη, 9.229). When this plan backfires spectacularly, it is difficult not to hold Odysseus accountable. In hindsight, presentOdysseus acknowledges that robbing Polyphemus and leaving “would have been more profitable” (ἄν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν, 9.228). However, his reference to the “unheroic quality” of κέρδος (‘greed’) suggests that he considers this course of action beneath him (if not his crew) — seemingly missing the fact that his decision to wait for the Cyclops was equally motivated by potential gain (ξείνια). Brown takes a more forgiving view, arguing that Odysseus merely fails to realise that “the rules of hospitality do not apply to the Cyclopes” , a race who spurn the god of guests (οὐ…Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχου ἀλέγουσιν, 9.275), and can hardly be blamed for the disastrous results. Yet Odysseus predicted this: looking at the giant cave, he envisages an ἄνδρ’…μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν (9.214) who οὔτε δίκας ἐὺ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας (9.215), though, of course, the reliability of present-Odysseus’ narration is questionable. Either way, Odysseus’ gamble on Polyphemus’ hospitality does not pay off — at the cost of his men’s lives — and his abuse of xenia is arguably proved when Zeus rejects his sacrifice of Polyphemus’ treasured ram. Scholars have found this incident troubling; if Odysseus had behaved heroically, why would Zeus not only reject his offering, but actively ponder how

to destroy Odysseus’ fleet and crew (ὅπως…ἑταῖροι, 9.554-5)? In “a programmatic speech” in Book I, Zeus establishes that the gods do not “arbitrarily cause human suffering” : rather, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε’ ἔχουσιν (1.33-4). Odysseus must, then, have brought his suffering upon himself through his own ἀτασθαλία (“reckless folly” ). Brown, again, argues in Odysseus’ favour, claiming that Zeus simply “has no obligation to support him” because Polyphemus is not bound by the ξείνων θέμις of human society, and Odysseus, knowing no better, misinterpreted the situation. However, it seems more likely that Zeus is punishing Odysseus for his xenia-related hubris. As he sails away, Odysseus calls back to Polyphemus that his blinding was divine punishment by “Zeus and all the gods” (9.479) because Polyphemus dared to eat his guests (ξείνους…ἐσθέμεναι, 9.478-9), once again invoking ξείνων θέμις. Odysseus thus “arrogates to himself a divine mission” that Zeus has not sanctioned , and to add hypocritical insult to hubristic injury, Odysseus himself was the first to violate xenia and, by his own logic, offend Zeus, god of guests. This, to quote Friedrich, “must greatly irritate Zeus” . The Cyclops episode shows Odysseus’ fallibility as a leader and guest, motivated by his acquisitiveness and exacerbated by his arrogance. Odysseus’ fallibility in the Cyclopeia goes beyond his violation of xenia, however. Upon Odysseus’ escape from Polyphemus’ cave with his remaining


companions, the episode could be counted as a victory — even if Odysseus’ self-serving desire for ξείνια trapped them in the cave to begin with. Perhaps, chastened by his failure, Odysseus could have returned to Ithaca the same year as the fall of Troy. Yet Odysseus proves his fallibility once again by revealing his real name to Polyphemus and, in doing so, enabling Poseidon to curse his nostos (δὸς μὴ… Ἰθάκῃ ἔνι οἰκί’ ἔχοντα, 9.530-1). Odysseus’ name is a prominent theme in Book IX, which contains the only two occasions in the poem where Odysseus truthfully gives his name . Odysseus belatedly reveals his name to Alcinous at the beginning of Book IX; past-Odysseus later convinces Polyphemus that his name is ‘Nobody’; finally, after escaping Cyclops Island, he makes the fatal mistake of telling Polyphemus his true name. The poet reintroduces present-Odysseus succinctly as πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς (9.1), using his familiar epithet, “Odysseus of many schemes”. Odysseus then introduces himself to Alcinous as Ὀδυσεὺς Λαερτιάδης, ὅς πᾶσι δόλοισιν ἀνθρώποισι μέλω (9.19-20), revealing his true identity to the Phaeacians for the first time. It is significant that both examples emphasise his cunning: Odysseus uses the more grandiose construction of ὅς…μέλω to intimate that he is known to all (πᾶσι) for his trickery (δόλοισιν), and indeed that his κλέος οὐρανὸν ἵκει (9.20). This is in stark contrast to past-Odysseus, who describes himself not as πολύμητις but πτολιπόρθιος, “sacker of cities” (9.504). Indeed, past-Odysseus has recently sacked both Troy and the city of the Cicones, yet he is also the cunning trickster who masterminds the plan to escape Polyphemus’ cave. In fact, both past and present-Odysseus are both πολύμητις and πτολιπόρθιος, but while present-Odysseus embraces the former, past-Odysseus emphasises the latter. Friedrich argues that this has everything to do with Odysseus’ “self-abnegation” in later calling himself Οὖτις (9.366). According to Webber, ὄνομα, as in English, has the extended sense of ‘reputation’ ; thus when Odysseus tells Polyphemus Οὖτις ἐμοί γ’ ὄνομα (9.366), he erases his heroic reputation — the heroic deeds to his name — for the sake of outwitting him. This is “the ultimate outrage” for the warrior-hero, and Odysseus’ folly in taunting Polyphemus with his real name can thus be understood as a balm to his violated kleos. Indeed, it seems that Odysseus simply cannot resist revealing his name; his companions desperately try to “soothe” him (9.493) but Odysseus’ μεγαλήτορα (“heroic”) θυμόν will not be persuaded (9.500). Past-Odysseus’ use of the epithet πτολιπόρθιος, in addition to urging Polyphemus to tell others (φάσθαι, 9.504) of his victory, emphasise 10

his achievements as a warrior in response to the perceived loss of his reputation. Yet as it is this act that enables Polyphemus to invoke Poseidon’s wrath, thus endangering Odysseus’ nostos. The inclusion of the companions exhorting Odysseus not to provoke the Cyclops further seems to invite the reader to question the wisdom of Odysseus’ actions. Though the companions are fear Polyphemus throwing another boulder, not divine retribution, the poet (and perhaps present-Odysseus, looking back again in hindsight) foreshadows the ramifications to come. Indeed, Polyphemus does throw (βαλών, 9.499) a metaphorical βέλος after them in the form of the curse, which causes the destruction that the companions predict. The strength of his throw (τόσσον…ἵησιν, 9.499) perhaps reflects Polyphemus’ power to invoke the divine heft of Poseidon. In the folk-tales to which the Cyclopeia owes its origins, the ogre usually throws a cursed ring after the hero that “betrays the hero’s whereabouts and almost causes his death” . The curse, then, can be seen as “an epic version of the ring” , which doubles as the missile the companions fear Polyphemus will throw. In any case, Brown points out that Polyphemus repeats Odysseus’ words almost verbatim, Ὀδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον οἴκαδ’ ἱκέσθαι υἱὸν Λαέρτεω (9.530-1), “to make sure that his imprecation is viable and accurately aimed” : Odysseus gives Polyphemus the key to his destruction. Podlecki, on the other hand, links Odysseus’ identification with xenia, interpreting the second boulder thrown by Polyphemus as the ξείνια that Odysseus initially sought, ironically given in exchange for his guest’s true name . While namegiving is a key feature of Homeric xenia, cementing guest-friendships by allowing the host to claim

reciprocation , the significance of Odysseus’ selfdisclosure more likely lies in the curse that becomes “the key to the action of the whole poem” . The curse serves a narrative purpose by prolonging Odysseus’ nostos and, in a way, justifying his wanderings, but also testifies to the hero’s fallibility: he brought his κήδεα…στονόεντα (9.12) on himself. Odysseus’ failures in Book IX can perhaps be explained by the “postwar transition” that he undergoes after the Trojan War. The Odysseus who encounters Polyphemus is still in the Iliadic mindset that prioritises kleos over survival; in this new reality, however, he must place survival before glory, with nostos, rather than kleos, taking precedence. Rinon argues that Odysseus’ renunciation of “a code of heroic behaviour that had been a standard of excellence… cannot be realised without catastrophic effect” , and indeed it is Odysseus’ apparent identity crisis that provokes him, catastrophically, to reveal his heroic name and allow Polyphemus to curse him. While this might augment his kleos as a warrior, as a veteran and survivor, the greatest threat to Odysseus’ nostos — his new purpose — is himself. Present-Odysseus, however, has successfully undergone this “essential” development, taking pride in the cunning to which he owes his survival; he even invokes the language of κλέος (9.20) in conjunction with the δόλοι that he once felt diminished his heroism. Past-Odysseus’ attitude towards xenia is also influenced by his Iliadic mindset: the aristocratic Homeric warrior invests in securing a “network of ξεῖνοι”, perhaps explaining Odysseus’ eagerness to meet the Cyclops . The pastOdysseus of Book IX is an Iliadic hero in the Odyssey, which proves his fatal flaw. Yet in the intervening years, present-Odysseus has adapted to his postIliad reality, renounced the martial versions of xenia and kleos that have “suddenly become invalid” and become an Odyssean veteran, who finds glory not in battle but survival.

nostalgia at the Phaeacian banquet suggests his commitment to the nostos he formerly relinquished. Instigating Poseidon’s wrath not only serves the narrative of the Odyssey, but acts as a trigger for Odysseus’ postwar character development.

Works Cited Primary Sources Homer. Odyssey I-XII. Edited by W. B. Stanford. London: Duckworth, 1996. Secondary Sources Brown, Calvin S. “Odysseus and Polyphemus: The Name and the Curse.” Comparative Literature 18 (1966): 193-202. Brown, Christopher G. “In the Cyclops’ Cave: Revenge and Justice in ‘Odyssey’ 9.” Mnemosyne 49 (1996): 1-29. Fenik, B. Studies in the Odyssey. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1974. Friedrich, Rainer. “The Hybris of Odysseus.” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 111 (1991): 16-28. Newton, Rick M. “Poor Polyphemus: Emotional Ambivalence in ‘Odyssey’ 9 and 17.” The Classical World 76 (1983): 137-142. Podlecki, A. J. “Guest-Gifts and Nobodies in ‘Odyssey 9’.” Phoenix 15 (1961): 125-333. Stanford, W. B. The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero. Oxford: Blackwell, 1963. Rinon, Yoav. “The Pivotal Scene: Narration, Colonial Focalization, and Transition in ‘Odyssey’ 9.” The American Journal of Philology 128 (2007): 301-334. Webber, Alice. “The Hero Tells His Name: Formula and Variation in the Phaeacian Episode of the Odyssey.” Transactions of the American Philological Association 119 (1989): 1-13.

While Odyssey IX is, superficially, a tale of adventure and wit overcoming might, it also functions as a critique of its hero. Odysseus makes two fatal errors in the Cyclopeia: he selfishly attempts to engage Polyphemus in the xenia-ritual, then, having escaped the Cyclops’ clutches, jeopardises indefinitely his nostos by allowing Polyphemus to curse him in the name of kleos. The poet, through present-Odysseus’ narration, does not present Odysseus in a flattering light; but present-Odysseus provides living proof of his past self ’s character development, from reckless, arrogant Iliadic warrior to dignified veteran, whose 11

BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS Subject Editor: Agata Siuchninska

Discuss the term ‘leverage’, what it means to an investor and

the role that leverage played in the financial crisis. Do you think that there should be limits imposed on financial institutions to restrict leverage? written by adam zdrzalka

In this short essay I am going to define leverage and explain how investors use leverage. Then I will look at leverage in the financial crisis with focus on excessive consumer borrowing, derivatives and the shadow banking sector. I explain why those involved used so much leverage before I briefly touch on neuroeconomics and its part in the financial crisis. I will finish by saying that there should be more limits imposed on financial institutions to restrict leverage, giving my reasons.

where the loan-to-value ratio was near 100% because they believed that house prices would continue to rise. This is one example of excessive leverage, since the homeowner was taking out loans that were large relative to what he himself owned. If the value of the house were to fall – which it eventually would – the borrower would find himself exposed through leverage, and facing a loss position. This is why so many subprime borrowers defaulted on their mortgages.

Leverage is the use of financial instruments or capital to increase the potential return on an investment. If an investor finds an opportunity to make a profit, he or she wants to take as much profit from that investment as possible. The investor will borrow funds from a lender and invest those as well. The investor then pays back the lender with interest, and keeps the difference between the interest and the gain from the investment. In the financial sector sometimes this difference is very, very small; it could be around 2% or less. An investor will need to invest huge amounts of capital to make a lot of money from a 2% gain. And so he invests huge amounts of money that he has borrowed – and we say he is highly leveraged. One issue with being highly leveraged is if the investment goes badly then the investor must pay back everyone that he has borrowed from, with interest. The more he borrowed relative to his own holdings, the more leveraged he is and the more he loses when things go badly. Leverage multiplies gains on a good investment, and multiplies losses on a bad investment.

Within the financial sector itself banks were using various financial instruments to make a profit. One of these was Collateralized Debt Obligations, or ‘CDOs’, where a mortgage pool would be broken down into tranches with different ratings and these tranches were sold to investors. Banks would sell most of a CDO but keep the AAA tranches on their books (for the returns) and keep some of the equity tranches on their books (because they couldn’t sell them). Those who held CDOs could take out Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on the CDO, which was a form of insurance in case of default. This incurred a small cost. Similarly there was a small cost of funding the CDO in the short-term markets (where funding was cheapest). I outline the cash flow below:

Leverage played a large role in the financial crisis. It began with excessive consumer borrowing. People began to use credit cards to purchase items they could not realistically afford. Likewise, the banks were allowing people to take out mortgages on a house

Net Profit on a bond = Coupon Received (e.g. 7%) - Cost of Funding - Insurance Premium (CDS)


Once the cost of funding and insurance premium was subtracted, there might be a very small ‘positive carry’ on the investment (think: basis points, or a fraction of a %). Earlier we noted that when profit margins are very small, investors will borrow a large amount of capital in order to maximise the return on their investment. This is exactly what the investment banks did; they invested billions of dollars into the carry trade in order to maximise the returns on a

CDO coupon. They were very highly leveraged. At the same time, they had to put aside little capital against their CDO leverage because they often dealt in AAA bonds – the safest type of bond, with the lowest probability of default. As a result of the high rating, banks could borrow even more to invest since investors had faith in where their money was going. Now remember that with more leverage comes more risk. Why did sophisticated investors, with complex models to calculate risk, and managers to limit risk, let themselves become so highly leveraged?

When the financial crisis occurred the shadow banks were so highly leveraged that individual shadow banks lost billions. Remember; leverage multiplies gains on a good investment, but multiplies losses when things go wrong. Shadow banks were often set up by investment banks, and many of these investment banks had to bring the shadow banks back onto their books or risk a terrible financial reputation. Since the shadow banks were de facto a part of their parent banks through this link, the parent banks themselves were exposed to much greater leverage than normally permitted. That said, some parent banks allowed the shadow banks to fail.

They thought that the trades were riskless. Since they often held the safest AAA bonds, and then took out CDS protection on those bonds they believed that they had eliminated risk. What’s more if we think back to the beginning of the chain the homeowners, thinking that their home would rise in value, believed that they were exposed to less risk. And if we think of the other end of the chain the end investors, putting their money into bonds with a AAA rating, believed that they were exposed to less risk. In summary everyone along the line thought that they were exposed to less risk than they actually were, therefore they were prepared to use more leverage, and they were more exposed when the crisis happened.

When banks adopt a too-big-to-fail mentality and invest trillions in poor bonds with a high degree of leverage, ultimately they are unable to save themselves when things go wrong. This leads to governments bailing out the banks using taxpayers’ money. I believe there should be strict limits imposed on financial institutions to restrict leverage, with banks made to hold more equity, more bank capital and no more too-big-to-fail thinking. Whilst this will reduce banks’ profits it is better for banks to grow slowly under safe conditions rather than grow rapidly and eventually crash. Furthermore, I believe that banks should become more personal with their clients. Banks and their customers no longer meet face-toface and the public has lost all faith in the banks it was forced to rescue. It will take a lot of effort form the banks to rebuild this relationship.

Much of these investments can be explained through ‘neuroeconomic’ thinking. Financial gain causes a release of dopamine, whilst risk elicits a feeling of fear. Investors, seeing the rewards offered by CDOs and believing that the risk was removed, were rewarded with dopamine each time they carried out a CDO trade without feeling the fear associated with risk. The bigger the trade, the bigger the rush. In their brains this was a one-way street of feeling good which led to more trades, of a greater volume, thereby increasing their leverage.

In conclusion leverage played a huge part in the financial crisis from homeowners to derivatives to the shadow banking sector. When the crash eventually came, the degree of leverage involved meant that businesses could not handle the losses, and today the global economy is still trying to recover fully as a result. Neuroeconomics was crucial to the crisis as investors felt that they had eliminated risk from the equation through the use of financial instruments. Let’s hope that governments continue to make changes so that we never again see the same levels of exposure in the banking system in the future, and that banks can rebuild their relationship with the general public. Thanks for reading.

I’ve mentioned excessive consumer borrowing and derivatives. One other sector that used huge leverage was the shadow banking sector. This sector was unregulated, had to hold little or no bank capital, and had no limits on the leverage it could use. Normal investment banks worked in billions of dollars, whilst the shadow banking system was dealing in trillions. In 2007 the shadow sector totalled US$10 trillion, hedge funds made up US$1.8 trillion whilst Conduits and SIVs made up US$2.2 trillion. Their leverage ratios far exceeded any seen in other parts of the financial system since they invested using borrowed funds, whilst holding minimal amounts of their own equity. 13

ENGLISH AND FILM Subject Editor: Matthew Newman

Jazz: The Problematic Muse of American Modernist Poetry written by elena meyer-bothling In the study of American modernist literature, the “hierarchical, canonising impulses” (Nelson 55) of literary criticism dictate that we imbibe a constructed, institutionalised version of history, which deems only a few worthy to be studied, and propagates the pervasive exclusion of non-white and female voices in the modernist canon. The elitist nature of the canon is perhaps best exemplified by The Little Review, a modernist literary magazine, which bore the slogan “[m]aking no compromise with the public taste” (Medd 134). Ezra Pound denounced all “commercially-minded literary magazines, which pander to public taste rather than form it and are derivative, belatedly following original trends established elsewhere” (Gasiorek 716). Yet, poets of the canon themselves followed “original trends established elsewhere” in their use of AfricanAmerican jazz in their works. The syntactical and formal experimentation modernists owed much to the swinging syncopation of Harlem Stride Piano and the scat-singing of Louis Armstrong, for example. Whether by unconscious assimilation or conscious appropriation, jazz’s influence is problematic, as white poets were profiting from a black art form many rejected because of its association with blackness. To Langston Hughes, jazz was “one of the inherent expressions of Negro life in America: the eternal tom-tom beating in the Negro soul - the tom-tom of revolt against weariness in a white world” (Hughes 694), and yet white bandleader Paul Whiteman was considered the “King of Jazz” in the 1920s (Anderson 165) and benefited from reproducing black creativity, just as modernist poets did; in the words of T.S. Eliot, “immature poets borrow, mature poets steal” (Yaffe 101). The influence of jazz aided modernist poets in their formal experimentation, yet this has been suppressed in our knowledge of twentieth-century history; “the lives and experiences of disenfranchised populations, insofar as they intersect with poetry, are rejected as inferior or irrelevant to the best of cultural history” (Nelson 68). 14

While jazz does influence the form of T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, Eliot himself was staunch in his efforts to preserve the purity of high art from the pollution of mass culture, and as “Eliot’s Anglophilia…went together with a horror of…Africa” (Hutchinson 96-7), he was unlikely to consciously appropriate an African-American art form. However, he was exposed to jazz and ragtime “through his patronage of the English music halls in the 1920s and earlier” (Chinitz 244), therefore any influence was probably due to unconscious cultural assimilation: April is the cruellest month, breeding Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing Memory and desire, stirring Dull roots with spring rain Winter kept us warm, covering Earth in forgetful snow, feeding A little life with dried tubers. (1-7) “April” and “[l]ilacs” are trochaic, lending the first two lines more of a trochaic metre than iambic, though iambic metre, thought to mimic human speech, is much more commonplace in poetry. While this unusual metrical choice reflects Eliot’s inversion of the typically romanticised view of April and its association with spring and renewal, it is also redolent of standard jazz measures, in which the first and third beats of a four-beat bar are, like the first syllable of the metrical foot in trochaic metre, emphasised. This was a key feature of the Harlem Stride piano style, popularised by James P. Johnson in the 1920s, where the first and third beats were further accentuated by bass notes. The caesurae followed by present participles (1-3, 5-6) give these lines an unfinished quality, and the subsequent enjambment drives the lines onwards. In lines one and two, the participles are trochaic, with the previous word a stressed syllable in the metre. The abrupt change in rhythm caused by the double stress is reminiscent of a jazz cross-rhythm, a “rhythm in which the 15

Little cullud boys with beards re-bop be-bop mop and stop. Little cullud boys with fears, frantic, kick their draftee years into flatted fifths and flatter beers (1-5)

At first exactly and first exactly do they do. (27-34)

regular pattern of accents of the prevailing meter is contradicted by a conflicting pattern” (Randel 216). The metre and number of metrical feet change after the first two lines, portraying the disorientating effect of unfinished thoughts, as well as reflecting rubato (freedom of tempo) in jazz, for example in Mamie Smith’s “Crazy Blues”, recorded in 1920. Lines 117-26 of The Waste Land also appear to have been influenced by jazz: “What is that noise?” The wind under the door. “What is that noise now? What is the wind doing?” Nothing again nothing. “Do You know nothing? Do you see nothing? Do you remember Nothing?” I remember Those are pearls that were his eyes. “Are you alive, or not? Is there nothing in your head?”

and jazz, in her works. She collaborated with Virgil Thomson on the opera Four Saints in Three Acts, with the original cast comprised of African-Americans singers and dancers. However, her portrayal of African-American culture in “Melanctha” in Three Lives is problematic. She portrays African-American culture and dialect not as it was, but how she wanted it to be; ““Melanctha”…begs the question: what is so “black” about the story, other than the narrator’s insistence that the characters are black people…?” (Wallace 114). Moreover, she falls into the trap of the “good Negro” – Melanctha, the eponymous mulatta protagonist of the story, is described by her friend Rose as “never…no just common kind of nigger” (Stein 238). Melanctha functions as a blackface mask of Stein, allowing her to fantasise black femininity while shielding herself from identification with it. Indeed, reverberations of nineteenth-century blackface minstrelsy echoed through white perception of jazz, with many critics and historians “downplay[ing] or ignor[ing] [Louis Armstrong’s] influential singing: they regret or deplore its physical side (grinning, mugging, body English) as an embarrassment. Armstrong’s singing… was an anachronistic extension of nineteenth-century minstrelsy’s “darky entertainer”” (Appel 30). Stein was clearly exposed to African-American culture, and jazz’s influence can be seen in her formal experimentation in “If I Told Him: A Completed Portrait of Picasso”:

The paranoid conversation we are privy to is evocative of the call-and-response tradition in the African spirituals that prefigure jazz, and are heard via “conversations” between instruments in 1920s African-American jazz. It must be said that the purpose of this reading is not to purport that hearing jazz was Eliot’s inspiration for formal experimentation – his constant fluctuation of form and metre recreate the sense of disorientation and discomfort that many felt at the inexorable acceleration towards modernity in the 1920s– only that jazz rhythms may have unconsciously influenced the way in which he experimented. Indeed, this passage reveals anxieties of the 1920s; the insistence of “nothing again nothing” and repetition of “nothing” suggests that it is the nothingness, or shallowness, of modern life that is causing the speaker’s anxiety, and the increasingly fragmented structure of the poem visually depicts his collapsing mind. Eliot fears, therefore, that, as a society, we are so spiritually numb we even question whether we are “alive, or not”. Eliot’s motivation for formal experimentation, then, may have been the development of a soulless mass culture, but the product of his experimentation is still permeated with features of jazz. Unlike Eliot, who appropriated jazz without addressing African-American issues, or even being conscious of his appropriation, Gertrude Stein consciously referenced African-American culture, 16

Exactly do they do. First exactly. Exactly do they do too. And first exactly. Exactly do they do. And first exactly and exactly. And do they do.

Compared to the longer lines earlier in the poem (“[e]xact resemblance to exact resemblance the exact resemblance as exact as a resemblance, exactly as resembling, exactly resembling, exactly” [16]) and after this passage (“He he he he and he and he and and he and he and he and and as and as he and as he and he. He is and as he is, and as he is and he is, his” [43]), the short lines give the impression of improvised solos breaking away from a harmonic rhythm. Moreover, in Stein’s recording of the poem, she makes “exactly” amphibrachic, and the hard stress on “act” and “first”, along with the quick syncopated uttering of “do they do” sounding like “doobie doo”, makes her recital sound altogether like Louis Armstrong’s scat singing. The lack of punctuation in her longer lines lends the sound and rhythm of her words a sense of freedom, or rubato, and like Whitman’s long lines, make us conscious us aware of the percussive quality of our mouths when we speak. Upon hearing Stein’s recording, Eliot commented:

The title itself is a musical reference, a “flatted fifth” or tritone is known as “The Devil’s Interval” because of its tense, dissonant sound; it usually appears at the end of phrase, and necessitates a musical resolution. Moreover, Dizzy Gillespie, an African-American jazz trumpeter, was one of the first to consistently use tritone substitutions in his playing, and Hughes would have almost certainly heard his playing. Gillespie was also a pioneer of the “be-bop” jazz referenced in line two; the repetition of plosive “b” and “p” sounds in lines one and two mimic bebop’s frenetic tempo and its prominent percussion section, as per the shattering drumbeats of Max Roach. The alliteration of “flatted fifths and flatter” in line five, and repetition of “f ”s throughout the second stanza are also reminiscent of ride cymbals in a drum kit, muffled by jazz brushes. Like the musical tension of a tritone, Hughes calls for a resolution – something must be done about the forced binary of poverty or fame for black youth. Yet, although jazz was a way to escape dire straits, many viewed it as licentious and of a “low” culture. An article in a 1921 volume of Ladies Home Journal, “Does Jazz Put the Sin in Syncopation?”, deemed jazz “a low streak in man’s tastes that has not yet come out in civilization’s wash” and an “expression of protest against law and order” (qtd. in Rasula 158). Vachel Lindsay – who, admittedly, had an affinity for black rhythms in his poetry – was hounded by the epithet of “jazz poet”, which he despised, seeing it as the title of an entertainer, not a poet. He catapulted Hughes to fame after reciting one of his poems at a dinner, and as Rasula comments, “[i]f anyone deserved the epithet “jazz poet” it was Hughes, but this episode makes it clear how the jazz label [adhered] to whites, in literature as in music, for in the culture at large black people were rarely accorded the respect of being discussed as individuals” (Rasula 172). Yet, Lindsay was content to use black rhythms to bring him fame, while denigrating both Africans and jazz in his racist poems “The Congo” and “The Curse of the Saxophone”. The appropriation of jazz in modernist poetry is both problematic (whether consciously done, like Stein, or unconsciously, like Eliot) and crucial to its development, particularly in regards to formal experimentation. Indeed, James Welden Johnson

…its rhythms have a peculiar hypnotic power not met with before. It has a kinship with the saxophone. If this is the future, then the future is…of the barbarians… this is the future in which we ought not to be interested. (qtd. in Watson 20) This again reflects Eliot’s abhorrence of popular culture, as well as revealing his strained relationship with African-American culture – Stein’s saxophone was one he was too prejudiced to admit to playing himself. Whether Stein chose to appropriate African-American jazz to reflect Picasso’s fixation on primitive African culture, or simply because it injects her poem and its form with vitality, its use is problematic, “the tom-tom of revolt against weariness in a white world” (Hughes 694) enhancing her own white world. Langston Hughes’ use of jazz in his works is not appropriative, unlike Eliot and Stein. An AfricanAmerican writer, Hughes uses black cultural influences in his poems to draw attention to AfricanAmerican issues, for example the prevalence of black poverty in “Advertisement for the Waldorf-Astoria”. In “Flatted Fifths”, Hughes uses jazz and AfricanAmerican dialect to portray his worries about young black jazz musicians, who transition from poverty and “flatter beers” (5) to fame and “sparkling Oriental wines” (7). 17

said that “there is nothing of artistic value belonging to America which has not been originated by the Negro . . . everything else is borrowed from the old world” (262), and North argues that “linguistic mimicry and racial masquerade were not just shallow fads but strategies without which modernism could not have arisen” (vii). Black music “came into direct conflict with [Western] values in a public arena on a mass scale” (Sidran 94), and to combat white mass culture, modernist poets used “lower” AfricanAmerican culture to demonstrate their resistance to the norm and infuse their works with originality. Yet, not all white appropriation of jazz in literature is problematic – Frank O’Hara’s elegiac poem “The Day Lady Died”, in honour of Billie Holiday, and Michael Harper’s homage to John Coltrane in his poem “Brother John”, are both charming tributes. It is our responsibility to unravel the cultural constructions of what modernist poetry is, as well as the social politics surrounding it. Nelson instructs us to question why “the poetry sung by striking coal miners in the 1920s is so much less important than the appearance of The Waste Land” (68); our mission, then, is to further explore the poetry buried in mines and hidden in smoky speakeasies, and give credit where it is due.

Harlem Renaissance Thought. Duke UP, 2001. Baker Jr., Houston A. Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance. Chicago UP, 1987. Chinitz, David. “T. S. Eliot and the Cultural Divide.” PMLA, vol. 110, no. 2, 1995, pp. 236–247. stable/462913. Accessed 20 Nov. 2016. Eliot, Thomas Stearns. The Waste Land. Horace Liveright, 1922. Accessed 20 Nov. 2016. Faulkner, Anna Shaw. “Does Jazz Put the Sin in Syncopation?” Ladies Home Journal, August 1921. Hughes, Langston. “Advertisement for the WaldorfAstoria.” From Totems to Hip Hop: A Multicultural Anthology of Poetry Across the Americas 1900-2002, Avalon Travel, 2002, pp.223. ---. “Flatted Fifths.” Moment’s Notice: Jazz in Poetry and Prose, Coffee House Press, 1993, pp. 8. ---. “The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain.” Nation, 23 June 1926. Jerving, R. “Jazz Language and Ethnic Novelty.” Modernism/modernity, vol. 10 no. 2, 2003, pp. 239-268. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/mod.2003.0040. Accessed 20 Nov. 2016. Johnson, James Welden. Selected Writings, vol. I, Oxford UP, 1995. Medd, Jodie. Lesbian Scandal and the Culture of Modernism. Cambridge UP, 2012. Nelson, Cary. Repression and Recovery: Modern American Poetry and the Politics of Cultural Memory. Wisconsin UP, 1989. North, Michael. The Dialect of Modernism: Race,

Works Cited Anderson, Paul Allen. Deep River: Music and Memory in


INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Subject Editors: Ellie Collett & Alexander Wallis Smith

Is globalisation a positive or negative development? Critically discuss. written by tara klein Globalisation has been conceptualised as ‘the process of increasing interconnectedness’ between world actors and events (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2014: 9). By this definition, the impacts of national decisions are felt on an international scale; most crucially, the indiscriminate nature of growing environmental problems enables them to ‘transcend national boundaries’ (Vogler, 2014: 341). Positive developments of globalisation are indeed identifiable, particularly the liberalist case for ‘perpetual peace’ among democratic nations, economic prosperity and harmony of interests (Kant, 1991: 102-8); however, this essay will focus more critically on the detrimental effects globalisation continues to have on the environment. Exposing the impact of human activity on the global commons, a wealth of scientific research has increased the urgency with which environmental issues should be addressed at a transnational level. Despite calls for collaborative action in combatting climate change such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 2009 Copenhagen conference and 2015 Paris agreement, such attempts have proved largely unsuccessful. This essay will scrutinise the presently ineffective notion of liberal international cooperation that has sought to address environmental problems, shedding critical light on the expansion of global markets and worldwide trade. I will then employ an eco-Marxist lens to expose the causal links between world capitalism and environmental degradation, as well as the consequent inequalities between developed and developing nations. Globalisation continues to have a profoundly negative impact on the environment. The UN identifies biodiversity change, influenced by human activity, as ‘the largest threat to the future of humanity’ (Díaz et al, 2006), with the Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology outlining the phenomenon of widespread coral bleaching on the Great Barrier Reef (2016). As a direct response of unfavourable conditions such as elevated sea temperatures and

polluted waters, damage to wide swathes of coral is having destructive consequences on marine biodiversity in the area. The clearing of land for cattle ranching by the relentless deforestation of the Amazon rainforest continues as a result of international demand for beef, leather and other derived products. Equally, the mass, unsustainable overfishing of species like the salmon and tuna fish is perpetuated by ever-growing,worldwide consumption (Vogler, 2014: 342-7). These examples highlight the destructive nature of international activity that is irreversibly altering global biodiversity. Moreover, the constant movement of people and commodities across international borders continues to contribute to the pollution of the air and high seas. Ship discharges adding to the effects of land-based effluent and oil spills (BP; Shell) and cheap, accessible passenger planes emitting vast volumes of CO2 and N2O are both contributing factors to the widely acknowledged processes of global warming and subsequent climate change. In the midst of numerous complex environmental issues, these examples aptly highlight the negative effects of the globalised world, calling for urgent international efforts to address them.


Although these issues are wide in scope, the theoretical school of liberalism offers positive developments for addressing aforementioned environmental problems, primarily by establishing cooperative institutions that reflect shared international interests (Burchill, 2013: 65). For example, research conducted on a transnational scale, such as that executed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), increases the legitimacy of environmental problems at hand, such as the degradation of the Earth’s atmosphere. This provides strong, factual grounding for the development of cooperative strategy and empirical targets. Other scholars take a conflicting view, criticising global governance schemes for their ineffective frameworks in response to climate change

aforementioned environmental costs on the global commons, namely the oceans and the atmosphere. Through the movement of worldwide goods across the commons, there is less accountability for environmental damage. As they ‘do not fall under sovereign jurisdiction’ (Vogler, 2014: 347) – thus are not attached to a particular region or state – there is broader scope for mistreatment of the global commons without the risk of direct interstate conflict. Secondly, the exoticism of foreign animal products epitomised by the fur trade continues to pose a threat to endangered wildlife. Exported by parts of the US and Canada in the late 17th Century, the commercial trade of beaver hats failed to consider the wider implications of the loss of up to 15 million beavers for their fur, the repercussions of which contributed to ‘the destruction of an entire ecosystem’ (Foster, 1999: 42-3). In this light, the positive aspects of global trade and material gain must be challenged when considering the dire consequence these processes have had on entire species.

increases to 2°C denounced as insufficient in its aim to reduce the impacts of climate change (Crawford, 2015: 7). Furthermore, in highlighting former failed outcomes of both the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, the ability for nations to collaboratively achieve these unambitious Paris targets is brought into question. Vogler speculates that the underlying driving force of international meetings on environmental issues is to convince domestic publics that ‘something is being done’ (2014: 346). Although this view is overly simplistic and somewhat cynical, this assessment provides clear scope for a reframing of collective interest and priority, particularly a call for increased commitment from the US as a highly influential, global power.

(Held & Hervey, 2009). This is made evident by the failure of the Copenhagen Conference in 2009, largely affected by a lack of accountability, an absence of cooperation from the US as the global hegemon, and the notion that delegates ‘were not looking to save the planet’ but rather ‘looking out for the national interest of their native governments’ (Cooke, 2009); ‘powers vying to secure their own advantage in any future deal about climate change’ (GlobalPolicyJournal, 2010). Following the 1992 UN Rio Earth Summit, the issuing of Agenda 21 was ‘frequently derided’ on the basis of its ‘non-binding character’ (Vogler, 2014: 346). Comparably, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol offered more plausible change by setting binding targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Outside the EU, however, large countries were falling short of these goals; Canada choosing to withdraw from the Protocol altogether to avoid facing international censure (Klein, 2014: 69). Meanwhile, the US and China were ‘churn[ing] out more than enough extra greenhouse gas to erase all the reductions made by other countries during the Kyoto period’ (Henson, 2011), largely undermining the positive progress made by EU states. More recent multilateral agreements have also come under scrutiny: the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference has been criticised, the target of limiting global temperature

By assumption of the international liberal order, globalisation has defied national boundaries and increased the interconnectedness of worldwide financial markets (Dunne, 2014: 114-5). Although this may be perceived as a positive development in terms of rising socio-economic standards, this is undermined by the multifaceted impact that global trade continues to have on the environment. Firstly, despite the benefit of increased access to foreign commodities, globalisation and the growing ease of cross-national trade make a direct contribution to 20

political pawn in their establishment of world trade connections supports Klein’s apt conclusion: ‘the triumph of market logic… is paralyzing almost all serious efforts to respond to climate change’ (2014: 23). Regarding the development of poorer countries in line with global targets, the process of globalisation may offer positive mechanisms. Due to the strong economic standing of developed nations, as well as their access to resources, wealthier states are able to support developing regions through humanitarian intervention and foreign aid budgets. Funding of sustainable development programmes is facilitated by international frameworks such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), brought into fruition in 1991. Despite this prospect for positivity, Klein notes that interstate competition has ‘deadlocked UN climate negotiations for decades’ (2014: 23): wealthy countries refuse to compromise their position in the international system whilst poorer countries claim their ‘right to pollute’, once used by modern global powers like the US to aid their rise to economic prosperity. This notion is difficult to contest, particularly following the Western industrial revolution that mobilised the depletion of natural resources we continue to exploit today (Buck Cox, 1985: 49-61).However, Redclift and Sage assert that the environmentally vulnerable regions are least equipped to cope with the consequences of climate change. This reiterates the aforementioned notion that environmental problems are not confined to borders, referencing the ‘increased incidence in tropical regions of hurricanes, typhoons and drought’ (1999: 10). Furthermore, globalisation is

To continue, the process of globalisation has facilitated the spread of capitalism; the accumulation of wealth and material are central to the concept. The school of eco-Marxism combines eco-political theory and Marxist perspectives and can be employed to highlight the environmental contradiction of the global capitalist system (Mirovitskaya and Ascher, 2002: 83). Eco-Marxists argue that capitalism is ‘inherently incompatible’ with environmentalism; Schwartzman questions in Marxism and Ecology whether or not global capitalism can be sustainable (1996: 261). Naomi Klein argues that this ongoing pursuit for economic growth is used an ‘excuse for putting off climate change action’; presenting climate change as ‘a battle between capitalism and the planet… right now capitalism is winning’ (2014: 22). This notion of prioritising trade relations over environmental progress is particularly evident when examining the role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a form of global governance. National treatment, a contentious issue of the 1990s free trade wars, prevented Ontario from maintaining buy-local policies in line with Kyoto targets. The WTO sought to protect international trade deals by eliminating these provisions; Ontario was under pressure to accept the WTO’s actions as not to appear ‘antifree trade’, despite its clear success in addressing environmental commitments (ibid: 71). Moreover, Russia ‘unexpectedly’ passed the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 to assist their acceptance as a member of the WTO (Harvey, 2015). Russia’s use of the treaty as a 21

placing developing nations under mounting pressure to remain competitive exporters in the international realm. In order to increase the productivity of cassava1, Indonesian farmers have abandoned sustainable systems, employing monocropping to expand the area of cultivation (Glaeser, 1990: 10). This ‘removal of water conservation structures’ is proving detrimental to the security and livelihoods of Indonesian cassava farmers, reaffirming the intense pressures of international trading competition as a result of globalisation. David Held provides commentary on the wide scope of environmental degradation, stating that environmental problems such as those seen in Indonesia ‘bite deeply into the wellbeing, and future wellbeing, of populations across the world’ (GlobalPolicyJournal, 2010). It is this notion of the future that is so crucial to developing countries; current sustainability strategies enforced to increase security, protecting the livelihoods of farmers, are under threat from the strain of globalised, international trade.

commons and its impact on climate change, a loss of biodiversity by direct human activity and the widening of inequalities between exploited developing nations and the wealthy. Furthermore, the presently ineffective nature of multilateral agreements has rendered targets inadequate to create necessary progress in combatting such negative effects. In the light of a ‘near disaster’ at Copenhagen and the exposed ineffectiveness of collaborative deals like the Kyoto Protocol, there may be merit in adopting local and regional-scale efforts. However, addressing the World Trade Organisation’s stance on the Ontario buy-local policy, as well as the pressures of competitive international trade on Indonesian cassava farmers, it seems increasingly likely that trade will continue to override climate change as the international interest (Klein, 2014: 69-73). David Held holds that ‘the scale of environmental degradation... the absence of political will, and the complexity of some of the proposed solutions rarely promote optimism’ (GlobalPolicyJournal, 2010). Having critically explored the profoundly negative impacts that the process has had on both humanity and the natural world, it is with this same level of pessimism that we must view the development of globalisation.

In conclusion, liberalist prospects for globalised cooperation and interdependence have proved to be insufficient in addressing ongoing environmental problems, such as the degradation of the global


LAW Subject Editor: Kristianna Nicolaou

Resolving disputes without the use of litigation is becoming increasingly prevalent. This, together with our online reliance and social media usage means that potentially, online dispute resolution could increase the effectiveness of the justice system. written by laura tudor Introduction

costs and delay in our justice system. This essay will, therefore, examine the application of ADR and ODR as a collective medium in three legal areas: civil, family and restorative justice.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is the means of coming to an agreement outside of litigation, with or without the help of a third party1, and has been increasing in popularity since the Lord Woolf ’s Access to Justice report in 19962. The pliable nature of ADR has provided innovative opportunities, extending its application to a number of legal areas, as can be seen by government services such as HMRC utilising ADR as a means of resolving tax disputes3. The latest evolution of ADR is widely known as Online Dispute Resolution (ODR), a system Colin Rule describes as ‘dispute resolution and information technology combined into an important new tool’.4 However, ADR is not always celebrated, and this has lead to academic and practitioner scepticism and its effectiveness being perused. Consequently, there are periodic reviews of the justice system, arguing for reform and modernisation of the courts: the essential question focuses upon the use of ODR and its ability to remedy the inherent problems such as increasing 1 Citizens Advice, ’Using alternative dispute resolution (ADR)’ (2016) <https:// www.citizensadvice. settling-out-of-court/using- alternative-dispute-resolution-adr/> accessed 24 March 2016 2 Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and Wales (HMSO, 1996) < civil/final/index.htm> 3 HM Revenue & Customs, ‘Tax disputes: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)’ (, 8 December 2014) <> accessed 18 March 2016 4 C Rule, Online Dispute Resolution for Business (1st edn, John Wiley & Sons 2002) 3

Application in Civil Justice

The overriding objective is an obligation ‘to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost’5 using ‘active case management’ under the CPR 1.4(1)6 and has become a central principle of the civil justice system: it is an aspiration, but the present state of civil justice is often shown in the light of a shortfall in achieving the overriding objective. It is, therefore, appropriate to determine the effectiveness of ODR in this light, evidenced by a decrease in delay and costs to parties. Notably, most research and recommendations concern low value claims7. This may be due to the high volume but may also imply the scope of ADR is essentially restricted and inadequate for high value cases. Nonetheless, there are calls for an online court, and this is to go beyond the ‘mess for less’ adoption of technology the courts have already implemented to facilitate existing systems.8 The lesser importance of human interaction in civil cases makes ODR rather fitting, although Raines cautions that ‘some of the normal challenges faced by ADR practitioners are simply magnified’ when online.9 To illustrate, ‘online disputants often state that they are hesitant to reach


5 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 1.1 6 Ibid 1.4 7 R Susskind, Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims (Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group, Civil Justice Council, February 2015) 8 Ibid. 9 SS Raines, ‘Mediating in your pyjamas: The benefits and challenges for ODR practitioners’ [2006] 23(3) CRQ 359–369

an agreement because they have little faith that the other party will live up to the mediated

profound mistake to view a trial as a failure of the civil justice system’ and furthers this by adding that ‘it is not necessarily true that an unsatisfactory settlement is better than the best trial’16. There are obvious implications that arise when parties are forced to settle for settlement’s sake. A hot topic surrounding ADR and would logically extend to ODR is mandatory mediation. Compulsion may disincentivise pursuing a claim which has obvious implications on the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR, something judicially advocated by Dyson LJ in Halsey17. This could compromise the effectiveness of the justice system if it is a barrier to the courts doing their job. In addition, there is a severe risk that procedural and substantive justice would be undermined.18 This has been further propelled by the criticism that there is no appeal system in mediation, and in particular arbitration (where the arbitrator makes the final binding agreement).

agreement’.10 This is easily remedied by taking the view that ODR will supplement the courts and they will continue to be the final arbiter. In fact, the mediated agreements may be more effective if they are created personal to the parties, but it is easy to see why the threat of legal action would be a greater incentive upon failure to adhere. If creativity and lack of precedent avoid the use of a court, there are obvious cost and time savings which help to achieve the overriding objective. Moreover, some have argued that not everyone will have access to computers but since there are only ‘5% of people without access to the internet’11 this is a futile argument. A further matter is that some see ADR as a privatisation of justice, an idea that conflicts with the principle of open justice. Beyond settlement of disputes, the civil law provides a public function of ‘reinforcing values and practices’.12 Subsequent implications are seen when the preparation is being made, as Genn describes, for settlement and not adjudication which she and other commentators suggests increases access at the expense of justice13. It may, therefore, be implied that justice is becoming somewhat of a privilege, open exclusively to those who can afford it. In this light, civil justice is concealed by what Nader calls ‘harmony ideology’14.

These arguments, although fair, are perforated in the simple fact they are overlooking: that ODR would be a system to supplement and not replace the traditional courts. In this sense, the courts are the final source of redress and article 6 remains protected. Furthermore, the judiciary has since made it clear that they prefer to actively encourage19 parties to use ADR and not compel. It must be noted that mandatory ADR/ ODR may compromise the effectiveness of such mechanisms and the justice system as a whole where it fails due to increased costs in money and time to parties, which may have been avoided if the courts had been used in the first instance. This has a clear polar effect to the overriding objective the civil system wishes to pursue. It also does nothing to remedy the position of those who struggle to afford the courts themselves, let alone an accumulation of legal fees, again decreasing access to justice.20 This is, however,

The online court is designed to produce ‘one coherent system’ to ‘achieve a settlement at the earliest opportunity’15. Although proponents of an online court, and Sir Leveson, promote settlement as providing evident benefits in reducing costs and delays, others argue it undermines the courts. Genn advances Higginbotham’s view that ‘it is a 10 Ibid. 11 R Susskind, Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims (Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group, Civil Justice Council, February 2015) at 9.5 12 H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (The Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press 2010) 20 13 Ibid. 69 14 L Nader, ‘A Reply to Professor King’ [1994-1995] 10 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 101 15 R Susskind, Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims (Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group, Civil Justice Council, February 2015) at 6.8


16 H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (The Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press 2010) 74 17 Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576 18 H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (The Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press 2010) 19 Lord Justice Jackson, The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Furthering The Aims of the Civil Litigation Costs Review (Judiciary of England and Wales, Eleventh Lecture in the Implementation Programme RICS Expert Witness Conference, 8 March 2012); Faidi & Anor v Elliot Corporation [2012] EWCA Civ 287, per Lord Justice Jackson 20 Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review: Interim Report (Judiciary of England and

interdependent relationships’26. To illustrate the ineffectiveness of ADR, and potentially ODR, would be to see no decline in the number of disputes still seeking redress in the courts.

a minor risk when you consider ‘between 3 and 3.5% of all claims issued go to hearing or trial’21, leaving the rest to be settled out of court and using ADR. Evidently, this is a tangible issue that would need to be addressed should ODR become implemented and judicially promoted.

Family justice is a complex and sensitive area, made so by the array of emotions27 and this is where, prima facie, the use of technology is arguably limited. This is apparent in the intrinsic limitation of the scope of ADR and ODR in family due to its inability to encompass cases that feature abuse and vulnerable children, evident by the reluctance to extend MIAMS to include these circumstances.28 Thus, to extend ADR to these cases would perhaps have the opposite effect to that desired and communication between parties will be already be difficult. According to Sander, ‘simple modification of mediation models are problematic’ due to the unique characteristics of family law29. Such characteristics are that the interests of children, who may be a third party to the dispute, need to be protected.30 This is why ‘person orientated’31 methods such as mediation, that address emotional issues are ‘better suited.’32 If this

It is therefore submitted that ODR will increase the effectiveness of civil justice if it replaces the small claims courts entirely, but traditional courts must be retained for larger cases: it will need to be a system of integration. The streamlining of cases that fail to settle, owing to the complexity and technicality of the facts, prevents excessive delays, can reduce overall costs and thus enables the overriding objective to be achieved.22 A focus on settlement need not be negative so long as justice is not compromised.

Application in Family Justice

Although its conception is owed to reform of the civil justice system, ADR, and subsequently ODR, has started to gain popularity in the private family sphere. Under Family Procedure Rule 1.2 it is the duty of the court ‘give effect to the overriding objective’.23 This is identical to that addressed above in civil justice so, naturally, the effectiveness of family justice will be assessed in the same manner. However, attention must be paid to the difference in the aims of mediation in family law. According to the Family Justice Council, mediation ‘is not solely a solution seeking process’24 and of particular importance is ‘the restoration of functioning communication’ and ‘ongoing effective parenting’25. It is important to consider the effectiveness in light of these aims because ‘family disputes usually involve people (notably parents) who have continuing and Wales, December 2015) 21 Ministry of Justice, ‘Court Statistics Quarterly April to June 2013’ [2013] Ministry of Justice Statistics Bulletin < uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 245095/court-stats-april-june-2013.pdf> accessed 18 March 2016 22 R Susskind, Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims (Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group, Civil Justice Council, February 2015) 23 The Family Procedure Rules 2010 1.2 24 V. Leach, Family Mediation - The Context (Family Justice Council, 2005) 25 V. Leach, Family Mediation - The Context (Family Justice Council, 2005)


26 J Walker, The Development of Family Mediation. in Information Meetings and Associated Provisions within the Family Law Act 1996: Final Evaluation Report (Research Conducted by the Centre for Family Studies at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne 2001) 27 J Walker, The Development of Family Mediation. in Information Meetings and Associated Provisions within the Family Law Act 1996: Final Evaluation Report (Research Conducted by the Centre for Family Studies at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne 2001) 401 28 The Family Procedure Rules 2010 3.8(1) 29 FEA Sander, ‘Towards a functional analysis of family process’, in J Eekelaar and SN Katz (eds), The Resolution of Family Conflict: Comparative Legal Perspectus (Butterworths 1994) 30 J Walker, The Development of Family Mediation. in Information Meetings and Associated Provisions within the Family Law Act 1996: Final Evaluation Report (Research Conducted by the Centre for Family Studies at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne 2001) 31 L Fuller, ‘Mediation – its frame and functions’ [1997] 44 Southern California Law Review 301– 328 32 J Walker, The Development of Family Mediation. in Information Meetings and Associated Provisions within the Family Law Act 1996: Final Evaluation Report (Research Conducted by the Centre for

is true, then the ‘human factor’ needs to be present, something often lacking in the use of ODR. This has been highlighted by Raines who argues that the ‘cold, impersonal realm of cyberspace cannot adequately accommodate human emotions and meet the needs of disputants as fully as face to face ADR processes’33.

conducive and will only contribute to the stressful situation that a family breakdown is. Not only that, but the frequency of impasse in ODR would suggest that it is not suitable to achieve the family overriding objective. Moreover, assessing ‘whether the obstacles to settlement are primarily substantive, psychological, or procedural in nature’ is an effective function that a mediator can provide, both online and offline.40 This is absent in the courts as they are only focused on matters of law and, if this can reduce the time spent adjudicating the breakdown and draining various resources, then ODR may prove effective in reducing the backlog of the courts and a useful tool in assessing what is proportionate value in respect to the parties’ needs. In addition, parties have a ‘tendency to dwell on blame’41 which take up a lot of time before the mediator has to direct the parties onto “attacking the problem and not the person”42. This may mean that ODR in a family setting will not reap the time saving benefits that are seen in civil justice.

Raines found that e-mediation participants ‘express higher levels of anger… in the initial communications that follow the commencement of mediation’.34 This is obviously not conducive to the parties in a family setting and could lead to ‘escalatory behaviour’35. These angry and unproductive outbursts would otherwise not be allowed in the court due to the hindrance it causes to dealing with the case effectively. On the other hand, working through underlying emotional issues that would otherwise be neglected by the courts can be helpful so long as mediators can ‘recognise and validate the emotions of on-line disputants repeatedly’36. Unfortunately, ODR allows disputants to simply “walk out” of an online session more easily, and according to Raine, it is more common than a face-to-face meetings37. Again, this is something that is simply harder in the courts as parties respect the etiquette of proceedings and are arguably more cautious in upsetting the judge.

Regardless of any limitations to the use of ODR in family law, it may still be effective as a diagnostic tool. For example, platforms such as Rechtwijzer can provide a useful way of filtering cases that can be settled outside of the courts.43 These platforms can be free to users and, after answering the prerequisite questions, can explain what options an individual has. This has the potential to stop people using the courts as a first instance, using legal resources that are more appropriate elsewhere, and reduce delays within the courts. Furthermore, the withdrawal of legal aid, save where domestic violence can be proven, has meant that individuals are looking for similar quality, cheaper alternative legal providers.44 Diagnostic platforms may, therefore, be able to fulfil the ‘justice gap’.45

According to Eisen, ‘mediators generally believe miscommunication is at the root of many conflicts’. Since written communication is more vulnerable to misinterpretation than verbal communication, online mediation may cause as much miscommunication as it seeks to rectify.38 Miscommunication may also explain why there is a higher risk of impasse than face-to- face mediation39. The impasse is not Family Studies at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne 2001) 401 33 SS Raines, ‘Mediating in your pyjamas: The benefits and challenges for ODR practitioners’ [2006] 23(3) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 359–369 34 SS Raines, ‘Mediating in your pyjamas: The benefits and challenges for ODR practitioners’ [2006] 23(3) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 359–369 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 SS Raines, ‘Can Online Mediation Be Transformative? Tales from the Front.’ [2005] 22(4) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 438 39 M Morris, J Nadler, T Kurtzberg and L Thompson, ‘Schmooze or Lose’ [2002] 6 Group Dynamics 89–100


40 SS Raines, ‘Can Online Mediation Be Transformative? Tales from the Front.’ [2005] 22(4) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 442 41 SS Raines, ‘Can Online Mediation Be Transformative? Tales from the Front.’ [2005] 22(4) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 444 42 R Fisher and W Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Penguin Books 1981) 43 Rechtwijzer 2.0 <> accessed 30 March 2016 44 C Blacklaws, ‘ODR in family law’ (September 2014) < 2014/09/odr-in-family-law/> accessed 30 March 2016 45 H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (The Hamlyn Lec-

Application in Restorative Justice

think that ODR could overcome the problems with accessing jails53 or enabling restorative justice’s use in more serious offences by using shuttle e-mediation.

ADR has a reach far beyond the private law sphere and has been controversial when implemented in criminal justice46. Restorative justice is a voluntary process which allows victims of crime to meet with their offender, enabling communication and restoration to the personal effects of the offence47. Victim Offender Mediation (VOM) is the primary ADR method used in this setting but perhaps an extension of ODR can improve this area. Akin, but not identical to the above legal areas, is the overriding objective under Criminal Procedure Rule 1.148. For the same reasons given above, it is useful to assess the effectiveness in light of Ministry of Justice objectives as this will reflect the effectiveness exclusively to this area. Currently, the aims of the MOJ are to reduce recidivism49, the current rate is 26.2%50, and cost efficiency compared to prisons, “the cost to the taxpayer of reoffending is estimated to be £9.5 to £13 billion per year”.51

The political matter of ‘balancing’54 victims rights with those of defendants is a central but highly political55 issue in restorative justice. In the ‘conventional justice system, victims are peripheral’,56 but this directly conflicts with the operation of restorative justice where ‘victims are central’57. Therefore power imbalances are likely to be encountered, evident in Rossner reporting an offender ‘apologising for being ‘bad with his words’’58. For vulnerable victims, though, ODR may provide anonymity which ‘makes people feel safer expressing strong emotions than they do in the face-to- face environment’59. This could be helpful for allowing victims of violent or sexual offences convey their emotions beyond that of a victim impact statement, and this may help the courts recognise the interests of the victim in the case in line with CPR 1.2(d)60. Alternatively, this may be low impact because the raw emotion is simply not conveyed in the same manner as in person meetings, and online mediums have a tendency to ‘dehumanise’61 participants, problematic

As a primary matter, restorative justice and ODR may have its effectiveness limited to a specific class of cases. This is because most projects are focused on use in low level convictions, as is the case in the UK. That said, a project in Langley, British Columbia has been able to work with more serious offenders such as robbers, rapist and murderers, and, surprisingly, has yielded ‘highly significant results…for both victims and offenders’.52 Prima facie, it would be logical to tures) (Cambridge University Press 2010) 46 D Miers, ‘Situating and Researching Restorative Justice in Great Britain’ [2004] 6(1) Punishment & Society 24 47 RJC, ‘What is Restorative Justice?’ (2016) 48 The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 49 Ministry of Justice, Single Departmental Plan: 2015 to 2020 (Ministry of Justice Corporate Report, 19 February 2016) 50 MOJ, Proven Re-offending Statistics Quarterly Bulletin, England and Wales (Statistics, 28 January 2016) 51 MOJ, Featherstone, 2010 to 2015 Government Policy: Reoffending and Rehabilitation (MOJ Policy Paper, 26 March 2013) 52 M Liebmann and S Braithwaite, Restorative Justice in Custodial Settings (Report for the Restorative Justice Working Group in Northern Ireland 1999) <https:// files/resources/files/Research%20into%20Restorative %20Justice%20in%20Custodial%20Settings.pdf>


accessed 28 March 2016 Page 8 53 Ibid. 54 Liberty, ‘Liberty’s Response to the Home Office White Paper “Justice for All” (October 2002) < default/files/oct-2002-cj-white-paper.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016 55 Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General, ‘Justice for All’ (White Paper, July 2002) <https://www. jfawhitepaper.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016 56 D Miers, ’Situating and Researching Restorative Justice in Great Britain’ [2004] 6(1) Punishment & Society 26 57 Ibid. 58 M Rossner, Emotions and Interaction Ritual: A Micro Analysis of Restorative Justice [2011] 51 British Journal of Criminology Page 102 59 SS Raines, ‘Mediating in your pyjamas: The benefits and challenges for ODR practitioners’ [2006] 23(3) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 359–369 60 The Criminal Procedure Rules 1.2(d) 61 SS Raines, ‘Can Online Mediation Be Transformative? Tales from the Front.’ [2005] 22(4) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 437–452

where the ‘principal currency’62 is emotions. For those who believe that a victim’s role within the justice system should be minimal, it must be conceded that, despite the obvious benefits to a victim, this is not the focus of the justice system and an implementation of ODR in this sense would do little to increase the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. It will, therefore, be submitted that, if Rossner is correct in believing what makes restorative justice work is the interaction ritual, in particular, emotional intensity63, then the aforementioned crucial human factor is missing here too.

never been intended to replace the traditional courts, something Miers states as ‘inconceivable’69 and should continue to operate ‘on the margins of criminal justice’70. This has been something that has helped its success.71That said, mixed results have been seen: restorative justice ‘can significantly reduce offending in some cases, increase it in others and sometimes have no effect at all’72. In most studies, it has been shown that participants of restorative justice commit statistically significantly fewer offences73, thereby meeting MOJ objectives and increasing the effectiveness of the justice system. Alternatively, if restorative justice emphasises process rather than outcomes, Rossner argues it can be deemed more successful than simply focusing on participants or recidivism74. It must also be highlighted that researchers are nonetheless aware that the cost of reoffending is ‘a hard measure of potential benefit’75.

Reduction in reoffending may mean that an adoption of restorative justice may increase the effectiveness of sentencing in line with CPR 1.2(f)64. This rule ensures that ‘appropriate information is available to the court when bail and sentence are considered’. Rossner cites a case where the judge felt it more appropriate to spare a defendant jail after finding that a VOM was ‘very moving’ and acknowledged the offender was ‘genuinely contrite’.65 Although this leads to some commentators and victims concur that this is a ‘soft option’66. there are obvious benefits to the prison system where low level offenders are taking up valuably scarce prison resources.

(Presentation to the Commission on English Prisons Today, 7 November 2008) < howard_league/user/pdf/Commission/Paper_by_ Joanna_Shapland.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016 Page 1

Finally, an important consideration is how restorative justice and ODR should fit within the criminal justice system67 to increase its effectiveness. As Shapland reports ‘restorative justice is used parallel to criminal justice, not diversionary’68. Restorative justice has 62 M Poblet and P Casanovas, ‘Emotions in ODR’ [2007] 21(2) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 145-156 63 S Cammiss, ‘Just Emotions: Rituals of Restorative Justice by M Rossner’ [2014] 41(4) Journal of Law and Society 667 64 The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 1.2. (f) 65 M Rossner, Emotions and Interaction Ritual: A Micro Analysis of Restorative Justice [2011] 51 British Journal of Criminology 116 66 D Miers, ’Situating and Researching Restorative Justice in Great Britain’ [2004] 6(1) Punishment & Society 32 67 A Ashworth, ‘Responsibilities, rights and restorative justice’ [2002] 42(3) British Journal of Criminology 578–95; J Shapland, A Atkinson, E Colledge, J Dignan, M Howes, J Johnstone, R Pennant, G Robinson and A Scoresby, ‘Evaluating the fit: Restorative justice and criminal justice’ (British Criminology Conference July 2002) 68 J Shapland, ‘Restorative Justice and Prisons’


69 D Miers, ‘Situating and Researching Restorative Justice in Great Britain’ [2004] 6(1) Punishment & Society 37 70 D Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford University Press 2000) 104 71 M Liebmann and S Braithwaite, Restorative Justice in Custodial Settings (Report for the Restorative Justice Working Group in Northern Ireland 1999) <https:// files/resources/files/Research%20into%20Restorative %20Justice%20in%20Custodial%20Settings.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016 Page 2 72 M Rossner, Emotions and Interaction Ritual: A Micro Analysis of Restorative Justice [2011] 51 British Journal of Criminology 95 73 J Shapland, ‘Restorative Justice and Prisons’ (Presentation to the Commission on English Prisons Today, 7 November 2008) < howard_league/user/pdf/Commission/Paper_by_ Joanna_Shapland.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016 Page 2 74 M Rossner, Emotions and Interaction Ritual: A Micro Analysis of Restorative Justice [2011] 51 British Journal of Criminology 97 75 J Shapland, A Atkinson, H Atkinson, J Dignan, L

of a state funded service from the ‘Ministry of Justice/ Consumer Protection of six regional governments of Germany’83. It claims to have a ‘high settlement rate’ which ‘attests to the success of this technique for small claims’84. This may be a useful comparative example, from a leading civil law country, and its proven success should pave the way to the UK government investing more into similar domestic services. This is also the case in restorative justice where projects are largely provided by community groups and rarely by custodial institutions themselves.85 Belgium provides an example as to how it can be successfully carried out under national policy.86

Furthermore, it is important to remember that the current absence of ODR within this area means any of the above arguments lack credibility when extended to ODR, so are nothing more than hypotheses. Perhaps, if another country pioneers a move towards ODR in criminal justice, the UK may consider this too, as is happening in civil law.

Potential Barriers

Finally, there remain three overarching issues that must be addressed before ODR can be introduced as an effective way of increasing the efficiency of the justice system. Firstly, there remains an issue of funding for such projects. A common preconception is that the courts are reluctant to adopt technology: a reluctance owed to ‘deeply embedded court culture’76. Lord Dyson is keen to dismiss judicial scepticism as a hindrance to implementing an online court. Instead, he argues it ‘…is not because there is reluctance on the part of the judges to come into the 21st century…’77, as is often the assumption made, but rather ‘…because there has not been the funding necessary to make the requisite IT investment.’78 Indeed SquareTrade79, used by eBay80, and Canadian company Smartsettle81 have been privately funded pursuits. However, Online Schlichter82 is an example

Secondly, Ponte is correct in advancing that ‘professional standards ensure the quality of ODR services’87. It is, therefore, important to establish a universal professional standard. This is lacking in the UK, raising some concern, but is possible to see elsewhere, especially through the AAA in America88. In a bid to do the same the EU has published a code

Edwards, J Hibbert, M Howes, J Johnstone, G Robinson and A Sorsby, Does Restorative Justice Affect Reconviction? (The Fourth Report from the Evaluation of Three Schemes, Ministry of Justice Research Series 10/08 June 2008) Page 69 76 Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review: Interim Report’ (Judiciary of England and Wales, December 2015) Page 52 77 Lord Dyson Master of the Rolls, Delay Too Often Defeats Justice (The Law Society, Magna Carta Event 22 April 2015) P13 78 Lord Dyson Master of the Rolls, Delay Too Often Defeats Justice (The Law Society, Magna Carta Event 22 April 2015) P13 79 SquareTrade, ‘Leadership’ (Square Trade, 2016) < > accessed 28 March 2016 80 EBay, ‘Dispute Resolution Overview’ (eBay, 2016) < disputeres.html> accessed 28 March 2016 81 anj Thiessen, ‘Smartsettle’s Vision’ (November 2004) <> accessed 28 March 2016 82 Online Schlichter < schlichtungsportal-fuer-elektronischen-geschaeftsverkehr>


accessed 28 March 2016 83 R Susskind, Online Dispute Resolution For Low Value Civil Claims (Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group, Civil Justice Council, February 2015) at 4.9 84 ibid. 85 M Liebmann and S Braithwaite, Restorative Justice in Custodial Settings (Report for the Restorative Justice Working Group in Northern Ireland 1999) <https:// files/resources/files/Research%20into%20Restorative %20Justice%20in%20Custodial%20Settings.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016 86 M Liebmann and S Braithwaite, Restorative Justice in Custodial Settings (Report for the Restorative Justice Working Group in Northern Ireland 1999) <https:// files/resources/files/Research%20into%20Restorative %20Justice%20in%20Custodial%20Settings.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016 page 24 87 LM Ponte, ‘Throwing Bad Money After Bad: Can Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Really Deliver the Goods for the Unhappy Internet Shopper?’ [2001] 3 Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property 91 88 American Arbitration Association and International Centre for Dispute Resolution, ‘Standards of Conduct for Parties and Representatives’ <http://> accessed 30 March 201

of conduct for mediators89. However, the density of codes of conduct should be balanced against the desire to have mediators remain distinct from lawyer otherwise the original intention to have an alternative system is defeated.

In an era where some, small businesses included, cannot afford legal costs and access to justice is becoming a privilege, ODR offers a remedy. It is hard to deny that technology can, and should, be utilised in some areas of our justice system to achieve the overriding objective and relieve some of the pressures faced by our courts. Nevertheless, ‘technology must be the servant of justice, not its master.’95

Lastly, there is an imminent need for a greater public understanding of ODR. This is one of the ‘central aims’ of Susskind’s Report90 and the Department of Justice in Canada has also adopted pamphlets to promote ADR91. It cannot be expected that ODR will increase the effectiveness of the justice systems if, as Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz suggest, ‘parties do not know about’92 and may ‘not see or believe in its advantages’93. Thus, this is arguably ‘the biggest difficulty in the field of ODR’94.

Bibliography Legislation:

Children and Families Act 2014 Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 Secondary Legislation: Practice Direction 3A – Family Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings (MIAMs) Para 17 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 The Family Procedure Rules 2010


As submitted by Sir Leveson, the specific aim of the justice system is not a settlement but in fact the pursuance of justice in accordance with the overriding objective. Implementing ADR/ ODR does not change that. In fact, ADR/ ODR can effectively supplement the traditional courts despite some inherent limitations and limited applicability in legal areas, such as restorative justice. The most prominent area that could benefit from ODR is the civil justice system, as has been explored above. It is surprising that in 2016, notwithstanding copious reviews and submissions for an online court system, the courts have yet to be modernised but this is largely owed to the lack of funding. Nonetheless, the future looks promising since there has been a heightened interest in pursuing ODR. 89 European Code of Conduct for Mediators; (EC) 98/257 Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes [1998] OJ L115/31 90 R Susskind, Online Dispute Resolution For Low Value Civil Claims (Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group, Civil Justice Council, February 2015) at 1.8 91 Canada Department of Justice, ‘Resolving Disputes - Think About Your Options’ (Government of Canada, 1998) < csj-sjc/dprs-sprd/dr-rd/index.html> 92 G Kaufmann-Kohler and T Schultz, Online Dispute Resolution: Challenges for Contemporary Justice (Kluwer Law International 2004) 132 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid.

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95 Lord Dyson Master of the Rolls, Delay Too Often Defeats Justice (The Law Society, Magna Carta Event 22 April 2015) P15

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H Genn, Judging Civil Justice (The Hamlyn Lectures) (Cambridge University Press 2010) J Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge University Press 1989) P Ekman, Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriage (Norton 2001) R Fisher and W Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Penguin Books 1981) Other Sources: American Arbitration Association, ’Arbitrators & Mediators’ (2016) < arbitratorsmediators? _afrLoop=1543693983484667&_afrWindowMode=0&_ afrWindowId=ci2ez5z61_52# %40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dci2ez5z61_52%26_afrLoop % 3 D 1 5 4 3 6 9 3 9 8 3 4 8 4 6 6 7 % 2 6 _ afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrlstate%3Dci2ez5z61_92> accessed 30 March 2016 American Arbitration Association and International Centre for Dispute Resolution, ‘Standards of Conduct for Parties and Representatives’ <> accessed 30 March 2016 C Blacklaws, ‘ODR in family law’ (September 2014) < odr-infamily-law/> accessed 30 March 2016 Canada Department of Justice, ‘Resolving Disputes Think About Your Options’ (Government of Canada, 1998) <> Citizens Advice, ’Using alternative dispute resolution (ADR)’ (2016) <https:// consumer/alternative-dispute-resolution/settling-outof-court/usingalternative-dispute-resolution-adr/> accessed 24 March 2016 eBay, ‘Dispute Resolution Overview’ (eBay, 2016) <http:// disputeres.html> accessed 28 March 2016 Helfgott et al, Citizens, Victims, and Offenders Restoring Justice: Final Project (Report to the Centre on Crime, Communities, & Culture of the Open Society Institute 1998) HM Revenue & Customs, ‘Tax disputes: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)’ (, 8 December 2014) <> accessed 18 March 2016 J Hyde, ‘Online Courts Will Cut Need for Lawyers’ (16 February 2015) <http:// article? PageNo=1&SortOrder=dateadded&PageSize=> accessed 24 March 2016 J Shapland, A Atkinson, E Colledge, J Dignan, M Howes, J Johnstone, R Pennant, G Robinson and A Scoresby, ’Evaluating the fit: Restorative justice and criminal justice’ (British Criminology Conference July 2002) J Shapland, ‘Restorative Justice and Prisons’ (Presentation

to the Commission on English Prisons Today, 7 November 2008) <https://d19ylpo4aovc7m.cloudfront. net/fileadmin/howard_league/user/ pdf/Commission/Paper_by_Joanna_Shapland.pdf> accessed 28 March 2016 M Moncrieff, ‘Momentum for Resolving Small Claims Online is Gathering Pace’ Guardian (London, 1 April 2015) < apr/01/resolving-small-claimsonline-uk-courts> accessed 26 March 2016 Online Schlichter < herzlich-willkommen-auf-dem- schlichtungsportal-fuerelektronischen-geschaeftsverkehr> accessed 28 March 2016 Rechtwijzer 2.0 <> accessed 30 March 2016 Restorative Justice Council, ‘What is Restorative Justice?’ (2016) <https://> accessed 20 March 2016 SquareTrade, ‘Leadership’ (Square Trade, 2016) < http:// > accessed 28 March 2016 V Thiessen, ‘Smartsettle’s Vision’ (November 2004) < visionspeech/> accessed 28 March 2016

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES Subject Editor: Lelloucha Hamadache

Explain the cause of contemporary volatility in Iraqi society. written by nasha lock Iraq before both Ottoman and British rule is limited; an important counterfactual element is therefore the constant uncertainty of what the social dynamics in Iraq would have been if the colonial empires had not arisen (Lundestad, 1999: 134). Danforth takes this further, arguing that no commission could have been expected to find the magic line that got all the Sunnis on one side, the Shiites on the other, and the oil right in the middle (Danforth, 2013). Nevertheless, one cannot underestimate the extent to which mandate rule both deliberately and inadvertently initiated these tensions. Therefore, whilst previous tensions existed, British occupation generated a new epoch of tensions, that continue to be the predominant barrier to contemporary social development in Iraq. Tripp strengthens this, stating ‘the history of Iraq begins here [with British occupation]’ (Tripp, 2007: 30).

Recognizing complexity is quintessential to understanding and explaining the causes of volatility within Iraqi society. This is because there are many contributing variables, and the nation is arguably the locus of some of the most severe enduring conflicts in the contemporary international system. The causes of this violence, akin to regions in the world collectively, often have an underlying basal foundation that structures the societal cleavages: conflict is subsequently triggered by a sudden variable, as preexisting pressures and tensions have had extensive time to establish. Essentially, the basal foundations that this essay will explore are the legacies of colonialism and juxtaposing religious ideologies. The triggers or catalysts that exacerbate such foundations are weak political institutions, mainly in the form of dictatorship, foreign involvement and intervention in Iraqi affairs and increased domestic terrorism. Modern Iraq has therefore crystallized strong societal tensions that are marked by two principal layers of complexity. Although this thesis will examine Iraq, the discussed factors and resultant complexity can undoubtedly be applied to the majority of regional states in the Middle East. Furthermore, due to the numerous quantity of factors that instrument such volatility, only a selected few of the most significant factors will be discussed; this is not to say that there are not more- indeed, the variables that cause contemporary volatility in Iraqi society are of abundance.

The legacy of mandate rule under the British plays an integral role in setting the foundations of political weakness and consequent social indifference in Iraq. The construction of ‘religious rivalry’ through the application of nepotism was one of the core components of mandate governance; imperialists ‘divided concentrations of native people’, consequently aggravating internal tensions with the projected telos


Mandate Legacy Iraq cannot be understood in isolation from the historical factors that forged its existence as a nation state (Ismael & Ismael, 2015: 80). The preceding sources argue that British mandate rule in Iraq rooted the base of contemporary volatility in Iraqi society; however, this does not appreciate that there would have unquestionably been preexisting societal tensions within Iraq both under and before Ottoman colonialism in 1466. It must be considered that historian’s knowledge of the societal conditions in


of ‘retaining overarching power’ (Selvik & Stenslie, 2011: 260) (Marker, 2003) (Soeters, 2005: 78). In Iraq, this was exemplified by the British installation of King Faisal ibn Husayn. Faisal ‘appeared to be open to British manipulation’; indeed through underlying British influence and order, it was hoped that Faisal would ‘build an internal against radicals calling for complete British withdrawal’ (Dodge, 2003: 20) (Crittenden, 2012). The deliberate exacerbation of societal divisions in Iraq, through the use of nepotism, was therefore pursued by the British in order to retain colonial absolute power and weaken nationalist opposition to external rule. Furthermore, under British occupation, the already dominant Sunni minority (22-27%) were placed in positions of power to keep the Shia majority (7075%) in check (Crittenden, 2012). When Iraq issued itself de facto autonomy in 1958, and thus the end of British conditional presence, these hostilities and artificially created oligarchical bigotry remained without an overarching power to control them. Soeters notes the detrimental ramifications of this to contemporary development: these stereotypes still lead ‘a vital and sometimes fatal existence, even after the powers have left’ and plies regions with a sense of artificial identity (Soeters, 2005: 78). Nevertheless, one needs to consider that post-independent political mismanagement, particularly under Saddam Hussein has undoubtedly exacerbated such tensions; this will be further discussed in the preceding sections.

egotism that dominated British foreign policy in the creation of Iraq; indeed Jundi notes ‘it was a solution that was far from optimal in establishing a stable long term existence in the Middle East’ but instead filled the West’s pragmatic, strategic and oil interests (Fadi, 2008). This demonstrates that the Iraq state system set up after WWI was detrimental to the future affairs of the nation, fundamentally as there was a lack of essential state identity; henceforth reinforcing the impact of mandate rule on Iraq. Religion Religion is a core element of quotidian sociopolitical relations in Iraq and resultantly has a significant influence upon societal relations; firstly this section will focus upon the accountability of Islam, which is practiced by over 97% of Iraqis, for fuelling cleavages within Iraqi society. Whilst the distinction between the Sunni and Shiite branches of Islam dates back to a seventh Century split over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad, it continues to obstruct the establishment of cohesion within the region today. Collier notes that societies that have one group or cardinal religion that is large enough to form a majority of the population, but where other groups are still significant, are more at risk of civil war; Iraq is formed of 60% Shiite and 30% Sunni (Collier, 2007: 25) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). This view is not entirely without merit, for one has to consider that despite a historic struggle, Sunni and Shia had for the most part coexisted in Iraq throughout their history with very few periods of sectarian violence; both the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the overthrow of Saddam’s regime in 2003 enabled supposed Shia Islamism and empowerment, with a sense of Sunni loss (Sky, 2015: 152). This demonstrates quintessentially that whilst religion lays the base of Iraqi religious hostility, it is a partnership of global events and weak political institutions that catalyze and trigger religious hostilities, resulting in consequent societal volatility. One could take this further, indeed Dabrowska and Hann remark that Iraq’s many conflicts are a ‘struggle for political domination that is given a religious justification’ engaged by ‘many who are not particularly devout [but] participating in the bloodshed and fighting to advance group interests’; this would thus suggest that religious identity is utilized as a means to fulfill political aspirations (Dabrowska & Hann, 2008: 16). The Sunni-Shia divide is therefore the base of religious animosities in Islamic society in Iraq. However, this divide is then catalyzed and exacerbated by political institutions.

Artificial border drawing under the Sykes-Picot agreement is of unquestionable importance for understanding volatility within contemporary Iraq. Soeters confirms this, writing ‘conflicts occur where absolute power centres were able to control large areas’ as ‘national frontiers cut straight through ethnic populations’ (Soeters, 2005: 32). Akin to colonies in the Middle East and Africa collectively, under the Sykes-Picot agreement straight lines made supposedly uncomplicated and coherent borders (Osman, 2013). This means that states were created regardless of the multitudinous ethnic make-up of the territories, laying the foundations for much of the instability that plagues the region today as juxtaposing ethnic populations were constrained into living within the same national boundary (Milton-Edwards, 2011: 30). Indeed, the British established Iraq by merging three former Ottoman vilayets; this created nation states where none had existed before and failed to correspond to the actual sectarian, tribal, or ethnic distinctions on the ground consequently generating states with absent identities. This demonstrates the 34

Iraq is additionally composed of many minority groups, the principal ones being the Yezidis, Mandaeans, Christians and Turkmen. The relationships between these various Iraqi religious groups are marred by a high level of distrust (Lamani & Momani, 2010: 95). Minorities have often received limited or conditional recognition of their identity, as they are often told that they are Arab, Kurd or that they must change their religion depending on the political demands of the majority group at that given time (Lamani & Momani, 2010: 95). States characterized by regional religious disparities or socio-political exclusion of religious groups from positions of power have become increasingly more difficult to sustain; this is because, under worldpolity theory, the perception that religious expulsion and discrimination is both unjust and illegitimate has been intrinsically embedded in the globalized world culture (Olzak, 2011: 8-10). In Iraq, the lack of Christian representation and basic civil rights has invigorated animosities leading to a myriad of conflict and migration over the past decade, more recently exacerbated by the rise of ISIS. The number of Christians in Iraq is significantly decreasing; from 1.3 million in 2003 to 300,000 in mid-2015 (Williams, 2015). This number is only set to continue declining, indeed increased extremism in contemporary Iraq has threatened the Christian minority to the point of extinction; ISIS proclaim Iraqi Christians as a ‘fifth column’ (House of Commons Papers, 2005). Social cohesion is an essential element of maintaining relative peace within any nation. The discrimination and persecution against minority religions, in conjunction with the prominent sectarian Sunni-Shia divide, therefore provides a fundamental variable to the roots of societal instability in Iraq, on both an inter-religious and intra-religious level.

conflict in international de facto democracies despite heterogeneous societies, such as Britain, Germany and the United States. Indeed, poor governance partnered with underlying societal antagonisms serves as an inevitable root for societal cataclysm. This is typified by the increased ethnic divide between the Sunni and the Shiite under the politics of the Saddam Hussein epoch. The Sunni Arabs, which, as aforementioned account for the minority, provided the bulk of the governing class under Saddam, whereas the Shiites, who comprise the upward majority of the population, were denied political rights and their religious freedoms were curtailed (Karon, 2006). Moreover, Song argues that, often, corrupt politicians and murderous dictatorships provoke hatred of a minority group to strengthen their position; frequently, and notably under Hussein, this propaganda ends in ethnic cleansing or genocide (Song, 2013). Saddam’s tactics of divide and rule created far greater divisiveness within Iraqi society, and each community tended to turn in upon itself for solidarity and protection (The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004: 111). Tripp rightly notes that Hussein ‘reinforced the longapparent ambivalence of the Iraqi state’; reinforcing the reoccurring and significantly problematic lack of identity in the society of Iraq (Tripp, 2007: 216). This demonstrates that religion in Iraq is intensely connected with politics; thus, providing evidence to confirm that weak political institutions partnered with a preexisting vulnerable, fragile foundations and a polyethnic society contributes tremendously to volatility in Iraqi society. Involvement and Intervention in Iraqi affairs This section will argue that it is external factors, namely foreign involvement in Iraqi affairs, which disallow the establishment of cohesion within Iraqi society. Firstly globalization and economic integration in the Western world agitate ethno-political forces in Iraq (Song, 2013). Collier and Hoeffler’s distinguished thesis argues that an abundance and consequent lootable availability of natural resources exacerbates paradoxical underdevelopment and intensifies civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002: 5-10). The conspicuous presence of Western oil companies in Iraq arouses hostility from those who reject Occident values and the great concentration of wealth and power that domestic Iraqi oil provides such nations with. Furthermore, the very production of oil in an otherwise underdeveloped state often damages the local economy as it funnels vast wealth to a minority and thus exacerbates the preexisting


Weak political institutions One has to consider that contemporary political mismanagement exacerbates the preexisting colonial-based or religious cleavages within Iraqi society. The environment surrounding a nationstate understandably plays an integral role in states’ experiences of internal hostilities and conflict (Cordell and Wolff, 2010: 27). Quintessentially, weak societal relations within nations are characterized by an absence of functional and impartial state institutions which can protect states internally through both interdependence and defense (Cordell and Wolff, 2010: 27) (Habyarimana, 2008). Evidence to support this is provided by the lack of domestic 35

as Henry and Springborg in examining the nature of power and economy in Iraq (Moore & Springborg, 2010: 44). Direct foreign military involvement in Iraqi affairs have further hindered social relations within Iraq. In 1997, General Binford Peay stated ‘the international community must have free and unfettered access to the Gulf States’; he crucially notes that any disruption in this flow ‘would intensify the volatility of the world oil market [and] precipitate economic calamity for developed and developing nations alike’ (Binford Peay, 1997). Consequently Western powers, notably the US, have vigorously involved themselves in Iraqi affairs in an attempt to democratize the nation and thus securitize their oil supplies. Bueno De Mesquita and Downs rightly argue that leaders of intervening states accord with the priority of pleasing their domestic constituents, as opposed to promoting successful democracy abroad (May, 2008: 101). As a result, such leaders are more likely to install autocratic leaders that undermine democracy, but that will be more in line with US policy goals and economic opportunities; this in fact detracts from a countrie’s democratic trajectory. Furthermore, the actual consequences of direct intervention destabilized socio-economic development in Iraq. Quintessentially, Barakat notes that Iraq was ‘deliberately deconstructed in order to be reconstructed to a new model’; this undermined the preexisting fragile identity of Iraqi society, leading to an attempted construction of a new, artificial identity through the process of democratic nation building (Barakat, 2008, 3). Tripp states that the Western powers had ‘only a weak grasp of the personal histories, relationships, rivalries and status differences’ behind the provincial networks which significantly ‘heightened tensions’ (Tripp, 2007: 281). This process of societal deconstruction through intervention in order to fuel Western pragmatic, economic and strategic goals has thus significantly exacerbated volatility in Iraqi society.

societal cleavages with those that prosper and those that do not; Habyarimana rightly notes that unequal distribution of economic growth is a palliative for societal discontent (Klare, 2004: 21) (Habyarimana, 2008). Iraq typifies this theory: the nation surpassed Iran as the second largest oil producer in OPEC at the end of 2012 (Schaeffer, 2009: 52). Consequently, ethnic elites and those in governance have focused on acquiring profits from the trading of oil, leading to mass inequality in the country and successive violence (Song, 2013). Collier argues here that once a war has begun, the economic damage undoes the growth achieved during peace; internal war tends to reduce growth by around 2.3% a year (Collier, 2007: 27-33). The 2006 Iraq Civil War had a formal lasting period of a year, but informally has continued to plague the region today; utilizing Collier’s aforementioned theory, this would indicate that the nation is 20.7% poorer than it would have been had it not undergone oil based conflict. The rise of China as a strategic power furthermore reduces optimism for the future societal affairs Iraq, as it will lead to increasing Sino demands for oil and the partnered guaranteed defence to secure it (Cordell & Wolff, 2010: 27). This therefore demonstrates the continued damaging legacy of foreign involvement in Iraq; ‘today’s globalisation and yesterday’s colonialism’ are perceived as not so very different by scholars such

Globalization additionally claims some legitimacy in the increased domestic terrorism in Iraq, notably the rise of ISIS. The partnership of failing to integrate into the globalized system and desire to preserve tradition and culture catalyses the rise of Islamic extremism and fundamentalism in Iraq. Culture is one explanation as to why militant Islam’s call for armed struggle has been successful in gaining recruits in Iraq; in particular, violence and domestic religious fundamentalism is perceived to be the only method of preserving traditions, identities and values against a 36

and prosper within the global system.

cultural tsunami of Western products and materialism. Nevertheless, of more accountability than culture is the financial consequences of globalization, which contributes to the rise of radicalism; social changes associated with globalization and the spread of free market capitalism appear to overwhelm groups who perceive themselves as economically deprived in the new international system (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2011: 369). The aforementioned oil-based conflict exemplifies this. External firms extract oil profiting Iraqi elites and government officials with abject reinvestments that benefit Iraqi society; this fundamentally exacerbates domestic hostilities and grievances resulting in revolt. Whilst preexisting cultural grievance therefore causes terrorism in Iraq, greed associated with socio-economic globalization exacerbates it. Song thus rightly states ‘Globalization may be a trigger for conflict but its existence is mitigated by other factors’ (Song, 2013).

Perhaps one can distinguish that the most reoccurring theme present in this essay is the lack of identity in Iraq, whether it be caused by mandatory rule, religious juxtaposition, political weakness and a resultant weak national state, or continued intervention by external powers. Of these aforementioned variables, the legacy of mandate rule arguably has the most profound influence on volatility in Iraq, as artificial border drawing has prevented development and aggravated ethnic cleavages. Muller draws on this conclusion, stating ‘when state and societal-group boundaries do not coincide, politics is apt to remain ugly’ (Muller, 2008: 14-16). As demonstrated, the causes of societal volatility in Iraq are complex as there are many different variables which contribute to its formation. Nevertheless, the partnership of British occupation and resultant contemporary weak governance are the most significant contributors to volatility in Iraqi society.

Concluding Remarks Ultimately, the causes of volatility in Iraqi society cannot be solely explained by a single variable. Instead, this essay demonstrates that both mandate occupation of Iraq and religion formulate a base, enabling societal animosities; this base is then exacerbated by weak political institutions, the effects of globalization and intervention by foreigners. British authority of Iraq interfered with the multitudinous ethnic make-up of Iraq through both border drawing and the practice of divide and rule, leaving the nation vulnerable to further conflict post-independence. Religion has provided as a fundamental root of societal conflict; indeed, both intra-religious indifferences and interreligious hostilities have tensioned societal friction and consequently prevented cohesion. Weak political institutions have exacerbated these preexisting antagonisms; exemplified quintessentially by both the lack of de facto democracy in Iraq and Hussein’s deliberate prejudice and advocation of discrimination against the Shiite majority in Iraq. Globalization has additionally led to external economic interference within Iraqi affairs by hegemonic powers, resulting in domestic competition to provide and resultant agitation of ethno-political forces. Foreign intervention has also hindered societal relations in Iraq, essentially as Western powers have rebuilt Iraq corresponding with their strategic interests instead of conforming to the multitudinous ethnic make-up of the Iraqi society. Moreover, globalization has some claims responsibility for contemporary domestic terrorism in Iraq due to a desire to preserve tradition and the inability for Middle Eastern states to integrate


Barakat, S., Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq: An Introduction, (New York, 2008). Baylis, J., S. Smith and P. Owens, The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford, 2011). Binford Peay, J. H., “Promoting Peace and Stability in the Central Region” (Report to the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on National Security, Washington D.C., United States, March 17 1997) www. (Last Accessed: 12 November 2015). Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook: Iraq’ (2015) (Last Accessed: 3 November 2015). Collier, P., The Bottom Billion, (Oxford, 2007). Collier P., and A. Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, (Oxford, 2002). Crittenden, S., ‘The Clash Within Civilisations: How The Sunni-Shiite Divide Cleaves The Middle East’, The Global Mail, (2012) (Last Accessed: 15 October 2015). Cordell, K., and S. Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: Causes Consequences - Responses, (Cambridge, 2010). Dabrowska, K., and G. Hann, Iraq Then and Now: A Guide to the Country and Its People, (Connecticut, 2008). Danforth, N., ‘Stop Blaming Colonial Borders for the Middle East’s Problems’, The Atlantic, (2013) http:// stop-blaming-colonial-borders-for-the-middle-eastsproblems/279561/ (Last Accessed: 18 October 2015).


Dodoge, T., Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-building and History Denied’, (New York, 2003). Fadi, J., ‘Sykes-Picot and the Arab World’, Al Jazeera Online, (2008) arabunity/2008/02/2008525173710454223.html (Last Accessed: 15 October 2015). Habyarimana, J., et al. ‘Is Ethnic Conflict Inevitable?: Parting Ways Over Nationalism and Separatism’, Foreign Affairs, (2008) http://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/64457/james-habyarimana-macartanhumphreys-daniel-posner-jeremy-weinst/is-ethnicconflict-inevitable (Last Accessed: 1 November 2015). House of Commons Papers (HCPP): 2005, Cm. 6606 ‘Human Rights Annual Report’ http://www.publications. pdf (Last Accessed: 25 October 2015). Ismael, T. Y., and J. S. Ismael, Iraq in the Twenty-First Century: Regime change and the making of a failed state, (New York, 2015). Karon, T., ‘Understanding Iraq’s Ethnic and Religious Divisons’ (2006) article/0,8599,1167476,00.html (Last Accessed: 1 November 2015). Klare, M., Blood and Oil: How America’s Thirst for Petrol Is Killing Us, (London, 2004). Lamani, M., and B. Momani, From Desolation to Reconstruction: Iraq’s Troubled Journey, (Ontario, 2010).

Soeters, J. L., Ethnic Conflict and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil War, (Oxford, 2005). Song, K., ‘Has Globalization Exacerbated Ethnic Conflicts?’ (2013) has-globalization-exacerbated-ethnic-conflicts/ (Last Accessed: 28 October 2015). The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Iraq: Reconstruction and Future Role, (Abu Dhabi, 2004). Tripp, C., A History of Iraq, 3rd. ed, (Cambridge, 2007). Williams, D., ‘Christianity in Iraq is finished.’, The Washington Post, (2015) www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/christianity-in-iraq-isf inishe d/2014/09/19/21fe aa7c-3f2f-11e4-b0e a8141703bbf6f_story.html (Last Accessed: 25 October 2015).

Lundestad, G., East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945, (Oxford, 1999). May, L., War: Essays in Political Philosophy, (Cambridge, 2008).

MODERN LANGUAGES Subject Editor: Ellie Richardson

Viva Euskara! The Sociolinguistic Situation of Basque in France and Spain written by jennie fox Basque, or euskara/euskera is spoken in the Basque Country, which is comprised of three different areas: the French Basque Country or Northern Basque Country, in the south west of France, the Basque Autonomous Community (hereby referred to as the BAC) and Navarre in the north of Spain. These regions are constituted by seven historical provinces: four in Spain; Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Araba and Navarra, and three in France; Lapurdi, Basse-Navarre and BAB, Balona-Anglet-Biarritz. It is a non-Indo-European isolate language which means that it does not stem from the same linguistic family as its European counterparts, such as French and Spanish. Whilst it is the only surviving isolate language in Europe, other examples of isolate languages can be found all over the globe, including Waorani of Ecuador and Iatê of Brazil (Ethnologue).

the Statute of Autonomy only establishes the ‘right’ of Basque citizens to speak both languages (Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country 1979: Art. 6.1). Between 1939 and 1975 General Franco took control of Spain and enforced Spanish Nationalism. During his regime, all regional languages in Spain, including Basque, were actively suppressed and regulations were enforced including the prohibition of public use of the language, outlawing Basque names and the burning of books in Euskara. The Basque Government went into exile and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) effectively went into hiding (Gardner-Chloros 2009). All educational institutions were forced to teach entirely through the medium of Castilian, to the point where Basque was completely neglected (Fifth Sociolinguistic Survey 2011). However, some Basque medium schools (ikastolak) clandestinely continued to teach in Basque so some of the language was still preserved. In the 1950s, a group of Basque students set up Euskadi ta Askatasuna (more commonly known as ETA) as a reaction to what they perceived as the passivity of their parents. It started as a broad cultural and humanist movement but gradually evolved into an armed organisation with separatist and revolutionary aims (Gardner-Chloros 2009).

The situation of Euskara differs greatly between France and Spain. The language currently holds official status in the BAC and parts of Navarre in Spain, whilst is does not in the Basque speaking regions of France. In 1992, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was adopted to protect and promote the historical, regional and minority languages of Europe (Council of Europe). It was signed by Spain in November 1992, ratified in April 2001 and entered into force in the August (European Charter). However, despite signing the Charter in 1992, France still refuses to ratify it as it is not in line with the French constitution (Sanchez 2007), which states that ‘the language of the Republic is French’ (Hooper 2012). In France, all regional languages have no specific status and no official recognition, apart from seven including Basque, Breton and Occitan, which have been awarded regional official status. It is also important to note that despite both Spanish and Basque being official languages in the BAC, the status of these two languages are not the same in practice. The Spanish Constitution grants the ‘right and obligation’ of all Spaniards to speak Spanish (Spanish Constitution 1978: Art. 3) whereas,

Marker, S., ‘Effects of Colonization’, (2003) http://www. (Last Accessed: 14 November 2015). Milton-Edwards, B., Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, (Cambridge, 2011). Moore, H., and R. Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, (Cambridge, 2010). Muller, J., ‘Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism’ Foreign Affairs 105 (2008) 14-16. Olzak, S., ‘Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Discontent?’ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (2011) 8-10. Osman, T., ‘Why border lines drawn with a ruler in WWI still rock the Middle East’, BBC News Online, (2013) http:// (Last Accessed: 29 October 2015). Schaeffer, R., Understanding Globalization: The Social Consequences of Political, Economic and Environmental Change, (Lanham, 2009). Selvik, K., and S. Stenslie, Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East, (London, 2011). Sky, E., The Unravelling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq, (London, 2015).



During the 1960s the Francoist regime was more tolerant towards regional languages and after Franco’s death and the fall of the regime, the Basque Government returned and the new democratic Spanish State took a more positive stance on minority languages. Basque autonomy was established and local languages of Spain were granted co-official status alongside Spanish (ibid.). The Basque Language Academy or Euskaltzaindia, formed in 1919 as an official body responsible for researching and safeguarding the Basque language (Royal Academy of the Basque Language) and is entirely independent from the French ‘Academie française’ and the Spanish ‘Real Academia Española’. In the late 1960s it decided to develop a codified form of Euskara, named Euskara Batua, which could be taught in the now increasing

Basque educational sphere.

however the number in France is still lower than the number in Spain (ibid.). In 1982, the Seaska association began receiving funding from the state. Nowadays the Ministry of Education pays teachers’ salaries and is responsible for providing training and establishing conditions and content of teaching, however although 70% of funding is provided by regional or state authorities, the ikastolas still rely on parents contributing financially and are constantly looking for financial assistance (Sanchez 2007).

With the Spanish transition to democracy, Basque language planning in the BAC and, to a lesser extent, in Navarre, passed to language institutions and regional governments (Amorrotu 2003). After the introduction of a standardised form, important efforts were made to revitalise Basque. Firstly, the Basque Language Academy had to deal with the fact that most of its speakers were illiterate and even the most highly educated Basque speakers did not necessarily know how to read or write in Euskara as they were educated in Spanish or French (Amorrortu 2002). This provoked the development of ‘gau eskolas’ or evening classes throughout the Basque Country, which taught Euskara to adults as well as developing a teaching scheme to be implemented into the education system. Ikastolas or full-immersion schools that use Basque as a medium of instruction already existed, although they remained clandestine during the Francoist regime. These schools then became private, legal schools and ultimately became part of the public school system in the BAC and Navarre.

A major contributing factor in the revitalisation of Euskara are the attitudes towards the language. From the 16th century, as was the case for many regional minority languages, Basque was considered the language of tradition and Spanish and French that of modernity. The more powerful social groups, (the church, nobility and bourgeoisie) used this to distance themselves from the lay people (Amorrortu 2002), who only had knowledge of the minority language. The high volume of speakers in rural areas, and the lack of recognition within a national system of education, generated the stigmatisation of Euskara as primitive and a tongue for the uneducated (Gardner-Chloros 2009). In the 20th century, attitudes changed. The Basque language took a central role in a redefinition of Basque nationalist ideology and it became ‘the integrative most important element of Basque distinctiveness’ (Amorrortu 2002: 819). Despite being ‘somewhat ambivalent’ towards the language, Sabino Arana, founder and leader of the Basque Nationalist Party in Spain, recognised its usefulness as a significant cultural marker of the Basque people (GardnerChloros 2009). Nowadays however, despite playing a significant role in the identity of Basque people, in some cases Basque speakers are hesitant to speak

Although Basque language speakers in France were not submitted to suppression within a dictatorship, the language was actively repressed by the French State. The French political system is based on a single unified state with a will for cultural and linguistic uniformity (Sanchez 2007), a precedent also reflected in the educational system. In the 1880s, Jules Ferry implemented measures, particularly within education, that weakened the regional languages of France, which were referred to as patois. Speaking patois was forbidden at school and similarly to the ‘Welsh Not’ incentive in Welsh-English education (R.O. Jones 1993: 548), pupils were punished upon speaking it instead of French. Speakers of Occitan referred to the effects of being made to abandon one’s regional language as la vergonha, ‘shame’. Although Euskara is not a dialect of French and thus technically not a patois, speakers of it still experienced similar treatment by the state, punishment at school and humiliation when speaking it in public. In 1969, the Seaska association was set up in the Northern Basque Country by parents and teachers who wished to revive the Basque language (Sanchez 2007). Aided by the advancements in Basque education in Spain and the recently developed Euskara Batua, the association launched its first Basque medium school in France. Nowadays the number of ikastolas is still growing and they can be found all over the Northern Basque Country,

Figure 1. Language competence by territory. Basque Country, 2011 (%) 40

Basque or even reveal that they have knowledge of it due to the association of Euskara with the ETA. Until 2013, the ETA was a prolific terrorist organisation responsible for hundreds of killings and kidnappings within Spain and unfortunately for many, the Basque language and identity was tarnished in both France and Spain by its affiliation with the Basque separatist group. Another factor which favours Basque language maintenance through language transmission is its speakers current language competence. The Basque Government classes the different levels of language competence in the Basque Country using the following terms: bilingual, where speakers are proficient in both Basque and Spanish or French, passive bilingual, where speakers have been exposed to Basque enough to have a comprehension of it but little to no ability to use it, and non-Basque speaking which refers to those who have no knowledge of Basque at all. The Basque Government conducts a sociolinguistic survey every five years using closeended phone questionnaires on the social evolution of the Basque language and they cover the entire territory in which Basque is spoken. According to the 2011 survey, 27% of the population aged 16 and over in the Basque Country is bilingual, 14.7% is passive bilingual and 58.3% is non-Basque speaking (Fifth Sociolinguistic Survey 2011). However the number of bilinguals varies between the three regions, with the highest number in the BAC at 32%, 21.4% in the Northern Basque Country and the lowest in Navarre at 11.7% (ibid.).

Figure 2. Language competence, district by district. Northern Basque County, 2011 (%) more rural areas of the Northern Basque Country are quite isolated and have been less influenced by the French lingua franca, as in provinces such as Lower Navarre and Zuberoa, 51.2% of the population have only Basque as a mother tongue (ibid.). During Franco’s regime, Spain saw internal migration from the South to the North as Spanish speakers were encouraged to move to more industrial areas, primarily regions such as the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia, which in turn, diluted the concentration of speakers of those languages and aided Franco’s strategy to eradicate minority languages. Language maintenance has also been affected by a considerable increase in the foreign immigrant population in Navarre and the BAC in the last decade and by the aging of the population, as the life expectancy is rising while the birth rate remains extremely low (ibid.)

The Basque language has the most governmental support in the BAC, and whilst the situation is improving in the Northern Basque Country, the French State has excluded Basque from administration and education and this has affected the rate of language acquisition. Language maintenance in Navarre has been affected by its close proximity to Spanish monolingual provinces and by the number of non-Basque speakers that live there. Today there are 185,000 bilinguals more than in 1991 (ibid.), with an increase in the bilingual population taking place above all in the BAC, which demonstrates that steps taken to revitalise Basque have been successful. However, in the Northern Basque country, losses continue to take place, and the number of non-Basque speakers has increased. This could be due to the influx of retired French people buying a second home or relocating to towns and cities, such as Biarritz, and thus filtering the number of bilingual speakers with French monolinguals. The

Due to Franco’s language policies, the case of Basque language shift differs from the norm. Those of the first generation are able to speak Basque as their first language (L1), but instead of having knowledge of both Basque (L1) and Spanish (L2) many second generation speakers have no knowledge of Basque at all because they grew up while it was outlawed and their education was solely in Spanish. Third generation speakers, however, were exposed to and taught Euskara after the regime when it was reintroduced into education and society . This situation is the opposite in the Northern Basque Country, where the percentage who have Basque as their mother tongue is becoming increasing lower as age decreases (ibid.). 41

In the BAC and Navarre, the use of Basque has increased in all domains except in the home. The greatest rise in the last 20 years has been the use of Basque in formal domains such as municipal offices and health services (ibid.). Unfortunately the Northern Basque Country is seeing a decrease in the use of Basque everywhere (ibid.). Despite this, there is a positive attitude towards efforts to promote Basque and its transmission to children, with 66% of the population wanting their children to go to a Basque medium school (ibid.).

secondary education, Basque is taught as a subject between 3 ½ to 4 hours a week (Gardner 2005) and although no schools in Navarre teach with Basque as a medium of instruction, at university level, 2 of the 23 degree courses can be studied in Basque at the Universidad Pública de Navarra (UPNA) (ibid.). 6% of the total subjects in other universities throughout the BAC can also be studied in Basque (ibid.), a statistic which is rising. The media has played a major role in Basque language maintenance. There is currently a daily newspaper, Berria, which is published solely in Basque and is available throughout the Basque Country. A second, Gara, is written in both Basque and Spanish but is only published in San Sebastian, in the BAC. Many more Basque and bilingual newspapers existed in the past but were either closed down by Spanish Nationalists during Franco’s regime or in the 1980s and ‘90s for allegations of illegal association with the ETA. A weekly magazine, Argia, is also published in Euskara. Other literary works include a Bible published in Euskara and an official dictionary published in Basque-French, Basque-Spanish and Basque-English (Ethnologue).

Aside from the ikastolas, Euskara has a meagre presence in French public education. In 1951, the Deixonne law was proclaimed and this allows minority languages and culture in France to be taught for 1 to 3 hours a week, providing the teacher is willing to do so. French is the medium of instruction and it is not possible to learn a regional language as a modern language at primary or secondary school in France, however since 1997 the baccalauréat for history and geography has been available in Basque (Sanchez 2007). Extra teaching hours are offered outside the curriculum, with the IKAS organisation uniting teachers of Basque and promoting Euskara through the publication of literary works, theatre and youth magazines such as ‘Nanai’, a translation and adaption into Basque of the monthly French magazine ‘Toboggan’ for children over 5 years old (ibid.). Currently the teaching of regional languages in France is primarily based on the goodwill and dedication of parents and teachers.

The Basque Country also has its own television radio network, Euskal Irrati Telebista (EiTB), which has 6 television channels and 5 radio stations (EiTB. eu). Two television channels broadcast entirely in Euskara: ETB1, a general channel and ETB3, a youth channel which broadcasts cartoons, and two channels broadcast in Spanish: ETB2, a second general channel and ETB4, for sports. Another two channels are international and provide information on Basque language and culture in both Basque and Spanish: ETBSAT, aimed at the rest of Spain, France and Europe and CANAL VASCO, aimed at Latin America. Euskadi Irratia, EiTB’s main radio station broadcasts in Basque 24/7. EiTB is transmitted from the BAC in Spain, and is supported by the local Spanish government. However, although both EiTB television and radio is also broadcasted in the Northern Basque Country, a French equivalent is not available as the French government has not provided support to realise this.

In Spain, Euskara has been very much integrated into public education. Alongside the ikastolas, which teach wholly through the medium of Basque, both Basque and Spanish can be found in schools, although it ranges from area to area. In public primary and

Figure 3. Language competence by age group. Basque County, 2011 (%) 42

The Basque language has also become ever more present in new media. Many online websites are available in Basque, including public blogs written in Euskara, Wikipedia (Wikipedia) and online news. Euskara is a language choice available on Facebook and Google Translate and is used on social networks, such as Twitter. Music has also played a part in the revival of the Basque language, with Basque

language songs sung in a variety of genres from folk to jazz and heavy metal. Its appearance in the mass media has increased its social prestige and lexical modernisation, as well as its popularity among young people as it is no longer viewed as a dated language only available in old literature and spoken by elder generations. The revitalisation of Basque is often considered as a successful language planning story (Amorrortu 2002), similar to the case of Catalan in Spain. However, although Basque is now present in many institutional settings, the sociolinguistic situation is still diglossic and the language is under threat due to interference from other High languages, predominantly French and Spanish. Speakers are able to code-switch between Basque and the majority language and language borrowing is very common, especially when speakers are less confident in speaking Basque or they have forgotten a word in the language. It is estimated 40% of modern Basque is made up of borrowings from Romance languages (Bavin & Stoll 2013), including ‘lontxea’, a borrowing from English ‘lunch’, which has been adapted in the morphology of Basque. Nevertheless, thanks to positive attitudes towards Basque, regional attempts to preserve it and governmental recognition and acceptance in some regions, Basque currently holds a status of 2 in Spain and 5 in France on Joshua Fishman’s GIDS scale (Fishman 1991). This demonstrates that its minority status is successfully being reversed. More and more people are learning Basque, 75% of speakers believe that Euskara is not considered to be in danger of extinction (Fifth Sociolinguistic Survey 2011) and statistics show that as a general whole, Basque is not at risk of disappearing in the next three to four generations. Bibliographical references Amorrortu, E. 2002. Language planning and linguistic

attitudes in the Basque Case. University of Deusto, Bilbao. Online resource, available: actas2002/04/01.%20Estibaliz%20Amorrortu.pdf. Last accessed: 7/12/2014 Amorrortu, E. 2003. Basque Sociolinguistics: Language, Society, and Culture. University of Nevada Press, 2003. Online resource, available: books?id=Vv3drdSdal0C&pg=PA41&source=gbs_ toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false. Last accessed: 7/12/2014 sque Autonomous Community Department of Education,


Language Policy and Culture. Fifth Sociolinguistic Survey, 2011. Published July 2013 by Eusko Jaurlaritzaren Argitalpen Zerbitzu Nagusia Servicio Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco Donostia-San Sebastian, 1 – 01010 Vitoria-Gasteiz. Online resource, available: informacion/sociolinguistic_research2011/en_2011/ adjuntos/FithSociolingusticSurvey.pdf. Last accessed: 7/12/2014 Bavin, E.L & Stoll, S. 2013.The Acquisition of Ergativity (Trends in Language Acquisition Research). John Benjamins Publishing Company 2013. Council of Europe. Available: http://conventions.coe. int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/148.htm. Last accessed: 7/12/2014 EiTB, Basque television radio network. Available: http:// Last accessed: 7/12/2014 Ethnologue. Available: language/eus. Last accessed: 7/12/2104 European Charter. Available: http://conventions. c o e . i n t / Tr e a t y / C o m m u n / C h e r c h e S i g . asp?NT=148&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG. Last accessed: 7/12/2014 Fishman, J. 1991. Reversing Language Shift: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Assistance to Threatened Languages. Multilingual Matters Ltd, Clevedon. Gardner, N. 2005. The Basque language in education in Spain, 2nd Edition. Ljouwert/Leeuwarden: Mercator European Research Centre on Multilingualism and Language Learning. Online resource, available: http:// dossiers_pdf/basque_in_spain2nd.pdf. Last accessed: 7/12/2014 Gardner-Chloros, P. 2009. ‘Multilingualism of autochthonous minorities’. In: Peter Auer & Li Wei (Eds.) Handbook of Multilingualism and Multilingual Communication. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter Hooper. S. 2012. France a ‘rogue state’ on regional languages . Available: features/2012/03/201232943156736852.html. Last accessed 7/12/2014 Hualde, J. I & Zuazo, K. 1988. Euskararen batasuna (The standardization of Basque language). Euskaltzaindia. Published in: Hualde, J. I. Language Problems and Language Planning 31.2 (2007): 143-168. Online resource, available: objects/pubs/Hualde-Zuazo_standardization%20of%20 Basque.pdf. Last accessed: 7/12/2014 Jones, R. O. 1993. The sociolinguistics of Welsh. The Celtic Languages, ed. M. J. Ball, 536‒605. London & New York: Routledge. Royal Academy of the Basque Language. Available: http:// Last accessed: 7/12/2014 Sanchez, D. Basque. 2007. The Basque language in

Social Sciences Subject Editor: Zaina Mahmoud

Using at least one example consider the following statement: medicalization transforms normal into pathological written by lota bantic


Medicalization, argue Conrad and Schneider (1982), describes the process by which a problem can be understood in medical terms, the process of adopting a medical framework to understand a problem, or the use of medical intervention in treating it. Across a variety of disciplinary fields, there has been much debate over the nature of medicalization, especially in regards to the overall effect it has had on society as a whole. Famously, Zola described medicalization as a means of social control, hailing it ‘the new repository of truth, the place where absolute and often final judgments are made by supposedly morally neutral and objective experts’ (1972). Many questions have been raised since then on the topic, including the one I am attempting to answer here. Are medicine and medicalization influenced by what is considered normal, or does medicalization have a hand in defining ‘normal?’ I am going to argue that neither is exclusively true, and that medicine works in relationship with the rest of society to dictate what is normal and what is not. As my example, I am going to be looking at how sex and therefore to an extent, gender, are medicalized and the implications this has for individuals whose sex or gender identities fall outside of the culturally accepted male/female binary. ‘‘Is pathological the same concept as abnormal… is normal the same as healthy?’ (Canghuilhem, 2008). The essay question here is limited in answering these questions: it would take another essay in and of itself to examine in depth exactly what is meant by the term ‘normal’. Canghuilhem states that ‘normal’ can sometimes ‘designate a fact that can be described through statistical sampling: it refers to the mean of measurements made of a trait displayed by a species’ (2008). However, what is considered ‘normal’ in a society is more complex than mere statistics, although the frequency in which certain things occur do play a part. ‘Normal’ varies cross

culturally, and for a working definition usually means things that conform to a standard, something which is expected. In terms of health and our bodies, we would expect that ‘normal’ would have a relationship with the term ‘natural’, or as Chodoff puts it: ‘The Human Condition’ (2002). However, if we were to use the example of menstruation: it is a common occurrence and a natural phenomenon within nearly half of the human population, and yet is still taboo in our culture, meaning it hasn’t been normalised. ‘To medicalize the human condition is to apply a diagnostic label to various unpleasant or undesirable feelings or behaviours that are not distinctly abnormal (Chodoff, 2002). In the case of menstruation, the term ‘PMS’ is often used, which refers to the so-called ‘Pre-menstrual Syndrome’. Arguably, the use of the term ‘syndrome’ to refer to a natural bodily process that occurs to such a high statistical percentage of the population shows that what is ‘natural’ and what is considered ‘normal’ is not always the same.


A frequently used example to illustrate a ‘normal’ societal behavior being medicalized is that of smoking: what used to be a common practice is now seen as a risk to health; legally in the UK cigarettes have to come with health warnings. In addition, this process of medicalization has exerted medical influence into the domain of the law, as the government has legislated against the practice, from ‘1st July 2007 all enclosed and substantially enclosed work places (including vehicles) and public places became no smoking zones under the Smoke Free law. Anyone who smokes in these areas, for example in a pub, café or on public transport are indeed breaking the law.’ ( In this instance, it is fair to argue that medicalization does indeed transform the normal into the pathological. However, there

control: ‘Defining deviant behaviour as a medical problem allows certain things to be done that could not otherwise be considered; for example, the body may be cut open or psychoactive medications may be given. This treatment can be a form of social control’ (Conrad 1975, 18–19) As quoted by Reiheld, (2010). The example I am going to use to explore this point is that of the medicalization of sex and gender. When considering the process of medicalization, sex and gender are not categories that is immediately thought of: this is how medicalized these categories are. Sex is understood, and taught, to be a combination of chromosomes: XX makes you female, XY makes you male. Anything that falls outside of this is considered to be wrong, as is historically the case of Intersex people in the west. The process of medicalization allows for these ‘deviant’ bodies to be dealt with surgically: ‘By the very acceptance of a specific behaviour as an ‘illness’ and the definition of illness as an undesirable state, the issue becomes not whether to deal with a particular problem, but how and when’ (Zola, 1972). ‘Every day babies are born with bodies that are deemed sexually ambiguous, and with regularity they are surgically altered’ (Preves, 2003). For decades it has been a routine medical practice to ‘correct’ the bodies of intersex babies with surgery, because their bodies do not fit into what society, and in particular the institutions of science and medicine, consider to be ‘normal’. Indeed, the ‘renaming of intersex as a disorder of sex development allowed medical professionals to

have been plenty of examples historically where the abnormal has been pathologised, namely of behaviour that has been pathologized on the basis that societally it was considered abnormal: such as homosexuality. A famous case is that of Alan Turing, who, following his conviction before the decriminalization of homosexuality in the UK in 1967, was chemically castrated by medical professionals in an attempt to ‘cure’ his sexuality. He was considered to have a ‘mental disorder’ that could be fixed. Reiheld warns of this in her work: ‘A person with a condition that has been medicalized who feels perfectly healthy might be diagnosed by medical professionals and treated as sick by society regardless of whether she acknowledges that there is anything at all the matter. This is what homosexuals and dissidents have had reason to fear’ (2010). Here, medicalization was used to perpetuate a systematic oppression and punish behaviour that was ‘deviant’. Therefore, if the answer to the aforementioned question ‘is normal the same as healthy?’ is affirmative, then it is clear to see how this poses a problem when it comes to medicalization. If we take the healthy/unhealthy dichotomy to be identical to the normal/abnormal dichotomy, we risk perpetuating existing social structures and oppressions by virtue of defining behaviours and characteristics which are considered ‘abnormal’ as a sickness, illness or disorder. As aforementioned, this has already happened in the case of homosexuality. This lends weight to Zola’s argument that medicalization is a process of social

medical institution pushes a label onto the experience of transgender people and continues to reinforce the societal idea that transgender people have something medically wrong with them: ‘controlled access to treatment has had a major impact on the gender identities of transsexuals who have been through it… access to treatment is necessary but the price for this in terms of self-determination has historically been a heavy one’ (Monro, 2000). This puts a pressure on transgender people to behave and ‘perform’ their gender in a way that is in line with what medical practitioners want, rather than in a ‘normal’ way, a way that reflects who they actually are. As a result, many transgender people have attempted to take control of the medicalization of their identities and their bodily autonomy by self-medicating, as Israel and Tarver found in their study of transgender people living in their extensive study working with transgender individuals across America: ‘they were frequently resorting to self-medication with black-market hormones’ (1977). However, Monro’s participants recognized the need for medical processes in transitioning, their objection was with the way their identities were pathologized.

reclaim their authority and jurisdiction over intersex, which had come under fire from intersex activism’ (Davis, 2015). This is evidence for the argument that medicalization is more about social control than anything else, despite the fact that medicine is supposedly ‘morally neutral and objective’, as Zola has already critiqued. In the case of intersex people, medicine and medicalization have taken on a narrow view of their bodies, in order to make them fit into the structures our society has in place. IntersexUK, an activist group, raise the point: ‘Despite being born with healthy and functioning bodies in the majority of cases, Intersex children are regularly given forced or coercive sterilization, forced genital and anal examinations, and unnecessary treatment and cosmetic surgery without their consent. These irreversible surgeries are medically unnecessary and are used to make Intersex bodied children conform to ideas of binary sex stereotypes’ (intersexuk. org). Here, intersex people are advocating for themselves and arguing that their bodies are indeed ‘normal’, and therefore here medicalization has been instrumental in furthering the oppression intersex people face, by aiming to alter their natural bodies to conform to societal standards. Here, medicalization pathologizes what is normal due to the fact that ‘the medical model relies on a flawed view of nature, and biomedical knowledge about sex difference reveals much more about dominant gender beliefs than about nature. The medical model conceptualizes disability, transgender, and intersex as problems in need of cure/elimination’ (Hall, 2015).

I believe the case of sex and gender is a perfect example of how medicine as a social institution works in relationship with society in terms of defining what ‘normal’ is. On the position of LGBTQIA+ people, medicine has often taken already existing societal conceptions of these people and behaviours as a starting point. However, as Davis argues “the medical profession holds a unique position at the institutional level of gender structure, where it can either perpetuate or challenge traditional gender ideologies and, in so doing, use its authority either to harm or to help intersex people’ (2015). I would use this to argue the position medicine holds in wider society. The process of either medicalization or demedicalization can be harmful or beneficial depending on the context. While medicine is a powerful social institution and often at the forefront in deciding what is or isn’t ‘normal’ (at least where the bodies and behaviours of the individual are concerned), this does not mean that other social institutions or indeed individuals do not have agency when it comes to medicalization. Individuals in society have attempted to take back control of their bodies and their autonomy by process of self-medicalization. This can take many different forms, such as the example mentioned above of some transgender individuals who acquire hormones on the black market and self medicate. While this can be empowering to individuals, it must be noted that

To explore the medicalization of sex and gender further, I turn now to the example of transgender individuals. If transgender people want medical assistance in transitioning, they are subject to ‘medical gatekeeping (Pellegrino, 1986)’: ‘While trans people who desire sex reassignment surgery and hormone replacement therapy may not perceive these procedures as a cure for “misaligned” sex and gender, they have been forced to submit to a Gender Identity Disorder diagnosis in order to receive permission to access the medical services they need to exercise gender autonomy’ (Hall, 2015). In the UK, the rules state: ‘If you want to have genital reconstructive surgery, you’ll usually first need to live in your preferred gender identity full time for at least a year… the length of the transition period recommended can vary, but it’s usually one to two years. This will allow enough time for you to have a range of experiences in your preferred gender role’ (, 2016). This process of gatekeeping by the 46


Chodoff, Paul. (2002) “The Medicalization Of The Human Condition”. Psychiatric Services 53(5), pp. 627-628. Web. 23 Oct. 2016. Conrad, P. & Schneider, J.W. (1992) Deviance and medicalization: From badness to sickness. 3rd Edition. Philadelphia: Temple Press. Davis, G. (2015). Medical Jurisdiction and the Intersex Body. In: Contesting Intersex: A Dubious Diagnosis, 1st ed. [online] NYU Press, pp.55-86. Available at: http:// [Accessed 25 Oct. 2016]. Fainzang, S. (2013). The Other Side of Medicalization: SelfMedicalization and Self-Medication. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, [online] 37(3), pp.488-504. Hall, K. (2015). Gender. In: R. Adams, B. Reiss and D. Serlin, ed., Keywords for Disability Studies, 1st ed. [online] NYU University Press, pp.89-91. Available at: http://www. [Accessed 25 Oct. 2016]. Israel, G. and Tarver, D. (1997). Transgender care. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Monro, S. (2000). Theorizing transgender diversity: Towards a social model of health. Sexual and Relationship Therapy, [online] 15(1), pp.33-45. Available at: http:// [Accessed 25 Oct. 2016] Pellegrino, E. (1986). Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping. Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy, [online] 2(1), pp.23-45. Available at: cgi?article=1604&context=jchlp [Accessed 25 Oct. 2016]. Preves, S. (2003). Intersex and Identity: The Contested Self, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers university Press, p.2 Reiheld, A. (2010). Patient complains of . . . : How medicalization mediates power and justice. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, [online] 3(1), pp.72-98. Available at: pdf/10.2979/fab.2010.3.1.72.pdf [Accessed 25 Oct. 2016]. Zola, I. (1972). MEDICINE AS AN INSTITUTION OF SOCIAL CONTROL *. The Sociological Review, 20(4), pp.487-504.

it can be hazardous to health. Equally, medicine and medicalization do work in relationship with other social institutions, and what is pathologized and what is not is constantly changing. For example, due to pressures from activist groups such as IntersexUK, the medical institution is slowly starting to change the approach it takes to intersex people, particularly in the treatment and care of intersex children. Whilst I have criticised medicalization in the context of sex and gender throughout this essay, it must also be noted that by giving medical names to these ‘conditions’, the medical profession has at least given legitimacy to them by virtue of acknowledging that they exist. By working with the people that experience sex and gender in these ways, the medical profession has the capacity to lend its authority to de-stigmatisation and empowerment. As illustrated by Monro’s participants, people are not necessarily adverse to the medical process, but are adverse to the way it works in its current form and the implications this has for the way they are viewed in wider society. If medicine worked with people instead of speaking over them, medicalization could work in a way that is beneficial to all involved. In conclusion, we see that medicine as a social institution is not free from cultural biases or norms and values: medicine can never be truly neutral because people are not. As such, it has the power as an institution to perpetuate and make widespread cultural oppressions and ideals that are already in place. One of its pitfalls historically has been that of binary thinking that makes up a great deal of Western society. Healthy/pathological or unhealthy, Normal/ abnormal and right/wrong are all binaries which have crossed paths. With this in mind, where does that leave us in regards to the statement ‘medicalization transforms normal into pathological’? I would argue that medicalization has often pathologized the ‘natural’, and in many cases behaviours or traits that were considered ‘normal’. However, most importantly, medicalization plays a crucial societal role in defining what ‘normal’ is, a power that can be used for better or for worse.

Other: IntersexUK. (2016). Intersex. [online] Available at: http:// [Accessed 25 Oct. 2016]. (2016). Gender dysphoria - Treatment - NHS Choices. [online] Available at: Conditions/Gender-dysphoria/Pages/Treatment.aspx [Accessed 25 Oct. 2016].

Bibliography: Academic: Canguilhem, G., Marrati, P. and Meyers, T. (2008) The Normal and the Pathological. In: Knowledge of life. New York: Fordham University Press.


THEOLOGY AND RELIGION Subject Editor: Bea Fones


Proposing tripartite human existence in light of late medieval painterly prophesies by Hieronymus Bosch written by augusta karlsdottir Life is much like a maze, and so is the painting “The Garden of Earthly Delights.” A captivating work of art, “The Garden of Earthly Delights” never fails to go unnoticed for its elaborate and enticing depictions of humanity. Painted by exceptional Dutch artist, Hieronymus Bosch (1450-1516), it is an infamous work, brimming with soulful insight and imagination. Observe, and one is bewildered, in awe of the precocious and seemingly near-prophetic quality of the painting, strictly classified as a triptych due to its division into three panels. Quite likely the most controversial triptych ever created, The Garden of Earthly Delights portrays three distinctive states of human existence. In this essay, these particular states will be referred to as tripartite human existence, and neatly be summed up as hope, fall, and hell, respectively. This classification leads on to the core of this essay which, from a Christian theological perspective, concerns what it means to be human. In this essay, it will be argued that tripartite human existence follows near-precisely the progression of the three states portrayed in The Garden of Earthly Delights triptych.

example is falling madly in love and forgetting that one has morals; in The Garden of Earthly Delights, a similar amorous immorality is found. According to a classification by Ferguson (1961), nuditas criminalis is also prominent in these panels; that is, the naked state of a human being which expresses lust and vanity (Ferguson, 1961). Customarily, the second panel of the triptych is the largest; twice the size of the first and the third panel. As such, the second panel displays the largest number of people indulging in various acts, most of a highly provocative nature. For a number of reasons, these concupiscent displays are important for the understanding of the second proposed tripartite state of human existence, fall. According to Karl Barth, sexual relations between humans are created out of a need to image the triune God and the personal relationships found between the Father, Son and Spirit (Deane-Drummond and Clough, 2009, pp. 6971) Therefore, perhaps the second panel does not depict strictly excessive indulgence, sin, and human fallenness, but rather an extravagant form of imago Dei in practice. Due to the innocence of the seemingly sinless need to image the triune God, the indulgence will attract human beings; even the most God-fearing, whom in the painting may be enjoying themselves in the act of imaging God. But naturally, such relational acts spin out of control, leading to sins galore and wretched human fallenness. In the case of the individual, such fallenness occurs when the first sin is committed. As stated before, this can happen at any age, is not bound by time and is bound to happen. Thus, it now becomes somewhat clearer why the progression from hope to fall, and thence to hell, is inevitable, for it is a veiled and shrewd path (in certain theological understandings, perhaps one

In the first panel of the tremendous triptych, Adam and Eve are portrayed alongside God in Eden, a vision beautifully drawn on the Genesis narrative. The ethos of purity in Eden forms the first tripartite state of human existence, which is hope. It is a state of purity and innocence wherein a dialogue with God, through either prayer or revelation, is possible and even quite frequent. By inevitable human action (such as will be explained further on with reference to Karl Barth), this pure and sinless state is corrupted, culminating in devastation when hope is overthrown by the state of fall. In the case of an individual life, this occurs when a person inevitably, by their human nature in relation to God, succumbs to some temptation or indulgence. A common 49

the reappearance of hope. This can be understood in such a sense that Bosch, in painting The Garden of Earthly Delights, was perhaps divinely aware of a possibility for escaping the hellish void of suffering. This idea is reminiscent of that proposed by Simone Weil, who, in her book “Waiting for God,” stated reassuringly that, when in the void of debilitating suffering, a human being can continue waiting.

suggests a relationality between non-human animals and human beings comparable between, on the one hand, that of human beings in sexual expression and, on the other, that of the triune God within Itself. The merging of non-human animals with human beings is a particular theological extreme of Western art, contrasted greatly by the iconography of Eastern Orthodoxy. According Esther D. Reed, the presence of animals within Eastern theology is never depicted in such fashion; rather, Orthodox iconographic art usually excludes the explicit portrayal of animals, and instead only implies their presence in the captivating colour and beauty of mountains, rivers, and other landscapes (Reed, 2009, pp. 66-70).

fashioned by the devil), trodden by faith-blinded yet justified humanity (Cortez, 2010). Passionately extravagant and equally perturbing, the third and last panel of the triptych sees fires ravaging a stately city in the distant yet far-reaching background, whilst a white egg-like figure serves to terrify observers of the absurd and excruciating perils of the final tripartite state of human existence. The horrors in the final panel naturally suggest that Hell is a place of eternal damnation, where the fires of God’s love will burn the mistaken and fallen, as well as their cities. The state of hell is one that painfully actualizes the punishment of sins. Yet, despite its horrifying portrayal, the painting oddly seems to suggest that Hell does not spell the end for all human beings. These scenes allow much contemplation on the theological understanding of the proposed tripartite human existence. According to A Handbook of Symbols in Christian Art, the bestiary is “a moralizing natural history of ancient origin, based on the Greek physiologus.” The painting of animals in the Middle Ages and late medieval times drew parallels between their animals and their human counterparts; one represented the morals or lack thereof of another (Sill, 1975, pp. 16-23).

Interestingly, in Western theology, this is known as a reductionist approach. Reed states it thusly: “Orthodoxy’s reply to the question of missing animals is that they are not missing but included within the noble colour of the mountains that is a reflection of the beauty of the kingdom of heaven.” Though their visual expression differs, perhaps the ideological contrast between Western and Eastern theology is not so great as it may initially seem, as both traditions seem to recognize the importance of non-human animals in the great order of creation (Reed, 2009, pp. 70-74).

However, human beings are not the only ones featured in the landscape of the painting. Nonhuman animals are particularly prominent, many of whom are disfigured and disproportionate, exotic and imagined. Their enmeshment with human beings

The chiaroscuro effect of the third panel is not only a painterly master stroke, but also a divine indicator of hope despite hell. In the distant backdrop, skies alight with an unknown brightness seemingly indicating 50

time and any of the three states, art is but the colour and the light of existence, much like the painted and the risen Jesus Christ; the letterset in which the whole of tripartite human existence is written. From the maze of The Garden of Earthly Delights, many theological conclusions on the nature of human existence can be drawn; on what it means to be human. In this essay, tripartite human existence consisting of hope, fall, and hell has been speculated. Further to that, the interplay of beings at the forefront of the triptych, that between human beings and nonhuman animals, has been explained in the context of both Western and Eastern theology. This interplay ties into tripartite human existence in showing that non-human animals are significant in creation, and in forming a unity with human beings and the whole of creation. This essay has merely begun to scratch at the surface of The Garden of Earthly Delights and the fascinating painterly prophecies of Hieronymus Bosch, of which there are many more. Future research on this topic may undoubtedly yield intriguing results which will greatly contribute to the development of theological aesthetics and systematic theology.

Then the insufferable waiting shall cease, for one day, God will expose Himself to the sufferer, and make of them a believer, eternally protected, saved and immersed in His love. The extent of His love is perhaps proven by the ability to inspire hope in the most terrifying of existential situations (and, on a more personal note, to inspire this theological argument). Despite the unimaginable horror of Bosch’s hell, God still inspires love in either the casual observer of the painting, or the analogical sufferer molested and manipulated in the painting. If this thought, a variation on redemption, does not serve to inspire faith and curiosity for God in someone, then not much will (McGrath, 1991). Art may be an exaggeration of life, but it is primarily and more importantly a molding factor in the cognitive and religious experience of a human being in preparation for the tripartite journey of existence. What would our perception of Jesus and the crucifixion be, were it not for any of the myriad artworks depicting his death, suffering, and eventual resurrection? In a more political line of thinking, would the Roman Catholic Church have succeeded in attracting and maintaining billions of followers without its impressive visual displays of its saints, namely the gold-laced figure of gold-hearted Mother Mary? Similarly, though perhaps slightly unbecomingly in this context, it is worth wondering where consumerism would stand, were it not for television commercials and colourful billboards.

Bibliography Boeve, Lieven, Yves de Maeseneer and Ellen van Stichel (eds.) (2014), Questioning the Human: Toward a Theological Anthropology for the Twenty-First Century, New York, NY: Fordham University Press Coakley, Sarah (2013), God, Sexuality and the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Drury, John. Painting The Word. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999. Deane-Drummond, Celia and David Clough (eds.) (2009), Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, London: SCM Press Cortez, Marc (2010), Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed, London: T&T Clark Harrison, Nonna Verna (2010), God’s Many-Splendored Image, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Kelsey, David L. (2009), Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press McGrath, Alister E., Christian Theology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2007. Migliore, Daniel (2014), Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology (3rd edition), Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Robinson, Dominic (2011), Understanding the Imago

This is not to say that art is a driving force of mass mania; such a notion shall, of course, be left to further discussion. The purpose in the questions above is to highlight that art is highly effective in molding human cognition, as well as in providing aesthetic calm and pleasure to the observer, even to the point of a God-like saving of a life. Without art, like God, human existence is feeble at best. For this reason, it is clear that the tripartite theory of human existence is insufficient if lacking the mention of art. Therefore, let us say that tripartite human existence is immersed in and beset with art. Intangible and unlimited by 51

Focus Feature

The last 100 years in retrospect: How has the Political and Cultural Landscape Changed with Trends of Globalisation and Nationalism? Managing Editor: Akash Beri 52

english “We don’t work in Africa”

A case study of Ken Saro-Wiwa’s memoir ‘A Month and A Day’ in the British sphere, in relation to the dawn of the ‘global community’ and its shared responsibility. Nigeria’s military government executed the writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995. Before his death, his activism was known in Britain to the few and the specialised but his murder would prompt international outrage that temporarily threw the plight of the Ogoni people into the Western public sphere, as seen in the 1996 New York Times article “Blood and Oil: A special Report”. Now his memoir A Month and A Day, charting his penultimate arrest, can be studied on a module in the University of Exeter. This book demonstrates that where global activism, world citizenship and shared responsibility meet, both transnational and nationalist thinking are born in equal fervour. Raising questions about global responsibility and whether the complete deconstruction of nationalism is needed to provide the necessary attention to the groups and cultures marginalised and exploited across the world. The formation of communities is a survival strategy fundamental to almost every known culture and civilization (E.O Wilson). But in a world more connected than ever before, with the Internet carrying the details of different cultures and lives across the globe, the illusion that human beings are inherently divided into categories such as ‘the nation’ starts to break down. Ken Saro-Wiwa’s ‘A Month and A Day’ maps the places where activism falls short of total inclusion because of these national divisions. Saro-Wiwa writes, for instance, when he initially approached charity organisations in 1991 to aid the Ogoni people in the fight against exploitation by oil giants Shell and Chevron many were not interested. Greenpeace replied that they “don’t work in Africa” (61). Similarly, when he contacted Survival International and Friends of the Earth he “drew a blank” (64), and Amnesty International did not have the capacity to help

as Saro-Wiwa writes “The Ogoni people were being killed […] – but in an unconventional way. Amnesty was only interested in conventional killings” (61). Whilst to some degree Greenpeace were not working in Africa in 1991 because they were not yet logistically able, national and geographical boundaries clearly play a role here. The statement, as Saro-Wiwa conveys it, “we don’t work in Africa” clearly reveals a perception of the African continent and all its separate nations as one entity. Perhaps, also, a particularly large and intimidating entity when considering the allocation of help. Ruby Wax, in her book – which is somewhat tinged with neo-colonialism – writes that “multi-tasking has driven us mad; like leaving too many windows open on your computer, eventually it will crash. We are simply not equipped for the 21st century. It’s too hard, too fast, it’s too full of fear; we just don’t have the bandwidth” (2). Whilst not the most beautiful of analogies, this begins to articulate one of the reasons globalisation is problematic in terms of activism, and can lead to nationalist thinking. Additional responsibility means an additional strain on your resources. The Internet allows us to read about exploitation and cruelty around the world, and each person - or each organisation like Greenpeace - can only stretch themselves so far. It is arguably these questions of nationalistic perspectives versus the transnational that have been seen in the US elections and in the UK during and following the Brexit campaign. But as Saro-Wiwa writes, Britain shares responsibility for the destruction of Ogoniland - “It was British colonialism which forced alien administrative structures on us and herded us into the domestic colonialism of Nigeria” (50). Furthermore, Ashley Dawson contends that the “ideologies of difference and innate superiority [of British colo53


Define and discuss the use of rhetoric in relation to Donald Trump’s election campaign. Aristotle introduced the classical concept of rhetoric as the art of persuasion through the use of language (Aristotle 2010). By this definition, rhetoric is a pervasive force in the political landscape, with prospective leaders seeking to gain support through their delivery of words. The 2016 US Presidential Election has exposed ‘one of the most effective practitioners of persuasive rhetoric the political world has seen’, Donald J. Trump (Romm 2016). This essay will explore Trump’s use of rhetoric, namely classical Aristotelian devices – logos, ethos and pathos (Herrick 2015) – as well as the recurring themes and rhetorical frames that pervaded his campaign (de Bruijn 2016).

Works Cited

nialism] were far harder to dismantle than the political-economic system of imperial preference” (6). In its 21st year since publication, ‘A Month and A Day’ is a text on a module in a UK university, and elements of the book itself seem to indicate that it was intended to be read by people from outside Nigeria and Ogoniland. In the preface, Saro-Wiwa takes pains to explain that “to the Ogoni, the land and the people are one and are expressed as such in our language” (2). The text invites the international community into the world of the Ogoni, and seeks to foster greater understanding between these different cultures through appreciation, understanding and acceptance of that difference. ‘A Month and A Day’, thrust into our immediate academic and cultural sphere, forces us to ask what changes we could all make to help marginalised peoples fight against global companies, is it our responsibility to do so and, fundamentally, will we make these changes?

“BBC World Service - Witness, The Execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa.” BBC News. BBC, 20 Nov. 2013. Web. 12 Feb. 2017. Dawson, Ashley. Mongrel Nation: Diasporic Culture and the Making of Postcolonial Britain. Ann Arbor, the University of Michigan press, 13 July 2007. Okwoche, Peter. “Nigeria Ogoniland Oil Clean-up ‘could Take 30 Years’.” BBC News. BBC, 04 Aug. 2011. Web. 12 Feb. 2017. Lewis, Paul. “BLOOD AND OIL: A Special Report.;After Nigeria Represses, Shell Defends Its Record.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 12 Feb. 1996. Web. 12 Feb. 2017. Wax, Ruby Sane New World:Taming the Mind. London, United Kingdom, Hodder & Stoughton General Division, 27 Feb 2014. Wilson, E. O. “Why Humans Hate.” Newsweek. Newsweek, 02 Apr. 2012. Web. 12 Feb. 2017.

written by Chloe Jaques and 54

Ilona Weir

indecisive, incapable and ‘stupid’: ‘they don’t have a clue’; ‘they can’t lead’. Meanwhile, Trump states that he made ‘all the right predictions on Iraq’ (Donald J. Trump for President 2015), displaying his ‘prophetic qualities’ (Mercieca 2015). In this way, Trump constructs himself as a leader who ‘rejects restraints’ and transcends the capabilities of the political establishment (ibid 2015), an idea welcomed by many Americans tired of political elitism. His support is thus intensified by the idea that ‘paradoxically… Trump’s followers see anyone who opposes him as members of the establishment: the louder these opponents raise their voices against Trump, the more they serve Trump’s purposes’ (de Bruijn 2016).

Aristotle’s Artistic Proofs are observable throughout Trump’s political campaign. Trump’s heightened use of ethos, persuasion through character, and pathos, persuasion through emotion, enables him to abandon logos, logical argumentation and reasoning: ‘demagogues make arguments based on false claims and appeal to emotion, rather than reason… Trump doesn’t seem all too concerned with the facts’ (Mercieca 2015). Conforming to traditional values by establishing himself as a family man and ‘a very nice person’ (TIME 2015) increases his social legitimacy and likeability; as da Nobrega notes ‘liking and social proof are very strongly related’ (2014). Moreover, in presenting his leadership qualities and economic prosperity, Trump portrays himself as a demagogue, creating a ‘direct link’ between his presidential self and the restoration of America to its ‘former greatness’ (Leth et al 2016). Binding himself with American exceptionalism, Trump denounces his critics as those who will not contribute to the American Dream, strongly appealing to public patriotism (Mercieca 2015).

Whilst Trump’s campaign branding makes clear his contempt for political discourse, he cleverly makes use of rhetorical techniques under the guise of unscripted speech; as Thompson notes, ‘anti-rhetoric… can be the most persuasive move of all’ (2016). Furthermore, Trump is able to excuse his sexist discourse by reiterating his rhetorical frame of American decline (de Bruijn 2016): ‘this country is in big trouble… we don’t win anymore, we lose to everybody’ whilst dismissing his misogynistic comments as menial and unimportant: ‘it’s fun… we have a good time’ (David Knight 2016). This use of meta-framing, namely acknowledging criticism without directly addressing it, allows him to reject critics as ‘politically correct’ (de Bruijn 2016). Moreover, Trump’s employment of enthymeme allows him to construct points without clear definition; leaving statements ambiguous further enables Trump to renounce accountability on the basis that no explicit comment was made, for example remarks about Megyn Kelly and the ‘blood coming out of her… wherever’ (Team Trump Comms 2015). By utilising rhetorical devices, Trump consistently rejects denunciation whilst reiterating the appeal of his political brand: he can ‘say anything and get away with it’ (Parton 2015).

Aside from classical depictions, rhetoric is often defined with negative connotations; political language is carefully constructed in a stylised form, politicians delivering elaborate words with little substance (Romm 2016). Throughout his campaign, Trump separates himself from the political establishment by condemning his rival candidates, presenting them as

In conclusion, Thompson notes that with ‘group identity giving way’, individual politicians and their characters become ever ‘more personal’ (2016). This 55

Donald J. Trump for President. “Donald Trump Presidential Announcement Full Speech 6/16/15 | Donald J. Trump for President.” YouTube, 16 June 2015, https:// Herrick, James A. History and Theory of Rhetoric: An Introduction. Routledge, 7 Aug. 2015. Mercieca, Jennifer. “The Rhetorical Brilliance of Trump the Demagogue.” Huffington Post, 12 Dec. 2015. Parton, Heather D. “Why Donald Trump Can Say Anything and Get Away with It.” Alternet, 29 July 2015. Team Trump Comms. “Donald Trump on Megyn Kelly: “There was blood coming out of her wherever.”” YouTube, 7 Aug. 2015, watch?v=M28z9y4yT6Y Thompson, Mark. “From Trump to Brexit Rhetoric: How Today’s Politicians Have Got Away With Words.” The Guardian, 27 Aug. 2016. TIME, Staff. “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech.” TIME, 16 June 2015.

is evident throughout Donald J. Trump’s rise to presidential office, with classical rhetorical devices such as Aristotle’s Artistic Proofs largely contributing to the campaign’s success. As Mercieca highlights, ‘scrutinizing Trump’s rhetorical skills can partially explain his profound and persistent appeal’ (2015); in exploring Trump’s use of rhetorical techniques, particularly his divisive, fear-mongering narrative, demagogical anti-rhetoric and the framed depiction of America in crisis, it is possible to see how Trump has maintained the support of the disillusioned. Works Cited Aristotle. Rhetoric. Cosimo, 1 Jan. 2010. da Nobrega, J. V. “Discourse Analysis: Ronald Reagan’s Evil Empire Speech.” Open Journal of Modern Linguistics, vol. 04, no. 01, 2014, pp. 166–181, 10.4236/ojml.2014.41014. David Knight. “Megyn Kelly V Donald Trump: How It All Began!” YouTube, 28 Jan. 2016, com/watch?v=fnibTaKx4P4 de Bruijn, Hans. “Donald Trump’s Rhetoric: An Analysis of His Frames.” Trouw, 27 Feb. 2016.

wrtten by Tara Klein

international relations In a year of whirlwind politics with seismic election outcomes, such as ‘Brexit’ and Donald Trump’s unexpected ascent to become President of the United States, no two themes have been at the forefront of international politics more so than globalization and nationalism. In the past century, the development of globalization and increased interconnectedness between countries across the world has created numerous benefits to the economies and the peoples of nations worldwide- both developed and developing. Nationalism, like a wave, has been mutable in its form yet constant in its nature, and its omnipresence in political affairs has meant that it is continuously able to disrupt the traditional political establishment – the past twelve months the best possible epitome. The two trends have been decisive in how modernity has been moulded thus far, and the developments of both nationalism and globalization shall be crucial in framing the future of the international political landscape.

Europe. The first half of the the 20th century- where nationalism had been widespread and merciless in its nature- thus created a segregated and discriminatory society that had set precedent for the global political landscape. A decline in the intensity, and volume, of the aforementioned wartime nationalism during the post-war period evidenced the creation of a gradually more liberal and progressive society in Europe. The introduction of the British Nationality Act in 1948, which gave the subjects of the British Empire the right to live and work in the UK, evidences the first steps of Britain’s globalist policy which would create a more inclusive political, and cultural, landscape. The gradual onset of a globalized world in the post-war era – with the creation of organizations such as the World Trade Organization and United Nations – evidences the making of a interconnected and interdependent world wherein co-operation between countries became more imperative than before. The landscape in developed countries is today far more rosy: the number of people living in poverty in the developing world has dropped by over 30% in the last 35 years. Unlike the prevalent xenophobia and radical nationalism during the World Wars, modernity has clearly established a globalized world from which the majority of countries internationally can benefit.

Humanity does not need reminding of the atrocities that occurred during World Wars I and II. It had been the gargantuan sentiments of nationalism and national pride – or national egocentrism, as it may be better termed – that underpinned the rise of belligerents such as the Nazis. This trend of nationalism was the most aggressive possible, and years were spent attempting to halt the juggernauts that would slaughter millions in the aim for national supremacy across


Nationalism, especially in the past decade, never fails


box, but through violence too; Germany saw a 77% rise in hate and racially-fuelled crimes between 2014 and 2015. The efforts of Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, self-transformed from political outsiders to triumphant politicians, have created a populist-driven political upheaval that has disrupted the natural order of the establishment and ongoing globalist policies. The next century will see the fierce dichotomy between nationalists and globalists continue, and will bring with it a turbulent, transforming and highly unpredictable political landscape – just like in 2016.

to mobilize significant numbers of a country’s population in order to achieve a common goal- usually bound in the form of protectionism. Figures show that nationalism both in Europe and globally is on an upward trend: the Eurosceptic Freedom Party of Austria has doubled its share of the public vote since 2006, and within the first four years of its existence the anti-immigrant Alternative für Deutschland party has propelled itself to the forefront of German politics; defeating Angela Merkel’s party in 2016 regional elections. Overseas, Trump’s victory was a symbol of mounting discontent at globalist policies enacted by the establishment – a Gallup poll in the summer of 2016 showed that 82% of Americans were ‘dissatisfied with the way things are going in the United States’ , as the thought of a protectionist and isolationist country has gradually become more appealing. What tone does the upsurge in nationalism and increased hostility to globalization then set for the next decade? Citizens are not only translating their discontent with the establishment through the ballot

written by Thomas Smith

social sciences

Ultimately, social discontent, exacerbated by socio-economic changes, will challenge the traditional sources of identity around class and the nation, discharging xenophobic and nationalistic currents (Delanty and O’Mahony 167), a trend that can already be observed in the rise of right-wing parties in Europe and Britain (Butt 1); a movement that may evolve into stronger right-wing radicalism in the near future.

Works Cited Bekerman, Zvi and Thomas Geisen. International Handbook of Migration, Minorities and Education. New York: Springer, 2012. Web. Butt , Ahsan . “What does globalization mean for nationalism?” 7 May 2012. Asian Correspondent. Web. 19 January 2017. Delanty , Gerard and Patrick O’Mahony. Nationalism and Social Theory: Modernity and the Recalcitrance of the Nation. 1st. London: SAGE, 2002. PDF. Natrajan, Balmurli and John Tomlinson. “Masking and Veiling Protests : Culture and Ideology in Representing Globalization.” Cultural Dynamics 15.2 (2003): 213–235. Web.

The fear that foreigners could possibly change a state’s culture leads to the renaissance of a widely-supported view, that for example immigration should be limited as well as an increased national sense to guard cultures and traditions from mingling or adopting new social structures. For example, Russian poses a threat to Estonian and it now is an official government policy to maintain and develop Estonian language and culture (Bekerman and Geisen 208).

written by Arvian Hesketh

of globalisation, however, it is not enough. It is not migration, but technology, they claim futilely. Technological innovations are making menial jobs obsolete. Clamping down on migration is easier than trying to control technology: borders can be tightened, walls can be built.

Following the atrocities that the world suffered in the early and mid-20th century, we vowed ‘never again.’ We began forming alliances and treaties, allowing for increased trade and interdependence. Globalisation is how we ensure ‘never again,’ its proponents claimed. However, globalisation has led to a fracturing within society, creating divisions echoing those present in the 20th century prior to the start of World War Two. Divisions are no longer along socio-economic lines, but rather along support for globalisation.

Without migration and dependence on foreign countries, there would be no economic problems, their political leaders chant. Heralding nationalist slogans and advocating isolationism, their leaders prey on the ‘us vs. them’ dichotomy present: they are stealing our jobs, they are the reason our economy is doing poorly. The only way to solve this issue is through getting rid of them. Doing so, they claim, is the only way to save the country.

Traditionally supported by conservative social blue and white-collared workers who are under-educated or semi-educated, the centre right has begun to look for a scapegoat, enraged by the economic loss they have suffered as a result of this free flow of culture and trade. Increased migration and technological advances has led to a decrease in socio-economic status for this group, leading them to turn to anti-establishment movements, blaming migration for the increased unemployment and demand for cheaply produced foreign goods. Supporters of globalisation try and tout the benefits

Globalisation characterises a world that is becoming more and more interdependent, not only economically, but also socially and culturally. It also can lead towards increased nationalism. In today’s world, people have more mobility than ever before, with air travel allowing long journeys to be travelled within only hours. This development brings together individuals from myriads of backgrounds and over time will inevitably lead to a multicultural community. However, multiculturalist states threaten nationalist ideology; as persistent migration erodes the notion of a nation-state, it challenges the significance of a common cultural heritage. A growing universal culture implies the loss of national culture, a concern amongst many protestors against globalisation (Tomlinson qtd. in Natrajan and 217). These anxieties, in turn, foster nationalist thinking.

To combat this rise in nationalism and ensure that ‘never again’ does not become ‘once a century,’ it is important to look towards the true reasons behind economic instability, and not use minorities as a scapegoat once again.

written by Zaina Al-Bahrani 58


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The Undergraduate Volume 4, Issue 1  

The seventh issue of the University of Exeter's leading independent, interdisciplinary academic journal. Featuring essays written by student...