Photo by Matthew Brady / National Archive
The 1860 Japanese embassy to the United States, posing with Americans in Washington, D.C.
the U.S.-Japan relationship, has also gone through all sorts of vicissitudes. Being very modest at first, suffering under discrimination, being imprisoned, but then miraculously turning into the model minority in the ’60s and ’70s. One thing I’d like to stress here is that whenever you talk about U.S.-China relations or U.S.-Japan relations or U.S.-Mexico relations, it’s assumed that there’s an equality there. Formally and technically there is an equality, but one of the things that you look at when you see the U.S.-Japan relationship over the last 150 years is the relative power differential between the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. has always, in this situation, been
“The U.S. has always...
been the more powerful power; Japan in some ways has always been proactive and retroactive.” the more powerful power, and Japan in some ways has always been proactive and retroactive. Where it steps out of that is the 1920s and ’30s and ’40s, where [Japan] tries to forge its own kind of future, often in opposition to the established empires of England and France and the United States. It’s the U.S. that usually takes the initiative in many cases, whether it’s Commodore Perry or so on. So the Kanrin Maru has to
12
THE COMMO N WE AL TH
be seen in that context, as a response to what was American influence. You can tell I’m a professor here, because I’m trying to give you all of the nuances. You’re talking about U.S.-Japan relations; you can’t overlook all these other factors. Russia’s a factor, China’s a factor. Commodore Perry and the Americans, were they really interested in Japan? Well, they were interested. There are certainly some folks who were interested; they sent letters of petitions to President Fillmore and so on. But largely speaking, at that time, America was in rivalry with the leading empire: England. And they wanted a slice of the China market, so Japan was, in a way, a very convenient stopover point to “The Big Apple.” You have to kind of see U.S.-Japan relations in a larger context of East Asian relations, U.S.-East Asian relations. Russia is not too far out of the picture. Even today, when we start talking about U.S.-Japan relations, China is always that big elephant in the room. You can’t overlook it; it can’t simply be defined as a U.S.-Japan bilateral situation. That’s the big picture; let’s talk about the little picture. The United States begins to take the initiative in the 1850s, when President Fillmore sends Commodore Perry with a fleet of eight vessels to Japan, which eventuates in this Treaty of Konagawa in 1854, which compelled the Japanese to open two treaty ports to the Americans. Now, the [agreement] that was probably more important than even the opening was the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1858. This in a way laid the basis for what was eventually going to become probably
ap ril/may 2011
the most important part of this U.S.-Japan relationship. It’s about money, it’s about trade, it’s about commerce, it’s about people exchanging goods and services over time. The U.S. consul [to Japan], Townsend Harris, was able to negotiate a very advantageous type of agreement. He had no military force, and this is another reason why we have to look at the larger context. How was Townsend Harris able to do this? He pointed to what the British and the French were doing. What were the French doing in Indochina? They were creating an empire. What were the British doing in China? They were fighting the so-called Arrow War [aka the Opium War]. So Townsend Harris simply said, “I’ll be the good cop. You make a deal with me and we won’t impose these terrible things that the French and the British are doing to the Chinese and the Vietnamese.” So the Japanese said, “Yes, let’s do that. Let’s do it the nice way. Let’s not do it the hard way.” One of the results of this was the development of the port of Yokohama of 1860. Mostly, the shogunate didn’t really want to deal with the Americans, but the Americans were very forceful. The shogunate was the samurai government established by the Tokugawa family in 1600. It’s at this crossroads in 1859 that they were going to send their very first delegation abroad. Part of it was to secure ratification of this treaty that had, in some ways, been foisted on them and kind of strong-armed by Townsend Harris. ... [As for who made the decision to accept the treaty,] it’s a highly debated issue. It was debated at the highest ranks. I think the man in charge of Japan at that time was Hotta Masayoshi [a powerful figure in the Tokugawa shogunate], and he was probably the person who actually gave the “yes” to [the Harris treaty]. He was more willing. He thought that it would be better to negotiate a bad agreement than not to negotiate anything and face a war. So this is kind of the lesser of the two evils. Do you vote for Barbara Boxer, or do you pick Carly? You know? Hotta had to make that decision for Japan. He was a realist. I think he served Japan well. Ω This program was made possible by the generous support of Levi Strauss & Co.