Legal Notes:
Thomas Drechsler, Esq. Byrne & Drechsler, L.L.P., Counsel to Members of the Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association
“LEGAL THOUGHTS”
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here are two recent cases worthy of note to those in the law enforcement field from our Supreme Judicial Court, one of which involved Boston Police Officers at the Dorchester District Court. In a recent decision in Commonwealth vs. Roland R (a juvenile), 448 Mass. 278 (2007), the Supreme Judicial Court examined the issues of privacy and reasonable suspicion arising from a search of a bag by a court officer at the courthouse entrance. In this particular instance an individual attempted to enter the courthouse and was compelled, as is the case with all individuals except for licensed attorneys or uniformed police officers, to remove all items from his pockets, place them on a tray, along with his bags, to be screened by an x-ray device. There are signs posted at the front entrance of the courthouse (and all courthouses) informing all who enter that their bags are subject to a manual search. Apparently court officers in the Dorchester Court, and perhaps other courts, in the course of conducting those searches look not only for weapons but other contraband which is barred from the courthouse such as drugs or food. In this particular instance the court officer informed the juvenile who had made it successfully through the electronic metal detector that his bag was going to be searched manually. The juvenile then picked up his bag and left the building. The court officer approached a Boston Police Officer who then approached the juvenile outside the courthouse about 7 or 8 feet from the screening station. When the officer said to the juvenile, “Hey, come here” the juvenile turned and ran. Other officers then pursued the juvenile without knowing the reason for the chase. Id. at 280. After pursuing the juvenile for about 3 to 5 minutes through yards and over fences, several officers apprehended him and gave him Miranda warnings in response to which the juvenile stated that he was running because of “what was in the bag.” The officers then searched the bag and found drugs. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the initial search as a lawful administrative search affirming that area entry inspections of courthouses for safety and security purposes are clearly permissible without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing or danger. The Court ruled that the juvenile gave implicit consent to the inspection when he approached the security area and placed the bag on the table, particularly in light of the signs in the area. Most significantly, the Court held that the juvenile was not entitled to withdraw his consent to the search once he placed the bag on the court table. Id. at 280. The Court, in upholding the search, simply indicated that any other ruling would “jeopardize courthouse safety” Id. at 281, as it might encourage people to make “multiple attempts” to enter the courthouse with www.bppa.org
illegal items pulling the bag back each time it became apparent that the bag might be manually searched. The Court cited the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in ruling that once you begin the courthouse screening process it’s reasonable to complete it. Id. The Court also rejected a challenge to the scope of the anticipated search based upon the fact that security officers were looking for food and drugs in addition to the stated purpose of seeking weapons. In rejecting that challenge the Court emphasized the fact that the primary purpose behind the security checkpoints is to check for weapons or other dangerous materials. The fact that officers are then instructed to look for other contraband during the course of that search to prevent it from entering the courthouse does not automatically render the search unreasonable. Id. at 284. The Court cited the strong public interest in keeping public buildings safe and sanitary. The Court then moved on to the issue of the pursuit of the juvenile. The Court held that the court officers and Boston Police Officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that the juvenile, based on his actions in retrieving the bag once he was notified of the search, was in possession of some contraband. Once the juvenile took off in response to the officer’s request to “Hey, come here” there was “a reasonable suspicion
based on specific articulable facts and reasonable inferences that the juvenile had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.” Id. at 284. The Court thus reversed the lower court’s order allowing the motion to suppress and entered an order denying that motion.
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he second case of note is that of Commonwealth vs. Keith J. Considine, 448 Mass. 295 (2007) in which private hotel security and teachers at a private school searched the hotel rooms used by students during a school-sponsored recreational ski trip. Students who participated in the trip were aware that they were required to surrender the keys to their room to a chaperone when they left the room and were not permitted to be in their room without a chaperone during daytime hours. Students also were aware of a general school rule that granted private school personnel the right to inspect their lockers at any time if the administration “believes that the content of any locker is not in the best interests of the school.” There were, of course, also other rules generally prohibiting possession of drugs, alcohol or other illegal substances, and finally a provision that the school rules would apply to field trips. The search arose when one of the chaperones decided to
check on some students who appeared to be in the room unchaperoned. They searched the room carefully and found alcohol as well as drugs and drug paraphernalia. They then called the State Police. The legality of the search was upheld because the Supreme Judicial Court basically ruled that the constitutional requirements of reasonable suspicion or probable cause simply do not apply in the private school context. Noting that “the Fourth Amendment applies to searches by school officials in public schools,” Id. at 298 and cases cited, the Court ruled that these protections do “not apply to searches conducted by persons who are not state agents.” As you may know, as a general rule evidence found by private parties is generally admissible unless they were acting at the direction of or in conjunction with or at the instigation of state officials. Id. at 298-299. Although the State Trooper entered the room in the course of his official duties, he only entered the room “pursuant to the consent conferred by the school authorities” whom the Court ruled were “in control of the room.” In this decision the Court further defined the border between searches which are conducted by private authorities versus those conducted by agents of the state.
TPF Retirement Party – 1970’s PAX CENTURION • January/February 2007 • Page B11