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s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20311208 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S)

d. (S/NF) Timeline from May 2001 to 11 September 2001: In May 2001,UBL told detaineehe intendedto use him as his contactwith the group basedin the US. UBL asked detaineeto relay to Atta the need to be patient and to follow instructions. When detainee preparedto leave Afghanistan, he askedKSM to help facilitate his travel. KSM informed detaineethat he could obtain a valid Saudi passportfor him and that detaineeshould travel to Pakistanto obtain this passport. Upon learning that KSM could obtain a passport,detainee expressedhis intent to usethis passportto travel to the US; however,UBL forbadedetainee from doing so, becausehe did not want to risk compromising the planned operation. In June 2001, detainee^leftAfghanistan and traveled to Karachi, PK, where he met KSM at the Mahran Hotel." KSM had made Abd al-Rahim Gulam Rabbani aka (Abu Rahmah) aka (SayyidAmin), ISN US9PK-001460DP(PK-1460),responsiblefor detainee'stravel.3aKSM gavedetaineea Saudipassportin the nameof HasanAli al-Assiri and a ticket to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (MY), where detaineewas scheduledto meet Atta. Detaineealsoreceived $5,000USD from Atef for his travel to Malaysia. Detaineearrived in Malaysia approximately6 June2001.35While there,h! stayedat the Hotel Corona,appliedfor a Yemeni passport,and contactedAtta to inform him that detaineewas awaiting Atta's arrival in Kuala Lumpur. Atta informed detaineethat he was unable to travel becausehe was busy waiting for the arrival of the other 15 Saudi hijackers in the planned attacksagainstthe US. Detaineeremainedin Malaysia for threeweeks.'o DetaineephonedKSM to advisehim that Atta could not make the meeting. KSM instructeddetaineeto return to Germany.3T (S/A{F) On 8 July 2001,detaineetraveledfrom Hamburg,GM, to Reus,Spain(SP),to meet with Atta.38 Detaineehad no contactwith anyone else. Detaineetold Atta that there was no pressureon the date for the US attacks,but askedAtta to give him a week or two advance notice becauseUBL wanted detaineeto travel to Afghanistan to tell him the date before the attacksoccurred. Atta told detaineethat all the non-pilots had arrived in the US from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia without problems. Upon their arrival in the US, Atta divided the non-pilotsinto four teams,basedon their English ability. Atta also told detainee that the targetswere the World Trade Center,the Pentagon,and the US Capitol. Detainee said he knew Atta had been given the targetsby UBL and Atef before Atta left Afghanistan. If they (the hijackers) could not reachtheir targets,they were to simply crash the aircraft.3e Detaineetold Atta that UBL had sueeestedthat the teamsinside the aircraft durins the " TD-314/38347-02 to TD-3r4r4r052-02 tt TD-3r4141138-02 'u TD-3r4/3834i-02 t' TD-3r4r4n38-02 t' TD-3| 4r 40345-02, TD-3r 4nl 4 l 5-03, TDr3| 4-38347 -02 tn tD-3 l4lr 1753-03. TD-3r4rr43r4-03

6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I / 2O3II2O8

Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah Bin al Shibh  

3. (sruD JTF-GTMOAssessment: JTF-GTMO-CDR CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON:E.O. 12958,AS AMENDED,SECTION1.4(C) DECLASSIFYON: 20311208 S...

Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah Bin al Shibh  

3. (sruD JTF-GTMOAssessment: JTF-GTMO-CDR CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON:E.O. 12958,AS AMENDED,SECTION1.4(C) DECLASSIFYON: 20311208 S...

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