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8 December2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander.United StatesSouthernCommand.3511 NW 9lst Avenue. M i a m i ,F L 3 3 1 7 2 SUBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S)

JTF-GTMO DetaineeAssessment 1. (S/NF) Personal Information: o o

o o . o

JDIMSA{DRC ReferenceName: Ramzi Muhammad Abdullah Bin al-Shibh Aliases and Current/TrueName: Ramzi Mohamed Abdellah Omar. Umar al-Yemeni. Abu [Jbaydahal-Hadrami. Hasan Ali al-Assiri. Ahad Sabet Placeof Birth: Hadramawt.Yemen (YM) Date of Birth: 0l May 1972 Citizenship: Yemen IntemmentSerialNumber (ISN): US9YM-010013DP

2. lVtFOUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health.

3. (sruD JTF-GTMOAssessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommendsthis detaineefor ContinuedDetention Under DoD Control (CD). b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detaineewas a significantmemberof al-Qaidawho was selectedto be the "coordinator" for the 11 September2001 attacks. Detaineemet with many high-level al-Qaida leaders,attendedmilitant training at the requestof Usama Bin Laden (UBL), and planned future operationsuntil his capturein late 2002. JTF-GTMO determined this detaineeto be:



S E C RE T / / NOFORN/ I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:CombatantStatusReviewTribunalInput andRecommendation for Continued (S) DetentionUnderDoD Control(CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010013DP o o o 4. (SruD

A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threatto the US, its interestsand allies. A MEDIUM threat from a detentionperspective. Of HIGH intelligencevalue. Account of Detainee'sTimeline:

The following section is based on a consolidation of several accountsfrom various significant individuals in order to assemblea feasible timeline. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detaineecamefrom a religious family and becameinterestedin his religion at the ageof 12. During the 1994civil war in Yemen,when detaineewas about 22 yearsold, he fought for two months in support of the government. In 1995, after a failed attemptto obtain a visa to the US, detaineetraveledto Munich, Germany(GM), wherehe appliedfor asylum. From 1995-1997while awaitingtle outcomeof his asylumpetition, he lived in Hamburgunder the nameof Umar al-Yemeni.' Detaineewas reportedlyseenin Bosnia (BK) during the summerof 1996.' In No'ue-ber 1997,after learninghis Germany asylum requestwas denied, detaineetraveled to Yemen to obtain a studentvisa at the German embassyin Sanaa,YM. Subsequently,he returnedto Germany where he described himself as a recluse,never dating or attendingparties. He alsonotedhe was a poor student who received failing grades. It was around this time that detaineemoved in with Mohammad al-Amir Awad al-Sayyid Atta' aka (Muhammad Atta), and they began their close relationship.oOn 31 January1998,detainee'sappeal-request for asylumwas deniedand he was declaredsubject to arrest(NFD. Detaineeremained in Germany living with Muhammad Atta until September1999,when detaineemoved out.5 b. (S/NF) Recruitment and Early Timeline for the 11 September operation: ln late 1999, detainee,Muhammad Atta, Ziad Samir Jarrah,and Marwan Yousef Mohammad Rashid al-Shehhiplanned to travel as a group to Chechnyafor jihad.o While traveling by train from Hamburg to Bonn, GM, detaineeand al-Shehhi spoke about Chechnyawith Khalid al-Masri. Khalid al-Masri gave them the phone number of Mohamedou Ould Slahi aka (Abu Musab),ISN US9MR-000760DP(MR-760), and identified him as a personwho could facilitatetheir travel to Chechnya.Detaineeand al-Shehhivisited MR-760 at his home

'tyo-zvtzgzqq-oz 'ro-ztqrufir-03 3 to-3t+/o:617-03 o to-zrurzg344-02 s to4tqrc67z6-02 '

Analyst Note: Atta, Jarrah, and al-Shehhi were all participants in the 9/11 attacks.

2 S E C R E T // NOFORN I / 2O3II2O8

S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S) in Duisburg, GM. MR-760 informed them it would be very difficult for them to travel to Chechnya,via Georgia becauseof their Arab appearance.MR-760 recommendeddetainee and al-Shehhi attempt to enter Chechnya,via Afghanistan (AF). MR-760 also instructed them to obtain visas for Pakistan(PK), after which the group would be told how to travel to Afghanistan.t ln Nouember 1999,detainee and,Ziad,Samir Jarrahwent to the Pakistani Embassyin Frankfurt, GM, and obtained a one month visa. Muhammad Atta and al-Shehhi obtainedPakistani visas from the Pakistani Embassyin Berlin, GM. MR-760 then instructed the detaineeand the three other men to travel to Karachi, PK, and from there to Quetta,PK, into Afghanistan. Detaineedid not seeMR-760 againafter that time.8 (S/A{F) In late Novemberor December I999,uff lou, men traveledto Afghanistan separately. Al-Shehhi was the first to leave. Prior to leaving, he gave both detaineeand Jarrah$1,500USD to financetheir travel. Jarrahand Atta travelednext, followed by the detainee.Within the last few weeksof 1999,detaineetraveledfrom Hamburg,GM, via Turkey, to Karachi, and then to Quetta,where he stayedfour days before entering Afghanistan.n All four membersof the group traveled to Afghanistan with the intention of receiv,ingal-Qaidabasic military training beforeproceedingto Chechnyato participatein jihad. '' By the time detaineearrivedat a guesthousein Kandahar,detaineebelievedthat alShehhihad alreadydecidedto swearbayat(an oath to allegiance)to UBL.rr Detaineealso leamed that Atta and Jarrahwere at the UBL military camp near the Kandahar airport and that they had alreadymet with, and pledgedbayat to, UBL.12 (S/A{F) Detaineesaidhis initial audiencewith UBL was with a group of about 15 others, including al-Qaida military commanderAbu Hafs al-Masri aka (Muhammad Atef, deceased), Muhammad Atta, Jarrah,and UBL's chief bodyguard,Abdullah Abd al-Qadir Tabarak,ISN US9MO-000056DP(MO-056, transferred).'' When detaineemet with UBL the secondtime, UBL askeddetaineeabout his intentions. Detaineeexplained to UBL that he was currently living in Germany,but wanted to go to Chechnyato fight in jihad. UBL askeddetaineeif he wanted to work with him, to which detaineerespondedin the In January2000, detaineemet UBL a third time during a dinner that was also attendedby Atta and Janah. At this time, Atta and Jarrahencourageddetaineeto considerpledging bayat to UBL. Two days after this dinner, UBL requesteda short personalmeeting with detainee,at which time ' to 3 u r3g344-02,TD-314 n0479-03,TD/3I 4 -40242 -02 t fo4ruA0242-02,The 9-11Commission Report24-Jul-2003 t to-zrurzg344-02 'o TD-314/t0419-03 " TD-314/10479-03 t2to-31+/38344-02 '3 tr-3t+/38344-02 ta to4vlto4Tg-03


S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SLIBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal lnput and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S) detaineepledgedbayatr5and declaredthat giving his life for the causewas acceptable.UBL told detaineeto return to.Germany and that Muhammad Atef would give detaineethe specificsof the mission.'o tlBL chosedetainee,Atta, Jarrah,and al-Shehhi,for the Hamburg,GM, group (a referencetothe core membersof the 9/11 hijackers),and designated Atta as the leaderof the operation." [n early 2000, Atef told detainee,Atta, and Jarrahthat they were undertaking a very secretmission and that they were to immediately travel back to Germanyand begin applyng to flight schools.l8Al-Shehhi had alreadymet with Atef and had left Afghanistanfor Pakistanby the time this c. (S/NF) Timeline from February 2000 to March 2001: In February2000, detainee traveled to Karachi, PK, with Atta. While there, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), ISN US9KU-010024DP(KU-10024), instructeddetainee,Atta, and al-Shehhifor approximately 10 days on how to behavelike a US citizen and gave them generalinformation on life in the US.20 h Germany, Atta, detainee,al-Shehhi,and Jarrahbegan looking for flight schoolsin Europe,but learnedthat Europeanflight schoolswere very expensiveand involved a very long training period. Detaineethen consideredapplyingto flight schoolsin the US, because they were less expensive,of shorterduration, and not as rigorous. Al-Shehhi traveled to the United Arab Emirates (AE) and received a US visa from the US Embassyin Dubai in February 2000.21h August 2000, detaineetraveled from Frankfurt, GM, to Sanaa,YM, via Dubai, AE.22During detainee'sshort time in the United Arab Emirates,he attemptedto apply for a US visa and to meetwith KSM's nephew,Ammar al-Baluchi,ISN US9PK01001SDP (PK- I 0018) (NFD.23Detaineestayedin Sanaafor four weeks,but failed to receivea reply from a flight schoolin Florida to which he had appliedfor training. While in Sanaa,detaineewent to the British Embassyand obtained a five-month visa to the United Kingdom. Detaineestatedthat he did this in an effort to improve his chancesof obtaining a US visa.2aDetaineereportedlywent to London in order to find a wife or obtain a false passportto help him gain entry to the US to participate in the 11 Septemberterrorist attacks.

" TD-3r4/38344-02 'u TD-314/lo479-03, " TD-314I t7 902-04,TD-3 I 4-38344-02,TD-3| 4- t0479 -03 " TD-314/38 344-02,TD-3t4-1047g -03 'n TD-3r4r49770-02 to TD-3| 4r r4ggg-03,TD-3| 4I 107| -04 6 " TD-314/38344-02,91 1 StaffReporton TerroristTravel2I-AUG-2004 t' to-3r4r38344-02 " to4rul5z6o6-05 24ro3tqB1344-02

4 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8

S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SI-IBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S) Detaineefailed to find a wife or obtain a passport2sand in September 2000, detainee retumed to Frankfurt.26 (S/A[D In October 2000, detainee'sbrother in Yemen, Ahmad, notified him that his paperwork for aviation school had arrived, and detaineereturned to Sanaa. His return coincidedwith the attackon the USS COLE and the US Embassywas subsequentlyclosed for five days;therefore,making it impossiblefor detaineeto apply for a US visa.'' Since detaineefailed repeatedlyto obtain a visa to the US, he was selectedto be a "coordinator"for the US operationworking out of Germany, as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan,and Malaysia.28 In December2000, the Hamburg, GM, group met to discussoperations. Detaineesaid the group never worked as a cell, and the four membersdid not use any code namesor "kunyas" (aliases)while in Germany; they only used their true namesin Germany. Detaineesaid that decisionson operationaldetailswere basedon discussionswithin the group,with Muhammad Atta having the final decision authority.2eBy early January 2001,the othershad traveledto the US and informed detaineethat they had obtainedtheir pilot's licenses, completedtheir initial training, and awaited further instructions from UBL and Atef. Detaineeobtained a visa to Iran and then traveled to Afghanistan.3oln late January 200I, detaineearrived at the al-NebrasGuesthouseand continued on to the IIBL camp near the KandaharAirport. Detaineevisited with UBL and told him that Atta, al-Shehhi,and Jarrah had completed flight training and were awaiting additional instructions. UBL askeddetainee to remain in Kandaharwith him for a few days. During his stay in Afghanistan, detainee contractedmalaria and neededto stay in a treatmentcenter for over a month while he recuperated. While at the treatmentcenter,UBL visited detaineeon two occasionsand spoke only of detainee'shealth.3l In March 2001,after leavingthe treatmentcenter,detainee attendedaparty with UBL, Atef, al-Qaida military commanderSayf al-Adl, and KSM. During the party, UBL praisedthe October2000 attackon the USS COLE. Prior to detainee'sdeparturefrom Afghanistan, UBL and Atef told detaineeabout the intended targetsfor the US operation, as discussedearlier with Atta. UBL explained that the targets, the World Trade Center,the Pentagon,and the US Congress,were selectedto strike at the heartof the US, its military, and its political base,becauseof US pro-Israelpolicies.32 " lo-314145155-02,TDl3l4-04745-02, Analystnote: Sourcereportingspecifies heffaveledto Londonto "find a wife or obtaina falsepassport."Detaineeprobablymeantto find a wife, throughwhomhe couldthengainentry intotheUS. 26to4vr38344-02 27to41+88344-02 '* TD-3r4r4t052-02 2eto4ru126263-05 'o TD-314i383 44-02,TD-3| 4r 47 -02 383 " TD-314/38347-02 32ro3tqB8347-02 )


s E c R E T // NOFORN I I 20311208 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S)

d. (S/NF) Timeline from May 2001 to 11 September 2001: In May 2001,UBL told detaineehe intendedto use him as his contactwith the group basedin the US. UBL asked detaineeto relay to Atta the need to be patient and to follow instructions. When detainee preparedto leave Afghanistan, he askedKSM to help facilitate his travel. KSM informed detaineethat he could obtain a valid Saudi passportfor him and that detaineeshould travel to Pakistanto obtain this passport. Upon learning that KSM could obtain a passport,detainee expressedhis intent to usethis passportto travel to the US; however,UBL forbadedetainee from doing so, becausehe did not want to risk compromising the planned operation. In June 2001, detainee^leftAfghanistan and traveled to Karachi, PK, where he met KSM at the Mahran Hotel." KSM had made Abd al-Rahim Gulam Rabbani aka (Abu Rahmah) aka (SayyidAmin), ISN US9PK-001460DP(PK-1460),responsiblefor detainee'stravel.3aKSM gavedetaineea Saudipassportin the nameof HasanAli al-Assiri and a ticket to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (MY), where detaineewas scheduledto meet Atta. Detaineealsoreceived $5,000USD from Atef for his travel to Malaysia. Detaineearrived in Malaysia approximately6 June2001.35While there,h! stayedat the Hotel Corona,appliedfor a Yemeni passport,and contactedAtta to inform him that detaineewas awaiting Atta's arrival in Kuala Lumpur. Atta informed detaineethat he was unable to travel becausehe was busy waiting for the arrival of the other 15 Saudi hijackers in the planned attacksagainstthe US. Detaineeremainedin Malaysia for threeweeks.'o DetaineephonedKSM to advisehim that Atta could not make the meeting. KSM instructeddetaineeto return to Germany.3T (S/A{F) On 8 July 2001,detaineetraveledfrom Hamburg,GM, to Reus,Spain(SP),to meet with Atta.38 Detaineehad no contactwith anyone else. Detaineetold Atta that there was no pressureon the date for the US attacks,but askedAtta to give him a week or two advance notice becauseUBL wanted detaineeto travel to Afghanistan to tell him the date before the attacksoccurred. Atta told detaineethat all the non-pilots had arrived in the US from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia without problems. Upon their arrival in the US, Atta divided the non-pilotsinto four teams,basedon their English ability. Atta also told detainee that the targetswere the World Trade Center,the Pentagon,and the US Capitol. Detainee said he knew Atta had been given the targetsby UBL and Atef before Atta left Afghanistan. If they (the hijackers) could not reachtheir targets,they were to simply crash the aircraft.3e Detaineetold Atta that UBL had sueeestedthat the teamsinside the aircraft durins the " TD-314/38347-02 to TD-3r4r4r052-02 tt TD-3r4141138-02 'u TD-3r4/3834i-02 t' TD-3r4r4n38-02 t' TD-3| 4r 40345-02, TD-3r 4nl 4 l 5-03, TDr3| 4-38347 -02 tn tD-3 l4lr 1753-03. TD-3r4rr43r4-03

6 S E C R E T // NOFORN I / 2O3II2O8

S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal lnput and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S) attacksbe comprisedof individualswith closebondsto help ensuresolidarityuntil the end. Detaineetold Atta that UBL requestedthe attacksbe carriedout as soon as possiblebecause he was worried about the security implications of having so many operativesin the US and that Atta should not advise the other operativesof the date of the attacksuntil the last minute.aoOn 16 July 2001, detaineepurchaseda retum ticket to Hamburg, 11 days earlier than his original reservation.o'Detaineecalled and told KSM of the meetinghe had with Atta, and KSM subsequentlytold UBL that the operativeswere ready.a2 (S/AIF) In mid-August 2001, Atta calleddetaineeduring the night and said he wantedto tell detaineea riddle. Atta told detaineethe riddle was two branches,a slashand a lollipop. (Analyst note: The riddle signifiedthe dateof the attacks.) DetaineecontactedKSM, told him the date,and KSM informed UBL roughly ten daysbeforethe 11 September2001 attacks.a3On 5 September2001, detaineetraveledby air from GermanyootoMadrid, where he spentthree days tryng to get a flight to Dubai, AE.4s In Dubai, Ammar al-Baluchi met detaineeand they traveledtogetherto Pakistan.ouOn the morning of 11 September2001, detaineearrivedin Karachi,where KSM picked him up and escortedhim to PK-1460's safe house. Detainee,KSM, Ammar al-Baluchi, and9lIl financierMustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi celebratedwhen they saw the attacksof 11 September2001 on the news. After the success of the attacks,the operativesprostratedthemselvesand gave thanks to Allah.aT e. (S/NF) Timeline from 12 September 2001 to June 20022 On 12 September2001, detaineeleft Pakistanfor Afghanistana8and arrived in Kandahar,where he saw Sayf al-Adl, who was with a JordaniannamedAbu Turab.oeAbu Turab was consideredthe caretakerof the 15 Saudi hijackers. Detaineesaid that Turab had not been privy to the operationaldetails of the attacks.)' Al-Adl told detaineeto go to Kabul wherehe could get military training and meetwith LIBL.51 Both UBL and Atef w-erein Kabul at this time.52in mid-Septemberio}t, detaineemet with UBL, al-Qaida'ssecondin commandAyman al-Zawahiri,al-Qaida's outt-3t+/38366-02 o' TD-31414034s-02 o' TD-3r4r38366-02 a3to-3t+/38366-02 ooTD-3I 4I tl 4 I 5-03,TD-3| 4I 26263 -05,TD-3I 4I 40345 -02,TD-3| 4I 429t6-02 ot Tn4r4r38366-02 ouTD-3r4t52606-05 o7TD-3l4llO7L6-O4,TD/314-38366-02, Analystnote: Thereport,TD-314138366-02, mistakenly reportedthat detaineearrivedin Kandahar,but is clarifiedin thenext sentence to be incorrect;meantto be Karachi. o* TD-314/r3320-04 'n To-31+/38366-02 50to-3t+/38366-02 5' Tr-3r+/386n-02 s2to4tqB8366-02


S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S) spokesmanSulaymanAbu Ghayth, and Atef at a location outside of Kabul. During the meeting, detaineereceived greetingsand words of praise from the four senior al-Qaida leadersfor his supportto the 11 September2001 hijackers.5sUBL sentdetaineeto Camp Nine near Kabul for military training for approximately a month.5a While at Camp Nine, detaineetrained on the use of conventionalweapons,insurgencyand guerrilla warfare, and 55 sabotagetechniques. (S/AfD After detaineefinished training at Camp Nine56and after the initial US strikes in Afghanistan,tt UBL sent a messageto detaineeinforming him to dispersethe new al-_Qaida recruits,who had amassedin or nearKabul, to variouscampsfor acceleratedtraining.s8Just beforeNovember 2001,Khallad bin Attash aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP(YM10014),saidhe traveledto a small town just outsideof Gardez,AF, where he met with detaineeand Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiriaka (Mullah Billal), ISN US9SA-010015DP(SA"brothers"then left for Zormat, 10015). Detainee,Khallad, al-Nashiri,and approximately20 "brother" is referenceto al-Qaida affiliated operativesand AF. (Analyst Note: The term fighters.) When they arrivedinZormat in early November 2001,YM-10014 statedthat they met with senioral-QaidaleaderAbu Faraj, al-Qaidamilitary commanderAbd al-Hadi alIraqi, and senior al-Qaida member Abu Layth al-Libi. The group later moved on to Kandahar.snln December2001,while in Kandahar,detaineemet with Sayf al-Adl, who neededhelp cooking for the fighters. Sayf al-Adl assigneddetaineeto the kitchen for about two weeks.uoWhile still in Kandahar,detaineehad a discussionwith KSM and al-Nashiri about future offensive operationsagainstthe West. It was decidedthat al-Nashiri would conductattacksagainstUS offi"iullnstallations in SaudiArabia in the nearterm.6r After the fall of Kandahar,62KSM told detaineeand roughly 30 Saudisto retreat to Iran. Detainee spentabout six weeks in Iran. He returnedto Karachi, PK, becausehe learnedthat unidentified Iranians were seekingto arrestmujahideen(Islamic fighters) in Iran, and it was no longer consideredsafe there.o'

tt tl-3 t+/386n-02,TD-314i10359-03 to TD-314/386n-02 tt ro4q139606-02 tu TD-3r4r39oo3-02 57AnalystNote: Allied forcesbeganstrikeoperationson 7 October2001. tt to-3 t+/3861r-02,TD-314i39003-02 tn TD-314t29878-03, TD-3I 4 t39003-02 uoTD-3 14/ I I 485-03,TD-3 I 4/07889-03,TD-3 14I 29Bi B-03,m 3 | 4I 39003-02 ut to-3 r4l38s3z-02,TD-3r4r3891 3-02 62AnalystNote: Kandaharsurrendered to Karzaion 7 December2001. "' TD-314139003-02, TD-314l39005-02


s E c R E T // NOFORN I / 2031t208 JTF-GTMO-CDR SIIBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S) (S/A{F) Detaineeand KSM discusseddetainee'spossibleuse of an unidentifiedflight training school in Karachi, PK, for future training. The flight training would involve small aircraft and possiblylarger commercialaircraft. Detaineesaid that he possiblywould have attendedthe school, but that thoseplans never came to fruition becauseof his notoriety after his role in the 11 September2001 attacksbecamepublic. Detaineeassumedthat KSM must have been considering future operationsutilizing aircraft.6aFrom January6sto March 2002, detaineestayedat severalsafehouses,including one that belongedto PK-1460.uuDetainee introducedindividualsnamedAbu Yousef and Abu Adil to KSM at PK-1460's housein Karachi around February or March 2002, with the intention to conduct an operation in the [IK.67 In April 2002,Ammar al-Baluchi,indicted al-QaidamemberJosePadilla,and Binyam Ahmad Muhammadaka (Talha al-Kini), ISN US9ET-001458DP(ET-1458),went to a restaurantin Karachi where they met with KSM, detainee,and Abdenahman aka (Abd alRahman). (Analyst Note: Abderrahmanis probably ISN US9PK-001461DP(PK-1461)). During the hour-longdinner,KSM handedPadilla $5,000USD and they exchangedemail addresses.KSM wished Padilla and Binyam good luck and left with detaineeand Abderrahman(NFI).68 (S/AIF) In early June2002,KSM askeddetainee'sopinion aboutconductinga 11 September-styleattack againstHeathrow airport, telling detaineethat he thought having two or three operativeshijack an airliner taking off from Heathrow Airport would not be difficult. KSM further statedthat sincedetaineehad worked on the 11 September2001 attacks,KSM valued his opinion. The plan was to hijack an airplane departingHeathrow, tum the airplane around, and crashthe airplane into the airport. Detaineetold KSM such an operationwould be easierif al-Qaidacould plant operativesamongairport employees,but that these operativescould only provide operationalinformation and they would still needto create teamsto conduct the hijacking. KSM seemedeagerto carry out the operation. 5. (S//NF) Capture Information: a. (S/A{F) From 10-11 September2002,Pakistaniauthoritiesconducteda seriesof raids againstseveralsuspectedal-Qaidaresidencesin Karachi. On 11 September2002,one of the residenceswhere three individuals were located, including the detaineewas raided. The residentsheld knives to their throats and threatenedto kill themselvesrather than be taken into custody. The standoff lasted approximately four hours before Pakistani officers were * to-3t+/09824-03 65tn-3 r+/l 05 s2-03,TD-3r4nr g 16-04 uutD-31+/r0359-03 67ro3rur rc08l-03,TD-3l4lr3458-03 68tn-3 t+/0591 5-03,TD-3r4r3gi7 2-02 9 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8

S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF.GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: CombatantStatusReview Tribunal Input and Recommendationfor Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for GuantanamoDetainee,ISN: US9YM-010013DP(S) able to overpower them and take them into custody.u' At least22 improvised remote radio detonatorsand20 packetsof individually wrappeddocumentsbelongingto variousmembers of the UBL family were found in the house.70 b. (S) Property Held: None c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 4 September2006 d. (S/NF) Reasonsfor Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detaineewas transferredto JTFGTMO to faceprosecutionfor terroristactivitiesagainstthe United States. 6. (SlnD


a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threat to the US. its interestsand allies. b. (SnD Reasonsfor Continued Detention: Detaineeis a significantmemberof al"coordinator"for the 11 September2001 attacks. Detainee Qaidawho was selectedto be the met with many high-level al-Qaidaleaders,attendedmilitant training at the requestof UBL and helped plan future operationsas late as June 2002, three months prior to his capture. o (S/A{F) Detaineeservedas the 11 September2001 attackcoordinatorand was a closeassociateof the primary hijackers. o Detaineerepeatedlyfailed to obtain a visa to receiveflight training in the US,t' and was subsequentlyselectedto be the "coordinator" for the 11 September2001 operation,working out of Germany,Afghanistan, Pakistan,and Malaysia.T2Detainee was a memberof the GermanCell that includedpilots of the 11 9eptember2001 attacks: Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah.'' o (S/A{F) Attawas pickedbyUBL to be the leaderofthe ce11.7a Afta7swas detainee'sroommateand they were consideredfriends.T6

uero 4 ruB 6523-02,TERR108-259-2002 '_otD-3 14r 31098-02, TD-3l4103630-04 " TD-314/08837-04 '-t TD-3r4l 41052-02, TD-3I 4l t7 902-04,TD-3I 4lTi 65| -03 '' TD-314/08837-04 '_oTD-3r 4r rcq79-03,TD-3I 4I t7 902-04 '' TD-3t4lo36ti-03 'u tD-3r4r06i26-02

10 S E C R E T // NOFORNI / 2O3II2O8

S E C RE T //NOFORN I I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT:CombatantStatusReviewTribunalInput andRecommendation for Continued DetentionUnderDoD Control(CD) for Guantanamo (S) Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010013DP o (S/A{F) Janah" was also detainee'sroommate. Jarrahtried to register detainee at the sameflight training school in Florida where he was trained.T8 ' Detainee'sCitibank accountshoweda withdrawal in the amountof $2.200 USD for a US flight training center in Florida.Te o (S/AfD Detainee said al-Shehhi8oonly knew about the flight training and nothing aboutthe selectionand training of the "muscle" hijackers. Al-Shehhi found out about the selectionof the targetsafter the completion of flight training. Detainee said al-Shehhi,as with the other membersof the German cell, learnedof the final selectionof targetsafter the meetingin SpainaroundJuly 2001. Detaineestatedthat hijackers Jarrah,Hani Hanjur, Mihdhar, andHamzi receivedthe sameinformation at the sametime that al-Shehhireceivedit.8r o (S/A{F) Detaineemet with, and had the confidenceof, the following al-Qaida leadership: o (S//NF) UBL askeddetaineeto work with him. Detaineepledgedhis allegiance to UBL, and explainedhis willingnessto becomea martyr.82 o (S/AfF) Muhammad Atef met with detainee,Atta, and Jarrahthree times. During thesemeetings,Abu Hafs instructeddetainee,Atta, and Jarrahthat they were undertaking a very secretmission which required them to attend flight schoo1.83 o (S/AfF) KSM first met detaineein early 2000 in Pakistanwhen detaineewas preparingto apply for flight schools. Detaineelater met KSM in February2001 and at this time a mutual respectfor eachother grew. After the attacksof 11 September, detaineesaidhe naturally wantedto gravitateto KSM becauseof their relationship.8a o (S/AID In December2001,al-Nashirimet with KSM and detaineein Afghanistan. During this meeting, future offensive operationsagainstthe West were discussedwhich includedUS installationsin SaudiArabia.85 o (S/A{F) Khallad bin Attash said he traveled to a town outside of Gardez,AF, where he met with detaineeand al-Nashiri. Detainee,Khallad, al-Nashiri, and approximately 20 associatesthen left for Zormat, AF, where they then met with Abu Faraj,Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and Abu Layth al-Libi. The entiregroup later moved on to Kandahar.86 " TD-314t036r7-03 " TD-3t4rcq7gr-02 'n to-314t06726-02 to To-3t+/03617-03 8t ToSrurngoz-} 82to-3 t +/I 047g -03,TD-3| 4I | 4gg9-03, TD-314I | 1387-03,TD-3| 4I 38344-02 tt tD-314/38344-02 'o TD-3r4m485-03 tt TD-3r4rt2068-03, TD-3t4I4t 142-02, TD-3t4 t39532-02 86ro4 ru/29878-03, TD-314/39003-02 11 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / I 2O3II2O8

S E C R E T // NOFORNI I 2O3II2O8 JTF-GTMO-CDR for Continued SUBJECT:CombatantStatusReviewTribunalInput andRecommendation (CD) (S) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-010013DP DetentionUnderDoD Control o

(S/A{F) Detaineehad knowledge of, and played a role in, the planning of future alQaidaoperations. o (S/A{F) In approximatelylate 2001 or early 2002,due to detainee'ssuccesswith the 11 September2001 operation,KSM discussedwith detaineehis probableuse of aircraft in future [n Jr.,nez}}z,Heathrow was a targetof consideration. KSM discussedconductingan 11 September-style attackagainstHeathrowairport. KSM further statedthat since detaineehad worked on the 11 Septemberattacks,KSM valuedhis opinion on this similar operation. The ideawas to hijack an airplane departingHeathrow, tum the plane around, and crash the airplane into the airport.88 o (S/A{F) At the recommendationof UBL, detaineereceived training at the al-QaidasponsoredCampNine.8eWhile at Camp Nine, detaineeleamedhow to use conventional weapons,insurgency,guerrilla warfare, and sabotagetechniques.eo o (S/A{F) Detaineedemonstratedclear militant acts of aggressionduring his capture. The occupantsof the guesthouse,where detaineeresided,usedrifles and grenadesagainst the security guards and threatenedto kill themselveswith knives rather than be detainee'sdedicationto the fight against captured.el(Analyst Note: This demonstrates the US and its allies.) as c. (U//TOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detaineedetentionthreatlevel is assessed MEDIUM basedon a DoD initial90-day observation.



0,fu{# v

RearAdmiral,US Navy Commandine

" TD-3l4rogB24-03 tt TD-3l4lr008r-03,TD/3l4-r3458-03 tt tl-3 t+/386tt-02,TD-314/39003-02 noTo44139606-02 n' TD-3 | 4r3 6523-02, TERR-108-259-2002,TD-3 | 4r37098-02,TD-3 14r 03630-04

t2 S E C RE T / / NOFORNI I 2O3II2O8



Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah Bin al Shibh  
Ramzi Mohamed Abdullah Bin al Shibh