Issuu on Google+


l0 June2005


MEMORANDUMFORCommander, UnitedStatesSouthernCommand,3511NW 9lstAvenue, MiamiF , L 33 1 7 2 . SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendation to Retainin DOD Control(DoD) for Guantanamo (S) ISN: US9AG-000659DP Detainee,

JTF GTMODetaineeAssessment 1. (FOUO)PersonalInformation: o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: Abdenour Sameur o Aliases and Current/TrueName: Mustafa. Sameur/Samir Abdenour. Abdul Rashid. Carlos Perrera o Placeof Birth: Alsiers. Alseria (AG) o Date of Birth: 28 March 1973 o Citizenship: Algeria o IntemmentSerialNumber (ISN): US9AG-000659DP

2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth,hasno knownallergiesandis not currentlyon anymedications.He hasno travelrestrictions.' 3. (S/NF) JTF GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Retainedin DoD Control(DoD). b. (S//NF) Summary: JTFGTMO previouslyassessed detainee asTransferto the Control (TRCD) of AnotherCountryfor ContinuedDetention on 30 August2003. Basedupon previousassessment, hebe informationobtainedsincedetainee's it is now recommended Retainedin DoD Control(DoD).


s E c R E T //NOFORN I / 20300610

S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2030O610 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S) For this updaterecommendation,detaineeis assessed as a memberof Al Qaida's global terrorist network with specific ties to the North African Extremist Network Q.JAEN)in London and Afghanistan. Detaineehas a history with Islamic Jihad and trained at the AlQaida sponsoredAl Farouq Camp. Detaineewas armed and likely participated in hostilities in Jalalabadand Tora Bora. It is assessed this detaineeis a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interestsand allies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwisenoted,the following paragraphsare basedsolely on the detainee'sstatements. a. (S) Prior History: Detaineeheld a variety of odd jobs and desertedfrom the Algerian military aftera few months of service. In 1995detaineefought in the jihad in Bosnia. Detaineeleft Algeria and traveled via Tunisia to Rome, Italy (IT). A man namedNouradin facilitated his travel. From the airport in Rome, IT, detaineewent to a bus station. Here he askeda group of unknown Algerians for help in obtaining false documentsso he could travel to the United Kingdom (UK). An unknown associateof the group provided detaineewith a SpanishID card and told him to travel to London via Sicily, IT. In October 1999,detainee and an associatenamed Korim, variant Kareem, traveled to London, UK. They stayedfor a year and a half. In London, detaineeattendedthe Finsbury Park mosque,the Baker Street mosque,and the Shepard'sBush mosque. b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: At the FinsburyPark mosque,detaineemet Algerians, Jamal Al Din and Toufik who told detaineeabout living in Afghanistan (AF). Detaineelived in the UK illegally and Afghanistan appealedto him. (Analyst note: His illegal statusmay be a referenceto traveling to the UK on false documents.Detaineenoted he has political asylum in the UK.) Detaineedecidedto travel to Afghanistan to study Islam and seek a better life, noting he did not like the treatmenthe received in the UK from the governmentand citizens. Toufik provided detaineewith a contact number for Muhammad (Likely Muhammad Shah, who servedas a facilitator under network facilitators Jafar Al Jazaieriand SulaymanAl lazaierl) and a Pakistanivisa, but detaineepaid for his own ticket. Detaineetraveled with Nouradin from London to Islamabad,Pakistan(PK), in the summerof 2001. An Afghan named Muhammad escorteddetaineeto Peshawar,PK, and then to Jalalabad,AF. In Jalalabad,detaineestayedabout 40 days at the Algerian guesthouserun by Abu Jaffar. c. (S) Training and Activities: Detaineetraveledto Khandahar,AF and then to the AlQaida sponsoredAl Farouq training camp where he trained on the AK-47 for about one week. (Analyst note: In Kandahar,detaineelikely stayedat the Haji Habbashguesthouse.) The 11 Septemberattackson the US occurred and detainee'strainer, Abu Assad Al-Suri (Asuri), informed the traineesthe program was canceledbecausethe US would be bombing the camp. Detaineetraveled to Abu Jaffar's Kabul, AF, guesthouse.Then he went to the

2 s E c R E T //NOFORN I I 20300610

S E C R E T // NOFORN I / 2O3OO6IO JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S) Algerian guesthousein Jalalabadto retrieve his belongings and attemptedto leave Afghanistan. Detaineestayedat the guesthouseuntil forced to leave due to the US campaign (probablymid November2001). Detaineeand other residentsfled to the mountainsof Tora Bora where he remained for approximately one month. Detaineeand a group of over 100 men then fled to Pakistan.While at the guesthousein Jalalabad,prior to fleeing to Tora Bora, an unknown individual assignedan AK-47 to detainee. d. Capture Information: In February2002,Pakistanimilitary captureddetaineeand his entire group after they had crossedinto Pakistan. Pakistani forces held the group and during a transfer to anotherprison, the prisonersrioted, flipped a bus detaineewas on, and detainee attemptedto escape. During this escapeattempt, Pakistani forces shot and wounded detainee.(Analyst note: Basedon detainee'saccount,he was likely capturedin the operation that netted over 100 Al-Qaida/extremist memberswho were led out of Afghanistan by Ibn Sheikh Al Libi.) On 5 April 2002, the Pakistani governmenthandeddetaineeto US custody. e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 14 June2002 f. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide informationon the following: o . o

The Algerian Guesthouse Terrorist personalitiesat the Algerian Guesthouse Terroristpersonalitiesand methodsin the UK

5. (S/NF) DetaineeThreat: poses a HIGHrisk,asheis likelyto posea a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed thedetainee threat to the US, its interestsand allies.

b. (S//NF)Reasonsfor ContinuedDetention: . (S) Detaineetrained at the Al-Qaida sponsoredAl-Farouq training camp. He is assessedto be a member of the NAEN becauseof his recruitment and noted associations in London and Central Asia. (Analyst note: The NAEN is a Tier 0 Counterterrorism target defined as terrorist groups which pose a clear and immediate dangerto US persons or interests. Detaineenoted Toufiq might have performed a background check on him through Toufiq's connectionsto the mujahideenin Algeria. This indicatesdetaineehad associationswith other extremist organizationsin Algeria, possibly including the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preachingand Combat (GSPC).)

3 S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2O3O0610

s E c R E T // NOFORN / / 20300610 JTF GTMO-CG to Retainin DoD Control(DoD) for Guantanamo SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendation (S) Detainee, ISN:US9AG-000659DP o (S) Detaineewas an associateof extremistsincluding Toufik in London, Muhammad in Pakistan,and Jaffar in Jalalabad. Detaineeattendedjihad indoctrination classesgiven by Jaffar at the Algerian guesthouse.(Analyst note: Toufik is likely RabahKadre aka Toufiq. Toufiq was the number two man of the AlQaida cell in London and assumedcontrol of the Al-QaidaA{orth African Extremist Network recruiting and facilitation segmentin London. Al-Qaida member Abu Doha ran this segmentuntil his arrest. Toufiq operatedout of the mosquesin London and servedas a recruiter and facilitator for the campsin Afghanistan. Muhammad is likely Muhammad Shah. Shahwas involved in a radiological plot involving uranium and red mercury (a nuclear scam material). Shah also servedas a facilitator under network facilitators Jafar Al Jazaieriand SulaymanAl Jazaieri. He moved personnel acrossthe Afghanistan/Pakistanboarder. Jaffar is Jafar Al Jazaieriaka Omar Chabani,a known extremist facilitator with direct links to Algerian training camps in Jalalabadand the North African Extremist Network. He also has direct links to AlQaida operativesin the UK and throughout Europe.) o (S) In London, detaineeattendedthe Shepard'sBush Mosque,the FinsburyPark Mosque,and the Baker StreetMosque. All threemosqueshavereportedlinks to extremist recruiting and facilitating. . (S) Detaineehas historical ties to Islamic jihad and extremist groups. Interrogators believemuch of detainee'scover story is fabricated. Detaineedeniedfighting in Bosnia althoughhe previouslyadmittedto doing so. (Analyst note: Detaineebelieveshe is smarterthan interrogatorsbut has unwittingly given information of intelligence value. Additional claims and recantationsby detaineeare designedto negatesuch incriminating statements.Detaineelikely did participatein the Bosniajihad, indicatingan established history with Islamic jihad and likely extremist entities that are also known to have participatedin Bosnia. This indicatesdetaineelikely receivedadditionaltraining in 1995. If his military training from Algeria was deemedsufficient, detaineecould have bypassed training in Bosniaand immediatelyjoined the hostilities.) o (S) Detaineeis a supporterof the Islamic LiberationFront (ILF), which advocates violent oppositionto the govemmentof Algeria. (Analyst note: The ILF is the Islamic SalvationFront (FIS). The FIS, as a memberof the NAEN.) . (S) Detaineeutilized counter interrogation techniquesby recanting previous information or leaving out significant information when discussinghis past, associates, and activities in an attempt to prevent associationwith incriminating entities and activities. Detaineerarely repeatedthe sameinformation with the samedetails. o (S) Detaineeclaimedadvanceknowledgeof the 11 September2001attacks againstthe US. Detaineeadmitted an unidentified individual informed him one week prior to the attacksthat somethingwas going to happento the US. (Analyst note: Anyone with information about attackson the US would not provide such

+ S E C RE T // NOF'ORNI I 203OO610

S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 203006IO JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationto Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S) information to a simple acquaintance.Detaineewould have to be a trusted member of the network in order to have acquiredthe information.) . Detaineelater claimed no one had discussedthe attacksdirectly with him, contradicting information he admitted to in previous debriefings. o (S) Detaineeacknowledgedthat other individuals actively conductedfundraising and recruiting activities in the mosquesin London, but denied he went to Afghanistan due to theseactivities. (Analyst note: Detaineehas not provided specific detailed information on theseactivities, although he noted money collected at the Finsbury Park mosquefundedAbu Jaffar's Algerian guesthousein Afghanistan. It is possible detainee,and other recruits, courieredmoney from the UK to Abu Jaffar. Detainee can likely provide information concerningrecruiters,fundraisers,methods, couriering,facilities,and recruitsthemselves.) o (S) Detaineeclaimed he paid he own way to Pakistan,but later contradicted himself and statedthe Finsbury Park Mosque (likely Toufik) provided him with a ticket, Pakistanivisa, and falseFrenchpassport.This is assessed to be the most accurateaccount. At one time, detaineehad four passports. o (S) In initial interviews,detaineedid not disclosehe and London associate Nouradin traveled to Pakistantogether. Detaineealso changedhis story to state Toufik had provided the phone number for Muhammad to Nouradin insteadof detainee. Detaineefunher changeddetails stating Nouradin and Toufik were the sameindividual, but detaineetraveled alone. Another changeis detaineestatedhe saw Nouradin in London and then in Jalalabad.(Analyst note: Changing the story in this manner attemptsto place extremist associationswith Nouradin and remove them from detaineein one instance,and helps to protect the identities of associatesand attempt to avoid incriminating himself with the others. Detaineehimself, as noted above,is assessed to have beena memberof, and have associationswith, extremists in the NAEN in London and Italy. Detaineehad severalvariations in his story regardinghis travels.) o (S) Detaineestatedhe traveled to London via Rome after leaving Tunisia, then contradictedhimself and statedhe traveled to Sicilv from Tunisia. c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee'sbehavioris generallynoncompliantand aggressive. Detaineehas threatenedto kill military membersseveraltimes and has been cited routinely for failure to comply and harassingguards. Detaineeincited disturbanceson at leasttwo occasions.

6. (S/NF)DetaineeIntelligence ValueAssessment: a. (S) Assessment: JTFGTMOdetermined thisdetainee is of MEDIUMintelligence value.

s E c R E T //NOFORN I | 20300610

S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 203O061O JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendation to Retainin DoD Control(DoD) for Guantanamo (S) Detainee, ISN:US9AG-000659DP . (S) Detaineeis routinely noted for deceptionduring interrogationsand was identified as a habitual liar with a superiority complex. He likely has information of high value, but doesnot provide it willingly, if at all. He likely has information regarding terrorist operationsin Algeria, North African Extremist Network personneland operationsin the UK. He may possessinformation on Al-Qaida in Afghanistanand on the 11 September terrorist attacks.

b. (S//NF)Areasof PotentialExploitation: o l1 September2001 terroristattacks- personnelin Afghanistanduring 2001 with advanceknowledge of the attacks o Terrorist facilities o Al-Qaida/network personnelin Afghanistan/Pakistan o Algerian terrorist groups 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemy combatantstatuswas reassessed on 4 October2004, and he remains an enemv combatant."g

TAY W. HOOD BrigadierGeneral,USA Commanding

6 s E c R E T //NOFORN I I 20300610

Abdulnour Sameur