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Campaign • 218

accounts of history’s greatest conflicts, detailing the command strategies, tactics and battle experiences of the opposing forces throughout the crucial stages of each campaign

MAGINOT LINE 1940

battles on the French Frontier

German front line, 15 June German front line, 17 June German front line, 19 June German front line, 21 June German advance, 16–17 June German advance, 18–19 June German advance, 20–21 June

XX

168 XX

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Aschbach

79

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246

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Lembach Woerth

Sarre-Union

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Wissembourg XX

III

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Sarralbe

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215

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103

Remnants of French Groupe d’armées 2

GERMANY

Rh

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XII

XXX

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257

III

F

Constructed during the 1930s, the maginot line was supposed to form the ultimate defence against a german invasion of France. but the strength of the line varied widely, and during the assault on France in may 1940 the germans were able to identify its weak points and focus their attacks against them. While the invading army was able to smash through the lightly defended section along the river meuse, at other points the line held. although the maginot line was to prove a strategic failure, the stiff resistance put up by some of the fortresses was a testament to the fighting ability of the French army. this is the story of the seven major german operations launched against the maginot line, and the defiant fight put up by this most famous of fortifications.

Full colour battlescenes

illustrations

3-dimensional ‘bird’s-eye-views’

MAGINOT LINE 1940

battles on the French Frontier

XXX

MAGINOT LINE 1940

maps

PUBLISHING

OSPREY

WWW.OSPREYPUBLISHING.COM

m romanyCh & m rupp

OSPREY

M ROMANYCH & M RUPP

illustrated by John White

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CAMPAIGN • 218

MAGINOT LINE 1940 Battles on the French Frontier

M ROMANYCH & M RUPP

ILLUSTRATED BY JOHN WHITE Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic

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First published in Great Britain in 2010 by Osprey Publishing, Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 0PH, UK 44-02 23rd St, Suite 219, Long Island City, NY 11101, USA E-mail: info@ospreypublishing.com © 2010 Osprey Publishing Ltd All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors wish to thank the following people who were instrumental to the genesis, research, and writing of this book. To Herrn Gerhard Hauke who took Martin on his first trip to the Maginot Line in 1987 and Thomas Bertram who joined Martin on many subsequent trips to the Line, both above and below ground. Their inspiration and support sparked Martin’s long interest in the Maginot Line. To Scott Stopher who introduced the authors to each other, starting them on the path that led to this book.

To Clayton Donnell, who gave the authors the idea and impetus to write a book for Osprey Publishing, and Karl Klusewitz and Patrick Osborn who enlightened Marc on the possibilities of using research material available at the US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). To Michael Constandy, a consummate researcher, who guided our archival research at NARA. And finally, to Marc’s wife, Jackie Scott, for her encouragement and suggestions that helped us overcome many of the trials and tribulations that plague authors.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ARTIST’S NOTE ISBN: 978 1 84603 499 2 E-book ISBN: 978 1 84908 254 9 Editorial by Ilios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com) Page layout by The Black Spot Index by Fineline Editorial Services Typeset in Myriad Pro and Sabon Maps by Bounford.com 3D bird’s-eye views by The Black Spot Battlescene illustrations by John White Originated by PPS Grasmere Ltd Printed in China through Worldprint Ltd. 10 11 12 13 14

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale.

The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever.

All enquiries should be addressed to: John White, 5107 C Monroe Road, Charlotte, NC 28205, USA The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.

THE WOODLAND TRUST Osprey Publishing are supporting the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland conservation charity, by funding the dedication of trees.

ABBREVIATIONS BCC

© Osprey Publishing. Access to this book is not digitally restricted. In return, we ask you that you use it for personal, non-commercial purposes only. Please don’t upload this pdf to a peer-to-peer site, email it to everyone you know, or resell it. Osprey Publishing reserves all rights to its digital content and no part of these products may be copied, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic, mechanical, recording or otherwise (except as permitted here), without the written permission of the publisher. Please support our continuing book publishing programme by using this pdf responsibly.

Bataillon de chars de combat

IR

Infanterie-Regiment

RAMF

Régiment d’artillerie mobile de forteresse

RAP

Régiment d’artillerie de position

RI

Régiment d'infanterie

RIC

Régiment d'infanterie coloniale

RIF

Régiment d'infanterie de forteresse

RMIC

Régiment de mitrailleurs d'infanterie coloniale

RMIF

Régiment de mitrailleurs d'infanterie de forteresse

FOR A CATALOGUE OF ALL BOOKS PUBLISHED BY OSPREY MILITARY AND AVIATION PLEASE CONTACT: NORTH AMERICA Osprey Direct, c/o Random House Distribution Center, 400 Hahn Road, Westminster, MD 21157 E-mail: uscustomerservice@ospreypublishing.com ALL OTHER REGIONS Osprey Direct, The Book Service Ltd, Distribution Centre, Colchester Road, Frating Green, Colchester, Essex, CO7 7DW E-mail: customerservice@ospreypublishing.com www.ospreypublishing.com

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CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

5

CHRONOLOGY

6

ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

8

OPPOSING COMMANDERS

12

French commanders

German commanders

OPPOSING ARMIES The French Army

The Wehrmacht

15 Orders of battle

OPPOSING PLANS French

27

German

THE CAMPAIGN

31

Fall Gelb: the opening moves Overrun of the Ardennes defences The capture of Fort La Ferté Battle for the Maubeuge fortifications Fall Rot: the invasion of France Envelopment of the Metz region Operation Tiger: breakthrough in the Sarre Widening the breakthrough Attacks in northern Alsace Operation Kleiner Bär: assault across the Rhine

AFTERMATH

91

THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY

93

FURTHER READING

94

INDEX

95

Flandres Lille Escaut Maubeuge Ardennes Montmedy

Maginot Line fortified sectors

Maginot Line defences – heavily fortified Maginot Line defences – weaker sections

Advance of German Army – Fall Rot

25

25

50

75km

50 miles

1 German operations against the Maginot Line

1

Paris

West Wall German front 5 June Advance of German Army – Fall Gelb

Envelopment of the Metz region Breakthrough in the Sarre Attacks in Northern Alsace Assault across the Rhine

Amiens

ine Se

0

me

BEF

1

FRANCE

Billotte

1

XXXXX

XXXX

Lille

2

1

XXXX

3

9

3

Reims

XXXX

Maubeuge

4

e

Ma rn

Aisne

5

Sam

bre

Brussels

BELG

BELGIUM

6

Sedan

Verdun

2

Ardennes Fo r e s t

XXXX

Liege

4

3

8 9

Nancy

XXXX

10

Besson

3

XXXXX

Epinal

XXXX

5 11

Colmar XXXX

18

17

14

7

XXXX

Strasbourg

6

SWITZERLAND

Karlsruhe

Leeb

C

N

Mainz

XXXXX

XXXX

Freiburg

Basel

7

16

XXXXX

15

XXXX

13

XXXX

2

Koblenz

Rundstedt

A

XXXXX

GERMANY

ALSACE

5

Mulhouse Belfort

8

1

Bitche

12

Saarbrücken

X XX XX

Remnants of French Forces

Prételat

2

16 Trier

12

Köln

XXXX

XXXX

XXXXX

4

Metz

LORRAINE

XXXX

Thionville

7

4

Kleist

Luxembourg (City) Longwy

X

Bock

B

XXXXX

XX XX

XXXX

Aachen

6

XXXX

LUXEMBOURG

Fall Gelb 10 May – 4 June

Fall Rot 5–25 June

2

1

Namur

XXXX

lle

0

4.

5.

6.

7.

Som

Overrun of the Ardennes defences Capture of Fort La Ferté Battle for the Maubeuge fortifications

Fall Rot:

1.

2.

3.

Fall Gelb:

15. Bas-Rhin 16. Colmar 17. Mulhouse 18. Altkrich

Rhine defences:

12. Rohrbach 13. Vosges 14. Haguenau

Région fortifiée de Lauter:

11. Sarre

Sarre Gap:

7. Crusnes 8. Thionville 9. Boulay 10. Faulquemont

Région fortifiée de Metz:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

se

Belgian border defences:

7

XXXX

Oi

Dunkirk Encirclement

XXXXX

Dunkirk

M s

se

ge

s in

e us Me

Mo

Vo s

ine

ta

14:17

ou n

X

Rh

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Overview of the campaign, 10 May–25 June 1940

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INTRODUCTION In May and June 1940, Germany won a lightning victory in Western Europe, defeating the Allied armies in less than six weeks. Although never decisively engaged in combat, the Maginot Line was central to how both France and Germany prepared for and conducted the campaign. France’s strategy and war plan were built on the idea that the Maginot Line would provide a secure front along the Franco-German border, as well as a base for Allied forces to counter the Wehrmacht offensive through Belgium. To this end, the French Army built fortifications along its northern frontier for ten years, first in Alsace and Lorraine and later along the Belgian border. However, as time and resources ran out, significant portions of the frontier were left weakly fortified, especially in the Ardennes sector. It was a mistake that played into German hands.

For its part, the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) understood that to invade France and defeat the French Army, it had to breach the Maginot fortifications. Before the invasion the Wehrmacht committed significant resources to preparations for attack on permanent fortifications. Then, during the campaign, the Germans attacked the Maginot Line in ten separate corps and division level operations. All told, one-third of the Wehrmacht’s divisions took part in operations against the Maginot Line.

The Wehrmacht conducted its campaign in two phases: Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow), the invasion of the Low Countries and Northern France, and Fall Rot (Plan Red), the invasion of France proper. During Fall Gelb, the Wehrmacht struck the Allied armies at their weakest point – the hinge between the mobile forces in central Belgium and the strong permanent fortifications of the Maginot Line in northern Lorraine. With overwhelming combat power, the Panzer formations overran French forces at Sedan and split the Allied front in two. The Panzers then bypassed the remaining fortifications along the Belgian border, which were systematically reduced by infantry and combat engineers. Fall Gelb ended after German forces encircled Allied forces in Belgium and forced their evacuation at Dunkirk.

Several weeks later during Fall Rot, as Panzer formations plunged deep into central France, the Wehrmacht attacked the Maginot Line in Alsace and Lorraine. In battles reminiscent of World War I, infantry supported by heavy artillery conducted large-scale offensives in the Sarre and Upper Rhine regions that divided and isolated the strongest sections of the Maginot Line. These operations resulted in some of the heaviest fighting of the campaign. But, overshadowed by the French Army’s collapse and subsequent surrender, these battles are forgotten by history.

5

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CHRONOLOGY 1939 3 September

Britain and France declare war on Germany.

7–30 September

French Groupe d’armées 2 invades German Saarland.

16–24 October

German Armeeoberkommando (AOK) 1 counterattacks in the Saarland.

1940 10 May

Fall Gelb, the German offensive in the west begins.

12–15 May

Heeresgruppe C conducts diversionary attacks against the Maginot Line in northern Alsace and Lorraine.

13–15 May

Panzergruppe Kleist pierces the border defences at Sedan and Monthermé.

16–17 May

German AOK 4 overruns border defences east of Maubeuge.

17–19 May

71. Infanterie-Division captures Fort La Ferté.

18–24 May

German VIII Armeekorps (AK) seizes fortifications in the Maubeuge area.

20 May

Heeresgruppe A reaches the Channel, isolating Allied forces in Belgium.

22–26 May

German VIII and XXVII AK seize fortifications in the Escaut sector.

27 May to 3 June Allied forces evacuate the Dunkirk pocket.

6

5 June

Fall Rot, German invasion of France begins.

12–13 June

French 18e Corps d’armée abandons fortresses Chesnois, Thonnelle and Vélosnes.

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14 June

Infantry divisions of Heeresgruppe B enter Paris.

14–15 June

Operation Tiger. German AOK 1 breaks through defences in the Sarre Gap.

15–18 June

Operation Kleiner Bär. German AOK 7 conducts an assault crossing of the Rhine River.

17 June

XIX AK (mot.) reaches the Swiss border, encircling 500,000 French soldiers in Alsace and Lorraine, 20,000 of them in the Maginot Line.

19 June

The 215. Infanterie-Division pierces the Maginot Line in the Vosges Mountains.

20–21 June

The 167. Infanterie-Division seizes forts Bambesch and Kerfent, but fails to take Fort Einseling.

20 June

The 246. Infanterie-Division unsuccessfully attacks fortifications in the Haguenau area.

21 June

The 161. Infanterie-Division unsuccessfully attacks Fortress Fermont and Fort Ferme-Chappy.

21 June

Heeresgruppe C orders a halt to any further infantry assaults against the Maginot Line.

21–24 June

The 262. Infanterie-Division captures forts Haut-Poirier and Welschhof.

22 June

The German 95. Infanterie-Division fails to force Fortress Michelsberg to surrender.

22 June

Armistice is signed (to take effect on 25 June).

22–25 June

French Groupe d’armées 2 surrenders in the Vosges Mountains.

25 June

Hostilities formally end.

27 June to 4 July

Last Maginot Line fortress troops surrender and leave their fortifications.

7

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ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN The French Government built the Maginot Line in the 1930s to guard against a German invasion. Its purpose was to halt a German attack long enough for the French Army to mobilize and then to serve as a base for a counteroffensive. Construction was a massive undertaking that occurred in several distinct cycles prompted by changes in the diplomatic situation between France and Germany.

The first and strongest sections of the Maginot Line were built in northern Alsace and Lorraine from 1930 to 1936. Two lines of permanent fortifications were constructed along the German border, one from Longuyon to the Sarre Valley and another from the city of Bitche to the Rhine River. Designated as the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter respectively, these heavily fortified fronts were designed to stop a direct attack from Germany into Alsace and Lorraine. In between the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter, a 50km (31-mile) stretch known as the Sarre Gap was left unfortified because the neighbouring Saarland area of Germany was still under French control. Concurrently, several lines of concrete casemates were built along the Rhine River from the Haguenau area south to the Swiss border. These, the Rhine defences, were designed to secure eastern Alsace from a cross-Rhine attack. Because Belgium, an ally, was also building fortifications along its border with Germany, the French Army left the Franco-Belgian frontier unfortified except for two short lines of casemates constructed in the Raismes Forest near Valenciennes and the Mormal Forest near Maubeuge. These defences were meant to provide ‘security positions’ for French forces in case of a German invasion of Belgium.

These two large artillery blocks of Fortress Simserhof, Block 6 (left) with three rapid-fire 75mm guns and Block 4 (right) with a 135mm howitzer, were typical of the firepower and protection built into the fortifications of northern Alsace and Lorraine.

In the foreground is a row of anti-tank obstacles.

(M. Romanych)

8

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A second cycle of fortification construction occurred from 1936 to 1939 in response to Germany’s reoccupation of the Saarland and Belgium’s declaration of neutrality. The French Army lengthened the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter by building a new line of permanent fortifications west of Metz from Longuyon to Montmédy and another on the left flank of the Région fortifiée de la Lauter from the Bitche area to Sarreguemines. In addition, a line of casemates was built across the Sarre Gap. Finally, a series of forts and casemates were constructed north of Maubeuge to block an invasion from Belgium. Intended to be as extensive as the fortifications of the first construction cycle, budgetary constraints forced the French Army to scale back or delay construction of these later fortifications. The consequence of this patchwork approach was significant. Despite years of construction, France’s prepared defences along the frontier from Switzerland to the English Channel still had gaps and weak sectors.

Opposite the Maginot Line was Germany’s West Wall, a fortified zone of small blockhouses armed with machine guns and light anti-tank guns. Begun in 1936 after German soldiers reoccupied the Rhineland, the West Wall’s purpose was to deter French aggression and, failing that, delay the attack.

By 1939, defences of the West Wall were far from complete, although one of the strongest sections was in the Saarbrücken area opposite the Maginot Line’s weak Sarre Gap. In late August 1939, the Wehrmacht manned the West Wall with token forces while the bulk of the army massed against Poland. Along the French border were 19 divisions of Heeresgruppe C, many of which were secondand third-line reserve units with limited artillery, transport and training.

Anticipating German military action, France alerted its armed forces and began manning the Maginot Line. Then, in response to Germany’s invasion of Poland, France ordered a general mobilization and, with Britain, declared war on 3 September. Three days later, the French Army had 57 divisions in northern France, and the Maginot Line was declared ready for action.

However, the fortress troops were ordered to avoid incidents with the Wehrmacht and forbidden to open fire without permission from the sector commander. Even so, the line effectively served its purpose by providing a base for the French Army to mass forces for an offensive.

On 7 September, in a purely political move, French forces commanded by Général d’armée Gaston Prételat moved into German Saarland. Eleven divisions crossed the border near Saarbrücken along a 35km (22-mile) front.

Cautiously advancing, French reconnaissance units followed by infantry and mechanized forces encountered negligible opposition. Opposing the French were ten infantry divisions of the German AOK 1 commanded by Generaloberst Erwin von Witzleben. Despite the large number of forces involved, heavy combat did not occur. Lacking the strength to stop the invading French force, Gen.Obst. von Witzleben engaged the French in a delaying action as his army pulled back to the West Wall. French casualties – reported as 77 soldiers – were light.

Unaware of its overwhelming force advantage and lacking clear offensive objectives, the French Army did not press the attack. By 12 September, the offensive peaked and then stagnated in the face of stiffening German resistance. Ordered to take defensive positions before the West Wall, the divisions of Groupe d’armées 2 had advanced less than ten kilometres (six miles) into Germany, occupying about 200 square kilometres (77 square miles) of territory and 20 villages.

9

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LEFT Remains of a French tracked vehicle destroyed by a German mine during the Saar offensive in September 1939. Most French casualties during the operation were due to mines and booby traps emplaced by withdrawing German forces.

(NARA) RIGHT Commander of the French 4e Armée, Général Réquin, inspects the construction of a trench in the Sarre region.

To their own detriment, French field units spent too much time building defences instead of training.

(M. Romanych)

Anticipating a German counteroffensive once Poland was defeated, the French Grand Quartier Général (GQG) ordered Groupe d’armées 2 to withdraw on 30 September. As the French divisions moved behind the Maginot Line, the German AOK 1, now reinforced by several first-line infantry divisions, attacked. From 16 to 24 October, in a series of local actions, AOK 1 pushed the French covering force back across the border, retook most lost German territory and even occupied a small portion of French territory.

The Maginot Line deterred further cross-border offensive action.

The termination of the Sarre operation ended France’s only offensive of the war. Most combat action had taken place beyond the range of the Maginot Line’s fortress artillery in the narrow strip of land between the border and the West Wall. Thus, the Maginot Line played only a supporting role. With the cessation of AOK 1’s counteroffensive, the Phoney War (in French, drôle de guerre; in German, Sitzkrieg) began.

The French Army quickly settled into a defensive posture. Along the frontier a final period of fortification construction occurred. As more French and British forces moved into position along the frontier, engineer and troop units hastily built concrete blockhouses and field fortifications to supplement and extend existing defences. Even along the strongest sections of the Maginot Line, fortress crews added more blockhouses, barbed-wire entanglements, and anti-tank obstacles. In some places secondary defensive lines were constructed to add depth. This last push to fortify the border came at the expense of needed unit training which lagged behind that of the Wehrmacht.

Both sides evacuated civilians from border areas. In the case of the French, a wide swath of territory termed the zone rouge (red zone) was evacuated in front and immediately behind the Maginot Line along the German border from Thionville to Alsace. This was done to protect the civilians from battle and to make military operations easier, especially in built-up areas. Ultimately, an estimated 764,000 French civilians were evacuated.

10

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Although fighting during the Phoney War was limited to skirmishes and artillery duels, the propaganda war between the Allies and Germans was very active. German propaganda banners such as this one were a common sight along the Franco-German border and Rhine River.

(M. Romanych)

As the campaign in Poland concluded, German forces moved to the western front and began preparing for offensive action. The most active part of the front was along the area between the Maginot Line and the West Wall. Both armies engaged in active patrolling, occasional artillery duels, intelligence gathering, and propaganda operations. German aerial reconnaissance systematically photographed the Maginot fortifications. Small-unit skirmishes were frequent, but there was no significant combat action. French losses during the eight months of the Phoney War were reportedly 98 officers and 1,750 soldiers.

The Wehrmacht’s primary operation was a deception that portrayed preparations for offensive operations in the Sarre Gap and upper Rhine near the Swiss border. The purpose of the deception was to keep French divisions in Alsace and Lorraine away from the planned main attack through the Ardennes. Deceptive measures included false radio traffic, fake headquarters, routing of units redeploying from Poland through Saarbrücken and upper Rhine areas, and disinformation provided by German agents to French and Swiss intelligence.

Crews of the Maginot Line saw limited combat action during the Phoney War. After the Saar offensive, the fortresses were ordered not to fire artillery without provocation and to limit shelling to ten rounds in order to avoid German retaliation. The artillery occasionally supported forward infantry units or engaged targets of opportunity such as German patrols and any other observed activity. In January, the restriction was relaxed, allowing fortresses to fire artillery against significant-sized targets. For most fortress crews these engagements were their first opportunity to use the artillery. Not surprisingly, a few teething problems with the weapons, ammunition and turret support systems were discovered and quickly corrected. Otherwise, the fortress troops, as well as the rest of the French Army, continued to dig in and wait for the German attack. For their part, the Germans tried to keep the French calm by restricting patrolling and artillery fire.

11

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OPPOSING COMMANDERS Veterans of World War I dominated the general officer corps of both the French and German armies. However, each group drew different lessons from their wartime experiences. Most French generals were deeply rooted in past doctrines and practices, while the German generals included many innovators looking for new ways to conduct war.

FRENCH COMMANDERS

The strongest fortifications of the Maginot Line were under the command of Gén. Prételat, commander of Groupe d’armées 2. By the time of the major German offensives against the Maginot Line in the Sarre and Rhine regions most of Groupe d’armées 2 had withdrawn, leaving the defence of the frontier to the fortress troops. (NARA)

12

The French chain of command was overly complicated and cumbersome.

French forces had two commanders – Général d’armée Maurice Gamelin and Général d’armée Alphonse Georges. As Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, Gamelin retained all authority, but delegated the responsibility for operations of the field army to Georges. The result was two competing headquarters with overlapping roles. Aggravating the situation was Gamelin’s and Georges’ dislike for each other, a lack of radio communications between both headquarters and the field forces, and each commander’s habit of commanding far from the front.

Général Gamelin was responsible for the planning, organization and readiness of the entire French Army. As the army’s chief since 1935, he oversaw completion of the Maginot Line defences, the modernization programme and the development of France’s military strategy. Surprisingly, even though he was a brigade and divisional commander during World War I and a corps commander in the 1920s, Gamelin was more of a staff officer than a commander. Cautious, reserved and uncomfortable around troops, he secluded himself at his headquarters in the Château de Vincennes near Paris, far away from current events that might disturb him.

Général Georges was a completely opposite personality to Gamelin.

Outgoing and candid, Georges was a no-nonsense soldier and leader. He was expected by many to become head of the French Army in 1935. However, Gamelin was selected instead because either (depending on the source) Prime Minister Edouard Daladier thought Georges was too right wing in his political views, or Georges’ health was too precarious, having never fully recovered from wounds received during an assassination attempt against the king of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934.

Under Georges were three army group commanders – Générals d’armée Gaston Billotte (Groupe d’armées 1 located along the Belgian border), AndréGaston Prételat (Groupe d’armées 2 in Alsace and Lorraine), and Antoine

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Besson (Groupe d’armées 3 in southern Alsace and along the Swiss border).

Général Billotte was similar in demeanour to Gén. Georges. At the start of the war, Gamelin selected him to command Groupe d’armées 1 because he was the army’s most offensive-minded field general officer and a primary proponent of French armoured divisions. Therefore, placing Billotte in command over France’s primary mechanized force made sense. When Billotte was injured in a car accident on 21 May 1940 (dying two days later), he was replaced by Général d’armée Georges Blanchard.

Most forces in Alsace and Lorraine, including the main fortresses of the Maginot Line, were under the command of Gén. Prételat. At 55 years old, he was young by French general officer standards. He was also very experienced at higher-level command, having commanded Groupe d’armées 2 well before the start of the war and during the Saar offensive in September 1939. By May 1940, Prételat’s command included three field armies and most of the Maginot Line fortress troops.

Général Besson was also an experienced field commander, having commanded a regiment during World War I, and a brigade, division and army in the 1920s and 1930s. In October 1939, he took command of Groupe d’armées 3 on the extreme right flank of the north-east front in the Colmar and Mulhouse region of the Upper Rhine. There, he played a minor role in the battle for France.

GERMAN COMMANDERS The chain of command for the campaign in the west was Adolf Hitler, Generaloberst Walther von Brauchitsch (Commander-in-Chief of the Army), then the three army group commanders who commanded the operational forces – Generaloberst Gerd von Rundstedt (Heeresgruppe A), Generaloberst Fedor von Bock (Heeresgruppe B), and Generaloberst Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (Heeresgruppe C). Based on their World War I experience, these generals and many of their subordinates doubted a quick war could be won against France. They thought Fall Gelb could be defeated easily by either a stout defence by French forces entrenched along the border or a counteroffensive by forces behind the Maginot Line.

The commander of Heeresgruppe A, Gen.Obst. von Rundstedt was the Wehrmacht’s senior officer in terms of length of service. He was brought out of retirement in April 1939 to plan the invasion of Poland and command Heeresgruppe Süd. Afterwards, he and his staff moved west to plan the French campaign and lead the main attack. Rundstedt’s subordinate commanders were Generaloberst Gunther von Kluge (AOK 4) and Generaloberst Wilhelm List (AOK 12), General der Infanterie Ernst Busch (AOK 16), and General der Kavallerie Ewald von Kleist (Panzergruppe Kleist), all with combat experience from the Polish campaign. Assigned to Heeresgruppe A were two energetic and innovative officers who would ultimately embody the blitzkrieg concept – General der Panzertruppe Heinz Guderian, the Wehrmacht’s Panzer expert and XIX AK (mot.) commander, and Generalmajor Erwin Rommel, commander of the 7. Panzer-Division.

Heeresgruppe A also had many exceptional division commanders and staff officers who became group commanders later in the war. All except Busch were well suited to mobile operations as envisioned by the German invasion plan.

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An authority on defensive warfare, Gen.Obst. Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb was the ideal officer to defend Germany’s western frontier during the invasion of Poland and then direct two major offensives against the Maginot Line during the invasion of France.

(M. Romanych)

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General Busch was an ardent supporter of the Nazi Party who achieved rapid promotion once Hitler came to power. Although his performance in Poland as a corps commander was undistinguished, Busch’s political stance gained him command of the newly formed AOK 16 in October 1940.

Fortuitously for Busch, his chief of staff was Generalleutnant Walter Model, a tactically competent dynamo who became the driving force behind AOK 16 operations.

The senior commanders of Heeresgruppe C – Gen.Obst. von Leeb and his two subordinate army commanders, Generaloberst Erwin von Witzleben (AOK 1 stationed opposite the strongest parts of the Maginot Line), and Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann (AOK 7 located along the Rhine River) – were in direct contrast to the commanders of Heeresgruppe A. As a group, they were neither among Hitler’s favourites nor part of the developing Panzer general elite. All three sat out the invasion of Poland, assigned to defend Germany’s western front from French attack. As a result they lacked recent combat experience and first-hand knowledge of modern mechanized forces.

They were though, assigned responsibility for two planned major offensives against the Maginot Line.

A capable leader, Gen.Obst. von Leeb was out of favour with Hitler because of his anti-Nazi attitude and religious convictions. Among the army group commanders, Leeb was the only strong objector to the invasion in the west, but for moral rather than operational grounds. Retired in 1938 when commanders considered hostile to the Nazis were removed, Leeb was reactivated in July of the same year and given command of AOK 12 during the occupation of the Sudetenland. Afterwards, he retired again from active duty, only to be called back a second time in the summer of 1939 to command Heeresgruppe C. Generaloberst von Witzleben was anti-Nazi. In the mid-1930s, Witzleben became an active opponent of Adolf Hitler. On 1 September 1939, he took command of AOK 1, which was defending the frontier opposite the Maginot Line. With minimal forces, Witzleben stopped France’s abortive Saar offensive and then conducted a counterattack that took back most of the French territorial gains. During the Phoney War, he remained an active member of the anti-Hitler resistance.

Generaloberst Dollmann was an undistinguished leader with no higherlevel command experience. He served without special distinction in World War I and never had a field command at division or corps level. Good at sensing and adapting to political currents, Dollmann was promoted because of his relations with Nazi party officials rather than on his military ability. On 25 August 1939, Gen.Obst. Dollmann took command of AOK 7, which was manning the West Wall along the Rhine River.

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OPPOSING ARMIES On the eve of the German invasion, the Allies had a quantitative advantage over the Wehrmacht. The combined strength of the French, British, Belgian and Dutch armies was some four million soldiers organized into 151 divisions.

The Wehrmacht had about three million soldiers assigned to 135 divisions positioned along the western front. The Allies also had a numerical superiority in armoured vehicles, artillery and aircraft. To make up for its inferiority in soldiers and weapon systems, the Wehrmacht depended on superior training and command and control to provide a decisive tactical edge.

Before May 1940, the Wehrmacht actively trained its commanders and units for combat. Particular emphasis was given to river-crossing operations and attack of fortified positions. After difficulties in Poland, command and control were decentralized to make officers and units more responsive and flexible. Subordinate commanders were expected to move forwards to make decisions and communicate orders more rapidly than possible from a command post in the rear. Moreover, the Germans fielded a wide variety of radios for ground and air forces. The result was the Germans’ ability to adapt quickly and exploit changing battlefield situations.

Sited on high ground, fortress artillery such as this armoured 75mm turret of Fortress Metrich had good fields of fire and a high rate of fire, but also a short range (11,900m) that was easily outranged

by German heavy artillery.

(M. Romanych)

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In contrast, the French Army moved to the frontier and stagnated. Instead of combat training many units built blockhouses and field fortifications.

Despite the lessons of the Polish campaign, the GQG still emphasized World War I concepts of defence and firepower. The army’s fatal weakness was its slow, centralized command system that could not keep pace with battle events and gave little initiative to subordinate commanders. All orders to the army were issued by Gén. Maurice Gamelin, Army Commander-in-Chief, yet because his headquarters lacked radio, he had to rely on the civilian telephone network or dispatch riders. Typically, 48 hours were needed to pass orders to the divisions. Oddly, the Maginot Line, and not the mobile units, possessed the best communications equipment.

THE FRENCH ARMY In May 1940, most of the French Army was in defensive positions along the north-east frontier. Ninety-three divisions manned the front with 11 divisions in general reserve. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) brought additional forces to the fight with nine divisions in the Lille area and one, the 51st (Highland) Division stationed on the Maginot Line east of Metz.

Operationally, the French north-east front was divided into the field army and the fortress troops. Field forces were organized into three groupes d’armées (army groups). Groupe d’armées 1, commanded by Gén. Billotte, was located along the Belgian border. The strongest army group, it had four armies and the BEF, as well as most of the French mechanized force. Général Huntziger’s 2e Armée, the least capable army in Groupe d’armées 1, was the link between the strong mobile forces of Groupe d’armées 1 and strongest fortifications of the Maginot Line in Alsace and Lorraine. Further east, was Groupe d’armées 2 with three armies and the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter under the command of Gén. Prételat. In southern Alsace, Groupe d’armées 3 commanded by Gén. Besson included a short section of casemates along the Rhine River in the Colmar and Mulhouse areas, as well as several infantry divisions along the Swiss border.

The quality of French divisions was variable, ranging from excellent for active units to poor for reserve units. Mechanized and fortress troops were considered elite units in terms of training, equipment and morale. Reserve divisions were composed of older reservists with less training and World War I equipment and accounted for almost 50 per cent of the field divisions. Fortytwo reserve divisions were stationed along the north-east front, half of which reinforced the Maginot Line in Alsace and Lorraine.

The Maginot Line In May 1940, the Maginot Line was not a continuous fortified front. In terms of strength and organization, it consisted of several distinct fortification lines.

First and foremost were the strong first construction cycle fortifications of the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter (the so-called Maginot Line proper). Then there were the second cycle constructions added to extend the two régions fortifiées (fortified regions). Next in defensive strength were the casemate lines of the Rhine defences and Sarre Gap. Finally, the weakest section of the Maginot Line was the defence built along the Belgian border from Montmédy west to the English Channel, of which only those built in the Raismes and Mormal forests and north of Maubeuge had any true defensive 16

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value. The remainder of the Belgian border was protected by a series of ad hoc concrete blockhouses and fortifications field built by engineer and infantry units.

The strongest feature of the Maginot Line was the ouvrage (fortified work or position.) There were two basic types of ouvrages – large fortified works (gros ouvrages), or fortresses, and small fortified works (petits ouvrages), or forts. The primary difference between a fortress and a fort was size and armament. Fortresses were two to three times the size of forts and were equipped with artillery – 75mm guns and 135mm howitzers, many mounted in retractable, rotating armoured turrets. Twenty-two fortresses were built in the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter, as well as in the Montmédy sector. Depending on terrain, fortresses were located approximately every 15km (nine miles) in order to provide overlapping artillery fires. Along the strongest sections of the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter, German forces could be engaged by the artillery of two or more fortresses.

Forts were equipped with infantry weapons – machine guns, 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns and 81mm mortars. These weapons provided local defence for the fort and adjacent sections of the defensive line. Thirty-six forts were built in the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter, the extensions to the fortified regions and around Maubeuge. Many forts were planned as fortresses but scaled back because of budget cuts.

Fortresses and forts typically had several combat blocks and entrance blocks interconnected by a network of underground galleries. The galleries and underground portions of the blocks contained the facilities needed to sustain the weapons systems and crew for up to 30 days: command posts, power stations, crew quarters, kitchens, ammunition magazines and workshops. The typical fortress had between six and twelve blocks and a crew size between 500 and 1,000 soldiers, although the largest fortresses – Hackenberg and Hochwald had 21 and 28 blocks respectively – and crews of more than 1,000 soldiers. Forts had between one and four blocks and a crew of 100 to 200 soldiers.

Augmenting the fortresses and forts were more than 100 interval casemates (casemates d’intervalles). These casemates were large, one- or twostorey, reinforced concrete structures. In two-storey casements, the lower level was below ground and contained the power generators, ammunition stores and crew quarters. The upper floor, at ground level, contained multiple firing chambers (rooms) armed with twin 7.5mm machine guns, and 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns. These weapons were sited into interlocking fields of

LEFT Interval casemates filled the gaps between the Maginot forts and fortresses. With limited fields of observation and firepower, casemates like this one in Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach were vulnerable to ground assault unless artillery support was provided by a nearby fortress or interval artillery unit. (M. Romanych) RIGHT Imposing belts of anti-tank obstacles such as these rows of steel rails near Bitche ran along much of the French border with Germany and Luxembourg. Attacking German troops had first to breach these obstacles before assaulting the fortifications.

(M. Romanych)

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Casemates of the Rhine River defences were built directly on the bank of the Rhine.

Lightly armed, the casemates needed supporting interval infantry and artillery to oppose a German river crossing successfully. This casemate was photographed using optics from the German side of the river in early 1940.

(M. Romanych)

fire with adjacent fortified works. One-storey casemates had these same features, but often on a smaller scale. Casemates typically had one or more armoured cupolas for observation and self-defence. Crew size was about 15 to 30 soldiers. Casemates were designed to operate independently, but required artillery support from nearby fortresses or field artillery to withstand a determined assault.

Fortresses, forts and interval casemates were linked together by belts of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles that fronted the fortification line and surrounded most major fortified works. Combat blocks and interval casemates were sited to provide mutually supporting fire and to cover the obstacle belts. Generally, the anti-tank obstacles were six rows of steel rails set vertically in the ground. The anti-personnel obstacles were belts of dense barbed-wire entanglements up to five metres (16ft) wide. Anti-tank and barbed-wire barriers blocked roads through the obstacles.

A variety of other defensive structures – advanced posts, blocking positions along main roads and shelters for local infantry reserves – increased the depth of defences into a ten-kilometre-wide (six-mile) zone.

In practical terms, only those sections of the Maginot Line with artillery fortresses were impregnable to Wehrmacht attack in 1940. Elsewhere – the second construction cycle extensions to the régions fortifiées and the casemates of the Rhine defences and Sarre Gap – lacked the density of fortifications and artillery to withstand a deliberate German attack. The Sarre Gap defences were particularly weak, consisting of little more than two lines of unfinished casemates reinforced with field fortifications. The Rhine defences were unique, consisting of two and sometimes three parallel lines of casemates sited to enhance the natural barrier of the Rhine River.

In comparison with the fortifications built in Alsace and Lorraine, those along the Belgian border were austere. These fortifications were a loose line of ad hoc field fortifications suited primarily to local defence. Most of these fortifications were built by infantry and engineer units during the Phoney War. 18

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Armament was limited to machine guns and small-calibre anti-tank guns. Only the second-cycle defences north of Maubeuge were of any real defensive value.

Even so, none of the border defences could withstand a determined German attack, unless reinforced by infantry and artillery of the field army.

By far the weakest fortifications were in the Ardennes region near the town of Sedan. This oversight was perplexing considering that Sedan was astride a classic invasion route and was once one of the most fortified places in France. But in 1940, the strong fortifications of the Maginot Line proper ended 25km (16 miles) short of Sedan leaving only a weak line of blockhouses to fill the gap. This weakness in the border defences was known to both the OKH and GQG and is where the Panzers attacked on the third day of the invasion.

The fortress troops The Maginot Line was organized into secteurs fortifiés (fortified sectors) manned by régiments d’infanterie de forteresse (fortress infantry regiments, RIF) and fortress artillery regiments. These regiments augmented by engineer, signal and medical troops formed the crews of the fortresses, forts, casemates and blockhouses. In the Metz and Lauter areas, the sectors were grouped into regions fortifiées, each of which was equivalent to an army corps.

In May 1940 there were 43 RIFs manning the fortifications of the northeast frontier. A typical regiment had about 3,400 soldiers, sergeants, and officers organized into three battalions. Suited for static operations, RIFs were equipped with heavy infantry weapons such as machine guns, anti-tank guns and mortars, but lacked mobility.

Two types of fortress artillery regiments were assigned to the Maginot Line, régiments d’artillerie de position (RAP), which were static artillery units, and régiments d’artillerie mobile de forteresse (RAMF), which consisted of mobile artillery. Soldiers of the RAPs manned the artillery turrets, blocks and casemates and provided interval artillery to fill gaps between each of the artillery fires of the fortresses. In general, one regiment was assigned to each secteur fortifié, although there were variations based on the importance of the sector. About a third of the Maginot Line’s artillery was under fortification in either casemates or turrets. The interval artillery was important because its artillery had longer range than that of the fortresses. The RAMFs were assigned to the Régions fortifiées de Metz and de la Lauter to provide mobile artillery that could reinforce the RAPs. In May 1940, there were 11 RAPs and nine RAMFs equipped with artillery pieces ranging from 75mm to 370mm, many of which were of World War I vintage or earlier.

In terms of manpower, the fortress units were equivalent to approximately 15 field divisions.

Interval troops Before the war, only fortress troops garrisoned the Maginot Line. However, after mobilization the GQG realized that fortress units could not adequately occupy the space between the major fortifications. In December 1939, the Maginot Line was reinforced with field divisions, designated as ‘interval troops’ because they reinforced the intervals between the fortified works. The purpose of these units was to provide continuity and depth to the defence and mobile forces for counterattack. The result was a dramatic increase in troops stationed along the Maginot Line proper. On 10 May 1940, 24 infantry divisions were stationed from Montmédy to the Swiss border.

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Prior to the war, fortress troops and the field army were under separate command. However, during the Sarre offensive, conflicts arose between the two chains of command. To solve this problem, the fortress troops were reorganized and placed under the command of the field army. The régions fortifiées were dissolved and reorganized into the two corps of fortress troops, the 42e Corps d’armée de forteresse in Metz and the 43e Corps d’armée de forteresse in Lauter. Units positioned opposite the Ardennes region between Sedan and Maubeuge, and along the Swiss border, became the 41e and 44e Corps d’armée de forteresse respectively. Five secteurs fortifiés – selected because no offensive action was anticipated – were converted to divisions d’infanterie de forteresse (fortress infantry divisions, or DIF) numbered 101 through 105. The remaining secteurs fortifiés were unchanged. This unified command structure was employed until mid-June 1940 when interval units withdrew from the fortifications in the Metz and Lauter regions. At that time, the senior fortress commanders assumed command of the secteurs fortifiés, just in time to defend against the attack of Heeresgruppe C.

THE WEHRMACHT In the spring of 1940, the Wehrmacht was semi-modern. On one hand, it had 16 well-trained and equipped Panzer and motorized divisions. On the other, the infantry had many second- and third-rate divisions. Only the best infantry divisions (i.e., those raised in the first wave) were suited to offensive action.

Divisions that were mobilized later were deficient in organization, combat experience, personnel, equipment and training.

For the invasion in the west, 135 divisions were allocated to three army groups (Heeresgruppen) lettered A, B and C, and the OKH reserve. To the north, opposite Holland and northern Belgium was Heeresgruppe B commanded by Gen.Obst. von Bock with two armies totalling 29 divisions. In the centre, opposite central Belgium, was Heeresgruppe A commanded by Gen.Obst. von Rundstedt. As the campaign’s main effort, it had 45 divisions organized into four armies, one of which was Panzergruppe Kleist. To the south, along the Franco-German border was Heeresgruppe C commanded by Gen.Obst. von Leeb. In general, the best divisions were assigned to Heeresgruppe A, then Heeresgruppe B. With 16 divisions, most of which were reserve units with inferior equipment, Heeresgruppe C was by far the weakest army group.

The infantry regiment was the foundation for operations. However, infantry alone could rarely seize permanent fortifications. A successful attack required reinforcement by combat engineers equipped with explosives and sometimes flame-throwers, supported by heavy artillery and dive-bombers. Organic to infantry regiments of first-wave infantry divisions were 37mm anti-tank guns, 50mm and 80mm mortars, and 75mm and 150mm infantry guns, all which had limited effectiveness against reinforced concrete and armoured cupolas.

Heavier firepower came from the divisional artillery regiment, which possessed 105mm and possibly 150mm howitzers. The regiments of better-equipped divisions also had organic 20mm or 37mm anti-aircraft guns, or Flak (German abbreviation for Flugabwehrkanone), which were well suited to suppressive fire against fortifications. In most cases, infantry regiments of divisions created in 1939 and later – typically, those that attacked the Maginot Line proper – were without many of these weapons. These units had only older-model or smaller-calibre artillery, such as 105mm howitzers, and no anti-aircraft guns.

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For more firepower, infantry regiments were reinforced by artillery from corps or higher headquarters. Army corps had heavy artillery up to 210mm, but even these pieces were not sufficient to destroy the main Maginot fortifications, which were designed to withstand indirect fire up to 400mm.

However, the 210mm howitzer could suppress the turrets and cupolas of the fortresses and destroy smaller blockhouses and shelters. Against the rear and sides of the Maginot Line combat blocks and casemates, direct fire from 105mm and 150mm artillery pieces was moderately effective.

To defeat the fortresses of the Maginot Line, the OKH thought it needed siege artillery. In the mid-1930s as the Maginot Line proper reached completion, the development and production of siege artillery was ordered.

Two weapon systems designed specifically with the Maginot Line in mind were the 600mm Mörser Karl (Gerät 040) heavy self-propelled mortars and the 800mm K (E), or ‘schwere Gustav’ (Heavy Gustav) railway guns, both of which were not ready in time for the French campaign.

Yet, at the time of the offensive in the west, the Wehrmacht had longrange railway artillery ranging from 150mm to 280mm calibre, one 420mm Krupp howitzer (Gamma) reassembled from World War I era parts, as well as several 305mm howitzers and a World War I-vintage 420mm howitzer from Skoda in Czechoslovakia. A new addition was the German 355mm howitzer M1 built by Rheinmetall that had a longer range than the older 420mm howitzer. These siege artillery pieces were allocated to all three army groups, but initially weighted to Heeresgruppe B, which was planned to encounter the Belgian fortifications in the first days of the campaign. Later, this artillery was used against the Maginot Line.

Siege artillery proved ineffective against the Maginot fortresses, which were specifically designed to withstand bombardment from artillery up to 420mm in calibre. Here, the only Czech Skoda 420mm howitzer remaining from World War I is emplaced near Oberotterbach from where it shelled Fortress Schoenenbourg.

(M. Romanych)

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ORDERS OF BATTLE French order of battle Fortress and interval units, 10 May 1940

Army group

Army

Interval unit

Fortress unit

Groupe d’armées 1

7e Armée

Secteur fortifié de Flandres: I Groupe (-)/161e RAP

British Expeditionary Force

Secteur fortifié de Lille: No assigned fortress troops

1ère Armée

Secteur fortifié d’Escaut: 54e RIF, I Groupe (-)/161e RAP

Secteur fortifié de Maubeuge: 101e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (84e RIF, 87e RIF, II & III Groupe/161e RAP)

9e Armée

2e Armée

Groupe d’armées 2

3e Armée

4e Armée

5e Armée

22

Secteur fortifié d’Ardennes: 41e Corps d’armée de forteresse, 102e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (42e DBMC, 52e DBMC, 148e RIF, 160e RAP)

10e Corps d’armée 55e Division d’infanterie 3e Division d’infanterie Nord Africaine

Secteur fortifié de Montmédy (Sedan to Mouzon): 136e RIF, 147e RIF

18e Corps d’armée 3e Division d’infanterie coloniale 41e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Montmédy (Montmédy to Marville): 155e RIF, 132e RIF, 99e RAMF, I Groupe/169e RAP

24e Corps d’armée 51e Division d’infanterie 58e Division d’infanterie 20e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de la Crusnes: 42e Corps d’armée de forteresse (128e RIF, 139e RIF, 149e RIF, 46e RAMF, I Groupe/152e RAP)

Corps d’armée coloniale 56e Division d’infanterie 2e Division d’Infanterie British 51st (Highland) Division

Secteur fortifié de Thionville: 164e RIF, 167e RIF, 168e RIF, 169e RIF, 70e RAMF, 151e RAP

6e Corps d’armée 42e Division d’infanterie 26e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Boulay: 160e RIF, 161e RIF, 162e RIF, 164e RIF, 23e RAMF, 153e RAP

9e Corps d’armée 47e Division d’infanterie 11e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont: 146e RIF, 156e RIF, 163e RAP

20e Corps d’armée 82e Division d’infanterie Alpine 52e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de la Sarre: 41e RMIC, 51e RMIC, 133e RIF, 69e RMIF, 82e RMIF, 174e RMIF, 49e RAMF, 166e RAP

8e Corps d’armée 24e Division d’infanterie 31e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach: 133e RIF, 153e RIF, 166e RIF, 59e RAMF, 150e RAP

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Groupe d’armées 3

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Interval unit

Fortress unit

30e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié des Vosges: 43e Corps d’armée de forteresse (37e RIF, 154e RIF, 156e RIF, 165e RIF, 60e RAMF, 168e RAP)

12e Corps d’armée 70e Division d’infanterie 16e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Haguenau: 22e RIF, 23e RIF, 68e RIF, 70e RIF, 79e RIF, 69e RAMF, 156e RAP

17e Corps d’armée 62e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié du Bas-Rhin: 103e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (34e RIF, 172e RIF, 237e RI, 155e RAP)

13e Corps d’armée 54e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Colmar: 104e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (28e RIF, 42e RIF, 242e RI, I Groupe/170e RAP)

Secteur fortifié de Mulhouse: 105e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (10e RIF, II Groupe/159e RAP)

44e Corps d’armée de forteresse 67e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié d’Altkirch: 12e RIF, 171e RIF, III & IV Groupe/159e RAP

Fortress and interval units, 5 June 1940

Army group

Army

Interval unit

Fortress unit

Groupe d’armées 2

2e Armée

18e Corps d’armée 3e Division d’infanterie coloniale 3e Division d’infanterie Nord Africaine 41e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Montmédy (Montmédy to Marville): 155e RIF, 132e RIF, 99e RAMF, I Groupe/169e RAP

3e Armée

42e Corps d’armée de forteresse 20e Division d’infanterie 51e Division d’infanterie 58e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de la Crusnes: 128e RIF, 139e RIF, 149e RIF, 46e RAMF, I Groupe/152e RAP

6e Corps d’armée 26e Division d’infanterie 56e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Thionville: 164e RIF, 167e RIF, 168e RIF, 169e RIF, 70e RAMF, 151e RAP

Secteur fortifié de Boulay: 160e RIF, 161e RIF, 162e RIF, 164e RIF, 23e RAMF, 153e RAP

20e Corps d’armée

52e Division d’infanterie 1ère Division de grenadiers Polonais

Secteur fortifié de Faulquemont: 146e RIF, 156e RIF, 163e RAP

Secteur fortifié de la Sarre: 41e RMIC, 51e RMIC, 133e RIF, 69e RMIF, 82e RMIF, 174e RMIF, 49e RAMF, 166e RAP

5e Armée

43e Corps d’armée de forteresse 30e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Rohrbach: 133e RIF, 153e RIF, 166e RIF, 59e RAMF, 150e RAP

Secteur fortifié des Vosges: 37e RIF, 154e RIF, 156e RIF, 165e RIF, 60e RAMF, 168e RAP

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Interval unit

Fortress unit

12e Corps d’armée 70e Division d’Infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Haguenau: 22e RIF, 23e RIF, 68e RIF, 70e RIF, 79e RIF, 69e RAMF, 156e RAP

62e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié du Bas-Rhin: 103e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (34e RIF, 172e RIF, 237e RI, 155e RAP)

13e Corps d’armée 54e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié de Colmar: 104e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (28e RIF, 42e RIF, 242e RI, I Groupe/170e RAP)

Secteur fortifié de Mulhouse: 105e Division d’infanterie de forteresse (10e RIF, II Groupe/159e RAP)

44e Corps d’armée de forteresse 67e Division d’infanterie

Secteur fortifié d’Altkirch: 12e RIF, 171e RIF, III & IV Groupe/159e RAP

German order of battle Forces engaged in combat against the Maginot Line, 10 May to 4 June 1940 (Fall Gelb):

Army group

Army

Corps

Division

Location of combat action

Heeresgruppe B

AOK 6

XXVII AK

253. Infanterie-Division 217. Infanterie-Division 269. Infanterie-Division

Escaut

Heeresgruppe A

AOK 4

VIII AK

8. Infanterie-Division 28. Infanterie-Division

Maubeuge

XV AK (mot.)

5. Panzer-Division 7. Panzer-Division

Panzergruppe Kleist

AOK 16

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Solre-le-Château

II AK

12. Infanterie-Division 32. Infanterie-Division

Trélon and Anor

XXXXI AK (mot.)

6. Panzer- Division 8. Panzer- Division

Monthermé and Nouzonville

XIX AK (mot.)

1. Panzer-Division 2. Panzer-Division 10. Panzer- Division

Sedan

VII AK

36. Infanterie-Division 68. Infanterie-Division 71. Infanterie-Division

La Ferté

XIII AK

15. Infanterie-Division 17. Infanterie-Division

Montmédy to Longwy

XXIII AK

34. Infanterie-Division 58. Infanterie-Division 73. Infanterie-Division 76. Infanterie-Division

Longwy to Moselle

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AOK 1

AOK 7

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Corps

Division

Location of combat action

XXXVI AK

169. Infanterie-Division 183. Infanterie-Division 212. Infanterie-Division

Longwy

XXX AK

79. Infanterie-Division 93. Infanterie-Division 95. Infanterie-Division

Sarre

XII AK

60. Infanterie-Division 75. Infanterie-Division 258. Infanterie-Division

Sarre (Operation Fackel)

XXIV AK

252. Infanterie-Division 257. Infanterie-Division 268. Infanterie-Division 262. Infanterie-Division

Sarre, Rohrbach and Vosges

XXXVII AK

215. Infanterie-Division 246. Infanterie-Division

Vosges and Haguenau

XXV AK

555. Infanterie-Division 557. Infanterie-Division

Bas Rhin

Höheres Kommando XXXIII

554. Infanterie-Division 556. Infanterie-Division

Colmar and Mulhouse

Forces engaged in combat against the Maginot Line, 5–25 June 1940 (Fall Rot)

Army group

Army

Corps

Division

Location of combat action

Heeresgruppe A

AOK 16

Höheres Kommando XXXI

161. Infanterie-Division 162. Infanterie-Division 183. Infanterie-Division

Crusnes and Thionville

Heeresgruppe C

AOK 1

Höheres Kommando XXXXV

95. Infanterie-Division 167. Infanterie-Division

Boulay and Faulquemont

XXX AK

79. Infanterie-Division 93. Infanterie-Division 258. Infanterie-Division

Sarre (Operation Tiger)

XII AK

75. Infanterie-Division 268. Infanterie-Division

Sarre (Operation Tiger)

XXIV AK

60. Infanterie-Division 252. Infanterie-Division

Sarre (Operation Tiger)

Höheres Kommando XXXVII

215. Infanterie-Division 246. Infanterie-Division 257. Infanterie-Division 262. Infanterie-Division

Sarre, Rohrbach, Vosges, and Haguenau

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Army

Corps

Division

Location of combat action

AOK 7

XXV AK

555. Infanterie-Division 557. Infanterie-Division

Colmar (Operation Kleiner Bär)

XXVII AK

218. Infanterie-Division 221. Infanterie-Division 239. Infanterie-Division

Colmar (Operation Kleiner Bär)

Höheres Kommando XXXIII

554. Infanterie-Division 556. Infanterie-Division

Colmar (Operation Kleiner Bär)

The weapon that proved most devastating to fortifications was the 88mm gun. Designed as a dual-purpose, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapon, the 88’s high-velocity gun was very effective against the armoured turrets and cupolas and reinforced concrete structures of permanent fortifications. Without the 88mm gun, German assaults against the Maginot Line would have been much more costly. The anti-aircraft version was distributed to Luftwaffe Flak regiments (22 88mm guns each) and Army independent anti-aircraft battalions (12 88mm guns each). The anti-tank version was allocated to schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilungen (heavy anti-tank battalions). During Fall Gelb, the preponderance of 88mm guns were assigned to Heeresgruppe A and B, which were each allocated a Flakkorps (anti-aircraft corps) of three regiments. Furthermore, two schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilungen – 8 and 525 – were assigned to Heeresgruppe A. Heeresgruppe C had only a few Luftwaffe 88mm Flak batteries. However, during Fall Rot several additional Luftwaffe anti-aircraft batteries and schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525 were reassigned to support Heeresgruppe C’s attacks against the Maginot Line.

Air support to the infantry was primarily provided by Ju 87 Stuka aircraft assigned to two Luftflotte (air fleets) formed for the campaign. Luftflotte 2 (IV, VIII Fliegerkorps, II Flakkorps) supported Heeresgruppe B while Luftflotte 3 (I, II, V Fliegerkorps, I Flakkorps) supported both Heeresgruppe A and C. Together, Luftflotte 2 and 3 had three Stuka-Geschwader (divebomber wings) totalling some 360 Ju 87s. As the campaign progressed, the dive-bombers were allocated as needed to support ground operations. Most attacks against the Maginot line were supported by Stukas, which when carrying 500kg bombs were devastating against the open positions of interval artillery, but generally ineffective against concrete fortifications.

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