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Tsong-kha-pa: The Object of Negation
Consequentialists]. When the true existence apprehended by the apprehension of true existence is refuted through reasoning, one—like the magician—does not apprehend external and internal phenomena as having a mode of abiding that is not posited through the force of an internal awareness; rather, one understands [external and internal phenomena] as mere existents posited through the force of an awareness. Moreover, those posited through the force of an awareness that are not damaged by valid cognition are asserted as existing in conventional terms; however, everything posited through the force of an awareness is not asserted as existing in conventional terms. Although the production of a sprout from a seed is posited through the force of an awareness, it is not contradictory that the sprout also is produced from the seed from its own side. This is like the fact that there is an appearance as a horse or an elephant even from the side of the basis of conjuring [that is, a pebble or twig]. Through this, all phenomena existing in conventional terms are to be understood. Even the noumenon is posited as existing through the force of the awareness to which it appears. Hence, it is not an exception to being posited as existing in conventional terms. Therefore, the significance of applying the example, a magician’s illusion, to the meaning—other phenomena—is not at all that just as a magician’s illusion appears to be a horse or an elephant but is empty of being such, so all [phenomena] such as pots and so forth appear to be pots and so forth, but are empty of being pots and so forth. For, if that were the case, being that phenomenon [for example, being a pot] would not occur, and the application of the example to the meaning would be that [phenomena] appear to be such-and-such but are not the actual thing. When non-conceptual pristine wisdom of meditative equipoise is generated, in its perspective all dualistic appearances are quiescent. This is like one whose eyes, not having been affected [by the magician’s mantra], have neither the illusory appearance nor adherence to it. Later [in Chandrakīrti’s text] there is no indication of the Autonomists’ uncommon modes of refuting [true existence] by reasoning; therefore, let us here express briefly and in a way easy to understand how through this system all phenomena are caused to appear as like a magician’s illusions. Objects of knowledge are inclusively divided into the two: effective things and non-effective things [or impermanent and permanent phenomena]. Let us explain this with respect to effective things first.