THE MEASURING STICK
work of these principles, the common good, human dignity, the responsibility for one’s neighbour and for the natural environment, that political discussions must be held and by which all political ideas must be transversally critiqued. Looking at Europe, and specifically at relations between the state and the individual, including the expectations of both parties, we have to answer the question of whose interests politics actually serve. As Bretherton argues, politics that serves the interests of the few, or even the interests of the many, is inadequate and cannot live up to the standard of understanding politics as a way of loving your neighbour. Or to quote Moltmann: “Instead of viewing ourselves as rivals, “we” and “the other” become love the enemy, because “he is like you”—he or she is human.” Taking this a step further, as Figel’ emphasises, being human is not worthless, as each human has dignity. Thus, solutions which fail to take this approach, do not meet the ethical requirements that will bring about the human flourishing of each that is needed for the common good to be realised. If we agree with Bretherton that the main purpose of politics is to enrich our common life, what does this mean in practice in contemporary Europe? This does not mean that through politics, government should intervene in every area of our private lives—as this would strangle our freedom and strip our agency—but rather that politics should be informed by and responsive to our common concerns. In this context, defining the common interest and our common concerns, above and beyond special interests, is crucial. No European society is or has ever been completely homogeneous—as Figel’ notes, each person is unique (different from all others within the same society). In increasingly multicultural societies, not only with greater levels of immigration, but
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