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INTRODUCTION Fukushima 7th Anniversary Report

FUKUSHIMA AT 7 The last year may appear to have been uneventful at first look. In reality it has been one of significant discovery. Pieces of new information come out and may seem inconsequential when looked at alone. Together this new information begins to coalesce into a clearer picture of the meltdowns that caused the world’s worst nuclear disaster.

SIMPLYINFO.ORG We have been actively documenting and researching the Fukushima Disaster since March 11, 2011 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report

Reactors Unit 1 Work at unit 1 this year focused on a robotic containment inspection and work on the refueling floor. Both provided some new clues towards what happened with this meltdown. Many times the lack of a significant finding is itself significant when it shows that an event in an area can be ruled out.

The Pmorph robot was sent into unit 1 in February of 2017. This was a follow up robotic inspection after a previous pair of robots collected limited information before suffering a technical death in containment. Pmorph’s task was to move along the catwalk inside containment until it reached the pedestal doorway on the far side. It stopped at multiple locations to drop down a probe to collect data before the final drop in the pedestal doorway. (1)

1 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report The collected data found unusually low levels of radiation compared to what was expected. This also found no evidence of corium (fuel debris) in the pedestal doorway. A sand like substance was found along the containment floor. There was no evidence in these locations of corium residues. Sample testing found nothing that confirmed the existence of corium in these sandy deposits. A possible explanation could be that this sand was left after corium passed through the area but was hot enough to not leave traces. It is also possible that these sand like substances were from damage to the upper concrete bio-shield or pedestal. The latter possibility may be a more realistic explanation as the sand like substances were seen piled on top of other materials on the containment floor. (2)

This containment inspection hoped to find solid evidence of where unit 1’s melted fuel was located. To date the only finding that appears to be melted fuel and has high enough radiation levels to support that, are in the torus room of unit 1. (3) The last year’s work at unit 1 focused primarily on dealing with the refueling floor. During the meltdowns and explosions unit 1’s refueling floor level collapsed. This left a tangle of radioactive debris and unknown conditions beneath. Slow progress was made in inspecting this area. Concerns that this work would distribute radioactive dust into the strong coastal winds caused frequent stops to this effort. (4) What they did find was useful information. Earlier inspections found that a portion of the heavy concrete reactor well cover had been dislodged upward. The new inspections looked closer around the reactor well and were able to place a scope down underneath. It was discovered that the top layers of the reactor well concrete were pushed up and out of the well. Lower layers were broken and had fallen down into the reactor well.

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Radiation levels around the reactor well are moderate. The containment cap may have lost the gasket seal or a similar failure. Inspection work has not been able to view the cap to look for physical damage so far. Early on TEPCO felt unit 1 was such a danger that they put a temporary tent over the building. Why this was done was never made clear to the public. (5) The Nuclear Decommissioning Facilitation Corp (NDF) produced their annual report for Fukushima Daiichi last year. Their findings for unit 1 lend some insight to the problems with this reactor. They found that the Reactor Water Cooling System (RCW) was contaminated with fuel debris.

High radiation levels along these pipe runs indicated there was some amount of fuel debris in the pipes. NDF concluded that the sump in the reactor pedestal feeds this cooling system. This may have been how corium (fuel debris) fell into the pedestal sump and then found its way into the RCW system. Our research shows that this system can feed water to multiple locations. One of those is the suppression chamber in the torus room. This pipe system was opened and directed at the suppression chamber early in the disaster. There was no documented event of this system later being closed. It is possible it was left open as the disaster unfolded.

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The NDF report also confirmed that they assume the containment cap gasket has failed. This same report found a heat source that may indicate some amount of fuel debris in unit 1’s containment. Using the temperature sensors on the Heat Ventilating Handling Units (HVH), they found elevated temperatures on the north side of containment. This would correspond to the side of the building under the spent fuel pool. These lower areas of the reactor building on the north side are also where some other indications of possible small amounts of fuel debris exist.

The reactor vessel never reached expected pressure levels during the meltdown. This made the NDF researchers conclude that a pipe or steam valve failed allowing pressure to leak into containment. This report also found what they described as “high Cs concentrations” on the outer walls of the torus room. This would be radioactive cesium isotopes. Our earlier findings concluded that there is a high likelihood of fuel debris being deposited into the outer areas of the torus room. This admission by NDF may be a carefully worded admission of the same to some extent.

The NDF report brings up the possibility that unit 1 suffered a pipe break during the meltdown progression. 4 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report NDF also provided evidence that unit 1 may have been the source of the deadly contamination in the vent stack unit 1 shares with unit 2. (6) The newer findings provide additional insight into older findings. Various inspections have been done in the torus room for unit 1. The location of multiple significant findings in the torus room are in the same general area of the building as the higher temperature readings found using the HVH system sensors. These pieces of information joined together appear to indicate notable activity in this area. This includes a damaged torus vacuum breaker with scorching, a sign that corium may have been involved. A leaking overhead water pipe was also found. This general area is where steam was found coming up from the torus room in 2011. A brief high radiation level inside containment found by a robot was also in this general area as is a highly contaminated RCW pipe that exits the torus room up into the 1st floor.

Radiation levels in this area above the water line are higher here than other areas. Videos and data from a previous inspection of this portion of the torus room was withheld by TEPCO. When we inquired with IRID about this missing video, TEPCO refused to provide it or an explanation. Inspections of the west (land side) section of the torus room found probable corium on the torus room floor and directional scorching. This area also had localized high radiation under the water level. The torus room floor sections near most of the other signs of damage have not been subject to any sort of inspection. In the past TEPCO and other parties have made vague mentions of fuel fragments or particles being located in the torus or torus room. Having the water level go too low in unit 1 has also been a subject of concern with TEPCO. This seems to back up the theory that fuel debris exists in the torus room.

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Notes for the above graphic: 1. First scope inspection location, possible corium and scorching found. 2. Steam through floor between the torus room and first floor. 3. Scorched torus vacuum breaker, failed bellows seal and water dripping from ceiling. Over 2 Sievert/hour to almost 3 Sievert/hour radiation at this location.

7. Severely scorched downcomer, bubbles coming up out of the water at this location, residues on the downcomer. 1.6 Sievert/hour radiation. 8. Second scope inspection of the torus room. Location where broken floor and fine brown sediment was found. 9. RCW pipe location on first floor. This pipe was found to be heavily contaminated. P = pedestal doorway

4. Broken (burned) plastic sand pocket drain pipe below torus downcomer pipe with water leaking out. 5. Two downcomers TEPCO never provided video or information for on boat inspection. 6. Scorched downcomer.

6 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report Fuel fragmentation may have taken place as unit 1 melted down. This possibility has significant implications for damage to the environment, public health and dealing with the aftermath at the plant. The risk has been known since at least the 1980’s. In the right conditions during a meltdown instead of fuel assemblies and reactor materials melting into a liquid, they reach a stage of vaporization. The metals, cladding and uranium fuel pellets can vaporize rather than melting. These materials can then condense back into solids. This may explain the process that created the radioactive glass spheres and black substances. A growing list of peer reviewed studies looked at this problem. These studies confirmed that microparticles released to the environment contained nuclear fuel, structural materials from the reactors and trapped radioactive isotopes such as cesium and uranium. (7) Similar microparticles were found after the explosions at Chernobyl. While the events at Chernobyl were different in many ways, this shows that releases to the environment may have many similarities. There is no doubt left that Fukushima ejected nuclear fuel via microparticles to the environment. The question that remains is what volume of these particles were ejected during the explosions or allowed to leak into the sea.

The potential for a pipe break in containment seems to tie into other events during the meltdown. Further inspections inside containment will help confirm this. The exact location of any significant mass of fuel debris is still elusive. Evidence has pointed more and more to fuel debris being widely distributed. Any significant amounts may be in the north and west sides of the torus room. There is a high possibility that the way unit 1 failed caused microparticles or fragmented fuel debris to widely distribute into the reactor building and systems. This allowed these particles to find a route through highly contaminated standing water in the reactor building, to the turbine building then out the lower level turbine building opening into the groundwater and eventually to the sea. Further inspection of unit 1 will be an important method of finding any remaining fuel debris or ruling out locations by a process of elimination. This will also determine with more clarity the events during the meltdown. Areas that would benefit from further inspection include the suspect areas of the torus room floor, upper containment and the reactor pedestal. Unit 2

Unit 1 conclusions The reactor well and refueling floor are heavily damaged. There is some evidence of the containment cap gasket or a valve on the containment cap failing during the meltdown.

Unit 2 saw an extensive series of inspections over the last year. A series of robot inspections in 2017 and a scope inspection in 2018. These inspections focused on the conditions inside the reactor pedestal below the reactor vessel. This is the presumed location where fuel debris is expected to have been found.

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In January of 2017 TEPCO and IRID announced the robots to be used for these inspections. First a cleaning robot was to clean the control rod rail inside containment. Then a shape changing robot called Scorpion was to traverse the rail, enter the pedestal area and move across the steel catwalk floor. This all proved far more challenging than expected. Before any of this work could take place a serious effort was needed to clean the area around the

hatch that would be used to introduce the robots to containment. Earlier work found that the gasket around the hatch had failed during the meltdown and the area was heavily contaminated. A series of heavy robots were used to remove debris, shielding bricks and to scrub the surfaces to make the area safer to work in. All of this significantly delayed the inspections from the original work dates. (8) (9)

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A preliminary scope inspection went first to look at the conditions along the rail. Some minor debris was found but nothing was admitted as being problematic.

Further inspection into containment by the scope was not conducted at this point though it was in the original planning. (10)

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The additional scope work was conducted and published a few days later. What was found put the entire project in jeopardy and was apparently not what they expected to find. Radiation levels as high as 530 Sieverts/hour were found. These readings were later estimated to be lower yet still unusually high by comparison to other areas in containment.

The scope was able to look inside the pedestal at the metal floor grate they planned to have Scorpion inspect. Instead they found a warped gaping hole in the metal floor grate. Melted fuel had moved through this area destroying sections of the floor grate. Residues that could be identified as some form of melted fuel debris were seen around the edges of the holes. This confirmed that fuel had fallen from the reactor vessel to the pedestal floor. (12) (11)

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A day later TEPCO raised doubts about continuing the inspections in unit 2. The radiation levels were far higher than they assumed would be found. The robot was built to tolerate around 75 Sieverts/hour while new readings showed radiation in the worst areas to be in the hundreds. It was eventually decided to go ahead with the robot inspections. (13) TEPCO slightly changed the inspection plans. Scorpion would travel down the CRD rail to the opening of the pedestal and attempt to take more photos and readings. The area of highest radiation was part way down the CRD rail. Radiation in the pedestal was estimated to be lower than what was found along the rail. (14)

While all of this was taking place a translation error in a routine news story created a minor panic. A Kyodo News article was improperly translated by English language newspapers. The high reading inside containment was misinterpreted as a radiation spike at the plant. The erroneous story spawned more erroneous stories, many among media outlets that should have known better. (15) TEPCO sent the cleaning robot into unit 2’s containment on February 9th, 2017. The robot was able to clean some charred debris off of the CRD rail before suffering a fatal failure. As it approached the area of high radiation the camera began to show interference and darkening of the picture. This was a clear sign the robot was being damaged by the high radiation. 11

2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report TEPCO workers managed to retrieve the robot before it completely failed. (17)

general area of the high radiation zone. The robot was unable to free itself.

Three days later it was decided to send Scorpion on a suicide mission into unit 2. The robot would gather data as long as it could. This included a high possibility the robot would die inside containment and they would not be able to retrieve it. This would create problems for future inspection work. (17)

This eventually required TEPCO to abandon the robot and cut the tether. Scorpion was left in containment. (19)

On February 16th Scorpion entered containment. TEPCO provided limited information after the inspection. New photos showed what the scope inspection had found, gaping holes in the floor grating. (18) The following day it was announced that Scorpion died inside containment. The robot became trapped in debris on the rail in the

In early April IRID published additional findings from the inspections. The locations of the fuel melt through had been clarified. This showed a melt through area offset to one side of the reactor vessel. This may indicate a type of failure called a “creep rupture�. This is where the hot steel of the bottom of the reactor vessel begins to tear open on the side of the curved surface. Instead of the molten fuel burning a hole through the center of the reactor vessel bottom head, it creates a rip in the steel off to one side. This area of the failure and melt through is also in the general area of containment near where the high radiation area was found. (20)

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Newer analysis by the decommissioning authority (NDF) assumes that fuel gradually dropped into the pedestal during the meltdown and that no significant amount of fuel is left in the reactor vessel. This is confirmed by the findings in 2017 from the inspection work. Computer modeling from Sandia National Lab and other meltdown research concludes that a slow melt through is more likely to burn down into the pedestal concrete. (21) Previous muon scans and our additional analysis of this data indicate that all or most of the melted fuel has left the reactor vessel.

This rules out the reactor vessel as a location for any significant amount of nuclear fuel as they search to find where it may have gone. Our refined image of the muon scan also showed what may be a small amount of fuel debris in the recirculation system pipes. The refined image shows a more distinct reading on a section of recirculation pipe. This section of recirculation pipe in the muon scan happens to be right in the location where the high radiation reading was found inside unit 2 containment along a section of the CRD rail. (22)(23)(24)

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In January of 2018 TEPCO conducted another scope inspection inside unit 2. This looked inside the pedestal and also dropped down to look around the pedestal floor. Technical information on the equipment and what limited data was released for this inspection indicates that TEPCO is not disclosing a considerable amount of information about this inspection. This data may be some of the most important data for all of the inspections conducted at unit 2 over the years. The limited data provided looked around the outer walls of the pedestal and did not include any information for the central pedestal floor areas or the floor sump pits.

These are the very areas where the key information related to the meltdown would be. The lack of this data raises some serious questions about what was found and why TEPCO does not want this information to be public. Pieces of a fuel assembly lifting handle were found in the lower pedestal. This rather unexpected finding does not have a clear answer. How did this handle make it to the pedestal without melting? How could it have fallen so far unimpeded? It does appear that this handle fell after the surrounding fuel debris pile was cool enough to not melt the handle.

14 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report If there was evidence found that corium had burned down into the pedestal floor and potentially beyond this would be a major piece of news about the post meltdown conditions at the plant. It could also establish if the bulk of the melted fuel was located in the pedestal basemat concrete. Another possibility is that they found no evidence of fuel having piled up or burned down into the pedestal basemat concrete in any significant amount. This would raise the very serious question of where they fuel has then ended up.

The limited photos provided by TEPCO show a very small amount of what appears to be metallic corium. This is corium that contains mostly metal substances from the reactor and a limited amount of nuclear fuel. What has been shown to the public is not a finding of the bulk of the missing nuclear fuel. Where the fuel is located may be known to TEPCO but it is not known to the larger general public or the research community. (25)(26)

15 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report In July TEPCO published new findings for radiation readings inside unit 2’s containment. The 2017 scope camera had been tested with a Cobalt 60 radiation source. The majority of the radiation inside unit 2 would be from other sources that create a different interference rate than Cobalt 60. This difference caused TEPCO to slightly overestimate the radiation readings. The adjusted readings were still considerably high. (28) TEPCO installed an elaborate platform and sealed building on the side of unit 2 this

year. The platform would allow entry into the unit 2 refueling floor level. The work is a precursor to eventually removing the roof and walls of the building to later install a cover building for spent fuel removal. What is not explained in this process is how this later work would avoid releasing more contamination to the environment. Unit 2 was the major contributor to ongoing radiation releases to the air before a filter and sealed panel was installed on unit 2’s blow out panel opening. (29)

16 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report In October 2017 TEPCO announced they were beginning a process to scrape off roof tiles on unit 2 using remote controlled heavy equipment. They claimed they would use water spray and other tactics to attempt to control radiation releases for this work. This roof was contaminated during the meltdowns and explosions in 2011. No further information about this work has been given to the public by TEPCO and there was no disclosed system to monitor for potential dust releases to the environment. Previous work at the plant showed that contaminated dusts could blow far offsite without being detected by radiation monitoring at the plant. (30) Unit 2 Conclusions Unit 2 has been a quiet source of major concern since the initial disaster. Highly radioactive water was found in the sea front canals for unit 2 soon after the meltdowns. More recently it was discovered that a significant amount of contaminated groundwater sits below the plant site and beyond. Efforts to inspect unit 2 have been a major focus at the disaster site over the last year but have not resulted in a clear finding of the nuclear fuel. It appears that a pipe section that may be part of the recirculating cooling for the reactor vessel could be

contaminated. This may be the source for the high radiation field found inside containment along the CRD rail. Radiation levels inside the pedestal are lower than in containment. This makes a significant volume of nuclear fuel residing in the pedestal very unlikely. Muon scans have shown that no significant amount of fuel remains in the reactor vessel. Radiation readings seem to confirm this as readings near the bottom of the reactor vessel didn’t increase vs. other parts of the pedestal. The limited amount of fuel debris residues have been shown to the public do not include the types that would contain a high content of nuclear fuel. We now know where the missing fuel is not. This leaves the question of where it then has gone? TEPCO is running out of places to look.

Unit 3 A muon scan for unit 3 was completed in the summer of 2017. This found conclusively that there is no fuel inside the reactor vessel. The angle of the scan did not include the lower areas of containment. This rules out any fuel debris of any significant amount residing in the reactor vessel for unit 3. (31)

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In July of 2017 work began to inspect inside unit 3’s pedestal. An underwater swimming robot named “Sunfish” was put into

containment. The robot experienced no problems on the series of inspections.

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Residues were found inside the pedestal that appear to be types of corium. One type appears to be a black metal that dripped down from the reactor vessel. Another appears as light colored uniform spheres adhered to various surfaces. Along with this, eroded spots were found along the pedestal

concrete wall. This light colored material is different than those found in units 1 and 2 and doesn’t immediately match any expected type of corium. This indicates something unique or unexpected may have happened inside unit 3. (32)

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A second inspection was conducted that looked around the lower portion of the pedestal. This found what appeared to be black, brown and pumice types of corium. Black corium being mostly composed of metals, brown having a higher amount of nuclear fuel in it. Pumice type corium is created when corium comes in contact with water while it is still hot.

TEPCO provided a few close up photos of fuel debris piles but no wider angle photos. This inspection also lacked any photos of what could be confirmed in the central pedestal floor. What TEPCO has shown so far does not constitute the bulk of the melted fuel, only some residues and small debris piles. Where the bulk of the fuel is located is still unknown. (33)

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TEPCO did provide some heavily edited video for the unit 3 inspection work, unlike the unit 2 inspections. (34) Months later TEPCO made a new admission about the unit 3 pedestal inspection.

A lifting handle for a fuel assembly and the bottom portion of a control rod were found among the debris on the pedestal lower area. Both were not melted and were resting on top of piles of fuel debris type materials. (35)

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The Decommissioning Authority (NDF) report for this year looked at a number of data sets and concluded that all of them showed all of the fuel inside unit 3 has melted and it is unlikely any of the fuel remains in the reactor vessel in any significant amount. The muon scan completed in the last year also confirm this assumption. The containment water level inside unit 3 is higher than the other two units. The one leak point that has been found so far is in the MSIV room on the first floor where steam pipe expansion joints were found to be leaking. This behavior with the water level rules out any major leak routes lower in containment. Water does not leak into the torus room. This makes nuclear fuel in the torus room unlikely. The lower containment

isn’t leaking by any significant amount. This makes a large hole or leak in the containment floor unlikely. The NDF report also confirms the effort to put water into containment via the containment spray lines during the disaster. This left at least some standing water in the containment floor. Unit 3’s fuel load contained plutonium MOX fuel assemblies. This additional plutonium in the melted fuel may have been enough to potentially create a criticality event inside unit 3. The standing water in containment and the higher plutonium content of the melted fuel may have set off a criticality event in containment.

22 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report This could explain the spectacular explosion at unit 3 if a criticality was involved. We will cover this concept in depth in our upcoming extended report on unit 3. (36) Work to install the cover building on unit 3 for future removal of the spent fuel from the

The delays in installing the cover building caused spent fuel removal to be pushed back until the end of 2018. (38)

spent fuel pool began in January 2017. This work has taken longer than expected as multiple challenges were discovered. Some of the planning had to be changed to lower the potential radiation exposure of workers. Portions of the cover building installation had to be done by hand, requiring workers to spend time on the refueling floor. (37)

By November 2017, most of the cover building had been installed. The final section was installed in early 2018. (40)

By October, a single section of the cover building had been installed. This followed months of preparation work and installation of the platform the cover building would bolt onto. (39)

23 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report Unit 3 conclusions The bulk of the fuel has not been found inside unit 3. A number of inspections have been done inside unit 3, none have found the bulk of the fuel in the reactor, containment or reactor building. Visual evidence and a review of the events during the disaster indicate that a criticality may have taken place inside containment as part of the events of the explosion. Upcoming work to remove fuel in the unit 3 spent fuel pool comes with some level of risk. Inspections of the pool found some fuel racks to be partially dislodged and deformed. This could cause difficulties in removing the fuel assemblies. Earlier testing of the pool water by TEPCO assumed that there were not any fuel assemblies that had completely failed into the pool. There isn’t any way to scan the assemblies before removing them, leaving some questions about what they might find. This work will be done remotely and within the cover building. Work done this way lowers the potential for releases to the environment or exposing workers.

Unit 4 No work at unit 4 has taken place in the last year. Spent fuel was removed in previous years leaving the building with no remaining fuel assemblies inside.

Unit 5 No work at unit 5 has taken place in the last year. Fuel inside the reactor vessel was moved to the spent fuel pool inside unit 5 in 2014. All of unit 5’s spent fuel remains in the pool in the reactor building. Removal of the spent fuel inside unit 5 was given a low priority. It is scheduled for removal at some time after units 1-3 have their spent fuel

successfully removed. Unit 5 is of a similar design to units 2-4 and has been used as a test bed for preparing work efforts in the damaged reactors. Unit 6 Fuel in the reactor at unit 6 was removed in 2013. All fuel in the unit 6 spent fuel pool remains in this pool. Some of the fuel assemblies from unit 4’s spent fuel pool were relocated for temporary storage in unit 6’s spent fuel pool. Nuclear Fuel Ejected From The Reactors There is growing speculation that nuclear fuel from the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi was ejected into the environment. A highly radioactive black substance began being found around eastern Japan soon after the disaster. Multiple studies confirmed this black substance was a microparticle fused material from Fukushima Daiichi that contained nuclear fuel, metals and fuel cladding. Another substance that appeared as microscopic glass spheres was also found in certain areas of the fallout zones and beyond. This substance included nuclear fuel and what appears to be materials from the concrete inside the reactor containments. (41) Another study this year reached the same conclusion. A Manchester University study explicitly calls the substances they studied to be nuclear fuel releases from the plant. The researchers called for further investigation into these released nuclear fuel microparticles. (42) What makes these materials so problematic is that they are highly radioactive, with a half-life of billions of years due to the uranium content. These materials do not dissolve in the body or the environment.

24 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report It was already discovered that some workers with high radiation exposures during the disaster had inhaled these substances. The workers exposures didn’t go down as expected over time tipping off researchers that there was a problem. Investigators found that these insoluble radioactive microparticles had been inhaled by the workers who were at the plant during the meltdowns. These particles are permanently lodged in their lungs. Due to the insolubility their bodies cannot expel the particles. This will leave the impacted workers with lifelong radiation exposures to their lungs. Since these microparticles have been found around the evacuation zone and also well beyond including as far away as Tokyo, it is possible that members of the general public have inhaled these particles. These particles in the environment create another long term risk. Expectations that radiation levels will go down over time may not play out as hoped. These particles do not break down over time in the environment causing them to be more persistent. As these particles continue to exist in the environment they create a long term risk of being inhaled by anyone who

encounters them. Any method that can lift dusts and dirt into the air creates a potential exposure to these microparticles. Reactor Building Conclusions The bulk of the nuclear fuel has not been found in any of the 3 reactors that suffered meltdowns. This creates challenges towards planning fuel removal at the plant if they can’t confirm exactly where it is. All three units have suffered some form of containment failure. The question of where any of the fuel may actually be located and how much was actually ejected to the environment remains a major question.

Plant Site Issues Frozen Wall In January of 2017 TEPCO declared most of the frozen wall to be effectively frozen. Land side sections remained unfrozen at the time. This had initially been done to provide a way to control water levels inside the reactor block area. (43)

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By early 2018 TEPCO reports had declared most of the frozen wall including the landside sections to now be frozen. A recent meeting by Japan’s nuclear regulator (NRA) questioned the effectiveness of the frozen wall. TEPCO claimed it has cut incoming groundwater in half and reduced 400 tons of contaminated groundwater per day. The NRA said the wells being used to pump up contaminated groundwater was the reason for the improvements rather than the frozen wall. The frozen wall’s effectiveness also appears to be impacted by rain where typhoons impacted the wall defenses. The wall seems to be helping but it is not the miracle cure some thought it might be. (44)

Tank Farms The H4 tank farm where highly radioactive water and sludge had leaked into the Pacific ocean has been completely removed. Bolt together tanks that had leaked were dismantled and sent to radioactive waste handling. Work continues on site to remove the remaining bolt together tanks and replace most with welded tanks intended for longer term storage. (45) Plant related environmental issues A new study found that the brackish groundwater that exists below beaches up to 10 kilometers away from Fukushima Daiichi is considerably contaminated. This source of contaminated water has been 26

2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report releasing contamination back into the ocean since the disaster. This shows a previously unknown location of contamination in the environment. (46) Fuel Removal Planning Various research partners have been working on technology to remove melted fuel at Fukushima Daiichi. Functional models have been created for tasks like removing fuel debris from inside the reactor vessel. (47) The groups in charge of decommissioning the disaster site confirmed that only dry fuel removal concepts will be used. Initially TEPCO had considered flooding the containment structures to remove any fuel debris. This posed structural challenges to the buildings along with problems trying to keep all of this sealed. It also posed a serious risk of re-criticality in the fuel debris. Based on the current information regarding damage to the reactors and where fuel might be, it was decided that dry removal technology would be the direction for future research. (48) In 2016 the decommissioning authority (NDF) published in a report that they would consider potentially tunneling under the reactor buildings to try to retrieve melted fuel. This tactic would only be of use if melted fuel had burned deep into the basemat concrete or below the reactor building. Implementing this technology would be an extreme challenge. (49) New Technology In addition to the new robots used this year a new flying drone has been in use. RISER looks like a standard quadcopter but includes on board radiation detection equipment and a gamma camera to visualize radiation. This drone has been used in the unit 3 turbine building, a small section of the unit 3 reactor building and to inspect the unit 1-2 vent tower. (50)

Data Falsification Scandals A series of quality assurance data falsification scandals hit Japan’s automotive and steel industries. This included potentially some equipment at Fukushima Daiichi. Kobe Steel who admitted years of data falsification problems produced 19 spent fuel casks for Fukushima Daiichi and provided some of the metal pipes used at the radioactive waste incinerator. (51)

Our Suggestions There is more work that could be done at the disaster site to better understand the meltdowns and confirm the conditions in the reactors. All of this is approachable work with some history of previous implementation. We urge TEPCO and the groups tasked with decommissioning to implement these efforts. Radiation Probes High radiation capable probes have been in use in the nuclear industry for decades. Implementing this technology in suspect locations could help confirm radiation levels. These probes would be easier to place than robotic equipment. There may also be some benefit in using neutron detectors in specific locations. Such technology was used at the Chernobyl disaster site to gather data. Scope Investigations Scopes may be a better approach than using robots to collect data inside the reactors. The technology is easier to deploy in more locations and can be removed even when there is an equipment failure. Using scopes to investigate various locations within containment could provide multiple data sets to confirm conditions and locate fuel debris. These scope locations could then include the introduction of monitoring equipment to track temperature, radiation or 27

2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report other data points. This technology may prove useful for looking under the reactor well concrete covers to inspect for damage and leak locations.

return zone� were found to still have high radiation levels. (52) (53)

Drill Under Unit 2

We have discussed the black microparticles and glass spheres extensively over the years. This may be a factor in many of the perplexing problems after the disaster. It could play a role in some of the persistent radiation levels in the environment. These insoluble microparticles would not break down or migrate in the environment as other types of radiation releases would. This may cause radiation levels to persist for much longer than predicted. Since these materials also contain uranium they will be highly radioactive for years. Cesium isotopes will decay away over decades but these uranium isotopes can be a problem for billions of years due to their long half-life. The gamma radiation given off by the uranium is particularly problematic.

We have proposed this concept multiple times over the years. The benefit of doing this has not diminished with new information. Angle drilling under at least unit 2 should be done. Collecting soil core samples would provide information about any possible leak of melted fuel or fuel debris below the reactor building. It would also provide information about the soil contamination type and levels directly below the building. Depending on what is found in these locations, it may also be beneficial to put neutron detectors or radiation probes into these soil core holes to track radiation data long term.

Environmental Issues Radiation levels in the environment have not been going down as anticipated. Greenpeace reported that their analysis showed many areas still re-contaminate after decontamination efforts. Existing radiation levels are not dropping as expected. This may hint at problems different than what were initially expected from the disaster. Areas in the “difficult to

Black Stuff

Soil Storage Contaminated soil storage still dots the landscape around eastern Japan. Some of this has been moved to centralized storage near the Daiichi disaster site. These storage sites have created their own problems. One such facility was placed on the banks of a river leading to concerns of run off contamination. All of this soil still has nowhere to go long term. (54)

28 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report

Forest fires ran through part of the “difficult to return zone” over the summer. This raised concerns about potential radiation releases from the fires. This was found to be a problem around Chernobyl where fires would re-suspend contamination into the air. (55) There was an effort to allow contaminated soil to be used in road construction projects. This plan was eventually shot down by Japan’s nuclear regulator (NRA). Without any standards to try to contain this soil or protect the public from radiation exposure it seemed incredibly short sighted. This also didn’t take into consideration the potential for radioactive microparticles to be rereleased into the environment had this been allowed to take place. (56)

Farming Some farming and food production has resumed in the region. The government stance is still to push producers to continue operations while compelling the public to buy the products. A dairy producers group wants to build large scale dairy farms in some of the worst contaminated regions of Fukushima prefecture. The group touted the benefits of modern technology and potential for research. They did not mention what measures would be taken to prevent the cattle from becoming contaminated either in milk or meat products. (57)

29 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report Fish from Fukushima waters have begun shipping to Thailand for sale. Japan’s central government has also been pushing various countries to lift food bans related to the disaster. (58)

person’s total exposure, ignoring their internal exposures. Ingestion is frequently not considered. Inhalation has been completely ignored as an exposure pathway in most cases.

Food Restrictions

Newer findings that some Fukushima workers have long term lung contamination with microparticles that have long half-lives raise wider public health concerns. Members of the public exposed to the fallout clouds from the meltdowns and explosions may also have some amount of inhaled microparticle contamination. This kind of exposure can have long term consequences even if the amount is quite small.

Many food restrictions are still in place. The government and farmers want to relax testing standards on Fukushima rice. New standards would rely on other factors in the reporting system rather than blanket checks for radiation. The government has been quick to tout testing showing radiation levels below 100 bq/kg in Fukushima rice. This does not mean rice from the region is free of contamination. It is just somewhere below the 100 bq/kg cut off set by the government. (59) By 2020 Fukushima prefecture plans to have radiation testing on rice to be only random spot testing rather than blanket testing. (60) In 2017 we reviewed the government managed radiation testing of the food supply. We found a miniscule amount of the foods tested were actually from Fukushima prefecture where there is the most concern. Only 2.52% of the food products tested were from Fukushima and only 0.96% were agricultural products from Fukushima. This skew in the official testing also ignored many of the food products known to be problematic. All of this gave a false sense of food safety. (61)

Human Health Impact Ongoing health problems caused by the disaster has been a contentious issue. The Japanese government and parties with affiliations in the nuclear industry have sought to downplay the problems. Exposures are frequently misrepresented. An external exposure is presented as a

Efforts to downplay the potential risks go hand in hand with efforts to dismiss individual health problems as not being related to the disaster. Worker Health & Exposure A meta-study of the occupational health response during the disaster found some key needs that were lacking. Emergency planning had put TEPCO in charge of emergency and occupational health issues during the initial disaster. TEPCO was so overwhelmed with the disaster response that the government had to step in and assist with these tasks. Even so, it took weeks before a basic system was set up. It took even longer for reasonable occupational health oversight to begin. Years later many aspects of worker safety and health were still not being appropriately addressed. (62) In January of 2017, 15 workers were found to have cancers that were suspected to be due to their radiation exposures at the plant. (63) A worker had his leukemia diagnosis officially tied to his radiation exposure during the disaster. This was the 3rd worker to develop leukemia and have it officially

30 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report recognized as being due to radiation exposure during the disaster. (64) The 20,000 workers who battled the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi in the first 9 months of the disaster are offered health screenings by the government. Only 35% of the eligible workers have participated. Some cited the inconvenience of time and travel to participate. Others said that they didn’t think participation would do anything to improve their health. (65) Complicating the issue of worker exposures and health problems is the lack of sufficient radiation monitoring. During the initial disaster there were not enough personal radiation meters. Workers frequently shared one meter for a work team. Individual workers would go into unknown areas without a meter. There were also many instances of workers leaving a meter behind to go do high radiation high risk work in an attempt to not “max out” their exposure. This would have caused them to no longer be able to work at the site. Workers also reported that exit scanners would run too fast and not accurately record their daily exposure. All of this created conditions where workers official exposures were significantly lower than what they may have been exposed to. Workers with somewhat low official exposures may still be presenting with health damage as years go on. Public Health & Exposure A new study found Strontium 90 in the teeth of cattle abandoned in the evacuation zone after the disaster. The study found that teeth that were in growth phases after the initial disaster incorporated more Strontium 90 than teeth that were fully formed before the disaster. The study did not look at Strontium 90 in the bones of these animals. This does show that Strontium 90 was released to the environment in significant enough quantities to be found in these cows. This could be a potential problem to some extent in the

human population. The reintroduction of cattle farming to the areas near the evacuation zone raises questions about the safety of doing so based on this study. (66) 106 children now have thyroid cancer after the Fukushima disaster, documented by the Health Survey. The government entity tasked with monitoring thyroid cancer after the disaster continues to insist that these cancers couldn’t be due to the disaster. Many of these cancers were found on secondary screenings. This means that these children previously had a screening where there was no cancer found soon after the disaster. Follow up screenings later found they had developed cancer in their thyroid. An additional 5 children were found to have thyroid cancer in December. The Health Survey only monitors a small percentage of children exposed to radiation in the region. The actual numbers are likely much higher. Some parents opt to have their children screened by non-profit groups that provide assistance or by private doctors. The thyroid cancers and abnormalities found outside of the official Health Survey are not counted. How much higher the actual thyroid cancer rate is, is currently not known. The rate found in the Health Survey is already much higher than the normal rate in children. (67) (68) A private group has documented that children diagnosed with thyroid cancer after the disaster had a 9.5% rate of cancer relapse after surgery. They urged the government Health Survey to include postsurgery checks for cancer relapses. These relapses took place about 28 months after surgery. The documented relapses were reported to the private support group but may have come from multiple reporting sources. Currently the official Health Survey does not provide data on relapses. This relapse problem may be related to the type of treatment being provided in Japan. The standard protocol in the US is to completely remove the thyroid then follow 31

2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report up with radioiodine treatment. In Japan some of these are treated by only removing the cancerous half of the thyroid and not doing radioiodine treatment. This difference could be why there are some relapses. The thyroid cancers found in Fukushima children have in the past been described as being unusually aggressive. This could also play a role in the incidences of relapse. (69) (70)

multiply those rates to apply to the entire group of potentially impacted people, these health problems suddenly look much worse. Concerns about politicization and privacy may mean these attempts at public health screenings will be of little use in giving a clear picture of the true health impact of the disaster.

A German study estimated the relapse rate after partial thyroid removal to be about 5%. A number of factors played a role including the details of the surgery and post-surgical treatments. (71)

Social Impact

Record numbers of vision problems and obesity were found in Fukushima school children this year. The latter is speculated to be from restricted outdoor activity. Environmental contamination has led to long term restrictions on outdoor sports, playing outside and other outdoor activities. (72) Health surveys conducted after the disaster for both workers and children have a number of problems. Potential participants have concerns that the data will be used for political purposes. Many have cited that they gain no personal benefit from participating. Health care is widely available in Japan. Receiving a check-up and consultation with a doctor may better serve the patient. Obtaining this information from a trusted source rather than a government survey that may have ulterior motives would improve patient confidence. Low participation rates in both surveys may show either a lack of trust or lack of interest in providing the government with data. This causes the official counts to be of limited use. There may also be skews in the data due to who participates. If only one sub-type of the cohort participates and they have a higher or lower incidence of health problems it could make the data less accurate. If you take the health problem rates found for the people that participated in the surveys and

The social impact in Japan and beyond continues. The government stance in Japan remains one of public relations and propaganda to gain acquiescence. Over the last 7 years this has had limited results. The public largely distrusts the government on this issue. Evacuees feel short changed for many valid reasons. Efforts to push people to consume questionable food products has gained as much as it likely will. Those who didn’t care continue to eat whatever without critique. Those who care have made long term changes to their eating and purchasing habits. The government stance has been that they will return everyone to the contaminated and damaged regions. In their efforts to push an impossible policy they have eroded what little public trust and support was left. Few want to return. After repeated incidents of dishonesty in dealing with evacuees and the decontamination efforts, there is little trust of the government on this issue. The central and prefecture governments have attempted various stunts to repair the image of the damaged region. Multiple attempts to have Olympic games moved to Fukushima prefecture have been tried. There was an effort to have an international rugby tournament held at J-Village, the former soccer center used as an emergency response center for the disaster. (73) The highway through the heavily contaminated portion of the evacuation 32

2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report zone has been reopened. A “rebuilding” hub was established around the train station in Futaba, just outside of the plant grounds. Potential success of such efforts remains to be seen. (74) Lawsuits Multiple court cases have taken place in the last year. A court ruling in Chiba prefecture found that evacuees could sue for loss of their communities, jobs and businesses. These less tangible losses can now be considered as part of future financial settlements. Another court ruling in Chiba found TEPCO guilty of responsibility for the disaster while absolving the central government. A different ruling in Gunma prefecture found both parties at fault. (75) (76) Three TEPCO executives faced trial beginning in June. The court case accuses the three of criminal negligence that led to the disaster. Central to this case are decisions made by the three before the disaster that ignored the tsunami risk to the plant. They are accused of refusing to implement additional safety features that could have lessened the damage to the plant. (77) A trial witness testified that he presented TEPCO’s executives with data showing a huge tsunami such as the one that hit the plant could happen. This was in 2008. He was asked to recalculate his data to try to find a more desirable result. When that recalculation came to the same end result of damage to the plant the executives chose to ignore his findings completely. The research division that told of the tsunami risk also told the executives that a 10 meter high tide wall could provide some protection to the plant. This measure was rejected by the executives.(78) (79)

A class action lawsuit was filed in a Boston US court against GE. The suit involves about 150,000 Japanese citizens and hundreds of businesses impacted by the Fukushima disaster. The suit claims that GE misrepresented the safety of their reactor design back in the 1960’s in order to reap the profits of selling new nuclear plants. Whistleblowers in the US in the 1970’s highlighted the significant design flaws in the reactor design that ultimately contributed to the massive disaster in Fukushima. (80) Reactor Restarts Attempts to restart Japan’s nuclear fleet continued in the last year. TEPCO’s massive Kashiwazaki Kariwa nuclear plant received permission from Japan’s nuclear regulator to restart two units there. The prefecture government in Niigata where the plant resides is still refusing to give their permission for a restart. The local government wants TEPCO to continue to provide information about the meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi before they will consider any restart. (81) As part of TEPCO’s effort to gain regulators approval for a restart they presented an odd set of equipment. A pair of pump trucks TEPCO claimed could stave off a meltdown were shown. These two pump trucks would have questionable potential to provide sufficient cooling to a reactor to prevent a meltdown. Other portions of reactor systems involved could be unavailable. It is unlikely these two trucks have enough pump capacity to provide sufficient cooling to stop a meltdown once one starts. (82) The current status of nuclear reactors in Japan can be found in our graphic.

33 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report

TEPCO’s Past Antics The 2017 publication of a series of international news reports dubbed the Paradise Papers implicated TEPCO. The investigative reporting found prominent people and large companies hiding assets overseas. One of the companies found to be using these offshore money schemes was TEPCO. The released information so far hasn’t described how much wealth or what years TEPCO conducted these activities. (83) The Niigata prefecture investigative committee reviewing the Fukushima Disaster discovered that TEPCO’s president in 2011 ordered employees to not use the word “meltdown” when talking about the disaster. This was at the height of the

disaster when the condition of the reactors was still being presented in a confused manner to the public. It took another two months before TEPCO would even admit a meltdown took place. This restriction on informing the public caused many to underestimate the potential safety threat at a time when they were most at risk of radiation exposure. (84) In the last year US investment firm Blackrock called on the companies the fund invests in to clean up their act. The Blackrock CEO urged these companies to take a hard look at their role in society, not just how much money they could generate. (85)

34 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report “To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society.”

Transparent, open and honest disclosure of the investigative work at the plant needs serious improvement. The public has a right to know.

TEPCO has certainly failed on this front. TEPCO continues to enjoy taxpayer funded financial support while paying dividends to shareholders each quarter. The government of Japan bears some responsibility for this. They opted to give TEPCO long term financial support without putting harder requirements on the company. The notion of corporate social responsibility (or the lack of such) looms large in the aftermath of the disaster.

Seven years later the understanding of the health impacts of the disaster and the damage to the environment have evolved. Work by government allied groups tend to do more to shore up the government position of minimal problems than to provide reliable understanding. Real answers may come from unbiased scientific research and citizen run groups. These parties have consistently discovered things about the disaster impact that the government ignored or overlooked.


Those who have found themselves without their homes, jobs, communities or their health still have a long journey toward recovery. Financial compensation has been slow and insufficient. Reestablishing a new life has been challenging as government efforts have instead tried to push people to return home, even when home is unsafe. Successful court rulings may provide some relief. For now many are still stuck in fluid situations where they can’t go home and starting over still eludes.

This year saw significant advancement in understanding the technical aspects of the meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi. While the melted fuel has not been found in any of the three reactors, the ongoing data collection has added to the body of information. This can then be used to better understand the meltdowns by process of elimination.

Bibliography 1. Pmorph Robot Prepares For Fukushima Unit 1 Entry February 15, 2017 2. Fukushima Unit 1 More Questions Than Answers From New Inspection March 23, 2017 3. Unit 1 Torus Radiation Shows Possible Source Location February 28, 2013

35 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report 4. Fukushima Reactors Face More Setbacks October 4, 2017 5. Fukushima Unit 1 Refueling Floor Inspection Results May 4, 2017 6. Experts Tell All On Fukushima Unit 1 August 10, 2017 7. Uranium Dioxides and Debris Fragments Released to the Environment with CesiumRich Microparticles from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Asumi Ochiai, Junpei Imoto, et al Environmental Science & Technology 2018 52 (5), 2586-2594 DOI: 10.1021/acs.est.7b06309 8. Fukushima Unit 2 Containment Inspection, What You Need To Know January 2, 2017 9. Fukushima Unit 2 Containment Inspection Starts Jan 18th January 17, 2017 10. Fukushima Daiichi; Progress & Problems This Week January 30, 2017 11. What The New Fukushima Unit 2 Inspection May Indicate February 2, 2017 12. Fukushima Unit 2 Failure Point Found! February 2, 2017 13. Fukushima Unit 2 Robot May Not Go In Due To Dangerous Conditions February 3, 2017 14. Fukushima Unit 2 New Radiation Readings From TEPCO February 6, 2017 15. No, Fukushima Daiichi Did Not See A Radiation Spike February 4, 2017 36 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report

16. Fukushima Unit 2 High Radiation Damages New Robot February 9, 2017 17. Scorpion Robot To Make Suicide Mission Inside Fukushima Unit 2 February 12, 2017 18. Scorpion Enters Fukushima Unit 2 February 16, 2017 19. Scorpion Dies In Fukushima Unit 2, Sends Back Data February 17, 2017 20. Fukushima Unit 2 Confirmation Of Damage Found April 6, 2017 21. Experts Tell All On Fukushima Unit 2 August 17, 2017 22. Experts Tell All On Fukushima Unit 2 August 17, 2017 23. Something Incredible Found In Fukushima Muon Scan August 1, 2016 24. Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power Station No. 2 On the position grasp of the fuel debris in the furnace by muon measurement 7.28.2016 International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning 25. TEPCO Withholds Critical New Fukushima Meltdown Data From Public January 23, 2018 26. Analysis Of Fukushima Unit 2 Pedestal Inspection 2018 February 2, 2018 27. TEPCO Revises Fukushima Unit 2 Radiation Readings July 29, 2017 37 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report

28. Fukushima Unit 2 Decomm Progresses April 28, 2017 29. Fukushima Unit 2 Decomm Progresses April 28, 2017 30. Fukushima Reactors Face More Setbacks October 4, 2017 31. Fukushima Unit 3 Muon Scan Finds NO FUEL In Reactor Vessel July 29, 2017 32. Fuel Residue Found In Fukushima Unit 3 July 22, 2017 33. Fukushima Unit 3 Inspections Find More Melted Fuel July 22, 2017 34. New Fukushima Unit 3 Videos Provide More Clues August 1, 2017 35. The Surprise Found Inside Fukushima Unit 3 December 19, 2017 36. Fukushima Experts Tell All On Unit 3 October 12, 2017 37. Fukushima Unit 3 Cover Building Installation Underway January 18, 2017 38. Fukushima Daiichi; Progress & Problems This Week January 30, 2017 39. Fukushima Reactors Face More Setbacks October 4, 2017

38 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report 40. SimplyInfo.Org: Fukushima Update November 22, 2017 November 22, 2017 41. Article series on black substances and glass spheres from Fukushima Daiichi 2011-2018 42. Manchester University. "New evidence of nuclear fuel releases found at Fukushima." ScienceDaily 28 February 2018. 43. Fukushima Frozen Wall Progress 2017 January 19, 2017 44. TEPCO defends Fukushima ‘ice wall,’ but it is still too porous The Asahi Shimbun March 2, 2018 45. H4 Tank Farm Removed At Fukushima Daiichi May 30, 2017 46. Unexpected source of Fukushima-derived cesium Virginie Sanial, Ken O. Buesseler, et al Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Oct 2017, 114 (42) 11092-11096; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1708659114 47. Fukushima Fuel Removal Model Unveiled April 20, 2017 48. Authority Confirms Dry Removal Plan For Fukushima Daiichi July 6, 2017 49. The Semi-Secret Plan To Tunnel Under Fukushima Daiichi March 10, 2017 50. Radiation Imaging Drone Introduced At Fukushima Daiichi February 20, 2017

39 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report 51. Kobe Steel Scandal May Hit Fukushima Daiichi Fuel Casks, Incinerator October 17, 2017 52. Airborne radiation near Fukushima nuke plant still far higher than gov't max Mainichi Japan January 18, 2018 53. Greenpeace investigation shows Fukushima radiation risks to last into next century Greenpeace International 1 March 2018 54. New Fukushima Contaminated Soil Storage Sits On River Banks November 8, 2017 55. Forest Fires In Fukushima Pose New Risk May 1, 2017 56. NRA Puts Stop To Plan To Reuse Contaminated Soil January 10, 2017 57. Fukushima dairy farmers look to large-scale ‘reconstruction farms’ to revive battered industry The Japan Times January 14, 2018 58. Thailand gets first fish exported from Fukushima since 3/11 The Japan Times March 1, 2018 59. Fukushima farmers looking for authoritative ways to shed nuclear stigma The Japan Times December 24, 2017 60. Fukushima looks to ease blanket radiation checks on rice starting in 2020 The Japan Times March 3, 2018

40 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report 61. 2017 Food & Radiation Report April 3, 2017 62. Review of health issues of workers engaged in operations related to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Koh Hiraoka, Seiichiro Tateishi and Koji Mori1 Journal of Occupational Health 2015; 57: 497–512 63. 15 Fukushima Workers Have Cancer January 18, 2017 64. Gov't certifies Fukushima TEPCO employee's leukemia as work-related illness Mainichi Japan December 14, 2017 65. Only 35% of Fukushima Daiichi workers tested NHK World March 6, 2018 66. 90Sr specific activity of teeth of abandoned cattle after the Fukushima accident – teeth as an indicator of environmental pollution Kazuma Koaraia, Yasushi Kino, et al. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity Volume 183, March 2018, Pages 1-6 67. No. of children at time of Fukushima disaster diagnosed with thyroid cancer hits 160 Mainichi Japan March 6, 2018 68. 5 more minors in Fukushima Pref. at time of nuclear accident diagnosed with thyroid cancer Mainichi Japan December 26, 2017 69. Thyroid cancer relapses in some Fukushima children NHK World March 1, 2018 70. Fukushima Thyroid Examination December 2017: 193 Confirmed/Suspected Thyroid Cancer Cases (No New Cases Reported) Fukushima Voice January 25, 2018

41 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report 71. Recurrence prophylaxis and drug therapy strategies after operations on the thyroid gland Feldkamp et al Dt Ă„rztebl 1998; 95: A-2324-2328 [Issue 38] 72. Japanese school kids post worst eyesight on record as obesity makes comeback in Fukushima: survey The Japan Times December 22, 2017 73. Tepco hoping Rugby World Cup can help Fukushima Rich Freeman The Japan Times December 21, 2017 74. Fukushima Update; September 25, 2017 September 25, 2017 75. Fukushima Update; September 25, 2017 September 25, 2017 76. Court Finds TEPCO & Japan Government Guilty In Fukushima Disaster March 18, 2017 77. TEPCO Execs Trial Starts Over Fukushima Negligence June 1, 2017 78. TEPCO asked subsidiary to underestimate tsunami threat at Fukushima nuke plant: worker Mainichi Japan March 1, 2018 79. Court told ex-Tepco Execs were informed barriers could prevent tsunami flooding at Fukushima plant The Japan Times February 28, 2018

42 2018 Fukushima Disaster 7th Anniversary Report 80. GE faces federal lawsuit over Fukushima nuclear disaster David L. Harris November 18, 2017 81. TEPCO Sets 2019 Kashiwazaki Kariwa Restart, New Niigata Gov. Says Not So Fast April 27, 2017 82. TEPCO Sets 2019 Kashiwazaki Kariwa Restart, New Niigata Gov. Says Not So Fast April 27, 2017 83. TEPCO Implicated In Paradise Papers Scandal November 6, 2017 84. TEPCO president gave order not to call 2011 crisis a 'meltdown' Kohei Kano Asahi Shimbun December 27, 2017 85. BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk Losing Our Support Andrew Ross Sorkin New York Times January 15, 2018

43 2018

CREDITS The 7th Anniversary report was the work of the research team. Editor: Nancy Foust Research Team: Peter Melzer, PhD Edano San MD Paul W Shafer, PhD Nancy Foust and various members of the research team who have contributed this year.  Copyright 2018 Cover graphics background by  Freepik



Simplyinfoannualreport2018 final  

The 7th anniversary report on the Fukushima disaster.

Simplyinfoannualreport2018 final  

The 7th anniversary report on the Fukushima disaster.