(From: Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, by Walter Biemel, translated by J.L. Mehta, HBJ, New York, 1976) Anticipation and Awaiting in Being and Time How does the temporality of understanding exhibit itself? We saw that to understand is to project upon one’s own possibilities of being, a disclosure of the ability-to-be. The various modes of “knowing” are based on such understanding. Projecting oneself upon one’s possibilities, however, is nothing but a temporalization, a generating, of the future. “The future makes ontologically possible an entity which is in such a way that it exists understandingly in it’s potentiality-for-being” (p. 385, BT). The possibility is not simply imagined, desired, hoped for or feared as a possibility. Rather, Dasein is such possibility, and only insofar as it is that does Dasein’s future approach it. This manner of the temporalization, or being brought on, of the future is called by Heidegger “anticipation” (Vorlaufen, running ahead). The Dasein which temporalizes itself from its authentic future, that is, the future in which it attains to itself or realizes itself, is the authentic Dasein, and anticipation is the way it temporalizes the future. How is inauthentic Dasein constituted? If care as a unitary structure is grounded in temporality, and if temporality includes the three ecstasies of future, past and present (my note:“ecstasy” meaning “standing out” – Dasein transcends itself, stands outside of itself, by simultaneously being carried in three different temporal directions—future, past present), then the future must be involved even in inauthentic Dasein. But in what manner? The analysis of everyday Dasein showed how Dasein is absorbed in concern, how it comprehends its own self in terms of concern and what the concern is about. “Dasein does not come towards itself primarily in its inmost non-relational potentiality-forbeing, but awaits this concernfully in terms of that which yields or denies the object of its concern” (p. 386, BT). The inauthentic future is an awaiting (Gewartigen). Awaiting in turn makes possible the attitude of expecting, hoping, wishing (my note: all are leveled-down possibilities—from ‘willing,’ for example, “seizing upon possibilities,” we arrive at mere ‘wishing’ whereby possibilities have not been taken hold of in concern; they may not have even been pondered). The term which comprehends the authentic as well as inauthentic temporalization of the future is being-ahead-of-itself, the concept for grasping this existentiality. (p. 57) *** The two modes of temporalization, the authentic and the inauthentic, can be schematically contrasted as follows:
Future: Present: Past: (having-been-ness)
Anticipation Moment Repetition (or Retrieval)
Awaiting Present-ation (making present) Oblivion
Heidegger – Biemel - Temporalization
(p. 59) On the Present: When Dasein anticipates, as in resoluteness, such anticipation involves “a present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the situation. In resoluteness, the present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one’s closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having-been. That present which is held in authentic temporality, and which thus is authentic itself, we call the ‘moment of vision’ [Augenblick] (p. 387, BT). The Moment is not a now-point in a temporal series. It is, rather, the manner in which Dasein is opened up to what meets it or, more precisely, to what it lets be encountered. That depends upon its own mode of being, upon its own ability to be itself. The inauthentic temporalization of understanding, has in the ecstasy of the present, its corresponding present-ation. This means that the ability-to-be comprehends itself in terms of the object of concern that lies in front of it in the present. The authentic temporalization, on the contrary, temporalizes itself directly in terms of the future and does not forfeit itself to the object of concern. (pp. 57-58).
Heidegger – Biemel - Temporalization
Published on Apr 14, 2013
From Biemel's 1973 introduction to Heidegger: 'Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study'... here, Biemel explains the difference between authe...