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İSTANBUL ŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİ Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01

Muhammed Fatih Keleş Samet Sevgi Bilge Erdemli Ömer Faruk Kafalı

Türkiye Birleşik Komunist Partisi Kapatma Davasi Anayasa Yargisi Karar Analizi Who Is The Master Of European Union Law ? Institutions Of European Union And Their Roles

Zeynep Ahsen Keskin

An Examination Of Theories Of International Law

Dilara Nur Tunçtürk

Powerful States, Weak States And The Formation Of Customary International Law

Ahmet Dülger Mahmut Sait Arslan

Peace And Security: Failures Of The Security Council United Nations Security Council Should Be More Representative


» İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi öğrenci dergisi hakemli bir dergi olup senede bir defa elektronik dergi olarak yayınlanmaktadır. » Dergimiz, bölüm ayrımı yapmaksızın lisans ve yüksek lisans öğrencilerinin hukuk alanına dair makale, karar incelemesi, kitap incelemesi ve bu alanlarda çeviri eserlerinin yayınına açıktır. » Dergimizde yayınlanacak yazıların daha önce başka bir yerde yayınlanmamış olması gerekmektedir. » Yazıların MS Word dosya formatında, A4 boyutuna göre, Times New Roman yazı fontu kullanılarak, 12 punto ve 1.5 satır aralığı ile iki yana yaslı şekilde hazırlanması yayına hazır halde gönderilmesi gerekmektedir. » Atıfların dipnot şeklinde sayfanın en altında yer alması, Times New Roman yazı fontu kullanılarak, 10 punto ve 1 satır aralığı ile İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Klavuzu’na uygun olarak hazırlanması gerekmektedir.

» Makalelerde başlık, özet ve yararlanılan eserlerin yer aldığı kaynakça bölümlerinin bulunması zorunludur. » Türkçe makaleler yanında İngilizce makaleler de kabul edilmektedir. » Makalelerini dergimizde yayınlamak isteyen tüm lisans ve yüksek lisans öğrencilerinin, kısa özgeçmişleri ile beraber makalelerini dergimizin e-mail adresine yollamaları gerekmektedir. » Dergiye yapılan başvurular incelenerek yazara üç ay içerisinde kabul, red veya düzeltmeye dair bir cevap iletilecektir.

İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi  

e-posta : hukuk@sehir.edu.tr Kuşbakışı Caddesi No: 27 34662 Altunizade – Üsküdar – İstanbul Tel : 44 44 0 34 Faks : 0216 474 53 53  


İSTANBUL ŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİ Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01

Yayın Kurulu Doç.Dr. Ali Yeşilırmak Yrd.Doç.Dr. Halil Rahman Başaran Yrd.Doç.Dr. Mustafa Yaylalı

Makalelerde yer alan görüşler yazarların tamamen kişisel görüşleridir.


TAKDİM Hukuk alanında çok değişik türde bilimsel dergilere rastlamak mümkündür. Bu dergilerin bir çoğunda akademisyenlerin bilimsel araştırma ve değerlendirmeleri neşredilmektedir. Özellikle son yıllarda hukuk fakültelerinin sayısındaki artışa paralel olarak hemen hemen her hukuk fakültesinin bir dergi çıkardığı, bunun yanında barolar ve noterler gibi mesleki kuruluşlar, Türkiye Adalet Akademisi gibi meslekiçi eğitim veren birimler, Anayasa Mahkemesi, Uyuşmazlık Mahkemesi, Yargıtay, Danıştay, Sayıştay gibi yüksek yargı organlarının ve bir kısım ticari kuruluşların da çıkardıkları yayınlarda yine hukuk alanında yazılmış akademik araştırmalara yer verdikleri görülmektedir. Çoğu basılı eser niteliğindeki bu kaynaklar yanında son zamanlarda e-dergi formatında elektronik ortamlarda neşredilen yayınlar da artış göstermektedir. İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi olarak mevcut bu yayınlar dışında farklı bir hukuk dergisi çıkarma fikri çerçevesinde, hem fakültemizin akademisyen yetiştirme amacı hem de gittikçe artan biçimde dillendirilen hukuk öğrencilerinin muhakeme ve yazma yeteneklerine yönelik eleştiriler göz önünde bulundurularak, lisans öğrencilerinin araştırma ve yazma kabiliyetlerinin geliştirilmesi açısından bir öğrenci dergisi çıkarma düşüncemizi bu ilk sayıyla hayata geçirmiş ve beğenilerinize sunmuş bulunuyoruz. Dergimiz sadece İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi hukuk fakültesi öğrencilerinin değil yurtiçi ve yurtdışındaki tüm hukuk fakültesi öğrencilerinin hukukla ilgili araştırma ve incelemelerine açıktır. Bu nedenle tüm hukuk öğrencileri bu dergide yayınlatmak istedikleri araştırma ve makalelerini gönderebileceklerdir. Dergimiz hakemli bir dergi olup ancak hakem onayından geçmiş olan araştırma ve makaleler yayınlanacaktır. Böylece hem öğrencilerimizi yazmaya teşvik etme ve çalışmalarını değerlendirme hem de ileriye yönelik olarak gerek akademik gerekse mesleki kariyerlerinde önemli bir referans olabilecek eserler üretmelerine imkan sağlamak niyetindeyiz. Dergimizin hukuk hayatımıza yeni bir katkı sağlaması dilek ve temennisiyle emeği geçen tüm öğretim elemanlarımızı kutlar başarılar dilerim. Prof. Dr. M. Macit KENANOĞLU DEKAN


İÇİNDEKİLER Muhammed Fatih Keleş Türkiye Birleşik Komunist Partisi Kapatma Davasi / 1-10 Samet Sevgi Anayasa Yargisi Karar Analizi / 11-18 Bilge Erdemli Who Is The Master Of European Union Law / 19-25 Ömer Faruk Kafalı Institutions Of European Union And Their Roles / 26-32 Zeynep Ahsen Keskin An Examination Of Theories Of International Law / 33-37 Dilara Nur Tunçtürk Powerful States, Weak States And The Formation Of Customary International Law / 38-45 Ahmet Dülger Peace And Security: Failures Of Thesecurity Council / 46-51 Mahmut Sait Arslan United Nations Security Council Should Be More Representative / 52-60


TÜRKİYE BİRLEŞİK KOMUNİST PARTİSİ KAPATMA DAVASI Muhammed Fatih Keleş

I. SİYASİ PARTİLER HUKUKU HAKKINDA GENEL BİLGİLER 1. Giriş Siyasi partiler, demokrasi çerçevesi içinde her türlü görüşün siyasi arenada kendine yer bulabilmesine imkan bulabilmesi ve demokrasinin gereği olan farklı fikirlerin tartışılmasının sağlaması açısından demokratik yaşamın vazgeçilmez unsurlarından biridir. Türkiye’de 1961 Anayasası’ndan önce dernekler hukuku’na tabi olan siyasi partiler 1961 Anayasası’ndan sonra ayrı bir kanun ile düzenlenmiştir.1 Bu çalışmada 1982 Anayasası dönemindeki Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’ndaki sorunlar ve Türkiye Birleşik Komunist Partisi hakkında açılan1990/1 Esas sayılı 1991/1 Karar sayılı ve 16 Temmuz 1991 yılında kararı açıklanan kapatma davası incelenecektir. 2. Siyasi Parti Kapatma Davaları Türk Hukuk düzeninde siyasi partiler Anayasa’nın 68 ve 69.maddeleri ile 2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu hükümlerine bağlıdır. Buna göre Anayasa’nın 69.maddesinin 4.fıkrasına göre Siyasi Parti Kapatma Davası açma yetkisi sadece Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı’ndadır. Bu dava Anayasa Mahkemesi’nde görülür. Özbudun Siyasi Partiler hakkındaki yasakları amaçlarına, örgütlenmelerine ve çalışmalarına ilişkin yasaklar olmak üzere üç kategoriye ayırarak incelemektedir. Anayasanın 68.maddesinin dördüncü ve beşinci fıkraları amaç yasaklarını, 69.maddesinin birinci fıkrası faaliyet yasaklarını, orijinal metinde 68.maddenin altıncı ve yedinci fıkraları ile 69.maddenin ikinci, yedinci ve sekizinci fıkraları örgütlenme yasaklarını içermektedir.2 Bu maddeler incelendiğinde Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin parti kapatma konusunda geniş yorum yapma yetkisine sahip olduğunu görmek mümkündür. Nitekim parti kapatma davaları incelendiğinde de büyük oranda kapatma yönünde kararlar alındığı görülmektedir. 1

Özcan, Hüseyin / Murat Yanık, Siyasi Partiler Hukuku, Der Yayınevi, İstanbul, sf.2-5 Yazıcı, Serap, “1982 Anayasası ve Parti Yasakları”, Demokratik Anayasa, ed. Ece Göztepe ve Aykut Çelebi, Metis Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2011, s.240. 2


2 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi

Siyasi Parti kapatma davaları 1995, 2001 ve 2004 anayasa değişikliklerinden de önemli ölçüde etkilenmiştir. 1995 yılında Anayasanın 69.maddesine partinin kapatılması için kapatılmasına sebep olacak fiilerin odak haline gelmesi şartı eklenmiş, 2001 yılında ise bu odak ifadesi tanımlanarak partilerin kapatılması zorlaştırılmıştır. 2004’te ise Anayasa’nın 90.maddesinde yapılan bir değişiklik ile hali hazırda normlar hiyerarşisinde kanunlar ile aynı basamakta olduğu kabul edilen uluslararası anlaşmalardan temel hak ve özgürlüklere ilişkin olanlarının, kanunlar ile aynı konuda farklı hükümler içermesi halinde uygulanacağı hükmü getirilmiştir. Bu durumda, Avrupa İnsan Hakları sözleşmesine aykırı olan durumlarda parti kapatma davası reddedilebilecektir. II. TÜRKİYE BİRLEŞİK KOMUNİST PARTİSİ KAPATMA DAVASININ İNCELENMESİ 1.

DAVALININ

TALEBİ

VE

ANAYASA

MAHKEMESİNİN

USUL

YÖNÜNDEN İNCELEMESİ Türkiye Birleşik Komunist Partisi hakkında açılmış bu kapatma davası birçok yönden önemli bir davadır. Bu davadaki Anayasa Mahkemesi kararı çok yerde emsal karar olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu davanın bir diğer önemli yanı ise davalı partinin Anayasa Mahkemesi’nden somut norm denetimi talep etmesidir. Ayrıca geçici 15.maddenin de tartışıldığı bu davada geçici 15.maddenin somut norm denetimi talep edilen maddelerin iptal edilmesine engel olması durumunda bu maddelerin ihmal edilmesi de talep edilmiştir. a.

Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’ndaki Maddelerin Anayasa Aykırılığı İddiası

Davalı parti TBKP, kendileri hakkında açılan bu davanın dayanağı olan Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nda Anayasaya aykırılık olduğunu iddia ederek Anayasa Mahkemesinin bunları iptal etmesi gerektiğini ileri sürmüştür. Gerçekten de Prof. Dr. Serap Yazıcı’nın da belirttiği gibi bu kanunda Anayasa’ya aykırılık vardır. Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun Siyasi Parti Yasaklarını düzenleyen 78, 80, 81 ve 96.maddelerde Anayasa’da olmayan yasaklar ve Anayasa’nın koyduğu yasakların genişletilmesi ile Anayasa’nın üstünlüğü ilkesine aykırılık söz konusudur.3

3

Yazıcı, Serap, “1982 Anayasası ve Parti Yasakları”, Demokratik Anayasa, ed. Ece Göztepe ve Aykut Çelebi, Metis Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2011, s.242-55.


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 / 3 Bu durumda, anayasaya aykırı unsurlar içeren bu kanun iptal edilebilir mi? Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin norm denetimi iki yoldan mümkündür: soyut norm denetimi ve somut norm denetimi. Soyut norm denetimi, anayasada belirtilen organlar tarafından Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne açılan iptal davası ile olurken somut norm denetimi mahkemede devam eden bir davadaki somut olay üzerinde uygulanacak normun anayasa aykırılığı iddiası ile olmaktadır. 4 Parti kapatma davası Anayasa Mahkemesi’nde görüldüğüne göre Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin kendi görüdüğü bir davada somut norm denetimi yapması mümkün müdür? Özbudun, bu noktada Anayasa’nın 152.maddesinde belirtilen somut norm denetiminin şartlarından “davaya bakmakta olan bir mahkeme olması” şartındaki davaya bakmakta olan mahkemenin siyasi parti kapatma davalarında Anayasa Mahkemesi olduğunu ileri sürerek parti kapatma davalarında somut norm denetimi yapılabileceğini savunmaktadır.5 TBKP, geçici 15.maddenin, aykırı unsurlar içerdiği iptal edilen SPK maddelerinin iptal edilmesine engel olması durumunda, dava görülürken bu maddelerin ihmal edilmesi talebinde bulunmuştur. Peki Anayasa Mahkemesi mevcut bir normu görmezden gelebilir mi? Bu durum 2004 değişikliklerinden sonra meydana gelseydi Anayasa Mahkemesi Anayasa’nın 90.maddesine dayanarak rahatlıkla bu kanun maddelerini ihmal edip uluslararası anlaşma olan Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi’ne göre karar verebilecekti. Ancak bu durumda geçici 15.madde ile korunan bu kanunun ihmal edilmesi mümkün görünmemektedir. Böyle bir vaziyette karar, geçici 15.maddenin kapsamına giren ve bu sebeple iptal edilemeyen Anayasaya aykırı unsurlar içeren kanun hükümlerinin ancak anayasanın ruhuna, temel ilkelerine

ve

bu

ilkelerin

dayandığı

hukuk

kurallarına

uygun

düşecek

şekilde

yorumlanmasıyla verilmesi mümkündür.6 Fakat ne kadar yorumlanırsa yorumlansın, yine de bu kanunlar davayı evrensel hukuk çerçevesinde bir sonuca götüremez. Davalı parti, “… geçici 15.madde yalnızca bir dönemi düzenleyen (12Eylül 1980 – 7 Aralık 1983) geçici bir maddedir..” sözleri ile bu maddenin sadece o dönem için geçerli olduğunu ve bu dönemin sonunda geçerliliğini yitirdiğini savunmaktadır. Bu nedenle geçici 15.maddenin anayasaya aykırı olan bu kanunu korumadığını ileri sürmüştür. Ancak geçici 15.madde “Bu dönem içinde çıkarılan kanunlar, kanun hükmünde kararnameler ile 2324 sayılı Anayasa Düzeni Hakkında Kanun uyarınca alınan karar ve tasarrufların Anayasaya 4

Özbudun, Ergun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku, Yetkin Yayınevi, Ankara, 2012, s.428. Özbudun, Ergun, Türk Anayasa Hukuku, Yetkin Yayınevi, Ankara, 2012, s.432. 6 Aliefendioğlu, Yılmaz, Anayasa Yargısı, Yetkin Yayınevi, Ankara, 1997, s.284. 5


4 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi aykırılığı iddia edilemez” diyerek her ne kadar demokratik ve insan haklarına uygun bir madde olmasa da açık bir şekilde o dönemde yapılan kanunların anayasaya aykırılığının ileri sürülmesini yasaklamıştır. Bu nedenle davalı partinin bu iddiası yerinde değildir. b.

Anayasa Mahkemesinin Cevabı

Anayasa mahkemesi usul yönünden incelemesinde geçici 15.madde tartışmasında maddenin ifadesinin açık olduğunu ileri sürerek “geçici maddelerin geçerliği, uygulama süreleriyle değil, geçici olarak düzenledikleri hukuksal ilişki ve kurumlarla kendisi ve bağlı olduğu temel metinlerin içerikleri ve verdikleri anlam ile değerlendirilir. Geçici maddeler, değişik hukuksal düzenlemeler arasında bağlantı kurar, kazanılmış hakların saklı tutulmasını, uygulamanın daha geniş bir zaman dilimine yayılarak yapılmasını sağlarlar…bu ara dönemde çıkarılan 22.4.1983 günlü, 2820 sayılı siyasi partiler kanununun anayasaya aykırılığı savında bulunamaz.” ifadeleriyle Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun geçici 15.maddenin koruması altında olduğuna karar vermiştir. Normun ihmal edilmesi konusunda ise Anayasa Mahkemesi Aliefendioğlu’nun da görüşünde yararlandığı bir Anayasa Mahkemesi kararına atıfta bulunarak ihmalin mümkün olmadığına karar vermiştir. 2.

DAVANIN ESAS YÖNÜNDEN İNCELENMESİ

a.

Genel Olarak

Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının hazırladığı iddianameyi 14.06.1990 tarihinde Anayasa Mahkemesine sunmasıyla açılan davada Türkiye Birleşik Komunist Partisi’nin Anayasa’nın 6,10,14 ve 68.maddeleri ile 2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun 78, 81 ve 96.maddelerine aykırı durumlarından dolayı kapatılması talep edilmiştir. b.

Kapatma Sebepleri

i. Sosyal Bir Sınıfın Diğer Sosyal Sınıflar Üzerinde Egemenliğini Savunmak ve Yerleştirmeyi Amaçlamak 1.

Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının İddiaları

Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı, Türkiye Birleşik Komunist Partisi’nin benimsediği marksizm düşüncesinin bir sonucu olarak sosyalist devrim amaçladığını ve bu devrimde demokrasinin ortadan kaldırılacağı düşüncesini ileri sürerek TBKP’nin kendi düşüncesindeki işçi sınıfının diğer sınıflar üzerinde egemenliğini savunduğunu ve bunu yerleştirmeyi


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 / 5 amaçladığını iddia etmiştir. Başsavcılık, iddialarını esas hakkındaki görüşünde marksizmin tarihini anlatarak savunmaya devam etmiştir. Böylece Partinin Anayasa’nın 6, 10, 14 ve 68.maddeleri ile 2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun 78.maddesine aykırılığı iddiası ile kapatılmasını talep etmiştir. Ancak partinin programındaki marksizm hakkındaki görüşlerine yer vermeden bu şekilde marksizme önyargı ile yaklaşıldığını vurgulamak gerekir. Başsavcılığın bu konudaki bir diğer argümanı ise eski Türkiye İşçi Partisi ve Türkiye Komünist Partisi üyelerinin düşünceleri ve faaliyetlerinden ötürü TCK’nın 141.maddesi ile yargılanmış olmalarıdır. 2.

Davalı Partinin Savunması

Davalı parti, ilk savunmasında egemenlik ile siyasal iktidar terimleri arasındaki farkı açıklayarak egemenliğin millete ait olduğunu ve ancak milletin siyasal iktidar yetkisini bir sınıfa verebileceğini savunmuştur. Davalı Parti ayrıca parti programından alıntılar yaparak partinin demokrasiyi ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlamadığını bilakis demokrasi ile çalışmalarını yürütmeyi hedeflediğini öne sürmektedir. “TBKP, marksizmi kendine göre yorumlayan bir partidir. Bu yoruma göre, TBKP, programında belirtildiği gibi, ‘sömürüye, savaş tehlikesine, silahlanmaya, her türlü baskı ve eşitsizliğe, ırk ve cins ayrımcılığına, doğanın tahribine, toplumsal yaşamın her alanında şiddete karşı mücadele’ eden bir partidir” açıklamasıyla Başsavcılığının iddialarının doğru olmadığını ileri sürmüştür. 3.

Anayasa Mahkemesinin İncelemesi

Anayasa Mahkemesi davalı partinin savunmasını yerinde bularak partinin klasik marksizmden vazgeçtiği kanaatine ulaşmıştır. Anayasa Mahkemesi 8.12.1988 günlü, Esas: 1988/1 ve Karar 1988/2 sayılı kararından alıntı yaparak sosyal sınıf esasına dayalı bir siyasi partinin kurulmasında engel olmadığını ileri sürmüştür. Bu kararın bir bölümünde “1961 ve 1982 Anayasalarında, sınıf gerçeğini ya da bunun iktidara yansımasını önleyici bir hüküm yoktur. Yasaklanan, bu iktidarın bir sınıf egemenliğini kurmak yolunda kullanılması ve bir tek sınıfın öteki sınıflar üzerinde egemenlik kurmasıdır” ifadesine yer verilerek partinin bir sınıfa yönelik olmasının doğal olduğu ve bunun bir sosyal sınıfın diğer sosyal sınıflar üzerinde egemenliğini savunmak anlamına gelmediği kabul edilmiştir. Anayasa Mahkemesi bu açıklamalar çerçevesinde Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının iddiasını yerinde görmeyerek reddetmiştir.


6 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi

ii.

Kullanılması ve Kurulması Yasaklanmış Adla Siyasi Parti Kurulması

1.

Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının İddiaları

Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun 96.maddesinin 3.fıkrası “Komünist, anarşist, faşist, teokratik, nasyonal sosyalist, din, dil, ırk, mezhep ve bölge adlarıyla veya aynı anlama gelen adlarla da siyasi partiler kurulamaz veya parti adında bu kelimeler kullanılamaz.” şeklindedir. Bu madde gayet açık bir şekilde sayılan isimlerin parti adlarında kullanılmasını yasaklamıştır. Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı bu maddeye dayanarak adında ‘Komünist’ geçen TBKP’nin kapatılmasını talep etmiştir. 2.

Davalı Partinin Savunması

TBKP, savunmasında “iddianame anayasanın 68.maddesinin gerekçesini 2820 sayılı yasanın 96.maddesinin son fıkrasının konuluşuna dayanak olarak gösteriyorsa da gerekçelerden hareket ederek yorum yapmak dinamik anayasa anlayışının bir sorunu olarak geçerli bir yöntem değildir. Anyasada ‘komunist’ adıyla parti kurulamayacağına ilişkin bir hüküm bulunmamaktadır. Anayasanın 68.maddesi sınıf ve zümre egemenliğini veya herhangi bir diktatörlüğü amaçlayan siyasi partileri yasaklamıştır. Anayasa Mahkemesinin 1988/2-1 sayılı kararında da belirtildiği gibi ‘sosyalist bir partinin Anayasa ve yasalarca yasaklanıp yasaklanmadığı konusunu sadece adına bakarak çözüme bağlamaya olanak yoktur’. Bir partinin adının ‘komünist’ olması, dünyadaki son gelişmeler de gözetilirse, sınıf egemenliği ve diktatörlüğünü savunduğunu göstermez. Bu yasak İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesiyle de bağdaşmaz. Ileride sözleşmeye aykırılık nedeniyle Avrupa İnsan Hakları Komisyonu’na başvurmak durumuna kalındığında çıkacak kararın davalının lehine olacağı açıktır.” ifadelerini kullanmıştır. Bu ifadelerden de anlaşılacağı gibi TBKP, SPK’nın 96.maddesinin son fıkrasının Anayasa’nın kendisine ve Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesine aykırı olduğunu ileri sürerek bunun kapatma gerekçesi olamayacağını savunmuştur. Gerçekten de TBKP’nin Anayasa’nın eski kararlarından da alıntı yaparak savunduğu bu düşüncesi yerindedir. Nitekim 1995, 2001, 2004 ve 2010 Anayasa yıllarında yapılan değişiklikler SPK 96.maddesinin son fıkrasında olduğu gibi açık bir şekilde Anayasa ve AİHS’ye aykırılık bulunan ve geçici madde ile koruma altına alındığından değiştirilemeyen hükümlerin kapatmaya gerekçe olmasını engelleyici niteliktedir. Ancak bu dava görüldüğü sırada geçerli olan Anayasa maddeleri ve SPK’ya göre yasak adla parti kurulması rahatlıkla bir partinin kapatılma sebebi olabilmekteydi.


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 / 7

3. Anayasa

Anayasa Mahkemesinin İncelemesi Mahkemesi,

Yargıtay

Cumhuriyet

Başsavcılığının

iddianamesindeki

‘kullanılması yasaklanmış adla siyasi parti kurulması’ suçlamasını incelemeye çok fazla yer vermemiştir. Çünkü ihmal edemediği bir hüküm ve hükmün norm denetimi ile iptalini engelleyen bir geçici madde söz konusudur. Böylece Anayasa Mahkemesi, 2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun 96.maddesinin son fıkrasına dayanarak Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi’nin kapatılmasına karar vermiştir. iii.

Devletin Ülkesi ve Milletiyle Bölünmez Bütünlüğünü Bozmak

1.

Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının İddiaları

Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı’nın iddianamesinde yer verdiği bir diğer kapatma gerekçesi ise Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi’nin Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bütünlüğünü bozduğu iddiasıdır. Başsavcılık bu iddiasında partinin tüzük ve programından alıntılar yapmış ve “özetlenen bu bölümlerde ayrı dili ve kültürü olan özellikle kendi geleceğini tayin hakkına sahip Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ülkesi toprakları üzerinde yaşayan bir kürt ulusunun varlığı açık ve seçik bir biçimde kabul edilmiştir. Bir siyasi partinin Türkiye ülkesi üzerinde Türkçe’den başka dil konuşan azınlık blunduğunu ileri sürerek ve o azınlığı erek edinerek onun için kendi geleceğini tayin hakkı da dahil olmak üzere bir takım haklar ve yetkiler tanınmasını istemesi ulusal yapıda gitgide kopmalara, bölünmelere yol açması anlamını taşır.” ifadesiyle TBKP’nin bir azınlık grubun varlığından bahsederek bu azınlığın haklarının olduğunu söylemesinin ülke ve millet bütünlüğüne aykırı olduğunu belirtmiştir. Bu düşünceler doğal olarak SPK’nın 81.maddesinin ifadesinin sonucudur. Bu kanun maddesine göre bir azınlık grubunun var olduğunu ifade etmek bile yasaklanmıştır. Bülent Tanör bu durumun mantık ve kültüre saygı çerçevesinin dışına çıktığı iddiası ile toplumda var olan etnik grupları temsil eden partilerin sistemden dışlanması yerine sisteme dahil edilmesinin devletin ülke bütünlüğünü

koruma

hakkını

zedelemeyeceğini

belirterek

SPK’nın

81.maddesini

eleştirmiştir.7 2.

Davalı Partinin Savunması

Davalı partinin savunmasında Anayasanın 66.maddesindeki “Türk devletine vatandaşlık bağı ile bağlı olan herkes Türk’tür.” ifadesindeki ‘Türk’ kelimesinin etnik köken anlamında 7

Yazıcı, Serap, “1982 Anayasası ve Parti Yasakları”, Demokratik Anayasa, ed. Ece Göztepe ve Aykut Çelebi, Metis Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2011, s.246.


8 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi değil Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlığı anlamında kullanıldığını ileri sürerek kürtlerin varlığının tartışılmasına gerek olmadığını ve artık kendi dillerinde eğitim yapıp yapamayacağının tartışıldığını söylemiştir. Ayrıca, TBKP Kürtler’in ayrılığını değil aksine eşit haklar kazandırılarak onların toplumla birliğini savunduğunu ileri sürmüştür. 3.

Anayasa Mahkemesinin İncelemesi

Anayasa Mahkemesi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin kuruluş yılları ve Milli Mücadele’yi anlatarak zaten katı olan SPK’nın 81.maddesinin yorumunu iyice katılaştırarak bu konuda hiçbir taviz vermeyeceğini göstermiş ve adeta bir tehdit algısı varmış gibi olayları değerlendirmiştir. Azınlıkların varlığının kabul edilmesinin ileride bağımsızlık talebine dönüşeceğini ileri sürmüş ve kararını bu yönde sürdürmüştür. AYM, uzun açıklamalarında SPK’nın 81.maddesinin ifadesinin tek devlet, bir ulus ve bütün ülke anlamına geldiğini de savunarak federal yönetimin bile savunulamayacağına hükmetmiştir. Bu sebeple TBKP’nin tüzük ve programında bulunan ‘Kürt’ ifadelerinin devletin ülkesi ve milleti ile bölünmez bütünlüğüne aykırı olduğu gerekçesiyle partinin kapatılması gerektiğine karar vermiştir. iv.

Kapatılan Bir Siyasi Partinin Devamı Olduğunu Beyan ve İddia Etmek

1.

Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının İddiaları

Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı, TBKP’nin 16 Ekim 1981 tarihinde yürürlüğe giren 2533 sayılı Kanunla, her türlü yardımcı kuruluş ve yan organları ile birlikte feshedilen Türkiye İşçi Partisi’nin devamı niteliğinde olduğunu ileri sürerek 2820 sayılı Siyasi Partiler Kanunu’nun 96.maddesinin 2.fıkrasına dayanarak kapatılmasını talep etmiştir. Ancak bu noktada, söz konusu 2533 sayılı Kanun ile feshedilen siyasi partilerin SPK 96/2 kapsamına girip giremeyeceği konusu tartışmalıdır. Çünkü TİP Anayasa Mahkemesi kararı ile kapatılan bir parti değil 12 Eylül darbesinden sonra çıkarılan kanunla feshedilen bir partidir. Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin kararlarına bakılacak olursa bu feshedilen partilerin de kapatılan partilerden kabul edildiği görülmektedir. 2.

Davalı Partinin Savunması

Davalı parti, programındaki TBKP’nin TKP ve TİP’in devamı olduğu yönündeki programındaki ifadelerle o partilerdeki kişilerin kastedildiğini ileri sürmüştür. Savunmada TBKP’nin tamamıyla yeni bir parti olduğu vurgulanmış ve söz konusu 96/2 maddesinin Anayasa’nın 2, 13/2, 68 ve 69.maddeleri ile AİHS’nin 9, 10, 11 ve 17.maddelerine aykırı olduğu görüşü de eklenmiştir. Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesinin bahsi geçen maddeleri


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 / 9 düşünce ve vicdan özgürlüğü, ifade özgürlüğü, toplantı ve dernek kurma özgürlüğü ve hakları kötüye kullanma yasağı konularını içermektedir. Davalı partinin sadece AİHS’nin 11.maddesi (toplantı ve dernek kurma özgürlüğü) yönünden bile haklı olduğu görülmektedir. Bu maddenin ikinci fıkrasına göre8 ulusal güvenlik, kamu güvenliğinin korunması, kamu düzenin sağlanması ve suç işlenmesinin önlenmesi gibi sebepler dışındaki herhangi bir sebeple toplantı ve dernek kurma özgürlüğü sınırlandırılamaz. Buna göre, TBKP bu sebepler dışındaki bir sebeple, sadece önceden kapatılan bir partinin üyelerinin yeni bir parti kurması gerekçesi ile kapatılmak istenmiştir. Bu açık bir şekilde AİHS’ye aykırıdır. 3.

Anayasa Mahkemesinin İncelemesi

Anayasa Mahkemesi feshedilen partilerin kapatılan partiler kapsamında olacağını ifade etmesine rağmen bu partinin kapatılan partinin devamı niteliğinde olmadığına kanaat getirmiş ve “davalı siyasi partinin daha önce düşünce, siyasal eylem ve hukuksal örgütlenme bağlamında varlık gösteren çeşitli siyasal hareketlerin kültürel mirasına talip olması ya da böyle bir savda bulunması son derece doğal ve demokratiktir” ifadesiyle önceki partilerin düşüncelerinden faydalanabileceğini savunmuştur. Sonuç olarak Anayasa Mahkemesi Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının TBKP hakkında iddia ettiği “kapatılan partinin devamı olma” gerekçesini reddetmiştir. III.

SONUÇ

Anayasa Mahkemesi Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi’nin “kullanılması yasak adla parti kurulması” ve “devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğünü bozmak” gerekçeleri ile kapatılmasına oy birliği ile karar vermiştir. Türkiye’de kapatılan siyasi partiler bilançosu incelendiğinde acı bir tablo ile karşı karşıya olduğumuz bir gerçektir. Bu durum demokraside almamız gereken yolun ne kadar uzun olduğunu bize göstermektedir. Kapatılan siyasi partilerin bir bir AİHM’de Türkiye’ye karşı açtığı davalarda Türkiye’nin tazminat ödemek zorunda kalmasına rağmen bir başka parti kapatma davası açıldığında yine aynı hatalar tekrarlanmaktadır. Ne yazık ki TBKP deneyimi de Anayasa Mahkememize ders alması için yeterli olmamış birkaç yıl sonra neredeyse aynı gerekçelerle Sosyalist Birlik Partisi kapatılmıştır (1993/4, 1995/1, 19.7.1995). Siyasi parti kapatma eğilimi ve pratiği konusunda 8

AİHS m.11/2 : “bu hakların kullanılması, yasayla öngörülen ve demokratik bir toplum içinde ulusal güvenliğin, kamu güvenliğinin korunması, kamu düzeninin sağlanması ve suç işlenmesinin önlemesi, sağlığın veya ahlakın veya başkalarının hak ve özgürlüklerinin korunması için gerekli olanlar dışındaki sınırlamalara tabi tutulamaz. Bu madde, silahlı kuvvetler, kolluk kuvvetleri veya devlet idaresi mensuplarınca yukarıda anılan haklarına meşru sınırlamalar getirlimesine engel değildir.”


10 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi Türkiye’de yıllar geçtikçe yapılan Anayasa değişikliklerinin de etkisiyle bir düzelme olduğu görülse de hala tüm ihtiyaçları karşılayacak yeni bir anayasa ve siyasi partiler kanunu ihtiyacı devam etmektedir.

Kaynakça Yazıcı, Serap, “1982 Anayasası ve Parti Yasakları”, Demokratik Anayasa, ed. Ece Göztepe ve Aykut Çelebi, Metis Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2011, 228-270. Özbudun, Ergun,  Türk  Anayasa  Hukuku,  Yetkin  Yayınevi,  Ankara,  2012.  

Aliefendioğlu, Yılmaz, Anayasa Yargısı, Yetkin Yayınevi, Ankara, 1997. Özcan, Hüseyin ve Murat Yanık. Siyasi Partiler Hukuku, Der Yayınevi, İstanbul.


ANAYASA YARGISI KARAR ANALİZİ

Samet Sevgi

1961 ANAYASASINDA ÖZGÜRLÜKLERİN SINIRI 1961 Anayasası temel hak ve özgürlükleri büyük ölçüde genişleten ve güvenceye alan bir anlayışa sahiptir. 1924 anayasasının, hak ve özgürlüklerin çoğu zaman sadece adının anılmasıyla yetinilen anlayışından farklı olarak 1961 anayasasıyla temel hak ve özgürlükler çok daha ayrıntılı bir düzenlemeye tabi tutulmuştur. Bu yüzden ödev konusu olan Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararı incelenmeden önce 1961 Anayasasında temel hak ve özgürlüklerin sınırlanması konusuna kısaca değinmekte büyük bir fayda görülmektedir. Demokratik düzende hak ve özgürlüklerin anayasa hükümleri ile tanımlanarak anayasal ilkeler tarafından güvenceye alınmaları esas teşkil eder. Yani temel hak ve özgürlüklerin anayasa da zikredilme sebebi bunları sınırlama düşüncesinden ziyade koruma altına alma ve amacına uygun olarak uygulanmasını sağlama amaçlarını taşır. Hak ve özgürlüklerin uygulama bulabilmeleri ise kanunda belirtilen somut hükümler aracılığıyla olur. Bu somut hükümlerin oluşturulması ise başta belirtilen, hak ve hürriyetleri güvenceye alan anayasal ilkelere uygunluğu nisbetinde geçerlilik arzeder. Bu noktada dikkat edilmesi gereken unsur, bir hak kanunda düzenlenirken dikkat edilmesi gereken kurallardır. Hak ve özgürlükler düzenlenirken sadece bu hakkın anayasada düzenlenmiş halinde belirtilen özel sınırlama hükümleri değil, aynı zamanda anayasanın bütün hak ve özgürlükleri kapsayıcı nitelikteki genel sınırlama hükümleri de dikkate alınır.

1961 Anayasasının da 11. Maddesi bu bağlamda pek çok tartışmalara sebep olmuştur. 1961 Anayasası orjinal halinde bu madde temel hakların özü başlığı altında, “Temel hak ve hürriyetler, Anayasanın sözüne ve ruhuna uygun olarak, ancak kanunla sınırlanabilir. Kanun kamu yararı, genel ahlâk, kamu düzeni, sosyal adâlet ve millî güvenlik gibi sebeplerle


12 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi de olsa bir hakkın ve hürriyetin özüne dokunamaz.” şeklinde düzenlenerek, hak ve hürriyetlerin sınırlanmasında; kanunla sınırlama, anayasanın ruhu ve özüne uygun olma ve hakkın özüne dokunmama şeklinde, bütün hak ve özgürlükleri kapsayıcı temel kriterler getirmiştir. Maddenin lafzı ve 1961 Anayasasının özgürlükleri genişleten ve güvenceye alan anlayışı göz önüne alındığında belirtilen maddenin bir genel koruma hükmü niteliğinde olduğu görülmektedir. Ancak bu noktada 1961 Anayasasının 11. Maddesinin aslında hak ve özgürlükleri koruma değil sınırlama fonksiyonu güden bir madde olduğunu savunan görüşler ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ülkenin içinde bulunduğu sosyal ve siyasi şartların da etkisiyle bu madde ilerleyen süreçte hem Anayasa Mahkemesi içtihatları hem de yapılacak olan anayasa değişiklikleri ile temel hak ve hürriyetler için genel bir sınırlama maddesi haline getirilmiştir. 1971 yılında yapılan değişiklikle “Temel Hak ve Hürriyetlerin Özü, Sınırlanması ve Kötüye Kullanılmaması” adını alan 11. Maddenin ilk fıkrasına eklenen “Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bütünlüğünün, Cumhuriyetin, millî güvenliğin, kamu düzeninin, kamu yararının, genel ahlâkın ve genel sağlığın korunması amacı ile veya Anayasanın diğer maddelerinde gösterilen özel sebeplerle,” ifadesi temel hak ve hürriyetler açısından çok geniş bir sınırlama imkanı oluşturmuştur. Ancak 11. Maddede yapılan bu değişikliğe rağmen

1961 Anayasasında

bulunan, özgürlüklere karşı kademeli yaklaşımın bu maddenin genel bir sınırlama sebebi olmasına engel olduğunu belirten yazarlarda bulunur (Yazıcı 2009 89-90). 1961 Anayasasında benimsenen kademeli yaklaşım incelenecek olursa üç tür özgürlük göze çarpar. Bunlardan ilki Anayasamızdaki, doğası gereği sınırlamaya tabi tutulmaya uygun olmayan, dolayısıyla herhangi bir sınırlamaya tabi tutulmamış özgürlüklerdir. Bu nitelikteki özgürlükler

Anayasanın

11.

Maddesi

gibi

genel

sınırlama

normları

ile

dahi

düzenlenememektedir. Kademeli anlayışa göre diğer bir özgürlük türü ise nitelikli yasa kaydı ile düzenlenen özgürlüklerdir. Bu tarz özgürlükler ise ancak kendileri ile ilgili maddelerde belirtilen özel sınırlama sebepleri doğrultusunda düzenlenebilirler. Kademeli anlayışın son türü olan basit yasa kaydı ile düzenlenen özgürlükler ise kendileri ile ilgili maddelerde herhangi bir sınırlama sebebi bulunmayan ve sınırlama konusunda yasa koyucuya takdir hakkı tanınan özgürlüklerdir. Bu süreçte kendini açıkça gösteren, özgürlükleri sınırlamaya yönelik anlayış 1982 Anayasası ile birlikte de devam etmektedir. Genel ve özel sınırlama nedenlerinin birbiribe eklendiği yeni kümülatif sınırlama rejimi ile sınırlamalar asıl, özgürlüklerin korunması ise istisna teşkil eder hale gelecektir (91-92).


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 / 13 Yukarıda yapılan genel olarak özgürlüklerin kanuni sınırı hakkındaki tartışmanın ardından hak ve özgürlüklerin anayasal sınırları ele alınacak olursa, bu sınırların hakkın doğrudan tanımında yer alan ya da aynı hak ile ilgili başka bir anayasa hükmünde yer alan sınırlar olduğu görülmektedir. Anayasal sınır konusunda kanuni sınırdan farklı olarak anayasanın 11. Maddesinde bulunan hakkın özü kavramının da geçersiz olduğu kabul edilmektedir. Son olarak, hak ve özgürlüklerin anayasa ve kanunlardan doğan sınırları yanında, o özgürlüğün niteliği gereği var olan objektif sınırları da mevcuttur. Basın hürriyetinin kişilerin şeref ve haysiyetine tecavüzü, düşünceleri yayma hürriyetinin suç işlemeye kışkırtmayı kapsamaması bu objektif sınırlara örnek olarak gösterilebilir (Özbudun, 2012, 112-113) ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ KARARI ANALİZİ KARAR KONUSU VE DAVA MAKAMI Yapılan kısa teorik girişin ardından ödev konusu olan Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararına geçilecek olursa, incelenecek olan 1963/16 esas, 1963/83 karar numaralı ve 08/04/1963 tarihli Anayasa Mahkemesi kararı; anayasa nizamı, milli güvenlik ve huzuru bozan bazı fiiller hakkındaki 05/03/1962 günlü ve 38 sayılı kanunun I. Maddesinin (B) bendinin Anayasa’ya aykırılığı iddiasını içerdiği görülmektedir. Anayasa’ya aykırılık itirazı, Ankara Birinci Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi tarafından, 1961 Anayasasının 151. Maddesinde düzenlenen somut norm denetimi mekanizması işletilerek yani görülmekte olan davada uygulanacak olan bir kanun hükümlerinin mahkeme tarafından Anayasaya aykırı görülmesi veya taraflardan birinin ileri sürdüğü Anayasaya aykırılık iddiasının ciddi bulunması durumunda, Anayasa Mahkemesinin bu konuda vereceği karara kadar davanın geri bırakılması şeklinde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Aykırılık iddiası, belirtilen 38 sayılı kanunun I. Maddesinin (B) bendinin ve bu bent ile ilgisi olan 3. Maddesinin, Anayasanın; “Anayasanın Üstünlüğü ve Bağlayıcılığı” başlıklı 8. Maddesi, “Temel Hak ve Hürriyetlerin Özü” başlıklı 11. Maddesi ve son olarak “Düşünce Hürriyeti” başlıklı 20. Maddesini ihlal ettiği şeklindedir. Anayasa Mahkemesi, 1961 Anayasası ile kurulduğundan dolayı kararında günümüzde uyguladığı sistematikten çok daha farklı bir sistematik kullanmıştır. Mahkeme, çok kısa bir şekilde iddiayı özetlemiş ve ardından gerekçesini belirterek itiraz ile ilgili kararına geçmiştir. Anayasa Mahkemesi, gerekçesini belirtirken sırasıyla, düşünce ve kanaat özgürlüğünün genel manası, Anayasanın 20. Maddesinin yorumu, 38 No’lu Kanunun çıkarılmasında güdülen


14 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi amaç ve son olarak Hak ve Hürriyetlerin özü kavramından ne anlanılması gerektiği hususları üzerinde durarak kararını vermiştir. İLGİLİ MADDELER Mahkeme gerekçeine geçmeden ilgili maddeleri verecek olursak: VII. Anayasanın Üstünlüğü ve Bağlayıcılığı MADDE 8.- Kanunlar Anayasaya aykırı olamaz. Anayasa hükümleri, yasama, yürütme ve yargı organlarını, idare makamlarını ve kişileri bağlıyan temel hukuk kurallarıdır.

II. Temel Hakların Özü MADDE 11.- Temel hak ve hürriyetler, Anayasanın sözüne ve ruhuna uygun olarak, ancak kanunla sınırlanabilir. Kanun kamu yararı, genel ahlâk, kamu düzeni sosyal adâlet ve millî güvenlik gibi sebeplerle de olsa bir hakkın ve hürriyetin özüne dokunamaz.

b) Düşünce Hürriyeti MADDE 20.- Herkes, düşünce ve kanaat hürriyetine sahiptir; düşünce ve kanaatlarını söz, yazı, resim ile veya başka yollarla tek başına veya toplu olarak açıklayabilir ve yayabilir. Kimse, düşünce ve kanaatlarını açıklamaya zorlanamaz. 38 No’lu Kanun: MADDE 1. (B) 27 Mayıs 1960 devrimini zedeliyebilecek şekilde : Bu devrimin neticesi olarak Yüksek Adalet Divanınca veya sair kaza mercilerince verilmiş ve kesinleşmiş olan karar ve hükümleri, söz, yazı, haber, havadis, resim, karikatür veya sair vasıta ve suretlerle kötüliyenler veya üstü kapalı da olsa mâtufiyeti belli olacak şekilde kötülemeye çalışanlar veya mahkûm edilenlerin mahkûmiyetlerine esas teşkil eden fiillerini yahut şahıslarını övenler veya neticelenmiş hazırlık, ilk, son tahkikat veya infaz safhalariyle ilgili resim, hatırat, röportaj yayanlar veya beyanat verenler; MADDE 3. — Birinci maddenin (A), (B) ve (D) bentleriyle ikinci maddede yazılı suçların tekevvünü için Türk Ceza Kanununun 153 ncü maddesindeki aleniyet şarttır.


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 / 15 Türk Ceza Kanununun 153 üncü maddesinde belirtilen şekilde; 1-) Basın yolu ile veya herhangi bir propaganda vasıtasiyle, 2-) Umumi veya umuma açık olan mahalde ve birden ziyade kimseler huzurunda, 3-) Toplanılan yer veya toplantıya katılanların adedi veya toplantının konusu ve gayesi itibariyle Özel mahiyeti haiz olmayan bir toplantıda işlenmiş olması, şarttır.

ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ GEREKÇESİ Anayasa Mahkemesi ilk olarak düşünce ve kanaat özgürlüğünden ne anlaşılması gerektiği üzerinde durmuştur. Yüksek Mahkemeye göre herkes istediği gibi düşünmekte ve istediği fikre inanmakta serbesttir. Yani kişinin iç dünyası kanunların her türlü müdahalesinden uzaktır. Ancak kişinin iç aleminde olduğu sürece mutlak ve sınırsız olan bu hürriyet, kişinin düşünce ve kanaatlerini çeşitli yollarla dışarı vurduğu takdirde toplum hayatını, dolayısıyla da hukuku ve kanunu ilgilendirir hale gelir. Bu noktada toplumun düzeni, huzuru ve sürekliliği ve Devletin güveliğinin sağlanması gibi amaçlarla düşünce ve kanaat özgürlüğüne çeşitli kısıtlamalar getirilmesi gerekir. Yani Anayasa Mahkemesine göre düşünce ve kanaat hürriyeti lafzının aksine, mutlak ve sınırsız bir hürriyet değildir. Bu kanaatin ardından Yüksek Mahkeme, belirtilen 20. Maddenin nasıl yorumlanması gerektiği üzerinde durmaktadır. Mahkemeye göre bu maddenin yorumlanmasında sadece maddenin lafzı değil, ayrıca Anayasanın bütünü göz önüne alınarak Anayasadaki diğer hükümler ve ilkeleri de yoruma dahil etmeliyiz. Yüksek Mahkeme, Temsilciler Meclisinde bu maddenin görüşülmesi sırasında yapılan tartışmalara atıf yaparak bu görüşünü desteklemiştir. Bu tartışmalara göre bazı temsilciler bu maddenin düşünce ve kanaat özgürlüğüne herhangi bir sınır çizmediği, dolayısıyla kişilerin kominizm, sosyalizm, irticaa yada ahlaksızlığı teşvik eden düşüncelerini yaymaları noktasında bir serbestiyet tanındığı şeklinde anlaşılabileceğini ifade etmişlerdir. Anayasa Komisyonu da Anayasa Mahkemesinin yaptığı açıklamaya benzer bir açıklama yaparak bu maddenin Anayasanın diğer hükümlerinden ayrı bir şekilde ele alınamayacağını ve gai yani amaçsal tefsir kullanılarak, Anayasanın bütünü ve ruhu göz önünde tutularak yorumlanması gerektiğini belirtmiştir. Komisyon bu noktadan sonra ise 1961 Anayasasının hürriyetlere karşı olan faaliyetleri yasak eden ve realist yani hürriyetlerin gerektiğinde toplumu ve demokrasiyi korumak için sınırlanabileceğini benimseyen bir


16 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi anlayışta olduğunu belirterek düşünce ve kanaat hürriyetinin hangi yönde kullanılması gerektiğini ifade etmiştir. Komisyona göre bu hürriyet kişilere, Devlet düzenine ve Demokratik düzene uygun kanaatleri belirtmek için sağlanmıştır ve dolayısıyla laik ve demokratik düzeni yıkma ya da Devlet ve Millet bütünlüğünü parçalamak gibi düşünceler bu hürriyetin kapsamına girmemekle beraber suç olarak addedilmelidir. Komisyon bu açıklamalarının ardından Anayasanın 11. Maddesine işaret ederek Anayasa sözü ve ruhuna uygun olmayan maddelerin sınırlanabileceğini ifade etmektedir. Anayasa Mahkemesi de düşünce ve kanaat hürriyeti konusunda aynı görüşleri paylaşmakta ve Anayasa 20. Maddesine herhangi bir kısıtlama sebebi konmamasını, kanun koyucuya bu maddeyi Anayasa Madde 11. çerçevesinde sınırlama konusunda takdir hakkı verilmesi olarak yorumlamaktadır. Gerekçenin devamında Anayasa Mahkemesi, 38 No’lu kanunun çıkarılma amacı üzerinde durmakta ve bu amacı; 27 Mayıs Devriminin sonucu ve felsefesi olan 334 sayısılı Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası ile kurulan demokratik ve sosyal hukuk düzenini korumak ve yerleştirmek, toplumun huzur ve güvenliğini sağlamak olarak özetlemektedir. Başlangıç kısmına yapılan atıflarla 27 Mayıs Devriminin amacı tekrar vurgulanarak, 38 No’lu kanunun I. Maddesinin (B) bendinde belirtilen fiillerin, yalnızca 27 Mayıs Devrimini zedeleyecek nitelikte olan Yüksek Adalet Divanı ve diğer yargı organlarının verdiği kararların yazı, resim ve diğer yollarla kötülenmesi ve Adalet Divanı tarafından mahkum edilen kişilerin fiilleri ve şahıslarının övülmesini kapsadığı belirtilmiştir. 38 No’lu kanunla sınırlanan fiillerin işlenmesinin 27 Mayıs Devriminin meşruiyetine gölge düşüreceğini belirten Anayasa Mahkemesi, bu durumun halk arasındaki barış ve huzuru ortadan kaldırarak, kin ve düşmanlığın tekrardan yayılması ile sonuçlanacağını öngörmektedir.Yüksek Mahkeme belirtilen şartlar altında, 38 No’lu kanun ile getirilen sınırlamaların kamu yararını gözettiğinden dolayı Anayasanın 11. Ve 20. Maddelerine aykırı olmadığı kanaatine varmaktadır. Anayasa Makemesi son olarak, hürriyetlerin

kötüye kullanılmasının engellemesi

maksadıyla sınırlanabileceklerini, ancak bu sınırlamalarda hak ve hürriyetlerinin özüne dokunulmaması gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Hürriyetin özü konusunda da tekrardan Temsilciler Meclisi Anayasa Komisyonu raporu ve meclis görüşmelerine atıf yaparak bu kavramın, bir hak ve hürriyetin gayesine uygun şekilde kullanılmasını son derece zorlaştıran


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 / 17 veya onu kullanılamaz duruma düşüren kısıtlamalara tabi tutulamaması anlamına geldiğini belirten Anayasa Mahkemesi, 38 No’lu kanunla getirilen kısıtlamaların insanların kanaat beslemelerine engel teşkil etmediği, sadece bu kanaatlerin dışa vurumunda Türk Ceza Kanunu 153. Maddesinde belirtilen kıstaslar doğrultusunda çeşitli sınırlamalar getirdiği, dolayısıyla Düşünce ve Kanaat Özgürlüğünün özüne dokunulmadığı sonucuna varmıştır. SONUÇ Kararın sonuç kısmında ise Anayasa Nizamını, Milli Güvenlik ve Huzuru Bozan Bazı Fiiller hakkındaki 05/03/1962 günlü ve 38 sayılı kanunun 1 inci maddesinin (B) bendinin Anayasa aykırı olmadığına ve itirazın reddine, üyelerinden Ekrem Korkut’un muhalefeti ve oy çokluğu ile karar vermiştir. MUHALEFET ŞERHLERİ Oy çokluğu ile verilen karara karşı yazılan muhalefet şerhlerinden ilkine bakıldığında, Ekrem Korkut’un genel manada hak ve hürriyetlerin sınırlandırılması konusunda, diğer Anayasa Mahkemesi üyeleri ile aynı kanaati paylaştığı ancak itiraza konu olan 38 No’lu kanunun I. Maddesinin (B) bendinin sınırladığı fiillerin toplumun ve Devletin bekası ve devamlılığı için önem arz etmediği görüşüyle diğer üyelerden ayrıldığı görülmektedir. Korkut’a göre 27 Mayıs’ın meşruiyeti ile B bendinde belirtilen sebepler arasında bir yakınlık yoktur. Devrimin meşruiyeti ile eski iktidar sorumlularının mahkumiyeti arasında bir bağlantı olmamakla beraber, bu şahıslar için beraat kararı dahi verilseydi dahi Devrimin gayrimeşru olmayacağını ifade eden Korkut, Devrimin meşruiyetini kabul ve teyid eden ekseriyet oyunun Yüksek Adalet Divanı kararlarından önce verilmesini buna dayanak olarak göstermiştir. Korkut, belirtilen sebeplerle B bendinde yasaklanan fiillerin, Anayasa düzenini tahrip edici ve lâik demokratik cumhuriyet olma ilkelerini yıkıcı bir mahiyet taşımadıkları için düşünce hürriyetinin kısıtlanmasının Anayasa'nın. 20 nci maddesinin lâfzına da aykırı olduğu gerekçesiyle Anayasa Mahkemesi çoğunluk kararına muhalefet etmiştir. Karara karşı yazılan ikinci muhalefet şerhi ise Anayasaya aykırılık itirazının, Anayasa’nın 152. Maddesinin 4. fıkrası göz önüne alındığında esas incelemesine geçilmesine gerek olmadığı şeklindedir. Bu şerhe göre 152/4’te belirtilen, Anayasa Mahkemesi kararının sınırlı ve yalnızca tarafları bağlayıcı olacağına dair karar verilebilmesi hükmü, itirazın incelenebilmesi için davanın devam etmekte olması şartını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Ankara Birinci Ağır Ceza Mahkemesinde görülmekte olan davanın, sanığa isnat edilen suçun 218 sayılı af kanununun kapsamına girmesinden dolayı ortadan kalktığı görülmektedir. Sonuç


18 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi olarak bu şerh, belirtilen sebeple çoğunluk kararının davanın esası ile ilgili hükümlerine muhalif olmaktadır.

ŞAHSİ KANAATLERİMİZ Anayasa Mahkemesinin 08.04.1963 tarihli kararında, başta yapılan kısa teorik tartışmada da değinilen 1961 Anayasası 11. Maddesi bir genel sınırlama normu olarak ele alınarak karar bu kabul üzerine tesis edilmektedir. Yüksek Mahkeme, Anayasanın 20. Maddesinde düzenlenen Düşünce ve Kanaat Hürriyeti hakkında herhangi bir özel sınırlama sebebine yer verilmese de bu hürriyetin 11. Maddedeki genel sınırlama sebeplerine dayanılarak sınırlanabileceği kanaatini taşımaktadır. Anayasa Mahkemesinin bu kanaati teorik tartışmada da belirttiğimiz hukuki esaslarla iki noktada çelişmektedir. İlk olarak Anayasanın 11. Maddesinin, maddenin lafzı ve 1961 Anayasası özgürlük anlayışı dikkate alındığında bir temel koruma normu olduğu açık olarak görülmektedir. Yani bu maddeden çıkarılacak anlam, hakkın ve hürriyetin özüne dokunulmadığı sürece; kamu yararı, genel ahlak, kamu düzeni, sosyal adalet ve milli güvenlik gibi sebeplerle sınırlanabileceği değildir. Bu hüküm yalnızca temel hak ve hürriyetler için ekstra bir koruma niteliğinde olup, hak ve özgürlüklerin sınırlanmasının zorlaştırılması amacını taşımaktadır. İkinci olarak ise teorik tartışmada belirtildiği üzere 11. Madde bir genel sınırlama maddesi dahi sayılsa Anayasanın 20. Maddesinde düzenlenen Düşünce Hürriyetinin, benimsenen kademeli sistem göz önüne alındığında doğası gereği sınırlanmaya müsait olmayan bir hürriyet olduğu görülmektedir. Yani 1961 Anayasası kademeli sistemi içinde 20. Maddenin genel sınırlama sebepleri ile dahi sınırlanamaması gerekirdi. Sonuç olarak Anayasa Mahkemesinin bu kararında belirtilen hususlar çerçevesinde isabet görülmemektedir.

KAYNAKÇA: Özbudun, Ergun. Türk Anayasa Hukuku, Yetkin Yayınları: Ankara, 2012. Yazıcı, Serap. Yeni Bir Anayasa Hazırlığı ve Türkiye: Seçkincilikten Toplum Sözleşmesine, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları: İstanbul, 2009.


WHO IS THE MASTER OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW?

Bilge Erdemli

I. Introduction Dissension between the European Union Law and national law is a topic touching upon one of the basic issues of current and future status of the Union. While preparation of a specific constitution for the EU goes on, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between the EU and national laws. The European Law consists of treaties, case law of the ECJ and general principles of EC law, and it is an integral part of domestic legal system of each member state. The truth is that the EU legal order and the national legal order are interlocked and interdependent. This paper puts forward the point that the community law is superior to national laws of member states. It proceeds as follows: first, it provides scope and meaning of supranationality; second, it will concentrate on the effect of EC law in the member states; third, it will discuss whether EU law or national law will take precedence in the event of conflict. Then it will conclude with summary of these arguments. II. A Supranational Union In order to prove primacy of the European Union law, I need to clarify what we understand from supranationalism. The term supranational was used first for European Coal and Steel Community (1951), which can be regarded as the nucleus of the EU. With French politician Robert Schuman, the term became more prominent and was seen as the cornerstone of the EU. In the 1960’s, the European Court of Justice defined that the Community constituted a new legal order of international law (Griller and others, 11). This can be seen as a signal of supranationalism. Supranationalism means that all members transfer their national powers and rights to the supreme authority and that this authority will create an order for all


20 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi members. Holding direct elections from member states to the European Parliament shows us that the EU is different than and beyond a political organization. Direct elections started many years later from the establishment. Because it is hard to accept for nation states, while nationalism was on the rise. In soft areas like defense and security, it is clear that none of the countries accept any authority over themselves. In the EU, these topics are still spoken behind closed doors and members make some secret agreements. I admit that in those areas there is no supremacy of EU law and national states are still powerful. But, we should keep in mind that, over the last 50 years, this Union has created a sense that the EU is just one monolithic country. By looking at the previous examples in social, cultural and economical areas, we should accept the supranationality of the EU as in, the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union and single currency for all members, the case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon about removing trade barriers (mentioned in art. 34 of TFEU), single visa for all individuals belonging to the EU, European Arrest Warrant which is valid throughout all member states and etc. In short, the areas, which have been negotiated by the EU, involve the supremacy of the Union law. But, in some critical areas as mentioned above, nation states are insistent on being on the safe side by keeping those within their own competences. In the founding treaties of the EU, we cannot see a clear explanation for relationship between national law and community law. The core states of the EU assumed that EC law would have the same effect of international law. But, in reality, it was determined by constitution of the member states. In dualistic member states like United Kingdom, it is easy to see that by the time community law becomes applicable, it must be certified by national constitution. In other words, it must be adopted by national authorities and than it becomes a part of national law. On the other hand, in some monistic countries like Netherlands, there may be also a special article in constitutions stating that community law is automatically superior to national law. Art 94 of the Dutch constitution says, “If the legal provisions are in conflict with international treaties or resolutions, then they are not binding.” In both cases, at the end, EU law overrules the national law. The jurisprudence of the ECJ has bolstered the primacy of the EU law over national laws. Because that ECJ’s rulings are concrete cases and they determine the current form of the EU law, they are not mere paperwork. Furthermore, the Declaration (no 17) adopted by


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /21 Treaty of Lisbon makes reference to the well-settled case law, which had established supremacy of the EU law. Therefore I prefer to use many cases in order to prove my argument. III. Direct Effect of the EC Law Direct effect means that creating rights and obligations is not only for states and institutions, but is also for individuals. Direct effect can be seen in treaty provisions and decisions addressed to the member states. Moreover, it can be seen in regulations and decisions addressed to individuals which are already indicated in Art 288 of TFEU. According to Borchardt, it helps turning the freedoms of the common market into rights, which is protected by national states (120). In the case 26/62 of Van Gend en Loos, a Dutch company imported chemicals from Germany. Dutch authority wanted a custom duty from this trade. But the Dutch company claimed that this would be a breach of the Art 25 of Treaty establishing the EC. The ECJ rendered a judgment by making reference to treaties and also spirit and aims of the community (Davies, 64). The court clearly indicated that the community itself created a new legal order of international law and also obligations and rights for individuals. Moreover; individuals can enforce them before national courts and protecting these rights is the essential duty of national courts. Here we can see the direct effect of the community law. After this case, the conditions for direct effect were identified. If the law is clear, precise, unconditional and not subject to any further implementing measures, it will be directly applicable in a national law. Any treaty articles, matching these three criteria will automatically apply in national law. This step catalyzed the harmonization process, which means that harmonizing the national law is in line with the community law. Besides, treaty articles’ direct effect is also valid in regulations, some decisions and international agreements. Another case is 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci. In this case, the ECJ held that member states are liable for payment of damages where loss is sustained by reason of failure to transpose a directive of the EU in whole or in part. But for this, also there are some criteria that, the directive must confer a right on citizens, the content of the right must be clear and there should be a causal chain between damage and state’s failure. According to Karen Davies, this ruling reinforces the member states obligations and ensures greater effectiveness


22 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi of directives (73). It can be realized beyond the rules of national states that, implementing community law was obliged for the members. Moreover, if states do not implement them properly and damage rights of individuals, they must compensate. It is obvious that community law is overruled here. On the other hand, while these direct effects are created by the ECJ, there are also some rulings that weaken the superiority. For example, In 1974 European Court of Justice’s Nold decision, it is said that, the court was bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions and fundamental rights, which were recognized and protected by the constitutions of member states. In this counter example, using that way of language is just a hush money for Germany. It can be thought that the EU, from time to time, prefers some specific way of language and words to satisfy the members. This happens rarely but helps to win members’ loyalty. Besides Nold ruling, in 1974 with the Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office problem of free movement of workers between member states occured. A Dutch woman wanted work within the Church of Scientology in the UK. The UK government refused her entry, just because of her declaration of being a member of that organisation (Kırk, 120). The ECJ certified the UK’s position on the basis of art. 45 of TFEU. In that article limitations by member states on ground of public policy were seen admissible. The EU gave importance to member states’ own public stability and dynamism, but requested to interpret narrowly the word public policy. In this case direct effect of community law is weakened. Three years after this case, the EU law regained its supremacy. In Italy the power to disregard or declare invalid a provision of national law was the sole right of the Constitutional Court. In the case 106/77 Simmenthal a lower court faced with a conflict between national law and community law provision and asked the ECJ to solve this problem. The ECJ said that the doctrine of direct effect of community legislation does not depend on national constitutional provisions and national courts have a duty to give full effect to the community provisions (Foster, 60). With this statement the ECJ made the direct effect of the EU law clear. Supreme Constitutional courts of member states lose their effect when it comes to community law. IV. Supremacy of Community Law The autonomy of the EU law is a sine qua non concept of the EU. It distinguishes the EU law from classic international law. And, we should keep in mind that community law is


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /23 not an alien system. Union law does not constitute a part of any national legal order. In case a conflict arises between national law and community law, it can only be solved by EU legal order. The existence of union law, albeit being within limited fields, depends on principle of primacy itself. In the case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, Italy nationalized distribution of electricity. A company owner Mr.Costa claimed that this act infringed a number of provisions or the EEC Treaty. The ECJ was requested to interpret the articles of the EEC Treaty. The Court confirmed that in any conflict between the community and the national law, community law must take precedence, even in the situation of lex posteriori, which was implemented in the UK. The court also added member states had created this new legal system by limiting their sovereign rights and assigning power to the community (Davies, 76). Therefore, EU law is superior to national regulations by nature. After this ruling, in the case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the ECJ faced with German Administrative Court’s concern about supremacy of community law. As I mentioned at the beginning, for some countries it is hard to accept an entity above their nations especially for UK and Germany. But the ECJ dealt with this struggle as well. In order to relieve Germans, court declared that community already recognized such fundamental rights under the protection of general principles of law. The case 213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd. was the most important case of supremacy of community law. As we can guess, UK created troubles about the community law. A dispute arose over the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which attempted to restrict ownership of UK registered fishing boats by requiring that at least 75 per cent of the boats must be owned by UK nationals. There were series of cases in which the UK was involved to solve before cases were submitted to ECJ. The courts had to make a decision for there was a direct conflict between the Merchant Shipping Act and the EC Treaty (Kirk, 9). UK Courts insisted in getting their own way and granted an injunction pending a decision by the ECJ. The House of Lords decided that, modification of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy when there is a conflict between a national law and community law, allowed the House of Lords to disregard that shipping regulations. After these cases the UK gave the community law a kind of higher status and paid compensation.


24 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi Same as in the UK, in the 1994 German Constitutional Court Maastricht ruling paragraph 55 said that Germany is one of the masters of treaties and it can revoke that adherence by a contrary act. Germany thought that, it has kompetenz-kompetenz and by giving one kompetenz, European Union was created and therefore EU law cannot be superior. But in those areas of law in which the EU has competency, all members accept the supremacy of the EU law. From time to time, member states need to emphasize their sovereignty. Moreover, in 1974 Solange I decision German Constitutional Court stated that German Constitution nullifies any amendment of the Treaty, which would destroy the identity of the valid constitutional structure of the Federal Republic of Germany. Germans thought that the EU still lacks a democratically legitimated Parliament and a codified catalogue of fundamental rights. Therefore German Constitution could not cover a transfer of power about protection for fundamental rights and also German court would ensure those rights. After this ruling the supremacy of community law was jeopardized. In contrast with Solange I decision, in 1987 Solange II decision, German Constitutional Court approved community legislation about protection of fundamental rights and maintained that, as long as present conditions prevailed, the Court would not exercise its jurisdiction. As August Reinisch indicated, “The German Court thereby recognized that in the time between the two Solange decisions, the ECJ had developed an established case law protecting fundamental rigths” (100). In the first Solange decision Germany did not accept the supremacy but in the second Solange decision, the community law overruled the national law. The last case is about Poland. In the case P 1/05, Polish Constitutional Court accepts the supremacy of EU law but only as a consequence of transfer of some competences under strict conditions set by national constitutions (Kowalik-Banczyk, 1356). In case of a conflict either Poland is to amend the Constitution, or the Union is to amend relevant union provision or as a last resort Poland is to withdraw from the Union. As a result of this case, European Arrest Warrant was found invalid, but the effect of its decision was suspended for eighteen months to give the government the opportunity to amend the constitution. This shows us that constitutional court in principle respects community law and within the limits of constitution, it is ready to meet union obligations (Hartley, 277).


Y覺l: 2014 Say覺: 01 /25 V. Conclusion Nigel Foster argued that EU law is assumed to be an autonomous legal order, which is related to international law and national law but nevertheless distinct from them (59). This paper tried to show that the distinction in terms of supremacy of the EU law by looking at the preceding rulings, which are about direct applicability and direct effect of the EU law. In the cases, it is obvious that, even if member states do not implement community law directly or harmonize their national law to the EU law, at least they pay compensation to those who suffer from that omission or non-execution. Member states rarely remind their power, but overall, the EU gets the final word.

Bibliography Borchardt, Klaus-Dieter. The ABC of European Union Law. Luxembourg: Publications Office of The European Union, 2010. Davies, Karen. Understanding European Union Law. New York: Cavending Publishing Limited, 2007. Foster, Nigel. Questions & Answers EU Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Griller, Stefan, et al. National Constitutional Law and European Integration. Study. Brussels: European Parliament Policy Department, 2011. Hartley, Trevor. The Foundations of European Union Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Kirk, Ewan. EU Law. London: Pearson Education Limited, 2011. Kowalik-Banczyk, Krystyna. "Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and The Idea of Supremacy of EU Law." German Law Journal 6.10 (2005): 1355-1366. Reinisch, August. Essential Questions in EU Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.


INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THEIR ROLES Ömer-Faruk Kafali

Introduction The European Union, as an institution which is today a model on the whole world, did not just arise in a short span of time and without any reason. After Second World War, many countries came together to co-operate and established different associations like the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) or WEU (Western European Union) for rise up life standards and security which collapsed in the middle of the 20th century.1 Until the EU has become today what it is, it developed and transformed several times. The pioneer for establishing this community was the “then French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in his declaration of 9 May 1950 in which he put forward the plan he had worked out with Jean Monnet to bring Europe’s coal and steel industries together to form a European Coal and Steel Community”2, the ESCS which was formed by France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and Italy. 3 Then after, other institutions were set up by the same countries like the EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) and EEC (European Economic Community). In 1965, “The Merger Treaty” was signed by the same countries to bring those 3 communities (ESCS, EURATOM and EEC) together and reconstruct the Union in order to be more effective. This was not the last step of the evolution of the Union, some other conventions (The SEA4, The Maastricht Treaty5, ToA6, ToN7 ) were put in rule for better co-operation and

1

Borchardt, 2010, p.9. Borchardt, 2010, p.11. 3 Davies, 2011, p.8. 4 The Single European Act, formed in 1986 and came into force in 1987. 5 Also called as The Treaty on European Union in 1992. 6 The Treaty of Amsterdam, formed in 1997 and came into force in 1999. 7 The Treaty of Nice, formed in 2000 and came into force in 2003 2


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /27 functioning of the community.8 Under those treaties, The Maastricht Treaty was the one which gave the name “EU” to the community. The reforms and innovations what these treaties brought will be seen while analysing the institutions. The analyse will be about; what the main legislative organs are (mentioned in the TEU article 13), how they function (rule) and how they are balanced in the use of power by having the right to check each other. The Institutions 1.

European Parliament

The EP was established with the ESCS in 1952 as “the assembly”. The Parliament represents the interests of the Citizens of Europe. It originated from 78 members who were chosen by each national parliaments. At that time, the legislative role of the parliament was quiet limited, just a place where debates were made towards a decision.9 Today it is generated by maximum 750 MEPs (Members of the Parliament) plus the President. Since 1979, the MEPs have been directly elected via democratic elections in every member state, for a 5 year period. EP represents approximately 500 million EU citizens. The monthly plenary sessions are made in Strasbourg (France), additional sessions in Brussels (Belgium) and the general secretariat sits in Luxemburg. The major political parties in Europe are represented in the EP. MEPs are grouped together as to political affiliations rather than nationality. In TEU article 14 and in TFEU articles from 223 to 234 show how the EP has to function.10 Especially TEU article 14 gives the general principles how the Parliament should act: “The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the Treaties. It shall elect the President of the Commission.” Thus the Parliament has two main functions: Legislation, determining budgetary and also supervisory. Vital is that, the legislative procedure in the EU is not given to a specific single institution. It is fragmented to three institutions; the commission, the EP and the Council11 in

8

Davies, 2011, p.11-19. Davies, 2011, p.32. 10 TFEU, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 11 Davies, 2011, p.33. 9


28 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi order to check and balance so that no institutions becomes too powerful and adopt maladministration. The legislative role of the EP became significant after the SEA introduced the process of “co-operation” in 1986. With that the Parliament gained the right to reject draft legislation.12 Further with the TEU and ToN the power of EP again increased to “co-decision” level that prevented the Council passing legislation without the agreement of the Parliament.13 The Legislation procedure will be analysed lastly, after the council and the commission is mentioned. Another power of the EP was to accept draft budgets. Again this procedure is not left to a single institution, to have a democratic administration this power is shared with the Commission which drafts budgets and after the Council and the Parliament may adopt14, while the CoA (Court of Auditors)15 provides an annual audit of spending. If both do not submit the draft, “the Commission will be required to re-submit its draft.” 16 The third role of the EP is the supervisory role. ”The EP is entitled to ask questions of the Commission and demand written answers.”17 Although the Parliament has the right to ask questions to the Council, unlike the Commission, they cannot be forced to answer. “Also the EP has the authority to require the Commission to resign en bloc” 18 as mentioned in the TEU article 17 and TFEU article 234. Beside this, “new Commissioners must be approved by the EP before taking up office.”19 Under the supervisory role the most important one might be the “judicial review”. The EP may exert supervisory powers over the law making powers of the other institutions by instituting a legal challenge before ECJ (Art. 263 TFEU) provided that the EP may challenge legally effective Acts (largely secondary legislation) produced by the other institutions.20

12

Davies, 2011, p.33. Davies, 2011, p.33. 14 Mentioned in the TFEU article 314. 15 One of the seven institutions in the EU that checks also maladministration. 16 Davies, 2011, p.34. 17 Mentioned in TFEU article 230. 18 Davies, 2011, p.35. 19 Davies, 2011, p.35. 20 Davies, 2011, p.35. 13


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /29 2.

The Commission

The Commission, before known as the “High Authority”21, is a multi-purpose institution that functions include the legislative, administrative and Quasi-judicial functions. The Commission is comprised of one member from each country (actual 28) for a period of five years. The Commission represents the interests of the European Union as a whole.22 In TEU article 17 and in TFEU articles 244 to 250 show how the Commission has to function. In the Commission, there are Commissioners which are individuals independent from countries, serve for the EU. “The Commission is divided into directorates-general, each headed by a director-general who in turn reports to a commissioner with overall responsibility for the work of that DG. The DGs are divided by subject matter, for example, industry or matters relating education, training and youth. Each Commissioner is supported by a cabinet and the Commission has a total staff of approximately 25,000.”23 ”The Council of the European Union appoints a President amongst the Commissioners, after first consulting the EP, the European Council24 proposes a President from amongst the Commissioners, who must then be formally elected by the EP. This is a particularly influential post, as the President will not only chair Commission meetings and attend the meetings of the European Council, but will also represent Europe at international summits.” 25 Commissioners who fails to fulfil conditions will be dismissed by either the President of the Commission or the EP might dismiss the Commission en bloc. 26 The European Commission is located in Brussels, Belgium. Like the EP, the Commission has also the power to legislate, to administrate and execute and supervisory. Initiating Union legislation such as the Union budget, the Structural Funds etc., is one of the primary tasks of the Commission. This legislative procedure will be analysed after mentioning the Council. Another, task is “monitoring observance and proper application of Union law. Here the Commission functions supervisory in monitoring “the Member States’ application and implementation of primary and secondary Union legislation, institutes infringement proceedings in the event of any violation of Union law.” If a violation is determined as a result of investigation, based on TEU Article 226, the Commission can bring 21

Before the Merger Treaty. Davies, 2011, p.40. 23 Davies, 2011, p.41. 24 Another institution from the EU mentioned in article 13. 25 Davies, 2011, p.40. 26 Davies, 2011, p.40. 22


30 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi this situation before the ECJ. Finally, the administrative and executive roles confront in representing the EU in international area.27

3.

The Council

“The Council is comprised on one representative from each Member State authorised to bind the government of that State.”28 The composition of the Council depends on the subject matter29. Council is led by a president, rotating between member states on 6 monthly basis. “The Council represents the interests of the governments of the Member States and has characteristics of both a supranational and intergovernmental organization.”30 This institution also has say in the field of legislation. This will be analysed after the roles of the Council are mentioned. Also, “The Council sets political objectives, co-ordinates national policies and provides a forum where differences between the Member States may be resolved.” If a decision has to be taken by the Council, this is mostly done by voting. From three types (simple majority, qualified majority and unanimity) of voting, qualified majority (QMV) has become the norm based on TEU article 16. If it is a really serious issue, about the sovereignty of a Member State for instance, the right to veto is given. Beside this, the Council shares its role with EP in terms of budget. Also, like the EP, the Council had the right to “annul”31 by virtue of the judicial review.32 The Legislation Procedure33 As mentioned above, three institutions (the Commission, the EP and the Council) have say in the field of legislation. The procedure whether starts within a specific DG of the Commission coming directly with a proposal to the Parliament, or coming to the Parliament of a request by the Parliament about a specific issue which should be legislated. Then this proposal will be voted, whether it should be send to the EP or not. For this procedure, generally simple majority is used.

27

Borchardt, 2010, p.63. Davies, 2011, p.37. 29 If the topic is agriculture than the ministers of agriculture go to the composition. 30 Davies, 2011, p.39. 31 invalidation 32 Davies, 2011, p.39. 33 This part is taken from “The ABC of European Union” from Klaus-Dieter Bochardt. 28


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /31 After adopted by the Commission, the proposal is sent simultaneously to the Council and the European Parliament.34 Then, the proposal will be discussed at a plenary session of Parliament, and is set out in an opinion which may accept or reject the proposal or propose amendments. Parliament then sends its position to the Council. When the proposal arrives to the Council, it can in the first reading, whether approve Parliament’s position and then the act will be adopted in the form of that position; this would mark the end of the legislative process. Or the Council does not approve Parliament’s position, it adopts its position at first reading and communicates it to the European Parliament. The European Parliament has three months starting from the communication of the Council’s position to: 1.

approve the Council’s position or not take a decision; the act concerned is then

deemed to have been adopted in the wording which corresponds to the position of the Council; 2.

reject, by a majority of its component members, the Council’s position; the

proposed act is then deemed not to have been adopted and the legislative process ends; 3.

Make, by a majority of its members, amendments to the Council’s position; the

text thus amended is then forwarded to the Council and to the Commission, which delivers an opinion on those amendments.

After, the Council discusses the amended position and has three months from the date of receiving Parliament’s amendments to do one of the following: 1.

It can approve all of Parliament’s amendments; the act in question is then

deemed to have been adopted. A qualified majority is sufficient if the Commission is also in agreement with the amendments; if not, the Council can approve Parliament’s amendments only by unanimity. 2.

It can choose not to approve all Parliament’s amendments or it does not attain

the required majority; this results in a conciliation procedure. In the conciliation procedure, is initiated by the President of the Council in agreement with the President of the European Parliament. At its heart is the Conciliation Committee, which is currently composed of 27 representatives each from the Council and the European Parliament. The Conciliation Committee has the task of reaching agreement on a joint text by a qualified majority within six weeks of its being convened, on the basis of the positions of 34

İf neccessary sometimes also sent to European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions


32 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi the European Parliament and the Council at second reading. The Commission takes part in the Conciliation Committee’s proceedings and takes all the necessary initiatives with a view to reconciling the positions of the European Parliament and the Council. If, within six weeks of its being convened, the Conciliation Committee does not approve the joint text, the proposed act is deemed not to have been adopted. Then to the third reading, if within the six-week period, the Conciliation Committee approves a joint text, the European Parliament, acting by a majority of the votes cast, and the Council, acting by a qualified majority, each have a period of six weeks from that approval in which to adopt the act in question in accordance with the joint text. If they fail to do so, the proposed act is deemed not to have been adopted and the legislative process is ended. Conclusion As seen, the procedure of legislation is very hard and complex. But this also causes that no of the institutions getting to powerful and having a democratic system. Of course still after the legislation there can occur problems, like mistakes made while the legislation. These can be reported whether by the European Court of Justice as ex officio or by individuals who apply to the ECJ. There have been several cases in which the ECJ declared legislations void, like the Roquette Frêres v Council Case (138/79). In this case, a legislation was adopted without consultation of the EP and this led to void the legislation.35 So as proven, the power of all three institutions were given balanced to avoid abuse of power.

Bibliography Bochardt, K. The ABC of European Union. 2010. Davies, K. Understanding European Union Law. 2011.

35

Davies, 2011, p. 33.


AN EXAMINATION OF THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW     Zeynep Ahsen Keskin

The study of International Law includes a wide range of theories. These theories could be multidisciplinary or created in themselves. This paper is an examination of theories of International Law in an attempt to find the theory that explains international law best. First of all, I will explain why we need theories to handle International Law in terms of their contributions to this area. Then, I will try to prove that “constructivism” is the most effective theory to explain International Law. Therewithal, I will discuss that there are many other theories to handle International Law such as realism and feminist approach. I will try to show their approach with broke strokes and especially with their problematic points as an approach for International Law. To begin with, it could be presented that there are some reasons that explain why we need International Law: International Law is more than a set of rules. There are many factors that we have to consider when we present an approach to IL. Treaties, court decisions and non-governmental organizations are very effective in creating a structure of IL. In that sense, we cannot define the International Law just as a simple set of rules. Also, a theory determines the subject matter of International Law. In that sense, it specifies the actors of this area. Lastly, a theory determines the approach of International Law. For example, realist theory considers on state-power, state’s self-interest and national security. In short, it could be argued that realist theory deals with state behavior and this is the approach of realist theory to handle the International Law in an efficient way. All in all, these are the reasons why we need theories in International Law. Firstly, in response to the question of which theory explains International Law best, I will examine the Constructivism. Constructivism has increasingly taken on an important role within the many disciplines like International Relations, etc. Now, it is introduced into the


34 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi study of International Law. (Karber, 189) As Karber points out: “With it there has been a growing interest in the role of ‘ideas’ the influence of ‘culture’ and importance of ‘rules’ in understanding of global interaction” (189). In recent times, globalization is the most discussed issue of International Relations and Political Science. International Law also closely deals with these areas. Today, it is fact that there is an obvious globalization process in International area. States are very connected with each other and they also voluntarily comply with the International Law. For example, many states signed the “Universal Declaration Of Human Rights” voluntarily. This can be explained not only by state interest but also by global interaction, ideas and values. Moreover, in the Constructivist account the variables of interest to scholars; eg. military power, trade relations are not important because they are objective truths which have strict social meaning. (ctd. Slaughter 3) It means Constructivists are concerned about norms, beliefs and history which emphasize the State behavior. In this context, as Johnston points out “China traditionally acted according to the Realist assumptions in international relations, but based not on the objective structure of the international system but rather on a specific historical strategic culture.” (ctd. Slaughter 3) Also, following the importance of social norms, it could be argued that Constructivists distinguish between the “logic of consequences” which explains the actions for maximizing the interest of a State and the “logic of appropriateness” which is intervened by social norms. (3) All in all, these are the points that explain the important notions of Constructivism. To my point of view, the most important point of Constructivism is that states construct one another in their relations. Also, they not only influence the international law but they are also influenced by it. In that sense, it can be argued that “state behavior” is really effective on International Law. South West Africa ruling (1966); established proceeding against South Africa for the treatment of Namibia, is a very strong evidence of this notion. The two governments relied on erga omnes obligations of South Africa but “International Court of Justice” declined the status of Liberia and Ethiopia. At that time, Namibia was under Trusteeship administration of South Africa. This decision was not enough in terms of their authority in Africa. The ICJ accepted that even if they have humanitarian, moral, historical and political connections with that place there was no legal interest of Liberia and Ethiopia. After this ruling, ICJ lost Its prestige in the international community because, colonial issues were very important in Africa at that time. At the first time, ICJ was seen as a guarantor of the solutions of issues like language of rights. However, the court missed this specialty in the international area because of this ruling. To rally this situation, ICJ established the principle


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /35 of erga omnes in another case, which is “The Barcelona Tradiction”. It showed the important problems of humanity considered in that article. According article 33: When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. (The Barcelona Traction, Second Phase) In short, as Başaran explained: “This evolution of the ICJ is a typical example of the constructive process in international relations” (134). On the other hand, there are some other theories that we should examine, but in this part of paper I will emphasize the weaknesses of these theories, Firstly, I will handle the Feminist approach, and after that I will examine the Realism. To begin with, Feminist approach interrogates patriarchy in this area, too. “Feminists have sought to explain aspects of State behavior and its effects by emphasizing gender as a variable of interest”. (ctd. Slaughter, 4) Feminism is one of the critical approaches of International Law and it demands that all areas of International Law should be analyses in the light of gender studies. As Chinkin points out “This was made a clear at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 where women mobilized around broad global agendas- economic political justice in all context- that were not immediately perceived of as appertaining to women. (Stockholm Declaration [1972] and Rio Declaration [1992])” (4). These are the examples of how this approach is put into practice. As mentioned above, according to Feminist approach International Law should be less patriarchal. This is the problem-solver aspect of Feminist approach, but as a counter argument Israeli and Palestinian Woman’s negotiations could be asserted. According to Finkel, there were many negotiations between these women and they were of course beneficial in terms of


36 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi communication about the issue (1), but at the end of day there is no solution or reconciliation about the process. That is the reason why feminist approach is a very limited approach to handle the International Law. Secondly, another approach which should be discussed is Realism. According to Realism, states are sovereign and they have their autonomy. Also, “They are bound only by forcible coercion or their own consent” (Slaughter, 1). In such a system, state power is the key term because only with the power, states survive and defend themselves. In that sense, it could be argued that according to Realist approach state power, state self-interest, national security and use of force are important terms. It can be accepted that, these terms are very important and determiner in IL, but problems of realists is why states depended on International Law voluntarily? If all system is bound up in the state’s self-interest this situation could not be explained. All in all, Realism has acceptable points, but it cannot be a response the question why states comply with the IL voluntarily. In conclusion, we need theories in International Law and the most important reason is that a theory provides an approach to us. In this paper, I explained some theories such as Constructivism, Feminism and Realism. Feminism and Realism have admissible points as an approach, but their clogged points were mentioned above. In that sense, Constructivism is the best theory in terms of explaining International Law. States are not only influenced by IL but they also influence International Law. In this context, it could be argued that in this constructivist continuum IL is changed, influenced and re-built by actors of International Law like international courts, governments and non-governmental organizations.                


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /37 Bibliography Başaran, Halil Rahman. “Implication Of The Interim Accord Ruling Of the International Court Of Justice “ The International Lawyer 47. (Summer 2013):123-135 Chinkin, Christine. Feminism, Approach to International Law. Max Planck Encyclopedia Of International Law, 2010. Karber, Phillip. ‘“Constructivism” as a Method in International Law’. Proceeding of the Annual Meeting American Society Of International Law Vol 94. (April 200): 189-192 Slaughter, Anne. International Relations, Principal Theories. Max Planck Encyclopedia Of International Law, 2011. South West Africa Cases. (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. S. Afr.) (Second Phase), 1966 ICJ 6 (July 18) The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 LCJ 3, Article 33. (Feb 5)


POWERFUL STATES, WEAK STATES AND THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW Dilara Nur Tunçtürk

1.Introduction International legal system is established on the concept of state equality.1 All states are considered as equal subjects of international law. However, when it comes to formation of customary law which is one of the main sources of international law, it is seen that powerful states are more effective than others. Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of International Court of Justice says that ‘[T]he Court . . . shall apply: b) international customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.’2 From this point forth, in order to be recognized as a customary law, an act must contain two elements: State practice and opinio juris.3 This requirement causes powerful states to be more effective because, it is easier for powerful states to create a behaviour which will be imitated or accepted as law by others.4 However, ICJ determines the existence of these two elements by regarding not only states’ and their behaviours but also its own judgments and United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.5 This second method of ICJ enables non-powerful states to be also influential in the area of customary international law.

1

Byers, M. (1995). Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules-Customary International Law From an Interdisciplinary Perspective. Mich. J. Int'l L., 17, 109. p. 113 2 See Statute of the International Court of Justice. 3 Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez (2011). Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. p. 686 4 Byers, M. (1995). Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules-Customary International Law From an Interdisciplinary Perspective. Mich. J. Int'l L., 17, 109. p.115 5 Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez (2011). Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. p. 681


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /39 In addition, ICJ recognizes the existence of regional customs. This gives opportunity to non-powerful states to create a rule that can be applied among themselves although it can not apply to states which do not give consent.6 In this paper, I argue that, although the powerful states remain as more effective actors in the formation and development of the customary international law, non-powerful states has started to be also effective by means of the case-law in terms of the method of ICJ which acknowledges that General Assembly Resolutions and ICJ judgments may reflect the general consent of the states (opinio juris). Furthermore, the concept of regional custom also gives weak states opportunity to have a say in the field of customary law. Under the first section, two methods that ICJ applies in order to identify customary laws explained briefly. Then, the role of the General Assembly in the formation of customs is examined which is followed by the analysis of the concept of local custom and how it may apply in favor of weak states. The paper concludes with the emphasis upon the emerging role of the weak states in the formation of customary international law. 2.The World Court’s Methods In fact, the Court’s primary duty is to apply rules which already exist. However, it is not to say that the court has no competency to contribute to development of new rules.7 This competency finds expressions in several statements of the Court’s judges. For instance, Judge Rossalyn Higgins stated that: “[F]ar from being treated as a subsidiary source of international law, the judgments and opinions of the Court are treated as authoritative pronouncements of the current state of international law. . . .”8 Especially in the area of customary law, the Court’s judgments have a particular importance because international customs are not written rules. Due to this fact, the methods that the Court apply to identify customary law are essential. As Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez 6

D'amato, A. A. (1969). Concept of Special Custom in International Law, The. Am. J. Int'l L., 63, 211. p.214 Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez (2011). Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. p.682 7

8

Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez (2011). Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. p.683


40 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi states, there are two main methods that ICJ applies : “The Strict Inductive Method and The Flexible Deductive Approach.”9 The Strict Inductive Method is the one which leads powerful states to be dominant in the area of customary law because, in this method, two elements which are expressed in the article 38 of Statute are required. As it is stated above, the acts of the powerful states are imitated or accepted as a law by weak states easily as it happened in the issue of Bush Doctrine. On 11 September 2001, few hours after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, president Bush declared that “"we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."10On 12 September General Assembly and Security Council passed resolutions which consolidate the proclamation that is known as Bush Doctrine.11 In the following weeks countless states supported Bush Doctrine though their acts and statements. Consequently, less than one month after the attacks the proclamation became a customary law.12 On the other hand, Flexible Deductive approach of the World Court enables nonpowerful states to become more effective. As Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez says: one of the main features of this approach is that opinio juris may be inferred from declarations of the UN General Assembly as well.13 Because every state has equal voting rights in the General Assembly, it has became possible for weak states to pass declarations in favor of themselves. 3.General Assembly Resolutions as Opinio Juris Since the 1945 the General Assembly has became an important tool for nonindustrialized states which they have used to adopt resolutions that advance their own 9

Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez (2011). Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. p.682 10

Benjamin Langille (2003). It’s “Instant Custom”: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 145 p.145 11

Benjamin Langille (2003). It’s “Instant Custom”: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 145 p.146 12

Benjamin Langille (2003). It’s “Instant Custom”: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 145 p.147 13

Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez (2011). Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. p.686


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /41 interest.14 By based upon the fact that 192 states are the members of United Nations, nonpowerful states argue that declarations and resolutions of General Assembly may reflect either state practice or opinio juris. Although powerful states have resisted, this interpretation is recognized by ICJ as well. Nicaragua Case, between the United States and Nicaragua, in 1986 is a well-known example in which ICJ considered General Assembly Resolutions as opinio juris. Before the judgment United States argued that ICJ has no jurisdiction to hear this case because the US government accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with a reservation which excludes the “disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless - all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or - the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction.”15 The court agreed with US argument that court can not hear the case by using the treaty as a base. However, the court said that its competency to hear the case comes from not only this treaty but also customary international law which finds its opinio juris in the declarations of General Assembly. The court stated that the US reservation does not deprive customary international law of its applicability. In the end, the court made a decision in favor of Nicaragua. Another attempt of weak states to create customs in favor of themselves occurred in 1974. Non-industrialized states passed the Declaration of New International Economic Order by General Assembly in spite of objections of United States and many other industralized countries. Along with this declaration, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted as well.

16

Developing countries set provisions including nationalizing natural

resources, prohibition of interference by supranational corporations in the internal affairs of States, abolition of trade practices that discriminated against the exports of non-industrial nations into the New Charter.17

14

Byers, M. (1995). Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules-Customary International Law From an Interdisciplinary Perspective. Mich. J. Int'l L., 17, 109. p.118 15

Retrieved from http://www.slideshare.net/prosenjitiit/ankush-2 Brower, C. N., & Tepe Jr, J. B. (1975). Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law, The. In Int'l L. p.295 17 Brower, C. N., & Tepe Jr, J. B. (1975). Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of International Law, The. In Int'l L. (Vol. 9, p. 295). 16


42 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi

However, this attempt has been unable to be enforced in practice because of the nonbinding nature of the Charter.18 Industrialized states refused to apply provisions by arguing that General Assembly Declarations and United Nations Charter are not more than recommendations.19 Despite the effort of weak states, a customary law in the field could not be achieved. It can still be considered as a successful attempt because it caused Common Fund for Commodities to be established at least. Space law is another important field in which General Assembly resolutions have been influential. Indeed, many principles of space law such as common heritage of mankind first were stated in the General Assembly Resolutions and were later included in treaties.20 By using their numerical superiority in the General Assembly, weak states, notably Argentina, succeed to create these general principles in teeth of two main space powers: US and Soviet Union. It was a success for non-powerful states to made treaties including main principles but,in order to achieve their goal it was required big space powers to sign these treaties. For instance, Van Glong described the Moon Treaty as “more a moral and a philosophical obligation than a legal entitlement”21 because the leading space powers, US and Soviet Union, were not parties to Moon Treaty.22 At that stage some scholars argued that these treaty provisions may still reflect customary international law which are based on the General Assembly Resolutions.23 As Blaser express: “[N]ot all law is treaty law, and this is especially the case in space. Law includes custom, which may draw on United Nations resolutions. It may also be reflected in 18

Blaser, A. W. (1990). Common Heritage in Its Infinite Variety: Space Law and the Moon in the 1990's, The. p.86 19 Cocca, A. A. (1981). Advances in International Law through the Law of Outer Space, The. J. Space L., 9, 13. 20 Cocca, A. A. (1981). Advances in International Law through the Law of Outer Space, The. J. Space L., 9, 13. p.18 21 Blaser, A. W. (1990). Common Heritage in Its Infinite Variety: Space Law and the Moon in the 1990's, The. p.86 22 Blaser, A. W. (1990). Common Heritage in Its Infinite Variety: Space Law and the Moon in the 1990's, The. p.85 23 Blaser, A. W. (1990). Common Heritage in Its Infinite Variety: Space Law and the Moon in the 1990's, The. p.87


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /43 publicists' teachings and writings.”24 In other words, the accession of a great number of countries- though they are all weak countries, to a treaty is a strong presumption and evidence of that treaty reflecting customary international law. However, the collaboration of weak states does not always reach great numbers or result in a treaty as in the example of space law. But still, even if these weak states do not succeed to ensure huge participation to their acts, they continue to invoke these acts as regional customs against other states. 4.Regional custom The term local custom refers the rule that applies among a group of states, whereas general custom applies to all states.25 The ICJ acknowledges the existence of local customs in its several judgments although their enforcebility is conditioned upon the defendant state’s consent which shows that this state accept to be bound by that local custom.26 Although a local custom can not bind powerful states if they do not give consent, it gives competence to states to create a binding rule at least among themselves. In Right of Passage case, for example, the Court recognized the existence and applicability of the local custom and held that: “[P]ortugal had a right of passage over Indian territory with respect to private persons, civil officials, and goods in general, for the purpose of reaching the Portuguese enclaves in India. The International Court's holding was based on evidence of a local custom, continuous over a period exceeding a century and a quarter, "accepted as law" by the parties, and constant and uniform.”27

24

Blaser, A. W. (1990). Common Heritage in Its Infinite Variety: Space Law and the Moon in the 1990's, The. p. 86 25 D'amato, A. A. (1969). Concept of Special Custom in International Law, The. Am. J. Int'l L., 63, 211. p.212 26 D'amato, A. A. (1969). Concept of Special Custom in International Law, The. Am. J. Int'l L., 63, 211. p.214 27 D'amato, A. A. (1969). Concept of Special Custom in International Law, The. Am. J. Int'l L., 63, 211. p.218


44 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi However, in the Asylum Case between Peru and Colombia the court did not recognize the asylum tradition as a custom because it did find no evidence that shows the usage of diplomatic asylum is either uniform or constant. Although asylum tradition among Latin American States was not recognized by the court, it has been continued to invoke against big powers. Snowden dispute between United States and Latin American states is an example on the agenda. Many Latin American States offer asylum to Edward Snowden who revealed the espionage activities of United States. Madura, the president of Venezuela declared that: "[A]s head of state of the Bolivarian republic of Venezuela, I have decided to offer humanitarian asylum to the young Snowden … to protect this young man from persecution by the empire."28 For sure, these declarations without any court judgment do not mean that the asylum tradition has became an international custom. The point that is important here is that nonpowerful states do not give up their attempts against powerful states even if these attempts come to nothing at the end. 5.Conclusion As it is stated in the article 38 of ICJ Statute, customary law must contain two main elements which are state practice and opinio juris.29 Although all states are considered as equal subjects in theory, powerful states have financial or military superiority which make them dominant in the formation of both state practice and opinio juris.. 30 The first factor which gives opportunity to weak states to be effective in the formation of customs is flexible deductive approach of ICJ. As Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez stated, this method considers the General Assembly Resolutions as opinio juris; thereby strengthens the roles of non-powerful states in the formation and development of customary international law. 31

28

Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/06/venezuela-nicaragua-offer-asylum-edwardsnowden 29 See Statute of the International Court of Justice. 30

Byers, M. (1995). Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules-Customary International Law From an Interdisciplinary Perspective. Mich. J. Int'l L., 17, 109. 31

Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez (2011). Methods for the Identification of Customary International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2009. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. p.686


Y覺l: 2014 Say覺: 01 /45 Another tool that weak states use is the concept of local custom. It is seen that especially weak states invoke local customs against powerful states in many cases. This essay has argued that, despite the significant role that powerful states in the formation of customary international law maintains; non-powerful states have also became effective by means of the recognition of General Assembly Resolutions as opinio juris and acceptance of the local customs by International Court of Justice.


PEACE AND SECURITY: FAILURES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL Ahmet Dülger

Introduction The United Nations (UN) is a key institution to resolve and avoid disputes in international area. Its organs such as the General Assembly, International Court of Justice, Economic and Social Council are authorized to perform different missions. However, the Security Council has the primary responsibility, under the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security. Although its powers, functions, and resolutions are the essential means for peace and security, the policies of member states of the Council determine the actions and this may obstruct the fulfillment of these purposes. So, my focus is on emphasizing the failure of the Security Council on the issue of protecting human rights. First, I am going to specify the motivations behind establishing such international organization and information about working of the Security Council. Academic writings, reports, and official information are going to be emphasized for giving the theoretical background. In the second part of the essay, I am going to analyze the failure of the Council with cases and resolutions in regard to human rights. Main Features of the Security Council The United Nations has founded in 1945 to avoid international war and “develop friendly relations among nations”1, after the failure of the League of Nations which could not prevent the Second World War. Founders aimed to base UN on more transparent relations and cooperation with each other to solve conflicts. Communication among members in terms of “collective security” is the key word which replaced the self-help by countries, reflects the aim for building new organization in order to ensure better peaceful atmosphere. Instead of appealing to “self-help” use of force each other (Article 2), requires all members to respect 1

http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /47 “territorial integrity” of other states. States must not resort to use of force in any matter “inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. The United Nations’ six principal organs are created to perform different duties for coordinating the relations and determining the strategies on particular issues properly. The main organ for making decisions and using the coercive power during the crisis to act in some way is the Security Council. Its key position is established by the Chapter VI (24/1) of the Charter which states its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. Also, the Charter provides that “the members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council” (Article 25). Consequently, it gives certain powers to Security Council to determine and resolve conflicts and political problems. The Council has fifteen members five of which are permanent members: the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, China, and Russia. Other non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two years. In order to make a resolution on a subject, these five permanent members and totally nine members of the council should cast affirmative votes (Article 27/3). So, if it is to be accepted that there is a significant threat to or breach of international peace and security, it has to follow the Council’s legal decision. When that kind of threat occurs, the Council can decide what measures are necessary to protect peace and security. It includes recommendations, economic embargoes, and severance of diplomatic relations -even use of force- (Articles 41 and 42). Peacekeeping and peacemaking (peace enforcement) are two means of use of force to provide security in conflicts. In the UN’s understanding of maintenance of international peace and security, these military options are not the initial choice without first imposing sanctions under Article 41. However, Article 42 provides for military enforcement measures-as it is called peace making or peace enforcement. It includes physical armed forces which are not often welcomed by one or both sides of the dispute in an area or a region. These military forces take sides in disputes and aim to intervene in order to solve the problem. If it is accepted to send a peace enforcement forces whose aim is proposing a cease-fire to parties, it can resort to “all necessary means” and become active fighters who wage war against the either one or both parties which breach peace and security. On the other hand, peacekeeping aims to provide security without use of force except in self-defence and defence of the


48 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi mandate 2 . This option is not mentioned in the Charter, rather Dag Hammarskjold, UN Secretary-general took the opportunity of the Suez Crisis (1956) to develop this term for sending peacekeeping forces to the area3. In order to send peacekeeping forces, consent of the parties is required and also these forces should be impartial. Moreover, their only job should be supporting the peaceful political process, protecting civilians, and assisting in the disarmament in terms of restoring the rule of law4. Theoretically, these limitations on both peace enforcement and peacekeeping control forces’ power and aim to form a peaceful atmosphere in current crisis areas. Peace and Security Cases Darfur Case Darfur was formerly an independent state and predominantly Muslim area in western Sudan before the region was divided into three federal states as North, South, and West Darfur in 2012. There has been a cruel warfare between the Sudanese central government and a number of insurgent movements since 2003. The general background of the problem is that the central government rejected to accept these groups’ political and social demands and it caused more aggressive actions from libertarian movements. After that the government reacted through military actions and started “ethnic cleansing” of the ethnic groups of Darfur. Until the Doha-Darfur Goodwill Agreement (2009), “2.7 million people have been forced to flee their home”5 and between 300,000 and 400,000 Darfurians have been killed6. While these killings were happening, the UN Security Council has adopted nine major and overall 26 resolutions7, however the killings were not stopped due to the lack of political will of the Council’s members to do that. Also, there has been no significant action until the Security Council took resolution 1769 in 2007. African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was deployed through this resolution and UNAMID agreed to

2

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml “How effective is the UN in Peacekeeping and mediating Conflict?” conference report by Vijay Mehta, Prof. Oliver Richmond, Dr. Martin Barber. 27th March 2008. University of St. Andrews, Scotland. 4 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml 3

5

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Bringing+peace+to+%20Darfur%3a+lessons+of+the+Darfur+Peace+Agreement. -a0193182661 6 Elizabeth Ferris. “Internally Displaced Persons in Darfur: Taking Stock” speech. 7 May. 2008. http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/05/07-darfur-ferris 7 Nadia Sarwar. “Darfur crisis: why has the u.n. failed?” report. 2009: p. 16.


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /49 have peacekeeping forces as 26,000 military, police, and civilian personnel. Even twenty-two months after that resolution, there has been no successful improvement to stop the killings and provide the security in area. In 2008, “UNAMID is at 40% of its capacity and still needs equipment, and helicopters to allow troops to respond to incidents quickly”8 and many of these troops did not effectively do their tasks. Also, the UN Secretary General’s report in 2009 mentioned that “lack of key military enabling units, such as the medium transport units, an aerial reconnaissance unit, 18 medium utility helicopters, and a Level-II hospital (…) [and] the withdrawal of Canadian-owned armoured personnel carriers (…) could create a temporary decrease in operational capacity”9. Consequently, these all show that even after adopting many resolutions on the issue, Darfur crisis has deepened and the peacekeeping troops, which were charged by the Security Council, neither delivered any help nor provided the security and peace in the region.

Rwandan Genocide Rwanda is a state in east Africa where 800.000 people were slaughtered systematically in three months in 1994. Hutu and Tutsi were the main groups which form the Rwandan society, but they had ethnic, social, and mostly political problems with each other as majority and minority tribes. After the president of the state, who was a Hutu, died in an airplane accident, the extremist Hutu organization, the Interahamwe, started to slaughter Tutsis and moderate Hutus in this chaotic environment. Although, the peacekeeping forces, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which were established in 1993 by the Security Council Resolution 872, were there, they failed to prevent the massacre of people. This is mostly because that “It took three weeks beyond the thirty-seven days for the Security Council even to pass the resolution creating the force. Despite the warning by the U.N. secretary-general that delay would ‘seriously jeopardize’ the agreement, it was another two months before substantial numbers of peacekeepers were in the country”10. This slow 8

http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/05/07-darfur-ferris UN Security Council, “Report of the UN Secretary General on the Deployment of the African UnionUnited Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur”, June 9, 2009. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N09/363/ 65/PDF/N0936365.pdf?OpenElement 9

10

“Leave None to Tell the Story Genocide in Rwanda Alison Desforges” report by Human Rights Watch. 1999: p. 99. http://addisvoice.com/Ethiopia%20under%20Meles/Rwanda.pdf


50 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi process was caused by the fact that especially the United States did not want to “repeat the mistakes made in Somalia” and highlighted the killing of 10 UN soldiers there in order to prove the situation was too risky11. Because of that, the Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR to 270 men by Resolution 912 and this caused the increase of massacre. Report of the Independent Inquiry 12 attributes the failure “to the lack of resources and political leadership, leading ‘to the terrible and humiliating situation of a UN peace-keeping force’ ”13. So, the inadequate actions of the peacekeeping forces could not prevent the genocide and the functions that were provided by the Charter were not performed.

Bosnia After the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there was an internal conflict about the independence demands of Muslim Bosniaks. They passed a referendum for independence on February 1992, but this was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs who were supported by the Serbian Government of Slobodan Milosevic. After that, Serbs sent their forces inside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian War took place between 1992 and 1995. In that time, 156,824 people were killed-disappeared and totally 278,800 died in “war-related” way until 199614. The UN Security Council firstly took the Resolution 713 (1991) which imposed an arms embargo on all of the former Yugoslavia. In 1992, the Council sent the peacekeeping forces, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which were normally not fighters and could not help to prevent the massacres. Likewise, the UN Security Council made 10 resolutions on that issue15. However the embargoes, no-fly regions, peacekeeping forces were not adequate to stop the ethnic-cleansing. While members of the Security Council were meeting and the resolutions were passing, in five days more than 8,000 Bosniaks were killed in Srebrenica (1995). After all these slaughters, the Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 11

Ibid at p. 100. Rahmatullah Khan. “United Nations Peace-keeping in Internal Conflicts: Problems and Perspectives”. 2000: p. 550. 13 Ibid at p. 553. 14 Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak. “War-related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results”. European Journal of Population (2005) 21: 187-215. P. 192. 15 Merve İrem Yapıcı. “Where the Military Actions in Bosnia Herzegovina Stands in International Law”. International Law and Politics (2007) 2.8: 1-24. P. 11. 12


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /51 and authorized a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The relationship between NATO and the UN was provided by the Charter Article 52 and Article 53 which states: “The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority”. So, NATO had in fact a role to do “peace support operations”16 and “NATO had been assisting the UN in relation to (a) the naval embargoes; (b) the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia; (c) the protection of UN personnel; and (d) the protection of safe zones” for Bosnia17. However, it is clear that this was very late attempt from the Security Council to provide peace and security in the region and this war was a real failure to fulfill UN’s purposes. Conclusion Today, 83,300 military observers work at 16 different regions of the world as peacekeeping forces18, also the peace enforcement forces still on work at the some crisis areas. So, these examples may be varied with, for instance, Iraq, Somalia, Congo, and even today Syria cases. They all share the similar problems that the international community or mostly big powers in the Security Council are not willing to do decisive actions for protecting the human rights there. It is clear that the UN organs did not make sufficient effort to prevent the massive slaughters and even not accept that as genocide in Kosovo19. Similarly, the UN Security Council’s permanent members connived at the massacres in Rwanda and did not carry out UN’s significant purposes. As Higgins states the UN must face these failures and “the issue of an enforcement capability and its responsibility”20. Because as I specified in Darfur case, through lack of equipment and cooperation in UN’s military forces, killings of thousands of people were not prevented. Peacekeeping forces’ right to resort to force only in soft-defense, the Security Council’s flexible mechanism of making resolutions and its implementations, and the slow process of establishing strict practices can be indicated as the causes of failure.

16

Rosalyn Higgins. “Peace and Security Achievements and Failures”. European Journal of International Law (1995) 6: 445-460. p.453 17 Ibid at 453 18 https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/ 19 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1530781.stm 20 Higgins at p. 459.


52 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE MORE REPRESENTATIVE

Mahmut Sait Arslan

Introduction As an organization founded in the years of World War II, current situation of United Nations reflects the hegemony of the victors of the war. The key organ of UN in its function of maintaining peace and security, the Security Council is mostly steered by P5. However, over influence of few States reduce the objectivity, credibility and legitimacy of UN actions, hence harm the feeling of justice. Therefore, as it’s argued since decades, a substantial reform is a must in UN, especially in the Security Council. To enhance its efficiency, credibility and expediency with its major goal of international peace and security, the status of permanent membership and veto power should be abolished. Moreover, global representation of the States is a must to ensure impartiality of the allocation of the limited sources and decisionmaking. Throughout the time since the foundation of UN, much have changed in the economic, military and political outlook of the international sphere. There are many explicit demands for the reform of UN Security Council’s structure and nominations for permanent memberships. Nevertheless, quite a little process is made in the past years due to variety and conflict of interests. Therefore, this article will deal with the issue of reform in theoretic and ideal level, while trying not to lose connection with the reality. In the first part of article I will put forward some prominent demands for reform and their counter-thesis. In the second part, I will evaluate the arguments set forward and explain the motives behind the demand of the reform. At the last part, I will conclude with a the outcome of my arguments.


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /53 Demands for a Better Representation Charter of the United Nations was agreed during the war by Allies and those who were on their side. All of the countries that had adhered to the Allies’ 1942 Declaration by the United Nations were invited to the United Nations Founding Conference.1 Just after the end of World War II, recent permanent members of the Security Council were the preeminent military, economic and political powers. Their position in UN reflects their dominance in world politics after the war. World conscience is not represented in terms of regional, ethnical, religious and demographic proportionality. Despite these, United Nations is the sole universally accepted organization. Universality and supposed, on paper reasons of actions “add to their legitimacy.”2 However, whether members of UNSC really seek the supposed, on paper purposes or their sole national interests is questionable. There are some accuasitions that UNSC resolutions serve to member States’ interests and political agenda.3 In many cases UN remained passive, though its humanitarian intervention was expected and demanded by international community and local people. For exemplifying the politicized obstruction of the Security Council’s actions, we can point “the use of veto by China on extensions of peacekeeping missions in Guatemala in 1997 and Macedonia in 1999.” China was reacting to establishment of diplomatic relations by these countries with China’s foe, Taiwan. Another example is the use of veto power by US against a resolution which will extend the mandate of UN in Bosnia in 2002. The main motive of US was the threat of “subjecting American peacekeepers to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.”4 Another indicator of the Council’s tendentious operation is its role in the conclusion of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) of Nuclear Weapons. The recent P5 of the Security Council are recognized as nuclear-weapon States by the treaty. The treaty legitimizes the

1

“Oct 24, 1945: U.N. Formally Established.” www.history.com. accessed January 5, 2014. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/un-formally-established. 2 United Nations Today (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2008), 80. 3 Sudhir Chella Rajan, “Global Politics and Institutions,” GTI Paper Series 3 (2006). accessed January 5, 2014. http://www.gtinitiative.org/documents/PDFFINALS/3Politics.pdf 4 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, introduction to The United Nations Security Council and War, ed. Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31.


54 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi adoptation of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, while forbids it for the the others.5 Since it is clearly against the principle of equal sovereignty of States, India and Pakistan who have nuclear weapons and Israel who is believed to have6, have right to protest the treaty. The treaty is not of Security Council’s creation, rather it was negotiated by States. But the Council has important associations with that, especially in the implementation of it. Helping this treaty overlaps the view that Security Council serves to the interests of major powers.7 The most expressed step to prevent the Security Council from being affected by a few states, to increase its credibility is to enhance the representation of the world States in the Council. Even the recent permanent members express their desires and support to expansion of the Council. There are countless number of official and unofficial reform proposals. However, States cannot agree on the principals of the expansion, i.e. direction of the expansion. Shall it correspond the changes in political activities of the States, or criterias like dedication to peace, religious or regional or demographic representation should be reflected? Firstly, even if we accept that the structure of the organization meets the necessities of the post war political sphere of the world, we have to admit the fact that world have much changed until now. With the emergence of new influential economic and political actors, role of P5 is challenged. Brazil, Germany, Japan and India that are known as G4 are the most probable candidates to permanent memberships. They are among the ten economies with highest nominal GDP along with the P5. 8 They have been selected as non-permanent members numerous times. They have already formed an interest group and support each other’s bid. “In order to better reflect today’s geopolitical realities”, they support the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories. 9 However, especially their neighbours, who want to restrict their activities in the region oppose their demands.

5

Treaty On The Non-Prolıferatıon Of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Article I,II, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml. 6 Khaled Dawoud, “Redifining The Bomb” weekly.ahram.org.eg. accessed January 5, 2014. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/458/intervw.htm. 7 Vaughan Lowe and others, 27. 8 “World Economic Outlook Database”, www. imf.org, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx. 9 “Joint Press Statement: Ministerial Meeting of the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) in the margins of the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly”, www.un.int, (New York, 23 September 2011), accessed in January 4, 2014.


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /55 The most extensive opposition to the permanent membership of the G4 was raised bu Uniting by Consensus Group. 12 States argued in the General Assembly that “Widening the permanent circle for the few who sought special status, no matter how worthy their candidacies, would make the Council less accountable for its conduct, more remote from the membership and less representative of the world’s regions.”10 They offered to establish new 10 non-permanent seats which will be shared by all regions of the world. The members are to be selected by the members of that region. Reflection of regional representation is an another concern. Though all regions are represented by non-permanent members in the Council, not all of them are represented by a permanent member with a veto power. Recently South America, Africa and Oceania don’t have permanent members. Since the foundation of UN, through decolonization and the collapse of the Soviet Union more than 80 States, which comprimise more than 750 million people became independent.11 The African Union which is composed of 54 States and around a billion people demands a permanent membership seat for one of its members. Another perspective in the expansion is proposed by Organisation of Islamic Conference(OIC). Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East has been a region of constant conflict. Muslim-majority countries have been regularly subject to the UNSC’s concern. OIC demands a permanent seat in the UNSC for one of its members. As Secretary-General of OIC, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu states “If you look to the structure of the Security Council of today, you have the P5 [permanent five] and there are representatives of different civilizations, different cultures, political powers… but you won’t find representative of more than 1.6 billion people of Muslim world.”12 “Any reform of the Security Council must ensure adequate representation of OIC member States in any category of membership,” especially given that as OIC represented 57 member States and 1.6 billion people.”13

10

United Nations General Assembly, Press Release GA/10371. “The United Nations and Decolonization” www.un.org, accessed in January 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/. 12 Jessica Chasmar, “Islamic bloc wants a permanent seat at U.N. Security Council: report” www.washingtontimes.com, September 17, 2013. accessed in January 5, 2014. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/17/islamic-bloc-wants-permanent-seat-un-security-coun/. 13 United Nations Security Council, Security Council 7050th Meeting SC/11161. 11


56 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi However, objectors to this demand point the religious aspect of it and consider UN as a neutral organisation against religions.14 They consider about possible other religious demands. Exemplary, allocation of a permanent seat will be iniquity against other high-populated religions like Hinduism and Buddhism. A more practical concern about the membership of a Muslim country, especially if it enjoys a veto power, is the possibility of bringing the Council to a deadlock in its operations in the Middle East. Possible Benefits of a Better Representation All of the demands mentioned above address to some problems, especially representation and credibility. But none of the arguments clearly how their membership will serve to the world peace, rather the interest groups concern their own interests. It is not clearly stated why the changing reality in terms of material sources and influence should should result in permanent membership. “As many observers have noted, the desire for inclusiveness needs to be balanced against the objective.”15 For me, importance of equal representation will become apparent in its function of balancing. Today a risk of veto can result in alteration in draft resolutions. As it is a fundemantal principle of law, equality of arms will lead the decision makers think more prudently. Non-objectivity of UNSC policy is mostly observed in its stance in terms of maintenance of the rule of law in alike cases. “Why is action taken against one state but not another?” “Why are Israel and Iran and North Korea treated so differently in the context of nuclear non-proliferation, for instance?” The answer given to this by some writers is that duty of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security, not to maintain rule of law. Maintaining rule of law has been “wished upon it.” Thus, deciding among the cases to intervene is a question “not as a legal but as a political matter, demanding a political solution.”16Since the resources and capacity of the UN is limited, UNSC has to choose among the cases to allocate resources. At this stage it can be argued that through a perfect representation with equality of arms, exertion of the Council and allocation of the resources will reflect the desires of the parties 14

Daniel Greenfield, “OIC Muslim Org Wants a Seat on the UN Security Council” www.frontpagemag.com, February 8, 2013. accessed in January 5, 2014. http://www.frontpagemag.com/2013/dgreenfield/oic-muslim-orgwants-a-seat-on-the-un-security-council/. 15 Vaughan Lowe and others, 33-4. 16 Ibid, 34-6.


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /57 better. Parties will try to compromise. As an example, representative of the Muslim world will possibly make all possible concessions to avoid a veto against the interests of Palestine. Different entreaties to the countries will be decreased. As to the difference between law enforcement and maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council is inconsistent in determining when internal conflicts like civil wars become a threat to international peace and security. UN authorized military intervention to Afghanistan which has rich sources and not in Kosovo. Internal conflicts can be regarded as international because of “illegal arms flows, terrorism, drug trafficking, refugee flows and environmental degradation.”17 These can be performed or connived by any State, including permanent members, as in 1991-5 Yugoslavia arms embargo US and others connived in the acquisition of weapons from outside.18 Related with the last example, UN is criticized for its lack of its own, reliable intelligence services. UN actions can be instigated, misled through lobbying 19 . Though establishment of an independent organ of collecting secret knowledge is the ultimate solution, better representation can help to overcome biased intelligence. “The Security Council has a real, but not great, influence on the development of international law.” 20 It is generally accepted that Security Council resolutions can not challenge jus cogens and can be put aside if they do. But since Security Council resolutions prevail any other ordinary legal obligation, as stated in the Article 25 of the UN Charter, the Council can create binding obligations for its members and have affect in the formation of customary international law.21 Also, Security Council resolutions have a role in refining “the meaning and understanding of concepts such as self-defence.” Moreover, the Security Council can affect the formation and implementation of international criminal law through the tribunals it establishes, like the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals.22 A more representative and thus democratic process of law making can add to the practibility and prestige of law.

17

United Nations Today, 78. Vaughan Lowe and others, 52. 19 Ibid, 50. 20 Ibid, 43. 21 Ibid, 37. 22 Ibid, 43. 18


58 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi Despite all, as mentioned above, expansion brings along the risk of inefficiency. We’ve criticized the operation of national interests, but expansion will carry more interests, thus make things more complicated. If we are determined to establish peace and security in the world under the UN system, nations should ignore some of their interests in the international circle. As we have witnessed in the Cold War period, the better equality of arms result in more tension. Therefore, instead of giving more stabilizing and offensive rights, we should reduce them. With this object in my mind, turning a blind eye to all constraints of the reality, I am suggesting the elimination of all veto powers and permanent memberships in UNSC. Common, periodic, regional seats in the Security Council may force members to address to the interests of their region as a whole. But, since any amendment to the structure of the Security Council is dependent on the permanent members, it is unlikely that they will waive their superior standing. Conclusion To conclude, “the victorious Great Powers carried with them an inherent endowment of authority” for the maintenance of the their interests and peace, which they were “disposed to exercise thenceforth through the mechanisms of the new world organization.”23 To avoid the pursuit of self-interests through the UN, create a more credible, efficient, just world organisation representation of different regions must be provided, if we can’t totaly abolish the status of permanent membership.

23

Ibid, 40.


Yıl: 2014 Sayı: 01 /59 Bibliography Chasmar, Jessica, “Islamic bloc wants a permanent seat at U.N. Security Council: report” www.washingtontimes.com, September 17, 2013. accessed in January 5, 2014. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/17/islamic-bloc-wants-permanent-seat-unsecurity-coun/. Dawoud, Khaled, “Redifining The Bomb” weekly.ahram.org.eg. accessed January 5, 2014. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/458/intervw.htm. Greenfield, Daniel, “OIC Muslim Org Wants a Seat on the UN Security Council” www.frontpagemag.com, February 8, 2013. accessed in January 5, 2014. http://www.frontpagemag.com/2013/dgreenfield/oic-muslim-org-wants-a-seat-on-the-unsecurity-council/. “Joint Press Statement: Ministerial Meeting of the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) in the margins of the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly”, www.un.int, New York: September 23, 2011, accessed in January 4, 2014. Lowe, Vaughan, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, introduction to The United Nations Security Council and War, ed. Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31. “Oct 24, 1945: U.N. Formally Established.” www.history.com. accessed January 5, 2014. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/un-formally-established. Rajan, S. C., “Global Politics and Institutions,” GTI Paper Series 3 (2006). accessed January 5, 2014. http://www.gtinitiative.org/documents/PDFFINALS/3Politics.pdf “The United Nations and Decolonization” www.un.org, accessed in January 5, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/. Treaty On The Non-Prolıferatıon Of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml. United Nations General Assembly, “‘Uniting For Consensus’ Group Of States Introduces Text On Security Council Reform To General Assembly”, Press Release GA/10371, June 26, 2005, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10371.doc.htm United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Advocates Greater Ties With Organization Of Islamic Cooperation To Resolve Conflict In Middle East, Other Strife-Torn Regions”Security Council 7050th Meeting SC/11161, October 28, 2013, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc11161.doc.htm.


60 / İstanbul Şehir Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Öğrenci Dergisi United Nations Today (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2008) p.80. “World Economic Outlook Database”, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx.

www.imf.org,


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