Issue 10 : 11.15
BRIDGE BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SECURITY AND SHIPPING
IN FOCUS: SE ASIA Calls for a standardised format for reporting on piracy
CYBER SECURITY Now Byting the Offshore Industry
HRA Changes A review in the Indian Ocean could lead to a return to hijackings
South Africa Stowaways P&I Clubs issue updates on stowaway risk exposure
Welcome to the
BRIDGE Welcome to theBRIDGE from The Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI). Inside we bring you the latest news, views and thinking from across the maritime security sector. We hope you enjoy this edition and would love to hear from you if you have any comments or contributions, please email us: email@example.com
CONTENTS Seas of Change Page 3 SAMI & IMCA Workshop Examines Cyber Security Issues Page 4
Contact SAMI +44 (0)20 7788 9505
In Focus: South East Asia Page 6-7
Caribbean Piracy Page 8
HQS Wellington, Victoria Embankment, London, WC2R 2PN
South African Stowaways Change Page 9 Changes to the High Risk Area may be a high risk strategy Pages 10-11 Book Review: Aviation & Maritime Security Intelligence Page 11
SAMIâ€™s Secretariat team are on hand to help: Peter Cook Chief Executive Officer e: firstname.lastname@example.org
Floating Armouries Page 12-13
Chris Ashcroft Chief Operations Officer
Is shipping underestimating the impacts of cyber risks? Page 15
Member News Page 16 Secure Fisheries Launches its Report on Sustaining Somali Fisheries Page 17 Maritime Matters Pages 18-19
Nadia Balta Head of Membership e: email@example.com
Elisabeth Wilson Head of Equipment, Technology & Hardware e: firstname.lastname@example.org
Seas of Change SAMI CEO Peter Cook gives an overview of current maritime security issues
As the world reels from the brutal and savage terrorist attacks in Paris and our political leaders look at the most effective way to try to prevent a repetition, it is important that we open our eyes and minds to the range of possibilities on the maritime perspective for the next attack, where and how it may be conducted.
humanity and compassion whilst deterring terrorist infiltration. Our ports process an increasing volume of cargo, the number of containers passing through the supply chain last year was in excess of 170 million. Less than 2% of those were checked from a security perspective. But how do we effectively check these containers without significantly delaying the supply chain?
Firstly, we need to consider the terrorist planner; a conservative individual that watches carefully for weaknesses, like a port with little management of small vessel activity (Aden in 2000, which resulted in the attack on USS COLE), or lack of security procedures in place for passengers embarking vessels (on Superferry 14, in 2004, a man placed a television box containing explosives on a crowded deck, the explosion killed 116 people).
Our reliance on technology only increases, making us more and more vulnerable to exploitation by someone that understands a bit more than we do, and has the desire to prove it. Cyber-attacks ashore are becoming progressively more ingenious and common. It would therefore be grossly naive to say “if”, as it is clearly a question of “when” there is a major cyber-attack in the maritime domain.
These weaknesses are often exposed by criminals who have found a way to be successful in the perpetration of a particular crime such as smuggling or trafficking. The terrorist will then consider whether or not this kind of opportunity can be exploited to promote their ideological aims and, if so, possibly plan an attack.
It is often said that a terrorist only has to be successful once, whereas the counter terrorist forces have to be lucky all the time to prevent an attack. Whilst there is no denying that luck can play a part, this is not a premise on which to base a plan. An effective security plan is one that is carefully considered and effectively implemented by security professionals.
Seven years ago this month, a team of 10 terrorists prepared to attack Mumbai, on India’s West Coast, in a well-planned and coordinated amphibious raid. The Islamic militants attacked 12 locations over four days, killing 164 and wounding over 300.
Bad security doesn’t just happen; it is the commercial decision of somebody somewhere.
These attacks, which shook the world, were devastating because the terrorists exploited a weakness in port security that criminals like smugglers had taken advantage of for years. Today we see an enormous influx of desperate people from the Middle East and North Africa being trafficked by sea into Southern Europe by criminals, and it is inevitable that some of these individuals are extremists and terrorists. The conundrum Europe faces in dealing with this situation is balancing
SAMI & IMCA Workshop Examines Cyber Security Issues Over 80 delegates attended a Maritime Cyber Security Workshop onboard HQS Wellington during London International Shipping Week on 9th September. The event was jointly organised by the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) & the International Marine Contractors’ Association (IMCA). Peter Cook, SAMI’s CEO, and Nigel Hope, Chairman of the IMCA Security Working Group introduced the day, highlighting that this was the first time SAMI and IMCA had worked so closely together. The event underpinned the need to ensure that any response to a cyber issue has technical, procedural and cultural elements whilst also ensuring that IT and cyber security were designed in to vessels and systems from the outset. The workshop was facilitated by Templar Executives, whose Chief Executive, Andrew Fitzmaurice, introduced the meat of the day by trying to tease out a definition of Cyber Security and concluding that it “means different things to different people, the hard thing is to get one agreed definition and understanding.” Aron Sørenson, Chief Marine Technical Officer with BIMCO, briefed on the recent development of Cyber Security Guidelines, which was to be presented to the IMO for adoption by the organisation as industry guidance through submission to the MSC 96 during 2016. The majority of the day was given over to syndicate work for delegates to examine cyber security issues in a simulated environment. Tom Brind of Templar Executives set out the scenarios, which were designed to demonstrate real world manifestations of cyber attacks or an incident and to move it beyond the IT Department to tease out and understand the practical mitigations from a maritime and offshore specialist perspective. The scenario involved a modern 3D seismic survey vessel transmitting from the North Sea to Dar Es Salam in Tanzania and there were a number of incidents that occurred en route. The full event report is available to SAMI Members via the ‘Library’ section of the website.
THE FINAL PIECE WHICH FITS YOUR HIGHEST STANDARDS On Board Armed EU Security Guards, Port Security, Offshore Platform Security, Luxury Yacht Security, Intelligence Reports, Maritime Security Training, Maritime Crisis Management Consultancy.
+356 277 80424 www.seagullsecurity.com PAGE 7 email@example.com
IN FOCUS: SOUTH EAST ASIA It has been an interesting few months from a global piracy perspective – the same problems abound in the same places, but there are calls for a standardised approach to reporting attacks which is perhaps even more important as data appears to be getting skewed. LATEST INDUSTRY REPORTS From 1 January 2015 to 30 September 2015, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recorded 190 piracy incidents, with the majority focused upon lowlevel occurrences in Southeast Asia. According to the data, 154 ships were boarded, 21 attempted attacks took place and 15 vessels were hijacked. The IMB reports that 226 crew members were taken hostage, 14 assaulted, 13 injured, 10 kidnapped and one killed. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP) also released its latest update on maritime piracy recently. They recorded 161 incidents of piracy and armed robbery reported there in the first nine months of 2015, which represents a 25 percent increase in the total incidents compared to 2014. According to a statement, the agencies believes that “armed robbery and maritime crime continues to surge in Asia”. Of the 161 reported incidents, ReCAAP classifies 150 as armed robbery and the remaining 11 as piracy. Crewmembers were unharmed in 83 percent of incidents. ReCAAP defines 92 of them as category four (CAT 4) incidents, which involve one to three perpetrators who were not reported to be armed and escaped empty-handed upon being sighted. The majority of the CAT 4 incidents involved ships in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Straits (SOMS). ReCAAP also states that CAT 1 incidents, which involve nine or more armed pirates that successfully hijack a vessel or steal cargoes, continues to be a pressing issue. There have been 11 CAT 1 this year all of which involved the hijacking of oil tankers.
While there are some subtle differences in the reports from the two agencies, we can see a common upward trend. Backing up the main thrust of the figures, one intelligence provider reported that in the first nine months of 2015 they saw incidents reported across Southeast Asia rise by 38% when compared to the same period in 2014. The same source stated its fears that pirates were acting with “apparent impunity” in the region. Something which is perhaps even more worrying as historically the final quarter of the year usually contains the highest levels of attacks, boardings and robberies. GENERATING A RESPONSE There have been clear warnings that vessels should take all necessary measures to protect themselves, and should avoid complacency. While vessels are asked to respond appropriately, there is a growing emphasis on littoral States to act. Naturally different nations have diverse ways of dealing with piracy and even the perceptions of piracy problems. For the Malaysians they have decided to act proactively on security. While in Indonesia the government is concerned that the vast majority of attacks are actually fraudulent. For its side, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) is set to deploy commandos from MMEA’s Special Task and Rescue (Star) onboard government-linked companies’ cargo vessels in Malaysian waters. The deployment of troops will be made based on threat assessment analysis, and the teams will consist of at least four armed commandos.
COMMON PATTERNS REPORTS OF FRAUD Both ReCAAP and the IMB found common patterns, with pirates typically striking at night to use the cover of darkness. It is also common for pirates to board more than one vessel per-day especially if they are unsuccessful on another ship.
While across in Indonesia there were similar levels of concern about the level of piracy, but focused on what they considered to be the excessive levels of faked attacks.
There was also a strong feeling that the majority of incidents related to illegal oil bunkering. With vessels arranging illicit ship-to-ship (STS) transfers without paying the proper fees and avoid the designated areas. There have been claims that Singapore-flagged and owned vessels have been bunkering with their AIS shut off to avoid identification.
According to the Indonesian Navy, they are frequently confronted with bogus piracy reports in the Malacca Strait. The commander of the Navy’s Western Fleet, Rear Admiral Achmad Taufiqoerrochman stated that as many as 90 percent of piracy cases in the area were filed with “ulterior motives”, mostly related to insurance claims and competition.
That such an astonishing percentage of attacks could be fraudulent or fabricated is something of great concern. The Admiral went on to state the belief the reports are part of a plot to, “make the Malacca Strait the most dangerous strait in the world”.
piracy reporting centres and ships to utilise the same category system which will simplify all future reports. By doing this it is hoped a more accurate picture of piracy events will be captured,’ explained Philip Tinsley, BIMCO’s security manager.
Just as reports of attacks are hard to come by, accessing data about faked attacks is even harder – so there is a degree of scepticism in some quarters as to the 90% figure.
‘It is hoped that the document will be released by the end of 2015, once it has received industry approval.’
STANDARDISED REPORTING What this does highlight, however, is the need for a more standardised approach to reporting and data analysis. In response to long standing calls for a unified approach, shipowners organisation the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) has announced it is set to unveil a new reporting code designed to eliminate inconsistencies that currently produce significant differences in global statistics for piracy and hijackings. The criteria for recording incidents ranging from hijackings to attempted thefts currently varies for several of the organisations that report and collate statistics portraying the state of the problem worldwide. The variation is particularly acute in South East Asia where recent publication of maritime crime figures has led to organisations producing conspicuously different views on the true scale of the problem. NEW GUIDELINES BIMCO is working on a set of guidelines which will aim to standardise the categories of piracy and armed robbery at sea. ‘Once completed we will be asking all
The different criteria governing the reporting of maritime crime incidents has made the true picture and trends in SE Asia difficult to assess, and it is hoped that by gathering universally accepted and recognised data then the analysis will produce a more reflective picture of the state of play with regards to piracy. PIRATE NETWORKS Another important report to emerge recently was on the make-up of the piracy network in SE Asia. According to analysis by another intelligence provider there are 18 pirate networks accounted for and 65 upper-tier players have been identified. The report author states that “upper-tier players” consist of fixers (middlemen), boarding team leaders, recruiters, forgers, so-called ‘big bosses’, and buyers. Boarding team ‘foot soldiers’ as well as the insiders that supply information are not included in this list as it would triple if not quadruple it. Additionally, it is believed that ten phantom tankers have been identified within the region that are used for hijacking operations as well as three pirate mother ships, five suspected phantom ships and two go-fast boats. Knowing more about the pirates gangs should hopefully make a difference in countering them. PAGE 7
Caribbean Piracy While SE Asia has been the primary focus of most piracy reports in recent months, there are other areas in which the problems still pervade. West and East Africa may have seen dips in the volume of attacks, but one hot spot which is not usually synonymous with pirates has been the number, frequency and indeed ferociousness of attacks rise. This is the Caribbean, and more especially off Trinidad and Tobago and the South American coast. The issue of piracy along the maritime borders between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela has escalated to such levels this year that is has become subject to discussion amongst the island’s Cabinet officials and Venezuelan state authorities. Maritime boundary security and the related issues of piracy have become an important diplomatic focus, and there have been ongoing efforts to revive a highlevel consultative mechanism that had been established between both nation states, but which had fallen away in recent years. Part of the discussions have been on establishing regulations in relation to what happens at sea and how the nations should monitor their respective maritime borders. Regionally the issue has perhaps been clouded by territorial disputes, with Venezuela and Guyana at odds in relation to a boundary dispute in waters off their respective coasts. Interestingly this rather enforces academic views of piracy, as territorial disputes and complexity are often seen as one of the pillars of piracy – along with economic disparity and instability. The problem of piracy has been growing in the region of late and there have been a spate of attacks and even deaths, the most recently saw armed Spanish-speaking pirates attack Trinidadian fishermen last month. While in July, two fishermen were kidnapped, the search for their abductors led Venezuelan authorities to kill five pirates in August. A ransom demand had been made for the two kidnapped fishermen, whose fates remain unknown. Some experts believe it possible that a “pirate industry” has developed in Venezuela, with attackers seeking to earn income through opportunistic attacks at sea. Though the Trinidadian authorities are trying to steer clear of expressing their concerns too vocally, they have been keen to tie attacks to just one gang, which means they can play down the idea of a new “pirate industry” springing up.
In the meantime while political efforts continue, the Trinidad Government has reportedly acquired equipment to deal with border patrols, however there is more which still needs to be done according to local observers. Another maritime security issue which is very much a hot topic in the Caribbean region is that of “petty theft”, which is something that belies its rather misleading name, and is a precursor to more serious security issues. One senior maritime industry commentator, and former head of security with BIMCO recently claimed that even perceived small failings of maritime security and of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code can hint at much bigger problems. While not speaking about the Caribbean issue in specific terms, Thomas Timlen, believes the industry needs to stop using the term “petty theft”. Downplaying breaches of international maritime security measures can have globally catastrophic consequences. With an increasing number of people and organisations referring to unauthorised intrusions on board merchant ships as “petty incidents”, it seems that the concerns that lead up to the implementation of the ISPS Code may have vanished. Naturally the word ‘petty’ is an adjective used for events or things of little importance, and this is most definitely not the case when criminals board a vessel – whatever weapons they may carry, or whatever their target. According to Timlen, thefts from vessels should not be deemed trivial - they are boardings and should be treated as such. So with calls for a unified reporting agency, increasing levels of problems in seas such as the Caribbean, and a need for enhanced definitions, it seems that a real shake up of the maritime security landscape is necessary – but there are fears that such changes are unlikely. The reliance on some lesser form of catch-all term is something which politicians are fond of, and so it is even more important that problems are faced and not whitewashed.
South African Stowaways Change Stowaways remain a Master and shipowner’s worst nightmare, but they also affect insurers too. In light of this, and in order to try and mitigate problems for their member shipowners, P&I Clubs Gard and Steamship Mutual both recently issued important updates on changes to immigration procedures in South Africa, and the pressing matter of stowaway risk exposure which owners are facing. According to the Clubs, the South African Department of Home Affairs has implemented a stricter approach to the definition of a ‘trespasser’ as opposed to ‘stowaway’. This seemingly subtle change has actually resulted in increased repatriation costs, and therefore increased risk exposure for shipowners and their P&I clubs. SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH Until very recently when unauthorised persons were found on board a vessel in a South African port, either during the course of cargo operations or as the result of a pre-departure stowaway search, such individuals were categorised as “trespassers”. The significance of this categorisation was that the port would be responsible for dealing with those individuals once their presence was notified and they were handed over to port security. However, a review of three recent incidents by P&I Associates indicates that the local immigration authorities are now taking a different approach. On being called to the vessel to deal with unauthorised persons found onboard, any individuals found are now being declared to be stowaways rather than trespassers. This change in perspective and definition means that responsibility for the costs of dealing with and repatriating the “stowaways” rests with the vessel not the port. There are today a large number of illegal immigrants in South Africa and many of these work in South African ports as casual labour. The policy generally applied by South African Port Authorities is to impose an obligation on the crew to check identities, especially as concealment amongst port workers is a favoured technique of accessing vessels.
If any individual boarding the vessel, and this includes stevedores, agents, ship chandlers, cleaners, immigration, ship repairers and contractors, should be found not to have such a permit then the person should be denied access, taken to the bottom of the gangway and port security called. The port authority, as the landlord will have the person detained and charged as a trespasser on their property. Under the new approach being adopted by immigration, unauthorised persons found onboard will be regarded as stowaways with adverse financial implications for the ship, unless it can be proved that they boarded the vessel in the South African port and the vessel has evidence to support that allegation. This is proving to be less easy to establish than might be anticipated since the immigration authorities are tending to avoid recording any admissions by the stowaways themselves. OWNERS NEED TO ACT Consequently owners are strongly recommended to instruct the Masters of their ships calling at South African ports, and particularly Durban, to ensure that a diligent gangway watch is maintained to ensure that all personnel boarding the vessel are carrying a valid Transnet permit. The latest data, analysis and statistics on stowaways from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) perhaps sets the scene for these new concerns. According to the IMO, during 2014 a total of 61 stowaway incidents reported involving 120 individuals. Cape Town and Lagos were the most common ports of embarkation. Africa answers for 81% of the total of cases and the most common type of known stowaway nationalities were Nigerian, Ghanaian and Tanzanian. While according to the Swedish P&I Club, the average cost for a stowaway case is USD 38,500 although the costs for one case can escalate to several hundreds of thousands of dollars depending on the legal and practical difficulties to repatriate the stowaway concerned.
According to the Clubs, interviews with a number of stowaways has revealed that they have usually boarded the vessels with stevedores and cleaners and clearly had the intention of stowing away on the ships concerned. LOCAL AUTHORITIES As such, the local immigration authorities have now advised that the obligation rests with the vessel to ensure that only authorised persons are allowed onboard, and that it is the duty of the gangway watch to check that each person coming onboard holds a valid “Transnet” permit.
Changes to the High Risk Area may be a high risk strategy In an article first published in Lloyd’s List on 8th October 2015, SAMI CEO Peter Cook examines changes to the size and shape of the high risk area in the northwest Indian Ocean proposed by the Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
resources and their political masters lacked the desire to commit more resources.
The coastal states have been applying significant pressure on the shipping industry to reduce this massive area to something more reflective of the current situation. Piracy in the Indian Ocean has dropped to an all-time low; the last large commercial vessel to be hijacked was in May 2012. But is it too early? How can we tell whether such a change will reflect the reduction in attacks or trigger a return to piracy?
The shipping industry was forced to find something else to protect their ships, crews and cargoes; and private maritime security met that demand. The use of armed teams embarked on vessels reached its peak in 2011 and the last successful hijacking of a large commercial ship was the Smyrni, in May 2012. The private maritime security companies were the third factor that tipped the balance away from the pirate back to the shipowner.
When piracy off the coast of Somalia was at its peak, almost every nation told the shipping industry that piracy was an industry problem and it should deal with piracy itself. Nobody wanted to take responsibility, as they didn’t think it was threatening their national infrastructure.
Today there are more teams embarked on ships than ever before; the shipping associations and EU Navfor agree that 35%-40% of vessels transiting the HRA have armed teams embarked. As a former commander of EU Navfor, Vice-Admiral Duncan Potts, said on several occasions, “armed guards have a 100% success rate” and his chief of staff told a conference in Hamburg in 2012 that armed teams on vessels are “part of the solution, not part of the problem”.
Consequently, in September 2009 the shipping industry drafted the first Best Management Practice, which was published by the International Maritime Organization as MSC Circular 1335; this was quickly overtaken by BMP 2, then BMP 3 introduced the new term High Risk Area. Then came BMP 4 in August 2011. Each version was more comprehensive, with the current version including sections on citadels and the use of armed guards. The important point is that BMP was written by the shipping industry for the shipping industry and designating the HRA was a critical element of the industry’s response to being told piracy was an industry problem. Despite the growing adoption of the BMP by shipowners, these measures alone were insufficient to deter a resourceful pirate with very little to lose. While there was unprecedented co-operation between the navies during this time, they lacked ships. A mathematician calculated there would need to be more than 80 warships in the HRA to dominate the area, but the navies didn’t have the
The risk versus return equation for the pirates was well in their favour, and they knew it. In 2011, at the peak of piracy off Somalia, there were 237 piracy incidents reported, 28 vessels were hijacked and over 700 seafarers were held hostage.
Critical Fourth Element Denial of freedom to commit piracy on the high seas in the HRA is dependent on three interdependent elements; naval forces, BMP 4 and embarked armed guards. There is however a critical fourth element; the situation ashore. People don’t live at sea, they live on land and, if the conditions ashore don’t allow them to make a living, they will turn to the sea. Despite efforts to improve conditions in Somalia it remains a dangerous, lawless failed state which is not attracting any new industry or employment. Additionally there are reports from agencies such as Securing Somali Fisheries that rampant illegal fishing has returned to Somali waters, which was one of the original reason for contemporary piracy starting in 2005.
Book Review by Dirk Siebels Aviation & Maritime Security Intelligence by Hassan M. Eltaher
The coastal states of the HRA want the area to be reduced in size to reflect the current piracy situation; they have argued fervently at the CGPCS and placed enormous political pressure on the shipping associations for the area to be smaller and the boundaries moved away from their coastlines. The latest threat assessment by the naval forces stated that piracy was at a very low level but warned that the piracy networks are “dormant” and “not dismantled or destroyed”. They also admitted that their intelligence picture ashore was inadequate, making it very difficult to make assessments of future activity. The UN Office for Drugs and Crime has conducted a number of interviews with imprisoned pirates which revealed two common themes; first, that once released the pirates will return to piracy and second, the thing that scared them most were the warships. What is likely to happen if the HRA is reduced in size? It will send a clear message to the pirates that we think Somali piracy is over. Second, and more important, in my opinion, it will send a very strong signal to the politicians of countries that provide warships that they can bring their vessels home, taking away one of the three interrelated elements that most effectively deters pirates returning to sea. Any resurgence of piracy is unlikely to be immediate because the heavy seas of the monsoon. However, as the monsoon weather recedes in the spring we will see if the pirates return to plunder the seas off the Horn of Africa. Any change in the shape and size of the HRA is going to be the most fundamental change in counter-piracy tactics since pirates started to attack commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden. It is a dangerous gamble prompted by a remarkably effective triumvirate of shipping industry, navies and armed guards. Will it work, or will we see a return to a resurgence of vicious piracy and the merciless taking and holding of innocent seafarers by desperate criminals?
Presented as a 'how to' guide, this book tries to investigate similarities between aviation and maritime security. While the author has worked in both areas and can draw on extensive experience from his work for the Canadian government, the actual overlaps seem to be few and far between. Moreover, security threats to the aviation industry are distinctly different from the maritime industry as described in various case studies scattered throughout the book. The author acknowledges that the original intention was to develop a training programme, the idea of a book was only an afterthought. As a training programme, the content would certainly make much more sense as the ten chapters read like the outline of weekly sessions that could be part of a professional development course. Parts of this publication may indeed be a useful guide for students or professionals trying to get a glimpse into specific aspects of intelligence gathering. Confusingly, useful information is often mixed with personal opinion which can make a lecture in a classroom entertaining but feels out of place in a book aimed at a professional audience. The mix of opinion and fact becomes particularly clear when the author writes about his views on piracy in Somalia. In his opinion, a 'no-sail zone' should have been implemented in the Indian Ocean where a ship that 'does not identify itself satisfactorily' would have been 'destroyed and sunk lock-stock-and-barrel, no questions asked'. While the idea is certainly unique, such a solution would have been unthinkable due to human rights considerations and very practical reasons. Moreover, the separate chapters are lessons more than anything and the link between the aviation and maritime industry is not clearly established. Terrorist threats are the most obvious example. Airlines certainly face a very real threat by terrorists, even though it may often be exaggerated by security agencies to generate funding for their own tasks . In the maritime world, however, the risk of terrorist attacks is very limited and can be reduced to specific vessels and installations. Overall, the best parts of the book are those not influenced by personal opinion. The author provides a good overview on the workings of an intelligence service, on preparedness and intelligence sharing as well as on challenges for analysts. Most other parts may contain some useful aspects but opinion should always be taken with a grain of salt.
Comprehensive survey of Floating Armouries gets underway Olivia Bosch PhD, Project Manager, Floating Armoury Survey
SAMI is conducting a comprehensive survey of floating armouries (FA) operating in the High Risk Area (HRA) of the western Indian Ocean. It was agreed at the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee’s (MSC) Session in June 2015 that more information was needed about the number of FAs in the region, the extent of their use and methods of operation. The Survey is being undertaken on behalf of the Marshall Islands Registry which will report the findings to the MSC 96 session in May 2016.
Floating armouries (FA) are an asset – in the form of vessel-based storage for weapons, ammunition and security related equipment – used by private maritime security companies (PMSCs) in their role to protect merchant shipping from piracy in the western Indian Ocean. Unlike land-based armouries, FAs can be seen as a temporary phenomenon associated with recent efforts to combat piracy in this particular region. Initially with the recognition around 2005 of piracy off the coast of Somalia, the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) was introduced in which merchant ships were protected by a international coalition of navies. As piracy incidents subsequently spread across the western Indian Ocean, the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) established the Voluntary Reporting Area, which the major shipowner associations designated in 2010 as the High Risk Area (HRA). Ships undertook their own antipiracy protective measures, which became the Best Management Practices (BMP), as coastal navies were not in a position or lacked capacity to provide protection to merchant shipping during this period. Commercial shippers increasingly relied on PMSCs who offered and arranged armed protection during transits across the HRA. And as coastal states were concerned about having armouries ashore that might affect local and subregional stability, the concept of FAs was in effect ‘invented’. Floating armouries, also called offshore (logistic) support vessels, are platforms that FA companies either own or charter and onto which PMSCs place their privately-owned (or rented) arms, ammunition and related protective equipment needed to protect merchant shipping transiting the HRA. Vessels typically used as FAs include research ships, offshore tugs, patrol, pilot boats, and anchor handlers; these ships may be classified by the International Association of Classification
Societies (IACS) in compliance with Safetry of LIfe at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. In addition, ships are subject to Port State Control (PSC) inspections in accordance with IMO requirements to ensure they comply with international safety, security and environmental standards and adequate crew living and working conditions. PSC can detain vessels based on deficiencies in these various standards, and the flag State of the vessel is accordingly white, grey or black-listed. Some flag States have due diligence requirements for FA vessel registered owners or charterers who request their flag status, as well as for the vessel operators to assure appropriate licenses or permits for the weapons are in place. Flag States recently used to flag FAs, as published at 31 July
2015 by the UK Government, include Djibouti, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the UAE. Weapons and ammunition aboard the FAs should be properly secured and stored, and with the appropriate trade/export control licenses for the weapons, PMSCs liaise appropriately with FAs to assure tracking, transfer, and related documentation for weapons accountability – a secure ‘supply chain’ process. Usually expected to operate outside territorial waters (12 nautical miles offshore), FAs are currently known to cluster at significant points along major commercial shipping routes in the waters of and adjacent to the HRA, in particular in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and Sri Lanka. FAs use small shuttle crafts or inflatables to come alongside a merchant ship as it enters/leaves the HRA, to quickly transfer arms and ammunition onto/from the merchant vessel for private guards in turn to use to protect the merchant vessel during transit. Such a transfer can take place as quickly as five minutes, but being weatherdependent could take much longer, and should include recording and documentation of the arms and ammunition transferred.
Security of the FAs themselves is thus also important. While they and PMSCs are contributing to addressing piracy in the HRA, if in the future, profit margins decline as commercial shipping considers reducing the need for protection, then continued or improved assurances would seem appropriate so arms are maintained and accounted for. Relations between the PMSC and FAs would be such to assure that the control and handling of arms rests in authorised hands such as complying with ISO 28000. Some companies are known also to comply with ISO 28007 regarding the means to protect their own vessels.
New developments The above may be major components of a framework to assure authorised use and transfer of FA inventories. But currently there is not awareness of the number of FAs in operation, or what policies and good practices they – and their associated PMSCs, ship owner/charterers, and flag States – have in place to assure and account for such weapons inventories. Such accounting however, is considered to be difficult as the various related industry sectors adjust to several new developments. The first is the impact on the need for armed guards in the HRA, Somali piracy having declined from a high rate of incidents in 2011, to no reported successful pirate attacks involving large commercial ships in the past three years.
Secondly, concerns by some coastal States – notably India and Egypt which perceived the delineation of the HRA near their borders to affect their security and economic policies – led to a reduction in the size of the HRA on 8 October 2015 (to take effect 1 December). The main shifts in the HRA size were the movement of the eastern edge of the HRA westward to 65°E; and in the Red Sea, the reduction of the northern edge to 15°N. While the HRA itself is reduced, the UKMTO continues to encourage voluntary reporting by merchant shipping as it transits the previous size area. Thirdly, shipping insurance rates and premiums might change with that uncertainty filtering down to PMSCs and the FAs they use. The Joint War Committee (JWC) of Lloyd’s and the International Underwriting Association (IUA) company markets informs insurance underwriters of premiums for war risk and ‘perils’ such as piracy in addition to normal shipping insurances. Accordingly the JWC has its own “Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Perils” listed risk areas, one of which is almost identical to that of the previous HRA. As the JWC meets quarterly, its December 2015 meeting would be the first after the HRA reduction during which possible changes in the size of their listed area might be considered, and hence possibly a change in any additional premium. There seems to have emerged a possible unintended consequence for shippers’ insurances – if ship owners/charterers had previously received reduced premiums by having armed guards along the HRA transit, then what impact might there be if piracy has become a diminished risk? Reductions of maritime armed escorts in turn implies that FAs could face commercial pressures on profit margins and perhaps use less than good practices regarding accountability of their inventories. And as the nature of piracy and circumstances of coastal States in western Africa and in southeast Asia is increasingly publicised as distinctly different from that of the Indian Ocean, and FAs are not envisaged to widen their operations to those areas, then FAs could be expected to change their business models. In the meantime, while managing what might be considered a decline but not elimination in the number of FAs, the tracking and accountability of their inventories remains essential. For more information about the FA Survey Project, please contact: Olivia Bosch, Project Manager, firstname.lastname@example.org Peter Cook, CEO SAMI and Project Executive, email@example.com
INTRODUCING YOUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE RAIL GUARD & SHIP SIDE SHIELD ANTI PIRACY & ANTI BOARDING BARRIER
REPELTM is an anti-piracy Rail Guard to be fitted around the perimeter of a Vessel, over external hand rails and fitted to cover any openings restricting access to unwanted boarders. REPELTM provides protection to the Vessel, Crew and Cargo giving peace of mind to ship owners and operators. REPELTM eliminates the use of roofing ladders and grappling hooks, commonly used by unwanted boarders or hijackers who want to secure a vessel for ransom. REPELTM is primarily supplied as a two piece construction with a Shell and back Panel which may be pre-assembled or uniquely assembled over the hand rails. The unit is further secured to the railing by clamps. REPELTM is available with freeing ports for water runoff. The Shell may be installed without back Panel on Bulwarks, Bridge Wings and other locations where hand rails are not present. Units may be easily removed when access is required for installation of Pilot Ladders and Gangways. No over side access is required for installation or removal of the Rail Guards. REPELTM is manufactured from high end Polymer plastic with incorporated UV protection and is a 100% recyclable material, thus, environmentally friendly. The material is water and chemical resistant making it ideal for this purpose and is durable in adverse weather conditions.
Repel is built to conform to Vessel Handrails manufactured per class society specifications such as ABS 201, DNV 2010, LR 2010 â€œRules for Hand Railsâ€?.
OPEN WATER PANEL PLAIN PANEL
Repel is available for sale or rental to suit your needs.
FOR SALES AND INFORMATION: E: firstname.lastname@example.org W: www.globalshieldtech.org T: +44 (0)1224 784597
Is shipping underestimating the impacts of cyber risks? Potential cyber-attacks have risen to become the third biggest risk for UK businesses, according to the Allianz Risk Barometer 2015. This is a pattern which is repeated across other nations, and while fear of cyber-attack is rising, many firms are still reportedly underestimating the impacts of cyber risks. From the maritime perspective it has become increasingly obvious that the interconnectivity of onboard systems can pose a problem. Smart ships are, alas, vulnerable ships – from a cyber threat perspective. CLASS ADVICE The scale and scope of cyber crimes and threats, and the speed with which they are growing is truly terrifying, and with merchant vessels becoming more reliant on electronic systems the problem is intensifying. The International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) has also expressed grave concerns that the growing reliance on IT – within shipping companies, ports & logistics and offshore hugely increases the exposure to cyber risk. The issues of IT, information, software and cyber security are coming rapidly to the fore across the industry. It is not just insurers who are concerned; the Classification Societies too are beginning to appreciate the fact that transparency of information is changing the world around us.
considerable attention to be given to the configuration of shipboard systems. Both from a physical perspective, but so too in separating critical onboard systems from the outside world. The more complex the vessel it seems the more heightened the risk, and this is why SAMI, working with the International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA) is so keen to tackle the issue and raise awareness. Working together to host an event during London International Shipping Week (LISW) we were able to highlight to our respective members that the risks posed by cyber security failure could be catastrophic. MAJOR PROBLEM The risks posed by cyber threats to shipping are probably the widest problem ever tackled by the industry. There has never really been a threat before which can hit the office ashore and onboard at the same time – or can flow from one to the other with potentially devastating consequences. Historically the shore offices have been isolated from the actual “bad event” – being there to pick up the pieces and manage the effects of whatever can go wrong in the marine adventure. From sinkings, fire, accidents and piracy – the office has always been a protected safe haven from which good decisions can hopefully be taken which assist and support those at sea. INDUSTRY GUIDANCE
Classification Society DNV GL recently stated that new interconnected shipboard cyber challenges are emerging. They are increasingly concerned that all programmable components may be exposed to cyber threats, be they machinery, navigation or communication systems.
With cyber crime however, chaos can break out without borders, hinterland or foreshore – and that is a worry for corporate officers as it is for those on the ship. It is because of the sheer scale and nature of risk that leading shipping organisations will be publishing guidelines on cyber security on board ships.
They believe this to be a real weak spot for shipping, and stated that in 2014, more than 50 cyber security incidents were detected in the Norwegian energy and oil and gas sector alone.
The guidelines are expected to be issued by the Shipping Industry Round Table comprising BIMCO, CLIA, ICS, Intercargo and Intertanko. The aim is to adopt and harmonise guidelines that can be followed globally, in a way similar to Best Practices for Protection against Piracy.
HEALTH CHECKS The recommendation from Class is that “Cybersecurity audits” or “health checks” are a start. With a combination of so-called Hardware In-the-Loop (HIL) and cybersecurity testing, supplemented by selfassessments, third-party assessments, audits, testing and verification. According to Rod Johnson, of law firm Stephenson Harwood, increasing automation onboard is changing the task that it was intended to support. He calls for
These guidelines will be submitted to the next meetings of the IMO’s Facilitation Committee and Maritime Safety Committee in April and May 2016 respectively. The expectation is that the guidelines will make it unnecessary for individual states to impose their own diverse national regulations which will make compliance difficult. Instead the guidelines will be dynamic and more easily and quickly adapt to changes in technology and threats.
PAGE PAGE 15 7
Member News Updates from SAMI’s Global Membership Securewest International Launches STCW95 Course
Gold Standard for Maritime Risk International
Securewest International continues to develop their ongoing portfolio of wide ranging training courses - following the successful launch of the Securewest Maritime Firearms Competency course (MFCC), First Person on Scene (FPOSi) and Online Proficiency in Security Awareness course the company is now delighted to announce the launch of their STCW95 course to add to their portfolio.
Maritime Risk International, based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, has been awarded ISO PAS 28007 as a Private Maritime Security Company providing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel. MRI is the first UAE-headquartered company to be awarded the new industry benchmark, cementing its reputation as the leading provider of high quality reliable Maritime Security in the region.
All individuals who work offshore whether for commercial vessels, superyachts or on offshore platforms are required to hold the International STCW95 certificate as per the Manila Amendments 2010. The course covers all four STCW95 modules (Paragraph 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4) and can be booked as a package or individual models. The course modules consist of: 1. Personal Sea Survival Techniques 2. Fire Prevention and Fire Fighting 3. Elementary First Aid 4. Personal Safety and Social Responsibilities The Securewest Training Team looks forward to taking candidates through the educational course. For further information on Securewest and their training courses visit www.securewest.com
New Members Global One Security Services Sdn Bhd www.g1pmsc.com
Maritime Risk Solutions www.maritimerisksolutions.com
Global Shieldtech Limited www.globalshieldtech.org
Scope Maritime Solutions www.scope-maritime-solutions.com
Known as the ‘Gold Standard’ in Maritime Security, ISO PAS 28007 was introduced in December 2012 in a bid to raise standards and streamline processes for all Maritime Security providers. Achieving full compliance requires a three stage full forensic audit of all operations within the firm, ensuring that best practices are followed in every facet of the maritime security business. It was brought in to instill clients looking to enlist the services of Maritime Security businesses with the absolute confidence that their chosen provider maintains the latest industry best practices. Andy Michael, Commercial Director of Maritime Risk International said “The ISO is truly the ‘Gold Standard’ in our industry and we’re proud to have it. It recognizes our solid structure and our flawless security management framework. With our headquarters in the UAE we are close to the High Risk Area and ideally placed to deploy teams at short notice. Having the ISO only highlights why we are the go-to provider for so many of the world’s top shipping organizations. As well as our SAMI and ICoC memberships, this award complements our existing portfolio of ISOs, Flag State approvals and BIMCO compliant contracts and operations.” Michael continued “The changes in HRA boundaries are set to sharpen the focus on the service provision process. It’s more important than ever that providers are properly regulated. Using a firm with this latest ISO gives shippers the confidence that their vessel is secure in the hands of a professional, licensed, reliable, well equipped and fully insured company.” www.maritimeriskinternational.com
Secure Fisheries Launches its Report on Sustaining Somali Fisheries Secure Fisheries is a programme of the One Earth Future Foundation, and was developed as part of Oceans Beyond Piracy’s work to facilitate public-private partnerships and promote maritime governance. Secure Fisheries was created to bridge the gap between security efforts at sea and stability and prosperity on land and aims to support Somalis in the sustainable management of their fisheries resources. On 16th September 2015, Secure Fisheries launched its report “Securing Somali Fisheries” at an event at Bloomsbury House in London. After opening remarks by Robert Mazurek, the Report was presented by Dr. Sarah Glazer, both of Secure Fisheries. The launch attracted a broad spectrum of interest and was followed by a panel discussion, which generated much comment and debate. SAMI will be following up the Report with an in depth look at Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing in future editions of “the Bridge”, but in the meantime below is a summary of the opportunities. Secure Fisheries’ analysis of the sustainability and economic importance of Somali fisheries, coupled with conversations with Somali fishers, fisheries authorities, entrepreneurs, and fisheries experts supports the following proposals for achieving three goals that will responsibly develop Somali fisheries: Goal 1 – Developing Policies and Structures to Combat IUU Fishing 1.1 Form consensus on foreign vessel licensing and revenue sharing schemes, and invest funds in the Somali fishing sector. 1.2 Develop monitoring, control, and surveillance capacity for the domestic and foreign licensed fleets by finalising a Fisheries Monitoring Centre and requiring Vessel Monitoring Systems on all foreign licensed vessels and on semi-industrial and industrial fishing vessels. 1.3 Require landing certificates and procedures that increase the traceability of fish caught in Somali waters. 1.4 Ratify and implement the Port State Measures Agreement. 1.5 Actively participate in the IOTC management process, including mandatory data reporting, compliance with Conservation and Management Measures and participation at meetings. Goal 2 – Building a Foundation for Sustainable Fisheries Management
2.1 Expand efforts to collect fisheries data, including reporting from domestic and foreign fishing vessels, landing site data collection and sampling programmes, logbook systems for large vessels, fisheries observer programmes, and communication of data collection and analysis to fishery stakeholders. 2.2 Disseminate the Somali Fisheries Law put forth by the Federal Government of Somalia. 2.3 Continue and advance fisheries infrastructure development projects. 2.4 Develop new and comprehensive fisheries regulations that advance the goals for fisheries management established by Somali law. 2.5 Prioritise species or stocks for which management plans should be developed. 2.6 Consider the implementation of Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries programmes for coastal and demersal species. 2.7 Encourage coordination between federal and regional fisheries authorities in support of a unified Federal Somali Fisheries Authority. 2.8 Implement the provision of the Somali Fisheries Law that bans bottom trawling in Somali waters. Goal 3 – An International Call to Action to Stop Illegal and Destructive Foreign Fishing 3.1 Require flag-states to compel registered vessels to comply with Somali legislation and enforce sanctions when violated. 3.2 Support data and information sharing initiatives and identify vessels fishing in Somali waters without licences or using destructive fishing practices. 3.3
Increase import restrictions on IUU fish.
3.4 Enforce inspections of all vessels fishing in Somali waters but landing catch outside Somalia. 3.5 Hold owners responsible for the actions of their vessels, even if flagged to a different nation. 3.6 Support Indian Ocean regional agreements to end IUU fishing throughout the Indian Ocean that increases the use of Automatic Identification Systems on fishing vessels, strengthen the regional coordination of law enforcement and prosecutorial actions against fisheries crime, and adopt mandatory, unique, and permanent ship identification numbers. The full Report is available on the Secure Fisheries website (http://securefisheries.org/report/securingsomali-fisheries) and Dr. Sarah Glaser (sglaser@ securefisheries.org) would welcome any comments or questions from interested parties. This article is reproduced from material provided at the Report’s launch, courtesy of Secure Fisheries, and the One Earth Future Foundation. PAGE 17
Maritime Matters Missing Seafarers Reporting Programme Fully Mobile Enabled Human Rights at Sea has announced that its ‘Missing Seafarers Reporting Programme’ online platform is now fully mobile enabled for all smart phones, tablets and mobile devices. This facility is a requirement for keeping pace with technological advances and online use for ensuring that the Programme can be easily accessible from mobile devices. This will allow a greater ability for immediate reporting of missing seafarers and fishermen globally. Built by CData Ltd, Director Mike Robinson said: “In the age of mobile communications, it is vital that websites are not only usable on desktops and laptops, but on smaller screens too. Using the latest web technology we were able to build from the bottom up, a responsive layout design for the Missing Seafarers Reporting Programme that is specifically written for mobiles and tablets without the need of additional scripts and forwarding that may have an impact on existing site performance. In adapting the design and content for use on a mobile device, users are now able to visit https://www. missingseafarers.org no matter what device they are using, to submit reports, update reports and browse the database with ease”. CEO of Human Rights at Sea, David Hammond, commented: “Supported by international donors led by Seafarers UK, we have been able to take this concept from paper to reality.
The technical build of the Programme has been necessary to assure a secure platform that can handle and manipulate the reports and evidence submitted. By making the platform fully mobile, we are now able to expand the accessibility for submission of reports to everyone with a mobile device, wherever in the world they may be.” Commodore Barry Bryant, Director General of Seafarers UK, said: “Seafarers UK is very pleased to have been able to fund and support the development of the Missing Seafarers Reporting Programme (MSRP) thus far. The technical development of a mobile version of the programme’s Missing Seafarers’ Register is very welcome, and is in keeping with such a fluid and versatile workforce. Hopefully this will now aid the loved ones of missing seafarers in uploading information and documents more quickly and easily than before, and Human Rights at Sea, as it continues with its key aim of building an accurate international database of the status of seafarers missing at sea. The Vision of the Missing Seafarers Reporting Programme is to primarily support seafarers, fishermen and their families by the registration of seafarers and fishermen missing at sea through a secure, independent and international on-line platform. That platform is known as the ‘Missing Seafarers Register’ (“the Register”). The Aim of the ‘Missing Seafarers Reporting Programme’ through the use of the ‘Missing Seafarers Register’ is to build an accurate international database of the status of seafarers and fishermen missing at sea on a global basis. www.missingseafarers.org
SAMI Supports London Poppy Day
The SAMI task was the Thames Clippers, we deployed the team from Tower Hill pier for the morning “rush hour” and after free coffee from Starbucks we converged on offices and bustling streets to increase our yield.
SAMI again supported London Poppy Day this year by working with the Royal British Legion (RBL), and serving personnel to conduct a surge operation across the capital, the aim being to encourage commuters, visitors and tourists to donate as much as possible and wear a poppy with pride.
After the evening rush the team re-grouped and we meandered back to the festivities at Leadenhall Market via a couple of pubs where the uniformed sailors had particular success helping Londoners to “lose pounds” for the RBL.
The group (including the SAMI team) of retired and serving personnel gathered at Leadenhall Market by the Lloyd’s Building at 6am on a mild October morning to receive final instructions, collect buckets, poppies and “poppy bling” before setting off on our mission. PAGE 18
The SAMI team collected over £3,800 and LPD made over £884K for the RBL. SAMI would like to thank MBNA Thames Clippers, the cafes on board for unending refreshments, the sailors, marines and retirees for all their help in making LPD 2015 such a successful and enjoyable day.
Seafarer Assistance Card Scheme Launched Specialist marine insurance intermediary Seacurus has launched a Seafarer Assistance Card scheme to enable seafarers to check for cover and provide timely notification of claims under the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006). The cards are personal to the seafarer and are issued by the crewing company when seafarers take up their first position at sea. Seacurus managing director Thomas Brown says, “Under the soon-to-be implemented MLC 2006 amendments, each MLC-compliant vessel will be required to carry a certificate of financial responsibility which provides seafarers with details of the financial protection which the owners have put in place, as well as the details of who to call in the event of a claim. “The same is not true for crewing companies which, as policy holders, keep the master policy in their office, and evidence of cover is not readily available to the seafarers it serves to protect. In the interests of transparency, we felt it important that seafarers had their own evidence of cover, coupled with user-friendly direct access to the underlying security. “Time is often of the essence. This is where the Seafarer Assistance Cards perform a vital function. They provide the seafarer with access to the CrewSEACURE web portal to check for cover and help them provide timely notification of claims.” Seacurus manages the financial security requirements for an ever-increasing number of
seafarer recruitment & placement services and crew management companies. Thomas Brown says, “We are seeing a number of referrals from flag state inspectors when crewing companies apply for their MLC approvals. Leading the way with respect to MLC compliance for crew companies are the UK MCA and Transport Canada, both flag state administrations which require crewing companies operating within their jurisdictions to demonstrate that they have in place a system of financial security to comply with MLC2006 Reg. 1.4 which safeguards the financial interests of the seafarers that such companies place at sea. “Seacurus has evolved its CrewSEACURE product range and developed variant wordings to meet these requirements. If MLC 2006 is to fulfil its promise as a seafarers’ bill of rights, it needs the support of products and services which deliver on the intent of the convention.” Full details of the newly developed web portal can be found at www.crewseacure.com
AFFILIATES Making Maritime Business Happen AFEX www.afex.com
Ellis Clowes www.ellisclowes.com
ATP Instone www.atpi.com
Kanoo Shipping www.kanooshipping.com
Austral Maritime Services
Sec-Ex www.sec-ex.com PAGE 19
Bridging the Gap Opportunities We welcome both new members and partners to work with SAMI in positively progressing maritime security issues. We believe in the importance of engagement, communication and dispelling the fog of confusion which has occasionally surrounded maritime security. We can all work together on an international industry basis to drive the improvement, clarity and positivity needed to safeguard seafarers, cargoes, ships and trade from the many security challenges facing them.
- Membership Membership in SAMI offers numerous benefits and seeks to keep members on top of important, ever-changing issues, trends and legislation within the rapidly evolving marketplace. We work hard to ensure that membership in SAMI projects a positive image of the industry to your clients – the shipping industry – and that membership indicates business initiative and engagement, and demonstrates a commitment to staying abreast of current developments in the market, while leading advances beyond it. SAMI’s membership is made up of international maritime security providers as well as equipment, technology and hardware providers exploring technical security solutions. In joining SAMI private maritime security companies (PMSCs) and suppliers to the industry are in the vanguard of the very best maritime security providers in the business. SAMI’s online directory provides an excellent promotional opportunity for member companies to share their credentials and services with ship owners, ship managers, charterers, flag States and marine insurers looking for security solutions.
- Affiliates SAMI Affiliates are preferred providers of business services to benefit the Association and its members. Companies wishing to work with SAMI will benefit internationally from the exposure and this will be a platform by which the organisation can engage with the maritime security industry and associated partners for the benefit of their business.
- Partnerships Since SAMI’s inception the Association has played a key role in providing detailed maritime security input to the international shipping industry. The Association has excellent working relationships with a range of leading intergovernmental organisations, both in a flag State administration sense, and also with a wider military, security and defence focus. Through industry, technology, academic, charitable and media partnerships SAMI continues to collaborate on a broad spectrum of maritime security issues. SAMI works in close collaboration with IMCA, the Nautical Institute and with the NGO Oceans Beyond Piracy who provide a unique report on the cost of piracy to the shipping industry and the local communities within piracy affected regions.
For more information about working with or joining SAMI: www.seasecurity.org / e: email@example.com / t: +44 (0)207 788 9505
Want to know more about Maritime Security? Iss ue 3
BRIDGEBRIDGE G SHI PPIN BRI DGI TY AND NG THE SEC URI GAP BET WE EN WE EN GAP BET SEC URI NG THE TY AND BRI DGI SHI PPI
CYBER THREAT S
Y OF S JONES IMAGE COURTES 2012
: 01 .14
Sign up today to receive the latest edition of theBRIDGE direct to your inbox...
Shipping operation under threa s CE IS t from FOR online E crime
TIME TO TE INNOVA
wave the new piracy Tackling African of West
SING HARNES LOGY TECHNO
on bers work e SAMI Mem surveillanc and training
TION SECURIT CONVEN RUM Y FOU CONUND
NDATION t ISO STANDA S MLC affec Implemen How will RDS security? ting the Certifying ard secu maritime right g stand rity and effec legal , safe Developin use of force solutions the maritime tive private rules for security
: RED BY
WATCHS TANDER PROTEC TION
Technolo maritime gy’s answer to piracy
Read more news and in-depth articles from SAMI, it’s Members and Affiliates in the enhanced digital edition of theBRIDGE
Maritime Security issues, updates, news and views from the Security Association for the Maritime Industry