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JULY 2013 VOL. 24, NO. 7 | www.chinaeconomicreview.com

༆৻ັྕাӞ ᇎେ࢔๡ಎ૳฼ූ వᅙվѕऍ

China connected Focus: BUSINESS EDUCATION

2013ฤ7Ꮬఓ


EDITOR’S NOTE | ёᆈ֭ߍ

ಸ᱌⮱͚ప㏼≻⹫ч㘪॓㱶㱂哆अ喤႓㔲‫❵ܧک‬უ倅ጹ౴ϻ̶

JULY 2013 VOL. 24, NO. 7 | www.chinaeconomicreview.com

2013ฤ7Ꮬఓ

Ѻᑄ䛹ᓤᰩ⮱≋㻮‫ࣾܧ‬㻯⚔᱗Გ⮱๔䊸߬喟㟊ߍ਒๔႓⮱ㆠᅁ

䶬eᑄ䛹ᓤᰩ᣽䚿ϧЙࡰ̴̺㺮ѻѝጯ౧⮱߈䛼喠৵҈๔႓⮱⤳ᴒᓤe ᑄ䛹ᓤᰩᠴ‫ܧ‬喑䔅᭜㺮ᅪ䛼ࣾᆂ㏼≻喑᝺㘪Ҭܳ䙺䔽ₒ䊝ा‫ڙ‬Ꭰ喠す̶

༆৻ັྕাӞ

ѺȨ̓⩹᭜Ꭰ⮱ȩ҉㔲ច侙᫜eᑄ䛹ᓤᰩ݆ՎᄩᰶᎼࣾᆂȡ

ᇎେ࢔๡ಎ૳฼ූ వᅙվѕऍ

ౕξ䃎ツȠ๔᪝ᢛহ⼨ߕο㖁⮱ᬣА㗹ᮜ̸喑͚ప⮱⼨ߕο㖁 㑾Ƞ⩢ၽੳߎহο㖁㑾䛾㲺ₐࣾ⩌Ɑ㖇अȡ̶ጕ๡#"5喍⮫ᏓȠ䭬䛹 ጡጡহ㚫䃜喎๔ͫ䔈‫ߕ⼨ۈ‬ο㖁㑾喑ౕ๔᪝ᢛ⮱䊲㏔Ꭰझ̷㘪॓㐚‫ۆ‬ ⺋䄊喤 ᰫ‫܍‬҂ᬣ喑➖㖁㑾ѩͻ䔅⍧̺जࣷȡ㔹Ϸ喑Ąℾ⩌➖㖁㑾ąጟ♣ ᰆ‫ٶ‬ͺ⣝喑➖㖁㑾ϔ͇ᐭ໸ₒ‫ڒ‬๔㻱὎Ꮑ⩕䭣⃢喑ᮧᚔ⹫ࡧȠᮧ㘪უ

China connected Focus: BUSINESS EDUCATION

ᅲȠ䔉⼸ࡨ⫄Ƞ丌৮䔪⏜Ƞᮧ㘪ϑ䕇Ƞ䒓㖁㑾Ƞ⼨ߕᩜЅććₐౕ㲺‫ڒ‬ ϧЙᬒ፥⮱㶐丌Ѽ㵹͸͚ȡ ➖㖁㑾⮱ᴴ۳ჇͶ喑ࢠ䕇䓴Ԏᖜэᙌ䃫ิ喑䃖Ш҂➖৮̻ο㖁㑾



Executive Editor ᓍ‫ܠ‬ Deputy Executive Editor ঃᓍ‫ܠ‬ Editor-at-large ߲‫ཽۈ‬ Associate Editors ‫૷ܠ‬

Liu Chen Philip Liu Graham Earnshaw Brenda Yang, Deng Dan

China Economic Review, English Editor ‫ ૷ܠ‬Jake Spring Staff Writer ᓟষཽ Don Weinland Interns ᓐಯ Jessica Lee Ethan Robertson

 

䔋㐀喑䔈㵹Ԏᖜϑᢏহ䕇䃜喑჋⣝ᮧ㘪ࡃ䃳‫ݘ‬ȠჇѺȠ䌌䍗Ƞ⯾ᣔহノ ⤳ȡ➖➖Ⱕ㖁ጟ䲋⻾႓Ꭸᘠȡ♣㔹喑अ᱙ߍࢶ䔪㉏হᣔ‫ݣ‬䏘ใ͸➖喑ᅞ 㘪Ҭ㏼≻⹫чजᠮ㐚ࣾᆂ喑෋䔈ϧㆨ⮱⺼⹶͵喤

T

he so-called “internet of things” may sound like an odd contrivance, but for those that hate jargon, it’s refreshing

that something actually is exactly what it purports to be: the connection of physical objects with the internet. Certainly, in



Art Editors ගၣ‫ ૷ܠ‬Jason Wong Sales Director ሾ၉ᔐପ Pierre Zolghadri Account Managers ሾ၉ளಯ Allen Xu, Ralph Wang, Lolita Bian, Riikka Koponen Distribution Manager खቲளಯ Seana Liu Publisher ߲‫ۈ‬૦৩ China Economic Review Publishing Address ࢐ᒍ The Plaza Building, 102 Lee High Road London, SE13 5PT, England

some respects, the internet of things is a long way off for China compared to places such as Northern Europe, where phones have long been linked to various household functions. The biggest advancement to date in China has been the advent of mobile wallets, giving Chinese the ability to pay speedily and seamlessly on the internet and in person. Other uses appear to be further off, but investment dollars are already being poured into it. We’ll likely know soon enough whether the internet of things becomes the next big thing.

Room 1801, 18F, Public Bank Centre, 120 Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong ISSN 2073-2570 Hong Kong printer 01 Printing Limited Suite M, 3/F, Tower 3, Kwun Tong Industrial Centre, 448 Kwun Tong Road, Kowloon  ਓস‫އ‬ኯ  Hongkong ሧভ +852 3174 6136 Shanghai ࿟਱ +86 21 5187 9633-811 Editorial Department ‫ ݝ૷ܠ‬letters@chinaeconomicreview.com Sales Department (Ads) ሾ၉‫(ݝ‬ਓস) ads@chinaeconomicreview.com

02

July 2013

JULY 2013 VOL. 25, NO. 7

Ϲಋ෶Ⴝĭ໋ࣤϹಋ෶Ⴝಮ଄ಚ֭ඈ૳࿀फ़ĭ

FOCUS

䃱䃧‫⤰ڕ‬ੳ႓䮏ᵎₐ䲏͡䛺๔ᠾᝅ喑᱗Გः۠λ㜗䏘៲ᒀ⮱᰺ߎ㻿㞟

COMMENTARY GLOBAL BUSINESS EDUCATION MUST SERVE A WIDER RANGE OF INTERESTS IN THE FUTURE

BUSINESS EDUCATION ഍၄ࢥც

ಱ‫ލ‬ಮҊ֬ၣಱ‫ލ‬٢൜ࠏ૊ࣂಎҎࠏҎ‫ْٻ‬ႎ ࠏሏᄣЯॄ୅ೀh෶Ⴝ୅ೀԪำѡћ଄ປĭर ແЯॄҘёಮჼຣӶh໛ᅫᇗ฼֦֭ࠒуԪำ ѡ඲଄ປरᆿಮ૾уh ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THE CONTENT OF THIS PUBLICATION CANNOT BE REPRODUCED IN PART OR IN WHOLE BY ANY PERSON IN ANY JURISDICTION WITHOUT WRITTEN APPROVAL FROM THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER.

The dragon MBA Ӹੋవྣ MBA programs in greater China compete internationally վᇗ߇౽4)(ལପം်‫ࡅݛ‬໿ฃ


ᄬै CONTENT

6

28

ॖෂ৺ူ ᇕೊᆀቤ಍ޭ

16 ቤ਋‫ފ‬

The House View

6 ऻノ⤳ᬣА

8 Behind the curtain

10௡ୡ

Month in Review 12 Newsbriefs

ᓜ౺ Column

14㜗⩞䔶᠖ 20๔䊸߬ 21ᰭສ⮱ᬣА 24̺Ꭰぶ⮱АФ

ॖෂ৺ူ

25

17 Cybersecurity goes mobile 19 Paul French’s diary

30

22 Reading into official corruption

Report

29ℾ⩌➖㖁㑾

26 Easing off the gas

36ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇‫ڕ‬䲏᣽䕌

38 Don’t get too comfortable

40ᄱ䶾䃳‫⮱ݘ‬᭒๖

43 Connect the plots

48⼨ߕᩜЅ䧞ᮜᬍ䭽

45 This little piggy in the US market

July 2013

03


ᄬै CONTENT

43

32

Cover story China connected The “internet of things” is connecting your pocketbook with the world. Connecting your car to your washing machine. Connecting your phone to your microwave.

৛ႊ

46 47 Westward ho! 52 Drafted into service

59‫⳨ݺ‬๔अᅭ 54 The tariff bump

જᄌ

Cover story 32 China connected

62Ⴘ↌হथ侙‫ٶ‬᫄ჹ

54 Q&A

ఘᒦਪ

56 The danger in our bellies

64᪴ࡃ⮱эឬ

Looking at China 65 Spring and autumn

ည૚Ą᯺ᔇᇝᎊ଑ Travel journal 66ϧ̮‫ڡ‬ᬧ

04

July 2013

61

68 The land of children


ழ᜺ࠣ

޲ܽৠ൐օ ξᬣА⮱ノ⤳‫ܳٲ‬䓽⩕γ็⻺᫝‫ڡ‬ឭᱜ ᪴]䅏⺒

܎

᭜ⵁ⾣㺬᫦႓ᱜ⮱႓㔲ᬍ̺ⴒ䖀喑 ϻ̓㏗̸ࡷणᐭ໸喑႓ᱜⵁ⾣

ₐᐼ䔈‫ڒ‬γऻ⣝АͨͶ⮱ᬣА喑䔆⻺႓ᱜ ⮱⊗⒛‫ڤ‬ᰶࣺ䓾⣝Аᒏ᜽ऑ‫⮱ڥ‬Ƞड़㧆⮱ э㐌႓ᱜ㠰ᐼ喑ຯᅩ䛴᣽‫ܧ‬Ą̷ፊጟ㏼₨ ώą喑ᣒⱭࣵᰶ႓㔲᣽‫ܧ‬Ą㞧ᱜጟ㏼₨ ώąȡऻ⣝АͨͶౕਟ႓Ƞ⹫ч႓Ƞ᪴႓ ឦ䃱Ƞ㞧ᱜ႓Ƞᩬ⇨႓ぶ็͗䶳ഌ᣽‫ܧ‬γ 㜗ጞ⮱Ҁ㈨䃧䔝喑ѳ᭜ౕノ⤳႓䶳ഌ喑ࢠ ҬΌᰶᄾ᪝⮱႓㔲᣽‫ܧ‬⣝Аノ⤳⮱㏵㐀喑 ѳ๔็᪝ϧᎣ⇎ᰶᘼ䃳‫ݝ‬⣝Аノ⤳ऺႅ჋ ώ喑ः㔹А͸⮱᭜ऻノ⤳ᬣА⮱‫ݝ‬Გȡ ᜾Й⣝ౕ᝭䄵ࣷ⮱ノ⤳⤳䃧喑̭㝙᭜ ᠴ㺬᫦ノ⤳⤳䃧ȡ҉ͧ̓⩹̷ᰭ‫ڤ‬ᰶ᪴ᬻ

ⰥԎ͚పᰭ㏵㘪์჋⣝ा̓⩹э᧚ノ⤳჋䌢⮱ᷓᘠ

Ꮒ㪡⮱పუ喑̻䗨䓾⮱͑͗పუᬒ᱙হ࢝ ᏓⰥ℁喑͚ప᝭㘪᣽ӈ㐆ノ⤳⤳䃧⮱䉎⡛

ᱜȠ⼨ߕ⻾ឭȠξ䃎ツぶ็⻺᫝‫ڡ‬ឭᱜ喑

Ⱋ⮱ᅞ᭜჋⣝ᝅ⪒᜽ߌ䒙ಸȠ䛺ൾ》ζх

Ხᄾ喑ͦᅩᅁe䰤ᖖহ‫ߠٸ‬ᓤeᄼ΁⇨͑

఍ₑ喑⣝ౕ䔈‫ڒ‬γξノ⤳ᬣАȡ⣝Аノ⤳

߬Ƞ⓭ࣾጒ҉≨߈ȡ

ϧ䘪ౕऱ㜗⮱Ȩノ⤳ᕊᘠटȩ̭Γᄳ͚ప

⮱㏵㐀喑㔹ऻノ⤳ᬣА⮱ፓᲒ喑‫ڣ‬჋̻҉

⩞⊤ᅁ⮱Ąϧࢂव̭ࣹ䊏ąノ⤳὎ᐼ

ノ⤳ᕊᘠ̭ぁፓ䓴喑ຯह叾ᵩᅁౕȨਟ႓

㔲᝭⼝⮱ξノ⤳ᬣАⰥѩȡぁ㔲䃑ͧ喑ξ

ᘠ‫ݝ‬γ⽨Ⰸহ๘⮱䭬ㆠጡ㏼㥒὎ᐼ喑䔆͑

ट䃟⑁ᒂȩ̭Γ͚ᄳ͚పਟ႓ट̭ぁፓ䓴

ノ⤳ᬣА჋䭲̷⼝ͧऻノ⤳ᬣАͧສ喑̭

⻺὎ᐼᰶ̭͗‫ڞ‬ह◦喑ᅞ᭜ᄳ᪡͗㏼㥒Ҁ

̭ᵤȡ

᫦䲏जВহ⣝Аノ⤳ᬣАⰥᄦᏁ喑ओ̭᫦

̺᫚㏳ܳ喑ᒏ᜽̭͗͗⠙⿸⮱㜗䉌⯵μ㏼

䲏जВহξ䃎ツᱧぶắᔢܿܳᐭᲒȡ

㥒Ҁ喑㏱㏴⮱᜽অᰶ䒰๔⮱۠ゃ㜗⩞Ꮣ喑

⣝ౕᰶ㜡߈λⵁ⾣͚పノ⤳ᕊᘠ⮱

06

႓㔲᣽‫ܧ‬᝭䅀⮱͚పᐼノ⤳喑ຯᰫЂᑧȠ

䔆ψᵵҸᕨ㐀䊤Გᰶ̶͗➦◦喟ᰶ⌞

᣽Վ็ߠ็ᓄ⮱‫ڙ‬Ꭰ㫗䚙Ҁ㈨ȡѳ᭜䔆͑

᜽͚㠞ぶϧ喑ᄦλ䔆⻺᣽∂喑ぁ㔲Ꭳ̺䊋

䖰⮱͚పऑАノ⤳ਟ႓ᕊᘠȠ‫ٵ‬䔈⮱㺬᫦

⻺᫦ᐼ䔅᭜ᰶψ̺ह喑䭬ㆠጡӔ䛺ౕノ⤳

ह喑ѳᄦλ᝭䅀⮱͚పノ⤳὎ᐼ݆ᰶ᝭Ԋ

ノ⤳⤳䃧হᲝ‫⮱ܧ‬ノ⤳჋䌢喑䔆̶◦Ό᭜

ч䃎̷喑᝭䔪Ⅿ⮱ࢂѺᬣ䬡ᵥツ‫ݣ‬Ꮣ̺ϲ

⪆ȡᎡ䊤喑⩞䛾㲣䒜У㦐θчͨፚᒽ

͚పᲝ‫ܧ‬ノ⤳὎ᐼ᝭ᣕሴ⮱̶㻿὎ಸȡ

䃖䭬ㆠጡ䔪Ⅿ᜽᱙ᰭᄼࡃ喑䔅䔪ⅯࢂѺᬣ

ᄾ᭒Ƞ͚ప⣝Аࡃノ⤳ⵁ⾣чহ̭ψప‫ڲ‬

⊤ᅁ⮱Ąϧࢂव̭ࣹ䊏ąノ⤳὎ᐼ᭜

䬡䭱ߍթ⮱ᰭ๔ࡃ喑䛺ౕ᪡Ҁ᩵⯷喠㔹⊤

㦄ऺੳ႓䮏㖁वࣾ䊤Ą͚పᲝ‫ܧ‬ノ⤳὎ᐼ

ͧγ䔯Ꮑ‫ࡃ⤰ڕ‬৮❹ᝅ⪒⮱䰭㺮㔹᣽‫ܧ‬喑

ᅁΌ䛺㻳䉏ߎⰛᴴ̷⮱͇㐖喑ౕ⊤ᅁΌᰶ

Ო‫ܧ‬຃ą喑䔆⻺຃䶦㜡߈λࣾ⣝㷘‫⤰ڕ‬Ю

䔆⻺ノ⤳὎ᐼ᭜Вঅጒহͧ჏ᝤ݈䕍⮱Ф

̶ᑍ㶕ᝅ⪒ᢌ⯷㶕Ƞᬒ⌲㶕হϧࢂ䚙㶕喑

͇᝭ᣒऄহ䃑ज⮱͚పЮ͇ノ⤳὎ᐼ喑⃼

թহ჏ᝤ䉱⎽वౕ̭䊤喑Вঅጒ݈䕍⮱჏

⪆䋠Ю͇‫⋓ݖ‬喑ᡐ์ጯ౧䉦⩕喑⯵μ㜗

Ꭱϻ̷ࡰუЮ͇͚⨱䔶‫࡮ܧ‬უᰭ‫ڤ‬ᰶ͚ప

ᝤФթҀ⣝㜗䏘⮱Фթ喑⃼͗ϧ᜽ͧ㏳ܳ

䉌喑䛺ౕ͗Ҁ᩵⯷ȡ

ノ⤳὎ᐼ⮱Ю͇喑Ꭳ᧝‫ۆ‬ᵵҸ‫❵ܧ‬ȡ

ࢂѺ㏼㥒Ҁ⮱᜽অȡ᣽‫⮱ܧ‬㗹ᮜ᭜‫ࡃ⤰ڕ‬

䓾࡮ᎡᲒ喑͚పᰶψЮ͇㏼䓴‫࡮܍‬Ꭱ

ᰭ䓾‫⮱❵ܧ‬ᵵҸ䯳᭜すρ᱙Ȩξノ⤳

⮱ᠾᝅȠο㖁㑾ᬣА⮱ᱧ䕴̻ᠾᝅȠ㵹͇

ᣏ㉏‫ܧ‬Გ⮱ノ⤳჋䌢Ό䊷Გ䊷ऄ᱙ౝЮ͇

ᬣА喟㼐⴮͚పノ⤳὎ᐼȩ喑ͧ҂ः㜗ξ

͸䬡⮱》ζ⓭◵ぶ็⻺఍㉍ȡᄦλຯ҂अ

უ⮱‫∕ڠ‬喑ຯ⊤ᅁ⮱Ąϧࢂव̭ࣹ䊏ą὎

ノ⤳ᬣА喤ᵦᢛ᱙Γ҉㔲⮱ჇͶ᭜喟ξᬣ

䲖喑⊤ᅁΌ᣽‫ܧ‬γ㜗ጞ⮱अ䲖ᣗ᫪喑ຯअ

ᐼȠࡻͧധ᱙∂Ƞ㖁ᘠ⮱Ąᐧ⤚ၽȠჇᝅ

А䊤⎽λξ䃎ツᱧ喑⎽λВ⹫ϑͧͨ⮱Ԏ

䲖὎ᐼ喑⤳ᔢ‫ٵ‬㵹ȠԿ̶㻿㏱㏴Ҁ㈨Ƞᐧ

⪒Ƞፓ䭌кąЮ͇ノ⤳⤳ᔢぶぶȡぁ㔲Ⱕ

ᖜ㏼≻䔽ₒ䒙ा๔᪝ᢛᬣАহ⼨ߕο㖁㑾

⿸㜗ͨ㏼㥒Ҁ䓽㥒ノ⤳Ҁ㈨Ƞͧϧ᝺᣽

Ԏ͚పᰭ㏵㘪์჋⣝ा̓⩹э᧚ノ⤳჋䌢

ᬣА喑㔹⣝ౕノ⤳὎ᐼ‫ܳٲ‬䓽⩕γ⹫ϑឭ

ӈԊ䯉Ƞᰶⅈడ⮱Ю͇᪴ࡃȡ⊤ᅁअ䲖⮱

⮱ᷓᘠ喑Ό㘪჋⣝ᓤ冮‫⮱⩌ٵٸ‬ᷓᘠȡ

July 2013


㖞ഭր⋍ӊá?ŽË–ц⭟㓿ଡ଼ѝྠր⋍ӊá?Žáą&#x;ŕ¨&#x;ਓŕ¨&#x;Ň€â€ŤŢœâ€Źŕ¨¨ 7KH&RFD &ROD&RPSDQ\ ÇƒÇ‰ŇĄŃ†ÖŁÓŞÇŠ *RQH ZLWKWKH:LQG â˛´ŕ¨ â“€ŕľ ËˆŇ?áą&#x;ä‚Šŕżś áŻ&#x;ĐŹá?łáľ‡ -DPHV%URZQ Çƒĺ‚œĐąĐŹä?&#x;á—§ĐŹä   0DUWLQ/XWKHU.LQJ-U â˛´á­ľŇ‘Ëˆŕ¨ź ᰌᤕᴚц⭟ᴰབྷⲴ≤᯿䞜DŽր⋍ӊá?ŽŇ?ŕ´? ц⭟аâ?ąâ˛´â˘™â?ąŕ¸Şâš°ä‡ŽáŻ­Çƒâ‘™ŕŞźâ˛´â‰„â€ŤŮ‰â€ŹÇƒ ă–žŃ­â˛´áŻľâ‘¨ăœŒŕľ ÇƒŕĄ™ŕ­śâ§&#x;ຳટӪ᥽â?žâ?žă˜ź 䰍਽DŽր⋍ӊá?Žă“żŕ­śáĄ€áľœŐžÇƒâ­?â?ŤŕŤąä?˜ ĺ„ˆËˆâ…’ä—žŃ?ŕ´­â€ŤŢœâ€Źŕ¨¨ŕĄ˝áś•áŁ…ä?´Ç„

ր⋍ӊá?Žá¤•á´šá˘°ăœ­á ¤â&#x;?Çƒăżąŕ˝Šä‡śá’Żâ˛´ŕŞˆ á?•Ç„ŢŚŕŁŁŕŁ˜á?˛ŕľŞá’¤ä–ŤÇƒâ­?Ó—ŕŁ‹ĺ„ˆÇƒáĄ€äŽŻä—ľ ä™?ËˆĐ°ŕĽşÔ•Đşâ˛´ŕŁŁŕŁ˜ŕŁ‹á’¤ĺ–´ÓťŇž ኹѝ䰤DŽր⋍ӊá?Žŕ˝—á†–ÖƒăŒŤáą&#x;ă–žŕ´­á´°á“Žŕ˝— â˛´â€ŤăƒťŢœâ€Źŕ˝—á†–ÖƒăŒŤŃťĐ°Ëˆâ€ŤŢĄâ€Źŕ¤ľŕŠ›áĄ°â€ŤăƒťŢœâ€Ź 䲒ᚑDŽր⋍ӊá?Žâ‡żŃšá†–â­?ŕ¨šăžąĺ„ˆŃ?âˆ…ŃŠáĄ€ ă”™ĺ„ˆŇžá’Łŕľˇŕ śËˆŕŚŁá´šä?´ášŹă§§á—‡+23(ŕž† á†–ä  Ëˆäˆ•ŕž†á†–ä  áą&#x;ഭᇌ䇔ŕ¨&#x;â˛´ä‡‘ŕĄ‚ËˆŃŞ 䈕á?Žâ˛´ÔŤÖ…á†–ä˛’Çƒŕ˝—á†–áĄ†á˘°áľ&#x;ᆖᚑᨀ‍׋‏ ᆖä?Šá¨¤ŕŁ™Ç„ ਟᰌր⋍ӊá?ŽŇ?á”°áŠ…Ňśäşˇŕ¨‡ŕž­ä‡´â˛´ÔąŃŠá˜› ä™?ŕŠ&#x;ŕŁ˜ä‡‘ŕĄ‚Ëˆä˜‰áą&#x;ŕľ˜â€ŤŢ˜â€Źŕ´­á§‚ŕ¨˝ă…œĐ°â˛´ÓŞáĄ˝

ŕ¸ŠŢŤä‡‘ŕĄ‚Ç„äˆ•ä‡‘ŕĄ‚ŃŞáŻ â€ŤŢœŢ¤â€Źŕ¨¨ŕŞźŕźžŕ˝—Ń?Ⲵ â€ŤŢœâ€Źŕ¨¨á¨€â€ŤÝ˝×‹â€Źä?Šâ˛´ă”Źŕ¨¸ÓŞáĄ˝ä€“ߣᯊᚸDŽ 䈕á?Žŕľ˜ă”—ă”?ŕ¨ áŠ…â˛´ŕ¨źá°ŚËˆŇ?㔤᤹⾰䳾㠤Ⲵ â­?â?ŤáŻŠá”żÇƒă–žŃ­â˛´ă šâ?Śâ§&#x;ຳટ䇢れⲴâ­?â?Ť ટá?•ÖŒâ‰‹ŕ´¤Ç„ր⋍ӊá?ŽŕĄ™Ňžă“żŕ­śâ˛´á˜ąŕŁŻÇƒ á†źŕŽ´â˛´â˘™â?ąŕŞźä™Šä‡&#x;ŕ¸Şâš°ä‡ŽáŻ­ËˆÔ•ŕ§şä˜˛á“–â˛´ â­?â?ŤŕŞźă“żŕ­śáĄ€áľœËˆÖŻŃťáĄ€ŃŞâ€ŤŢœâ€Źŕ¨¨Çƒĺ„ˆă‡‘ŕŞź ŕŞˆá?•áĄ€äŽŻâ˛´â¨śáœŁâ§&#x;ຳDŽ Ä€áĄ Ôœá¤•á´šŕ˝Šáš§â˛´ŕľ â¨śâ§&#x;ŕşłËˆŃ á‡źâ˛´ă šâ?Ś ä?´â“€Ô•ŕ§şâ‘™ŕŞźá‡ŒÓŞâ˛´â‰„â€ŤŮ‰â€ŹÇ„áĄ ÔœŢ§ŕźˇá´šŕŁ™ Ňžâ€ŤŢœâ€Źŕ¨¨áĄ€ŕŁ?Ⲵᴰ֣ଡ଼ъâ§&#x;ŕşłËˆá´šŕĄ™â˛´â´ ă‡‘ ŕŞźă€žá­Śă”ƒáś´Ô•ŕ§şá­Żá“ŒÇƒÔąŃŠŕŞźá†–áľ&#x;⭟Ⲵᕪ ŕ˝—ăš„ŕ¨¸Ç„áĄ Ôœá¤•á´šŃ†â­źĐşá´°ă‘ąá˜‰Çƒá´°ĺ„ˆá­¸ â˛´áľŞŕľŞËˆÔ•ŕ§şâ€ŤŢ˜â€Źă–žŕ´­ŕ¨ áŠ…á´°ä—ľä™?Ⲵâ‘&#x;ŕ¨“Ëˆ ä˜‰Ó‹äœ­á´šŕŁ™ŇžŕŠ¨á•…ŕ´­äąľÔąŃŠÇ„áĄ Ôœâ˛´â€ŤŢ˜â€Ź â¨łá–ĄŕŤ˝ŕŁ‹â‡żŕ˝™äœ­ŕľ˜á˘™ŕ˝—Ä á?ŽäŽŻ1DWKDQ 'HDOăş˜â˝ŞÇ„ ⅢҜ䀓㖞ഭր⋍ӊá?Žâ˛´á´¤ŕ˝ŠŘ‘áš&#x;Ëˆäˆ§ŕ¨ â­Ľ 䛞㠣sjacobs@georgia.orgăš„ăŒŤÖ€â‹ŤÓŠ á?Žĺ‚Ťäś‚ዋᣅä?´Ô“ăş˜6HWK-DFREVËˆáĄ†ä‡Żä°ž Georgia.orgÇ„

Georgia, USA: Where the World Does Business Georgia is home and birthplace to the likes of the Coca Cola Company, Gone with the Wind, James Brown, the world’s largest aquarium and Martin Luther King, Jr. Georgia is also known for having a world-class logistics infrastructure, moderate climate, exciting tourism destinations, probusiness environment and talented workforce. With its low cost of doing business and attractive quality of life, Georgia welcomes investment from Chinese companies. Located at the heart of the southeastern United States, one of the fastest growing and most populous regions of the country, companies can reach 80 percent of the U.S. via a two-day drive or a two-hour flight. In Georgia, the world’s busiest, most efficient passenger airport, as well as the fastest-growing port in the U.S., offers global access. Delta Air Lines has multiple one-connection daily flights from Atlanta to Beijing and Shanghai, and the Georgia Ports Authority (GPA) has an established relationship with nine port cities in China. Chinese companies will find Georgia’s business climate thriving and its global community vibrant. More than 75 percent of the Fortune 500 companies

have operations in the capital city of Atlanta and the state is home to 16 Fortune 500 headquarters, the third largest concentration in the U.S. More than 70 international governments have a presence in Georgia, and 3,000 facilities from 60 countries, including China, operate throughout the state. Businesses in Georgia are fueled by skilled and knowledgeable employees. Georgia’s workforce is young, productive and growing rapidly, more than half the population is between ages 20-54. One of the largest public university systems in the U.S., the University System of Georgia, encompasses a total of 31 public colleges and universities. Every student in Georgia who graduates from high school with above average marks is eligible for a HOPE scholarship, a nationally recognized program which provides tuition assistance to any college, university or technical school in the state. Georgia is also home to the acclaimed Georgia Quick Start program, ranked first in the nation for workforce training. Quick Start provides free, comprehensive workforce solutions for new and expanding companies.

The state continues to grow while sustaining a gracious style of living, a beautiful natural setting and a cultured atmosphere for living and working. Georgia is recognized for its business-friendly attitude, logistics and communications infrastructure, and modest costs of living and doing business – the ideal environment for companies, their executives, and their employees to thrive. “We are a diverse state geographically and are blessed with an abundance of natural resources and a temperate climate. We have the right business environment to help make companies successful, favorable regulations and tax structure, and a great consortium of government, business and academic communities. We have the world’s busiest and most efficient airport and the fastest growing port in the U.S., which have helped us attract international businesses. Our global reach is expanding every day,� said Governor Nathan Deal. To learn more about Georgia, USA, contact Seth Jacobs, Georgia’s investment representative based in Qingdao, at sjacobs@georgia.org or visit Georgia.org.

CO-PUBLISHED ARTICLE

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Ń?ŕ´­â€ŤŢœâ€Źŕ¨¨ŐŠŕ¨ â§ Ö€â‹ŤÓŠá?Žâ˛´ŕ­śŃŠâ§&#x;ŕşłâ…“â…“ ŕŠ ăŚ“Ëˆŕ´­äąľŕ˝Šâ€ŤŕĽ†Ýłâ€Źá?˛ŕľŞâ€Ťâ”‘ݾ‏â?ŤŕŁ‹Ç„ᇌ Ń†â­źÓ„â˛Žá•ŞÔąŃŠä˜šá¤™áˆśá™Ťäœ˜ä‡Žŕľ˜Ö€â‹ŤÓŠ á?ŽËˆÖŻäˆ•á?ŽáĄ€ŃŞŃ†â­źÓ„â˛Žá•ŞÔąŃŠŕľ˜ă–žŕ´­â˛´ ă…œĐšŕ˝—äłśŃ?ྠDŽᒌф䎾䗡ⲴӄⲎᕪԹ ŃŠŕľ˜äż†á“ŒÓŠâ˘Šâ€ŤŢ â€Źŕ˝—ä‡Žá´šä˜€ăŠ•â›ŠÇ„ŕ¨–ŕ˝†ËˆäŽľ ä—ˇŃšŕ´­äąľá­Żá“ŒáľŞáś´ŕľ˜Ö€â‹ŤÓŠá?Žä‡Žá´šĺ‚Ť ŕľ Ëˆŕ¤ľá¤œŃ?ŕ´­ŕľ˜Ţľâ˛´њഭᇌⲴ á‡ŚÔąŃŠŕľ˜â€ŤŢ˜â€Źá?Žä˜€ăŠ•Ç„


THE HOUSE VIE W

Behind the curtain China’s crackdown on hot inflows led to cold exports. Get used to it

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conomists and I-bankers have been complaining for months that the China’s export figures have been inflated. But, pulling back the curtain to get a truer picture of exports, they might not like what they see. That’s if trade data released in early June is any indication. Export grew at the slowest pace in a nearly a year in May, rising at shockingly low 1% year-on-year. That’s down from 14.7% growth in April. Slowing growth itself isn’t that surprising. A slowdown had been widely expected, with a consensus economist prediction of only 7.3%, according to Reuters data. Markets were also expecting lackluster trade data as well, contributing to a decline of 3.9% in the Shanghai Composite Index the week leading up to the data announcement. Qinwei Wang, a London-based China economist for Capital Economics, wrote in a note the day before figures were released that exports had been unusually strong in May of 2012, which makes for a tough year-on-year comparison this year. But even looking month-to-month, the numbers also weakened with exports falling to roughly US$183 billion in May from US$187 billion in April. The main reason for the dim expectations was a crackdown in early May on false trade statements. Companies have widely been suspected of inflat-

08

July 2013

ing the value of their exports in order to sneak more money into the country. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) stated on May 5 that it would warn companies if their stated exports were larger than the value of the actual transaction and blacklist them if they could not adequately explain the discrepancy. The crackdown appears to have worked but with the side effect of dragging headline export figures way down. Much of the hot money flowing in was thought to be through Hong Kong, and data specifically on flows between the mainland and the financial center indicate the rules have indeed curbed that illicit activity. Exports to Hong Kong grew only 7.7% in May, compared to 57% in April, as Reuters astutely points out. The fact that the purchasing managers’ index (PMI), an indicator of manufacturing activity, did not presage this drop in exports is also a sign that the fall has more to do with the crackdown on illicit inflows than an actual slowdown in production. In the official data release on June 1, the PMI subindex for new export orders rose to 49.3 in May from 48.4 the year prior. A number below 50 indicates a contracting growth rate, but the rise in the export sub-index nevertheless clashes with the huge slowdown in export growth.

Traders may cringe in the shortterm, but a more accurate reading of trade data is important if it helps economists and policymakers understand the true nature of the slowdown. “Export growth in May confirms our estimates that China’s ‘true’ export growth so far this year could just be [in the] lower single digits,” said Bank of America Merrill Lynch economists in a note today immediately following the data release. In an earlier note, the economists had suggested that the real growth in exports for the first four months of the year was actually 5%, instead of a official 17.3%. Regulators may have been clever in cracking down on the hot inflows when they did. The dates on which economic figures are released are generally announced far in advance. It’s possible Beijing could have foreseen that May figures would be released on a Saturday when the mainland is headed into a five-day holiday for the Dragon Boat Festival. The Shanghai Composite Index dropped by 2.8% when the market reopened, a significant but fairly measured drop compared to the severe export figures. Traders should recognize that more accurate data is a positive sign for the long-term sustainability of the economy, and thus stocks. In other words, traders and investors should brace themselves for more data releases like this in the future.


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р║ар╢╝╦Цре╢╩╢рдП р║ар╢╝рж╝смЯрг╕тАл┌гтАмс╜З(SBOE (BUFXBZ с╜И═о╠ЕсМТ╙зсДЙрежраСр╢╝тАл┌У╫╖тАмс╜ЛрпжсБ┐спнр║а рж╝смЯсм╢тАл╦Ю┌ГтАмсЬ╡ркЕсак╘всКнсА░с╜Лрж│снжсИд═╖╩╣рг░ро┤сЛЪс╜Лрж│ркЕсак╠в╠ар╢ЮргИс╜Лрпж сБ┐тАл┌НтАмсмД╙РсаУр╛м╦Цре╢╟ЛсВАсМЮ╘дтАл█Л▄ИтАм╨╖▀Щр┤Н╟Лс░│р│Бр╣Ч▄░сждрдЖрдп╨ЬраЯ╩╗╦УсоЙсДлс╜Л╨а ╒ОсМ╖╒ЛрйЖсДЙ▄╖тАл█ЛтАмсНл╒ЛржмтАл╠Ц┌а╦Й╫╖тАм╟М рг▒р░дс╜Лс░│сЛЪ╟ЛрбОр║ар╢╝╦Цре╢╘дтАл▄ИтАм╨╖▀Щр┤Нрдзргк╟Мрж│рддсКТснжсИдсг╣ ╩╣рг░ро┤сЛЪ╟МрддсКТсо▓р▓к╥С╙╗с╜ЛсЙаснж╠╛рд║снж╘вр│┐╒Лрйгр╕Бсжа╒ЛсФИрбпсЖВ╘всйПр╝есУг сАЬсБФргктАл▄ЦтАмсКНр▒Ерозр▒Эрддс╜ЛреБсЮ╗╦┐╘дтАл▄ИтАмсДЙрлЯсИС╟Лс░│см╡╘всАЧ╠╝риХ╟Мр╢ЗрдПтАл▄ИтАмр┤НсЭ╣сО╡ сжЙс░│сд│сВВр│Шс╜ЛсдБсЫа╤лрбО╙ЬсЭЯ╤▓с╜ЛсТ╜сдЯржЛрл╕╟М╨осжЙсЬИ╬╜▀╕╨Ъ╬Щр╜▒тАл┌НтАмсмД"сМЮ╥и ╨Ьр┤НсЬИ╬╜р▓Х╤Нс╜Лрк┤р░ер░г╨ОсдИсДЙсЭ╣ро╢╓Ц═ХсбФсДЙ╥и╨Ьр▒Н═Зс╜Л╩╢сбгрйЖ╦Э╦┐режраСр╢╝╦в сТпр╖л╩╝сЬ┤╙отАл┌атАм╙Ь╥и╨Ьр┤Нр▓Хр░┐╦з╩╢╟М тАл┌атАмсиа╩╢╒Б╟Л╦┤╒Б╘в╘Ара▒рдзсдпсДЙ╙а╩╢╒БсМ▓сМ╖рйЖсДЙ╬жрл╕сДЙсв╜сеК╠Усдпс╜Л╦АтАл┌НтАмсмД╙Р сДЙ╥и╨ЬсАЦ▄С╓Цр╛м╦ЙсКнсА░с╜Л╥к╩╝режраСр╢╝тАл┌г╫╖▄▓═Ф┌У╫╖тАм╘всА┐сАпр╗ЧсДлсДЙ╓╡р╛а╦ГсЦ╕рдЖ сйУс╜Л╬Нр║ар╢╝╦Цре╢╘дтАл▄ИтАм╨╖▀Щр┤НрйЖ╦Э╦┐╦ЖсВМ╨ЪсАоржмсб┤тАл┌НтАм╨Ь╒В╘втАл┌НтАм╨осЕ╗╒П▄╖тАл╦Й═М█ЛтАм сДЙспксдд╥и╨Ь╦зтАл┌атАмс╜Л╘й╥Б═Ф▄▓сДЖсоЦ═ВсДЙр╡УсдА╟М═ХсаОсДЙргЙтАл▄е┌гтАмсЭЧс╜ЛсгШ╠╛рж╝смЯтАл╠Ц┌атАм ├╛╘╡сддтАл▌ЭтАмсДЙ╟Л╘╡╧браксДЙ├┐см╢тАл┌ГтАм╙РсА░ржПсДЙрд▓соЦ╩╜с╜ЛсНВсг╛╤Црг▒сДЙсЛ┤ре╢╘жрбШс╜ЛсЬБсЭ┐ ▀┐╦ЭсВАсМЮ╨╖▀Щр┤НсДЙр║ар╢╝╦Цре╢╘дтАл▄ИтАм╨╖▀Щр┤Нс╜ЛтАл▌╝тАмсМ╗╬│рлЖр╗ЧсИЬр┐ГржЦ╟МсФЩр▓к╨ЯсДЛраСсйП сЫа╟Лсг╣риТсО╛ро╢╟Л,"3- 4503; сКН╨ЪсАоржмсб┤тАл┌НтАм╨Ь╒В╘в═Хсж╣сКНтАл┌НтАм╨осЕ╗╒П═М╦ЙргВ ╨Щсп╛╥и╨Ь▄▓рг▒с╜Лрг▓╦Др║ар╢╝╦Цре╢╦АсИЬрйЩро┤рддсЙа╦┐слБр░псДЙсУбтАл▌ЭтАмсДЙсИЬсаз╒Л═║╨бсМЖ╟М р║ар╢╝╦Цре╢╘дтАл▄ИтАм╨╖▀Щр┤НсТмрдзргк╠╛р▒О╩╢сДпсЙасбЫ╠ЕтАл┌НтАмсмД╙Рр▓Х╤Нс╜Л╒УраЖрйЩрмб╬ШтАл┌НтАмсмД сдпсЫасДЙсоЖсМЮ╥и╨Ьр░и╥лс╜Л╘Ьрг▒тАл▄╖┌ЩтАм█╡рдзсЭ╣╦┐рпаргД╨Р╓ЭтАл╫╛тАмс╜Л╠╛╬ШтАл╫╖тАм╥л╠атАлра┤▄втАмри░╟Л ═Ч╥лс╜Л╠мрг▒╠Хр░ер░Э▄▓сО╛раУсО╛соз╓╡р╛а╨Щсп╛с╜Л╠╛тАл▄ШтАм╥кр░и╥л╦ЙржЦ╟Мр░▓р▒Ор░Эра▒╩┐ро▒сдп сг╛раЖрйЩсДЙ╙гсМЮрл░╠╝рмбс░│╥и╨ЬсИЬрйЩсДЙроЮ═│р╢┤рг░с╜Л╤╕сд┤╒Пр╛асРРсм╢роМрдГс╜Лрмб╙гроЮ╦У режраСр╢╝тАл┌атАм╙ЬсДЙсЙг╠Б╥ж╟М


ᐑཥ

ቀ‫ގ‬ ͚㒻ٰ仃ᣏ䃕Ჱᐧ᫝ಸ๔ప‫ڠ‬㈨ పუͨፚ΍䓾Ꭰλᰵᬒ㜠ᬒౕ㒻పߍ ‫⺼ݖ‬ᅩχጋႶ㏠ќᵩᎱచ̻ຒጡ侙ᕨ㐌ͫ 㵹γчᮑȡ͑పٰ仃ᣏ䃕γĄᲱᐧ᫝ಸ๔ ప‫ڠ‬㈨ąぶ䬛䷅ȡࣹ᫦हᘼ‫ࣾܳٲ‬ᡒᝅ⪒ ̻㏼≻ᄦ䄊Ƞੳ䉥㖁༁чȠⰮጋ䪬䃧ಈぶ ᱧ‫⩕҉ݣ‬喑ព๔ౝ᫦㏼䉥व҉喑Ԋᠮౕι ࡮ప䯳ఏহχ๗㏼व㏱㏴ぶ็䓦হౝࡧ㏼ ≻ᵳ᳣̸⮱ࡼ䄰व҉喑Вᄦ䄊व҉⮱᫦ᐼ ໒઱ั⤳㏼䉥ᦖᨓぶぶȡ

㟞ᬄ䄰ѻ͚ప㏼≻෋䕌 㟞ᬄ䯳ఏࣾጰᰭ᫝̭᱌Ȩ‫⤰ڕ‬㏼≻ᆂ᱈̻ ゃ⪒ȩ喑ᄳϷᎡ͚ప㏼≻෋䕌䶱≸ϻࣨᎡ Ꮒ⮱̸䄰㜠喑Ꭳᠴ‫ܧ‬ែ䉱᩵⢴ ᖣࡃぶ఍㉍᭜ᄩ㜡㏼≻෋䪬ᩫᚏ⮱࣌఍ȡ ្ॷहᬣ̷䄰㒻పȠᬒ᱙ぶࣾ䓫㏼≻Ҁ෋ 䕌喑䶱≸ϷᎡ̸ࡷᎡ᫝‫ڡ‬ጯ౧̻ࣾ䓫పუ

͚ప‫ٶ‬мЮ͇㘪॓Ꮣ䓴Ⱪ‫࢞⮱ݺ‬ᱧ

㏼≻෋䕌ጛ䌊ᄳ㑖ᄼȡ ₐౕ䔈㵹⮱ࣹⅴᎣ䉚ᵵȡЃᤡᑂ᪝ᢛ᭫

‫܌‬රი൯ӎ

ౌฑ䛺䛾ᆋ↎ᴀ͒䛺

⹧喑Ꭱ喑͚ప㜗㒻ప䔈ऐ⡗

⌞ౠ‫᠌ࡧ⊤ݺ‬Ꭱែ䉱Ϭ

⣜Ԋ䘕ࣾጰ⮱Ȩ͚పౌฑ⣜ධԊ៑ᩬゃȩ

㖶ܳ‫̴ͧݘ‬ॕȠ̴ॕȠ̴ॕȠ̴

⌞ౠጯᰵᬒₐᐼឦฺ‫⌞⊤ݺ‬⍜⣝А

᭫⹧喑͚పౌฑ↎ᴀ⮱ᕨҀᒏ̺߬ღͽ

ॕ喑ϷᎡᰵ㜗㒻ప䔈ऐ⡗㖶̴ॕȡ

᰺ߎ͇व҉ࡧ㐩व㻱ܿ喑᣽‫ܧ‬Ꭱ‫ڲ‬ែ䉱 Ϭ喑Ꭱ‫ڕ‬䲏ᐧ᜽‫⊤ݺ‬व҉ࡧ

㻯ȡᄦ̴‫ڙ‬䶤ധ᱙‫⩝ۉ‬Ԋ៑ࡧౌฑ៪ ᵤ⯾≸ࣾ⣝喑ᰶ̴‫ڙ‬䶤ౌฑ䛺䛾ᆋ䊲

᫜䄧⮨θУ

ധ⵭䃫᫪喑‫ݝ‬Ꭱ჋⣝ప‫⩌ڲ‬ϔᕨթ

ᴴ喑䊲ᴴ⢴䓫ȡࡻࢄౝࡧ䘕ܳ೻

㒻ప‫ݺ‬ᗲ្ϧঅ᫜䄧⮨ౕᰊ‫࠲ٶ‬᠙ĄḞ

Ϭٰȡ

ጯᰶ⮱㕂ౝ䖚ऄ䩶ȠⵤȠ↋ぶᰶ⃿

䪉ą䶦Ⱋౕ‫ڲ‬㒻పᩬᏉ็͗⼅ჳᗲ្⯾㻳

䛺䛾ᆋহⴠ⇦ㆨᰶᱧ➖↎ᴀ喠䪬↌̶㻿≟

䶦ⰛȡЃౕ仆⍜‫ڙ‬ጰ䃮ᢛ⼝喑㒻పᩬᏉ㑾

⁔Ⰼᄦࡻ‫ٶ‬мЮ͇ᒮࣺի䨭⼻

ౝࡧᰶ⮱೻ጯ䔋❴⮱‫⩝ۉ‬ऄ็⻺䛺䛾ᆋ↎

㐉‫ڒ‬Ӣ͚ప㑾㐉㜠ᄾᰶᎡᬣ䬡喑㒻పᩬᏉ

⁔Ⰼ༁অч䉥ᭀ༁অᓤऑ䊘➦აጰ喑ϻᰵ

ᴀ喑⮱ౌฑധ᱙͔๞⩌ϔ߈ȡ

叾჏ᩨ‫Ⱋ⮱ܨ‬ᴴ䓫‫͗⮫̷ݝ‬ȡ仆⍜➦‫ݘ‬㵹

ᬒ㜠ᰵᬒᄦϔ㜗͚ప⮱‫ٶ‬мϔ৮ᒮᩣ

ᩬࡧᩬᏉλᰵᬒࣾ㶕ฝᬻ⼝‫ڣ‬ጟ⻨ᐭ仆

⮱͡ᬣࣺի䨭⼻喑ₑऻ䄒⼻⢴ᄳࡴ

ឦ۳䒙ധ఍๔䅳䔈ऐᑂ♓㭾

⍜‫ݺ‬ᒭす̶పȡ䦵ᄦ㒻ప᫦䲏⮱ᠴ䉐喑͚

㜠ȡ䞡λₑᵵ⊶͚ࣷప็Ϭ㒻

‫͇ۉ‬䘕ᰵᬒឦ۳γ̶⻺䒙ധ఍๔䅳⮱

పใϑ䘕ࣾ㼭ϧ㺮Ⅿ㒻పĄ⚔⚔䪉ၽノສ

ٰ⮱ᄦ⁔‫ܧ‬ऐ̷ࣷࡰუЮ͇⮱⩌ႅহ็

䔈ऐȡ͚పᬖౕᎡᅞᐭ໸ϻ㒻ప䔈

㜗ጞąȡ

̴ϧᅞ͇喑͚᫦̭Ⱑ঩म䕇䓴ᄦ䄊ⷸੳ㼐 ۠䉥ᭀζ〜ȡ

ऐ䒙ധ఍๔䅳ȡѳᄦ䒙ധ఍ϔ৮⮱䃱ѝ

10

្ॷȠ䃱჎䓴⼸ࢡ᭜̺䔼ᬻ⮱喑ᑂ䊤‫ڙ‬

ᣕߕज‫⩌ں‬㘪⎽‫⩢ࣾ☚ٶ‬

фᲮ๔⮱♓㭾ȡ㚫䃜㑾̭䶦㑾㐉䄰ᴒ᭫

ᢛప‫ڲ‬྿Ҁᑂ䔝ᱰ༮⍍䖀⊵ᖜ⼝喑పუ㘪

͚ⴠ⇦ Ꭱ䔈ऐӱ࣌⇦̴ॕ

⹧喑⮱࣯̻㔲ࣺᄦ‫͇ۉ‬䘕ឦ۳䒙ധ఍

⎽ᅭₐౕ‫ݣ‬䃏Ȩज‫⩌ں‬㘪⎽ӈ☚჋᫪᫦

͚పⴠ⇦๖♣⅁䯳ఏ‫ڙ‬थ‫ڙ‬ጰ喑᱗Გ䔈ऐ

๔䅳⮱䔈ऐȡ

ᵵȩ喑䛺◦ౕВ๗䭠㘪Ƞౝ☚হ⩌➖䉕㘪

ӱ㒄᫜࣌⇦䛼ᄳ䓫‫⃼ݝ‬Ꭱ̴ॕ喑Ⱕᒀ

ぶӈ☚᫦ᐼͧͨȡᢛ᫦ᵵ݊⽬᭫⹧喑‫ݝ‬

λᎡ͚పⴠ⇦⊵䉦ᕨ䛼⮱࡮ܳ͸̭ȡ

ੳߎ䘕॓䃑⺮䔈ऐ㒻⡗㖶

Ꭱప‫ڲ‬๗䭠㘪ぶज‫⩌ں‬㘪⎽‫ࣾ☚ٶ‬

͚పੳߎ䘕᫝䬨ࣾ㼭ϧ↵ͦ䭠॓䃑γ㒻ప

⩢ᰬАᴴ⚑㻱὎ᄳ䓫̴ॕጓठ喑‫ݝ‬

̴䓫䯳ఏ᠌⮫Ϭែ䉱㠞ప

᳽ψჅঅ᝭䅀͚పĄ⺮₏䔈ऐ㒻ప⡗㖶ą

Ꭱ㏓䓫Ϭॕȡᄳᩦअᒀ‫ݺ‬䛺⩢䒨☚

̴䓫䯳ఏაጰᄳ᫒䉱Ϭ㠞䩾喍㏓वϧ

⮱䄡∂喑ጹ᱈㒻᫦㘪‫ڙ‬ₐᄦᒲᎣ໒઱ั⤳

⮱㘪⎽‫⩕ݖ‬⣝⟣ȡ

ℾጮϬٰ喎ែ䉱㠞పȡ‫͚ڣ‬Ϭ㠞䩾

July 2013


‫ڙ‬थ䄧χᣔ㗎ᥧ᝸Ȩ⺼ጰ᫜ȩ‫ڞ‬हႹ᜽ȡ

ౕࡻ⁔≟Ю͇ᗲ㐗䊝ѻ

⮪⯛Γࣾ⣝喑͚ప⮱Ю͇უౕᕨҀ̷᭜ռ

͚ప⁔Ⰼੳчࣷ㒄‫ڝ‬䉊ᵩノ⤳৕䄏‫ڙ‬

ͽ㻯⮱ȡᬍ䃧᭜ᕨҀ⮱Ꭵ⺼ᙌ喑䔅᭜۠Ⴧ

थλࡄϙ‫ڞ‬हࣾጰȨ͚ప⁔Ⰼੳчੳ͇Ԏ

Ꭵ⺼ᙌ⮱ऱ఍㉍喑ЃЙ็᪝កܳ⮱Ą䉌ռ

ᓰ䄰ᴒȩ⼝喑䮼Ɑ⁔≟Ю͇ᄦ‫⮱⋓ݖ‬

ᔮܳጰą倅ም䘪䯳͚λܳ喍កܳࡧ䬡ͧ

ᆂ᱈䓫‫ݝ‬᫝ѻ喑Ю͇Йጟᄳ䔈̭ₒӰ䔈∂

ܳ喎⩇㜠В̷ȡ

⇨ࣷᰡͧᎠぶ》ζ⮱ᩦ䲖㻳͚ͧప㏼≻᱗

็᪝Ю͇უΌ㶕⹧喑ЃЙัλᬻ᭫

Გ㶕⣝⮱ͨ㺮⒉ౕᣕߕ߈ȡ♣㔹喑ᄦλ͚

⮱ࢸ߈⟣ᔮ̸ȡЮ͇უ͚ᰶ䓾ఈ᜽ឬऄγ

ప䶳ᄩϧ᭜॓ᰶ䃑ⱌᐭᆂ䔆ψᓲ㺮⮱㏼≻

Ąᒵ๔⮱ࢸ߈ą喑㔹ឬऄĄ̭Ⴧࢸ߈ą⮱

ᩦ䲖⮱ᘼᙬ喑⁔≟Ю͇ЙϺᙌ̺⶛Ⴧȡ

ࢍγ䓾̶ܳ͸̭ȡ

ᅪノ䲏͡䄥็͒㖰ᠾᝅ喑͚పӊ♣

ຠᕔЮ͇უ⮱᪡ҀᎥ⺼ᙌ⪒ѻλ⩤ᕔ

᭜‫⤰ڕ‬㥒ᩣ䛺㺮ᩜᴞȡ ‫ͻ܍‬䓫ࡷ᪝⮱⁔≟

Ю͇უȡ̻Ąຠᕔᰡ∕䛺უᏚ⩌≨ą⮱э

Ю͇ᠴ‫͚ܧ‬పࢍ‫⤰ڕڣ‬ᩣ‫ڒ‬В̷喠ह

㐌㻯◦Ⱕࣺ喑უᏚᎥ⺼㒻␎㐆⩤ᕔЮ͇უ

ᬣ喑ᅪノᄦλ෋䪬⮱䶱᱌̸䭺喑⮱Ю

ፓᲒ⮱Ꭵ⺼ᙌ倅λຠᕔЮ͇უȡᎡ

͇ᄦλ᱗Გ෋䪬‫ݺ‬ᮜӊ♣Ԋᠮͽ㻯ȡ⩞ₑ

ĄუᏚᎥ⺼㒻␎ą᭜⩤ᕔЮ͇უᎥ⺼ᙌ⮱

ज㻮喑͚పጯ౧ౕ⁔≟Ю͇⮱‫⤰ڕ‬ᝅ⪒͚

すι๔侞ߕ఍㉍喑ࢍ 喠㔹हᎡ䔶᠖

ౝѺᘵߍ䛺㺮ȡ⁔≟Ю͇㐔㐚ಇჇλ᰺ߎ

ₑ䶦⮱ຠᕔЮ͇უࢍ℁ϲͧ喑Ⱕጛ

͚పጯ౧喑́⮱Ю͇䃎ܿ䔈̭ₒែ䉱

䓾̭ࡷȡ

͚ప喑Вᰡສ጖ధ⣝ᰶౝѺ喑Ꭳλౕࡻ》

ᒞ৺Ꭵ⺼ⅡᎠ⮱఍㉍‫ڤ‬ᰶᬻ᭫⮱Ꭱ咱

ζ͚Ԋᠮ㜗䏘х߬ȡₑใ喑๔䘕ܳЮౕ͇

Ꭳ䉚㠞ప౐ⅽ⍥㝴‫ڙ‬थ㗎Ъȡओใ

ᅯ➦◦ȡᆮ_ᆮ⮱Ꭱ䒨̭䒵ͨ㺮ऄ‫ݝ‬

͚ప᫝̭ᅷ䶳ᄩᅯ䏘̷ⰸ‫ݝ‬䕇䓴䔈̭ₒᩦ

Ϭ㠞䩾䃎ܿែ䉱ౕѓ᪓ᵥᓰࡧᐧ䃫䊲ρᭌ

݈͇Ƞࣾᆂ̻θ͇ࢸ߈⮱ᒞ৺喠ᆮ_

䲖‫͚⓭ݧ‬ప㏼≻෋䪬ज㘪ፓᲒ⮱ᱧ䕴喑‫ڣ‬

㏔̴䓫䙿Ꮔȡ̴䓫䯳ఏ㦐θ䪬⢸֒᳄⼝喑

ᆮ͸䬡⮱ϧ㓑喑̀∕λθ͇͸҆喑უᏚ⩌

͚ߍᑧ∂⇨⮱঩ฝᰭͧᑧ◵ȡ䕫ఈܳ͸̶

Ꭳ䉚౐ⅽ᭜ധλ̴䓫᪴ࡃ᫲⍥ϔ͇᱗Გ⮱

≨Όᐭ໸᜽ͧᒞ৺Ꭵ⺼ᙌ⮱䛺㺮఍㉍喠

⮱⁔≟Ю͇䃑ͧ喑∂⇨ᐧ䃫ᄳ᭜͚ప᱗Გ

ࣾᆂ㔰䛼ȡ̓⩹ຏࡻ䙿Ꮔጯ౧㷘ใప৮❹

ᆮࣷВ̷ϧ㓑Ꭵ⺼ᙌ⮱Გ⎽݆䊸ाλᓰᔮ

‫܍‬Ꭱ㏼≻㶕⣝䛺㺮⮱⒉ౕߕ߈喑Ꭳᄦₑ䔈

ࢍ䶳喑̴䓫۠Ⴧᩦअ䔆⻺ᅭ䲏喑䃎ܿᎡ

⮱Ꭰহ̻Ϙऄ⩌≨⮱⟣ᔮ喑ѳ᭜ЃЙ⮱Ꭵ

㵹γᬻ⶛঩मȡ

‫ͨ͗⩹ౕ̓ڲ‬㺮೻ጯᐧ䃫̴䓫䙿Ꮔȡ

⺼ᙌࢡռѻȡ

͚ప⁔Ⰼੳчͨፚ๔࢘㶕⹧喟Ą䓱

ᅪノऄ䃬㔲䘪᭜θ͇ᰶ᜽⮱Ю͇უ喑

Ϸͧ₏喑⁔≟Ю͇᝭ⰸ‫⮱ݝ‬჋䉕ᩦअࢡᒵ

ࣹⅴప䭲᠌ᩣ䉚㒻ᰭ๔㖶Ю

ѳ᭜ЃЙ䘪㶕⹧უᏚȠθ͇Ƞ֒Ꮴ᭜Ꭵ⺼

ᄾȡЮ͇⮱䉏ߎ㶕⣝⃼ۢᘵ̸喑ᄦλ⯵‫ݖ‬

ࣹⅴప䭲აጰᩣ䉚‫⤰ڕ‬㻱὎ᰭ๔⮱⩌⡗⩌

ᙌ⮱̶๔ͨ㺮ᩜᴞ喑㔹䉏ჹᎣ䲋۠ჇᎥ⺼

⮱ԎᓰΌᆎ݈᫝ѻȡᏁᅪᔘև‫ܴܧ‬჋ᰶ⯷

ϔੳࣷ⡗㖶ӈᏁੳटჳ᫜㤟ᅁᓤ喑ᩣ䉚ᕨ

ⅡᎠ⮱㐊ᄦ㺮㉍ȡ᫲⍥Ƞ䔈ԛ䄨ΓȠᙵ઱

⮱ᩦअ喑Ӱ䔈⩌ϔ߈ࣾᆂВ㑀হᨭࡴ⮱᜽

թ㏓ͧϬ㒻ٰ喑ຯ䕇䓴㒻పᩬᏉ჎ᴒ喑

‫⯷ڙ‬᭜Ю͇უ☚㶤⮱‫̶ݺ‬๔≨ߕȡΊ᜽Ю

᱙㐆‫⋓ݖ‬⢴䕍᜽⮱䉌䲏ᒞ৺喑䛷ᩫᰡ็⮱

ᄳ̸݈͚పЮ͇Ꭳ䉚㒻ప‫ڙ‬थ⮱ᰭ๔䛾䷊

͇უ䃑ͧϻθ‫⯷ڙ‬ᙵ઱≨ߕजВፓᲒᰡ็

ጯ౧ᱧч喑Ꭳᐧ⿸䊤̭͗В‫ڙ‬Ꭰ》ζͧᵥ

㏗ᒂȡ

⮱␎䋠ᙌȡノ⤳๔ಸЮ͇⮱Ю͇უ喑‫⹫ڣ‬

ᓰ⮱倅᩵Ƞ֒‫⮱ڕ‬ੳ͇⣜ධȡą

ϑవ␎䋠ᙌัλᰭ倅⮱⟣ᔮȡ

‫ٶ‬ᬻΠ͇ၽ‫ڙ‬थᄳౕ᫝㺬‫̷ڝ‬ጯ

㒄‫ڝ‬䉊ᵩノ⤳৕䄏‫ڙ‬थχ≟ࡧᕨ㷮፥

᝭ᰶᒞ৺Ю͇უᎥ⺼ᙌ⮱఍㉍͚喑

ࢇ䕥㶕⹧喟Ąᄦλ䗐ψ䪬᱌⩞ใపЮ͇Ⱕ

͚ప‫ٶ‬ᬻΠ͇ᬄ̸᫝㣞➦‫ڙ‬थაጰᰵౕ᫝

Ą⇨⤳⣜ධą̻Ą㜗♣⣜ධąᕨҀកܳ䒰

ᄦࢍͨᄩౝѺ⮱䶳ഌ喑ప‫ڲ‬Ю͇ₐౕᠮ㐚

㺬‫̷ڝ‬ጯ喑Вព๔ྡ٬䙺᫦ຣㆶ㲺䉱ȡ䔆

ѻȡ䓾ఈ᜽ऄ䃬Ю͇უ㶕⹧ᄦĄ⇨⤳⣜ධ

᣽倅㜗䏘⮱》ζ߈喑㔹䔆̭》ζᔮ߬Ϸऻ

᭜͚ప‫ڙ‬थ仃⁎䊡᫝㺬‫*ڝ‬10喑ᄳߍ⌞͚

̺๗‫ڠ‬ᓰą喑ЃЙᰡ็ⱭⱩλ჋䭲ȡⰥᄦ

गчअᓄᰡߍ⓭◵ȡ҉ͧᏁᄦ喑⁔≟Ю͇

᫝͑ప⮱㏼≻㖁㈨ȡ

λ Ꭱ喑 Ꭱ䊲䓴̭ࡷ喍喎

ₐ߈ఫពᆂ͇ߎ㠰డВࣷౝ㑅̷⮱᠀ᆂ喑

⮱ऄ䃬Ю͇უ䃑ͧ㜗♣⣜ධᖣࡃȡ䓾̰᜽

В䓫‫ݝ‬ᰡ๔㻱὎喑हᬣ䕇䓴䔈̭ₒߍᑧ㜗

⮱ऄ䃬Ю͇უ䃑ͧ‫ڣ‬᝭ౕ೻ጯ⮱⹫ч⇨Ⴖ

䏘х߬䶳ഌ喑ВⅯౕ̻᱙ౌЮ͇》ζ͚Ԋ

ᰶ᝭ᩦ઱ȡ㐊๔็᪝⮱ऄ䃬Ю͇უ㶕⹧ϻ

ᰶ̭Ⴧх߬ȡ㐆‫⋓ݖ‬⢴ፓᲒᰭ๔䉌䲏ᒞ৺

᱗ऄ‫ݝ‬䓴ⱌ჋⮱Ⴖ‫ڕ‬༮㗮喍㏾᳣Ƞ᪟䃵Ƞ

⮱᭜ϧ߈᜽᱙⮱ᨭࡴȡą

ᕽीぶ喎ȡ

喍᱙ᴼⰛ‫ڲ‬ღᵦᢛ‫ڙ‬ᐭԎᖜ᪡⤳喎

‫ٻ‬།იჯұ ͚పЮ͇უᕨҀռͽ㻯 ‫ڕ‬ప仃Ъ䦵ᄦЮ͇უ㓑Ҁ⮱Ꭵ⺼ᠴ᪝ 䄰ⵁ⮪⯛Γ喑⩞͚పᰭ๔⮱⠙⿸䉏ჹノ⤳

July 2013

11


MONTH IN RE VIE W

NEWSBRIEFS

12

China’s factory activity continues to drop

China to consider entering US-led trade group

China’s factory activity hit a nine-month low due to faltering demand, endangering China’s economic growth target of 7.5% and further pressuring policy makers to ease lending, Reuters reported, citing a preliminary survey. The flash HSBC Purchasing Managers’ Index dropped to 48.3 in June from May’s 49.2, reaching further below 50, the level marking the line between expansion and contraction. The survey’s indications add to the pressure on the People’s Bank of China to loosen monetary policy, which started mounting after the recent cash squeeze.

China’s Ministry of Commerce said that the country will study potentially joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade bloc of Pacific Rim nations lead by the US, Reuters reported. Beijing has been collecting opinions on the TPP from various industries and government organs. “We will analyze the pros and cons as well as the possibility of joining the TPP, based on careful research and according to principles of equality and mutual benefit,” a ministry spokesman said through a statement on its website. Japan is in the process of joining the 11-nation body.

CNPC joins in Tajikistan oil and gas deal

China to double mainland highway network

China oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) joined France’s Total and Tethys Petroleum in signing a Tajikistan oil and gas development deal, The Wall Street Journal reported. Tethys has said that the Bokhtar project in Tajikistan is expected to yield 3.22 trillion cubic meters of gas and 8.5 billion barrels of oil. The estimated costs of the first phase of exploration range from US$80100 million. China reportedly plans to increase the role of natural gas in its energy supply to 10% by 2020 to reduce dependency on coal, which currently fuels 70% of the country’s energy needs.

China transportation officials announced a plan worth US$766.8 billion (RMB4.7 trillion) to expand the mainland’s highway network, more than doubling its current size, South China Morning Post reported. The chief planner in the Ministry of Transport’s general planning department said at a press conference June 20 that the expansion will add 227,000 km of roads to the current network of 173,000 km for a total of 400,000 km by 2030. The new highways are to include two north-south major passageways in China’s west, connecting many of the 900 counties that presently do not have direct access to national trunk ways.

July 2013


China blocks Mastercard’s yuan transactions

Report: Rural environment deteriorated in 2012

The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has halted MasterCard transactions in yuan, signaling an unwillingness to open the credit card industry to foreign companies, Financial Times reported. The PBoC said no payment institution was allowed to cooperate with foreign companies on cross-border yuan transactions, stopping the Chinese online payment platform EPayLinks from processing such transactions on cards the company jointly issued with MasterCard. The WTO last year said that China has allowed its homegrown UnionPay to monopolize yuan-denominated transaction by discriminating against foreign card companies. China is expected to have the world’s largest card market by 2020.

Chinese environment officials reported that pollution throughout rural parts of China worsened considerably in 2012 due to expansion in industry, mining and animal husbandry, Reuters reported. The Ministry of Environmental Protection also stated in its annual report that China’s farms have overtaken cities as the major source of pollution. The ministry called environmental conditions in the countryside “grim” but wrote that the country’s overall environmental condition did not worsen in 2012. The report said that the overall air quality in cities was “generally stable” and that improvements had been made in water quality in 2012, although the pollution problems facing China remain severe.

China to boost its solar industry

Mao sedan resurfaces to compete with Audi

China will bolster its solar industry by boosting domestic demand for solar-generated electricity and providing easier financing to manufacturers, Bloomberg reported, citing a statement on the State Council’s website. Officials said that grid companies should build solar-friendly networks and give priority access to solar-generated power. The statement also emphasized the need for lenders to help solar manufacturers raise capital and assured encouragement of mergers and acquisitions among solar companies. The state’s solar push comes amid concerns over Chinese solar companies defaulting on loans and the impact of the EU’s recent tariffs on solar panels from China.

Red Flag sedans, once a symbol China’s communist elite, were set to go on sale on May 30 in an attempt to give Volkswagen’s Audi a run for its money, Bloomberg reported. China FAW Group will launch the Hongqi – or Red Flag – sedans for retail after a US$300 million overhaul of the version that was first built in 1958 for former Chinese leader Mao Zedong. The Chinese brand will go head to head with Audi, BMW and Daimler’s Mercedes-Benz for private sales. FAW has supplied 500 Red Flag sedans to Communist Party leadership in a nod to President Xi Jinping’s comments in December that officials shouldn’t be continually spotted riding in foreign vehicles.

July 2013

13


˄ಝ

ሹႶ࿒ᄼ 㜗⩞ᬏ᭜Ⱋ⮱ࣵ᭜᝸⃢ ᪴]䃥ᄼᎡ͚⁔ప䭲ጒੳ႓䮏㏼≻႓হ䛾㲺႓᪆ᢵ

̓

䃥ᄼᎡ

⩹ϻ᱗‫׼‬Ϸ๖䔆

౧喑ᄳЃЙ㜗ጞ᣼㐅᜽ᡪ⟯ⓉλᬏԿ⮱᩾

͗ϧ䘪ᰶ㜗ጞ⮱‫⯷ݖ‬喑ЃЙ⮱‫⯷ݖ‬ज㘪̭

ᵤ喑ຯₑ䰭㺮䛺

̓ͨȡ

㜡喑Όज㘪Ⱕο۟⾮ȡҸຯᒀ͚๛䨣㵹ͧ

⩠㜗⩞⮱ᘼͶ喠͚పϻ᱗

‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶ䄋⩌λ̓㏗Ą๔㥔᲎ą

ᣔ‫ݣ‬䕇䉔㛕㗭㔹ߍᖜᬣ喑ႅ‫ݖ‬⢴̷ࡴ喑

‫׼‬Ϸ๖䔆ᵤ喑ຯₑ䰭㺮ᑧ

᱌䬡喑䔆̭႓≫⮱ᵥᓰ㻯◦᭜Ąጯ౧๞

‫ו‬㧱㔲ᩜᠮ喑Ю͇݆఍䉤᜽᱙̷ࡴ㔹ࣺ

䄰ᄦ㜗⩞⮱Ԋ䯉ȡऑА⮱

▢ą喑ᝃ㔲ᰡ۳⶛ౝ䃟喑㜗⩞ጯ౧๞▢ȡ

ᄦ喑㔹́倅‫ݖ‬⢴чᑂ䊤㗎⺕Фᵩ̸䋹喑㗎

ມ䯣㷘‫ޒ‬๧γ㜗⩞喑ౕᑧ

ᵦᢛ䔆̭႓≫⮱䄡∂喑᫜ჳ᝭⼝䊋⮱Ąⰸ

ℾ఍ₑ䖚ऄᢌ๞ȡࣵຯᩬᏉノ‫ݣ‬ϔ৮Ф

ᱰ⮱ࢸ䔘̸喑ᓺऄᅵ䓞В

̺㻮⮱᝸ąч㐆䔆͗̓⩹ፓᲒ⌤Ξহ▫

ᵩ喑⊵䉦㔲⁏䓻喑ѳ‫ڙ‬थ‫̸⋓ݖ‬䭺喑ᢌრ

Ⅿ⩌ႅ喠Ϸ๖⮱ϧЙͨߕ

䯫喑㔹▫䯫⮱ᵦ⎽ᅞ᭜ጯ౧࣯̻㔲⮱䲋⤳

࠲᠙㗎ℾౕ‫⮱ڲ‬Ю͇᝭ᰶ㔲⮱‫⯷ݖ‬ȡШ҂

ᩫᐰ㜗⩞喑Вᢏः㇫⺋ͨ

ᕔ۟ߕ喑‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜⼝͸ͧĄߕ➖㇫⺋ąȡ

̭䶦ᩬゃ䘪чҬ̭ψϧऄ⯷喑ओ̭ψϧऄ

ო᝭ឬ䄧⮱Ⴖ‫⼖̻ڕ‬Ꮌȡ

ᬏ♣ጯ౧๞▢喑ᅞ䰭㺮⤳ᕔ⮱߈䛼Გᖏฺ

ᢌȡϭ͵᭜Ą⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ą喤ᬍ∂ჇͶĄ⹫

㖶Ҁ⮱ມᒦ᭜ᄦ䊑㸥㸥⮱ᯡ߈ᬍज๵҂⮱

⼖Ꮌ喑ຯ᳉̺㘪䭟₏▫䯫⮱ࣾ⩌喑䊤⴮Ό

ч‫⯷ݖ‬ą喑ຯ҂‫ݣ‬ჇĄ⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ąᰭ๔ࡃ

᰺ϻ喑㇫⺋⮱ມᒦ݆⎽λⰟⰛ⮱㜗ࡾহ㜗

ज‫ۼ‬ᄾ▫䯫⮱ᢌ๞喑䔆͗⤳ᕔ߈䛼ᅞ᭜

⮱ᩬゃ喤ࢠҬᒀϧЙ⮱‫̭⯷ݖ‬㜡ᬣ喑Ό᭜

ࡾᓰ⤳ᩜ䙺̸⮱ᮧ䃳㜗ᝂȡϧㆨ⹫ч⾣「

ᩬᏉ喑ᒀ♣喑ᓲ䶨᭜Ԏ๶‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶ⮱ᩬ

⩞λ⃼͗ϧ⮱‫ڤ‬Ҁ䃶ⅯⰥहȡҸຯ䉏ϔহ

᭜ౕ䔈ₒȠ䔭ࡃ喑䔅᭜अᢏᒏᐼ⮱ᒭฺᓗ

Ꮙȡ䔆̭႓≫ͨᑍᩬᏉߕ⩕䉏ᩬহ䉔ጮᩬ

ϧ䏘⮱Ⴖ‫ڕ‬喑㔹̺᭜఍ͧЃЙ⮱䃶Ⅿこव

⣜喤ऑጹ㙷ϧͧ͗ϧ̻೻䗓⮱‫ڠ‬㈨ζ䃧̺

ゃ喑Вࣷ⯾ノহ㵹ᩬぶᓛ㻯᎟䶱᝸⃢喑䖢

᳽͗㐊ᄦ⮱হ჏㻯⮱Ą⹫чąᴴ۳ȡ

о喑ౕᒀА䄚ධ͚喑ऑ㔮⮱প䷅䛺᫝㶕䔝

ᓗĄ⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ąᰭ๔ࡃ⮱݆࣌喑䄰㞯㏼≻

ౕ㛳䕍γ៪䆎⮱᪡Ҁ‫⯷ݖ‬হ៪䆎⮱

ͧጯ౧̻ᩬᏉ⮱ܳ⩹喑Вࣷ㜗⩞হノ‫⮱ݣ‬

䓽㵹喑ᠴᄩহノ⤳ጯ౧ϑᭀ喑‫ٸ‬᰺ጯ౧๞

‫ͨ⯷ݖ‬Ҁऻ喑㺮Ҭᗙౕ⾧͚⮱៪䆎᪡Ҁ‫ݖ‬

۟⾮ȡ

▢喑⩇㜠䔅Ꮑ䄒ߘჹ≻䉘喑ౕ჋⣝䉱⎽ᰡ

⯷㥪ౝ喑अͧजប㵹⮱‫ڤ‬Ҁᩬゃ喑ᅞᓲ䶨

ᰶ᩵䙺㒛⮱हᬣ喑Ԋ䃮⹫ч‫ڙ‬Ꭰȡ

ឫ‫ݝ‬Ą⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ą⮱А㶕喑⹫ч⇎ᰶᕊ㔰

Ꭱ喑‫ࣾ✳⤰ڕ‬γ‫ݺ‬᝭᱗ᰶ⮱䛾

14

㲺࢞ᱧ喑↶䛺ౝក‫ܨ‬γ̓ϧᄦ㜗⩞⮱Ԏ

Ш҂᠜᩾䘪᭜ᰶАФ⮱喑ᩬᏉ᎟䶱ᓲ

হ۠ゃ㘪߈喑⹫ч⮱А㶕᭜‫ڤ‬ᰶ㘪ߕᕔ⮱

ᓰ喑ᰫ㏼᭜͒ჳ㔹Ⴙ᪡⮱ጯ౧䕨䒾Ҁ㈨喑

♣䭽‫͗ݣ‬ϧ㜗⩞喑⮵ӊ‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶᘼঠⱭ

͗ϧȡ‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶⴒ䃳ܳၽλ᭜ᒀϮ̺䃖

‫้̭ͻ܍‬͸䬡ᅞ㷘ᦔ⃮₳ᅪȡࢤ‫⊤ڒ‬થ⑖

⩕㜗⩞ᢏः⼖ᎼহₐͶȡ䔆ϑᭀवツॄ喤

ౝВ⹫ч⮱А㶕㜗ᅲ喑აጰੜᰶЃЙិᤎ

⋎͚⮱ϧЙ͔๞γₐ፥⮱⤳ᮧ喑㏤㏤ៀѼ

θ჋䃮ᬻ喑䔆̺᭜ぶФϑᢏ喑㔹ᰡ‫̺׼‬Ꭰ

γ⹫чࣾᆂ⮱᫦ा喑ੜᰶЃЙज‫⤳ܳٲ‬㼐

⓭≮͚⮱⽨㡶喑㻳ᩬᏉͧ䔰䓴̓㏗͸ߘ⮱

ぶ᲎㏓喑‫ڙ‬фϑ‫ܧ‬䘕ܳ㜗⩞喑ᓄ‫ࢡ⮱ݝ‬᭜

Ą⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ą喑ੜᰶЃЙ㘪์䃫䃎⤳ᘠ⮱

ᰭऻ᫦㝌ȡᅪノВ㒻㖁‫ͧו‬А㶕⮱ऱప͚

ᰡ็⮱叨☓ȡ໾̺́䃧Ą๔㥔᲎ąহ‫⤰ڕ‬

㏼≻ᩬゃহ⹫чᩦ䕍䃎ܿ喑ប㵹ЃЙ⇨ప

๛䨣㵹⶛჋և‫ܧ‬γߗ߈喑䕇䓴䊲፥㻱⮱䉔

䛾㲺࢞ᱧ‫ݝ‬Ꮒ᭜ጯ౧๞▢䔅᭜ᩬᏉ๞▢喑

Ꭰ๖̸Ⴜఫ๔⪒⮱喑ᅞ᭜ᩬᏉহᬍ᝭ౕ̺

ጮែᩫ喑䖬‫ٺ‬γ≮ߕᕔⴚ㑧喑ϻ㔹䖬‫ٺ‬γ

ⰸѩ倅ᬻ⮱‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶౕ⤳䃧̷␼≋⮫

⮱Ⴥ؇Ҁ㈨ȡ㏼䓴ຯₑ⮱ắᔢ䒙ᢏ喑͗ϧ

̓⩹䛾㲺Ҁ㈨⮱ቖ⎰ȡ♣㔹䊷Გ䊷็⮱ⵁ

‫ܧ‬喑ౕ჋䌢͚̻䃫䃎⮱Ⱋᴴࢄ䓂ࡄ䓆喑᝭

㏱᜽⮱⹫чअ᜽γ㇫㠞ͨᄩ⮱⹫ч喑͗ϧ

⾣㶕ᬻ喑‫⤰ڕ‬䛾㲺࢞ᱧ⮱໸҉Ӿ㔲ₐ᭜ᵩ

䅀⇨̓㞜㢜㐆ᛔᛙ⤳ᘠప⮱ϧЙ䕍᜽ᰡ็

㜗⩞̻͗ϧᱰ‫⊵ݖ‬㲺ౕĄ⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ą͚喑

᳄᫜⒅䶳ᄩ̸⮱㒻㖁‫ו‬喑᜾Йᆯज఍‫ڣ‬᩾

㔹̺᭜ᰡᄾ⮱ёრ喑ⱌₐ⮱ऄ⯷㔲गᰶВ

अͧ็҆⮱㉜䊅ȡౕᰡ็⮱౧व͚喑͗ϧ

▘͸ߌ喑㔹ცᖂႰ⮱㏢▘͸㒗喤ຯहȨ㜗

᩾̓ͨ䏘Ъ㵹θ⮱ᩬᏉȡ

㜗⩞㷘㻳ͧĄ⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ąᰭ๔ࡃ⮱䯉ⶺ喑

⩞䔶᠖ȩす」᝭ܳᲽ⮱喑㒻㖁‫ו‬ᄦ̓

‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶౕ䕨䒾࣌◦̷ᅞ䩆γ喑

䖚‫ݝ‬๔ф⮱੫ᐰহᲮᱰ⮱ࢸ‫ݣ‬ȡ৵㕣‫ٸ‬ᅃ

㏗ᎡАĄ๔㥔᲎ą䉌ᰶͨ㺮䉐Ш喑ᑄ䛹

̓⩹̷Ꭳ̺ႅౕĄ⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ą喑఍ͧ̓⩹

䨽ౝᠴ‫ܧ‬喑ᑧ䄰䯳Ҁ‫࢞⮱⯷ݖ‬䮖ᅞౕλႰ

ᓤᰩ⩕๔䛼⮱᪝ᢛহθ჋䃮ᬻγ䔆̭◦ȡ

̷̺ႅౕ៪䆎⮱Ƞ҉̭ͧ͗᪡Ҁ⮱Ƞ‫ڤ‬ᰶ

㺮Ⅿᱰ߈⮱倅Ꮣ䯳͚喑㔹ᱰ߈㵹Ҭ㔲᝭䨧

䔈‫̓ڒ‬㏗喑㒻㖁‫⮱ו‬䉔ጮᩬゃ‫ܧ⁎ں‬

ᕊ㐡হᙌऄ㘪߈⮱Ą⹫чą喑ᅞ‫̺׼‬ႅౕ

ᅞ⮱᭜̭᲎Ą䕇ᒭມᒦ͸䌜ąȡ

⣝䛺๔๞䄜喑㔹㒻ప⮱‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶⴒ䃳㇫

៪䆎⮱Ƞ҉̭ͧ͗᪡Ҁ⮱Ƞ‫ڤ‬ᰶᕊ㐡হᙌ

‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶすι͗ᵦ᱙ᕔ䩆䄜᭜մ

㠞হЃЙ⮱ᩬ⩹᰸ࣸࢡ〚߈ᣖ亝喑‫࢞⩕ݖ‬

ऄ㘪߈⮱Ąϧℾąᝃ㔲Ąℾ᫼ąȡ⹫ч⩞

䃫γ̭͗‫ڕ‬㘪Ϯᙵ⮱ᩬᏉ喑Ą‫ڕ‬㘪ą⮱क़

ᱧ͚⮱ᕽᙹᗲ㐗হᕊᘠ⌤Ξ喑ᩨ‫ܨ‬㜗⩞ጯ

ᑍ̶ȠᱻఈȠ⢸ρぶ‫ڤ‬Ҁ⮱͗ϧ㏱᜽喑⃼

Ͷ᭜ᬍ䭽⮱䃑ⴒহប㵹㘪߈喑ĄϮᙵąᘼ

July 2013


ঠⱭВ᩾ℾⅡ▘ͧጞШȡ‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶ㔲ᄳ

➖㇫⺋ą喤⩢Ԏ͇㷘⼝ͧĄ㜗♣ಱ᫚ą喑

Ⅿສั喑Ҹຯ̺䶫䉏ᩬ䉱⎽⮱䭽‫ݣ‬喑෋ߍ

Ąጯ౧๞▢ąᑿ঻λϧ⮱Ąߕ➖㇫⺋ą喑

λ᭜ౕ͚ప‫ڲ‬ౝगᰶᩬᏉ㏼㥒⮱Ю͇᝺㘪

⺼‫ݖ‬ᐭᩜ喑व∂ౝᩣΝ䔶ℾȡओ̭ㆨ፥㻮

ᑿ঻λጯ౧ϑᭀ⮱ใ䘕ᕔȠጯ౧̷⮱㜗♣

䔈‫ڒ‬䔆͗㵹͇喑⩢Ԏ᰺ߎ⮱ФᵩΌ⩞ᩬᏉ

⮱ϑᭀ᭜䃛অ䕇䓴ᰶ‫ݖ‬λ᳽ψጒੳ䯳ఏ⮱

ಱ᫚ȠԎᖜ̺ᄦ⼝Ƞϑᭀ᜽᱙ぶጯ౧⮱

۠Ⴧ喑㐀᳉᭜͚ప‫ڲ‬ౝ⮱⊵䉦㔲̺ᓄ̺ᩜ

⿸∂喑Вᓄ‫ݝ‬䔆ψ‫⯷ݖ‬䯳ఏ⮱ᩬ⇨᡽ȡ

Ą䲋Ⴙ㒻ą఍㉍喠ᒀЃЙᐧ䃛ᩬᏉ᎟䶱

Ѕ℁‫ڣ‬Ѓపუᝃౝࡧ倅ᓄ็⮱䉦⢴喑䔉䔉

ౕ∂⇨㪱ᑞ⮱᫝‫ڡ‬ጯ౧పუ喑ᩬᏉ倅Ⴥ⮱

ᬣ喑ࢡᰶᘼᬍᘼౝմ䃫γᩬᏉჅঅ⮱Ⴙ‫ڕ‬

倅λ⻮ϧ‫ڙ‬थ᣽ӈ⩢Ԏ᰺ߎ⮱仆⍜ȡጯ౧

უ᫼Ⱑᣒ㏼㥒ੳ͇হЮ͇喑ຯ࢝ᅩ‫ݺ‬ᕨ㐌

⤳ᕔ喑ᩬᏉ᎟䶱⇎ᰶใ䘕ᕔ喑ᩬᏉ̺ज㘪

̷⮱Ą㜗♣ಱ᫚ąࢯੳੜ‫ݖ‬᭜ఫ喑ᩬᏉಱ

㟼৵ចუ᫼হ㤟ᒸძ⮱侙⻾᫜უ᫼喑䔆ψ

ಱ᫚喑ᩬᏉ⇎ᰶԎᖜ̺ᄦ⼝⮱䬛䷅喑ᩬᏉ

᫚ᅞजВԊ៑‫ڙ‬ф‫ٺ‬ऄಱ᫚͸რγॄ喤

უ᫼㣤ᓄγ⩢ԎȠⴠ⇦ぶ㵹͇⮱ಱ᫚㏼㥒

⮱ᩬゃ᜽᱙ぶλ䰣喑̭ऒ䄊喑ᩬᏉ᭜Ⴙ㒻

‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜㏼≻႓մჇጯ౧࣯̻㔲᭜ᰭ

ᱰ喑‫⮱ࣇ͝⋓ݖ‬ᩬᏉवह㥪‫ڒ‬ЃЙВ̻ࣷ

⮱ȡౕ䔆ⴚⴚ⮱Ꮌ㼭䛹喑᜾Йᬍ∂̭̭㼐

๔ࡃ͗ϧ‫⮱⯷ݖ‬Ą⤳ᕔ㏼≻ϧą喑ѳౕܳ

ЃЙ‫ڠ‬㈨ჳܴ⮱ឬ࠲ੳ᝸͚ȡ͚ప‫ݺ‬䧮䖀

䛷䔆ψ㏼≻႓ऺ䃺喑䄨㔲ग㺮ᄦ⚔‫ڠ‬λጯ

ᲽᩬᏉჅঅ⮱㵹ͧᬣ喑ࢡմ䃫ЃЙᰭ๔ࡃ

䘕䘕䪬݅ᔄ‫⩕ݖۈ‬㕹ᱰ喑ឦ㐆ੳϧ̮Γ㠄

౧হᩬᏉ⮱̺ᄦぶմ䃫喑ᅞⴒ䖀Ąጯ౧๞

Ą⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ąȡᄦλ䔆͗ᬻ᭫⮱䕨䒾̺̭

䧮䌜ᐧ䃫হ䃫ิ䛴䉚वह喑̮݆⩕䛾䧞ͧ

▢䲍ᩬᏉą⮱㐀䃧Გ㜗ਗ䛹γȡႹ㒻⮱ᩬ

㜡喑‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶ㔲䃠㣘ຯ⌞ȡͧϭ͵ϧহ

݅㐡៑ᩬ⇨হੳ͇‫ڠ‬㈨㑾ȡ㜠λჅঅՌ჎

Ꮙᒀ♣᭜᜾Й䔆̺͗Ⴙ㒻̓⩹⮱᠜᩾㔲喑

ϧᅞ̺̭ᵤএ喤㣘䲋Ⴥঅ᭜⩕➦₷ᱽ᫆‫ݣ‬

ឦȠ⯾ノȠᷭᴒȠᩣ⼻͸ᱧ喑㉏䉬Ƞऄ䉬⮱

̺䰭㺮ϭ͵⤳䃧喑̺䰭㺮᪝႓ᣕᄩ喑䃖᜾

᜽⮱喤㣘䲋ЃЙϻᄼᣒऄহ᜾ЙႹ‫̺ڕ‬ह

㙽䉒℁℁⮳᭜喑‫⃼ͻ܍‬๖䘪ज㻮䄥λ្〜ȡ

Йౕ‫ڕ‬㘪⮱ϧ䬡̷ፊ䲏‫ݺ‬䌗̸⺤ॷ喑䃖᜾

⮱᪆㗟喤㣘䲋ᩬᏉ⮱ߋ‫ڙ‬ბᰶⱭ⺋๴⮱傁

ౕᩬᏉჅঅᰭ๔ࡃ͗ϧ‫⮱⯷ݖ‬⣝჋ᗲ

Й㮁䄇ౝմ䃫ćć

߈喑䔈ࣨ⮱᭜些丌⩤ຠ喑‫ܧ‬Გ⮱᭜ᮧ㔲౐

̸ۢ喑ⵁ⾣ጯ౧̻ᩬᏉ⮱ܳ⩹喑᫝ऑ‫ڥ‬㏼

♣㔹⣝჋͚⮱ᩬᏉჅঅহ܎๘Ԅၽ̭

䉑喤ຯ᳉ჅঅΌহ䉖๘䊝ࡿ̭ᵤ喑ᰭ๔ࡃ

≻႓⮱ܳᲽᵳ᳣̺‫ں‬䔯⩕喑䰭㺮䛴⩕⩞ጰ

ᵤ喑ᬏᰶ⤳ᕔ䃎ツ⮱㘪߈喑Ό̺ͼĄߕ➖

Ѓ㜗ጞ⮱‫⯷ݖ‬㔹̺᭜Ą⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ą喑䗐͵

౻ࢄ喍Ꭱ䄧䉊ᅁ㏼≻႓຃ᓄͨ喎Ƞ

㇫⺋ąȡౕ䃎ܿ㏼≻⮱_Ꭱ喑ᩬ

‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜㏼≻႓ᐧ⿸ౕ⇆␖̷⮱⤳䃧๔࣓⿸

ఫ≈‫ٸ‬Ƞຒᅁḛぶϧࣾᆂ⮱Ą‫ڞڙ‬䔶᠖ą

Ꮙ❴䲏䔪Ⅿ෋䪬䕌Ꮣ喑Ხ倅⮱ែ䉱⢴ᄩ㜡

ࢠի㺳ቖ൹ȡ

⤳䃧喑䔆Ό᭜Ȩ㜗⩞䔶᠖ȩ̭Γ⮱ധ᱙᫦

⊵䉦৮➦‫ݘ‬᭜丌৮⮱ᲮᏓ࡛ͼ喑В㜠λౕ

Ȩ㜗⩞䔶᠖ȩ̭Γ㔰ᄌγ⣝჋̓⩹

∂ȡ‫ڞڙ‬䔶᠖႓≫Ꭳ̺఍ᩬ჏⮱‫⚼ ݖ‬ᓰ

হᎠᎡА‫̴ࡰ܍‬ϧ䲋ₐ፥₨ώ喑䔆᭜ϧㆨ

͚⮱ᩬᏉ喑㔹̺᭜‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶ㔲᝭䃫ᘠ⮱

㔹॓ჇᩬᏉ喑㔹᭜ᑧ䄰ᄦᩬᏉ⮱⯾Ⲑ̻‫ݣ‬

⤳ᕔ䔅᭜Ąߕ➖㇫⺋ą喤_Ꭱ喑

‫ڕ‬㘪ϮᙵᩬᏉȡౕ⣝჋̓⩹͚喑Ⴥঅ䔪Ⅿ

㏓喑गᰶౕ‫ڙ‬фহ྿Ҁ⮱ᑧᰶ߈⯾Ⲑ̸ ग

㒻㖁‫ו‬๔䛼ែᩫ䉔ጮ喑‫ݣ‬䕍γιᝅ͸ऻ㒻

͗ϧ‫⯷ݖ‬㔹䲋Ą⹫ч‫⯷ݖ‬ą喑ЃЙᓲ♣ч

ᰶౕ‫ݣ‬Ꮣ⮱ᰶ᩵㏓᲌̸喑ᩬᏉჅঅ᝺ज㘪

పᰭ๔⮱䉱ϔ∎⇘喑∎⇘⮱ⵡ▚ᑂࣾ

ౕ‫ݣ‬Ⴧহប㵹‫ڞڙ‬ᩬゃ⮱䓴⼸͚喑‫⩕ݖ‬᝸

ᠶ⚔‫ڙ‬ф⮱ᘼᙬ‫ݣ‬Ⴧহប㵹ᩬゃȡ

Ꭱ⮱䛾㲺⊤થ喑䔆ࣵ᭜ϧㆨ⤳ᕔ䔅᭜Ąߕ

͚⮱‫ڞڙ‬ᱰ߈喑‫ڙ‬ᐭᝃ䮽㩪ౝͧ㜗ጞ䄸

ࢠҬ⯾Ⲑহ‫ݣ‬㏓Ԋ䃮γჅঅ̻‫ڙ‬ф Ⱋᴴ⮱̭㜡ᕔ喑ᩬᏉ⮱᩵⢴Ϻᰶज㘪ѻλ ጯ౧̷⮱㜗ࣾϑᭀ喑䔆᭜఍ͧჅঅᬏᬍ⓭ ߞ喑ϓᬍԎᖜߋສ‫ڙ‬ф༁ច⮱θߎȡჅ؇ Ҁ㈨⮱➦◦᭜Ą̺Ⅿᰶߌ喑ѳⅯᬍ䓴ą喑 ̭ψθᗲևᄦγ喑‫ڙ‬ф䃑ͧ᭜Ꮑ䄒⮱喑̺ чᰶШ҂຃ߞ喠և䩆γ݆ᰶज㘪ࣾ⩌‫ڞڙ‬ 㜳䃧࢞ᱧ喑Ꭳ́ᢵह؇Вᳱ喑ౕჅ౧ࡴ䓮 ⮱》ζ͚ัλ̺‫ݖ‬ౝѺȡᩣ⯷হ䷻䮖⮱̺ ᄦ⼝۠ჇγჅ؇Ҁ㈨⮱㵹ᩬ᩵⢴ѻ̸喑ധ λहᵤ⮱䖀⤳喑Ⴥ؇Ҁ㈨ノ⤳̸⮱పᰶ Ю͇Ό̺ज㘪ᰶᒵ倅⮱㏼㥒᩵⢴ȡ䮑γ⓭ ߞ喑Ԏᖜ᭜ओ̭䬛䷅喑Ⴥঅ⇎ᰶ䋠์⮱Ԏ ᖜВႹ᜽‫ڙ‬ф䉸εЃЙ⮱Шߎȡ⣜ධ↎ᴀ ᭜㏼‫⮱ڥ‬Ąใ䘕᩵Ꮑą喑Ю͇ᢿᩫ↎ᴀ喑 ‫ڙ‬ф֒Ꮴᖣࡃ喑ѳЮ͇̺ᓲͧₑᩜЅ᜽ ᱙喑λ᭜ᅞ䓴Ꮣ⩌ϔহ䓴Ꮣ↎ᴀ喑ጯ౧̺ 㘪ᑂᄩЮ͇჋⣝Ąᰭхϔ‫ܧ‬ą喑ጯ౧๞▢

ऑጹ㙷ϧͧ͗ϧ̻೻䗓⮱‫ڠ‬㈨ζ䃧̺о

γȡᄦₑ喑‫ܜ‬ᖖ᫜ͨͶ㔲ͧ㒻పᩬᏉᐭ

July 2013

15


˄ಝ

᎟̺ज‫ޒ‬๧⮱ᱰ‫ݖ‬喑‫࠲͚ڣ‬᠙⩌পᱰȠ㜗 ⩞ᱰহ䔪ⅯᎥ⺼⮱ᱰ‫ݖ‬ąȡຯ᳉̭͗ϧ䔪 Ⅿ㜗⩞হᎥ⺼喑Ш҂ϧ̺ᓄВШ҂ऺͶহ Ш҂᫦ᐼ⺮₏Ѓ䔆ᵤև喑㜗⩞ᅞ᭜Ѓ⮱ϧ ⩌Ⱋ⮱ȡ ⶛⿸㜗⩞҉ͧⰛ⮱ᰶⱭ䛺㺮⮱ᘼͶ喑 ᝭ᰶ̻䔆͗Ⱋ⮱Ⱕᗃ⮱᝸⃢䘪̺‫ิڤ‬ₐᒀ ᕔ喑➦‫ݘ‬᭜䗐ψВ៪䆎䯳Ҁ⮱‫ࢸऺͧ⯷ݖ‬ ‫ݣ‬হ➧➟͗ϧ㜗⩞⮱᝸⃢ȡ⣝Аϧ⩌㔹㜗 ⩞喑䔆᭜̺㼭㜗ᬻ⮱喑̺䰭㺮䃧䃮喑ᅞ䔋 䯳ᱰ̀‫ݣ‬㔲ᕽᕂΌ̺ᓄ̺ឬ䃑䔆̭◦喑䊤 ⴮ౕ‫ڙ‬ᐭ౧वΌ㺮㶕⹧‫ܧ‬ᄦ͗ϧ㜗⩞⮱ᄷ 䛺喑䗐ψ⃬‫ݺ‬ѧՆ⮱๔႓ธग㘪ϻऻ䬕֤ 䓽䔈ࣺ͗ϧ㜗⩞⮱䔤㢜ȡ㮪♣⩅ᙬ些㢜㔲 ̺ͼ‫ڣ‬ϧ喑Ё㏳㻯ᄌ喑๔็఍㑧ͼ㜗Ԏ喑 ᝃ㔲຿࿶‫ݝ‬Ⴎज㜗₸䔈ი喑ສՌ⮴̷⮱卌 ϧЙ㘪์ౕጯ౧̷Вᰡѻ⮱᜽᱙㣤ःᰡͧ۳⶛⮱Ԏᖜ

䨠喑ᄳ๡䶣̷㜗⩞下㔁⮱हㆨ‫ܨ‬㥪ౕౝȡ ͗ϧ㜗⩞ᒀ♣̺᭜㐊ᄦ⮱喑ᒀ♣ज

‫ܧ‬㢜᫦喟ͧ‫ۼ‬ᢿЮ͇᣽ӈ䉏ᩬ㶒䉡ȡ ᭫㔹ᭀ㻮喑㶒䉡䷊Ꮑ䄒ぶλ‫ۼ‬ᢿ᜽᱙喑ѳ

16

ᅊ̺᭜ᩬᏉ㕹㘪ព๔Ƞℾ䬡݈䕍߈㶝䔭᝭

ВߍВ䭽‫ݣ‬喑ѳᓲ䶨᭜㜗ᙬ⮱喑ᝃ㔲䄡㜗

䕍᜽⮱㠓᳉喤

⩞ग㘪䃖⍎㔹̺ज‫ޒ‬๧ȡϧЙΌ䃥ч䬛喑

ᩬᏉᎣ⇎ᰶЮ͇⮱᜽᱙Ԏᖜ喑ग㘪㺮ⅯЮ

⇎ᰶ͗ϧ⮱݈䕍ᅞ⇎ᰶ㏼≻হ᪴ࡃ

㜗₸䔈ი⮱ມ᝺䯫䖀̺᭜䃖⍎γЃ⮱㜗⩞

͇㜗្ȡ㐀᳉जᘠ㔹ⴒ喑Ю͇ᮛ䕺㮇մ倅

⮱㍮㢐喑ϻ⩢▜Ƞ↪䒓‫ߕ⼨ݝ‬䕇Ԏ喑ϻ㐅

ॄ喤㜗⩞ϧহიມ⮱ᵦ᱙ࡧ‫ౕݘ‬λ喑‫ݺ‬㔲

្ȡऻᲒ㒻ప⣜ධᕨ㒟䛴ःओ̭᫦ᐼ喑䃖

⩨Ƞ䄄⁹‫ݝ‬ϑ৺ͽ喑ᬍ̭̺᭜ᕊᘠ㜗⩞依

ͧγ㣤ᓄᰡ๔⮱㜗⩞㔹㜗᜾䭽‫ݣ‬㜗⩞喑ऻ

Юౕ͇ጯ౧̷ϑᭀĄ↎ᴀ䙺䷊ą喑ϑᭀФ

侸হ▢ᙌ㜗⩞ࡴࡻ⮱㐀ᮣ喑ᬍ̭̺⎽λ͗

㔲݆В㜗᜾ມᒦᢏःມᒦЃϧ⮱ᱰ߈ȡ㜗

ᵩ㶕ᬻ喑჋䭲‫ۼ‬ᢿ᜽᱙ϲͧЮ̷្͇᪝⮱

ϧ⮱㜗⩞ᷓᘠহ㜗⩞ࣾᡒȡ❞䔗⩌Ƞ⺼➦

᜾䭽‫⮱ݣ‬᫦ᐼ᭜‫ݣ‬Ⴧ∂ᒸহ㻱݆喑∂ᒸⰸ

࡮ܳ͸̭喆䄨㔲Ό䃥ч䬛喑ᩬᏉͧϭ͵̺

হ΁ጰ᫜喑ᑍ๔ࡰȠ⁹ᓤহ䉊็㟙喑ౕ㜗

̷ࣨ䭽‫ݣ‬γ͗ϧ⮱㵹ߕ㜗⩞喑ѳ㠒⇎ᰶ∂

㘪ᴒั㮇្‫ۼ‬ᢿ᜽᱙⮱Ю͇এ喤ᩬᏉᒀ♣

⩞݈҉⮱⣜ධ͚喑ЃЙᓄВ䓽⩕‫ڣ‬๖᝺喑

ᒸᅞ⇎ᰶহᎠ⼖Ꮌ喑ౕᯡ߈ὗ㵹হᑞ㖶ᑧ

जВ䔆ᵤև喑ѳ⯾ⲐᷭᴒΌ᭜ᰶ᜽᱙⮱喑

㐆᜾Й⪆̸γਟ႓Ƞ⻾႓Ƞ㞧ᱜ̻䉏ჹ喑

丌⮱̓⩹䛹喑ਗ䛹ᰶ͗ϧ㜗⩞ज㼭喤∂ᒸ

᜽᱙ᰶज㘪倅‫̺ݝ‬թᓄ⩇㜠ᬍ∂䉌៲⮱ౝ

Ჱ᜽᜾Й⼝͸ͧ᪴ᬻ⮱ᵥᓰȡ෕Ⴕ᜽㻱⮱

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λϧЙ㘪์ౕጯ౧̷Вᰡѻ⮱᜽᱙㣤ःᰡ

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ͧ۳⶛⮱Ԏᖜȡ

㜗⩞⮱݈䕍߈ȡ

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ᑧ߬๔ᩬᏉ⮱‫ڡ‬䊤䲋ѳ㼐̺۠γጯ౧

ᑄ䛹ᓤᰩ๘ິᑂ⩕⩌ߕ⮱ᵵҸ喑䄡

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๞▢⮱䬛䷅喑㔹́䭽‫͗ݣ‬ϧ㜗⩞喑⾿ᖜγ

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㏼≻෋䪬ᰭᑧߟ⮱ࣾߕᱧÿ͗ϧ⮱ᘠ䆎߈

ౝ᣽ࡴ‫ڙ‬ф⮱⺼‫ݖ‬喑ϻ㔹࢝䃮γχᒀe᫜

हᬣ喑͒ᵩౝ䭽Ⴧᑧ‫ݣ‬ᕔ᝸⃢⮱Ҭ⩕㠰డ

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হҬ⩕⼸Ꮌ喑ᩬᏉຯह∂ᒸ᭜Ԋ䯉㜗⩞⮱

⮱䉱⎽喑ࢸ㑖γ͗ϧࣾᡒ⮱⾧䬡喠ᩬᏉ᎟

์℁‫ݨ‬ᘼͧ⹫чⱭᘠᰡᰶ᩵ౝӰ䔈⹫ч

ጒ‫ڤ‬ȡᄦλ⣝Аϧ喑ᰭ䛺㺮⮱㜗⩞ࢠ‫ݣ‬Ⴧ

䶱រᰟγℾ䬡⮱⓭ߞᱧ‫ݣ‬喑⹫ч։␋喑Ю

喍‫ڣ‬Ѓ⹫ч᜽অ喎⮱‫⯷ݖ‬喑⩕᜾Й̺ᒵ͒

∂ᒸহ䔶᠖ᩬᏉ⮱㜗⩞喑䔆̭㜗⩞ҬЃЙ

͇হ͗ϧ䔽⌽䔭ࡃȡัౕᩬᏉԊ៑̸⮱Ю

ᵩ⮱䄊䃟喑‫ݖ‬ጞ᭜℁‫ݨ‬ᘼ‫ݖ‬Ѓᰡᰶ᩵⮱‫ݖ‬

㘪์Ϙऄ㏼≻Ƞ⹫чȠ᪴ࡃȠᕊᘠぶ᫦䲏

͇͔๞݈᫝⮱ߕ߈喑ᄳ䉱⎽⩕λ⍥䄡হ䉬

Ѓ喑䔆᭜Ȩ㜗⩞䔶᠖ȩ⮱̭͚͗ᓰᕊᘠȡ

⮱Ꭼ∈㜗⩞ȡ

䉯ᩬᏉ喑ВӬ㐔㐚Ϙऄᢿ᫒》ζ⮱㵹ᩬԊ

ѳຯ᳉⩞ₑᓄ‫ܧ‬㐀䃧喑㜗⩞ϲͧ჋⣝͗ϧ

៑ᩬゃ喠͗ϧ݆ӊ䊃ᩬᏉ⮱⺼‫ݖ‬ᐭᩜ喑̺

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᭜Ⱋ⮱喑ࣵ᭜᝸⃢ȡ

‫߈ߗں‬႓΍হࠑ๸ጒ҉ȡȨ㜗⩞䔶᠖ȩ̭

᱙ᘼȡౕ᱙Γ⮱ᑂ㼭͚喑҉㔲ᦅᒂ㒻ప

喍᱙᪴㈨҉㔲ͧᱧᷝጒ͇‫」ࡻ⹫❵ܧ‬㏼

Γ᣼䔝γᝅऻ㠞ప⮱㤻䲎̺ᡜ喑Ϸ๖⁔≟

Ȩ⠙⿸ა㼭ȩ喑㐆‫ܧ‬γ᱙Γ⮱ओ̭͚ᓰᕊ

‫ڥ‬e㏼≻㈨݄Ȩ㜗⩞䔶᠖喍⣺㫼❵喎ȩ͚

⮱էߎ࢞ᱧহᬒ᱙㏼≻⮱ᠮ㐚㥔᲎喑ࣵ҂

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᪴❵᝭҉⮱Ꮌ㼭喎

July 2013

ₐ᭜ౕ䔆͗ᘼͶ̷喑᜾Й䄡喑㜗⩞ᬏ


COLUMN

Cybersecurity goes mobile Notable security breaches in China illustrate the case for beeďŹ ng up safeguards for mobile apps, write Kenny Hui and Billy Graham of PwC

C

hina boasts a population of more than 400 million mobile internet users, a number set to grow with ever-rising demand for smartphones. To capitalize on this trend, many Chinese businesses are developing mobile applications in order to better engage their customers. For example, in 2012, several commercial Chinese banks partnered with telecom operators and third-party payment service providers to develop mobile phone payment apps, often called “mobile wallets,� to more easily allow their customers to make purchases using their phones. But while these apps offer Chinese businesses a great way to engage their customers and employees, this

high level of access and interactivity comes at a price. When Chinese customers use mobile apps, they often share personally identifiable information, which could include their identity card number, name, home address, mobile phone number or bank account details. Employees, on the other hand, sometimes use their personal mobile devices to access corporate data and intellectual property inside and outside their traditional corporate workspace. According to a recent PwC survey, 88% of consumers globally use their mobile device for both personal and work purposes. As a result, mobile apps have become a prime target for hackers looking for valuable infor-

mation that they can exploit. While Chinese companies understand the benefits of mobile apps, many are still not adequately prepared for the evolving threat of mobile hacking and should be ,FOOZ)VJ doing more to protect themselves. Although China does have some data privacy regulations that govern the collection and use of personal information, the threats to mobile apps evolve quickly, so complying with regulations may not #JMMZ(SBIBN be fully adequate. Businesses in China and abroad have started to realize that mobile app security, and information security more broadly, are global concerns, regardless of where customers or employees are based. As Chinese apps gain popularity and attract users from around the globe, the need for information security becomes more important and also more challenging. As such, when determining the level of security needed for a mobile app, businesses in China must consider the sensitivity of the data that they are trying to protect and appropriately invest in mobile app security. Based on the mobile security-related work PwC does globally, the

July 2013

17


COLUMN

three key security considerations that Chinese businesses must address when developing an app are identifying the user, protecting data and recognizing an app’s vulnerability to reverse engineering.

Protecting your vitals How does the app verify the identity of the person using it? If identification happens at the app (not the device) level, is it centrally managed? These questions should be top of mind when considering how users will be identified and allowed to access apps. Traditional approaches such as username and password do not always fit well into a mobile context. Therefore, in some cases where the enterprise requires more than a device passcode, new and innovative techniques can be employed in order to balance the ease of use and protection of sensitive information. These new approaches should still rely on three foundational concepts to identify a user: namely something you are, something you have or something you know. This may include biometrics, a physical or virtual token, or a password. Data protection considerations generally fall into two categories – data in storage and data in transit. Sensitive data in storage is normally encrypted. Encrypted data is generally safe, as it can only be accessed with a “key.” However, the risk here is that the encryption key is stored or saved in an easily accessible location (on the mobile device). In one recent instance, hackers were able to find and exploit a vulnerability within an app developed by

18

July 2013

a major Chinese enterprise. The app stored customer passwords in plain text on the mobile device. The hackers were able to exploit this vulnerability and use the passwords to sign into the app and gain access to the protected personal information stored within. As a result, these hackers were able to make transactions using the identity and account details of these customers. Data in transit refers to protecting data as it moves between the mobile app and company servers. When implemented correctly, encryption is effective for protecting data in transit from being intercepted. Very sensitive or critical data should also be protected in memory.

Avenue of attack Hackers often attack apps through reverse engineering, which entails taking an app downloaded to a mobile device and decoding it to view its contents. Attackers often use this to derive assembly code, which they analyze to determine the app’s behavior, and in some cases, change the app’s behavior to do things that were never intended. One notable instance of this happening in China was in the form of a Trojan, malware that appears on the surface to be innocuous. The Trojan was embedded in several reputable apps that users would install on their mobile devices, after which the Trojan would use their account details to make a series of transactions, including downloading paid apps and activating other paid-for, on-demand services. A company must keep in mind that an attacker with access to an app can eventually circumvent its security controls and safeguards with enough

time. Whenever a firm is considering launching an app, it must weigh the sensitivity of the data involved if it were leaked against the cost of defensive coding implementation. To better improve the security of their mobile apps, businesses in China should focus on a few key areas. First, companies should think through motivations and arguments for developing the app from a business perspective and then clearly articulate the case for security controls and safeguards. Second, if companies are planning to develop more than one mobile application, they should examine the controls and safeguards needed across each of their apps to identify security patterns. These two steps will make it easier to identify common patterns and build robust and flexible security solutions for an array of use cases. Last, companies can develop a roadmap to address current security gaps to help keep security aligned to the business and allow security to evolve as technologies and business initiatives evolve. Mobile apps have the potential to help usher in new ways of doing business, but security cannot be taken lightly. As companies begin to push the boundaries of what can be done on mobile apps, security organizations will need to keep up. The time to get ahead of the curve on security is now.

Kenny Hui is a partner in the risk and controls assurance practice at PwC China. Billy Graham is a mobile security specialist with the firm


COLUMN

Paul French’s diary Urbanization, aging and a Chinese relaxation crisis

F

ew subjects in China today are more interesting or all encompassing than urbanization, particularly as we enter a fascinating demographic shift that will reduce the rate of urbanization. China is simply running out of bodies in the countryside to transport to the cities. This is forcing change – however much Beijing may resist it. That includes change to urban planning, change to how service and manufacturing sector economics work and change to – or even better the scrapping of – the hukou system, hopefully sooner rather than later. In my travels, it’s nice to come across Chinese cities that are a bit more relaxed and pleasant than the frenetic megalopolises. I recently spent a few days in Yichang, over in Hubei province, at the gateway to the Three Gorges. Yichang is what the Chinese call a small city at a mere 4.6 million people, but it doesn’t feel crowded. Its roads aren’t grid-locked, its air seems clean, industry is kept on the outskirts and people seem happy and relaxed. It’s a medical center for its area, but its many hospitals and clinics don’t seem to be suffering from the overcrowding and chaos bigger city hospitals invariably face. Yichang appears to me to have a nice mix of green and industry as well as old and new. Perhaps it’s not a perfect case study or about to get into Monocle’s infamous list of

the world’s “most liveable” cities just yet, but it seems to be getting something right. I pondered this question of livability with some Chinese bankers while in Yichang. One of them raised the interesting idea that a big problem in Chinese cities is a lack of relaxation-related facilities for most people. He bemoaned that while leisure giants like Disney were actively courted by Chinese cities, every- 1BVM'SFODI day leisure facilities providers – private sports centers, smaller scale attractions, etc – could never get funding from the banking system as it is presently structured. Consequently they either don’t happen, or they get built and are underfunded, disappointing and go broke pretty fast. Another Yichang contact believed that the problem lay more with people not being sure what to do with leisure time, outside of going on full-blown holidays. There simply aren’t enough outlets to let people develop hobbies. This does seem to be a problem. A friend who works for a major photography equipment brand tried to start up a camera club a while ago – to encourage people to take pictures, join communities of camera enthusiasts, take better pictures and buy more expensive kits. But trying to get such a club started proved impossible legally, and in the end he dropped the idea. China has legions of amateur photographers, desperate to enjoy their hobby and sometimes coming together online or in small informal groups, but rarely in organized clubs. All of these problems are going to become more acute. China’s aging population is a big theme now with China pontificators. In Yichang, the range of new providers of services for the old, from care homes to at-home help, was astonishing. They’ll be needed as China foresees fully 97% of its elder care needs in the future being met by either home-based healthcare or community-based initiatives. All of these can’t be either run by or solely funded by Beijing – China will need better financing systems and more volunteerism and informal organization to meet this challenge.

July 2013

19


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⮱䔆ψ䬛䷅喑̺᭜఍ͧ䉏ჹ๗็喑㔹᭜䉏

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ᢵ喑すιѺ᭜৵҈๔႓⮱⤳ᴒᓤeᑄ䛹ᓤ

⩕㕹ᱰ⮱ज㘪ȡ

अ᜽㐬㞟͚ప喤ąЃ䔅䄡䓴̭ऒ䄊喟Ϸ๖ ⮱㒻ప㺬⁔⹫ч喑ຯ᳉㘪์अ᜽̭๖⮱͚ ప喑䗐͵䔆ψపუ⮱᩵⢴ᅞч෋ߍȡ఍ͧ ౕ䃛чᩬ⇨⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑᝭ᰶ⮱‫ڞڙ‬ᩬゃ䘪 ⭘⬗ȡ キ㔹㼭͸ȡ㟊ߍ਒๔႓⮱ᑄ䛹ᓤᰩ᣽ 䚿᜾Йࡰ̴̺㺮ѻѝጯ౧⮱߈䛼喠৵҈๔ ႓⮱ᑄ䛹ᓤᰩ䃑ͧ喑䔅᭜㺮ᅪ̭ܴ߈䛼ࣾ ᆂ㏼≻喑᝺㘪Ҭܳ䙺䔽⌽䊝ा‫ڙ‬Ꭰ喠す̶ Ѻᑄ䛹ᓤᰩ݆᣽ՎᰶᎼࣾᆂȡ ͚ప㺮̺᫚ౝ䊝ाᐭᩫȡ᜾Й᝺䊝γ ̭◦䌜喑ጟ㏼ፓᲒγ䔆ᵤ⮱᜽᩵喑ຯ᳉᜾ Йߴλᐭᩫ喑䗐͵䛷ᩫ‫⮱ܧ‬⒉߈чᰡ๔ȡ 喍ᵦᢛ҉㔲ౕす࡮̭ᅷࡻϧЮ͇䶳㷃̷⊤

χᒀe᫜ჳ⮱Ȩపჹ䃧ȩຍჇγ㏼≻႓⮱ധ⵭

20

July 2013

ምч̷⮱⑁䃟᪡⤳喎


ቓ‫֭ނ‬൐օ Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ज㘪᭜䕇䓴᰺ߎᣕߕ㏼≻䒙ಸ⮱ᰭҠᬣᱧ ᪴]䭵⥓ь̷⊤ϑ䕇๔႓Ⴖ∝㏼ノ႓䮏᪆ᢵ

≻὎ᐼᓄ⯷ȡ э㐌⮱㏼≻෋䪬᫦ᐼ 䕍᜽⮱䬛䷅হऻ᳉ᒵ⌞䔉ȡ ϻ䔆⻺ᘼͶ̷Გ䃟喑ᅞ᭜ᄦ λ͚ప㏼≻䒙ಸ⮱‫ݺ‬ᮜ‫ڤ‬ᰶ ̺⶛Ⴧᕔȡ ѳ᭜喑ᄦλ͚ప᰺ߎ ͇喑ᄦλ᰺ߎᣕߕ͚ప㏼≻ 䒙ಸ喑⣝ౕज㘪᭜ᰭສ⮱ᬣ

䭵⥓ь

Аȡ䔆ᅞᘼঠⱭ͚ప㏼≻䒙 ಸᎣ̺᭜キࢂ⮱䃖(%1෋䪬⢴ϻ⃼ᎡȠ ‫ۼ‬ᄾ‫ݝ‬ᝃ喑㔹᭜㺮Ⅿ‫ڲ‬ღ⮱䒙ࡃȡѳ ‫ڲ‬ღ䒙ࡃϲ䲍э㐌⮱㏼≻‫ݣ‬Ꮣ᭜⇎ᰶ㘪߈ ࣨ䶧‫ݖ‬჋᫪⮱喑‫׼‬᰺ߎ͇䔆ㆨͨ㺮ӊចጯ ᜽ߌ⮱᰺ߎ͇чᰡߍ‫݈∕ڠ‬᫝

౧᜽䪬䊤Გ⮱᫝‫ڡ‬ϔ͇喑чᰡߍᰶ‫ݖ‬ౝᣕ ߕ͚ప㏼≻䒙ಸȡ

ߕ㏼≻䒙ಸ喑ᅞч⊶ࣷ‫ݝ‬㏼≻๔㗹

߈ȡ఍ₑ䔆็Ꭱ⮱䬛䷅⼜㉜̸Გ‫ݝ‬⣝

ᮜȡᰶ͗Ԅຄ⮱䄡∂᭜䃱䃧䔆͗㗹

ౕ喑ऻ᳉᭜ᒵ͒䛺⮱ȡ

ᮜ⮱喑Ą⣝ౕ᭜ᰭສ⮱ᬣА喑Ό᭜ᰭጛ⮱

ⱌₐສ⮱᰺ߎ͇̭Ⴧ᭜ጯ౧ᄩा喑̭ Ⴧ᭜ᘠⱭͧ჏ᝤ᰺ߎȡ᝭ᰶສ⮱᰺ߎ὎ᐼ

ᰭᵥᓰ⮱䬛䷅喑ᅞ᭜ౕ䓴ࣨ็Ꭱ

⮱‫ܧ‬⣝喑‫׼‬㠦᳉⮱΁ጰ᫜喑Ѓ᝭ᰶ㔰㭾⮱

䛹喑͚ప㏼≻෋䪬᭜⩞䉱䛾Ƞ䉱⎽䕇䓴ᩬ

♓◦̻‫◦ࣾܧ‬ᅞ᭜჏ᝤ⮱Ҁ侹হᙌऄȡສ

᜾͗ϧ喑࠲᠙ᒵ็⛌ᖶ⮱᰸ࣸ喑䘪ᙌ

Ꮙ⮱⍍䖀∕‫ݝڒ‬㏼≻͚ȡ͚ప㏼≻᜽䪬⮱

⮱হ᜽ߌ⮱᰺ߎ͇̭Ⴧч∕䛺ノ⤳̻ប㵹

‫ݝ‬ᄦ͚ప㏼≻Გ䄡喑⣝ౕज㘪᭜Ꭳ̺ສ⮱

ͨ㺮ᣕߕ߈᭜ᩬᏉȡᩬᏉᣕߕ(%1෋䪬⮱

߈ȡ࣌Გ⮱᜽䪬ͨ㺮ӊច̻ᩬᏉ⮱‫ڠ‬㈨喑

ᬣАȡ㮪♣᪝ႄᒵ␯ϛ喑ѳ᭜ᄦ䓾᱌⮱ᙌ

☚ᗲহ⼜Ხᕔ‫ݝ‬Ϸ๖᭜䓴Ъౝ♂ࣾ‫ܧ‬Გȡ

ͨ㺮ᓄ⯷λ᪝䛼⮱෋䪬喑䯫‫ٺ‬чᔪ⪒ᄦノ

ऄ喑͚ప㏼ࢳγ็Ꭱ⮱ࣾᆂ喑Ό䃥⣝ౕ

䓴ࣨ็Ꭱ喑В๛ЮͧА㶕⮱పᰶЮ͇Ꮛ

⤳হប㵹߈⮱‫̻∕ڠ‬჋᫪ȡ䔆Ό᭜᰺ߎ͇

ⱌₐₒ‫ڒ‬γ⬈㠓⮱䄰᪡᱌喑㔹́чᠮ㐚Ⱕ

๔‫ݝ‬Ϸ๖䔆͗ౝₒ䊲‫ܧ‬᝭ᰶϧ⮱䶱᱌喑ͨ

㘪์ᣕߕ͚ప㏼≻䒙ಸ⮱䛺㺮㔹⠙➦⮱х

ᒀ䪬⮱ᬣ䬡ȡ͚ప㏼≻Ꮑ䄒䄡̺᭜ัλສ

㺮ᅞ᭜䕇䓴∕‫ڒ‬䉱⎽᝭䕍᜽⮱ȡ

߬ȡ⣝ౕ䉱᱙Ό䱿ⱽ᰺ߎ͇ȡ℘ᬍ⪾䬛喑

ᬣАąȡ

⮱ᬣА喑⩇㜠Ⱕ䒰䓴ࣨᎡ喑ज㘪᭜ᰭጛ ⮱ᬣАȡ

䔆⻺ࣾᆂᓄ⯷λಱ᫚䉱⎽হᩬੳ‫ڠ‬ ㈨喑䔆ψ䘕䬕হЮ͇ᓄ‫℁ݝ‬䒰ᔘ⮱ࣾᆂȡ

᜾Йែ䉱᫝‫ڡ‬ϔ͇喑ᄦλ䗐ψэ㐌㏼≻⇎ ᰶϭ͵‫ڡ‬䋐ȡ

͚ప㏼≻⮱䬛䷅喑ͨ㺮᭜ౕ䓴ࣨᎡ

䔆⻺ࣾᆂ䓴⼸हᬣ㙞⻨γ䨣㵹Ҁ㈨ȡ͚ప

᜽ߌ⮱᰺ߎ͇чᰡߍ‫݈∕ڠ‬᫝ȡ݈᫝

䛹⼜㉜হ᭫⣝‫ܧ‬Გ⮱ȡᰭ‫ڠ‬䩛⮱࣌఍喑ᅞ

⮱䛾㲺Ҁ㈨ͨ㺮డ㐂ᩬᏉȠపᰶЮ͇Ƞ̷

᭜⩞ጯ౧ᑂᄩ‫ܧ‬Გ喑̻ጯ౧㉔ჳ㐀वౕ̭

᭜䓴ࣨ็Ꭱ喑ᄦλ࣌Გ෋䪬὎ᐼ‫ܧ‬⣝⮱

ጯ‫ڙ‬थౕ䒙ȡ఍ₑ喑䔆⻺䉱⎽∕‫ڒ‬᫦ᐼ̺

䊤喑♣ऻ㐀वឭᱜ喑чᣕߕ᰺ߎౕ͇͚ప

䬛䷅⇎ᰶ䛴ःⱌₐᰶ჋䉕ᘼͶ⮱ᣗ᫪ࣨ䔈

ϲᒞ৺‫ݝ‬Ю͇̻ᩬᏉ㜗䏘⮱㵹ͧ喑䔅ិ䛾

㏼≻㐀Ჱ䄰᪡হ㏼≻䒙ಸ͚䊤‫̺ݝ‬जᰬА

㵹㏍ₐ喑ᰡ̺⩕䄡ᩦ䲖γȡ䓴ࣨ็Ꭱ喑

㲺Ҁ㈨᠃‫ݝ‬ѻ᩵⢴⮱᛿ᘝ⟣ۢȡ⇎ᰶ䔆⻺

⮱҉⩕ȡϲϻ᪝ᢛ̷ⰸ喑͚ప㏼≻ч㏼ࢳ

ᩦ䲖ധ᱙̷։␋γȡ

㵹ᩬͨᄩ὎ᐼ⮱㏼≻෋䪬喑͚ప䨣㵹͇̺

⬈㠓⮱ᬣ᱌喑‫͚׼‬ప㗎ጯ̭ᵤȡѳ᭜ϻ‫ڲ‬

䔆̻ࢳटΌᰶ◦Ⱕѩȡ䔈‫ڒ‬䉏ჹ㉜

ज㘪ᰶ䔆ᵤ̭⻺‫⋓ݖ‬ᩣ‫ڒ‬ȡϷ๖喑䨣㵹⮱

ღᲒⰸ喑᫝‫ڡ‬ϔౕ͇͚పᖝᖝᰶⱭ䲋፥Ꭼ

⼜⮱ᬣА喑ჹ㸂ч㙽㮭ϧ⮱ᘼᔄȡ็

ᩣ䉦ᒀ♣២̺䓴‫ݖ‬ጛ⮱ᩣ‫ڒ‬ȡѳ᭜䨣㵹⮱

∈⮱᱗Გȡ

Ꭱ‫ݺ‬ᰶᒵ็䬛䷅喑๔უ䘪᛿ᘝȠ䘪ᣕ䄬ȡ

ᩣ䉦෋ߍ䲋፥ᔘ喑̺᭜䲍᣽倅᰺ߎ䉕䛼Გ

喍ᵦᢛ҉㔲ౕす࡮̭ᅷࡻϧЮ͇䶳㷃̷⊤

ᒀ♣喑̭ψЮ͇უȠ͇̀ϧธΌ᭜ᰶᓰᬍ

᣽倅喑䔅᭜ӊចႰ⮱ౝѺ喑ӊចэ㐌⮱㏼

ምч̷⮱⑁䃟᪡⤳喎

July 2013

21


COLUMN

Reading into official corruption Chinese media plays to a public cynical about corruption and wannabe officials ready to embrace it, writes media scholar Ying Zhu

G

raft, gluttony and the efforts to curb both have been Chinese news h ffixtures for two decades. Back in the 1990s, thenB Premier Zhu Rongji P llaunched a series of anti:JOH;IV c corruption campaigns tthat led to a number of high-ranking officials being ousted. The Communist Party today continues to revere Zhu for his resolve against corruption. A recent article in the official communist publication Liaoning Correspondence Party School magazine commemorated Zhu for his tough stand. President Xi Jinping now seeks to take up Zhu’s mantle. Late last year, after taking the top post in the party, Xi launched an austerity campaign to rein in lavish taxpayer-financed spending by officials and state-owned companies. While the crackdown targets conspicuous displays of wealth among China’s elite, it does not root out concentrations of money and power, those that reward people with the right family pedigree and connection. The public, therefore, has remained skeptical of the anti-corruption campaign. There is no shortage of online jokes mocking the renewed moderation campaign. “Eat quietly, take gently and play secretly” has become the unofficial catchphrase of the corrupt. As references to corruption and

22

July 2013

efforts to combat it permeate all of mainland society, Chinese television has been quick to cash in by producing TV dramas that offer up some version of righteous leaders who lead the fight against corruption. Many of these dramas were adaptations of anti-corruption novels that first came into vogue in the mid-1990s. The novels frequently featured heroic party officials, professing the uplifting message that corruption should and can be eradicated.

The loss of innocence Several early anti-corruption dramas were modeled on former Chongqing police chief Wang Lijun, the righthand man of the city’s ousted party chief Bo Xilai, who was hailed as an anti-graft hero before the scandal that landed him in prison. Then, in 2007, the TV series “The Great Ming Dynasty 1566” (“Daming Wangchao 1566”) hit the airwaves and gave a more candid consideration of official corruption. The show gave a new treatment to official corruption, treating it as inevitable and unstoppable. “1566” offered an intriguing look at the bureaucratic functioning of the Jiajing Emperor’s court in which thenruler Zhu Houcong relinquished dayto-day governance to subordinates. The Ming court was corrupt at all levels, which contributed to social unrest during the Jiajing period, a period not dissimilar from the situation in today’s China. “1556” exposed the

massive and systemic dysfunction of the Ming court and the extreme hardship ordinary people endured during that period. In “1566,” the shame associated with corruption is replaced by an eagerness to partake, to be part of the privileged few with means to be corrupt. It is Chinese television’s first drama that takes politics as is, showcasing the nuts and bolts of political “craftsmanship” without moralizing. The arrival of “1566” was informed by the revival of fiction on officialdom as a genre in the second half of the 2000s. In a new twist for the genre, several ex- or current officials tried their hands at writing novels that injected their real-life experiences into fictitious plots set in the circles of power. Wang Xiaofang, the former secretary to the executed Shenyang deputy mayor wrote “The Mayor’s Secretary” (2005) based on his experience serving in the city of Shenyang. Wang’s “The Chief of the Beijing Liaison Office” (2007) portrays the Shenyang liaison office in Beijing as a breeding hub of corruption. “The Civil Servant’s Notebook” (2009) reflects on the unspoken rules governing Chinese society, lamenting the trapped lives of civil servants.

Elite readership Such novels have become bestsellers, serving, in a perverse way, as manuals for China’s new generation of civil


Credit: alcuin

servants – they apparently make up the largest segment of readership for officialdom novels. The popularity of these novels implies a fascination with party politics and arguably a desire to become part of the power elite. Wealth is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the politically powerful and is then handed down within a few established family dynasties, so success has become increasingly inherited. Not surprisingly, the exclusivity of power has only further propelled recent college students in China to reach out to the party in hopes of joining the elite. Research shows that the most rapidly growing members within the CCP are now college students. They seek to join the party because they believe that party membership will lead to job security and social prosperity. In this fashion, as some have commented, the party has transformed itself from the Orwellian Big Brother to a Big Brother fraternity. The new officialdom novels deal

with the culture of Chinese officialdom, both the trivialities of government offices and the heart-wrenching struggles of their main characters. The works focus on the protagonist’s compulsive abuse of power, the complexity of human relationships involved and the struggle of those with a conscience. Here the corrupted officials are portrayed not as villains but as major players in a larger system. So epidemic, endemic, systemic and routine is corruption in China, the moral indignation and the will to rectify it reflected in the anti-corruption novels and dramas a decade ago have vanished. While the anti-corruption genre tackled the issues of China’s political culture, attempting to uncover a deeprooted political psychology, the officialdom novels take as a start point the inevitability of corruption and are lavish in their detailed descriptions of crooked dealings. The TV drama “1566” debuted

against this larger social background. From anti-corruption to officialdom, the evolution of Chinese primetime TV dramas registers the shifting mood of a Chinese society from moral indignation to complacence and resignation, and above all, cynicism. It remains to be seen if the party’s new round of austerity measure would actually amount to something that is effective enough to swing the public mood.

Ying Zhu is a professor in and chair of the Department of Media Culture at the City University of New York, the College of Staten Island. A leading scholar on Chinese cinema and media studies, she is the author or editor of eight books, most recently of “Two Billion Eyes: The Story of China Central Television.” She is currently working on a project concerning Sino-Hollywood courtship.

July 2013

23


˄ಝ

Ҋ௤ֱ֭օࡖ ⹫ч̺‫ڙ‬Ꭰ⮱ऻ᳉ज㘪᭜ϭ͵ ᪴]㏓⦌๘e᫜㦯ᵩ‫ݖ‬㡕喍+PTFQI&4UJHMJU[喎Ꭱ䄧䉊ᅁ㏼≻႓຃ᓄͨ

㏓⦌๘e᫜㦯ᵩ‫ݖ‬㡕

Ϸᰶ̶๔ͨ䷅৺ᒨ

▢喑᭜ᬍ᩵⢴⮱ᰭ๔ᵦ⎽喑Ό᭜̺Ꭰぶ⮱

ᚏহ(%1䭺ѻͧАФȡₐຯ᜾ᄳ᭫⹧⮱喑

‫⤰ڕ‬喟す̭喑ጯ౧

̭͗ͨ㺮࣌఍ȡ

჋䭲ᗲۢᖝᖝⰥࣺ喟᜾Й⮱⣝ᰶҀ‫Ⱑ̭ݣ‬

Ꭳ Ꭳ⇎ᰶࣾᡒᏁᰶ⮱҉⩕喑఍

᱙Γ䄂ఫ⌞Ꮣ䬽䛷ࣾ⩌ౕ㒻ప⮱̭

̺᫚ౝិ䉏ჹϻ⹫чᏂᅯহ͚ᅯ䒙⼨‫̷ݝ‬

ͧႰЙ᭫♣ᬏᬍ᩵⢴Ό̺⽠ ͧ

͗䬛䷅ÿ᜾Й᭜ຯ҂अ᜽γຯₑ̺‫ڙ‬Ꭰ

ᅯ喑ѳ䔆⻺Ҁ‫ݣ‬᩵⢴๗ѻ喑В㜠λ̷ᅯ⮱

Ⴧ喠すι喑ᩬ⇨Ҁ‫ݣ‬Ꭳ⇎ᰶ Ⴧ

⮱Ƞᱧч䊷Გ䊷ᄾ⮱⹫ч喑䔆⻺̺‫ڙ‬Ꭰ⮱

᝭ᓄ䔉䔉ᄾλ͚ᅯহᏂᅯ⮱᝭๞ȡ჋䭲

㏍ₐጯ౧๞▢喠す̶喑㏼≻ ㏍

ऻ᳉ज㘪᭜ϭ͵ȡ

̷喑᜾Йͧᬒ⯷ߍ‫ޔ‬হ䊲๔㻱὎⮱̺Ꭰぶ

Ҁ‫ݣ‬হᩬ⇨Ҁ‫ౕݣ‬ᵦ᱙̷䘪 Ҁ

᜾Ϸᬒ᝭᣼䔝⮱ᮜ䆎ᰶψ吜⌎喟᜾

Ѕ‫ܧ‬γ倅ᬯАФ喟̺ϲ᭜෋䪬ᩫᚏহ(%1

᭜̺‫ڙ‬Ꭰ⮱ȡᅪノ᱙Γ‫∕ڠ‬ ᭜

Й᝺݇݇ᐭ໸γ㼐᜾Йపუռ⻨γ݊㶤ᰶ

䭺ѻ喑⩇㜠䔅ᰶᰡ็⮱̺⽠Ⴧȡ䔆䔅̺࠲

⮱᭜ႅౕλᒀϷ㒻పহ‫ڣ‬Ѓ ⮱

็䔉ȡ̺䓴Ϻ♣䔅ᰶጹ᱈ȡ䔅ᰶ‫ڣ‬Ѓิ䔶

᠙᜾ЙЅ‫ڣ⮱ܧ‬ЃАФ喟㷘‫ݷ‬ᑞγ⮱ℾͨ

᳽ψࣾ䓫ጒ͇ࡃపუ͚䓴Ꮣ ᳽

ᵳ᳣㘪ᰡສౝ᰺ߎλ᪡Ҁ㏼≻喑ᰭ䛺㺮⮱

‫ݣ‬Ꮣ喑䭺ѻγ⮱‫ڙ‬ᎠহₐͶᙌ喑⩇㜠䔅ᰶ

̺Ꭰぶ⮱⣝䆎喑ѳ᱙ΓΌ㼐䛷γ䔆̶๔ͨ

᭜喑㘪ᰡສౝ᰺ߎλᎬ๔‫ڙ‬ℾȡ䔆⻺ิ䔶

᜾‫ݺٵ‬᣽‫⮱ݝ‬ᄦℾ᫼䃑हᙌ⮱䉕⪾ȡ

䷅᭜ຯ҂ჳܴⰥ䔋⮱喟̺Ꭰぶ᭜ᩬ⇨Ҁ‫ݣ‬

ᵳ᳣⮱̭䘕ܳ㺮Ⅿጯ౧̻ᩬᏉ͸䬡ᰶ̭⻺

᜾㏼፥ც∈ౝҬ⩕Ą䗐⮱㓑Ҁą

๞䉒⮱᜽఍হऻ᳉喑̺ᎠぶΌ䕍᜽γ㏼≻

ᰡສ⮱Ꭰ㶎喑䔆⻺㻯◦ᓄ‫ݝ‬⣝А㏼≻⤳䃧

䔆̭㶕䔝᫦ᐼᲒ᣽̷ࣷᅯϧธ⮱㏼≻হᩬ

Ҁ‫⽠̺⮱ݣ‬Ⴧ喑㏼≻Ҁ‫⽠̺⮱ݣ‬Ⴧࣵߍ‫ޔ‬

হࢳट䃮ᢛ⮱हᬣᩜᠮ喑ᄦₑ᜾⼺ऻᄳߍ

⇨ᱰ߈ȡౕᰶψᗲ̸ۢ喑᜾ⱌₐᘠ᣽ࣷ⮱

γ̺Ꭰぶÿ䔆⻺ᖣᕔ̸䭺ᐼ㳧᫸Ҭ᜾Й

В㼐䛷ȡౕ䔆ψิ䔶ᵳ᳣͚喑ᩬᏉឬ៲⮱

‫ڣ‬჋᭜̭͗ᰡᄼ⮱㓑Ҁÿ䗐㓑Ҁ͚⮱

䶧߬㔹̸喑㺮⾮ⵡ䔆⻺ఝᅭग㘪䕇䓴ຯ᜾

̭䶦㻿㞟᭜ᩣ‫ܳںڒ‬䙺喑ᅑ‫ڣ‬᭜ᒀጯ౧䓴

‫ݺ‬喠ౕओ̭ψᗲ̸ۢ喑℁ຯౕ䃕䃧Ϙ

̸᪴᝭䔝⮱ࡼ䄰̭㜡⮱ᩬゃȡ

⼸⮱㐀᳉๔ⰥᒱᏚ⮱ᬣՆȡ

ऄ㇫㠞᪆㗟ᬣ喑᝭ᠴ⮱㓑Ҁᅞᰡ๔̭ψ喑

ᒵ᭫♣喑ጯ౧Ꭳ⇎ᰶ‫׼‬ႰЙ⮱呀०㔲

ឦ‫ݑ‬ᩣ‫ܳںڒ‬䙺⮱ϧᰶᬣч䄡‫ܳں‬䙺

ა⼝⮱䗐ᵤᰶ᩵䓽㵹ȡጯ౧᱙Ꮑ䄒᭜⽠Ⴧ

⮱᜽᱙䓴倅ȡЃЙฝ⼝ើ‫ݣ‬఍㉍䓴็喑⾤

䄨㔲Ό䃥䃑ͧ᜾ᄦλ䨣㵹უহ‫ڙ‬थ

⮱喑ѳፚࢤ‫⮱⤰ڕ‬䛾㲺࢞ᱧ㶕ᬻጯ౧जВ

ϧহ͚䬡ᅯϧธ⮱᝭ᓄ䔉̺㘪ᑒ㶒̷ᅯϧ

$&0䄵䃧䓴็喑ᄦλᎡ䛾㲺࢞ᱧࣷ

अᓄᲮ‫⽠̺ڣ‬ჇᎣϔ⩌ⵡ౼ᕔऻ᳉ȡ䨣㵹

ธ⮱᝭๞ȡठ㔩ϧธ㏼፥ζ䃧䖀喑᜾Й᱙

‫ऻڣ‬᳉Ό䄵䃧䓴็喑ᅑ‫ڣ‬᭜ౕ㒻ప⮱̺Ꭰ

უЙ̺ᘉ‫ڿ‬䮖喑ຯ᳉̺᭜ᩬᏉᤡߖ⮱䄊喑

जВᰶᰡ็⮱Ꭰぶ喑ѳᓲ䶨В㏼≻෋䪬ᩫ

ぶ䬛䷅⩞ᲒጟͲ⮱ᗲ̸ۢȡ䔆̺ϲ᭜఍ͧ

䔆ψ‫ڿ‬䮖чᄳЃЙ㜗䏘হ᪡͗㏼≻ࢤ‫⑖ڒ‬ ⋎ȡ̺䓴喑ᒀ᜾ЙЁ㏳჎㻳㏼≻Ҁ‫ݣ‬ᬣ喑 ᅞчࣾ⣝䔆Ꭳ䲋֣♣喟䨣㵹უЙ᭜ऄ‫⓭ݝ‬ ߞ᝺䔆ᵤ‫ڿ‬䮖⮱ȡ ጯ౧⮱х◦᱙Ꮑ᭜Ⴐ⮱᩵⢴喑♣㔹⣝ ౕ⮱ጯ౧᭫♣̺᭜ᰶ᩵⢴⮱ȡ㏼≻႓ᰭധ ᱙⮱∂݆᭜䰭Ⅿぶλӈ㐆喑䔆᭜㏼≻ᰶ᩵ 䓽㵹⮱ᓲ㺮᲎Уȡѳ᜾Й᝭ั⮱䔆͗̓⩹ ႅౕⱭ๔䛼᱗␎䋠⮱䰭Ⅿ喑℁ຯ喑Ҭ⾤ϧ ᥳ㙞䉘ఝ᝭䰭⮱ែ䉱ȠӰ䔈䲋≟হ‫ڣ‬Ѓ๔ ≟⁍ࣾ䓫పუࣾᆂ᝭䰭⮱ែ䉱Ƞᩦ䔈‫⤰ڕ‬ ㏼≻ВᏁᄦ‫⤰ڕ‬अᯃᠾᝅ᝭䰭⮱ែ䉱ȡह ᬣ喑᜾Йࣵᰶ๔䛼᱗‫⮱⩕ݖܳٲ‬䉱⎽ÿ 䬟㒛ᝃ㔲ϔ㘪⇎ᰶ䓫‫ݝ‬ᰭ๔ࡃ⮱ጒϧহᱧ கȡ๞͇喑ᅑ‫ڣ‬᭜ጯ౧̺㘪ͧф็‫ڙ‬ℾ݈ 䕍ጒ҉⮱㐀Ჱᕔ๞͇᭜ᰭ͒䛺⮱ጯ౧๞

24

July 2013

㒻పℾф⹧༮ោ䃛๞ࣨᝬᅸ២៩䉻ఋᱰ

Ό䃥᭜ᕨϧऐ⮱ᝃȡ


⣝ᰶҀ‫̺Ⱑ̭ݣ‬᫚ౝិ䉏ჹϻ⹫чᏂᅯহ͚ᅯ䒙⼨‫̷ݝ‬ᅯ

䨣㵹უহ‫ڙ‬थ$&0ጟ㏼᜽ͧ‫ڞڙ‬㜳䃧⮱䳚

Ꭳ̺๴ᕗ喑ᩬ⇨̻̺Ꭰぶ͸䬡⮱㖁

Ხ࣯̻ᩬ⇨⮱უᏚ喑๔ϧЙॷ䃶᜾䛾䧞̺

ᡋᄦ䆎喑ᰡ䛺㺮⮱᭜喑ЃЙ䆎ᒮⱭ䬛䷅⮱

㈨ጟ᜽ͧᰭ䓾䃥็᪴」হ㦄҉⮱♓◦ȡѳ

᭜ᰭ䛺㺮⮱喑䛾䧞ϻᲒ䘪Ν̺ᲒᎥ⺼喠ᰭ

᝭ౕȡᒵ๔̭䘕ܳᲒ㜗̷ᅯ⮱̺Ꭰぶ᭜̻

᭜ౕ̭͗ϧϧ䘪ᰶែ⺕ᱰ喍㔹́ᵦᢛჇ

䛺㺮⮱᭜ͧЃϧ᰺ߎহ䔪Ⅿ‫ٲ‬჋⮱㇫⺋⩌

䛾㲺⩹হ‫ڙ‬थ$&0ᰶ‫⮱ڠ‬ȡ̺ϲຯₑ喑

Ͷ喑็᪝䔶ℾᎣౕ̺䗐⮱㓑Ҁ䛹喎⮱

≨ȡѳ᭜ౕ૔ௐ⮱̓㏗ᎡА喑䮼Ɑ᜾

䔆ψ䶳ᄩ㔲䔅፛Ɑൾ䕍γ᜾Йᄦλϭ͵᭜

ℾͨపუ䛹喑䛾䧞‫ݝ‬Ꮒͧ҂Ꭳ́ຯ҂䔆͵

ౕ䭬吅᫜➦႓䮏̺᫚ᣒ㼓᫝ᕊᘠ喑᜾ࣾ⣝

ສ㏼≻ᩬゃ⮱ⰸ∂喑䮑䲋Ꭳ́Ⱑ‫ݝ‬᜾Йγ

ᑧ๔ᰶ߈喑̭Ⱑ᭜͗᱗㼐͸䅉喑᜾ጹ᱈䔆

㏼≻႓⮱ⵁ⾣㠰డ䔉䔉䊲䓴ຯ҂䊇䧞喑Ⴐ

㼐γ䔆ψⰸ∂䩆ౕਗ䛹喑Вࣷ䔆ψϧ᭜ᔻ

᱙Γᄦₑ㘪᣽ӈ̭◦㼐めȡᰭ䛺㺮⮱᭜喑

჋䭲̷᭜ᄦ̺Ꭰぶᵦ᱙࣌఍⮱̭⻺ᣏ⾣喑

ᵤВ‫ڣ‬ЃϧͧАФ䄸ः⻮‫⮱ݖ‬喑᜾Й᝺㘪

᜾ᄳ䄂ఫ䬽䛷㏼≻̻ᩬ⇨ι㔲͸䬡⮱‫ڠ‬

᜾जВᰶ᩵ౝិ᜾ᄦ᪝႓⤳䃧⮱ռ❞ែ‫ڒ‬

์䛺᫝‫ݣ‬Ⴧᩬゃ喑В⶛Ԋ䛺ᐧ̭⻺ᰡߍᎠ

㖁ȡᅪノ๔უጟ⌲ẇౝⰸ‫ݝ‬喑䔆⻺ᬒ⯷ߍ

‫ݝ‬䔆⻺ᣏ⾣͚ȡ

ぶȠᰡͧ倅᩵Ƞᰡᰶ≨߈⮱㏼≻ȡ

‫̺⮱ޔ‬Ꭰぶ̺‫ݖ‬λ᜾Й⮱ᩬ⇨喑ѳ᜾㺮㼐

᜾ౕ叨Ⱞ⤳ጒ႓䮏᝭‫ࢇۆ‬ธ䃧᪴⮱

䛷⮱᭜喑䔆⻺̺ᎠぶΌ䲋፥̺‫ݖ‬λ᜾Й⮱

ͨ㺮‫ڲ‬ღᅞ᭜̺ᎠぶȠႰ䮼Ɑᬣ䬡⮱⑁䔈

㏼≻ȡ

ВࣷႰᄦႼ㻯㏼≻㵹ͧ➦‫ݘ‬᭜㏼≻෋䪬⮱

हᵤ᜾Ό㺮ᑧ䄰喑ᒀ᜾ౕ᫒䉐Ą䨣㵹 უąᬣ喑᜾䓴ܳキࢂࡃγȡ᜾᝭䃑䃳⮱䛾 㲺⩹ϧธ͚喑ᰶᒵ็᭜䊋ह᜾⮱๔䘕ܳ㻯

䕇䓴‫ۆ‬䔆᱙Γ喑᜾ఋ‫ݝ‬γᎡ‫ݺ‬॥ᑂ

ᒞ৺ȡ᜾䔶⩕γᒀᬣ㷘⼝ͧ᫝ऑ‫ڥ‬὎ಸ⮱

◦⮱ȡЃЙ͚ᰶψϧࣺោ␒⩕㕹ᱰ㵹ͧহ

᜾䔈‫ڒ‬㏼≻႓ⵁ⾣⮱̭͗䄊䷅ȡ᜾ᒀᎡౕ

̭ψᴴ۳մ䃫喑䃮ᬻγᵦᢛ䔆ψմ䃫喑ౕ

ᣍ๧ᕔ䉤喠ᰶψϧᘠ䕼‫ݣ‬䨣㵹⮱䓴Ꮣ‫ڿ‬

䭬吅᫜➦႓䮏ᰭ݊႓⮱᭜➖⤳͇̀喑᜾ૉ

͗Ҁ͚Ꮑ䄒‫ܧ‬⣝̭⻺᱊ाᎠぶ⮱㖇वȡᒵ

䮖㵹ͧ喠ᰶψϧ䃑ͧ䨣㵹Ꮑ䄒‫∕ڠ‬ᵥᓰ͇

❞䗐ψ᣼䔝᜾Й̓⩹⮱㇫㒻᪝႓⤳䃧ȡѳ

ᬻ᭫喑᫝ऑ‫⮱ڥ‬ᴴ۳὎ಸ‫ܧ‬γ䬛䷅喑ₐຯ

ߎȡ⩇㜠ᰶ‫܍‬უ䨣㵹ᅞ᭜䗐ᵤև⮱ȡѳ᭜

᭜᜾⮱ᓰࢡౕ‫ัݘ‬喑ⱌₐ॥ᑂ᜾⮱᭜ᒀᬣ

᜾ౕߍ䛹ጯ⮱᜽䪬ࢳ⼸⌲ẇౝा᜾㶕ᬻ喑

ᒵ᭫♣喑๔็᪝䛺㺮⮱۠ゃϧ➖Ꭳ⇎ᰶ䗐

䗐ψ⹫чহ㏼≻‫ޔ‬अȠࣾ⩌ౕ㒻ప⮱ℾᱰ

䗐⻺䄡㏼≻᭜ᰶ᩵⢴Ꭳ̺́ႅౕ๞͇ᝃₔ

ᵤև喟̺䃧᭜ౕ࢞ᱧᐭ໸‫ݺ‬䔅᭜ࣾ⩌ऻ喑

䓽ߕВౕࣷᒀᬣす̶̓⩹䔈㵹⮱䗐ψζः

㻳⮱ᴴ۳὎ಸ᭜ᰶ䬛䷅⮱ȡₐ᭜䃑䃳‫ݝ‬䔆

䗐ψᰭ๔হᰭᰶᒞ৺⮱䛾㲺ᱧᲱ⮱㵹ͧ᫦

ࣾᆂহࣺ⃃ℾͨͶ⮱᫄ζȡ䔆⻺ᑧ◵ᙬ᱈

⻺ᴴ۳὎ಸᬍ∂۳⶛᣼䔝᜾Й᝭ั⮱䔆͗

ᐼ⮱⶛Ꮑऄ‫ݝ‬ឦ‫ݑ‬喑㔹́ᓲ䶨㺮ᰶϧឬ៲

䘕ܳᵦḺλ᜾ౕ㒻పጒ͇ᵥᓰౝፓÿ࢝

̓⩹喑᜾ᐭ໸ᄨⅯ‫ڣ‬Ѓ὎ಸ喑‫͚ڣ‬ጯ౧̺

䉐Шȡ᜾᝭᫒䉐⮱Ą䨣㵹უąₐ᭜䗐ψ۠

すႶ㏠ጋߍ䛹ጯ⮱᜽䪬㏼ࢳȡౕ䗐٬᜾ϟ

Ⴙ઱Ƞ➦‫ݘ‬᭜Ԏᖜ̺Ⴙ઱হĄᬍ⤳ᕔą䘪

Ⴧ࣯̻⁧䃵হ̺䖀ᓤ㵹ͧ⮱ϧ喑᭜䗐ψ݈

ⱩⰛⲦγ̺ᎠぶȠₔ㻳Ƞ๞͇Ƞ㏼≻㶝

ࣾᡒⱭ䛺㺮҉⩕ȡ‫ڤ‬ᰶ䃪‫ݧ‬ᘼঠ⮱᭜喑䮼

䕍‫ܧ‬Ӱ䔈䔆ㆨ㵹ͧ⮱Ю͇᪴ࡃ⮱ϧȡ

䔭ȡᒀ᜾䔅गᰶᆮᬣ喑᜾ᅞ㏠䬤ͧϭ͵

Ɑ䔆ψ㻯ᔢ⌞‫ࣾڒ‬ᆂᎣ䊏ᓄ㏼≻႓⩹᳽ψ

‫׼‬䔆ᵤ⮱̭᱙Γӊ䊃λ᪝⮫ऺⵁ⾣㔲

䗐Ѻ᪡๖⚔ⰸ᜾⮱হ㩩जϟ⮱ຠϧౕ䔆͗

ϧธ⮱䃑ज喑Ⱕࣺ⮱㻯◦ÿጯ౧䓽㵹㞜

⮱⤳䃧႓䃳হ჋䌢ⴒ䃳ȡិ᝭ᰶ᣼䔝̺Ꭰ

ⰸ̷ࣨ➦‫ݘ‬ჹᰶ⮱పუࢡगᰶᄼ႓‫ښ‬Ꭱ㏔

ສ喑ᝃ㔲ग㺮ᩬᏉ̺᎟䶱⮱䄊喑ᅞч䓽㵹

ぶ⮱䉱᫆ⅴ䯳䊤Გ̺᭜Уღᭀ⮱θ喑ᄦλ

⮱᪴ࡃⅡᎠ喑᜾Ό㏠䬤ͧϭ͵຦̺⚔ⰸ㜗

㞜ສ喑‫ٲ‬᫒λ๔䘕ܳ⮱‫ڞڙ‬䄊䄚͚ȡຯह

㐆ͧ҂чࣾ⩌ₐౕࣾ⩌⮱䔆̭ܴ᣽ӈ̭⻺

ጞ⮱႖ၽࢡᲒ⚔ⰸ᜾ȡౕᒀᎡ䗐͗ᬣА喑

᜾‫ݺٵ‬᝭‫⮱ۆ‬䗐‫܍‬᱙Γ喑䔆᱙ΓΌ䄂ఫ㏍

㼐䛷Ό̺᭜Уღᭀ⮱θȡͧϭ͵ჹϧअᓄ

๔็᪝㒻పϧ䘪ិ㏼≻႓ⰸ᜽̭䬕‫ڠ‬λ䊇

ₐ䄜㼐Ƞ䭵䔝θ჋ȡ

ᰡჹᰶ喤ͧϭ͵͚ϔ䭣㏔㷘ᢼ⾧喤ͧϭ͵

䧞⮱႓䬛喑λ᭜᜾ౕᒵ็᫦䲏ⰸᲒ䘪̺๗

喍᱙᪴ᦅ㜗Ȩ̺Ꭰぶ⮱АФȩᱧᷝጒ͇‫ܧ‬

⾤ϧ᪝䛼̺᫚෋ߍ喤

ज㘪᜽̭ͧऺ㏼≻႓უȡ᜾⩌䪬ౕ̭͗⼜

❵⹫͚᪴❵⮱҉㔲㜗Ꮌ喑䃾㔲喟ᑍၽ⎽喎

July 2013

25


REPORT

Easing off the gas Are Chinese policymakers finally getting serious about curbing credit?

C

hinese firms are either out of cash or unwilling to part with what they have on hand. Agricultural Bank of China stoked worries over a tightening cash supply in mid-June when the country’s thirdbiggest lender failed to sell more than 40% of the bonds it put on the market. Those fears were validated that same week when a Ministry of Finance bond sale fell short of its target by some US$5.5 billion. The ministry sold off only 63% of the bonds it brought to auction, a clear sign that even the cen-

26

July 2013

tral government is struggling to raise funds. This tighter market leaves much less room for highly leveraged local governments and companies to get financing. That could lead to a dire situation if they need to rollover mounting bad debt, which many observers predict the companies hide by merely raising more money to pay off old debt. Perhaps one the clearest signs that China is tightening its cash supply came with the total social financing (TSF) data China’s central bank

released during the weekend before the bond sales. Growth in TSF, the country’s widest measure of credit, fell by about one-third between April and May. Analysts dug out several explanations for lower-than-expected TSF figures. New regulatory measure that sought to clamp down on flow of hot money – funds illegally funneled into the country – may have stemmed some credit growth, according to a note from Bank of America Merrill Lynch last week.


More encouraging was the possibility that new rules from China’s banking regulator to limit banks from issuing wealth management products – investment vehicles that push funds into highly risky and lightly regulated lending areas such as real estate and pawn shops – had curbed credit growth. Debt in the shadow banking sector, where the funds from many wealth management products were channeled, are thought to account for half of the growth in TSF. A third possibility that Standard Chartered noted relates to the fact that the central bank bought an average of US$2 billion in US dollars per day during the first quarter of the year. The purchases maintained liquidity and held up the price of the yuan. Those purchases have slowed, somewhat unexpectedly, Standard Chartered said. The People’s Bank of China was even selling US dollars in late May and early June, leading to a tightening supply of cash.

A delicate balance Most likely, all three possibilities are contributing to slowing credit growth. Together, they represent the tight balance between growth and default that China finds itself walking. China’s ever-increasing liquidity throughout its decades of growth has led to rising fears that the government would throttle credit spending. The trend has only accelerated, with debt as a percent of GDP jumping from 148% to 205% between 2008 and 2012. At the same time, this debt is being used in an increasingly inefficient manner, with returns on debt falling in that period.

The government faces on one hand rising credit and falling returns increasing the chance of widespread defaults destabilizing the financial system. On the other hand, many firms and investors fear that tightening credit could lead to a hard landing at a time when China’s growth is already decelerating. A tighter money market, and accompanying credit slowdown, does appear to be in line with new government leaders’ promises to curb rampant spending and a greater accumulation of debt. Such pledges in the past have been welcomed by economists but often ended with huge boosts in public spending. This time, regulators may be backing up their words with action. During the next few months, policymakers are likely only to loosen monetary policy unless the country’s employment situation deteriorates. Manufacturing employment is flat but not in a dangerous state, Standard Chartered noted, so regulators seem likely to stay the course. Onlookers who are nervous about a hard landing would do well to remember: China’s economic troubles only amount to a falling, but still rapid, pace of growth. The trend this year is still far from marking an outright contraction in credit. While month-to-month TSF growth appeared slow, that measure of credit in the first five months of the year actually increased by 52% compared to 2012. That is hardly a slowdown – it’s a country barely taking its foot off the gas pedal. What has yet to be seen is how far the country can ease off the throttle without falling into a tailspin.

July 2013

27


࠰᭧஌̃

༆৻ັྕাӞ ゃܿ]1IJMJQ-JV

P29 ૾഻༆৻ັ P36 ᇎେ࢔๡ಎ૳฼ූ P40 ഥ௜ൕѡ֭Յ็ P48 ၕ‫׶‬ᆮ‫ڹ‬ళࣧ໵ན

28

July 2013


૾഻༆৻ັ 䕇䓴➖㖁㑾⮱Ꮑ⩕ᐭड़ᮧ㘪⩌≨᫝὎ᐼ ᪴]䧮⥡

झ㔞㔁λ‫⮱⾧̷⩝ۉ‬叾㞟下㵹கᒏ

Ԏ㖁Ⰼ喍*56喎ࣾጰγȨ*56ο㖁㑾្ॷ

ѩĄ下ⷌą喑㷲ᰶ‫ڤژ‬㳧᫸ᶕ下㵹

喟➖㖁㑾ȩ喑ₐᐼ᣽‫ܧ‬γ➖㖁㑾⮱

㛯喑जВಯⰡ䊤䭺Ƞ⾧͚ᗙ։喑Ⴐ⮱ᣏ≸

ắᔢȡ្ॷᠴ‫ܧ‬喑ᬍ᝭ౕ̺⮱➖㖁㑾䕇Ԏ

๡᭜̭झᓛࢂⰥᱧȡ䔆झᱧகजВАᰬϧ

ᬣАࢠᄳᲒ͡喑̓⩹̷᝭ᰶ⮱➖Ҁϻ䒛

ጒጎ㻳‫⩝ۉ‬Ƞᄦ⩝ౝ᫪㗒ȡ

㗻‫ݤ➆ݝ‬Ƞϻᝬᅸ‫ݝ‬㏥ጫ䘪जВ䕇䓴఍

ౕ̭䬡ᅲბ‫ڲ‬喑ౝ̷Ꭰ䨧Ɑ̭▝

➦㑾ͨߕ䔈㵹ϑᢏȡ➖㖁㑾⮱㠞᪴᭜5IF

㞟Ą䋹Կౝℜą喑㔹ౕᅲუ㔮ϧ⮱Ꮇ̸݆

JOUFSOFUPGUIJOHT喑जВ䕇Ԅౝ⤳㼐ͧ➖

೘γ̭಄Ꮇ೘ᐼ⩌প⯾≸Зȡౕ⯾≸䓴⼸

➖Ⱕ㖁⮱㑾㐉ȡ‫ڣ‬ᴴ۳ჇͶ᭜喟䕇䓴ᄱ䶾

͚喑Ą䋹ԿౝℜąহᎷ೘ᐼ⩌প⯾≸Зज

䃳‫ݘ‬喍3'*%喎Ƞ㏏ใᙌᏁகȠ‫⤰ڕ‬ჇѺ

ᵦᢛᗲ្ۢ䂓ȡ

㈨㐌Ƞ⓭‫ٶ‬ម᣼கぶԎᖜэᙌ䃫ิ喑ᠶ㏓

មម᲎ᒏ⴮ᅞ㘪䞡‫ݘ‬㢜➖ⱌմ⮱Ą᜾

Ⴧ⮱ࡼ䃛喑ិШ҂➖৮̻ο㖁㑾䔋ᣒ䊤

ᴒᴒą喠ग䰭̭͗J1BE喑ᅞ㘪Ⴙ᜽㑾̷䃏

Გ喑䔈㵹Ԏᖜϑᢏহ䕇䃜喑В჋⣝ᮧ㘪ࡃ

丽Ƞ䊲ጯ䙺䔮ȠАᩣ࠲㸦ȠუᅲႶ䭟Ƞᢿ

䃳‫ݘ‬ȠჇѺȠ䌌䍗Ƞ⯾ᣔহノ⤳⮱̭⻺㑾

䭌ᠯतćć

㐉ȡ䔆䛹ᰶ͑ᅯᘼᕊ喟す̭喑➖㖁㑾⮱ᵥ

➖㖁㑾䔆͗᣽‫ܧ‬䔅̺‫ݝ‬Ꭱ⮱᫝ឭ

ᓰহധ⵭Ϻ♣᭜ο㖁㑾喑᭜ౕο㖁㑾ധ⵭

ᱜ喑ᬖጟ̺᭜̭⻺䖒̺जࣷ⮱倅⻾ឭắᔢ

̷⮱ᐣѥহពᆂ⮱㑾㐉喠すι喑‫⩕ڣ‬ᝤ〜

γȡ⣝ౕₐ䕇䓴̭㈨݄݈᫝⮱ℾ⩌Ꮑ⩕ϔ

ᐣѥহពᆂ‫ݝ‬γШ҂➖৮̻➖৮͸䬡喑䔈

৮喑㲺‫ݝڒ‬ϧЙᬒ፥⮱㶐丌Ѽ㵹͚ࣨȡ

㵹Ԏᖜϑᢏহ䕇䃜ȡ

ຯ҂᣼㐅➖㖁㑾ౕ͚ప⮱㒻ສ㨊ఫ喑

➖㖁㑾⊶ࣷ⮱㵹͇ᒵ็喑㠰డᒵᎬȡ

ຯ҂ᄳపใ‫ٵ‬䔈ᵵҸࣷ㏼侹ᑂ䔈͚ప喑ຯ

ᠶ⚔➖㖁㑾⮱ϔ͇䨫๔㜡जВ̶ܳ͗ᅯ

҂ᄳĄắᔢąܴ჋㥪ౝĄᏁ⩕ą喤Ąℾ

䲏喟仃‫ٵ‬᭜эᙌ㑾㐉喑Вι㐡⴮Ƞ3'*%

⩌ą᜽ͧ㖁㈨‫➖⤰ڕ‬㖁㑾ጯ౧̻͚ప᱙ౌ

喍ᄱ䶾䃳‫ݘ‬ឭᱜ喎ȠэᙌகȠ㟜❴ࣷᮧ㘪

ࣾᆂᰭ䛺㺮⮱ܴ‫◦ڒ‬ȡᮧᚔ⹫ࡧȠ丌৮䔪

ࢎͧͨ喑჋⣝Ą➖ą⮱䃳‫ݘ‬喠‫⁎ڣ‬᭜э䓀

⏜Ƞ䒓㖁㑾ぶ̭ឦᩦ઱⩌≨᫦ᐼᏁ⩕ऄ‫ݝ‬

㑾㐉喑䕇䓴⣝ᰶ⮱ο㖁㑾ȠᎬ⩢㑾㐉Ƞ䕇

⮱☚ᢔ喑ₐ᭜➖㖁㑾ϔ͇ੳ͇ࡃࣾᆂহ⹫

Ԏ㑾㐉ぶ჋⣝᪝ᢛ⮱э䓀̻䃎ツ喠̶᭜Ꮑ

ч᩵⯷ᬒ⯷᭫⣝⮱ᰭສ࢝䃮ȡ

⩕㑾㐉喑ࢠ䓀‫ڒ‬䓀‫ܧ‬ᣔ‫ݣ‬㏵〜喑जധλ⣝

Ąℾ⩌➖㖁㑾ą⮱Ꮑ⩕‫ڲ‬ღ喑㺳Ⰳ➖

ᰶ⮱᝸ᱧȠ1$ぶ㏵〜䔈㵹ȡ

㖁㑾‫⇬ݺ‬ឭᱜȠᮧᚔ೻ጯ̻⹫ࡧȠᮧᚔ‫ۉ‬

➖㖁㑾⮱ࣾᆂᓲᄳፓߕ᫝‫ڡ‬㵹͇⮱ቈ

͇̻丌৮䔪⏜Ƞᮧ㘪ϑ䕇̻䒓㖁㑾Ƞ⼨ߕ

䊤ȡౕԎᖜ⩌᜽᫦䲏喑➖㖁㑾‫⩕ݖ‬3'*%Ƞ

ᩜЅȠ๔᪝ᢛȠᮧ㘪⩢㑾Ƞᮧᚔࡨ⫄Ƞᮧ

эᙌகȠι㐡⴮Ƞࡄ᫄ᝃ(14ჇѺぶ䮼

㘪უᅲぶऱ㵹͇Ꮑ⩕ࣾᆂććϻĄߕąȠ

ᬣ䮼ౝ㣤ः➖Ҁ⮱Ԏᖜ喑эᙌகȠι㐡

Ąख़ąȠĄᆂąȠĄ⑁ąぶ็㻿Ꮣ䄍䛷ℾ

⴮Ƞ㏏ใ䃫ิȠᄱ䶾䃫ิ‫ݣ‬䕍ੳぶ䘪ᒵᰶ

⩌➖㖁㑾᫝̭䒛⮱ࣾᆂ⒛≮ȡ

ᱧч喠ι᭜Ԏᖜэ䔿᫦䲏喑ऱ⻺⩢Ԏ㑾㐉 ̻ο㖁㑾ᄳ䔈̭ₒ㲺व喠̶᭜Ԏᖜ⮱䯳͚

༆৻ັᄥᇗ‫ݛ‬ ➖㖁㑾⮱ắᔢ᭜ౕᎡ᣽‫ܧ‬ ⮱ȡᎡᰵᬒ喑ౕ⾮ᅩ᫜ͫ㵹⮱ Ԏᖜ⹫ч̓⩹ምч喍84*4喎̷喑ప䭲⩢

ั⤳ࣷᏁ⩕᫦䲏喑ࢠ䕇䓴㐩वԎᖜᎠझᣒ ᩣȠั⤳Ƞࣺ亵ᎣᏁ⩕Ԏᖜ喑๔䛼䒜УЮ ͇ᄳϻ͚ऄ⯷ȡ Ԏᖜэ䔿᫦䲏喑ऱ⻺⩢Ԏ㑾㐉Ƞ

July 2013

29


࠰᭧஌̃

͚పప䭲➖㖁㑾๔ч̷ᆂ‫⮱ܧ‬ᮧ㘪უᅲ⩕৮

ο㖁㑾̻Ꭼ⩢㑾㐉⮱㲺वᅇ䰭పუև䔈

̭㞅䔤ҍĄ⒉㝴ą⒉‫ڒ‬Ⅱ̸喑⯾≸

䒓䒳䲍㜗ጞ⮱ᮧ㘪ౕ䖀䌜̷㜗⩞㵹

̭ₒ⮱䄰ᣔȡ䓾ᎡᲒ➖㖁㑾ϔ͇䨫⮱す̭

Ⅱ̸‫⮱⃃ڨ‬ᗲۢȡ䔆झ䃫ิ‫ͧ⼝ڕ‬ĄⅡ̸

侣喑‫ڙ‬䌜䲍㜗䏘⮱ᮧ㘪ᄳϑ䕇≮䛼䄰᪡㜠

͗ᅯ䲏ែ㲺䉱≨ߕ⼜ᲮȡВι㐡⴮Ƞ3'*%

⣜ධ㐩वᙌⴒᎠझą喑ౕ➖㖁㑾⮱ᩜᠮ̸

ᰭҠ⟣ᔮ喑➖㖁㑾ₐ䔽⌽㷘⩕λᮧ㘪ϑ䕇

喍ᄱ䶾䃳‫ݘ‬ឭᱜ喎ȠэᙌகȠ㟜❴ࣷᮧ㘪

ज჋⣝ᮧ㘪ࡃ冩㮫‫⃃ڨ‬喑≸Ⴧ⯾≸ⅡҀ

㈨㐌⮱็䶦䶳ഌ喑Ռߖλᮧ㘪⯾ᣔ㈨㐌喑

ࢎぶϔ৮ⵁࣾ‫ݣ‬䕍⮱Ю͇ิऄែ䉱ᱧᲱ⮱

1)թȠⅡ⍖Ƞ⏣㼐⅔ぶ䛺㺮ᠴᴴȡ䔆᭜

㇫⶛ᢹᤎ䖀䌜Ƞ䒓䒳⮱㵹䍗䒕䔦ȡ᱙ᅷ๔

ռ❞ȡᢛ⌲⻾ⵁ⾣͚ᓰ㐌䃎喑ϻᎡ㜠

➖㖁㑾ឭᱜ᣽ࡴ‫͇ۉ‬Ԏᖜ᪝ႄࡃȠ⩌ϔ㜗

ч⮱ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ܳ䃧ಈ̷喑ᰶ‫͚ڠ‬పᮧ㘪ϑ

Ꭱ喑ጟᰶ࡮‫܍‬უⰥ‫ڙڠ‬थ㣤ᓄែ䉱ȡ

ߕࡃȠノ⤳ᮧ㘪ࡃ⮱݈᫝᜽᳉͸̭ȡ̷⊤

䕇ࣾᆂ㨊ఫ喑͚పᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ᰭ᫝ⵁ⾣᜽᳉

‫➖͇ۉ‬㖁㑾Ꮑ⩕ጒ⼸ឭᱜⵁ⾣͚ᓰহႶᓪ

ࣷϔ͇ࡃ‫ݺ‬ᮜ喑ᬒ᱙䊲๔ಸ೻ጯ⮱⇨ൢ㏼

᱄಑➖㖁㑾ᰶ䭽‫ڙ‬थܳ‫ݘ‬㜗ͨⵁࣾγĄⅡ

侹喑ВࣷᲒ㜗̷⊤⩢⻾ᮧ㘪㈨㐌ᰶ䭽‫ڙ‬

վ݇଎႓Ⴐࢰؕ

30

ᰵ̷ౕ݊⊤ͫ㵹⮱すఈᅷ͚పప䭲

ϔ‫➖⃃ڨ‬㖁㑾㈨㐌ąহĄᮧᚔ‫⩌͇ۉ‬ᔮ

थȠ䨣↌ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇䯳ఏぶх⻭Ю͇ܳϘ⮱

➖㖁㑾๔чᯕᆂ㻵чॵ⣝⊀㑖❵᱗Გᮧᚔ

వą喠᝸ᱧ☚䬕"11Ꮑ⩕Ą᜾ᴒᴒąᣕ‫ܧ‬

ᰭ᫝㼐۠᫦ᵵ喑ᄳᣕߕ೻ጯᮧ㘪ϑ䕇⮱‫ڕ‬

⩌≨⮱᫝὎ᐼ喑䃖ℾ⩌➖㖁㑾Ꮑ⩕㥪ౝ⩌

ᰭ᫝Ą㢜⯾⴮ម᣼ᴒ䄏ߌ㘪ą喠ฺᬓ๔႓

᫝ࡴ㏔ȡ

ᵦ喑ᥧ᝸ᩬᏉȠ㵹͇ᱧᲱȠЮ͇ӰҬ͚

ᬍ䩎ⵁ⾣䮏ⵁࣾγᮧ㘪ੳ৮䭟їᴴカぶȡ

⼨ߕᩜЅ̸⮱᫝‫ڡ‬Ⴖ‫ڕ‬ᔘᢤᩜЅᄳ

ప➖㖁㑾ϔ͇ࣾᆂᔘ䕌䔈‫ڒ‬๔㻱὎Ꮑ⩕

ⷝ᧋㜗ߕⅯߖȠ䒓䬕䔉⼸Ꮑᕒᐭड़Ƞ

䛾㲺ᱧᲱȠ⩢Ԏ䓽㥒ੳȠす̶᫦ᩜЅੳȠ

䭣⃢喑࠲᠙ᮧᚔ೻ጯȠᮧ㘪უᅲȠᮧᚔ‫ۉ‬

࢘ᭌჇѺᄩ㝗Ƞ倅ܳ䓕⢴䒓䒪䄚䴠䃳‫ݘ‬Ƞ

㏵〜䃫ิࣷ㼐۠᫦ᵵ᣽ӈੳ㉔ჳౝ㖁㈨ౕ

͇Ƞᮧ㘪ϑ䕇Ƞ䒓㖁㑾Ƞ⼨ߕᩜЅぶᏁ⩕

䒓䒪ཞͽᒞ䴠Ƞ᝸ᱧ"11Ꮑ⩕ÿऱ๔䒓

̭䊤喑Ჱ᜽̭̻͗➖㖁㑾Ⱕ‫ڠ‬㖁⮱᫝ಸ䉚

䶳ഌȡ

Юౕ̺᫚݈䕍倅ᕔ㘪↪䒓⮱हᬣ喑ᰡ∕䛺

➖᫦ᐼ喑Ό䔽⌽᜽ͧ➖㖁㑾⩢ၽੳߎࡃࣾ

➖㖁㑾ₐສѩ̭ᑍĄᮧᚔᩜᠮ㑾ą喑

ក䕍‫ݺ‬᝭᱗ᰶ⮱(↪䒓⩌≨Ҁ侹ȡ䕇⩕

ᆂ⮱̭๔☚◦喑ₐᑂ䊤͇⩹Ͱ㜠⹫ч⮱Ꭼ

䃖ᮧᚔ೻ጯ⮱㨊ఫ᜽ͧᘍℾ⮱Ꮑ⩕喑ᐭड़

ႶशᭌȠ͝⩝(#00,Ƞ㢐༮*70,"Ƞ

∈‫∕ڠ‬ȡ̻㑾̷э㐌⮱ᩜЅጒ‫ڤ‬ຯĄᩜЅ

ᮧ㘪⩌≨᫝὎ᐼȡᲕ⊓Ƞ⊓͉ȠଶჇ⮱ቚ

⺼➦4:/$Ƞ๴⦋↪䒓䒓㖁㑾ឭᱜ㖁व჋

჊ąȠĄ䉏Ѕ䕇ąぶ̺ह喑➖㖁㑾ឭᱜ̸

᫝ᮧᚔ⹫ࡧ喑̓⩹ᑧЮ͇ᓛ䒜ፓᲒ⮱

侹ბȠ↰ᅁ↰㖁व❞⿸ԎĄ䒓㖁㑾Ąξឭ

ᔘᢤᩜЅ⮱݈᫝Ꮑ⩕喑᭜ᄳο㖁㑾䉚➖হ

ξ䃎ツᮧᚔ೻ጯᎠझ喑๖哆7)0.&ᮧ㘪

ᱜȠश‫(ݖ‬OFUMJOLȠ⊤ᵩ喍䛾哆჏䒓喎

➖㖁㑾ᩜЅ㐀वౕ̭䊤喑ᄳ⼨ߕ㏵〜䃫ิ

უᅲ喑ВࣷᲒ㜗ᬍ䩎ȠᲚጋȠ䱿ᇈ⮱х⻭

(CPTͧ⊵䉦㔲ፓᲒ䷍㺳ᕔ⮱㵹䒓Ҁ侹喑

ຯ᝸ᱧȠᎠᲬ⩢㘾ぶ҉ͧ䒪Ҁ喑ҬᩜЅᰡ

ᵵҸᆂ喑䘪ౕ䶱⹧Ɑᮧᚔ⹫ࡧጟ᜽ͧࣾᆂ

ϻ㔹៶ߕ↪䒓⊵䉦ϔ͇喑݈䕍ⱌₐĄч⩌

Ⴖ‫ڕ‬Ƞᰡᔘᢤ喑ϻ㔹ក䕍⼨ߕο㖁⮱͗ϧ

ͨ≮喑ᮧᚔ೻ጯᐧ䃫̺‫ں‬䖒̺जࣷȡ

≨⮱↪䒓ąȡ

104㏵〜ȡ

July 2013


Ӊ၄ൻሯЯ౥ᩲ

ጟ㣤䶦ധ〆ᐭࣾ⮱ࣾᬻ̀‫ݖ‬喑ₐౕ⩠䄤

⯾ノ䬛䉐ᅑ‫ڣ‬䰭㺮㻱㠰ࡃȡ

➖㖁㑾ϔ͇ࡼч‫⤳ޜ‬θ䪬‫⼅ک‬Γ䪬

䶦ᬍ㏬⩢߈⯾ᣔ㈨㐌䃫䃎ᐭࣾ⮱̀‫ݖ‬喑ౕ

⌲⻾ⵁ⾣͚ᓰܳᲽጵ倅≗䱋㶕⹧喑͚

᳼᫜㐡㶕⹧喑➖㖁㑾ᑧ䄰⮱᭜‫⤰ڕ‬㻱὎喑

ज㑃⼸᪝ႄ䄚䴠ᩫ๔கᐭࣾȠ䊲㪱3'*%ࢎ

ప➖㖁㑾ϔ͇䰭㺮⾮ⵡ⮱ࣾ⨣䶵఍㉍ͨ㺮

ౕ䒰๔⮱㠰డ‫ڲ‬ϑοԎᖜ喑᝺чϔ⩌䒰๔

䃫䃎ᐭࣾহⰥ‫ڠ‬ϔ৮ᐭࣾ䶳ഌ喑‫⩠ڞ‬䄤䶦

ᰶВ̸‫͗܍‬᫦䲏ȡ

Фթ喑ᄳШ҂䃫ิ⮱Ԏᖜ‫ڙ‬ጰౕ̭͗㑾㐉

ࣾᬻ̀‫ݖ‬喑‫͚ڣ‬䶦඘㶒γప‫ڠⰥڲ‬䶳ഌ⮱

ᅪᔘ჋⣝̶㑾㲺व喑ߍᔘ᫝̭А㑾

̷喑䮼ᬣ䮼ౝ㷘ϧᴒ䄏হᩣ䯳ȡ

⾧⮪ȡᕊ㤹➦Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ጟ㣤ᓄ̷⊤ጯ݈᫝ധ䛾

㐉ധ⵭䃫᫪喑ͧ➖㖁㑾⮱჋⣝᣽ӈᓲ㺮⮱

⮱䉱䛾ᩜᠮȡ

᲎Уȡ᣽ᬖ䄸ܿ➖㖁㑾ࣾᆂ喑‫ݣ‬Ⴧ➖㖁㑾

ϷᎡᰵЪ喑పߎ䮏ࣾጰȨ‫ڠ‬λᣕ䔈 ➖㖁㑾ᰶᎼ֒Ꮴࣾᆂ⮱ᠴᄩᘼ㻮ȩ喑᣽‫ܧ‬

Ꭱ͚ప➖㖁㑾ϔ͇ጯ౧㻱὎䓫

ᴴ۳Ҁ㈨ȡౕప䭲̷䔅⇎ᰶ℁䒰㐌̭⮱➖

‫ݝ‬Ꭱ喑⾮ⵡ̭ឦᵥᓰឭᱜ喑݊ₒᒏ᜽

‫ݝ‬Ϭٰ喑℁̷Ꭱ෋䪬ȡ䊈䔗䶫

㖁㑾ᴴ۳Ҁ㈨͸‫ݺ‬喑Ꮑᅪᔘ‫ݣ‬Ⴧ➖㖁㑾Ⱕ

➖㖁㑾ϔ͇Ҁ㈨ȡͧ჋⣝Ⱋᴴ喑ᄳߍᑧ䉏

䬛ⵁ⾣᭫⹧喑䶱䃎㜠Ꭱ喑͚ప➖㖁㑾

‫ڠ‬ᴴ۳喑㻱㠰͚ప➖㖁㑾ጯ౧ȡ‫ݣ‬Ⴧᴴ۳

⼻ᩬゃឣᠮȠႹ઱ែ㲺䉱ᩬゃ喑呀ߞ䛾㲺

᪡Ҁጯ౧㻱὎ᄳ䓫‫ݝ‬Ϭٰȡ➖㖁㑾ᵥ

Ҁ㈨Ό᭜ͧγ䭟₏᪡͗➖㖁㑾ϔ͇⌤ΞȠ

䉱᱙Ƞ䷻䮖ែ䉱ࣷℾ䬡䉱᱙ែा➖㖁㑾Ꮑ

ᓰឭᱜᄳ჋⣝⾮ⵡ喑݊ₒᒏ᜽➖㖁㑾ϔ͇

ጯ౧⌤Ξȡ‫ܧ‬झ➖㖁㑾㵹͇Ⱕ‫ڠ‬ज㵹ᕔᩬ

⩕হϔ͇ࣾᆂȡ

Ҁ㈨ȡ

ゃ喑➦‫ݘ‬᭜ౕ䛾㲺Ƞϑ䕇Ƞ㘪⎽ぶ‫ڠ‬㈨ప

ౕϧЙᄦ➖㖁㑾䔆͗ऺ䃺䔅̺᭜࡮ܳ

͇‫ڲ‬ϧธ䶱䃎喑᱗ᲒᎡ‫➖ڲ‬㖁㑾

ℾ㏼≻ࣾᆂ⮱䛺㺮㵹͇Ꮑ⩕䶳ഌ喑ᩬゃᄩ

⛌ᖶ⮱ᗲ̸ۢ喑䉱᱙⩹ጟ᭜䷻⩌Ⅱ䊤喑➖

ч๔㻱὎ᮛࣷ喑ϔ͇㻱὎ᄳ℁ο㖁㑾๔

ाᕔᄦϔ͇ࣾᆂ‫ڤ‬ᰶ䛺㺮ᒞ৺҉⩕ȡĄᩬ

㖁㑾ፓᲒγᬍ䭽䕽ᘠȡ䷻䮖ែ䉱ࣷ⻮ࠌ㗎

Ժȡहᬣ喑जВ䶱㻮➖㖁㑾Წ಄‫̷⮱ڲ‬ጯ

ゃ‫ٵ‬㵹ąᄳ᭜͚ప➖㖁㑾ϔ͇㻱὎ࡃࣾᆂ

ᱰ㵹͇ᓲ♣ч㏼ࢳ̭⃢➖㖁㑾㍮㢐⮱叱䛾

‫ڙ‬थ͇㐖ᄳ㣤ᓄᠮ㐚෋䪬喑㔹Ⱕ‫ڙڠ‬थ㗎

⮱䛺㺮Ԋ䯉ȡ

ᬣ᱌ȡ

ФΌч఍ₑऄ⯷喑㣤ᓄᠮ㐚ᕔ̷⋕㵹ᗲȡ

Вᒭౕ䕇Ԏ⩢Ԏࣷο㖁㑾䶳ഌ⮱㏼侹ॷ䃶

3'*%‫ݣ‬䕍ࢯੳ䔉᱈䅤ϻᎡ‫ݝ‬ ̶Ꭱ䬡‫ऻٵ‬㣤ᓄᲒ㜗⌞ౠ݈᫝ែȠ̷

჋⣝㜗ͨⴒ䃳ϔᱰ⮱ᵥᓰឭᱜ⾮ⵡȡ

༆৻ັԿྕ଎൜

᜾Й⇎ᰶ‫ڠ‬䩛⮱ᵥᓰឭᱜ喑ᅞ̺㘪ᒏ᜽ϔ

⊤Ђࢇহ̷⊤㖁̶݈䒛㲺䉱喑͸ऻλ

͚ప➖㖁㑾ϔ͇ᅇัλࣾᆂ݊᱌䭣

͇ᵥᓰ》ζ߈喑ౕ᱗Გ⮱》ζ͚ᅞчऄ‫ݣ‬

Ꭱ᜽ߌ̷ጯȡजВ䄡᭜3'*%‫ݣ‬䕍ੳ⮱䶳䋾

⃢喑ႅౕ䄥็ϔ͇ࣾᆂ㏓᲌఍㉍ȡࢇ̓

λϧȡ఍ₑ喑ᢹᤎ‫ڤ‬ᰶ㜗ͨⴒ䃳ϔᱰ⮱ᵥ

㔲ȡ᜽⿸λᎡ⮱⌞ౠ吻䃳⻾ឭ䃳‫ݘ‬ᰶ

䒜У݈᫝䘕ᕨ⯾᫜㦯㟙e䉦ќ喍4UFGBO

ᓰឭᱜᄳ᜽ͧ➖㖁㑾ϔ͇ࣾᆂ⮱䛺͚͸

䭽‫ڙ‬थВ‫ౕڣ‬䃳‫ݘ‬ឭᱜ⮱䶳‫ٵ‬ౝѺΌ㷘็

'FSCF喎䃑ͧ喑➖㖁㑾䲏͡Ɑф็ᠾᝅ喑

䛺ȡ㜗ͨⴒ䃳ϔᱰ⮱ᵥᓰឭᱜ᭜➖㖁㑾ϔ

უែ䉱ᱧᲱⰸສȡ

࠲᠙⽠ჇᐧᲱȠᏁ⩕Ⴖ‫ڕ‬Ƞ๔᪝ᢛȠ๔А

͇जᠮ㐚ࣾᆂ⮱ᵦ᱙侞ߕ߈ȡ

̷⊤ᕊ㤹➦➖㖁㑾ᰶ䭽‫ڙ‬थ᭜➖㖁㑾

⴮ȠԎᖜ὎ᐼȠੳ͇䓽㥒὎ᐼȠੳ͇ࡃȠ

ࢇ̓䒜У⮱䉦ќ㶕⹧喑➖㖁㑾ϔ͇

ឭᱜ⮱ᣏ㉏㔲হ3'*%ឭᱜ⮱䶳‫ٵ‬㔲喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬

ᐭᩫ⎽Ƞज᧺҉ࡃВࣷ⯾ノ喑㔹➖㖁㑾⮱

ࡃ䲏͡ੳ͇䓽㥒὎ᐼ⮱ᠾᝅ喑э㐌ο㖁㑾 ВᎬॷ⯵‫⮱ݖ‬὎ᐼ̺㘪␎䋠➖㖁㑾⮱ࣾ ᆂ喑➖㖁㑾ϔ͇䰭㺮ᰶ᫝⮱ੳ͇὎ᐼ⮱‫ܧ‬ ⣝ȡĄࢇౕ̓⦋ธ̀䬕䃫⿸γⵁ⾣䮏ⵁ⾣ Ⱋ‫➖⤰ڕݺ‬㖁㑾㵹͇ज჋⣝⮱ੳ͇὎ᐼ喑 Ⱋ‫ܧ⾣ⵁݺ‬㜠ᄾᰶ⻺᜽ߌ⮱ੳ͇䓽҉὎ ᐼ喑‫⮱͚ڣ‬ੳ͇䓽҉὎ᐼᲒ㜗λ‫ں‬㲺 वȡąЃ䄡䖀ȡ Ą㵹͇Ꮑ⩕ᄳ᜽ͧ᱗Გ‫܍‬Ꭱ➖㖁㑾 ϔ͇ࣾᆂ⮱ͨ㺮侞ߕ߈ȡ᜽⛌Ꮣ䒰倅⮱ᮧ 㘪ϑ䕇Ƞ೻ጯႶ䭟Ƞᮧ㘪⩢㑾ぶጯ౧‫ݺ‬ᮜ Ꭼ䭁喑ែ䉱ᱧчጕ๔喑ᄳ᜽ͧ᱗Გ‫܍‬Ꭱ➖ 㖁㑾ϔ͇ࣾᆂ⮱䛺◦䶳ഌȡ䮼Ɑ➖㖁㑾Ⱕ ‫ڠ‬ឭᱜȠᴴ۳Вࣷᩬゃ⮱ࣾᆂႹ઱喑ⰥԎ ᰶᰡ็䶳ഌႹ઱᜽⛌䊤Გȡą倅≗䱋㶕 ⹧喑Ą➖㖁㑾ፓ㐆ϧЙ⮱ᬍ䭽䕽ᘠч⻨⩌ ≨䊷Გ䊷䓾ȡⰥԎ᱗Გчౕ➖㖁㑾䶳ഌч ⰸ‫ݝ‬ᰡ็⮱ᗷૉহ⾮ⵡȡą

ज⩕λ‫⮱≸⯾⩝ۉ‬ᄼಸ㳧᫸ᶕᣏ≸க

July 2013

31


COVER STORY

China connected The “internet of things� is connecting your pocketbook with the world. Connecting your car to your washing machine. Connecting your phone to your microwave

32

July 2013


S

pending money in Shanghai just got a whole lot easier. In April, Shanghai Mobile, a subsidiary of China Mobile, added itself to the country’s growing list of “mobile wallet” service provider. The payment method allows consumers to run their cellphones across a scanner to settle accounts instead of swiping a card or producing a wad of cash from a physical wallet. Shanghai, the country’s financial hub, has been something of a testing ground for new payment methods. China’s earliest version of the mobile wallet popped up last year in the city, and there are now reportedly more than 160,000 terminals that savvy Shanghai shoppers can use to drain their bank accounts. This new way of spending is part of a bigger trend that is aiming to put wallets, watches, TV sets and products and items of all sorts on a network that is constantly exchanging and updating information. This new level of computer and phone connectivity with devices and objects traditionally untied to information networks is known as the “internet of things.” Or at least that’s what the computer scientists are calling it. The concept is founded on the idea that many physical objects will transmit information, forming a complex network of global and instantly updated data. Portable music devices could soon be alerted if toast is burning in the oven, for example. But the uses are almost endless, and not all ridiculous. If a phone is monitoring its owner’s body, for instance, paramedics can be alerted of a health emergency without anyone placing a call.

The buzz At present, the term internet of things encompasses such a wide range of disciplines that even researchers who are working within the field had trouble defining the exact implications. “The internet of things is a buzz word and many things can be [included] in that concept,” said Jin Beihong, a research professor at the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Software.

July 2013

33


COVER STORY

Jin develops chips that he believes will one day be found in cars across China. The chips communicate with networks that give them real time information about the conditions around them. Vehicles equipped with these chips, often called the “connected car,” already exist in some countries. They can connect with a driver’s smartphone or computer at home to send notifications on maintenance, among many other things. “I don’t know when [the chips] will actually be used,” Jin said of her project in China. The specifics of her project were unclear, and she hinted that the real application of the technology could be years away for Chinese drivers. But vagueness and a far-off timeframe haven’t dissuaded investment in areas that might be counted in the broad stroke of the internet of things.

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July 2013

If anything, companies are ramping up their investments, hoping to catch at least some part of its early development. The internet of things is projected to be a more than US$122 billion industry in China by 2015, the state-backed Global Times newspaper reported in June. That’s a 105% increase on the 2012 value of the market. Much of the early investment in the industry in China will go into logistics and online consumption. But, theoretically, the internet of things should literally connect a wide range sectors. “I think the internet of things will continue to roar in the future because the market has witnessed increasing demand for big data storage from enterprises,” said Li Jing, a manager at Chinesemid, a Shenzhen-based internet technology company that makes data storage products.

“In terms of the cloud storage segment, the industry is in the mid-stage of advancement in China. The market was in its infancy over the last two years, but now is entering new era as the market has seen fast-growing demand. But as for intelligent technology solutions, such as intelligent home solutions, the industry is still in its infancy.” Cloud computing is an essential aspect of the internet of things. As more devices and everyday objects become connected to networks, the information they produce will need to be stored in a centrally accessible place. That’s where the cloud comes in. The cloud, another notorious buzzword, is essentially memory storage external to devices, often based in large collections of remote servers. It reduces the need for internal storage while


also quickening internet connection speeds.

Hitting wallets first The internet of things will likely be taken up slowly in everyday life in China. The foundation for the industry, however, could be increasingly evident in payment services, such as Shanghai’s mobile wallet. As internet speeds ramp up in China, the use of smartphones with 3G internet coverage has grown exponentially. The increasing role of smartphones in the Chinese economy has shown that Chinese consumers are moving away from computers for conducting financial transactions and buying things. The value of mobile commerce in

China has soared during the past few years. In 2012, Chinese bought US$7.7 billion in goods from their phones, a more than 200% increase on the year before, according to research group iiMedia. Global research firm McKinsey said that figure could climb to US$15 billion this year Data on the value of mobile wallet purchases are still unavailable in the Shanghai market. The number of terminals already installed bodes well for the service. So do the number of banks that have backed the project. Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and China Merchants Bank, among others, have supported the development of cashless, card-less spending. These kind of transactions via con-

nected mobile devices present one of the biggest challenges to the internet of things in China. Chinese people still lack trust in mobile transactions and many will be reluctant to upload personal information to a network that will eventually connect their bank to their washing machine. But, if the rise of e-commerce giants such as Taobao, followed by mobile commerce, is any indication of how trust can grow, the internet of things may have a bright future in China. “I think its status is similar to that of Taobao few years ago when people dare not shop online by using creditcard,” Li at Chinesemid said of mobile wallets. “So it takes time for this industry to be accepted by consumers.”

July 2013

35


࠰᭧஌̃

ᇎେ࢔๡ಎ૳฼ූ ➖㖁㑾ᣕߕ̸⮱ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ᰶ᱈⾮ⵡࣾᆂ⨣䶵 ᪴]ᮄ‫ۈ‬

͚

పᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ϔ͇⮱᜽ಸহࣾᆂ໸λ

Ꭼ喑̀⩕䒓䖀᲎喑⩕ᝤ䊲䓴̴ȡ

̓㏗݊ȡĄ࡮ρą᱌䬡喑⻾ឭ䘕

䧮䌜ᮧ㘪䓽䓀㈨㐌Όᐧ䃫γ࠲᠙䧮䌜㖁㑾

ᄳĄᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌‫ڠ‬䩛ឭᱜᐭࣾহ⹧㠰ą

ਜ਼⺕㈨㐌ౕ‫͗็⮱ڲ‬ၽ㈨㐌ȡ

䕇㈨㐌হ䒕䖀ϑ䕇ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌ȡ ➖㖁㑾ឭᱜ⮱ࣾᆂ喑ᄦᣕߕᮧ㘪ϑ䕇 ⮱ࣾᆂᰶⱭጕ๔⮱፛ߖ喑ϻࣾᆂ⮱䊸߬Გ

҉ͧ䛺๔䶦Ⱋ݄‫ڒ‬పუ⻾ឭᩨ‫ڠ‬䃎ܿȡ

ϻ䪬᱌Გⰸ喑೻ጯࡃ䔈⼸⮱ߍᔘ喑ᱧ

ⰸ喑➖㖁㑾হᮧ㘪ϑ䕇⮱㐀वᄳ᭜ᓲ♣⮱

Ą࡮̭ρą᱌䬡ϑ䕇䘕᣽‫⮱ܧ‬В⣝АԎᖜ

ߕ䒓Ԋᰶ䛼⮱ᠮ㐚᣽ࡴВࣷ೻ጯ䖀䌜ϑ䕇

䔶᠖喑➖㖁㑾Ƞξ䃎ツぶ⣝АԎᖜឭᱜั

ឭᱜ᣽ࡴϑ䕇䓽䓀͇喑๔߈ࣾᆂᮧ㘪ϑ䕇

᠒ᡑ⼸Ꮣ䘪ͧᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ϔ͇⮱䪬䔉ࣾᆂ᣽

⤳㘪߈ᄳ᜽ͧ᱗Გᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ࣾᆂ⮱ᵥᓰឭ

হϑ䕇Ԏᖜࡃぶᩬゃ⮱ᣕߕ喑ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ϔ

ӈγᎬ䭁⮱‫ݺ‬ᮜȡ

ᱜȡ㔹ᵦᢛᮧ㘪ϑ䕇̺ह㏳ܳጯ౧㜗䏘➦ ◦⮱̺ह喑ᄦ➖㖁㑾⮱Ꮑ⩕⮱Ό᣽‫ܧ‬γ̺

͇ᰶγᔘ䕌ࣾᆂȡ ͚పᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ࡼч⤳θ䪬ॡ∪ᔍ㶕

ᇎେ࢔๡൯ӎ

ह⮱㺮Ⅿ喑䰭㺮ᄦऱ㏳ܳጯ౧᣽ӈⰥᏁ⮱

⹧喑͚పλ̷̓㏗ᎡА᱘ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ᐭ

ᠶ⚔᰺ߎᄦ䆎⮱̺ह喑ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨

໸ᣕߕ喑Ꭳःᓄγ䒰ᔘ⮱ࣾᆂȡⰛ‫ݺ‬喑ప

㐌ጯ౧ͨ㺮जВܳ᜽倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨

В倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌ͧҸ喑➖㖁

‫ڲ‬ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇䯳᜽Ꮑ⩕ጟัౕ̓⩹‫݄ݺ‬ȡᰭ

㐌Ƞ䧮䌜ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌Ƞ೻ጯᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨

㑾⮱ͨ㺮Ꮑ⩕ᄳ䯳ౕ͚䕇Ԏ㈨㐌Ƞ⯾ᣔ㈨

᜽ߌ⮱‫ڕ‬ప㺳Ⰳᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜

㐌হⅡ̷ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌ఈ๔ㆨ喑‫͚ڣ‬೻ጯ

㐌হᩣ䉦㈨㐌̶๔಄喑‫⩕ݖ‬3'*%Ƞэᙌ㑾

&5$喍⩢ၽ̺։䒓ᩣ䉦㈨㐌喎ጟౕⰮᣕ

ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌ࣵजВܳ᜽೻ጯ䖀䌜ᮧ㘪ϑ

㐉Вࣷ‫ٵ‬䔈⮱Ԏᖜั⤳ឭᱜぶ➖㖁㑾ឭᱜ

➖㖁㑾Ꮑ⩕ȡ

ఫ㶕➖㖁㑾ౕᮧ㘪ϑ䕇͚⮱‫ڥ‬ಸᏁ⩕ ㏳ܳጯ౧

ͨ㺮Ꮑ⩕䶳ഌ

倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌

Ⅱ̷ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌

䧮䌜ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌

೻ጯ䖀䌜 ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇 ㈨㐌 ೻ጯᮧ㘪 ϑ䕇㈨㐌

䒕䖀ϑ䕇 ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇 ㈨㐌

Გ⎽喟⌲⻾ⵁ⾣͚ᓰ

36

July 2013

Ꮑ⩕᣼䔝

䕇Ԏ㈨㐌

‫➖⩕ݖ‬㖁㑾ឭᱜ喑᣽倅Ԏᖜᩣ䯳হ㑾㐉э䓀⮱᩵⢴喑᣽ӈฝ䴠Ƞఫ‫׼‬হ᪝ᢛ⮱э䓀

⯾ᣔ㈨㐌

‫⩕ݖ‬эᙌ㑾㐉ᄦ倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜䔈㵹‫⯾⼸ڕ‬ᣔ喑ᄦᐯ፥ᗲۢࣷᬣჇѺ喑ᔘ䕌ั⤳

ᩣ䉦㈨㐌

‫⩕ݖ‬3'*%ぶឭᱜ჋⣝倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜⮱ᮧ㘪ᩣ䉦ノ⤳喑࠲᠙ᬍ։䒓ᩣ䉦ぶ

䕇Ԏ㈨㐌

‫➖⩕ݖ‬㖁㑾ឭᱜ喑᣽倅Ԏᖜᩣ䯳হ㑾㐉э䓀⮱᩵⢴喑ᄦ䓽㥒䓴⼸͚⮱Ⅱ䌜㝦㝣ぶ᣽ӈฝ䴠Ƞ ఫ‫׼‬হ᪝ᢛ⮱э䓀

⯾ᣔ㈨㐌

‫⩕ݖ‬эᙌ㑾㐉Ƞ(*4ぶឭᱜᄦ叱䛾Ⅱ䖀䔈㵹‫⯾⼸ڕ‬ᣔ喑ᄦᐯ፥ᗲۢࣷᬣჇѺ喑჋⣝㝦㝣ߕᔮ ⯾ᣔぶߌ㘪

θᩲᏁᕒ㈨㐌

‫*(⩕ݖ‬4ぶ➖㖁㑾ឭᱜ჋⣝ᄦⅡ䌜㝦㝣⮱ჇѺȠ䌌䍗Ƞ䶱䂓Ƞ្䂓喑㉔ᕒ᩾ᤡぶ㐩वߌ㘪

䕇Ԏ㈨㐌

‫➖⩕ݖ‬㖁㑾ឭᱜ喑䒲ߖ჋⣝݄䒓হ䒓〆䬡⮱⽠Ⴧ䕇Ԏ

ӈ⩢㈨㐌

⶛Ԋज䲍⮱⩢߈ӈᏁ㺳Ⰳ䧮䌜⇬㏬喑䕇䓴倅᩵Ԏᖜᩣ䯳হऻझᔘ䕌ั⤳喑჋⣝ӈ⩢ᮧ㘪ࡃ

Ԏत㈨㐌

‫⩕ݖ‬эᙌ㑾㐉⶛Ԋ݄䒓͸䬡⮱Ⴖ‫ڕ‬䌊⻨喑䔪䍗݄䒓ߕा喑᣽倅䧮䌜ϑ䕇᩵⢴

⯾ᣔ㈨㐌

䕇䓴эᙌ㑾㐉Ƞ3'*%ぶ➖㖁㑾ឭᱜ᣽ࡴᄦ೻ጯ䖀䌜ϑ䕇ᗲۢ⮱⯾ᣔ᩵⢴喑և‫ݝ‬ᄦ೻ጯ䖀䌜 ㈨㐌⮱‫ڕ‬᫦Ѻ⯾ᣔ

ϑ䕇ᣔ‫ݣ‬㈨㐌

᣽倅Ԏᖜᩣ䯳᩵⢴喑䕇䓴‫ٵ‬䔈⮱䃎ツᱧឭᱜ჋⣝ᮧ㘪䄰㞯ϑ䕇ԎतȠϑ䕇ᠴᑂ喑В᣽倅೻ጯ 䖀䌜ϑ䕇᩵⢴

⩢ၽ䂓ᄌ㈨㐌

䕇䓴⩢ၽ䂓ᄌᷭ≸Ƞ䃝ᒂȠэ䓀হノ⤳䔊ࣺϑ䕇㻱݆⮱Ԏᖜ

೻ጯᩣ䉦㈨㐌

‫⩕ݖ‬3'*%ぶឭᱜ჋⣝೻ጯϑ䕇⮱ᮧ㘪ᩣ䉦ノ⤳喑࠲᠙ᬍϧթႵ։䒓౧㜗ߕ䃎䉦Ƞᩣ䉦ࡧഌ ᬍ։䒓ᩣ䉦ぶߌ㘪

䕇Ԏ㈨㐌

䕇䓴‫ٵ‬䔈⮱Ԏᖜᩣ䯳হэ䓀ឭᱜᄳ䒕䖀ϑ䕇কడ⮱ฝ䴠Ƞఫ‫׼‬Ƞ᪝ᢛぶԎᖜᰡߍ倅᩵ౝэ䔮 㜠ᣔ‫͚ݣ‬ᓰ

Ԏत㈨㐌

䕇䓴Ԏᖜั⤳ᄦ䒕䖀ϑ䕇䓽㥒Ԏत䔈㵹ᮧ㘪ࡃノ⤳

‫⯾⼸ڕ‬ᣔ㈨㐌

‫⩕ݖ‬эᙌ㑾㐉Ƞ3'*%ឭᱜহ䃎ツᱧั⤳ឭᱜᄦ䒕䖀ϑ䕇䓽㥒⮱᪡Ҁᗲۢ䔈㵹⯾ᣔ喑ࣷᬣᢿ 䮑ᐯ፥ᗲۢ


ܳ‫ݘ‬䕇䓴᣽ࡴԎᖜᩣ䯳ȠԎᖜэ䓀ȠԎᖜ

ѳ᭜喑჋⣝䔆̭‫ڠ‬䩛᪡वߌ㘪⮱䶳ഌ䔅᱗

ั⤳⮱᩵⢴Вࣷ‫⩕ݖ‬ᮧ㘪ࡃȠ㜗ߕࡃ⮱䃎

ⴒȡ

᱗Გϑ䕇䰭㺮ౕ㏬Ꭰझᄳ็⻺ϑ䕇 ㈨㐌⮱ߌ㘪Ƞϔ৮Ƞ᰺ߎহឭᱜ᪡वౕ̭

ツᱧ㈨㐌Გ፛ߖ倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜ノ⤳䘕䬕Ƞ䓽㥒

ϑ䕇䓽䓀᠒ᰶᑧ๔⮱ࡧഌ㑾㐉喑㔹䧮

䊤ȡ␎Ю͇ᓲ䶨जВͧ‫ڣ‬䶫჏᣽ӈ䕇䓴

ੳᰡߍ倅᩵ȠӬᢤ⮱჋⣝ᄦ倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜⮱ᮧ

䌜Ƞ㝗⾧‫ڙ‬थࣵ‫ڤ‬ᰶᑧ๔⮱ప䭲㑾㐉喑᝭

὎಄ϔ⩌⮱Ⴧ‫ࡃݣ‬᰺ߎ喑ࢠĄ๔ឦ䛼Ⴧ

㘪ࡃ⯾ᣔহノ⤳喑፛ߖ倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜थᱧহ΅

В䘪ᰶज㘪჋⣝䔆̭ߌ㘪ȡᰭऻ喑⩢Ԏহ

‫ݣ‬ąȡ䔆जВ᣽ӈ᪡͗Фթ䨫⊶ࣷ⮱᝭ᰶ

჏ᰡສౝϘऄౕ倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜̷⮱᫲㵹ȡ

ο㖁㑾ӈᏁੳ䘪᠒ᰶᄳ̺हϑ䕇᫦ᐼӈᏁ

᰺ߎ喑ϻ‫ܧ‬㵹䃎ܿ‫ݝ‬ᰭऻ⮱Ѕ䉦ȡЮ͇ᓲ

ੳ⮱᰺ߎ᪡वౕ̭䊤⮱㘪߈ȡ㒄᫜ጡ䊘ᕨ

䶨⌲ᮝ‫ڣ⩨ݨ‬৮❹喑Ꭳᄳ‫⩕ڣ‬λ᫝ϔ৮হ

㐀䖀喟ĄजВᬻ⶛⮱̭◦᭜喑㘪์᣽ӈο

᰺ߎ喑䔆ᵤ᝺㘪Ԋ䃮‫ౕڣ‬ጯ౧㣤ᓄ㞜ສࣺ

㖁ϑ䕇ノ⤳᰺ߎ⮱‫ٵ‬㵹㔲ᄳౕ䔆̭ࣾᆂ䓴

᭍ȡ䰭㺮‫ݣ‬Ⴧ∂ᒸ喑Ԋ䯉᪝ᢛ⮱Ԋჳᕔ喑

⼸͚݈䕍ज㻯Фթȡą

ѳहᬣΌ㺮᣽ӈ̭Ⴧ⮱䔼ᬻᕔȡ‫⤰ڕ‬㠰డ

Կᄷफ़ܼࡖᆼ Ą㮪♣᜾Й⩌≨⮱̓⩹ᬒ⯷㑾㐉ࡃ喑 ѳ͗ϧ‫ܧ‬㵹⮱ϑ䕇᫦ᐼ䔅᭜䲋፥䰣ⶻ⮱ȡ ᒵ็‫ڠ‬䩛ᬣ‫ݨ‬喑᜾Й̺ⴒ䖀ϻ"ౝ‫ݝ‬#ౝ ⮱ᰭҠ᫦ᐼȡą㒄‫ڝ‬䉊ᵩवцϧࢎ᫜␂e

Გⰸ喑∂ᒸҀ㈨⮱ᐭᩫ̻ࡼ䄰ᅑ‫ڣ‬䛺㺮ȡ

ܹሇ๯ሯࠗ߾

㒄᫜ጡ䊘 $BSTUFO 3PTTCBDI 㼐䛷䖀喑

㜠Ꭱ喑ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㵹͇᪡Ҁጯ౧

Ą䔆⻺̭Ҁࡃ὎ᐼᄳᄦ᜾Й⮱‫ܧ‬㵹΍ᘜፓ

㻱὎䓾Ϭٰȡ㔹Ꭱ᪡Ҁጯ౧㻱὎

Გ䛺๔ᒞ৺ȡą

䊲䓴Ϭٰ喑ጯ౧෋䪬⢴Ԋᠮౕ

ຯ᳉᱗Გϑ䕇ノ⤳᭜ᐧ⿸ౕ㏼≻হ⣜ධᴴ ۳͸̷喑ຯⷠহᄼ䷄ㆿ⮱ᢿᩫ喑䗐͵ο㖁 ϑ䕇ᄳ፛ߖ᣽倅ϑ䕇ധ⵭䃫᫪⮱Ҭ⩕ȡ

૳ਪᇵ‫ا‬໡฽

ϑ䕇̭Ҁࡃ᝭䰭⮱͗ϧ᲎У‫ڣ‬჋ጟ㏼

В̷ȡᮧ㘪ϑ䕇⮱ᔘ䕌ࣾᆂΌ॥ᑂγ䉱᱙

‫ิڤ‬喟⻮ϧ↪䒓Ƞ‫ڞڙ‬ϑ䕇喍‫ڙ‬ϑ̻䪬䕁

ጯ౧ᄦ‫∕ڠ⮱ڣ‬喑⌲⻾ⵁ⾣͚ᓰ⮱᪝ᢛ᭫

Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ప‫ڲ‬ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌ጯ౧ࡃᣕ䔈ᱧ

䒓喎Ƞ⼌䒓Вࣷ䊷Გ䊷፥㻮⮱⩢ߕ↪䒓ȡ

⹧喑ౕᎡ㜠Ꭱ̷ࡷᎡ䬡喑ᰶ็

‫ݣ‬Ϻ℁䒰㑧ͼ喑ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ϔ͇䨫ȠФթ䨫

ѳ᭜喑ጯ౧̷䔆ψϑ䕇᫦ᐼ䕇፥䘪ႅౕλ

უᮧ㘪ϑ䕇Ⱕ‫ڠ‬Ю͇㣤ᓄγ䷻䮖ែ䉱ᱧᲱ

䔅⇎ᰶⱌₐᒏ᜽喑᱗Გࣾᆂ㺮ӊ䲍䉱᱙হ

ᄮ䬚⮱ϑ䕇㈨㐌͚ȡĄ䔆ψϑ䕇㈨㐌‫ͻ܍‬

⮱ែ䉱喑ᄦᮧ㘪ϑ䕇⮱ࣾᆂ䊤‫ݝ‬γ⼜Ხ⮱

⻾ឭ݈᫝⮱‫ڞ‬ह侞ߕȡ

Ⱕο⠙⿸喑⩕ᝤ఍ₑ̺㘪ᔘ䕌᫦Ӭౝౕऱ

ᣕߕ҉⩕ȡ

⩞λ⊶ࣷᮧ㘪ϑ䕇㈨㐌⮱䘕䬕ф็喑

⻺ϑ䕇᫦ᐼ͸䬡䒙ᢏ喑喍ጯ౧喎㑧ͼϑ䕇

⌲⻾ⵁ⾣͚ᓰ䃑ͧ喑ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ᄳ᜽

ԎᖜᲒ⎽Όᅞ็㔹ᱯȡॡ∪ᔍ㶕⹧喑ऱ͗

̭Ҁࡃ䔆⻺⤳ᔢȡą㒄‫ڝ‬䉊ᵩवцϧȠ្

ͧ㑀㼐೻ጯϑ䕇ࢸ߈喑䭺ѻϑ䕇θᩲ⮱䛺

䘕䬕ȠऱㆨಸԎᖜ‫ڞ‬ϘϺᰶ℁䒰๔⮱෮

ॷ҉㔲͸̭侙‫ٸ‬e⍖➦䰺๘ .BSD8JOUFS

㺮᝸⃢喑ϻ㔹㣤ᓄᩬᏉ䘕䬕⮱๔䛼ែ䉱喑

ಿ喑ຯ҂䃖ऱㆨಸԎᖜ䕇䓴᪡व㣤ᓄᰡ倅

IPGG 䄡䖀喑Ą᝭В喑⣝АԎᖜ̻䕇Ԏឭᱜ

㔹ᩬᏉ‫ڞڙ‬᰺ߎ䘕䬕݆ᄳᄳ᜽ͧᮧ㘪ϑ䕇

⮱Фթ喑ຯ҂កⵡ䘕䬕Ƞ㵹͇䬡⮱෮ಿϺ

जϻ䔆䛹ᐭ໸喑ᣕߕο㖁ϑ䕇⮱ࣾᆂȡą

Ꮑ⩕⮱ͨ㺮䛴䉚߈䛼ȡౕ➖㖁㑾ϔ͇⮱ࣾ

䰭ᣏ㉏ȡ

᝭ᰶ೻ጯ䘪䲋፥䰭㺮ࣾᆂ䔆̭䶳ഌ喑

ᆂ݊᱌喑ᩬᏉ䛴䉚὎ᐼԊ䃮γ㵹͇⮱ᔘ䕌

ప‫ݺⰛڲ‬ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ϔ͇䨫䔅̺Ⴙ઱ȡ

ᅑ‫ڣ‬᭜ᰭ๔⮱Ꮤ೻ጯȡᄦ೻ጯϑ䕇㈨㐌

ࣾᆂ喑ᄦ㵹͇⮱ᣕߕ䊤‫ݝ‬γ㜠‫ڠ‬䛺㺮⮱҉

ह≻๔႓᪆ᢵᲕᮀ‫ٶ‬ᠴ‫ܧ‬喑࣯̻ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇

㔹㼭喑᭜̭͗䛺๔ᠾᝅȡхࡃ‫ܧ‬㵹᫦ᐼ喑

⩕ȡ

⮱Ю͇ф็喑ѳ᪡᲎ϔ͇䨫䔅̺Ⴙ઱ȡϔ

̺ϲᰶ⯷λ⣜ධ喑हᬣΌчᩦ઱䔆ψ๔೻ ጯ⮱⩌≨䉕䛼ȡ

ϻ㵹͇⮱ែ䉱ᱧчᲒⰸ喑⩞λᮧ㘪ϑ

͇⩌ᔮ⣜ධ䔅⇎ᰶᒏ᜽喑ᩬȠϔȠ႓Ƞ

䕇䶦Ⱋᒭᒭౝഌᕔ䒰ᑧ喑఍ₑౕែ䉱ᬣᐧ

ⵁȠ⩕ρ͗᫦䲏䘪᭜ϔ͇䨫͚ᓲ̺ज㑧⮱ ㏱᜽䘕ܳȡ

ᄦλᮧ㘪ϑ䕇⮱э᧚㔹㼭喑㺮∕ᘼ‫ݝ‬

䃛‫ࡧ∕ڠ‬ഌ‫ڲ‬䶳‫⮱ٵ‬Ю͇Вࣷ᠒ᰶᰶ᩵ᵥ

䃥็᲎У‫ڣ‬჋ጟ㏼᜽⛌ȡ仃‫ٵ‬Ӭ᭜ᮧ㘪᝸

ᓰឭᱜ⮱Ю͇ȡ‫͚ڣ‬喑ϻ䪬᱌ࣾᆂ䊸߬Გ

⩞λᮧ㘪ϑ䕇䶳ഌहᵤ⊶ࣷξ䃎ツȠ

ᱧ⮱Ꭼ∈Ҭ⩕ȡ⣝ౕ喑‫⤰ڕ‬ጯ౧̷⮱ᮧ㘪

ⰸ喑̭㏬೻ጯ⮱ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ጯ౧》ζⰥᄦᰡ

๔᪝ᢛぶ᫝‫ڡ‬Ꮑ⩕喑ႅ‫ו‬䶱䃎ᄳ᜽ͧ‫ݣ‬㏓

᝸ᱧጟ䊲䓴Ϭȡ̀უ䶱≸喑ᮧ㘪᝸ᱧ⮱

ߍ⓭◵喑㔹᱗Გι̶㏬೻ጯ⮱ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇Ό

ࣾᆂ⮱⨣䶵͸̭ȡ͚ࢇ⻾݈‫ޜ‬㦐θ䪬⩝হ

᪝䛼ౕ᱗Გ͑Ꭱᄳ෋ߍ̭Ժȡओใ̭◦᭜

ᄳ㣤ᓄᰡᔘ⮱ࣾᆂ喑जВ‫⮱ڠⰥ∕ڠ‬ែ䉱

⋈㶕⹧喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬э㐌᳣Ჱ䃫ิຯ҂जВᰡᰶ

जᔘ䕌ܳϘԎᖜ⮱‫ڠ‬䩛ឭᱜ⮱э᧚ȡĄ⣝

ᱧчȡहᬣ喑ϻ䷻䮖ែ䉱ᱧᲱ⮱ែ䉱㏳ܳ

᩵⮱‫⩕ݖ‬喑ౕᐧ͚⮱ႅ‫ו‬䃫ิຯ҂䔯Ꮑ᱗

ౕ喑᜾Йጟ㏼जВౕξ̷‫ו‬ႅ᪝ᢛ喑Ꭳ㘪

ጯ౧Გⰸ喑ᮧ㘪ϑ䕇‫⮱〜ݺ‬㻳䶾⯾ᣔ䃫ิ

Გ䰭Ⅿࣷा̸‫ک‬ღ䔅䰭㺮䔈̭ₒⵁ⾣ࣷࣾ

䕇䓴-5&ឭᱜহ⼨ߕ㑾㐉ᔘ䕌э䓀᪝ᢛȡ

ࢯੳȠ᪡Ҁ㼐۠᫦ᵵࢯੳВࣷ೻ጯᮧ㘪ϑ

ᆂȡₑใ喑䔅䲏͡ຯ҂᣽ࡴϑ䕇䶳ഌ᝭ᰶ

᝭В喑᱗Გϑ䕇὎ᐼ⮱ᵥᓰឭᱜധ⵭ጟ᜽

䕇䓽㥒ੳ㣤ᓄγᰡ็⮱‫∕ڠ‬ȡ

࣯̻㔲⮱ⴒᮀᏓ喑ຯ҂̺։䒓ᄦ䒓䒳䔈㵹 ノ⤳হ᰺ߎぶ䬛䷅ȡ

ᒏγȡą㒄᫜ጡ䊘䄡䖀ȡ ᫝⮱ϑ䕇὎ᐼ‫ڤ‬ᰶጕ๔⒉߈喑㘪์ϔ

Ӷ‫ࡷܹ܇‬ႁ෕

ॡ∪ᔍ㶕⹧喑Ą࡮ιρą᱌䬡ᮧ㘪ϑ

⩌᫝⮱Фթȡͧ䶫჏᣽ӈ‫ڕ‬䲏‫ܧ‬㵹᰺ߎ⮱

㒄‫ڝ‬䉊ᵩ̀უ᪓ӰЮ͇ࣷᬣ䃑䃳‫ݝ‬䔆

䕇ࣾᆂϺᰶ็͗䛺◦ȡ㔹҉ͧᮧ㘪ϑ䕇ᐧ

Ю͇喑ࢠ࠲᠙ϻ᫲㵹䃎ܿ‫ݝ‬䶱Ⴧ‫ݝں‬Ѕ䉦

̭䊸߬喑हᬣ䛴ःВ̸‫ڠ‬䩛ᣗ᫪喑㣤ᓄ᱗

䃫䛺㺮ͨҀ⮱Ю͇Ϻ䰭ӊ䲍ᩬゃȠ䉱᱙ᩜ

̭᲎哆᰺ߎ喑ᄳϻᮧ㘪ϑ䕇͚㣤⯷ᰭ็ȡ

Გο㖁ϑ䕇⮱᜽ߌȡ

ᠮⱭ߈ᣕ䔈䶦Ⱋࣾᆂȡ

July 2013

37


REPORT

Don’t get too comfortable Chinese firms may feel comfortable listing in the US again, but are American investors comfortable with China?

W

ith dismal prospects for listing close to home, Chinese firms are no doubt celebrating the revival of the US market for mainland IPOs. But for investors in US-listed Chinese firms, little has changed. The near freeze on Chinese IPOs in the US has lifted astonishingly fast. Several Chinese companies are now eyeing IPOs in New York, anonymous sources have told The Wall Street Journal. The apparent cause: a May 31 deal between the two countries giving US regulators limited access to financial documents at Chinese companies. Regardless of whether the sources are correct or not on any individu-

38

July 2013

al IPO, the chatter does indicate that Chinese firms are at least thinking about listings in the US again after the deal. While the US was never officially closed to Chinese companies, the ongoing spat between regulators over access had threatened a mass delisting of Chinese firms from US exchanges and ground new offers to a halt. Only two companies, social media network YY and Vipshop Holdings, braved the market last year in spite of this systemic risk. The question now is whether investors will embrace Chinese offers and, perhaps more importantly, should they embrace them.

For Chinese companies, the US market is no doubt more attractive than options closer to home. The US benchmark S&P 500 index has risen roughly 17% this year, while the Hang Seng has continued its lackluster performance by falling nearly 2%. IPOs in Hong Kong have been mixed, thanks largely to this recent track record of the exchange. Meanwhile, both the valuation and the stock price out of the gate could be lifted by the bull-market sentiment in the US. (Even if China’s securities regulator hadn’t halted approvals of IPOs, the market has also performed poorly year to date.) The prospects for investors aren’t nearly as enticing, however. Certain-


ly, US-listed Chinese companies are a slightly safer bet now that there is no risk of mass delisting. But investors may be no more protected from the fraudulent activities at Chinese companies that lead to the conflict with American regulators in the first place. US auditors can only request documents from Chinese firms if they have a reason for their inquiry. That means they’ll likely only be able to investigate companies after fraud allegations have come to light, by which time investors may already have been burned. The responsibility remains on the investors to look into the companies themselves to ensure what they’re buying has sound fundamentals. The responsibility itself is not a

problem – it’s how markets are meant to function. Stock punters should avoid companies that merely play on overall China growth and should focus instead on companies with proven track records that can be trusted. For example, Chinese e-commerce company Alibaba Group is widely expected to be pursuing an IPO. The Wall Street Journal reports it’s one of the firms considering a US offering. With Alibaba’s dominant position in Chinese e-commerce, the exchange it chooses shouldn’t be the deciding factor for investors. The risk of fraud dragging down such a widely recognized company is also smaller. The internet firm is likely to succeed no matter what exchange it lists on.

Lesser-known firms such as LightInTheBox, which plans to list in the US this month kicking off the potential Chinese return to US exchanges, deserve more skepticism. Perhaps the company is worthy of investment. YY and Vipshop have proven to be massive gainers, having delivered significant increases on their issue price. Such results may tempt investors to pile into subsequent Chinese IPOs. They’ll certainly have more opportunities to do so, given Chinese firms’ renewed interest in American listings. But if sentiment gets ahead of sound judgment, it will only take one Chinese stock imploding on fraud charges to remind investors how little has changed.

July 2013

39


࠰᭧஌̃

ഥ௜ൕѡ֭Յ็ ➖㖁㑾3'*%ឭᱜ᠒ᰶጕ๔⮱ጯ౧⒉㘪 ᪴]⊤䷻

‫⩌ٵ‬侫䒓̭ࣨუρᭌ㏔๔䙿Ꮔ࣯ߍ

䓾ᎡᲒ喑̭ψౝ᫦ᣕ‫ܧ‬Ꭳ㥪჋γឣᠮ

ᕊ㤹➦᭜⩞̷⊤ጯⰥ‫ڠ‬ᩬゃឣḺ喑ౕ

̭͗ప䭲倅ም䃧ಈȡЃᐭ䒓ᒱⰡ䔈

➖㖁㑾3'*%Ю͇⮱ᩬゃ喑3'*%ឭᱜ䶳ഌ

ᑍ↌倅⻾ᐭࣾచࡧ∕‫⮱ڹ‬倅᫝ឭᱜЮ͇喑

⮱х⻭Ю͇Όౕ̺᫚⊹⣝ȡ

᱙᪴ᐭ๡‫ܧ‬⣝⮱䊲㪱3'*%ࢎࢠ᭜ᕊ㤹➦⮱

‫ڒ‬䙿Ꮔౝ̸䒓Ꮐ喑㔹䲋‫׼‬э㐌䒓Ꮐ䖀䬥䗐

⠙უ݈᫝ϔ৮ȡᢛᕨ㏼⤳⢸下হጯ౧㏼⤳

ᵤᠶ䧛ःࢎ‫ࢎݤ‬喠ᣒⱭᲒ‫ݝ‬䙿Ꮔ⮱䃧ಈч ౧䬕ऐ喑ₑᬣ๔ᅼᎂ̷᭫⹧‫⁏ܧ‬䓻Ѓ㢲͡ ч䃛⮱ႄᎂ喑Ꭳ㜗ߕカ‫ݝ‬ȡ䔆⺋๴⮱̭ᎂ ग఍Ѓ䮼䏘ᥧፓ⮱̭ᑍ㪱㪱⮱ᰶ⎽ࢎȡ

ຊ႞‫ؿ‬ԣ Ąᄱ䶾䃳‫ࢠݘ‬Ҭ჋䭲̷᭜㜗ߕ䃳‫ݘ‬

হ3'*%ឭᱜ⮱䶳‫ٵ‬㔲喑ᕊ㤹➦➖㖁㑾͇̀

ឭᱜౕᬍ㏬⩢ឭᱜ᫦䲏⮱‫ڤ‬ҀᏁ⩕̻ࣾ

㜡߈λ(ᰶ⎽3'*%ϔ৮ᐭࣾࣷ㈨㐌䯳

̻ᣒ㼓ᐼ*$ࢎ̺ह喑ᑍ‫⩌ٵ‬Ҭ⩕⮱᭜

ᆂȡ䄒䶦ឭᱜ䕇䓴䛴⩕̭ψ‫ٵ‬䔈⮱ឭᱜ᝸

᜽喑जᵦᢛ჏ᝤ䰭ⅯႹ᜽᪡͗㼐۠᫦ᵵȡ

䲋ᣒ㼓ᐼȠ䔉䌊⻨䃳‫⮱ݘ‬3'*%喍ᄱ䶾䃳

⃢喑჋⣝ϧЙᄦऱㆨ➖Ҁᝃ䃫ิౕ̺ह

〜‫⮱〜ݝ‬䃫䃎䛴⩕‫ٵ‬䔈⮱(ᓛ∏ឭᱜ喑

‫ݘ‬喎ࢎ喑䔆ㆨࢎ⮱Ꮑ⩕㠰డ䲋፥Ꭼ∈喑ຯ

⟣ᔮÿ⼨ߕȠ䲆₏ᝃᖣߐ⣜ධ̸⮱㜗ߕ

㼐۠γ3'*%䔉䌊⻨Ƞ䭟۟⾮Ƞ̭㜡ᕔࣷ⽠

すιА䏘Ъ䃮ᅞ䛴⩕γ3'*%ឭᱜȡ㔹ᑍ‫ٵ‬

䃳‫ݘ‬হノ⤳ȡą̷⊤ᕊ㤹➦➖㖁㑾⻾ឭ

Ⴧᕔ⮱ឭᱜ䯫◦喑ऱ䶦ឭᱜᠴᴴ౴䓫‫ݝ‬ప

⩌⮱䔆ᑍᕊ㤹➦䊲㪱ᰶ⎽3'*%ࢎ䓽⩕γ

喍4VSNPVOU &MFDUSPOJDT喎ᰶ䭽‫ڙ‬थᕨ㏼

‫ٵڲ‬䔈ⅡᎠȡ

ప‫ڲ‬ᰭ᫝ឭᱜ喑ࣇᏓϲ℘ㆠ喑गᰶᮛ䕇ጯ

⤳⢸下㶕⹧ȡ

䲏ࢎ⮱̭ࡷ喑जᩫ‫ڒ‬䧞㶸⮱ࢎἪ‫ڲ‬喑Ӭλ ᥧፓȡ ᢛ ͇ ‫ ڲ‬ϧ ธ ϸ ㏺ 喑 3 ' * % ᭜ 3 B E J P 'SFRVFODZ *EFOUJGJDBUJPO喍ᄱ䶾䃳‫ݘ‬喎⮱ 㑖‫ۆ‬喑Ԅ⼝⩢ၽᴴカ喑᭜̭⻺䲋ᣒ㼓ᐼ⮱ 㜗ߕ䃳‫ݘ‬ឭᱜ喑䕇䓴ᄱ䶾Ԏत㜗ߕ䃳‫Ⱋݘ‬ ᴴᄦ䆎Ꭳ㣤ःⰥ‫ڠ‬᪝ᢛ喑䃳‫ݘ‬ᬍ䰭ϧጒ᎟ 䶱ȡ3'*%ឭᱜज䃳‫ݘ‬倅䕌䓽ߕ➖ҀᎣजह ᬣ䃳‫͗็ݘ‬ᴴカ喑᧺҉ᔘᢤ᫦Ӭȡ 3'*%ឭᱜ᭜ప䭲⩢㖁喍*56喎ࣾጰ⮱ ្ॷ͚喑ჇͶ⮱➖㖁㑾ఈ͗‫ڠ‬䩛ᕔᏁ⩕ឭ ᱜ͸̭ȡᎡᰵ㷘݄‫ڒ‬పუࣾᩦ༁Ƞ ጒԎ䘕Ȩ⩢ၽԎᖜϔ͇ឭᱜ䔈ₒহឭᱜᩦ 䕍ែ䉱᫦ाȩ䛺◦Ⱋᒂȡ ౕ➖㖁㑾᝭⊶ࣷ⮱䄥็ឭᱜ͚喑҉ͧ ͨ㺮ឭᱜ⮱3'*%ឭᱜጟౕ͚పᒏ᜽ϔ͇ 䨫喑Ꭳጟ㏼᜽ߌᏁ⩕‫⩌ݝ‬ϔ‫ݣ‬䕍Ƞ➖≮ノ ⤳Ƞ‫ڞڙ‬Ⴖ‫ڕ‬ぶऱ͗䶳ഌȡᎡ͚ప 3'*%ϔ͇ᕨϔթϬȡ㔹Ꭱ喑ጯ ౧㻱὎෋䪬‫ݝ‬Ϭٰ喑䋰ᅲ̓⩹す̶ Ѻ喑ϲ⁎λ㒻పহ㠞పȡ 䓾᱌喑పუጒԎ䘕⩢ၽ⻾ឭ༁䉌䉐ϧ 㶕⹧喑ϷᎡప‫ڲ‬3'*%ጯ౧ᄳ㐔㐚Ԋᠮᔘ䕌 ෋䪬喑䶱䃎℁Ꭱ෋䪬㏓喑3'*% ϔ͇⮱ጯ౧㻱὎ᄳ䓫Ϭٰȡ

40

݅䅓ϸ㏺喑҉ͧప‫➖ڲ‬㖁㑾ឭᱜ⮱ᣏ㉏㔲

July 2013

3'*%ࢎ⮱Ꮑ⩕㠰డᲮ‫ڣ‬Ꭼ∈

ౕ》ζ⓭◵⮱3'*%ጯ౧喑ᕊ㤹➦➖


㖁㑾‫ܚ‬ϭ͵㙞䷃㔹‫ܧ‬喤ᑿ㏠䊤Გᅞ᭜喟Ⱪ ‫ٶ‬Ƞϧ᝺Ƞ݈᫝Ƞጯ౧ȡ

‫⁎ں‬᭜㜡߈λϔ৮⮱ឭᱜ݈᫝হ㜗ͨ

‫ݛ‬୅ᆵቓ

ⴒ䃳ϔᱰ⮱ᐭࣾȡᕊ㤹➦ౕ݈͇͸݊ᅞ⶛

ᕊ㤹➦➖㖁㑾3'*%㈨㐌ϔ৮࠲᠙

仃‫ٵ‬᭜‫ิڤ‬䊲‫ٶⱩ⮱ݺ‬ȡᕊ㤹➦ᰭ݊

⿸γ㜗ͨᐭࣾⴒ䃳ϔᱰ⮱䖀䌜喑᪝ᎡᲒⶂ

3'*%ࢎȠ3'*%᝸ᠮᱧȠ3'*%⩢ၽ䨮হ

⮱ᵥᓰ͇ߎ᭜ቹ‫ڒ‬ᐼᏁ⩕䃫䃎ᐭࣾȡ㮪♣

᳉㉜㉜ȡⰛ‫ݺ‬ጟ㣤䶦ധ〆ᐭࣾ⮱ࣾᬻ̀

3'*%䄨‫ۆ‬கぶȡ݅䅓䛺◦ϸ㏺γ‫ౕ܍‬ప

͇㐖㞜ສ喑ѳ݈͇ఏ䭌᩼䨽ౝᢂᡶ‫➖ݝ‬㖁

‫ݖ‬喑ₐౕ⩠䄤䶦ᬍ㏬⩢߈⯾ᣔ㈨㐌䃫䃎

‫ัڲ‬λ䶳‫ٵ‬ౝѺ⮱ϔ৮ȡ

㑾⮱ੳᱧ喑䓲䕌䄰᪡͇ߎ᫦ा喑᜽⿸γᕊ

ᐭࣾ⮱̀‫ݖ‬喑ౕज㑃⼸᪝ႄ䄚䴠ᩫ๔கᐭ

ࣇᏓϲ℘ㆠ⮱ᕊ㤹➦ᰶ⎽䊲㪱3'*%

㤹➦➖㖁㑾‫ڙ‬थ喑ᄳᵥᓰ͇ߎ䒙ा➖㖁㑾

ࣾȠ䊲㪱3'*%ࢎ䃫䃎ᐭࣾহⰥ‫ڠ‬ϔ৮ᐭࣾ

ࢎ᭜ప‫ڲ‬ᰭ㪱⮱ᰶ⎽ࢎȡ‫ڣ‬э䓀䌊⻨ౕ

3'*%ឭᱜȡ

䶳ഌ喑‫⩠ڞ‬䄤䶦ࣾᬻ̀‫ݖ‬喑‫͚ڣ‬䶦඘㶒

ᐭ䭁ౝज䓫ㆠ喑ბ‫ڲ‬э䓀ज䔼䓴̭ൢ

γప‫ڠⰥڲ‬䶳ഌ⮱⾧⮪ȡᕊ㤹➦Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ₐౕ

ෆȡౕᰶ᩵⮱⩢⎽ノ⤳̸喑ᴴカҬ⩕ᄬপ

⩠្倅᫝ឭᱜЮ͇ȡ

ज䓫Ꭱ喍ᵦᢛࣾᄱ䶾⢴⮱̺ह喎ȡजᏁ⩕

‫⁎ڣ‬᭜䯳㖇γ̭ឦ㇫㠞ϧ᝺ȡ‫ڣ‬ᵥᓰ ᜽অ⩞Გ㜗ᑧЮ͇⮱䉱⌞*5̀უȠ⊤

݅䅓ಓ㼭喑⩞λప‫ⴒڲ‬䃳ϔᱰԊ៑

ᑿ႓ၽȠప‫ڲ‬㦄ऺ͇̀䮏ᵎࢇธࣷ㵹͇䒜 ⶙Уឭᱜ̀უ㏱᜽ȡ

Ⱕᄦ㪱ᑞ喑ᄩ㜡Ąᆞᄕą⡃⢄喑఍ₑౕ⩠

λ7*1჏ᝤࢎȠ։䒓౧㈨㐌হч䃛カ‫ݝ‬㈨ 㐌ȡ

⢸下喑݈͇ఏ䭌ᵥᓰ᜽অ͸̭喑᠒ᰶ

䄤̀‫ݖ‬ᬣч℁䒰䅕ᙻ喑఍̭ͧᬓ⩠䄤喑ᅞ

ᕊ㤹➦3'*%ᰶ⎽ࢎҬ⩕ᄬপज䓫

⩢ၽጒ⼸ࢇธ႓Ѻ喑‫ऻٵ‬Ш㕹λ͚ప⻾ឭ

䰭㺮ᄳⰥ‫ڲڠ‬ღ‫ڙ‬ᐭȡ᝭ВⰛ‫⩠ݖ̀⮱ݺ‬

Ꭱ喑᭜ప‫ڲ‬ᄬপᰭ䪬⮱ᰶ⎽ࢎ喑ᆋλВ

๔႓Ƞ͚⻾䮏ࣷࡻͧ‫ڙ‬थȡ҉ͧ䉱⌞͇‫ڲ‬

䄤ᗲۢ喑䔅̺㘪Ⴙ‫ڕ‬Ҁ⣝ᕊ㤹➦⮱݈᫝㘪

ᰶ⎽3'*%ࢂᲬͧᵥᓰ⮱ͨߕࣾᄱᐼᄱ䶾

ϧธ喑Ѓᄦ➖㖁㑾ឭᱜহ3'*%ឭᱜγ♣λ

߈ȡ

ࢎ喑ࣇᏓϲNNȡጟౕ䒓౧䖀䬥Ƞ➖͇

㘥Ƞຯ᪝უ⣺ȡ́ಓ䄇᪏㼭喑̺ͼ⓭ᗲȡ ᰫౕ⊤ใ⪆႓⮱݅䅓᭜݈͇ఏ䭌͚⮱ ᵥᓰϧ➖喑Ꭱ䒨㔹㻳䛻ცᎬ喑ᔄा䔉๔ȡ

ᰭऻ᭜␎䋠ጯ౧䰭Ⅿȡᕊ㤹➦➖㖁㑾

䒓䒳䔈‫ܧ‬ノ⤳Ƞუᵎ䕇Ꮑ⩕ぶ᫦䲏㷘Ꭼ∈

3'*%ϔ৮হ㼐۠᫦ᵵ౴㉔䉡ጯ౧喑Ⴙ‫ڕ‬჋

Ҭ⩕喑जᏁ⩕λ႓ᵎȠᄼࡧȠߋ‫ڙ‬๔ẩȠ

⣝γϔ͇ࡃᏁ⩕ȡ

‫ڨ‬㔮䮏Ƞ⯾⠞ぶȡ䄒ࢎ⮱➦◦᭜䔉䌊⻨䃳 ‫ݘ‬喑ౕᐭ䭁ౝፓ䃳‫⮱ݘ‬ᰭ䔉䌊⻨ज䓫 ㆠ喠ओ̭͗➦◦᭜倅Ⴖ‫ڕ‬喑ߍჳツ∂̻䃑 䃮喑ज⶛Ԋ᪝ᢛႶ‫ڕ‬ȡ ᕊ㤹➦⩢ၽ䨮喑᭜ज䛺ฺҬ⩕হ჋ᬣ ⯾ᣔ⮱⩢ၽ䨮‫ڤ‬喑जᏁ⩕λ䯳㷲マ䉔➖ノ ⤳ȠԊ⼻ࡧ➖≮ノ⤳Ƞ࢞䮖৮䒓䒳ノ⤳হ ᷭ侹ᷭ⫘䒓䒳ノ⤳ȡᕊ㤹➦ᰶ⎽䬲䄨க喑 ᭜䭟ⅡȠ䭟ᅅȠ䔯Ꮑऱ⻺⣜ධ⮱䬲䄨க喑 䃳‫ݘ‬䌊⻨䓫ㆠ喑जᏁ⩕λ։䒓౧ 㜗ߕ䃳‫ݘ‬Ƞუᵎ䕇Ƞ䉢䛺➖৮䃳‫ݘ‬Ƞч䃛 㜗ߕカ‫ݝ‬㈨㐌হ䬕⺮ჇѺ㈨㐌ȡₑใ喑䔅 ᰶ'*%᝸ᠮᱧ᝸ᠮ㏵〜Ƞ䊲倅䶾䬲䄨க⩢ ၽᴴカ䊲倅䶾䬲䄨க⩢ၽᴴカȠ䊲倅䶾᝸ ᠮᱧぶȡ

Ӷ‫܇‬႓Ⴐ ᕊ㤹➦➖㖁㑾3'*%㈨㐌ϔ৮ጟᰶ๔ 䛼᜽ߌ⮱Ꮑ⩕ᵵҸ喑ౕ⩕ᝤ͚᠒ᰶ㞜ສ⮱ ऐⶾȡ ຯ҂ฺౕᱯ⮱ბ‫ڲ‬⣜ධ͚喑჋⣝ᄦϧ অহ➖䉱⮱ჇѺহᄩ㝗喤Ꮑ⩕ᕊ㤹➦3'*% ϧঅჇѺノ⤳㈨㐌喑ऄᣔࡧഌ⮱ϧঅग㺮 ౕ᝸㚂̷ҖፓĄᕊ㤹➦3'*%䭟៳㚂ፓą喑 ऻझノ⤳ϧঅᅞज჋ᬣᢹᣔ‫ڣ‬Ѻ㒛Ԏᖜ喑 䔈㵹䄰䙺হノ⤳ȡ㚂ፓ䔅ፓᰶ្䂓ᠶ

July 2013

41


࠰᭧஌̃

ᕊ㤹➦䊲㪱3'*%ࢎ喍ጓ喎⮱ࣇᏓगᰶᮛ䕇ጯ䲏ࢎ喍ठ喎⮱̭ࡷ

䧛喑Җፓ㔲जВ‫្ߕݣ‬䂓ᠶ䧛喑ͨߕ̻

㈨㐌喑ज᫦Ӭუ䪬ᣒ䔮Ƞ䃬჏ჇѺȠ⺮ࡧ

䔆ᵤ⮱ᝅ⪒ᕔ᫝‫ڡ‬ϔ͇喑ᩬゃ⮱䛺㻳⼸Ꮣ

ऻझ㈨㐌㖁ᣒȡ͚⻾䮏ϧঅ䉱ϔノ⤳䔪䍗

្䂓喑ϻ㔹᣽倅႓ᵎ⮱Ⴖ‫ڕ‬䭟៑ⅡᎠȡጟ

হឣᠮ߈Ꮣ䔅䔉䔉̺์ȡĄᄦ‫ڤ‬ᰶᒵᑧ݈

㈨㐌ࢠᏁ⩕γ䔆ຄ㈨㐌喑В჋⣝Ⴙ઱⮱ϧ

̷ౕ⊤࢏⎫す̭͚ᓰᄼ႓Ƞᕊࢄ䌜Ꭹ٬

᫝㘪߈হϔ͇ࡃᏁ⩕㘪߈⮱Ю͇喑䨣㵹হ

অࣷ䉱ϔノ⤳হ䔪䍗ȡ

చȠ㩤㪴ᄼ႓ぶ็᝭႓ᵎ‫ڲ‬Ꮑ⩕ȡ

ᩬᏉ䘕䬕⤳Ꮑ䄒㐆ε䉱䛾̷⮱๔߈ᩜᠮȡ हᬣ喑ౕ⼻ᩣȠ⼌䛾হऱ⻺䙺ຄ᰺ߎ᫦䲏

ᄦλ䲋∂㥒䓽䒓䒳⮱䞡‫ݘ‬হノ⤳ा Გ᭜̭๔䯫◦ȡᕊ㤹➦➖㖁㑾3'*%㈨㐌

ΌᏁ㐆εᰡ็Ƞᰡ๔⮱хᘍȡą݅䅓ᐧ䃛 䖀ȡ

ःᓄγБϧ␎ᘼ⮱᩵᳉ȡ⩞ᕊ㤹➦ᐭࣾ⮱

ᕊ㤹➦ጟౕ͇‫ڲ‬ฝऺ卷䊤喑ࣾᆂ߬

"SVCB‫ڕ‬ప⩢ၽ䒓❹㈨㐌喑जВౕ

๡㞜ສȡ݅䅓ϸ㏺喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ₐౕ̻̭უ̓⩹

࠲᠙͚పౕ‫⩹̓⮱ڲ‬ऱపₐౕߍ㉔䔈

ㆠ⮱䌊⻨䛹喑В⃼⻿䒳⮱䕌Ꮣ䔈㵹䒓

ᑧ⮱↪䒓䯳ఏ≪䄵व҉θ჉喑⩞ᕊ㤹

㵹3'*%ឭᱜⵁࣾ喑๔߈ᣕᎬ3'*%Ꮑ⩕ȡ

䒳व∂ᕔ្䂓ࡼᴒȡजᰡ۳⶛䃳‫ݘ‬ᬍ䃮Ƞ

➦ा䄒䯳ఏ᣽ӈ‫ڣ‬ప‫ڲ‬䶳‫⮱ٵ‬3'*%ϔ৮喑

䔆㐆ప‫ڲ‬Ю͇ፓᲒᠾᝅ⮱हᬣΌ᣽ӈγᱧ

ຄ❹Ƞ្ᏌȠᐯ◦㥒䓽ぶ䲋∂㥒䓽䒓䒳喑

ㆨѩ䔆ᵤₐౕ≪䄵͚⮱๔䶦Ⱋ䔅ᰶສ็ȡ

䕴喑㔹Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ప‫ڲ‬䔅⇎ᰶ‫ܧ‬⣝̭უ‫ิڤ‬ᒵᑧ

䔅ज䃳‫⁍ݘ‬䉦㥒䓽䒓䒳হ䔊㻱䔊」䒓䒳喑 Ӱ䔈ノ⤳㻱㠰ࡃহ្ͫᵥᴒ⮱۳⶛ᕔȡ

42

๴௭௦ࣨ

ĄϻឭᱜⅡᎠⰸ喑ప‫ڲ‬3'*%ϔ৮̻

჋߈⮱➖㖁㑾3'*%Ю͇ȡ

ప䭲̷⮱ጛ䌊Ꭳ̺๔ȡą݅䅓ಓ⢴ౝ㶕

Ą᜾ЙᄳៀѼᱧ䕴喑̺᫚᣽倅ϔ৮

3'*%Ѐ‫ו‬ノ⤳㈨㐌喑‫⩕ݖ‬ᰭ᫝⮱

⹧喑ĄⰛ‫ݺ‬䕴‫̭⮱ݝ‬ψࣾᆂ⨣䶵‫ݣ‬㏓Ɑప

⮱ឭᱜহ䉕䛼喑В␎䋠̺᫚ព๔⮱ጯ౧䰭

3'*%➖㖁㑾ឭᱜহ(*4ౝ⤳ԎᖜឭᱜВ჋

‫ڲ‬3'*%Ю͇হ᪡͗ϔ͇⮱֒Ꮴ᜽䪬ąȡ̭

Ⅿȡ᜾Й⮱ᙬᮜ᭜喟ౕ䔆͗᱊䭠㵹͇喑᜾

⣝䉔➖⮱ᰶ᩵ノᣔ喑ጟ̷ౕ⊤ₓ䂓ऻࠑЀ

᭜᜽᱙䬛䷅ȡຯᰶ⎽3'*%ࢎ᜽᱙℁ᬍ⎽ࢎ

Йᄳ᜽̭ͧუ倅䕌ࣾᆂȠᰶⱭ䶪ᑧ⩌প߈

‫ו‬ぶ㈨㐌͚Ꮑ⩕ȡ㟼ጋ๔䗓⩕ധλ3'*%⮱

倅‫ܧ‬᪝Ժ喑х◦᭜䄨‫ۆ‬䌊⻨䪬喑ज䲍ᕔȠ

ࣷᑧ๔॥ᑂ߈⮱Ю͇喑̺᫚॥ᩣऱ⻺ᰶ᩵

ጒ͇ᣔ‫ݣ‬㈨㐌喑Ҭ⩕3'*%჋⣝≮Ⅱ㏬㜗ߕ

⽠ჇᕔᑧȡᕔФ℁ᒵ倅喑ѳప‫ڲ‬ጯ౧⮱ᣒ

䉱⎽Ƞ➦‫ݘ‬᭜ऱ⻺ᰶ⩕͸᝺喑ߍ‫ڒ‬᜾Й⮱

ࡃ喑ϻ㔹᣽倅⩌ϔ᩵⢴ȡ⴬䒓⼝䛺⽪ᴒ㈨

ऄᏓ̺๗倅ȡओใ᭜䉱䛾䬛䷅ȡ䉱䛾࡛

ఏ䭌ȡ᜾Йጹ᱈ⴚ᱌‫ڲ‬᜽䪬͇ͧ⩹̭≮⮱

㐌喑जᴒัຄ❹Ƞ֤䔰䓴ⷲ⮱䓽⚑䒓䒳ȡ

ͼ喑ᄩ㜡Ю͇⮱ࣾᆂऻߟ̺䋠喑ᒵ䯫և๔

3'*%㈨㐌ӈᏁੳȡą݅䅓㶕⹧ȡ

䛴⩕ᰶ⎽⩢ၽᴴカឭᱜᄦ⚑◚䒓䒳䔈㵹䔉

ևᑧȡ‫ڠ‬䩛ౕλ͚ᄼЮ͇ᒵ䯫ϻ䨣㵹⩠䄤

3'*%ឭᱜ̻ο㖁㑾Ƞ䕇䃜ぶԎᖜឭ

⼸⯾ᣔ䃳‫ݘ‬喑ᰶ᩵䭟₏γ䒓䒳֤䔰⚑◚⼻

‫ݝ‬ѻᖜ䉤喑㔹ᩬᏉ⮱ϔ͇ധ䛾ࣾᩫ䷊Ꮣ

ᱜ㐀व喑ౕ‫⤰ڕ‬㠰డ‫ڲ‬᠒ᰶጕ๔⮱ጯ౧⒉

হ䊲䒪䊲䛺䓽䓀ぶ⣝䆎ȡጟ䘕㒟λ䉢ጋϮ

̺๔ȡࣺԿ᭜̺㑧䉱䛾⮱๔Ю͇ᒵღᭀ㲺

㘪ȡ͇‫ڲ‬ϧธᮛ䕺䃑ͧ喑͚ప➖㖁㑾ϔ͇

ᔭ็უ⚑⴬ȡ⊤‫⩢ڠ‬ၽ䨮⯾ノ㈨㐌喑

䉱ȠϘऄ‫ݝ‬ऱ⻺хᘍȡ

ₐัλࣾᆂ݊᱌喑᱗Გᄳॵ倅䕌ࣾᆂ͸

जԊ䯉䉔➖䓽䓀Ⴖ‫ڕ‬喑䕼‫ݣ‬䉔➖䓽䓀͚‫ܧ‬

ᕊ㤹➦ጟ㏼㣤ᓄγ̷⊤ጯ݈᫝ധ䛾⮱

߬ȡ➖㖁㑾3'*%ϔ͇ᓲᄳ㣤ᓄ䒰ᔘ෋䪬喑

⣝⮱֤ⰄȠᣧᱯぶ㵹ͧȡጟ̷ౕ⊤⣜ධ჋

䉱䛾ᩜᠮ喑Ꭳₐౕ⩠䄤ᰡ倅䭣⃢⮱పუ㏔

⊹⣝‫ܧ‬す̭≮⮱➖㖁㑾3'*%Ю͇喑ᐭࣾ‫ܧ‬

͇䯳ఏぶ๔ಸЮ͇͚Ꮑ⩕ȡᎠႶᵎచ3'*%

ധ䛾ᩜᠮȡ݅䅓䃑ͧ喑ᄦλ➖㖁㑾3'*%

ᰡ‫ٵ‬䔈⮱3'*%ϔ৮ȡ

July 2013


REPORT

Connect the plots China’s lack of data on property owners has let the wolves move in on the market

B

y next June, China should know a bit more about who owns what property, how much of it, as well as how much it’s worth. Because right now, officials on the central level hardly have a clue. The system that China uses to register real estate ownership is highly fragmented. In some cities, Chinese record a property transaction in a digitized system. In small counties, they might jot the information down on paper before it’s permanently filed away. Drawing connections between localities – essentially figuring out who owns what nationwide – is almost impossible. Officials need to connect the dots. The looseness of the system has allowed wealthy Chinese, sometimes government or party cadres, to buy up large quantities of property undetected in different places around the country, a trend that has, among other things, driven housing prices sky high. By figuring out who owns what, the government can stop people from exceeding the limit on property purchases, which differ between cities. The Ministry of Land and Resources said in late May that it will streamline a national real estate registration system by this time next year. A comprehensive system has been in the works for several years and calls from China’s top leadership during the National People’s Congress in March expedited the process.

In theory, a unified system will let bureaucrats see what real estate an individual citizen owns across the country, whether their properties be in the distant Qinghai province or in Shanghai. It could also be a stepping stone to implementing a national housing tax. Instituting such a system will be far more difficult in practice. The problems with the current system goes beyond the digital divide, and a full revamp of the way records are kept will require cooperation between ministries, as well as consolidation on laws, a tall order in China. There are several different laws that specify how to register land. For anyone who owns a patch of forestland, they will have to look to Forest Law for direction. In the countryside, they might need to check Rural Land Con-

tract Law. Finding the correct place to register can also be difficult as more than 10 different government departments have registration offices. Urban housing, urban land for construction and several other classifications of property all need to be registered in different offices. Some 40 cities have online information systems, but the county level and below has hardly any online record-keeping. “It’s going to be a big job and not something that can be implemented in the short term,” said James Macdonald, head of research at property management firm Savills China. That’s why it’s unlikely a national system will be rolled out in its entirety by next June. It will probably be put in place in some cities, then those cities will be

July 2013

43


REPORT

connected and the system will grow, he said. The piecemeal nature of the rollout will not have a strong impact on the market, Macdonald said. If a comprehensive system was to suddenly go online, that could shock the housing market. It’s thought that much of the country’s demand is from investors or speculators, not first-time home buyers. As much as the government would like to preserve the market for newlyweds or those looking to move from the countryside to the city, it also doesn’t want a sharp drop in sales, which would have a devastating effect on a number of sectors that are tied to construction. In the long run, controlling the market is the main objective of the registration system, but it will also help combat corruption. A report released in early June by Study Times, a weekly newspaper published by the Communist Party School, said national registration would stop corrupt officials from hiding excessive

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July 2013

land purchases and even curb money laundering that is done through the real estate industry. Several reports in the last year have shed light on assets of party officials, with some having amassed shocking real estate hordes. One case in January drew online public outrage when it was revealed that the head of a rural bank in Shaanxi province owned 41 properties in Beijing worth about US$161 million. The incident demonstrated average Chinese people’s dissatisfaction with how powerful officials have horded property on the public dime, all the while driving up housing prices. However, it’s unclear if national registration would really have helped prevent the case. The banker, Gong Ai’ai, had used several aliases to keep under the radar, something the system isn’t designed to catch. Aside from busting corrupt officials, the system could help the government roll out a long-awaited – although seriously contested – housing tax. At present, limited housing taxes

exist only in Shanghai and Chongqing. For more than a year, the government has hinted that it will widen the breadth of the tax, but those efforts have run into strong opposition, likely from officials who own large amounts of property. Little progress has been made. Drawing connections between property ownership across the country will be essential to pushing through the tax, according to party mouthpiece People’s Daily. Taxes would be based on the accumulated value of properties owned. There are few other ways to derive these values other than recording them together. In pursuing a nationwide registration system, as well as a housing tax, Beijing is taking steps in the right direction. The short-term cooling measures that China has enacted since 2009 have had little effect in curbing prices. They are also erratic and further convolute what real demand for housing looks like. As daunting as the task may be, China’s new leaders should continue pushing for greater access to information on the market. It’s a step the country will have to take, better sooner than later. The housing market is yet another sector that grew up before China could bridle it. Only during the past few years have officials looked back and quivered at the challenge of meaningfully regulating it. A thorough registration system is part of the foundation on which China can build a healthy real estate sector. Or at least it would be a support beam that the government could raise to brace an increasingly unstable industry.


REPORT

This little piggy in the market A culture clash is imminent in the Shuanghui-Smithfield deal. Can the Chinese porker handle America’s giant spare rib?

I

t was a deal that took more than four years of brutal negotiation. In the end, Shuanghui’s buyout of Smithfield Foods forced the Chinese firm to take out financing for US$3 billion of the US$4.7 billion acquisition while also taking on the US$2.4 billion in debt that Smithfield has on its balance sheets. It also paid a 30% premium to Smithfield shareholders. But brokering the deal – the largestever Chinese buyout of a US firm – was the easy part. Once the papers are signed, Shuanghui (branded as Shineway in English) will actually have to manage and operate the world’s biggest producer of pork, a task that will not prove easy on a number of levels. Only time will tell if the Henan province-based company is up to the task, but experts said company culture is bound to be an obstacle to integrating in the US. The US media has shown some skepticism over the deal, but the most intense criticism has come from China. The state-backed news site Economic Information even likened the acquisition to a “snake swallowing an elephant,” referring to smaller Shuanghui taking over Smithfield. Others have questioned whether or not the deal will give Shuanghui indigestion. On the production side, the two companies look relatively similar. Both produce about six billion pounds of pork a year and are the leaders in their respective markets. Although Smithfield was founded in the 1930 and has

a deeper cultural resonance with US consumers than the Chinese firm does at home, Shuanghui’s operations date back to the late 1950s – a considerable heritage for a mainland company. Shuanghui, which is backed by investors such as Goldman Sachs and Singaporean sovereign wealth fund Temasek, employs more than 60,000 people, compared to Smithfield’s 46,000 some. Both companies have had foodquality problems, namely concerning the use of hormones. There are, however, ungainly differences between the meat packers, particularly in the size of the firms. Shuanghui’s assets total at about US$326 million, a fraction of Smithfield’s US$7.4 billion. The US company took in US$1.31 billion in revenue in 2012 while Shuanghui saw US$815

million the year before. Unlike Smithfield, Shuanghui isn’t listed so access to reliable financial data is limited. Another disparity is in the technologies the two companies wield. Smithfield has some of the world’s most advanced meat processing equipment, while Shuanghui is far behind in the industry relative to its size. Of course, these valuable assets are why the Chinese firm wanted to buy Smithfield in the first place. But a rift will no doubt remain between the quality and efficiency of production on the two sides of the Pacific – an operation that could soon be bringing to market 12 billion pounds of pig. These challenges could be short lived as technology should eventually diffuse from West to East. For Shuanghui, and any Chinese firm buying up Western-raised operations for that

July 2013

45


REPORT

matter, the thornier problems will be an enduring cultural disconnect. According to one report, cultural misgivings are why about 70% of Chinese cross-border buyouts fail. Take Geely Automotive as an example. The Zhejiang-based car maker bought Volvo from the US’s Ford for US$1.5 billion in 2010. Since then, integration has been strained and has nearly broken down at certain times. In April, Geely chairman Li Shufu told the Swedish press that Volvo interiors were “too Scandinavian,” much to the abhorrence of customers in the brand’s home market. Swedish representatives tried to downplay the comment, but Li’s attitude represents a divide between the bluntness of China and the couth of European speak. The bigger the scale of the buyout, and the more layers of management involved, the more acute cultural problem will manifest, according to

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July 2013

Gao Yang, a Shenzhen-based management consultant and an adjunct professor at Guangxi University. In the case of Shuanghui and Smithfield, cultural fallout could be severe. Gao said that he’s skeptical of the ability to resolve cultural differences between the two companies. Shuanghui’s headquarters is far removed from the country’s globally savvy coastline. “It’s based in central China, Henan province,” Gao said. “That’s the home of Yellow River culture. Chinese culture here runs strong. Their exposure to the West isn’t comparable with companies on the coast.” While business practices on the coast still differ from international norms, businesspeople there have far more exposure to the way business is done across the Pacific. The clash of cultures is a real threat, and the two companies must focus of communicating effectively. Some of

the other accusations surrounding the deal are probably overblown, however. Soon after news of a near-completed buyout was leaked to the press, rumors also circulated that US regulators would approve the deal. One US senator shot back that the deal was a threat to the country’s pork supply and therefore an issue of national security. The notion has gotten much attention. Chinese may have their eyes on US pork, but that exposure will be a boon to the economy and its eastward exports. The real concern lies in Shuanghui’s ability to manage and integrate with a US company of this magnitude. The real danger is if the Chinese from Henan province fail to engage US staff and customers on a familiar level and the merger breaks up, leaving Smithfield in a weakened state. China’s top porker will need to learn to cook American-style spare ribs, lest it leave this US titan of industry in disarray.


REPORT

Westward ho! Migrant workers aren’t as thrilled about taking up a life in China’s eastern manufacturing centers

F

actory owners didn’t cough up much last year in terms of salary increases. Bosses in China’s myriad of manufacturing plants raised wages only about half as much in 2012 as the year before. Salaries for China’s 163 million migrant workers grew by 11.8% in 2012, down from 21.2% in 2011, according to a report released in late May by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The stats might have led to some discontent on the production floor or in China’s growing service sector. But 20% annual increases in wages was a hard trend to maintain. The rate is returning to a more reasonable – albeit slightly lower – rate of salary growth closer to that of the past decade. Migrant workers took an average of about 13% more in wages every year between 2000 and 2007, before the rate fell to 5.7% at the onset of global financial crisis. The government’s 2009 stimulus in reaction to the crisis likely trickled down to workers gradually, explaining the higher increases in 2010 and 2011. An across-the-board look at wages will help take the pulse of China’s manufacturing sector. But this data is often skewed by migration itself. When workers in the countryside make the one-time jump to the city, so do their wages. This often substantial increase may have more to do with how much wages increase than any conscious decisions by factory bosses.

Perhaps more revealing were figures on migration patterns and the average age of the workers. Here, the NBS report, which focused on migrant workers, is pointing to longer-term phenomena that will define the shape of China’s workforce in the not-so-distant future. Businesses looking for workers on China’s coast should expect to see fewer migrants from central and western China. Although wages are still higher in the east, they increased slower than in both central and western provinces last year. Migrants can also save more money by staying out of the coastal provinces where the cost of living has climbed far faster than the rest of the country. A worker from the west – which includes everywhere from the plateaus and deserts of Tibet and Xinjiang to the jungles of Yunnan province – would save close to US$40 a month by staying in the west as opposed to moving eastward, a significant amount on a modest migrant’s salary. In fact, workers in central provinces such as Anhui and Hunan might consider heading west instead of settling in manufacturing centers such as the Pearl or Yangtze river deltas. Workers from central China will save about US$21 more by heading west. It’s no surprise that the total number of migrants living in traditional production hubs fell last year while the number of workers who stayed in their home province

climbed. If eastern provinces want to compete with growing inland manufacturing hubs such as the cities of Chongqing and Chengdu, they might have pay out a bit more than they did last year. Money won’t buy manufacturers everything, however. Although not widely reported, the NBS data also pointed to China’s aging work force, which is perhaps growing older than many had expected. Between 2008 and 2012, the percentage of Chinese migrant workers over the age of 40 jumped from 30% to 41%. This increasingly old body of workers is yet another source of pressure on the government. Losing ablebodied workers is one factor forcing Beijing to find new growth engines that don’t rely on cheap manufacturing and export. It’s also a sign that skills and efficiency among younger laborers must be improved. The smaller China’s work force gets, the more efficient it will need to be. The past 30 years of rapid economic growth were pulled along by China’s massive labor pool. The products were simple – often of poor quality – but China pushed out more than anyone. When population growth starts to decline around 2025, China can no longer rely on quantity. By this time the quality of its labor, exports and growth will say far more about the country’s prosperity.

July 2013

47


࠰᭧஌̃

ၕ‫׶‬ᆮ‫ڹ‬ళࣧ໵ན す̶᫦ᩜЅЮ͇ₐౕ⼨ߕᩜЅ䶳ഌ䔈㵹䛺◦ጰᅭ ᪴]ᮄ‫ۈ‬

ߕᩜЅ᭜➖㖁㑾⮱‫ڥ‬ಸᏁ⩕͸̭ȡ

Ą⼨ߕᩜЅА㶕᱗ᲒᩜЅࣾᆂ᫦ा喑

㟜❴ࢯੳȠ㏵〜ࢯੳȠੳᝤぶ喑㑧ͼ㐌̭

䮼Ɑ⩕ᝤ䰭Ⅿ⮱䛷ᩫ喑͚ప⼨ߕ

ᰶ᱈ᩦअᒀ‫ݺ‬ᩜЅጯ౧ᵩᅭȡąᭀ㻯ᮧᏀ

ᴴ۳ᅞҬᓄऱ᫦व҉᩵⢴ᒵѻȡЃ䃑ͧ喑

倅㏔ܳᲽጵᑍ㤹㶕⹧ȡ

పუᴴ۳‫ܧ‬झᄳӰ䔈᪡᲎ϔ͇䨫ᰡव⤳

ᩜЅϔ͇Ό䓻Გᰭສ⮱ࣾᆂᱧ䕴ȡౕࣨᎡ Ąࣹ࡮̭ą᱌䬡喑ᩜЅ჊჋⣝᜽ߌϑᭀϬ 䰣̴ぁ喑‫͚ڣ‬ᬍ㏬ᩜЅ䓾̴ぁ喑

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ၕ‫׶‬ᆮ‫ڹ‬ћሡ‫ۿ‬ि٪

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ȡ⩕ᝤౕౕ⼨ߕ䃫ิ̷㑾䉚᭜̭͗䛺

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͚ప䨣㖁ह͚ప⼨ߕλᰵ㖁वᣕ‫ܧ‬

๔⮱䊸߬喑䶱䃎Ꭱ͸ऻ喑䔆͗℁䛺чᣒ䓾

ߕᩜЅపუᴴ۳Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ጟ㏼Ⴙ᜽‫ڙ‬ᐭᘼ㻮ᒮ

/'$4JNࢎȡ㦸⊤Ԛϸ㏺喑Ҭ⩕/'$4JN

ȡ͚పϧℾ䨣㵹Ⱕ‫ڠ‬᪝ᢛ᭫⹧喑䶱䃎

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㻱Ⴧγ䓾౧ᩜЅ⮱Ⱕ‫ڲڠ‬ღ喑ᬻ⶛γ䓾౧

ႅःȠౕ㏬⊵䉦ぶȡҬ⩕/'$ 4JNࢎᩜ

Ϭٰȡ

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৮ᒏᔮᄳजВ‫ک‬ღ࠲᠙4*.ࢎȠ4%ࢎȠ‫ڕ‬

㵹ᄼ䷊Ѕȡ

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๔⮱ᐭᩫᕔȡ

᝸ᱧぶ็⻺㼐۠᫦ᵵȡ

ঁళ๿࣑ၕ‫׶‬ᆮ‫ڹ‬ҋऍ

‫ݝ‬Ꭱ‫ߕ⼨⤰ڕ‬ᩜЅ⩕ᝤᕨ᪝ᄳ䓫‫ݝ‬

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Ϭȡ᝗㜠ᎡᏂ⼨ߕᩜЅϑᭀ䛾䷊

ᆂͨ㺮⨣䶵ᅞౕλ㵹͇ᴴ۳̺ᬻ⶛ȡ⩞λ

䓾᱌喑ᰶ្䖀⼝ᔘ䧞ₐౕ䕇䓴ᔘ‫ݤ‬

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ߕᩜЅϑᭀ䷊ᄳ䊲䓴㒻ٰȡ

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2͚పす̶᫦ᩜЅጯ౧⼨ߕᩜЅϑᭀЪ䷊ ᩜЅ჊ ᩜЅ჊

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㖁ߕх߬喊 ͚ప䨣㖁喊 䉏Ѕ䕇喊

͚ప䨣㖁喊

ᝤ᪝䛼㇄ツጟᰶუВ̷ȡ㔹́喑ᰶ⊵

䃏ࢂवᎣᩜЅぶߌ㘪喑Ꭳᰶ᱈ᒏ᜽᪡Ҁ⼨ ߕᩜЅ㵹͇㼐۠᫦ᵵȡ ᭀ㻯ᮧᏀⵁ⾣ࣾ⣝喑䓾͑Ꭱ䮼ⱭВ᝸ ᱧ‫ࢎݤ‬கͧ‫ڥ‬ಸϔ৮⮱㒻పTRVBSF‫ࢎݤ‬க

៶ࢎ៶喊

ϔ৮ౕ᱙ౌःᓄᔘ䕌ࣾᆂВऻ喑͚ప⮱ᩜ

䧞㶸჊喊

ЅЮ͇Όᐭ໸ౕ⼨ߕᩜЅ䶳ഌ䔈㵹ⰥᏁ⮱ ϔ৮ጰᅭȡ᝭В喑ϻᎡ̸ࡷᎡᐭ໸喑

͚⼨ߕ喊 㖁ߕх߬喊

‫ڣ‬Ѓ喊

͚పጯ౧̷䊷Გ䊷็⮱ࢯੳຯᔘ䧞Ƞ៶ࢎ ៶Ƞͽ‫ݤ‬Ƞ⯿ၽᩜЅぶⰥ㐔ᣕ‫ܧ‬γ᝸ᱧ䴠 䶾‫ࢎݤ‬கᩜЅϔ৮ȡ

䄡ᬻ喟В̷᪝ᢛᵦᢛࢯੳ䃬䄵Ƞᭀ㻯㜗ᰶ⯾≸᪝ᢛহᭀ㻯ⵁ⾣὎ಸѝツ㣤ᓄ喑ᭀ㻯чᵦᢛᰭ᫝γ㼐 ⮱᪝ᢛᄦࢳट᪝ᢛ䔈㵹ᓛ䄰喑⼨ߕᩜЅᠴ⩕ᝤ䕇䓴⼨ߕ㏵〜喍̭㝙ͧ᝸ᱧ喎ࣾ‫ܧ‬᪝ႄࡃᠴБͧ‫⊵ڣ‬ 䉦⮱ੳ৮ᝃ᰺ߎ䔈㵹䉱䛾ᩜЅȠ䒙䉓ぶ䉱䛾≮䒙≨ߕȡ

ᭀ㻯ⵁ⾣䃑ͧ喑͚ప᝸ᱧ䴠䶾‫ࢎݤ‬க ϔ৮⮱㨙߰ࣾᆂͨ㺮ധλВ̸࣌఍喟͚ప 䨣㵹ࢎᮛࣷ⼸Ꮣ䒰๔喑䨣㵹ࢎࣾ㵹̻ऄ⤳ ጯ౧⮱ࣾᆂҬᓄ⩕ᝤᒏ᜽γ䒰⌞⮱ᄦ䨣㵹

Გ⎽喟ᭀ㻯ప䭲eᭀ㻯ᮧᏀeF#*͚పο㖁㑾ੳᗲ

Source: EnfoDesk©Analysys International

48

July 2013

ࢎ‫ࢎݤ‬ᩜЅ⮱Ҭ⩕΍ᘜ喠᝸ᱧ䨣㵹হ‫ڣ‬Ѓ ⼨ߕᩜЅϔ৮ࣾᆂ㑀ᚏ喑␎䋠⩕ᝤӬᢤᩜ


Ѕ䰭Ⅿ⮱⼨ߕᩜЅϔ৮䒰ᄾȡ䔆ψ఍㉍ͧ᝸ᱧ䴠䶾‫ࢎݤ‬கϔ৮⮱ ࣾᆂ᣽ӈγ჏㻯‫ݺ‬᣽ȡ 䕇䓴ᄦⰛ‫ݺ‬᝸ᱧ‫ࢎݤ‬கϔ৮䔈㵹ᄦ℁ⵁ⾣ࣾ⣝喑4RVBSF⮱ ᵥᓰ὎ᐼౕλВ᰺ߎੳᝤͧ‫◦ࣾܧ‬喑⩞ₑᒏ᜽γ̭ຄ㺳Ⰳੳᝤᩣ Ƞੳ৮ノ⤳ȠѺ㒛᰺ߎぶߌ㘪ౕ‫̭⮱ڲ‬㈨݄㼐۠᫦ᵵ喑㔹̺ϲ ϲ᭜‫ࢎݤ‬கϔ৮᱙䏘ȡ̻㒻పTRVBSF̺ह喑Ⱋ‫͚ݺ‬పጯ౧⮱᝸ᱧ 䴠䶾‫ࢎݤ‬கࢯੳ๔็ϲ։⪆ౕ‫ࢎݤ‬கϔ৮᱙䏘喑㔹䊝ा㼐۠᫦ᵵ ⮱ᅵᠴज᪝ȡຯ᳉ВⰛᴴጯ౧⮱㻿Ꮣ喑ప‫ࢎݤڲ‬கࢯੳͨ㺮ܳͧ ͑⻺ㆨಸ喟 す̭⻺ㆨಸ喑Вࢎ៶ࢎȠ⯿ၽᩜЅͧА㶕⮱ᩜЅЮ͇ᐭࣾ⮱ ϔ৮ͨ㺮㐆͗ϧ⩕ᝤҬ⩕喑㼐۠͗ϧ⩕ᝤ⮱䔉⼸Ѕ䰭Ⅿ喑͗ϧ ⩕ᝤ̸䒪"11ऻ䙺व᝸ᱧ‫ࢎݤ‬க喑जВ჋⣝Ⅱ⩢⚑ぶ‫ڞڙ‬θ͇㑡 䉦ȠԎ⩕ࢎ䔅Ƞ㑾䉚ЅВࣷ䒙䉓ぶߌ㘪喠 すι⻺ㆨಸ喑ᔘ䧞҉͚ͧపᰭᬖ̭უᅊ䄂᝸ᱧ‫ࢎݤ‬க⮱ᩜЅ ࢯੳ喑͇ߎჇѺ̻‫ڣ‬Ѓ᝸ᱧ‫ࢎݤ‬கᩜЅࢯੳ̺ह喑ჇѺλͧЮ͇ ჏ᝤᩣᩜЅߌ㘪ȡ ᢛᖶ喑ᔘ䧞⮱᝸ᱧ‫ࢎݤ‬கጟ㏼ౕԊ䮖ȠⰡ䨭ぶ㵹͇ᐭ໸ੳ⩕ ᣕᎬ喑㔹́䔅ౕᐭࣾ‫ิڤ‬хᘍ‫ݥ‬ノ⤳Ƞ䃏ࢂᣕ䔮Ƞ䃏ࢂवᎣᩜЅ ぶߌ㘪⮱᝸ᱧ䧞࠲喑Ꭳ‫ڣ‬ₐౕा᪡Ҁ㵹͇㼐۠᫦ᵵ⮱䌜ᒱᐣѥȡ ϻᔘ䧞⮱䔆ψϔ৮ጰᅭ喑ᭀ㻯䃑ౕͧ⼨ߕᩜЅ䶳ഌ喑ᔘ䧞Ϻ♣⇬ 㷚‫̭ڣ‬䉜䊝㵹͇ࣾᆂ⮱䌜㏬喑䕇䓴᝸ᱧ‫ࢎݤ‬கぶ⼨ߕᩜЅϔ৮̻ ‫ڣ‬Ѓο㖁㑾ᩜЅȠQPTᩣࢂぶ࣌ᰶᩜЅϔ৮ౕ㵹͇᠀ᆂহЮ͇᰺ ߎ䓴⼸͚ᒏ᜽㞜ສ⮱ࡼह҉⩕ȡ➦‫ݘ‬᭜‫ڣ‬ₐౕᐭࣾ⮱⼨ߕᩜЅϔ ৮喑䘪᭜Вੳᝤ⮱䰭Ⅿͧᵥᓰ喑䔆̭◦̻TRVBSF⮱὎ᐼহ䌜ᒱ ΌᲮͧⰥ䓾ȡᄦ℁㒻పTRVBSF喑‫ࢎݤ‬கग᭜‫̭͚ڣ‬ϔ৮喑㔹 ́ᰭ๔⮱Ꮑ⩕჋ౕੳᝤ⮱ᩣȡധλₑ喑TRVBSF䔽⌽ᐭࣾ‫⮱ܧ‬ 㺳Ⰳੳ৮ノ⤳⮱TRVBSF SFHJTUFS喑Вࣷ‫ิڤ‬Ѻ㒛᰺ߎߌ㘪⮱QBZ XJUI TRVBSF ჏ᝤ〜喑ᒏ᜽γ̭ຄ䦵ᄦ䰣ਜ਼㵹͇⮱⼨ߕᩜЅ㼐۠ ᫦ᵵ喑‫ڣ‬ᵥᓰФթౕλ‫ڣ‬㐩व⼨ߕᩣ䨣झ⮱ߌ㘪ȡ᝭В喑ϻᔘ䧞 ౕ⼨ߕᩜЅጯ౧⮱ጰᅭⰸ喑ᭀ㻯䶱䃎ᔘ䧞ᰶ᱈⢴‫ٵ‬ក䕍‫ⱌܧ‬ₐ⮱ ͚పTRVBSFȡ ᭀ㻯ᮧᏀᐧ䃛喑㮪♣䦵ᄦ͚ᄼੳᝤᐭࣾ⮱‫ڤ‬ᰶᩣߌ㘪⼨ߕ ‫ࢎݤ‬கϔ৮ጯ౧ࣾᆂ‫ݺ‬ᮜᎬ䭁喑ѳ᭜⩞λ͚㒻͑పౕጯ౧⣜ධȠ Ԏ⩕Ҁ㈨ᐧ䃫হ∂ᒸ∂㻱ぶ᫦䲏ႅౕ䄥็ጛᐯ喑͚ప⮱ᩜЅЮ͇ ౕ䔈㵹䦵ᄦੳᝤҬ⩕⮱᝸ᱧ‫ࢎݤ‬ᩜЅϔ৮ⵁࣾ䓴⼸͚喑̺㘪Ⴙ‫ڕ‬ ⚔ᥙTRVBSF὎ᐼ喑㺮䦵ᄦ͚పጯ౧⮱჋䭲ᗲۢࣾᆂ喑➦‫ݘ‬㺮ևສ ᩜЅႶ‫ڕ‬ᐧ䃫ȡ

ၕ‫׶‬ᆮ‫ڹ‬൯ӎࠪᇗ؏ۢ ᭀ㻯ᮧᏀᰭ᫝᪝ᢛ᭫⹧喑Ꭱす̭႐Ꮣ͚పす̶᫦⼨ߕ ᩜЅጯ౧⮱ϑᭀ㻱὎䓫‫ݝ‬Ϭ喑‫ߕ⼨͚ڣ‬ο㖁㑾ᩜЅϑᭀ෋䪬 䓲䕌喑䓫‫ݝ‬Ϭ喑ⴚԎᩜЅౕ⼨ߕᩜЅጯ౧⮱ࢍ℁̸䭺䊸߬ᬻ ᭫ȡ ᭀ㻯ⵁ⾣ࣾ⣝喑ᒀ‫ݺ‬㮪♣⼨ߕᩜЅጯ౧ࣾᆂ䒰ᔘѳϺั

July 2013

49


࠰᭧஌̃

λጯ౧ࣾᆂ⮱݊᱌喑ϑᭀ㻱὎⮱෋䪬̭ ᫦䲏̻ᩜЅࢯੳ⮱๔߈ᣕ䔈ᰶ䛺㺮‫ڠ‬㈨喑 ओ̭᫦䲏ऄᒀ‫ߕ⼨ݺ‬ᩜЅᏁ⩕ጯ౧⮱अࡃ ᒞ৺䒰๔喑᝭Вᒀ‫͚ݺ‬ప⼨ߕᩜЅጯ౧⮱ ጯ౧ᵩᅭॵ⣝͑ᲮࡃȠ䉱⎽ፓߕᕔহߕᔮ ࡃぶ➦ᒮȡ ϻᎡす̭႐Ꮣ᪡͗す̶᫦ᩜЅ ጯ౧⼨ߕᩜЅ͇ߎϑᭀ䷊ᗲۢⰸ喑ᩜЅ ჊Ƞ㖁ߕх߬Ƞ䨣㖁ࢍᢛጯ౧ϑᭀ㻱὎⮱ ‫̶ݺ‬Ѻ喑ᩜЅ჊‫ܚ‬Ռౕο㖁㑾ᩜЅጯ౧⼜ ㉜⮱Ꮛ๔⩕ᝤВࣷᬍ㏬⌅჊ፓᲒ⮱͇ߎ෋ 䛼⼨ߕᩜЅϑᭀ㻱὎෋䪬䓲䕌喑㖁ߕх߬ ‫ܚ‬Ռ͚⼨ߕহ͚ప䨣㖁⮱䉱⎽喑ౕⴚԎᩜ Ѕ͇ߎ᫦䲏Ϻ♣ࢍᢛ䒰๔⮱ጯ౧Ъ䷊喑᝭ В̺䯫ࣾ⣝喑ጯ౧Ъ䷊‫ݺ‬უ⮱ࢯੳ䘪᭜䉱 ⎽ಸ⮱ᩜЅЮ͇ȡहᬣ喑ᭀ㻯ᮧᏀⵁ⾣ࣾ ⣝喑៶ࢎ៶Ƞ䧞㶸჊ぶ݈᫝ᩜЅࢯੳ⩞λ ౕ⼨ߕᩜЅ䶳ഌ䔈㵹๔䛼⮱䉱⎽ែ‫ڒ‬喑᝭ Вϑᭀ㻱὎෋䪬䓲䕌ȡ ㏢㻯᪡͚͗ప⼨ߕᩜЅጯ౧⮱ࣾᆂࢳ

⼨ߕᩜЅА㶕Ɑ᱗Გ䛾㲺ᩜЅ⮱ࣾᆂ᫦ा

⼸喑ᭀ㻯ⵁ⾣䃑ͧ喑᱗Გ⼨ߕᩜЅጯ౧ᄳ Вᮧ㘪㏵〜হ⼨ߕο㖁㑾ͧ㏵〜হ㑾㐉䒪

50

٬ࣉಽᆮ‫ڹ‬၄༈‫ا‬ჵߌ

ᵩᅭⰥᄦ⽠Ⴧ喑ѡ䮼๔䛼⮱す̶᫦ᩜЅࢯ

Ҁ჋⣝⮱ᩜЅͧͨᄩ喑࠲᠙ӊច⼨ߕο㖁

ᭀ㻯ᮧᏀᰭ᫝᪝ᢛ᭫⹧喑Ꭱす

ੳᔘ䕌䔈‫ڒ‬104ᩣࢂ䶳ഌ喑104ᩣࢂጯ౧

჋⣝⮱ऱㆨ䔉⼸ᩜЅহ䓾౧ᩜЅ喑䶱䃎ⴚ

̭႐Ꮣ͚ప䲋䛾㲺ᩜЅ㵹͇ऱㆨᩜЅ͇ߎ

⮱ᵩᅭัλᔘ䕌अߕᬣ᱌喑⩞ₑፓᲒ⮱㐩

ԎᩜЅࢍ℁ᄳ̺᫚̸䭺喑㔹㷘‫ڣ‬Ѓ⼨ߕᩜ

⮱ᕨҀϑᭀ㻱὎䓫‫̴ݝ‬Ϭ喑‫͚ڣ‬104

वᩜЅ͇ߎጯ౧⮱ᵩᅭϺ̺⽠Ⴧȡ

Ѕ᫦ᐼःАȡ㔹́ϻⰛ‫ͨݺ‬㺮⮱ᩜЅࢯੳ

ᩣࢂহο㖁㑾ᩜЅ͑ㆨ͇ߎ⮱ϑᭀ㻱὎ܳ

ᭀ㻯ᮧᏀᎡす̭႐Ꮣ͚ప䲋䛾

ౕ⼨ߕᩜЅ䶳ഌ⮱ᣏ㉏ࣾ⣝喑ᒀ‫ݺ‬๔䘕ܳ

‫̴ͧݘ‬Ϭহ̴Ϭ喑᭜Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ऱㆨᩜ

㲺ᩜЅ㵹͇⮱᪝ᢛ㐌䃎᭫⹧喑ౕ104ᩣࢂ

ᩜЅࢯੳᐭࣾ⮱⼨ߕᩜЅϔ৮䘪᭜ӊច⼨

Ѕ͇ߎ͚ࢍ℁ᰭ๔⮱͑ㆨȡ

ጯ౧喑䨣㖁ੳߎВ㐊ᄦ⮱ϑᭀ䷊ጯ౧Ъ䷊

ߕο㖁㑾჋⣝⮱喑ⴚԎᩜЅহ䓾౧ᩜЅ䔅

ᭀ㻯ⵁ⾣ࣾ⣝喑ऻ❹⚔ᬣА喑⩞λ

ᢿऺす̭喠䕇㖁ᩜЅϑᭀ㻱὎ᢿऺすι喠

᭜В䓽㥒ੳᝃ㔲ᰶ䓽㥒ੳ䉱⎽⮱ᩜЅࢯੳ

ᩜЅЮ͇㣤ឦ͇ߎㆨಸ⮱ពᆂ喑㏬̷㏬̸

ᔘ䧞হⅴЅ๖̸㉔䮼‫ऻڣ‬喑ᔘ䧞ಇᠮ䊝㵹

ͧͨȡ᝭В喑ᭀ㻯䃑ͧᄦ⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᩜЅ

͇ߎⰥ㐀व喑ᩜЅ͇ߎㆨಸ็ٰࡃጟ㏼᜽

͇㐩व㼐۠᫦ᵵ䌜㏬喑䕇䓴㵹͇㏢⌞᠀ᆂ

䔈㵹ࢂ⠙⮱㐌䃎䲋፥ᓲ㺮ȡ

ͧͨ≮ᩜЅЮ͇⮱ࣾᆂ䊸߬喑᝭Вᭀ㻯䃑

‫ڣ‬ᩣࢂ͇ߎȡⅴЅ๖̸ϻᎡ݊ߍ䕌ι

ᭀ㻯䕇䓴ᄦ⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᩜЅ͇ߎϑ

ౕͧ䔈㵹ο㖁㑾ᩜЅȠ104ᩣࢂȠ⼨ߕ

̶㏬೻ጯ104ᩣࢂጯ౧᠀ᆂ喑䓽⩕̻ᩣࢂ

ᭀ㻱὎䔈㵹㐌䃎ࣾ⣝喑ᩜЅ჊Ƞ䨣㖁হ䉏

ᩜЅぶࢂ̭㏳ܳጯ౧ⵁ⾣⮱हᬣ喑‫∕ڠ‬ᩜ

᰺ߎੳव҉⮱ใ࠲὎ᐼᔘ䕌ᐧ⿸⍍䖀喑㏼

Ѕ䕇ࢍᢛ⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᩜЅጯ౧⮱‫̶ݺ‬Ѻ喑

Ѕጯ౧হᩜЅЮ͇㐩वᩜЅ͇ߎ⮱ࣾᆂᗲ

䓴̭Ꭱ⮱ࣾᆂϑᭀ㻱὎෋䪬䓲䕌ȡ

‫̶ݺ‬უࢯੳࢍᢛጯ౧⮱ጯ౧Ъ䷊喑᝭

ۢ࡮ܳᓲ㺮ȡᭀ㻯ᮧᏀᎡ႐Ꮣ䲋䛾

ౕ͇ߎ็ٰࡃࣾᆂ䊸̸߬喑ऱუᩜЅ

В⼨ߕο㖁㑾ᩜЅጯ౧⮱ጯ౧䯳͚Ꮣ䲋፥

㲺ᩜЅ㵹͇㐩वᩜЅϑᭀ㻱὎⮱ጯ౧㐌䃎

Юౕ͇͇ߎࣾᆂᝅ⪒᫦ा̷Ό䔽⌽‫ܧ‬⣝ጛ

倅喑͑Ხࡃ䊸߬ᬻ᭫ȡ̻ₑहᬣ喑⩞λ᪡

᭫⹧喑䨣㖁ੳߎȠᩜЅ჊হ䉏Ѕ䕇ܳ‫ݘ‬В

ᐯࡃȡ䨣㖁ੳߎౕࣾᆂ䓴⼸͚⿸䋠λͧ჏

͗⼨ߕᩜЅጯ౧⮱ࣾᆂᎣ̺᜽⛌喑᳽̭͗

Ƞহࢍᢛ䲋䛾㲺ᩜЅ

ᝤ᣽ӈ㐩वᩣࢂ᰺ߎ喑䮑ᬖ᱌ͨ㺮䦵ᄦੳ

㏳ܳጯ౧⮱ᔘ䕌ࣾᆂᝃ㔲Ռߖ᳽⻺݈᫝⮱

㵹͇㐩वᩜЅ͇ߎ⮱‫̶ݺ‬Ѻȡᔘ䧞হⅴЅ

ᝤ⮱104ᩣࢂ͇ߎ喑ពᆂ䦵ᄦ͗ϧ⩕ᝤ⮱

⼨ߕᩜЅϔ৮䘪ᰶज㘪ᩦअᒀ‫⮱ݺ‬ጯ౧ᵩ

๖̸‫ܚ‬Ռౕ104ᩣࢂጯ౧⮱ᔘ䕌᠀ᆂ喑ϑ

Ӭℾᩣࢂ͇ߎȠο㖁㑾ᩜЅ͇ߎহ⼨ߕᩜ

ᅭ喑᝭В͑Ხࡃহߕᔮࡃ⮱➦ᕔౕ⼨ߕο

ᭀ㻱὎෋䪬䓲䕌ȡᭀ㻯ⵁ⾣ࣾ⣝喑ᄦ℁ऱ

Ѕ͇ߎぶ喑ѳᩣࢂ͇ߎϺ♣᭜‫℁ࢍߎ͇ڣ‬

㖁㑾ᩜЅ䶳ഌ㶕⣝⮱ᅑͧᬻ᭫ȡ

ࢂ̭ᩜЅ͇ߎጯ౧喑ο㖁㑾ᩜЅ͇ߎጯ౧

͚ᰭ๔⮱̭䘕ܳȡ

July 2013


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July 2013

51


REPORT

Drafted into service Chinese regulators seek to increase the public’s role in rooting out IPO fraud

C

hina likes to keep its business to itself, often going so far as to label some corporate finances as state secrets. Few places have been more secretive than the securities market, where the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) passes opaque judgments on which firms get to IPO, and when. After years of poor performance of mainland exchanges, where companies are frequently found to be ridden with fraud, China’s top securities regulator has finally deigned to give the public a glimpse of the companies they could buy into. The CSRC has also been getting tougher on brokerages that help fraud-tainted companies to IPO on the mainland – at least when those companies are subject to public scrutiny. In May, the CSRC slapped Minsheng Securities with a US$326,000 fine for failing to uncover fraud at Shanxi Tianneng Technology, which the firm planned to help IPO. The regulator issued Nanjing Securities a warning for a similar failing with Guangdong Xindadi Biotechnology. Surprisingly, the CSRC didn’t punish the securities firms after discovering fraud in its own review of the two IPO applications. In fact, the CSRC had already approved the IPOs, at which point it released the companies’ financials to the public. The media then went to work uncovering the fraud in both cases by scrutinizing those documents.

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July 2013


The CSRC now looks set to make it even easier for the media to uncover such scandals. Draft regulations released on June 7 said that companies would be required to pre-disclose their financial documents to the public or the media one month before their IPOs will be approved. Previously those documents had only been released after the CSRC approved the issue. The pre-disclosure requirement was only one part of the latest draft regulations, which didn’t cause much of a stir when released. “This draft is mostly based on previous drafts,” said Winnie Deng, a senior associate who tracks markets at consultancy Z-Ben Advisors. “If you have the time to take a look, you can notice there’s nothing really new or stands out as its own issue.” Pre-disclosure to the public is one of the few new points. But, she said, one month remains a short period of time for investors and the media to scrutinize the potential listing, so it’s unclear how much affect the regulation would actually have. The other new point, according to Deng, is that the draft regulations introduced a two-year lockup period during which time major stakeholders cannot sell their shares. Currently, lockup periods are negotiated with cornerstone investors in each new issue on an individual basis. Even after the lockup period, which could be extended based on share performance, major shareholders would not be allowed to sell their shares at below the IPO price. The main goal is to prevent management from unloading their shares if the company fares poorly. Presumably,

by forcing management to keep some skin in the game, they’ll be more motivated to make sure the share price stays above water. These regulations will join a host of others already drafted. “Most of these drafts are in order to boost investor confidence… Some of these regulations are quite strict,” Deng said. Among them is a rule that would prevent the CSRC from approving further IPOs from brokerages that sponsor companies which later report a 50% drop in profit or a net loss. With the CSRC already going through several drafts, and few changes being made from draft to draft, Deng predicts these reforms are highly likely to be enacted. The rules stand to benefit the little guy, Chinese retail investor, at the expense of the big institution such as brokerages, major investors and the company itself. By locking institutions in for a set period of time and essen-

tially penalizing them further for falling stock prices, the CSRC is increasing the incentive that institutions have to do everything they can to support share value. Retail investors, who make up the majority of those playing mainland stocks, will therefore be less likely to buy into a dud. The rules – aside from increased public scrutiny – appear to be the government intervening in its exchanges when over time it should be taking an increasingly hands off approach, as is the case in most mature markets. But if anything, the rules are likely to only grow stricter until the CSRC stamps out widespread fraud, Deng said. Only then can regulation be more market-driven. China simply isn’t a developed market yet. “You don’t really see a lot of instances where financial results are fake in developed markets, but it’s quite common here.”

July 2013

53


REPORT

The tariff bump Surprise! Launch of EU tariffs boosts solar companies

H

ow’s this for counterintuitive: The EU launched a 11.8% tariff on Chinese solar products on Tuesday, and Trina Solar’s (TSL.NYSE, TR3.FRA) share price climbs 2.2%. Others also remained relatively unscathed. Yingli Green Energy (YGE.NYSE, YG11. FRA) saw a similar rise but Suntech Power Holdings (STP.NYSE, S9H. FRA) fell 1.9% that day. Perhaps the reaction was muted because the duties were softened from the original threat of up to 67% tariffs. Now they’re set to gradually ramp up to only 46% within two month if no further deals are struck between China and the EU. Given the level of exposure to the European market, the three-fold jump

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July 2013

in the tariff by August will certainly hurt Chinese companies. This is bad news for an industry already in the doldrums, tariffs or no tariffs. There are signs, however, that the market is starting to recover from a glut that brought prices crashing down last year, said Lu Yeung, an analyst at UBS Investment Research. Solar makers in other countries are slowing production of solar cells, and China has been shutting down capacity, early indications that the worst of the oversupply in the industry may be over, he said. Lu said he couldn’t comment on which companies might recover first. Investors should watch for progress in the EU. Experts have told China Economic Review that

opposition from EU member states will hold back more severe measures. If all stays calm on the political front, now could be the time to buy these companies on the cheap.

On the internet, it must be true Sohu.com (SOHU.NASDAQ, XOU. FRA), ever the subject of speculation, has found its shares again subject to traders’ guesswork. The stock rose nearly 25% in May with the expectation that it would buy another video streaming site. The logic is clear: Baidu.com (BIDU.NASDAQ, B1C. FRA) surpassed Sohu’s share of the video streaming market overnight when it bought PPStream’s video unit. Sohu simply has to buy a second-tier


video site “otherwise it will be hard for them to survive” in the streaming business, said Mike Chen, an analyst at China Merchants Securities in Shenzhen. But since May 31, shares have sank 3.6% as a deal has yet to materialize, and some wondered whether the speculation was excessive. Even if it does acquire another online video company, Sohu will have an uphill battle to fight as the company would likely still remain in third place, said Chen, who has a neutral rating on the firm. Unfortunately for investors, the other two leading video sites aren’t much more appealing. Baidu is losing market share in internet search to Qihoo, and video leader Youku Tudou (YOKU.NYSE) lost market share after the Baidu-PPStream deal. As the firms battle for market share, this is one fight investors may wish to sit out.

Paper pushers Exporters like toy and shoemakers haven’t been the only companies

caught off guard in the throes of China’s rebalancing process. As global demand wanes, the paper makers who produce the boxes that hold China’s exports when they’re shipped are also facing a slowdown, as well as pressure to reorient domestically. Nine Dragons Paper Holding (2689.HKG) and Lee & Man Paper (2314.HKG), China’s two biggest producers of paper packaging, have faced falling demand since 2011. “There’s definitely been a structural change in the economy, and that’s taken time to work through,” said Zac Gill, an analyst at CLSA Asia-Pacific who covers China’s paper industry. “It used to be that these paper companies were selling directly to exporters, or indirectly to manufacturers who were shipping things abroad.” Paper firms now must rely on domestic demand more for growth, he said. The outlook for the companies should improve as long as China’s GDP growth matches expectations this year, according to a report from Citi Research. Several

other factors will play into market performance too. Gill noted that the companies have reduced the weight of paper boxes, which cuts shipping costs. But this can appear as if they are selling less. The companies will also have more difficulty hawking their wares as they grow more expensive with the appreciation of the renminbi, as well as higher costs to buy used paper from overseas for recycling, Citi said. CLSA is bullish on Lee & Man but sees Nine Dragons underperforming the market. Citi downgraded its outlook on both companies but said conditions could improve this year.

IPO watch Three IPOs in Hong Kong have fallen out of the gate, and companies looking to list may once again start getting cold feet. Mando China Holdings, an auto parts maker, halted its listing that was scheduled to hit the market May 31. Wuzhou International Holdings (1369. HKG), a company based in Jiangsu province’s Wuxi that builds and manages malls, could have some legs as most of its projects are in lower-tier cities where there’s the most room for growth. China Harmony Auto (3836. HKG), an auto dealership group in Henan province, looks less promising as the company deals in foreign luxury cars, which may suffer under Xi Jinping’s crackdown. The company also appears overvalued. With Wuzhou raising up to US$220 million and China Harmony pulling in up to US$309 million, these IPOs are large enough to be a good barometer of sentiment.

July 2013

55


Q&A

The danger in our bellies China’s media is distracting the government from the real food-safety problem, one of the country’s top nutrition researchers says

F

ew issues attract the Chinese media spotlight like food-safety – or the apparent lack thereof. And it’s not just China’s newspapers and TV stations running horror stories on hormone-imbued chicken or rice with a side of cadmium. The international press was quick to pounce on the more than 20,000 pigs that floated down a Shanghai waterway starting in March. The coverage went on for weeks, spawning a host of jokes on the “free pork rib soup” that flowed from the taps of China’s biggest city. The stories get reads because they pose a question consumers must face every day in China: Can they trust what they put in their bodies? However, a huge number of these reports are missing the most pressing aspects of food safety, says Chen Junshi, a medical doctor and a senior researcher at the Beijing-based National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety. While the Chinese government is routinely accused of controlling the press, it’s actually the media that has led government sentiment on foodsafety scandals, Chen said. News reports focus heavily on the illegal usage of additives in food but neglect far more serious cases of food-borne illness. The result is a stalemate in which officials are pressured by the media to deal with mild cases while problems with E. coli and salmonella rage on. This is the first half of China Economic Review’s interview with Chen

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July 2013

Junshi on food safety in China. Go to www.ChinaEconomicReview.com for further discusssion of cadmium-tainted rice, gutter oil and China’s food safety regulators.

I’m emphasizing risk communication. I think this is the most important issue in the whole of food safety control in China.

What is risk communication? What are you working on right now? I’m working on talking, like this, with people like you, and the government.

It’s the exchange of information on the knowledge of food safety among all the stakeholders: Academia, government, consumer, media, food business.

Are there specific issues that you are looking at right now?

What’s the state of risk communication in China right now?


Very brief: Negative, misleading, unscientific information. All over China, all the media and social media.

Do you have some specific examples of misleading information? Too many. Have you heard about the colored steamed bread? That’s the typical misleading case.

What’s misleading about this case? One major media [outlet] in China reported that the colored steamed bread is a major food-safety event. But actually, this is just one manufacturer in Shanghai. They add citric yellow, a food coloring, into flour to make

steamed bread. And they claim it’s corn bread. So this is a fake product. The nature of the case is very clear. But in the media, this is a food safety event. Citric yellow is a permitted food color in the Chinese food safety standard. But the problem is the scope of its use does not include steamed bread. It can be legally added into beverages, biscuits, but not steamed bread. So this is the illegal use of food additives. But as for safety, it’s okay to use in beverages, it’s also okay to use in steamed bread. It’s a very safe food additive. There is no possibility of over-use. With food coloring, if you add too much, you don’t get the color you want. But it has nothing to do with health. But when you talk about food safety, and the media says this is a food safety issue, the government has no way to make it clear that this is food fraud [not food safety]. They will take immediate action, and you will not see this product in the market anymore. As far as I know, in this case, the Food Safety Office of the Shanghai Municipal Government met every evening for three weeks to discuss this very simple event, a so-called foodsafety event. In this case, the credibility of the Shanghai government goes down.

So it sounds like there is miscommunication in the Shanghai government. Yes, because they don’t understand the real best practice of communication, and they are afraid of that. As a consequence, six Shanghai government officials got punished.

With this specific case in mind,

what is the best way to deal with this problem? That’s easy. The government should have organized experts and government officials to have a media conference to tell them the truth. And published articles to tell them: What is the nature of this case? What is the food additive citric yellow? The government has to take very strong, quick action so you don’t have to worry if you bought this product and you consumed it. It’s safe. But nobody did that.

This is a good example of how people are misinformed. Are there many cases where consumers are under-informed and could be eating dangerous products? The government quite often publishes inspection results in the paper. They always publish something like, which brand of sweetener has saccharine that exceeds the national level, or preservatives, etc. But that’s not enough. The consumer needs much more information.

So then what is the No. 1 foodsafety concern in China? It’s not the food additives. The media makes people believe this is a major food-safety issue in China. It’s foodborne illness. Internationally it is. In the US, if you talk to the USDA, and ask what is their No. 1 priority, it’s food-borne illness. Because this causes disease and death, huge medical costs. Which big cases have been caused by additives? None. Melamine is not a food additive.

If you’re talking about food additives, would this include the

July 2013

57


Q&A

So what are the main challenges in tackling these problems? Is it enforcement on the local level that’s difficult? No government agency believes this is important because there is much less pressure on this issue. They put their priority based on pressure, media pressure, social pressure. So the colored steamed bread is a source of pressure on them, and it becomes their priority. Another example is the 45-day chicken. This became a food-safety issue. It’s normal [for a chicken to mature] in 45 days, not only in China. But the news reports that it is negative. It grew too fast. They must have used hormones. So the government is following the media and missing the bigger picture. The government is very angry with the Chinese media. Everyone says China is not a democratic country. Then why can’t you control the media?

recent case where hormones were added to chicken?

of food-borne illness, if they were sold illegally and if not cooked well.

No. That’s not an additive. That’s a veterinary drug, illegal use of veterinary drugs.

What are some simple examples of food-borne illness?

What are some examples of big food-borne illness cases? Was the recent case of pigs in the river in Shanghai a case of foodborne illness? There was no evidence that there was food-borne illness. If there were that many pigs, that would cause outbreaks.

I was told that if the pigs were diseased, it was a good thing that the pigs were thrown in the river instead of being sold. Do you agree? Yes, that would definitely be a source

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July 2013

It happens all the time. If there are spoiled meat products you get salmonella, E. coli. In the US, the pathogenic E. coli is sometimes in salad and the strawberries [and causes stomach problems]. But in China, if you have some diarrhea, that’s normal. That’s not food safety. Even the government officials say this is disease, not food safety.

Is that point of view incorrect? Of course it’s incorrect. The No. 1 food-safety issue in China is caused by pathogenic bacteria and parasites like this.

So how to better control foodborne illness? First, we have to know how many cases there are every year. Every year the Ministry of Health receives 10,000 to 20,000 cases from all over China. This is less than the tip of the iceberg. The US [Center for Disease Control] announced in 2011, there were 48 million cases every year in the US. In theory, China should have more cases because of the overall hygienic situation. And if you extrapolate according to the number of Chinese people, that’s a huge number. But the Ministry of Health only knows that there are 10,000 to 20,000. That’s the gap, less than the tip of the iceberg. Again, this is why this is China’s No. 1 food-safety issue.


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䉱䃜ㆨȡ఍ₑ喑⼨ߕ≼㻵க⮱ᵥᓰ》ζ߈ ᅞ᭜䉱⎽㖇व㘪߈ȡ

ϻധ⵭᪝ᢛᲒⰸ喑Ꭱప‫ߕ⼨ڲ‬

๔ㆨጯ౧喟⼨ߕ᝸⣜Ƞ䅤⁹Ⱪ䪉হᮧ㘪᝸

䊲㏔"QQᰶᒵ็⻺喑‫׼‬ᓛԎȠᓛࢇȠ

ο㖁⮱⩕ᝤ䓫‫ݝ‬Ϭ喑Ⱕ℁ο㖁㑾

㶕喑⣝䭣⃢⼨ߕ᝸⣜℁䒰ⰸສ喑̻ࡨ⫄ጯ

᝸ᱧႶ‫࢘ڕ‬ธȠ᥉⠄䓀‫∂ڒ‬ȠᩜЅ჊হ⮫

Ϭ⩕ᝤ喑⼨ߕο㖁ጯ౧जᘠ䆎⮱⾧䬡䲋፥

౧Ⱕᄦᰶ⌲ᮝ⮱ჇѺ喑ጯ౧‫ݺ‬ᮜ㘪์ⰸᓄ

Ꮣౝఫ喑‫⮱͚ڣ‬Фթᅞ᭜䔆‫܍‬უЮ͇᱗Გ

ጕ๔喑䔆᭜ⰸ̷ࣨᒵ㒻⮱ጯ౧ȡѳౕ᪝ႄ

‫ܧ‬Გȡ㔹䅤⁹Ⱪ䪉ౕឭᱜ᫦䲏ᰶड़ࣾᕔȡ

ౕ⼨ߕο㖁⮱ᝅ⪒‫ݣ‬倅◦ȡ㚫䃜ិᓛԎ҉ ͧᝅ⪒倅Ꮣ⮱ጯ౧喑̭᫦䲏ጹ᱈䕇䓴ᓛԎ ក䕇⩕ᝤ⮱䏘Ъ᪝ᢛ喑ओ̭᫦䲏ጹ᱈䕇䓴 ᓛԎ‫ں‬Ꮣᣏ䃕㘪์ͧЮ͇᣽ӈਗψ᰺ߎ喑 㔹͸‫ݺ‬㚫䃜ᰫ̻᠈ੳ䨣㵹व҉䓴ȡ ̶უЮ͇䘪ౕև᝸ᱧႶ‫ڕ‬ノ⤳ȡ᝸ᱧ Ⴖ‫ڕ‬чᚏᚏ⑁अ᜽ᄦ⩕ᝤ͗ϧԎᖜ⮱㐩व ノ⤳喑㘪์ឬ䒪ᰡ็⩕ᝤ᪝ᢛ喑䔆᭜᝸ᱧ Ⴖ‫ڕ‬᱗Გ̭๔䊸߬ȡ #"5ᅑ‫ڣ‬᭜䭬䛹হ⮫Ꮣᰡ็чࣨևౝ ఫᎠझ⮱ጰᅭȡౕⱌₐ⮱⼨ߕο㖁ᬣА喑 ౝఫᎠझ̻э㐌ౝఫ᭜ᰶᒵ็ࡧ‫⮱ݘ‬ȡ℁ ຯ⣝ౕजВ䔈㵹჋ᬣ㇫۳⮱ჇѺ喑䔈㵹̭ 〆ᐼ⩌≨᰺ߎ喑ѳ᭜В‫ݺ‬ധ᱙᭜䔈㵹̭ψ Ԏᖜ᥉㉏喑㔹́჋ᬣᕔ℁䒰ጛȡౕ᱗Გ⼨ ߕο㖁ᬣА᜽ߌ⮱ੳ͇὎ᐼ͚喑ౝఫᎠझ ᭜̺ღᔪ㻳⮱‫ڒ‬ऐȡ

⮫ᏓȠ䭬䛹ጡጡহ㚫䃜ᄦ⼨ߕο㖁㑾䔈㵹ᝅ⪒ጰᅭ

Ą᜾Й⮱㐀䃧ᅞ᭜喑⼨ߕο㖁ᬣ

July 2013

59


НՃ

⩢ၽੳߎ⮱ࣾᆂᄦ⊵䉦⮱‫⩕҉⓭ݧ‬᭜䲋፥ᑧ◵⮱

А喑ⴚ᱌ⰸ㏵〜喑͚᱌ⰸᎠझ喑䪬᱌ⰸ

ᢛ喑㺮ᄳ䔆ψ⩕ᝤ᪝ᢛহ⩕ᝤ䏘Ъ䔈㵹㐌

‫ڲ‬ღȡⴚ᱌㏵〜᭜̭Ⱑᑧ䄰⮱喑㔹‫ڒ‬ऐহ

䭬䛹Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ᰶ͑ㆨ᪝ᢛ喑̭ㆨ᭜Ю͇

̭ȡᭀ㻯䃑ͧ喑ο㖁㑾⩕ᝤᰶ̶͗䏘Ъ喟

‫ڲ‬ღ⮱ζ๧݆᭜䪬᱌Ꭳႅ⮱ȡą㘎ྤྤᕨ

ᄦใ‫ڙ‬ᐭ⮱ጯ౧᪝ᢛ喑䔅ᰶ̭ㆨ᪝ᢛ᭜Ю

す̭͗᭜㜗♣䏘Ъ喑࠲᠙䏘Ъ䃮͸ㆨ⮱䃮

㐀䖀ȡ

͇‫ڲ‬䘕⮱䓽㥒᪝ᢛ喑䔆䘕ܳ᪝ᢛⰛ‫ݺ‬䔅᭜

У䏘Ъ喠すι͗᭜䕇䃜䏘Ъ喑ͨ㺮ᠴ䕇⩕

Ą叾⯿ą喑ѳᄦλ䭬䛹䲋፥ᰶФթȡ䭬䛹

⮱*%喑ຯ22ȠᓛԎ喠す̶᭜ౕ㑾̷䔈㵹

ࠪ๾ᅦઃიၕ‫׶‬ҋऍ

60

᫦ᩜЅȠԎ䉤Ƞ䛾㲺ែ䉱Ƞο㖁㑾Ԋ䮖ȡ

ጹ᱈ិੳუ‫ڲ‬䘕⮱᪝ᢛᠬ䓴Გ喑ᒏ᜽Ю͇

ᩜЅᬣ⮱䛾㲺䏘Ъȡ䔆̶͗䏘Ъ̭ᬓ㷘ក

ᭀ㻯ᮧᚔ䮏ܳᲽጵ㘎ྤྤܳᲽ喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬

᝭ᰶ᪝ᢛ⮱䬚⣜ȡ䔆ψ᪝ᢛ᱗Გᄳчᩜᦾ

䕇喑᪝ᢛ⮱Фթᅞ䲋፥倅喑ᬍ䃧᭜᣽ӈЮ

⼨ߕο㖁㑾ႅౕⱭ̶๔䭢㥒ȡす̭䭢㥒᭜

䭬䛹⮱䛾㲺হ䭬䛹⮱➖≮ȡĄ㤉卌ąͨ

͇⮱᰺ߎ䔅᭜͗ϧ⮱᰺ߎȡ㚫䃜ౕ䔆᫦

ВJ04ȠႶࢀহ8JOEPXT1IPOF̶๔᧺҉

㺮ևᮧ㘪➖≮俕᎟㑾喑ౕ䔆͗ắᔢ̸ᰡ็

䲏℁䒰䊲‫ݺ‬喑Όጹ᱈हᬣᣏ䃕ᄦЮ͇⮱᰺

㈨㐌ͧᵥᓰ͟㖁䊤Გ⮱ϔ͇䨫ȡすι๔䭢

᭜䕇䓴䭬䛹⮱๔᪝ᢛ喑䕇䓴䒜Уឭᱜ⮱ᣔ

ߎȡĄ᝭В䄡⼨ߕο㖁㐆γ㚫䃜̭ࣵ⁎ᱧ

㥒᭜㚫䃜Ƞ䭬䛹হ⮫Ꮣ喑ౕᏁ⩕䶳ഌ䔈㵹

‫ݣ‬喑჋⣝ᄦऱ͗ࡧഌ͚ᄼಸ➖≮Ю͇⮱ᣔ

чȡą㘎ྤྤ䄡䖀ȡ

ౝⰅ͸ζȡЃЙⱌₐᘠ㺮ᠬ‫̺⮱ݝ‬ϲ᭜Ꮑ

‫ݣ‬ȡ䔆᭜䭬䛹㺮ᥚᐧ⮱䊲㏔Ꭰझȡ

‫א‬ሸ഍༈൯ӎ

⩕喑㔹᭜Ꮑ⩕㗹ऻ⮱᪝ᢛ喟⩕ᝤȠЮ͇ᝃ

⮫Ꮣ‫⃢̭ݺ‬ᬣ䬡ᄦ㏱㏴᳣Ჱ䔈㵹γ᫝

‫ڞڙ‬ㆨ⮱᪝ᢛ喑Ό࠲᠙䰭Ⅿ᪝ᢛȡす̶䭢

⮱䄰᪡喑ិ᥉㉏͇ߎ䘪ᩫ‫ݝ‬䕇⩕᥉㉏͇ߎ

ᭀ㻯䛾㲺ࣷᩜЅ㵹͇͚ᓰⵁ⾣͚⯾Ƞ

㥒᭜͚ప⼨ߕȠ㖁䕇হ⩢Ԏ̶๔䓽㥒ੳ喑

䘕喑हᬣᐭ䓌γ‫ݺ‬ाᩣ䉦⮱θ͇䘕喑ጹ᱈

倅㏔ܳᲽጵᑍ㤹ܳᲽγ͚ప⩢ၽੳߎ⮱ᰭ

Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ᰭᵥᓰ⮱̺᭜Ⱕο͸䬡⮱》व‫ڠ‬㈨喑

䕇䓴‫׼‬⍥᜼Ƞ䬲䄨Ƞ㻳䶾Ƞ⩌≨হ䴠ͽぶ

᫝䔈ᆂহࣾᆂ䊸߬ȡ

㔹᭜䰭㺮䒙ಸȡ055͇ߎᄦႰЙ䕍᜽䲋፥

ᵥᓰ‫ڲ‬ღᲒᣏ䃕⩕ᝤᩣ䉦ȡౕ⼨ߕ᥉㉏ጯ

ϻᎡᐭ໸喑͚ప⩢ၽੳߎ䔈‫ڒ‬

๔⮱ᒞ৺喑̶უЮ͇䰭㺮ࣷᬣ䄰᪡喑ा᪝

౧͚⮫Ꮣ⮱ጰᅭ喑̭᭜և-#4喑䔆̭ጯ౧

ᔘ䕌෋䪬⮱̴ϬᬣАȡᎡ喑͚ప⮱㑾

ႄ͇ߎ䒙ಸ喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬ጟ㏼ᰶ᝭ߕ҉ȡౕₑധ

࿮ᣒ⮫Ꮣౝఫᵥᓰ⮱͇ߎ喑ጹ᱈᣽ӈ࠲᠙

䉚⩕ᝤጟ㏼䊲䓴Ϭ喑ౕ͚ప㑾ℾ͚ࢍ℁

⵭̷䔅㺮ᅪᔘϻ(ࡴ㏔‫(ݝ‬喑‫ڞ‬हᣕߕ

᫲⍥Ƞఏ䉚ȠᎬॷ̭㈨݄⮱‫ڲ‬ღȡすι಄

䓫‫ݝ‬喑㔹㒻పጯ౧㑾䉚⩕ᝤ⮱⍄䔼⢴

ϔ͇ࣾᆂȡ

͇ߎ᭜⼨ߕᏁ⩕Ꭰझȡ⮫Ꮣ䔅ጹ᱈॥ᑂ㵹

䊲䓴ȡ䕇䓴ᄦ℁ࣾ⣝喑͚ప㑾䉚⩕ᝤ

ϷᎡ᭜䭬䛹ጡጡ⮱⼨ߕο㖁Ꭱᝃ㔲

͇ᆋᕔ℁䒰ᑧ⮱ใడ"11喑ВऻजВᥚ䒪

᱗Გ෋䪬㏏‫ݖ‬䔅᭜ႅౕ⮱ȡ

᭜䯳ఏᝅ⪒̸↶⮱す̭Ꭱȡ͸‫ݺ‬ᣕ$##4

‫⮫ݝ‬Ꮣ⮱⼨ߕ≼㻵க䛹喑᭫⹧ౕ⮫Ꮣౝఫ

⩌ᔮ䨫喑䔈㵹㏱㏴᳣Ჱ⮱䄰᪡喑‫ں‬ᣕ‫ܧ‬᪝

̷ȡ

ᒀ‫ݺ‬喑͚ప⩢ၽੳߎጯ౧ₐౕࣾ⩌ᔻ ᵤ䲋፥䛺㺮⮱अࡃ喤

ᢛȠ䛾㲺Ƞ➖≮‫܍‬๔Ꭰझȡ䭬䛹ⱌₐᏂᅯ

⼨ߕο㖁㐆㚫䃜ፓᲒ‫ڕ‬᫝⮱ᅊ䄂喑㚫

৮ㆨᵩᅭ⮱अࡃȡ็ٰࡃ᜽ͧ৮ㆨ

⮱᭜᪝ᢛ喑ᰭ‫ڤ‬ᵥᓰ》ζ߈⮱᭜䛾㲺ȡౕ

䃜͸‫ౕݺ‬և1$〜⮱ᬣՆ㔰㭾䓴ᄦЮ͇⮱

ᵩᅭࣾᆂ䓴⼸͚䲋፥䛺㺮⮱‫ڠ‬䩛䃺ȡ͚ప

䭬䛹䛾㲺ᏂᅯᎠझ̷喑ౕᩜЅ჊䔆͗䶳ഌ

᰺ߎ喑⣝ౕᓛԎև‫ݝ‬γȡⰛ‫ݺ‬㚫䃜ౕ䯳ఏ

⩢ၽੳߎጯ౧৮ㆨᵩᅭ᱊Ɑ̶͗๔᫦ा⑁

ᰶ䲋፥ᑧ⮱ጯ౧》ζ߈喑Ⱋ‫ݺ‬जВևす̶

ᅯ䲏ևγ͑Уθ喑仃‫ٵ‬ᰶᒵᑧ๔⮱⩕ᝤ᪝

䔈喑仃‫ٵ‬᭜⇬ⱭϻѻФा倅Ф⮱᫦ा⑁

July 2013


ౕ⼨ߕο㖁㑾〜ч‫ܧ‬⣝䊷Გ䊷็⮱݈᫝

䔈喑‫⁎ڣ‬᭜ϻᴴ۳ा䲋ᴴ۳᫦ा⮱अࡃ喑

⩢ၽੳߎ⮱ϑᭀ㻱὎ౕ̺᫚⾮ⵡ喑

ᐭ໸ϸ‫⩢ڒ‬ၽੳߎ⮱ࣾᆂ䓴⼸͚ȡ᱗Გ䶱

ᰭऻ᭜ϻ჋Ҁੳ৮ពᆂ‫ݝ‬᰺ߎ䶳ഌȡ

Ꭱ喑͚ప㑾̷䰣ਜ਼ጯ౧ϑᭀ㻱὎ጟ㏼䊲䓴

䃎䔅чᰶ䊷Გ䊷็⮱䨣㵹ϸ‫⩢ݝڒ‬ੳ䶳ഌ

⩢ၽੳߎጯ౧⮱》ζᵩᅭȡ䛺◦ⰸ

Ϭ喑ౕ͚ప⹫ч⊵䉦৮䰣ਜ਼ᕨ䷊͚

͚Გȡ䔅ᰶ̭͗䲋፥䛺㺮⮱䊸߬ᅞ᭜⁎䛾

#$⮱ጯ౧Ъ䷊ᗲۢȡᰶ̭͗䲋፥ᬻ᭫⮱

ጟ⾮ⵡȡᑍ㤹䃑ͧ喑⩢ၽੳߎ⮱ࣾᆂᄦ

㲺喑ͨ㺮क़Ͷ᭜ज㘪чߍ䕌䛾㲺㙞྿⮱ₒ

अࡃ䊸߬喑ᅞ᭜๔ಸᎠझࢯੳౕ䓾͑Ꭱ⮱

λ⊵䉦⮱‫⩕҉⓭ݧ‬᭜䲋፥ᑧ◵⮱喑߬ᓲч

н喑℁ຯ11὎ᐼȡ䕇䓴11Ꭰझ喑ែ䉱

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ᄦ͚ప㏼≻ᵩᅭፓᲒⰥᏁ⮱अࡃȡ

᫦হՌ᫦䘪जВౕᎠझ̷㜗⩞ౝႹ᜽ែ

ᡑᢶγಯⰡ⩢ੳ⮱ጯ౧Ъ䷊⾧䬡ȡᑍ㤹䃑 ͧ喑᱗ᲒಯⰡᕔ⩢ੳ䔅ᰶ̭Ⴧ⮱ࣾᆂ⾧

䉱䶦Ⱋ喑̺‫ں‬ӊ䲍‫׼‬䨣㵹Ƞែ䉱‫ڙ‬थ䔆ᵤ

߂৻ັࣉಽ

⮱͚䬡྿ϸȡ

䬡喑℁ຯಯⰡᕔ⩢ੳౕ䔈㵹̭ψⰥᏁ⮱ゃ

ο㖁㑾䛾㲺᭜䓾͑Ꭱ⹫чऱ⩹䲋፥‫ڠ‬

Ꭱ͚పο㖁㑾ᩜЅ⮱ϑᭀ㻱὎䓫

⪒ᕔᩦअ喠㔹๔ಸ⮱㐩वಸ⩢ੳᎠझౕ䔽

∕⮱䛺㺮䶳ഌȡᭀ㻯倅㏔ܳᲽጵᑍ㤹䔅ܳ

‫̴ݝ‬Ϭȡ䔆͑Ꭱ喑す̶᫦ᩜЅጟ㏼䊝ा

⌽᱊Ɑ৮❹ࡃ⮱᫦ा䒙अȡ

Ϙγᄦο㖁㑾䛾㲺⮱ⰸ∂ȡ

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ο㖁㑾䛾㲺࠲क़͑͗䲋፥䛺㺮⮱ᅯ

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ᔘ䕌ࣾᆂ喑࣌ᰶ⮱⍍䖀ᵩᅭࣾ⩌γ䲋፥䛺

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ಸ⮱ο㖁㑾⩢ੳᎠझ喑‫⌅׼‬჊Ƞϙ͉ጟ㏼

ᰡߍこवο㖁㑾⮱ᆋᕔȡ

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፥䛺㺮ȡᅞ᭜ܳጒ䊷Გ䊷Ⴙ઱喑Ό䊷Გ䊷 ㏳ȡడ㐂Ɑ⩢ၽੳߎ喑ᰶ̀䬕ϻθчঅノ ⤳⮱Ю͇喑ϻθᎬॷ㥒䨭ᣕᎬ⮱Ю͇喑

ᑍ㤹䃑ͧ喑᱗Გο㖁㑾䛾㲺ᄳч᱊Ɑ ⼨ߕࡃȠ⩢ੳࡃহ⁎䛾㲺̶͗᫦ाࣾᆂȡ

ఏ喑ౕჅ᫦㑾〆̷ᐭ䕇γԊ䮖ౕ㏬䨭ਜ਼͇ ߎȡᭀ㻯ౕⵁ⾣͚ࣾ⣝喑Ԋ䮖⩢ੳ⮱㻱὎

䔅ᰶ‫≮➖׼‬Ƞ䒜У᰺ߎ喑ຯ$3.喑䔅ᰶ

⼨ߕࡃͨ㺮ᠴ᱗Გ䛾㲺ࣾᆂᰡ็ч

̻పใⰥ℁䔅᭜ᰶ℁䒰๔⮱ጛ䌊喑㒻ప⣝

&31ぶࢯੳȡ⩢ၽੳߎ⮱ࣾᆂΌፓߕϔ͇

ा⼨ߕο㖁㑾〜䔈㵹䓮⼨喑ౕ⼨ߕο㖁㑾

ౕԊ䮖ౕ㏬䨭ਜ਼⮱㻱὎ധ᱙̷ज䓫喑

䨫ᵩᅭ䔈̭ₒ⮱ܳጒ㏳ࡃহႹ઱喑ᒏ᜽⩢

〜чᰶ䊷Გ䊷็⮱݈᫝ȡओ̭͗䲋፥䛺㺮

ѳ᭜͚పगᰶȡĄᄦ℁͚㒻ࣾᆂᗲۢ喑

ੳ᰺ߎ͇䔆̭䲋፥䛺㺮⮱ϔ͇ȡ

⮱䊸߬᭜⩢ੳࡃ喑࠲क़͑ᅯᘼᕊ喟̭᫦䲏

᜾Йⵁ⾣䃑ͧ喑⩕ᝤ⮱΍ᘜദ‫ڨ‬᭜䲋፥䛺

䔅ᰶ̭͗䲋፥䛺㺮⮱᫦䲏喑⩢ၽੳߎ

᭜䊷Გ䊷็⮱䛾㲺ϔ৮ᐭ໸჋⣝㏬̷䨭ਜ਼

㺮⮱ȡጹ᱈ᰶᰡ็⮱⩕ᝤ䕇䓴㏬̷᫦ᐼ䉚

⮱ࣾᆂᄦλ͚ప㏼≻ᵩᅭΌᄳፓᲒ̭Ⴧᒞ

হ䉚Ν喑䔆᭜䛾㲺ϔ৮⩢ੳࡃ喠䔅ᰶ̭͗

ΝԊ䮖喑ദ‫⩕ڨ‬ᝤ΍ᘜ᭜᱗Გ㺮๔߈ែ‫ڒ‬

৺ȡ⩢ၽੳߎ৮ㆨᵩᅭ⮱䛻㰛ពᑍ喑ᄩ㜡

䲋፥䛺㺮⮱ᅯ䲏喑䊷Გ䊷็⮱䛾㲺Ю͇

⮱᫦䲏ȡąᑍ㤹䄡䖀ȡ

July 2013

61


ភᮥ

෋ࢆ‫ތ‬රજ݃‫ھ׾‬ ͧϭ͵Ⴘ᱊倅Ⴥ⌲᏶㔹़অ䉗ྗ ᪴]ᱻᐭক㏼≻⩌≨ट҉უ

͚ప⑘䪬⮱ࢳट䪬

ࢄⰮԎ䭠ጯ‫ٶ‬ᆞ࣬և䓴࣬Бȡथ侙‫ٶ‬͸᝭

Გ喑Ꭱᩣ‫̴ౕڒ‬䉜В̷ȡ䓴ࣨᒏღ̭͗ϧ

⇠͚喑⊹⣝䓴͑͗

Вघथ侙‫ٶ‬喑ᅞ᭜఍ͧЃ᭜थ侙↍ౕ‫ٶ‬ᆞ

ᰶ䧞喑፥䄡Ąუϔ̴䉜ą喑‫ڣ‬჋थ侙‫̭ٶ‬

ᒵ㦄ऺ⮱ϧ➖喑̭͗घႸ

ևჅᬣ⩌⮱喍࣯㻮⌲ϧ䭵Ⴜ䄸ԛ䃏⮱ȨႸ

Ꭱ⮱ᩣ‫ڒ‬ᅞᰶ‫̴܍‬䉜γȡ

↌喑ओ̭͗घथ侙‫ٶ‬ȡ

थ侙᪴ₐ‫ٶڙ‬Ꭱ䅞ȩ喎ȡ Ⴘ↌⮱უ̓䌌थ侙‫ٶ‬㐊ᄦ⇎∂℁喑఍

̭᪴䧞䘪⇎ᰶȡౕȨⅡ≿эȩ䛹喑Ⴘ↌䨿

ᬣΌ᭜ट႓უȡЃౕႸϮ

ͧЃ❦ग᭜ᆞ͉䘀೻࣬⮱̭͗ჹ㸂‫ۉ‬ℾᝃ

䨈‫ڒ‬⠞В‫Ⱑ̭ݺ‬᭜៩थȡ៩थᵦ᱙̺᭜

ჄȠႸ㠞ჄȠႸ⺋ჄহႸ

㔲͚ᄼౝͨ喑ౝౝ䖀䖀̭͗Ꭰℾȡ

ჅȡႸ᱊⮱࣬㶆䛹䲏喑㕹Ѻᰭ倅⮱᭜࣬Б

ᣒ̸Გ‫ⰸں‬ЃЙ͑ϧ⮱㫗Ⅱȡ

喍ᝃ⼝ⴒ࣬喎喑‫⁎ڣ‬᭜ͨៀ⇨Ⴖ⮱࣬ᄶ喑

Ⴥ喑ൗ⼝ఈ᱊ٰ㔮ȡЃ䔅

थ侙‫⮱ٶ‬Ђ䕁᪡Ҁ䶧‫ݖ‬喑̺‫ݝ‬ι࡮ᆮ

‫⁎ڣں‬᭜㐆࣬Бև᪴⼅ጒ҉⮱ͨㅬ喑ͨㅬ

㟞γᄼࡷ⩌ᬣ䬡㑃‫̭ۆ‬䘕

ᅞ͚γ䔈ธ喑䮼ࢠ㷘⹩䘕ᅇΓ᠈ͧຠྫྷ喑

̸䲏䃫‫ܳ͗܍‬ノᝤऐȠ䉏⼻Ƞथ∂হౌౝ

㻱὎Ꮛ๔Ꭳ́䲋፥͒䅕⮱㑃ᎡҀटΓȨ䉱

♣ऻౕࣵ๔㜐Ꮛㅺ喍ౕ᜼ᰟȨᲕუᄳȩহ

⮱ͨᵵ喑ͨᵵ̸䲏᝺᭜៩थ喑៩थ̸䲏ࣵ

⇨䕇䞡ȩ喑ͧэ㐌ट႓ᐭ݈γь๔⮱ຍധ

Ȩ঩უᄳȩ䛹喑ₑϧ㷘̾ࡃͧ๔ລ㜐喎⮱

፥䃫‫ޜ͗܍‬᝸喑̭㝙घևĄᒂθąᝃ㔲

ᕔጒ҉喑ߌ߸ࢀ㦄喑‫ٶ‬㔭ࡰऑȡ

ਟჄぶఈ͗⮴ፊ᝸̸և䓴 ᱻᐭক

᣽ᥧ̸ₒₒ倅ࡴ喑Ꭱ㏗䒨䒨ᅞ䔈ϧθ䘕և

Ą䉡Γą喍䌌䬻ཱིᘉ䕇ລ⮱䗐͗ᄼ़ᑍ᪴

Ⴘ↌जツ̷̺ᩬ⇨უ喑Ό⇎‫ۆ‬䓴ϭ͵

Ⴥ喍‫़ݑ‬䘕ࢄᰦ喎喑㐔㔹ᒀ̷ప䭟䘕‫ޜ‬䘕

䔉ᅞ᭜䉡Γ喎ȡᠶ⚔Ⴘ᱊⮱㕹Ⴥ‫ݣ‬Ꮣ喑ͨ

Γ喑ѳЃहᵤ᭜ⱌ჋ႅౕ⮱ࢳटϧ➖ȡᒀ

䪬喍᳏ჳ‫ޜ‬Ҭ喎喑Ⱑ‫ݝ‬ႸਟჄࢠѺऻᒀ̷

ㅬጟ㏼᭜ᰭѻ㏔‫⮱ݘ‬Ⴥঅγ喑ͨㅬВ̸⮱

♣喑᜾Йᰭ⛌ᖶ⮱Ⴘ↌Ϻ♣᭜᪴႓უ᫪㔽

ოⰥ喍࣯㻮ȨႸटeथ侙‫ٶ‬эȩ喎ȡ

ͨᵵȠ៩थহ䉡Γ㐌㐌ᆋλ़অȡ

ᏢౕȨⅡ≿эȩ䛹ក䕍‫ܧ‬Გ⮱䗐͗㞧ᱜᒏ

Ⴘ᱊᭜͚పࢳट̷ᰭ‫ڥ‬ಸ⮱倅㫗‫ڨ‬᏶

ऑАិჅহ़ܳᓄᒵ⌲喑Ⴥᰶԥ⺱喑

䆎喟‫ܧ‬䏘ᄼ़喑ౕᆞ͉䘀೻࣬ᒀ៩थ喑↌

ᬣА喑Ⴥ㕹䊷倅喑⺼‫ݖ‬䊷ᗷϧȡथ侙‫ٶ‬և

़ࢡ㷘ᒀ᜽ߠᒦ喑̭㝙ᗲ̸ۢग᣽ӈ᰺

⎃ϧ⼝Ąࣷᬣ䰕ą喑ऻᲒ㥪㡶ͧჴ喑ࣨᶮ

ოⰥᬣ喑ᰵ㫗䉜喑ᰵ㇛ⴠ喑⃼Ꭱࣵ

ߎ喑̺㘪ᠬጒ䉱ȡ⢸Ⴖⴠअ∂ऻ喑ͧγ䭟

ᆞ⇷ևγ๡䶳喑‫⁎܍‬ក䔭Ⴥ‫ۈ‬డެВऻ喑

㘪Ⴧ᱌䶳‫̭ݝ‬๔ឦ㐘㒄㐥㐻喑ₑใ䔅ᰶᇄ

₏ധᅯϧঅ䉗↎喑᱊ᐤᰫ㏼ិ़অ㏠‫ݝڒ‬

ࣵͨߕऄ᱊ᐤ᠈Ⴖćć

Ѻ㶒䉡喍㕹䧞喎Ƞ丽些㶒䉡喍丽䧞喎Ƞ⛰

䉏ᩬᐭᩜ⮱㠰⪡喑जᘉ㐆⮱㫗Ⅱ๗ᄾ喍⃼

Όᅞ᭜䄡喑ౕ㐊๔็᪝᰸ࣸᓰⰛ͚喑

᫆㶒䉡喍㫗◚䧞喎Ƞ‫ڨ‬侙㶒䉡喍ܺ㇌喎Ƞ

ᰵᰭ็‫܍‬䉜䧞喎喑㔹́गౕ᳏ჳ䮏ぶ倅㏔

थ侙‫ٶ‬᭜ⱌ჋⮱喑Ⴘ↌ࢡ᭜㮇Ჱ⮱ȡ㮇Ჱ

Ԋ໳㶒䉡喍ׁϧ㶐㇛喎ぶぶ䔈䉓喍࣯㻮

㶆䬕䛹䄂㵹喑䔅⇎ᰶᮛࣷ‫࣬ݝ‬㶆ȡ᝭ВႸ

⮱㞧ᱜᒏ䆎䌌ⱌ჋⮱ࢳटϧ➖᱙ᲒᎣ̺䔯

ȨႸटe㕹Ⴥᔄȩ喎ȡិ䔆ψ㐌㐌ߍ䊤

↌Ⴘ៩थ㮪♣ౕ䘀೻঩䷻ੑ䰕᝸Ⱪ䕇๖喑

वᩫౕ̭䊤℁䒰喑ѳ᭜Ϸ๖᜾ռ㺮℁䒰̭ ̸喑ռ㺮䃖ᄼ䄡䛹⮱Ⴘ↌䌌ࢳट̷⮱थ侙 ‫ٶ‬᫄̭᫄ჹ喑℁℁ЃЙԖ䄮ᰡᰶ䧞ȡ 仃‫̺ٵ‬໕‫℁ٵ‬Ⴘ↌হथ侙‫⮱ٶ‬უ̓ȡ ᜾Йⴒ䖀喑Ⴘ᱊㮪♣Ⴙ‫⃮ᦔڕ‬γ䮸਽ ᬣ䔅₸⪆⮱䬕䬭‫ݣ‬Ꮣ喑㮪♣͒ᵩᠶ⚔⻾ͫ 㔰䄂Გ䔶᠁Ⴥ़喑ѳ᭜⩞λᖖ㢘‫ݣ‬Ꮣ⮱Ԋ ⪆喑⩞λͫ㡽‫ݣ‬Ꮣ⮱ႅౕ喑⩞λ‫ܧ‬䏘ธ๔ ๘უᏚ⮱㔰⩌ౕ᪆㗟⣜ධহ⻾㔰㏼侹̷䔉 䔉хλᎠℾၽႆ喑Ⴥঅ⮱ऻАϺ♣℁Ꭰℾ ⮱ऻАᰡღᭀևჅȡ̺ⲿᗕ䄡喑⣝Аϧ⛌ ⴒ⮱䗐ψႸ᱊Ⴥঅ喑‫ڣ‬჋๔䘕ܳ䘪᭜ĄჅ ιАąȡ 䌌Ⴘ᱊๔䘕ܳჅঅ̭ᵤ喑थ侙‫ٶ‬Ό᭜ ̺͗ៅ̺ថ⮱ჅιАÿ‫❣ڣ‬थ侙↍ౕ⇠

62

Ⴘ↌̭Ꭱ㘪ᰶ็ᄾ㫗Ⅱএ喤Ꮑ䄒䄡

थ侙‫ٶ‬᭜ᩬ⇨უ喑ह

July 2013

⩢㻳‫ޔ‬Ȩ᫝Ⅱ≿эȩ⊤្喑͚ͧᑍ⋢ε亝⑁⮱Ⴘ↌


ࢡ᭜̭͗ܳ䧞ጒ䉱䘪⇎ᰶ⮱㑃ใϧঅȡ

ᅞ᪏Ν̸̭᝭ᝬၽ喤

ᬍ䃧᭜॓‫ܧ‬䏘ჅιА喑๔䘪ិऺ㾶ⰸᓄᒵ

℁უ̓喑Ⴘ↌䔉䔉̺ຯथ侙‫ٶ‬ȡ℁㫗

थ侙‫ٶ‬㫗Ⅱ㮪倅喑ࢡ⌲᏶ᓄ㺮প喑䲋

䛺喑‫ؿ‬უᕊᘠহ⌲䃛͸䷻ҬЃЙ⮱俕ၽ䛹

Ⅱ喑Ⴘ↌ᰡߍ̺ຯथ侙‫ٶ‬ȡԖϧ᫄ჹ喑䄮

ѳ̺ᩣ䲋∂⮱䉬䉯喑䔋व∂⮱亵䊍䘪៿͸

⩌䪬ⱭᬧⰈ⮱㕨ᙌ᪴ࡃ喑̭ᬓ䉗↎㵹ͧ㷘

ч䊏喤㜗♣᭜थ侙‫ٶ‬Ⴙ㘉ȡ

䬕ใȡЃ❣ϟࣨ̓ᬣ⪆̸̭᝭㔮Ⴒ喑Ѓ̺

фϧ᝭ⴒ喑ЃЙч㓋ᙔᓄឫౝ㑊䧨䔈ࣨȡ

ज᭜Ⴘ↌ౕȨⅡ≿эȩ䛹ߖϧͧͽ喑

㺮喑䔮㐆γ਒਒थ侙ᬓ喠ႸϮჄౕ̓ᬣ䉼

℁᫦䄡㟼͉ಎ⮱㔮̷थ䭵ጹϛ喑ᮇᎡ

ᡒ䛾ຯౌ喑‫ܧ‬᝸䲋፥๔᫦喟す̭⁎㻮ₓ

㐆Ѓ䉜䉏ϔ喑Ѓិ̭ࡷܳ㐆γ䉘⾤

఍ͧᩣऄ‫⨣܍‬䙿喑ិ͹㏞፪ᐱ͏γ喑⇎㙥

Ძ喑䔮γ͑䨣ၽ喠す̭⁎㻮ᱻ䕢喑Ό

⮱㜲㜲喑ओ̭ࡷ᡽㐆γపუ喑㜗ጞ͊℘̺

ఋఈጊ㔮უ喑䏟ౕუ䛹̺᪏㻮ϧ喑ࣵ㓋ࣵ

䔮͑䨣ၽ喠す̭⁎㻮‫ࢃݝ‬㞧⮱⫲๔㮘㫈

⪆喠Ѓ᝸๡ग㺮ᰶ็҆⮱䧞䉏喑ᅞᠬ‫ܧ‬Გ

⅁喑☚⃿ᩨᓰ喑ᰭऻ㘷㗹̷䪬⃿⫛喑̺⇨

Ⅵ喑䔮γ͑䨣ၽ喠ᱻ䕢ౕ↌ጋ⥢⥣Ϛកё

ߋΓ䮏Ƞ᩾≻䉘ℾ喠Ѓ⮱㐀ࣾ໨ၽ⫲䕊喑

㔹₨喍࣯㻮㟼䓆Ȩ哆ጊ⪒ᔄȩ喎ȡ

ਫ਼ᰟ⮱Ⴘ⢶㣟喑Ѓᢼ‫͑ܧ‬䨣ၽ㐆Ⴘ⢶㣟

ࢡ⇎䧞Ⴖ㦙喑गສࢃౝウ喠Ѓࣨ̓В

᜾ᄦथ侙‫ٶ‬ᒵᰶສᙌ喑ᄦ䔆͗䭵ጹ

❣⃺ććຯ᳉Ⴘ↌⇎ᰶᩣ‫ڒ‬喑Ѓ䲍ϭ͵Გ

ऻ喑᱊ᐤ≫ϧ᪡⤳䖄ϔ喑ࣾ⣝უᬍ҆䉏喑

ϛᰡᰶສᙌ喑᜾㻶ᓄЃ䌌䴖ప䗐Ѻ఍ͧუ

ᩜᦾ䔆͵๔⮱ᐭ䨭এ喤めᵵᒵᬻ᭫喟䲍䉗

᳂๡᫮䓦गᰶ̭᱙Γ喍В̷౴࣯㻮㟼͉ಎ

᫼䉗↎㔹㜗ᱭ䅏㒗⮱‫ݺ‬ᕨ㐌࢏ₓ䧶̭ᵤ喑

↎ऄ䉬ȡ

㐆थ侙‫⮱ۆٶ‬ᄼэȨथ侙⍖‫ڙ‬㵹⟣ȩ喎ȡ

䘪᭜Ąⴒ㕨㔹ऻߴą⮱ϧ➖ȡजᘉ⣝А͚

Ⴘ↌⾣「䉗↎γ็ᄾ䧞喑ȨⅡ≿эȩ

⩞ₑⰸᲒ喑थ侙‫ⱌٶ‬䌌Ⴘ↌᫄ჹ⮱

ప⮱Ⴥ౧ᬖᅞ⇎ᰶγ㓋㕨ᙌ喑⣝ౕ⮱䉗Ⴥ

⇎㐆‫ڤ‬Ҁ᪝Ⱋ喑᜾Й̺Ӭັ⡉ȡ̺䓴ࢂϻ

䄊喑䉒ࡄ⮱̺᭜Ⴘ↌喑㔹᭜Ѓȡͧϭ͵㫗

࠲‫͗࡮܍ڨ‬ιຣ喑䉗ࢍ‫⮫܍‬ຄᝬϔ喑⃮ᢶ

̭Уθ̷ᅞ㘪ⰸ‫ܧ‬Ѓᒵᰶ䧞喟䬻ཱིᘉ⃺ຠ

Ⅱ͝ࣇ⮱倅Ⴥч䓀㐆⇎ᰶጒ䉱⮱㑃ใϧ

పუ‫͗࡮܍‬Ϭ⮱䉱ϔ喑⚔ᵤ㘪ౕϬ̴ϧℾ

ែກЃ喑Ѓ䮼᝸ᅞౕ࣬㶆᫮䓦Νγ̭ᎏẩ

অ喤‫ݺ‬㔲⌲᏶喑ऻ㔲䉗ྗ喑ຯₑ㔹ጟȡ

⮱᫒侯ฝ͚ᬯ䊤๡Გ喑≨ᓄ㜗ౕ喑〾ᓄಓ

ᝬႶ㒛䬻ℼȡႸ᱊ᝬФ᭜ᒵ̺Ӭ჉⮱喍࣯

ͧϭ͵倅Ⴥ⌲᏶㔹़অ䉗ྗ喤̭᭜

㻮᠆㦄ȨࡰᎡẩጯ喟⾬䊷ᬣ⾧ࣨऑА㒛

఍ͧ倅Ⴥᰶ倅㫗喑ᬍ䰭ࣨ䉗喑㔹़অͧγ

͇喎喑Ⴘ↌㚝࠲㺮᭜̺呀喑ᆯ㘪℘̺⟦䆘

‫ڨ‬უࢡ̺ᓄ̺䉗喠‫̭࣌͗ں‬఍喑ႸАჅঅ

♣ȡὗⰶۤᄦࡰ๘ᠴ喑Ԝ仃⩅ͧ⢸‫ژ‬㯸ȡ ᜾㻶ᓄ䔆ψ⣝А❵䉗Ⴥ⮱㘷㗹̷᝺᭜ ⱌₐᏁ䄒䪬⃿⫛⮱ȡ

July 2013

63


ᄺ˗‫ڎ‬

໛ߌ֭Զӽ ͚పᓲ䶨㐡ᠮᎣߍᑧࢳटэឬ⮱㏪ፓ ᪴]᭼ᵩ᪴ (SBIBN&BSOTIBX 

᭼ᵩ᪴

ᬒ喑̭Ѻ㺬Ⴖ⮱

λ᭜᜾ा䔆Ѻ㺬Ⴖ⮱᰸ࣸࣾ䬛喟㺮

λ䔈ₒ⪒ᰶψःۤ〾⮱ᔮᏓ喑५ЙΌᰶψ

᰸̻ࣸ᜾㕷䊤Ѓ

Ⅿ႖ၽ㟞䉦๔䛼ᬣ䬡ࣨ႓΍Ѓ̺ᙌ‫ڡ‬䋐⮱

ᜓᑞ喑࣌Გ५Й᭜㔮㟺㟺⮱ϧℾγȡ५Й

̰ᆮ٬ၽ⮱᪆㗟䬛䷅喑⼝

㠞䄚䄫⼸ᰶ็๔ᘼͶ喤䔆͗Ꭱ咱⮱႖〒᭜

̺ૉౕ⤰౧̷ກ依⾮俑Вζ䔽̭⯛⤰喑५

‫⃼ڣ‬ক᱘䘪㺮̷ࣨ㠞䄚হ

̺᭜ᰡᏁ䄒㟞ᬣ䬡ࣨγ㼐㜗ጞ᱙ℾ᫼⮱᪴

Йࢡ⁏ૉ䬟ₒᴠ൑͸̷̻卐卌⍥冩ͧѡȡ

ᄼ᣽⥡䒲ᄩ⤚ȡ䔆䃖᜾̺

ࡃȠ᫦ᐼ䄥ຯ㏰΍Γ∂ᝃऑ⥡喤ຯϷ喑᫝

ϧ⩌᭜็͵̺⶛Ⴧ喑५ЙՅⴒ䖀γ⩇͵䋠

⺮ᐭ໸ᕊ㔰᪴ࡃэឬ喑В

ߍಎȠ仆⍜ぶౝ㺬ࡃ⮱᪆㗟Ҁ㈨ᄦᒀౝ႖

В␎䋠५Й喑Ӭ㉔㉔ិᤎѼႰ喑ᰶຯᯡ䷻

ࣷϧ⩌㻯ぶ䬛䷅ȡ

〒䕍᜽⮱ᒞ৺ጟ݊㻮〜՗喑ᰭ㏵⮱ऻ᳉ᒵ

䰕⮱叾้喑ᙵ⃺͸㉔㉔៞Ѽ຦⮱❞ၽȡą

᜾⮱֣‫׼‬喑๔҉უ ᳄䄚യ‫҉݈ڣౕ⩌ٵ‬λ

ज㘪᭜ദ‫ܧڨ‬ᄦШ҂᪴ࡃ䘪ᬍ⌞‫≋ݨ‬㻮⮱ ̭Аϧȡ

̓㏗ᎡА喍͚ప⹫ч㏼ࢳጕअ͸‫ݺ‬喎⮱

ѳ᳄‫ࢡ⩌ٵ‬᭜ϻⰥࣺ⮱㻿Ꮣ䬽䔝γ㜗

ᒵ็͚పϧϺᠮㆨѩ㻯◦ȡϷᬒ͸͚ࡻఈ

Ȩ५ప५ℾȩ̭Γ͚䄵ࣷγ䔆̭䄊䷅ȡЃ

ጞ⮱̓⩹㻯喑䃑͚ͧపगᰶ㐔ឬ䓴ࣨ᝺㘪

ั∸⏏Ɑ䱿Ꭱϧ⮱☚ᗲহ≨߈喑ѳౕ䔆㗹

ౕ䄒㦄҉㐀䄚䘕ܳᄳ͚ప᣼䔝᜽ऑ㔮Ꭳ఍

䊝ा᱗Გ喑䊝ा̓⩹ȡ

ऻ喑᜾ѩͻⰸ㻮γ䒰̓⩹‫ڣ‬Ѓపუϧℾᄦ ⩌≨হ⣝჋ᰡ⌞⮱Ҁᗌȡ

ₑ䶴ᙌ㜗䆗⮱పᏓȡ᳄‫⩌ٵ‬ᠴ‫ܧ‬喑Ą㔮ą

Ą५Й᭜㔮๔⮱ℾ᫼ąȡЃ‫ۆ‬䖀喑

䔆͗ႄᘼঠⱭ㏼侹͝ჹ喑㻮䃳Ꭼ䭁ȡϻ䔆

Ą㔮Ꭱϧ⮱ጕⱩⰸᅪγ̭ܴ䓴̻̭ܴࣨ⣝

᪴ࡃ⮱эឬᄦλϧ⩌㻯⮱ᐧ⿸㜠‫ڠ‬䛺

͗㻿ᏓᲒⰸ喑͚పϧᰭૉສ⮱႐㞯Ꮑ᭜

А⩌≨⮱अ䓮 Όᰶ䃥็᭜≲㪱⮱喑Όᰶ䃥

㺮喑㔹ᰶγ㞜ສ⮱ϧ⩌㻯᜾Й᝺㘪჋⣝㜗

⻸႐ȡ

็ᄦλ५Йϧ⩌‫ڤ‬ᰶⱌ⤳⮱ᘼͶȡ५Йᄦ

᜾ᘼ䃳䔆̭ᰭ㏵Ⱋᴴȡ

ЃౕΓ͚‫ۆ‬䖀喟Ą᜾❞ສ᭒喑ѳ᭜᭒ ๗ᴁဖ喠᜾❞ສ฼喑ѳ฼๗㢐๥ȡ఍᭜᜾ ᰭ❞ສ⻸喑఍ͧ຦⮱णၽፓ̭ψ叱㞟喑䄰 ၽᵩใᴁহ喑㞟ᒖᵩใ⊀䗮喑Ⴐࣵᴀ̷̭ ψᔔ䗮⮱⺋䛴হ₨⮱䶱⹧ȡႰ⮱䛾叱⮱⊀ 䗮喑̺᭜㶕⣝᭒⮱◯⑘喑̺᭜㶕⣝฼⮱Ⰸ ߈喑㔹᭜㶕⣝䕩䓾㔮䓵⮱ళ⛌̻ᙵহ⮱ᮧ ᚔȡႰⴒ䖀ϧ⩌⮱ᰶ䭽喑ᩲⴒ䋠㔹ͽ๖ȡ ϻₑĂϧ⩌ᰶ䭽ă⮱ⴒ䃳̻͝ჹ⮱㏼侹喑 ‫ܧ‬⣝̭⻺㞟ᒖ⮱ϑ৺ᰟ喑℁̭ܴ䘪͝ჹ喑 Ⴐ⮱䱿㶕⣝⩌প̻߈喑Ⴐ⮱ᾅ叱㶕⣝䛾⢶ ⮱‫ڲ‬ღ喑㉘㶕⣝⊵Ხ̻₨ώȡą䔆⃢䄊‫ٲ‬ ࣺܳ᭍‫ܧ‬᳄‫ͧ҉⩌ٵ‬᪴ࡃϧ᝭‫ڤ‬ᰶ⮱䒰倅 ධ⩹ȡ ౕ᜾ⰸᲒ喑ϧㆨ㑁䕍‫⤰ڕ‬᪴ࡃহ⹫ ч⮱㙇ₒጟᬒ⯷ߍᔘ喑㔹͚ప㘪ౕ‫͚ڣ‬ល ⑁䛺㺮㻿㞟喑䔆ͨ㺮ᑿߌλ͚పᗍͲ⮱ࢳ ट喑Вࣷ⣝А͚పϧϻ⺃䒵ั㐔ឬ⮱᪴ࡃ 喍࠲᠙ਟ႓হ᪴႓喎䖄ϔȡ ♣㔹喑͚ప㠒ᘠⱌₐౕ‫͚ࣾڣ‬ᡒ҉ ⩕喑݆ᓲ䶨㐡ᠮᎣߍᑧ䔆̭ࢳटэឬ⮱㏪ ፓȡ

64

ᅪノౕȨ५ప५ℾȩ̭Γ‫ۆ‬᜽ऻ͚ప ⹫ч㏼ࢳγ䄥็अࡃ喑ѳ᜾ࣾ⣝ᬣ㜠Ϸᬒ

July 2013

႖〒Ꮑ䄒㟞ᰡ็ᬣ䬡ࣨγ㼐᱙ℾ᫼⮱᪴ࡃ


LOOKING AT CHINA

Spring and autumn China has a unique perspective on many aspects of life, given its long cultural continuity. The challenge is to preserve that continuity in the midst of 21st century education and media. By Graham Earnshaw

I

was talking to a friend in Xi’an recently about the education of his son, now seven years old. Every weekend, the boy’s time is taken up with extra lessons in English and the violin. It made me start to think about the transmission of culture from one generation to the next and about perspective on life. My hero, the great writer Lin Yutang, addressed this topic in his book “My Country and My People.” In the epilogue to the book, written in the 1930s and before the many changes that have taken place in China in the intervening decades, he described

China as being old and richly comfortable in its age. By old, he meant rich in experience. From this perspective, he said, the favorite season of Chinese people is autumn. “I like spring, but it is too young. I like summer, but it is too proud. So I like best of all autumn, because its leaves are a little yellow, its tone mellower, its colors richer, and it is tinged a little with sorrow and a premonition of death. Its golden richness speaks not of the innocence of spring, nor of the power of summer, but of the mellowness and kindly wisdom of approaching age. It knows the limitations of life and is content,” Lin wrote, reflecting a wider cultural stance. I sense that we are moving increasingly quickly towards the creation of a global culture and society. I believe China has much to contribute to such a culture, and much of what it can contribute relates to the manifestations of age, the rich depths of culture, philosophy and literature to which Chinese people today are the heirs. But to make that contribution, the links to that richness must be nurtured. I asked my friend how much value there was in subjecting his son to hours of learning English badly, in a context where the child has no interest or motivation to learn properly. I also questioned whether it would be better for children at that age to spend more time on extending their understanding of their own base culture, that

is learning more about Chinese, perhaps through calligraphy or guqin. We have seen in places like Singapore and Hong Kong the impact of an education system that forces children away from their own culture. You risk ending up with people who have no depth of understanding on any culture at all. But Lin was looking at a world where China was changing and integrating with the globe from a perspective that included still an unbroken continuity with the past. “We are an old nation,” he wrote. “The eyes of an old people see in its past and in this changing modern life much that is superficial and much that is of true meaning to our lives. We are a little cynical about progress, and we are a little bit indolent, as are all old people. We do not want to race about in a field for a ball; we prefer to saunter along willow banks to listen to the bird’s song and the children’s laughter.” So much has changed since he wrote that. But on the other hand, I still sense strongly the echoes of his point of view in the Chinese people around me. Chinese society today includes what might be the vitality and exuberance of youth. But beneath it, I sense a clearer awareness of the realities of life than is true in many other societies around the world. Self-awareness is the goal. Perspective is the key to self-awareness. Cultural continuity provides perspective.

July 2013

65


᜵຤ᝮ

ಮ‫ྞר‬ຳ ᭼ᵩ᪴喍(SBIBN &BSOTIBX喎⩌λ㠞ప喑⣝ᅲ̷⊤ȡЃВ̷̭⁎㥪㙇◦ͧ䊤◦喑㵹⼸ϻ̷⊤̭䌜 ा㺬喑ὗ䉜͚పȡ᱙ᰵ喑Ѓጟ㵹㜠๶㞯࣬೻ȡ ᪴]᭼ᵩ᪴ (SBIBN&BSOTIBX

̭䌜ा㺬喑ౕ䕇ᒭ๶㞯࣬೻⮱ᆞ䅤

㩙᳉䯳ጯ̷ा᳉‫ۉ‬Й䄏䬛γ䔆ࡦĄ侙ą⮱

㻯Фթ̺倅喑᝭В᜾Όᅞក⊵γ‫ڒ‬ᄧ⍥㻵

͚ᠮ㐚̸㵹喑⇬䕁ᅪ᭜⾬ᷚᒭᲒ⮱

䍗䔦ȡ

⮱ᘠ∂ȡ

䓽⚑䒓喑ႰЙ̺᭜␎䒪侣ा䪬↌̸͚⍥ౝ ࡧ喑ᅞ᭜⾧䒓䔁ఋ⌞ᆞȡ̭䌜̷⮱ᄼ䩴ᭌ ᭌ◦◦喑‫߰߰⅁⩌ޜ̭♣ڕ‬Ƞ͝亣ჹᏣ⮱ ᮜ䆎ȡ

ĄႰ₨γȡą‫ऺ̭͚ڣ‬᳉‫ॷۉ‬䃶᜾喑 䄡Ⴙ䔅㜗䶫㜗ౝ〾γ䊤Გȡ

݇䓴ᮜࡧ⊛ᶒ喑䬨ऺ๖̸⮱̶ሎ๴ ᮜÿĄแ䬕๖̸䯱ąӬ᭍‫Ⱪڒ‬ፅ喑䔆ᕽ

䕁͚ᆞ߬⌽Ꭰ喑̭↌⌲Ⅱϻ᜾䏘䓦⋹

ᕂΌ᭜ሎ↌䷻‫͚ٶ‬ᰭͧ䯱ьปͪ⮱̭ᎂ

䓴喑ᘠᓲ᭜̶ሎⅡᏀⅡѺ៙倅᝭ᄩ㜡ȡᐧ

γȡౕ̺हጮթ⮱ϧℾጮ͚喑Ⅱ㨊㞟⮱

♣㔹䔆❴ࡧഌ⮱⣜ධࢡ₸ⵡ̺ൗȡ

ౕ↌䓦⮱ᝬᅸ๔䘕ܳ᭜᫝ᝬ喑ज᜾ࢡӊ⼭

ٰ㏥ጮᰭͧ፥㻮喑㔹Ⴐ㗹䲏࢝‫⮱ݨ‬ₐ᭜̶

ᆞ䅤䬡⮱倅䕌‫ڙ‬䌜䶦ⰛϺౕ᫪ጒ喑ߍ͸⚑

䃝ᓄ䔆̭ፓ⮱‫ۉ‬ℾ䘪ጟ⼨ᅲ㜠๶㞯࣬⮱᫝

ሎᮜ㻯喟ጓӔͧ⮪ፊᆞ喑ठӔ᭜෮⿸ࡰЋ

⴬Ƞ⇆౾Вࣷऱㆨᝬᅸᐧ䕍ጒ⼸⮱ᒞ৺喑

೻ࡧȡĄ๔䘕ܳϧ⮱ᬒၽౕ⼨ᅲЃัऻअ

⮱̶ሎᇖ෮喑㗹ᮜั⮱ᆞሓ݆ॵ⣝ᑜ‫ܭ‬

㜡Ҭౌౝᢌ⃮ᗲۢ͒䛺ȡѳ᜾ࣾ⣝‫ۉ‬ℾЙ

ᓄᰡ⿅䔘γȡą̭Ѻ䌜ϧा᜾៞ᕕȡ

⟣ȡᅪノⱩ‫⮱ݺ‬ᮜ䆎ጟ䔉̺ࣷᒀᎡ䗐㝙⌞

ᄦౌౝ⮱Ԋ៑ᘼ䃳ࢡ̻ᬒԞ෋ȡ䕁͚᜾ा

̸̭〆Ӭ‫ݝ‬γ⮪ፊ೻喑䔆䛹⮱ᏆႴ

֣䕴⮱̭ऺ͚Ꭱ⩤ၽ䄏䬛㕹͇喑Ѓ⮱ఋめ

ᣖ᭍ౕ䱿ᆞ͈͚喑᪝⮫ᎡᲒ̭Ⱑ᭜䪬↌̶

͚䕁ᄼᛖᬣ᜾䔅̻ᒀౝ⮱̭ऺິຠ喑

᭜Ąԛ⤳ౝ⤰ąÿ䔆‫ڣ‬჋ₐ᭜ౕ䄆䄽ౝ

ሎౝࡧᰭͨ㺮⮱⍥㻵㘉ౝȡ᜾ᰫౕ๔㏓

Вࣷ຦ᆮ⮱ᄼ٬ၽᨭ䄵γ̭чȡ䄒ຠၽ

㶕䓫㜗ጞ‫ۉ‬ℾ⮱䏘Ъȡ

Ꭱ‫ݝݺ‬䃬䓴ₑౝ喑ᒀᬣ↌䲏⮱ⅡѺᅇ᱗៙

⮱๔٬ၽⰛ‫ݺ‬ₐౕ᰺‫ڢ‬ᒦ喑ᬣ䬡䪬䓫Ꭱȡ

‫ڣ‬䬡᜾䔅ᰫ䌜䓴̭͗ऺघⴠ侙⮱ᄼ

倅喑㔹ຯϷ݆ఈ䲏⣜Ⅱ喑ጟ♣᜽γ̭Ꮤᄼ

᜾䬛຦๔٬ၽᒀ‫̭͗ڢ‬ᰵ㘪ᡐ็ᄾȡ຦ఋ

䩴ȡ‫ܧ‬λສ๴ᓰ⮱侞Ҭ喑᜾ౕᒀౝ⮱̭͗

ᇈȡᢛ䄡⣝ᰶ⮱᪡͗ᮜࡧ䘪᭜᫝ᐧ⮱喑࣯

め䖀喟Ą̺็喑ज㘪̭͗ᰵȡą

䖰䮎ሚ喑ѳ⅁߬⟦ႅȡ

Ąͧϭ͵̺᎟‫⮱ݘ‬Გᡐᰡ็䧞এ喤ą Ąᒀ‫ڢ‬᭜̭⻺䩨◩喑जВൾ䕍Ѓ⮱ ᕔᵩȡą຦㶕⹧ȡλ᭜᜾ࣵ䄏䬛‫ڣ‬侨ౝ᝭ ౕ喑ᓄ‫⮱ݝ‬ఋめ᭜⺼ᐧⰮȡ ᜾ᘠा຦⮱ᄼ٬ၽγ㼐ℂ͇ऻ⮱ក ツ喑Ѓ⮱⃺ϟࢡᰬ‫ڣ‬և‫ܧ‬γఋめȡ ĄЃᎣ̺᭜ᒵч䄨Γ喑᝭В࣯‫ۈ‬ᄦЃ 㔹㼭Όツ᭜ᰭສ⮱‫ܧ‬䌜γȡą ౕह̭๖⮱ᮇψᬣՆ喑᜾ࣵ䕴㻮γ̭ ᄦ⃺ၽ喑٬ၽ࡮ܳ֒䄵喑ౕᓛ䚶⮱⟣ᔮ̸ 䔅㘪ᐭࢎ䒓ȡЃϷᎡᆮ‫ܧ‬๡喑ᰫ㏼Όౕ 䘕䭌᰺ᒦ䓴ᎡȡᄦₑЃ⃺ϟ䃱Ф䖀喟Ą㜠 ᄾЃౕ‫ۈ‬䭌႓чγᐭ䒓ȡą Ѓᄳࢎ䒓։䲍ౕ̭䓦喑̻⃺ϟ‫ݝ‬ᄦ ̭↌⌲Ⅱϻ᜾䏘䓦⋹䓴

66

July 2013

䲏⮱ᄼᏄरࡵ亚喑ᖝສ䕴̷γౕ̭᫮૊Ⅱ


ᄼᛖ⮱᜾ȡᄼᏄ⮱࢘⩌ᗲۢ䒰ጛ喑ԿΌ̻ ক䓦⮱⣜ධ࡮ܳⰥ⼝ȡĄᝃ䃥᜾जВᐭ䒓 ‫ݝ‬㠞ప喑♣ऻౕ䗐䛹ጒ҉ȡąЃ〾Ɑᄦ᜾ 䄡ȡ ፚ䬡丽ᵹ᫮⮱ओ̭͗⩤ϧ䬛䊤᜾‫ݝ‬ ͚ప⮱ᬣ䬡䪬ⴚ喑Ꭳ̻᜾ᣏ䃕γ㜗̓㏗ ᎡАВᲒ͚ప⹫ч⮱⻺⻺अࡃȡĄ䓴 ࣨ喑᜾Й⩇㜠䔋华㯸䘪̺㘪䮼Ӭ‫ܧ‬ਜ਼喑ग 㘪ࢃ㐆పუȡѳ‫ڣ‬ЃθᗲᎣ᱗ⱌₐࣾ⩌䒙 अȡą᜾ࣾ⣝ຯϷ䔆ㆨѩ᭜㔹䲋⮱䃧䄰ѩ ͻᘵࣾ፥㻮γȡ ᆞ䌜㱬㰿ा̸喑Ⱑ䓫䅤Ꮒ⮱⇠䖀ȡᒀ ㏼䓴䌜᫮⮱ࢎ䒓⼝䛺〆ᬣ喑᜾։γ̸Გ喑 亣ᰶ‫ڡ‬㜡ౝ〆̷ⷲ⼑ȡĄ‫ڙ‬᫑ȡą〆 ‫̭⮱ڲ‬Ѻጒ҉ϧঅॷ䃶᜾Ҁ䛺㐀᳉ȡ䔆͗ ᪝ႄധ᱙۳⶛ȡϻЃऐ͚᜾䔅ᓄⴒ喑䓴䌜 ⮱ࢎ䒓ᬍ䃧䊲䒪̻॓䘪ч㷘ᩫ㵹喑㔹䊲䒪 㔲ϲ䰭㑡㏠ٰ⮱㒇䛾ȡθ჋̷喑䕁㏼䔆 ̭〆◦⮱䒓䒳‫ͻ܍‬䘪᭜ϻ⌞ᆞ̸Გ⮱䓽⚑ 䒓喑๔䘕ܳ䘪ႅౕ䊲䒪⣝䆎ȡ

ٰϧℾጮ㗹䲏࢝‫⮱ݨ‬ₐ᭜̶ሎᮜ㻯

ᅞౕ‫ݺ‬ᒭ๶㞯࣬೻⮱䌜̷喑䪬↌≮ ഌᬃ᫻⮱䷻‫⁎ںٶ‬अᓄ⌲ᮝȡθ჋̷᜾ᅞ

͗⩤ϧᄦ᜾㼐䛷喑㔹Ѓᖝጔ䔅᭜͚ప‫ڞ‬ϔ

‫׼‬᭜ౕ΅౽䊲ѻ䕌㵹侣⮱䓴ᆞ䒓喑ౕ̺ह

‫ڇ‬অȡ

㔹᫝೻ࡧ⮱͚ᓰ݆᭜̭≫⩌ᱧ喑㔹 ́ѩͻ䕺ౝ叱䛾ȡᒀౝϧ䄡䔆䛹⮱㏼≻䲍

⮱Ⅱ೻䬡≮䔋ᔅ䔁喑ࢡ̺ࣵᓄ̺̭⁎⁎ₒ

᜾౽ౕ๶㞯࣬೻⮱̭͗䌜䓦᥷̷喑

Ą̶᲎哆ąᩜᦾÿ᫲⍥͇᭜⮪哆喑㘽ᾆ

‫⌞ڒ‬ᆞ喑Вा̸̭͗Ⅱ೻‫ݺ‬㵹ȡ䕁͚᜾ᰫ

᱈Ɑ㶄̷⮱䓽⚑䒓ᲒᲒᒭᒭ喑ₑใ䔅㘪Ⳕ

ϔ͇᭜叱哆喑⚑◚䉥ᭀ݆᭜叾哆ȡѳ⩞λ

ౕ̭უ丽亳䕄⪆喑रγψ䅳㙽喑૊γ◦ઑ

㻮ใప⍥჏⮱䏘ᒞȡ‫܍‬㞅䪬↌⍥䒛᪡้։

๶㞯᭜᪡̶͗ሎౝࡧ⚑◚ϔ͇⮱͚ᓰౝ

䙿喑̻ࣵ丽亳⮱㔮Წহ㔮Წཅϑ䄵γ̭ч

䲍ౕ๶㞯⮱↌ᇥ喑ສ䃖᫲჏Йᰶᬣ䬡࣯㻯

ፓ喑Ό᭜ᄳϔ৮䓽ᒭጘᆞহ‫ڣ‬Ѓౝࡧ⮱‫ڠ‬

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⮪ፊ೻⮱ᏆႴȡ䮼ऻࣵᰶϧ䭳㐚䓴Გহ᜾

ऐ喑᝭Вᒀౝ⮱䉏ᩬᩣ‫ͨڒ‬㺮Გ㜗⚑◚ȡ

㷘⃺ϟ៞౽ౕ㛊̷ȡ

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᜾䔅ᰫౕ࣬೻⮱㶄̷㻮‫ݝ‬䓴‫܍‬䒳䰤‫ٸ‬㥕

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᫜喑ᘠᓲ೻͚ΌჇᰶψᬣ‫ࢇ⮱ڡ‬ᒖ౧᝭ȡ

䬛᜾喑Ą᜾जВևШ҂θᗲ喑℁ຯកម࢘

ཅ⮱㘽ᾆੳ䉖喑䔅ᰶ̭͗Ꭱ䕫⮱ᬍ͇

̻ጘᆞ̭ᵤ喑ౕ๶㞯हᵤ㘪ᙌऄ‫ݝ‬

⩌ȡ䔆䛹ϭ͵ጒ҉ᱧчΌ⇎ᰶȡą

ϧธ喑๡㘾㖗ᬻࢡ⌞ऄ⩌≨⮱ៅ⸕ȡₑϧ

ᒀౝℾ䷻⮱ψ䃥ᒗᖺȡ᜾ᰫाᒀౝ⮱̭͗

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ᒵᘠহ᜾㕷㕷͚ప⮱ࡨ㢜Ҁ‫ݣ‬হ侙‫ٸ‬ᕊͨ

‫⼌ܧ‬䒓थᱧ䄏䬛䔆䛹⮱∂⇨⟣ۢ喑Ѓఋ

Ą຦जВѼᵎ喑̺чᰶϭ͵䬛䷅

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ጞᒵᎡ䒨⮱ᬣՆᅞጟ̸ᇄ喑᝭В⇎ᰶ䔭о

এ喤ą᜾ᒵສ๴ȡĄᒵ็ϧក᳣䬦θȡą

⮱ȡą຦㶕⹧ȡ ᜾Ꭳ̺䊋᜽႖ၽ̻⃺ϟܳᐭ⮱և∂ȡ 䔆͗Ꭱ咱⮱႖〒ᅞᏁ䄒হ㜗ጞ⮱⃺ϟ⩌≨ ౕ̭䊤ȡ

䛾ȡᅪノ႖ၽЙ㘪㐆εЃ䉱ߖ喑ѳധ᱙̷ Ό̺᪏㟞䧞ȡ

᜾䔅ह̶͑͗ϧᣏ䃕γ⚑◚ϔ͇⮱ ែ䉱ᗲۢȡᢛ䄡ౕᒀౝᐭ䛴̭Ꮤ᫝⴬䰭㺮

㮪䄡๶㞯⮱᪡Ҁ䲏⼜㺮๔‫ܧ‬ጘᆞ䃥

㕄䉱̴ٰϧℾጮ喑͑Ꭱऻᅞ㘪㣤ᓄఋ

᜾ᄦ๶㞯ࣷᒀౝ⣜ධ࢝䆎ᰭ⌞⮱ౝ᫦

็喑ѳ᪡͗࣬೻ࢡ఍䪬䓫‫ڙ‬䛹⮱⇠ᇥ㔹᭫

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ĄϷᎡ䔆ᵤ⮱θᩲ➦‫็ݘ‬ȡą̭ऺຠ ၽा᜾䔼䱟ȡ

July 2013

67


T R AV E L J O U R N A L

;OLSHUKVMJOPSKYLU Graham Earnshaw was born in England and has been walking west from Shanghai across China since 2004, always starting each trip from exactly the last place he stopped. This month, we find him east of 'FOHKJFDPVOUZOFBS$IPOHRJOH By Graham Earnshaw

T

he valley heading westwards down toward Fengjie town was busy with trucks filled with coal heading for the Yangtze River, with empty trucks heading back into the mountains. Along the way, I passed through a number of small towns, all lively and prosperous in feel. The countryside, meanwhile, was in a pretty tortured state. The new freeway being built along the valley’s length was largely responsible for the mutilation, along with coal mines, gravel pits and some housing construction. I found a growing awareness amongst the farmers of the damage being done to the land. I asked one middle-aged man I met on the road what he did, and he replied: “I look after the planet.” It was his cute way of saying “I am a farmer”. One of the towns I passed through was called Stone Horse and in a little market where farmers were selling fruits, I asked about where the horse was. “It died,” replied one of the fruit sellers, and laughed at his own joke. The valley flattened out, and I came upon a body of water, an outcrop of the great Yangtze Reservoir. The houses above the water line were mostly recently constructed, but my impression was that most of the displaced farmers had been moved to the new and expanded county seat of Fengjie.

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July 2013

“The majority of people who were moved ended up poorer than they were before,” one man said. I passed the temple of Baidicheng on a hill, which has been one of the main attractions of the Yangtze Gorges for centuries. It has become an island. I had passed it nearly 10 years previously, before the waters rose. People said it had been completely rebuilt and was not interesting anymore, so I walked past the entrance bridge without going in. Just passed that bridge, however, was a very famous view – the view west into the entrance of the Kuimen Gorge on the Yangtze River, possibly the most beautiful of all the Gorges’ vistas. The bluish 10 RMB note, the most

ubiquitous of all China bank notes, features an image of the view, with the Baidicheng hill on the left, the perpendicular walls of the Gorge on the right, and a hook-like mountain in the background. It is magnificent, although of course not as deep and sheer as it once was. I spent some time talking to a lady and her younger son, age 14. The elder son was currently off on a threeyear stint with the army. I asked how much the son made as a soldier and the answer was: “Not much, maybe 500 rmb a month.” So why do it when there are ways to earn more money? “It disciplines them, builds character,” she replied. I asked where he was stationed and she said Fujian province.


“Protecting China from Taiwan businessmen?” I asked. I asked son number two what he would do when he left school, and the mother answered for him. “He is not very good at his studies, so I think the army would be best for him too.” Later the same day, I met another mother and son, the son being a talkative and slightly drunk truck driver in his early 30s who had also previously spent three years in the army. “Well, at least he learned how to drive,” said his mother. His truck was parked opposite the little shop where they were eating lunch, with me resting on the side sipping water. It was beat-up and filthy and fit perfectly into the scene. “Maybe I could drive it to England and work there,” he said with a laugh. Another man at the lunch table asked me about how long I had been in China, and we talked about the many changes that had occurred since the 1970s. “In the old days, we could not even sell an egg to anyone but the state,” he said. “But other things have not really changed at all.” I found such comments came up spontaneously much more frequently than in the past. The road wound down out of the mountains, and after several switchbacks reached a stream at the valley floor. I passed a government truck weighing post. I stood on the scale and asked the guy in the hut to tell me how much I weighed. “Sixty kilos,” he said. That was about right. He said they let all the trucks through whether they were overloaded or not but took a 30 RMB fine from every truck that was overweight. That was just about every truck

coming down out of the mountains, mostly loaded with coal. As I walked toward Fengjie town, the Yangtze River was once again visible. I kept touching it at the river towns, then being turned back into the mountains to get to the next river town. My walk was like a very slow rollercoaster ride. I sat for a while with a restaurant owner and his wife, ate some beancurd, and drank a little beer as we talked. The wife had a cute threeyear-old daughter on her knee. “Can I come to Shanghai to work in your company?” she asked. “I will do anything. I’ll be the cleaner. There is no work here at all.” What about your daughter? “She will be living in school, no problem,” she replied. I hated this approach of mother-child separation. Kids at this age should be together with their mothers. My dominant impression of Fengjie and its environs was children. Huge numbers of babies and very young children. There was a population boom in progress here for sure. Every family had at last two children, and sometimes even four. I had never seen anything like it anywhere in China. “The birth control policies are not strictly enforced here,” said one man, who happened to be a Communist Party member in his spare time. I sat at a street stall restaurant in Fengjie and watched the coal trucks passing by, and also a few foreign tourists. Some of the Yangtze tour boats stopped at Fengjie overnight to let the tourists see the temple of Baidicheng. Other people joined us, a couple who ran a knickknack store down the street, an orange trader who offered me a farm girl at a cheap price, and an

unemployed 50-years-old man who was smart but bitter at the way life had treated him. He wanted to talk about Chinese medicine and Marxism, but mostly to bemoan his fate. He had no pension, he said, because he had been laid off at too young an age. His kids gave him some help, but basically he said he survived by spending almost no money. I found the town of Fengjie to be a dispersed mess of a place straggling along around 10 km of river bank, including several bits of the old town that were above the new water line. It was much bigger than Wushan. A girl stopped to talk to me in a restaurant and asked, “Why would you come to a crap place like this?” I protested that it didn’t seem so crap to me. The center of the new Fengjie town was lively, and there appeared to be money around. People said the local economy was supported by three dragons – the white dragon of tourism, the yellow dragon of oranges and the black dragon of coal. But most of the money came from coal because Fengjie is the heart of the Gorges coal industry, sending barge after loaded barge down the river to Wuhan and beyond. Like Wushan, there was a slightly wild feeling about Fengjie. I asked a taxi driver about the law and order situation and he said: “Not so good.” In what way? “There are a lot of fights.” I discussed investment in the coal industry with a couple of people. But the uncertainties and risks of the business were also significant. The coal seams can run out suddenly, officials can turn hostile and mine shafts can collapse. “It’s been quite bad this year for accidents,” said one woman.

July 2013

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CO-SPONSORED INTER VIE W

Hotel Reservation Service new Beijing office starts operation HRS further endorses the concept of “travel cost management” in Northern China

H

otel Reservation Service (HRS) - one of the world’s largest hotel booking companies is expanding operations in China to provide companies with more ways to cut costs on travel arrangements. HRS opened a new Beijing office recently in the belief that China is on the way to becoming the world’s largest business travel market in 2015 and that the Northern China region has great market potential. Hotel Reservation Service (HRS) operates a global electronic hotel reservation platform, connecting business and leisure travelers with 250,000 hotels in over 180 countries. Headquartered in Germany, HRS provides online travel solutions to 35,000 corporate clients worldwide while also offering a new concept in distribution channel to hoteliers. Corporate customers get access to HRS’s tailor-made hotel reservation system with its business travel spending analysis. Available in 32 languages, the HRS system enables direct bookings to be made free of charge, with instant confirmation. HRS Beijing new office received positive feedback from the market. Several clients have continually expanded hotel spending through HRS on-line hotel bookings and travel cost management tool. The Beijing office team has also put great effort into the hotel network expansion, resulting in an increase of new signed hotels, such as Four Sea-

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July 2013

sons, Conrad and The Imperial Mansion. “Business travel expenditure surged by more than 20 percent in 2012 and will rise even more quickly this year,” Tobias Ragge, CEO of Hotel Reservation Service said. “We are committed to the further growth of the Chinese business travel market.” “We can cut costs for companies in China that work with us by up to 30 percent,” said Kimi Jiang, Managing Director Corporate Solutions, HRS Greater China. “Corporate clients can gain competitive hotel pricing on more than 250,000 hotels through HRS. HRS also provides data-driven travel cost analysis to travel managers, who can gain more visibility on business spending and find ways to minimize costs.” Ms. Jiang said HRS had identified two key trends in its business – the online model of hotel spending man-

agement and the growth of China as a source of global hotel bookings. HRS China has launched its online HRS Intelligent Sourcing Program, which supports corporate clients to identify cost saving opportunities in the hotel procurement process, optimize their hotel portfolio, and control travel costs. “Our strong background in data-driven cost analysis and state-of-the-art technology in this business provides us with the ability to launch new products to meet market demand,” she said. China’s business travel expenditure totaled $62 billion in 2010 and is expected to reach $277 billion in 2020, according to the World Travel and Tourism Council. China is currently the world’s second largest business travel market and it is predicted that China will overtake the United States to become the largest business travel market in 2015.


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Shanghai

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Shanghai

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Manchester Business School

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Guanghua Road, Chaoyang,

Part-time Global MBA

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PRC

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china.adecco.com

Hong Kong Office

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Shanghai

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800 Xiuyan Road, Kangqiao,

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July 2013

71


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Belvedere Service Apartments

Dongling, Shenyang City,

Shanghai

Beijing

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72

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HuaYuan World Square, North

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July 2013


Shanghai, China

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15/F One Corporate Avenue

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Regus China World Tower 3

222 Hubin Road

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4/F, Fuxing Commercial Building

No.1, Section 2, Renmin South

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139 Ruijin Road (No.1)

Road

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CHONGQING

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710 Dongfang Road

Pudong

Zhongshan District

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Shanghai

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