Perspectives 2014 EDITION
Beyond Poverty A Broader Development Agenda
a Publication of the SaiS international development Program
about thE Front CovEr PhotograPh Photographer: Jen Ottolino Location: Zanzibar, Tanzania Date: February 2014 “Low Tide” was taken on a beach on the Tanzanian island of Zanzibar. The beach is located near the fishing village of Nungwi, on the northeast side of the island, and like many beaches in Zanzibar, is noted for its powder-white sands, azure waters, and dramatic tidal flows, during which the sea recedes up to 1/2 mile, as shown in this picture. As the water recedes, it creates tidal pools speckled with seashells, starfish, and sea urchins. It also moors fishing boats and creates a giant promenade for the inhabitants of the island, including fishermen, and schoolchildren in white and blue uniforms.
Jen Ottolino graduated from SAIS in December of 2013 with a Master’s of International Public Policy. She also has a BA from Northwestern University and an MBA and Master’s of Health Sector Management from Arizona State University. She has worked for over 15 years in the public and private sectors of the health care industry in the United States and travelled to Latin America, Asia, Europe, and Africa. Currently, she is based in Moshi, Tanzania, where she volunteers with the Good Hope Support Organization and Tanzania NAFGEM, the Network Against Female Genital Mutilation. When not volunteering, she is exploring Tanzania’s national parks and beaches, discovering its rich cultural heritage, and practicing Swahili with the locals.
A Letter from the Editor
In synthesizing lessons learned since 2000, many are asking—What’s Next? This year’s SAIS Perspectives theme, Beyond Poverty: A Broader Development Agenda, invites authors to answer exactly this question. The publication is arranged by segment, commencing with articles that present suggestions for the next iteration of current MDG goals. Access to water and sanitation has improved significantly, however maintenance and replacement of infrastructure pose a persistent challenge. Rates of primary education enrollment have soared, but success is not translating into jobs opportunities for the world’s youth. The inclusion of specific groups in the MDG framework inadvertently highlighted the exclusion of others. Authors discuss the importance of formally integrating select vulnerable populations into the development agenda. With growing numbers of individuals uprooted by natural disasters and conflict, the education of refugee populations will pave the way for development in these regions. In the same vein, a lack of data on LGBT populations in developing countries hinders the identification of sources of impoverishment specific to this group. Written as a fifteen-year global plan, static goals have not been updated to include concerns that emerged post2000. The next phase of international planning opens the door to both the adoption of new agenda items, and to modernized and innovative approaches to problem solving. Here, our authors identify issues that have earned a deserved place in the development agenda, detailing the varying roles
of institutions in fragile states, and emphasizing the importance of energy access to the development process, in countries such the Central African Republic, Somalia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Haiti. A transition from a focus on poverty alleviation to sustainable development is the next premise for international development process. The last segment of the publication provides an overview of the current consensusbased negotiations on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which stem from the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development. Nineteen focus areas were identified by the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development, intended to build upon the momentum established by the MDGs. A difficult feat to reach global consensus, final decisions on the SDGs are yet to be determined. This year, our theme is unique in that it is time sensitive. The field of development is at a juncture, and as students, poising ourselves to jump into careers in this field, the discourse on “next steps” is particularly salient. Just as the UN’s World We Want platform called for global feedback on the post-2015 development agenda, SAIS Perspectives seeks to present the voices of SAIS students, faculty, and alumni in this conversation. As 2015 approaches, we will release our grip on the MDGs, and wait to see how the next phase of global collaboration unfolds. Hilary Kinka Editor-in-Chief March 2014 PersPectives
t is rare that an entire field reconsiders the overarching principles by which it operates. The expiration of the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015 presents this challenge to the international development community. The past fourteen years have been governed by eight universal goals, guiding the direction, funding, and measurement of international development projects globally. The year 2015 represents an immense opportunity to integrate lessons learned, identify and include previously left-out groups, and modernize the agenda with new, relevant concerns. The MDGs focused the world’s attention on extreme poverty and hunger, universal primary education, gender equality and the empowerment of women, health provision, and environmental sustainability. In a field where progress is often not evident for years down the line, or is all together intangible, global collaboration provided a lens through which success could be tracked and measured concretely. And yet, the international community is torn as to whether these markers are appropriate, arbitrary, or merely benchmarks. When measuring progress by MDG objectives, successes are numerous: Ecuador met seven of its eight targets, China dramatically reduced extreme poverty, and Burkina Faso successfully halted the spread of HIV/AIDS within its borders. However, using the same yardstick, failures, too, abound: Malawi experienced an escalation of maternal mortality, undernourishment rose in India, and in Jordan, access to safe drinking water declined.
Prioritization for a Developing Nation The development process has multiple factors— It’s a drama with roles for numerous actors. Economics is only one part of the game; Politics too can be partly to blame, When a country just stagnates and development slows, And social divisions can also deal blows! The environment, too, can not be ignored— As the rich nations grew, earth’s temperature soared! Without institutions the market can’t function. And, exports may drop at that critical junction That economists call the “mid-income trap”: Between low-wage and high-tech, they’re caught in a trap! And policies also must be gotten “right”— Both slumps and inflation, the central banks fight. From Rodrik at Harvard, to Levy at SAIS, Some experts hope that it could suffice To identify “crucial constraints” at each moment, And mitigate those, so that growth we can foment. Others contend that a full-court press Is needed to deal with the whole complex mess.
Acemoglu and Robinson write that they feel That rotten governance is the Achilles heel. Against corruption and clientelism the two of them rail— That’s the reason, they say, as to Why Nations Fail.
Those two gloomy guys may be on the right track— “Extractive” kleptocracies hold nations back As in Central Asia’s various “stans”, Where wealth all ends up in the ruling group’s hands, And in many poor countries where bureaucrats feel That a government job is a license to steal. But—massive corruption’s not an absolute barrier— Some countries grew fast while their thieves all grew merrier. To line their deep pockets, China’s “princelings” weren’t loathe, Yet the country attained high annual growth! As did Korea during its earlier take-off While corrupt officials a portion did rake off; And India’s growth (for a while) came to life, Though the people complain that corruption was rife. With so many factors, one’s often confused; One doubts that regressions can really be used To tell which factors actually dominate, So that we’d know which key ones to nominate. Today, what criteria can the experts now find To show where priorities should be assigned? The effort to find them usually ends With the conclusion: “It all just depends . . . .” — William A. Douglas IDEV Poet Laureate Emeritus January 2014
IN THIS ISSUE
Perspectives is published by students
in the International Development Program of the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. The continued success of Perspectives owes largely to the efforts of its
faculty and staff support, including: Cinnamon Dornsife Editorial Advisor Senior Associate Director International Development Program Mariett “Tina” Evangelista Program Assistant International Development Program Robin Washington Program Coordinator (starting March 2014) International Development Program Kisha Manning Program Coordinator (through February 2014) International Development Program
2014 EDITORIAL STAFF Hilary Kinka Editor-in-Chief IDEV, Global Health, 2014 Allison Carragher Senior Editor IDEV, Finance and Development, 2014 Julia Wallin Senior Editor IDEV, Human Development, 2014 Jenny Lu Editor IDEV, Trade and Development, 2015 Jacob Morrin Editor IDEV, Development Economics, 2015 Gregor Schueler Editor IDEV, Finance and Development, 2015
8 10 12 15 17 19 22 24 27
29 31 33 34
poem: Prioritization for a Developing Nation William A. Douglas
A Message from the Director Deborah Bräutigam Perspectives on the Future of Development Michael Plummer, Melissa Thomas, Adam Webb
The Elusive Quest for Water and Sanitation for All… Tanvi Nagpal and Mark Radin Youth Unemployment: An Issue We Can No Longer Afford to Overlook Seethal Kumar The Importance of Measuring the Distribution of Health Lauren Hartel The Forgotten and the Hard-to-Reach: Incorporating the Child Refugee Right to Education into the Post-2015 Agenda Irena Grizelj Addressing the Most Marginalized: Considering Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Development Post-2015 Mitchell Delaney LNG Imports: A Case Study in Developing Haiti’s Energy Sector Charlotte Blommestijn, Marina Grushin, Elodie Manuel Leveraging the Strength of the Private Sector in Increasing Governance: The Somali Case Amber Stewart The Role of Institutions in Development: Contemporary Debate and Application to Côte d’Ivoire’s Experience between 1960–1990 Ayso van Eysinga Institutions Before Elections in the Central African Republic Bill Gelfeld op -ed:
SDGs, the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the Challenges of Consensus Decision-Making Lynn Wagner book review: Aid on the Edge of Chaos by Ben Ramalingam Lauren Frederic
International Development Program Update Alumni Update
The views expressed in this magazine reflect the views of individual authors and are not the views of the International Development Program.
A Letter from the Editor Hilary Kinka
A Message from the Director
e live in a very different world from the one where the Millennium Development Goals were launched with great expectations nearly fifteen years ago. A war on terror pushed development and security into an uneasy alignment as foreign aid money rushed into Iraq and Afghanistan. We watched with excitement, and then disappointment, as a wave of democracy rose and fell in the Middle East, highlighting the key role for inclusive governance. Africa has been growing at record levels for more than a decade, but without much structural change, and with hundreds of millions lacking access to electricity. Perhaps most surprisingly, traditional donor-recipient relationships and agendas have been challenged by the stunning rise of finance from new sources with new agendas: foundations, global funds, Chinese policy banks, impact investors. It gives me great pleasure to introduce this new issue of SAIS Perspectives, with its focus on the global development agenda beyond 2015: what’s next after the Millennium Development Goals? Our contributors explore these issues through book reviews, interviews with SAIS experts, and articles on post-2015 topics, including the negotiation of the Sustainable Development Goals, the problem of weak government institutions in the CAR and Côte d’Ivoire, measuring inequality in health, how the Somali private sector succeeds in a governance vacuum, solving Haiti’s energy crisis, and the inclusion of leftout groups: child refugees, unemployed youth, the LGBT population.
Special thanks to the Editor-inChief of this year’s SAIS Perspectives, Hilary Kinka, and her talented editorial team: Ally Carragher, Julia Wallin, Jenny Lu, Jacob Morrin, and Gregor Schueler. Their hard work shows in the professionally produced and stimulating pages of this journal. Thanks are also due to Senior Associate Director Cinnamon Dornsife, who worked closely with the student team, ably supported by Kisha Manning, Tina Evangelista, and Robin Washington. SAIS Perspectives had its origins as a newsletter for the Social Change and Development and IDEV programs. We have had some exciting changes in IDEV. One of my goals coming in as the new Director was to establish a practicum program where second year students work with clients as consultants, under faculty supervision, in a year-long project that can involve field visits during the January intersession. Practitioner-in-Residence, Tanvi Nagpal, is our lead for the pilot practicum. For 2013–2014, three groups worked with clients in India, designing and implementing impact surveys and creating new management and fundraising plans for clients, including ReapBenefit, a young social enterprise focused on solid waste management in Bangalore’s schools, LV Prasad Eye Institute, and the Indian Institute for Emergency Medical Services. A fourth group is working with the Water and Sanitation program at the World Bank, developing business opportunities that provide sanitation solutions for the rural poor. We will be on the lookout for good practicum opportunities for the future. Let us know if you can use
a team of IDEV students to design an evaluation, set up a monitoring system, develop a social enterprise action plan, or otherwise put into practice what they are learning here at SAIS. I am also pleased to report that IDEV is in robust health. Applicant numbers continue to be very high, and we are able to offer admission to an exceptionally prepared and talented group. Our faculty works hard to offer academically rigorous, new courses at the cutting edge of our field: public-private partnerships; social entrepreneurship; impact investing. Our alumni network is going to be at the heart of our new outreach strategy: we hope to see alumni even more engaged as IDEV partners in teaching, researching, fundraising, internships, and the practicum. We continue to be blessed with generous donors— Bernard Schwartz (through the Bernard Schwartz Globalization Initiative, which funded our IDEV internships and events), the Starr Family Foundation (which funded this year’s practicum trip to India), Hope Simon Miller, Alan Fleischmann, Dafna Tapiero, the Ferris Family, and the donors of the Richard JJ Sullivan fellowship. I thank them for their support of IDEV, and I look forward to working with all of IDEV’s supporters as we continue to explore what’s next in international development.
Deborah Bräutigam March 2014 Washington, DC
Perspectives on the Future of Development The Perspectives editorial Team interviewed melissa Thomas (SAIS DC), michael Plummer (SAIS europe), and Adam Webb (SAIS Nanjing) on their thoughts regarding the post-2015 development agenda.
Q: The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), established by the United Nations in 2000, have guided international development for nearly 15 years. They primarily focus on poverty reduction, improvement of primary education, and the provision of basic health services. What do you think has been the greatest success in the field of development during this period? WEBB: Basic social indicators, including primary health care and primary education enrollments, have improved somewhat in many of the poorest countries. This has been made possible in part by somewhat better honed techniques for targeting these populations and getting results from limited resources, and an appreciation
Professor Michael G. Plummer is the ENI Chair of International Economics and incoming Director of SAIS Europe in Bologna, starting August 2014. He served as the Head of the Development
THOMAS: Donors like the World Bank point to a steep reduction in the numbers of people living in extreme poverty, and in some countries we can clearly see greater wealth and improved quality of life. The difficulty is determining the role of aid or the Millennium Development Goals in influencing change. If nothing else, the MDGs have provided a useful framework for discussion about development priorities. PLUMMER: If I had to name the one greatest success in the field of development, it would be the reduction
Division at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) between 2010 and 2012. He has more than 30 years of experience in academia, focusing on international trade, international finance, and economic integration, especially in the Asian context, and has published extensively in these areas. Adam K. Webb has been Resident Professor of Political Science at the Hopkins-Nanjing Centre since 2008. He is the author of Beyond the Global Culture War and A Path of Our Own: An Andean Village and Tomorrow’s Economy of Values. Webb’s intellectual interests range widely across globalization, political thought, and social movements, as well as engaging multiple regions of the world.
in absolute poverty—partly due to the fact that the MDGs were all correlated. Even with some exceptions (for instance, the rise in gender inequality), by and large most development goals— improvements in primary education, provision of basic health services, access to energy and water resources— can all be highly correlated with poverty reduction, which in turn is associated with increases in per capita income. I would take issue, however, with the assertion that the MDGs “guided” international development. The MDGs are used more as a yardstick, in the sense that they were a good benchmark for assessing where we have and have not made progress. Q: Were there any major failures during this period? If so, what were the causes? Are there lessons to be learned? THOMAS: There is a tendency to treat the MDGs as if they were technical targets; more, to treat them as technical targets that every country in the world is expected to achieve. If the MDGs are evaluated in this way— which I don’t think they should be— there were certainly failures. Many of the poorest countries failed to achieve MDG targets, particularly in SubSaharan Africa. Some may even have had gains that were very important in their own context but treated as failures because they did not achieve the arbitrary targets set by the MDGs. The MDGs do not address the difficult question of trade-offs. They are written as if all of these objectives are equally and simultaneously achievable. Yet for very poor countries with limited resources and capacities, hard choices are all they have. PLUMMER: The biggest failure is not yet having in place a comprehensive CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 6
Melissa Thomas, J.D., Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of International Development and has been teaching at SAIS for nine years. Her research focuses on the governance of neopatrimonial states and US foreign policy toward those states, aid worker security, and the aid industry. Her book, “Governing While Poor: Poor Governments and the Western Dilemma,” is forthcoming in 2015. Before joining SAIS, Professor Thomas worked as a governance specialist for aid donors in Africa, South America, and the former Soviet Union.
of how much can be done with relatively small amounts of funding. We should also not overlook the ability of primary commodity producers in Africa and Latin America to spend some of their increased revenues on social needs. Even if only some of the money from mining and gas extraction gets to the poorest, a little bit can go a long way.
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approach to environmental sustainability. On this issue, there is often a disconnect between the developed and developing world that would need to be addressed in any post-MDG agenda. This is a classic international public goods problem, but developing countries will bear the brunt of the consequences of global warming. There have been opportunities for dialogue, and these need to continue. We can only make progress by articulating correctly the costs associated with global warming, to both developed and developing countries, to make the case for action. WEBB: There has been very little attention to real empowerment of the world’s poorest. The MDGs tend to focus on the ability of the poor, in the aggregate, to fit into a very stratified world economy. They are seen as people with subsistence needs, or as potential consumers, or as potential bearers of skills that do or do not match the demands of the market. None of this is about giving the poor more control over their fate. The idea of a dignified independent existence, with a wider distribution of productive capital and the economic networks to make good use of it, gets short shrift in what remains, ultimately, a very technocratic vision of the world’s future.
Q: Is the emphatic discourse about institutions in development economics (evident also in this year’s issue of Perspectives) justified, or will it prove to have been just another fad in hindsight?
PLUMMER: The role of institutions is definitely very important and institutions can often explain why some countries are successful and others are not. If a country has poor governance, inefficient institutions, and significant corruption, enhancing
development will always be a challenge. So improving institutions is essential in the development process. But the term “institution” is a very broad term that can be interpreted in different ways. That being said, failure in the evolution of institutions remains one of the greatest constraints to development in my view. THOMAS: The main problem is that donors have set out to change institutions, but with no theory of institutional change and little power to change them. Donors keep trying to “mainstream” political economy analyses (an effort that has gone on for about twenty years), but the difficulty is that political economy analyses often do not yield actionable recommendations for donor operations. This is not a consequence of the irrelevancy of institutions or of political economy analyses, but instead of donor overreaching. Q: As we begin to outline a new set of goals for development, what should we be thinking about? Where should the focus be? THOMAS: The conversation that I would like to see going forward is one in which we take the constraints of poor governments more seriously. Poor governments have different options than rich ones, and this means that they govern less, and rely on cheaper strategies to govern, such as patronage and repression. The West has delegitimized these governance strategies but has not offered a feasible alternative for the poorest governments. This has created an illusion of consensus on issues related to governance and the role of the state, while strongly reducing the effectiveness of our engagement with low-income country governments. I make this argument in my book, Governing While Poor, slated for publication with Columbia University Press in 2015.
PLUMMER: Trade will be a very important part of the post-2015 developing agenda. Overcoming the impasse in a single undertaking at Doha reflects the maturity of the system, with a bigger role for developing countries within the global economy. Developing countries after a generation of liberalization are now quite dependent on movements in the global economy and have a bigger stake in it; they realize the great potential of the global economy and that they must be active participants in order to extract gains in the future. We are already seeing this deeper integration in Doha, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and I expect we will continue to see more of it and this will form a very important part of the post2015 development agenda. I believe the global economy will look very different in 2025: with more integrated trade and investment globally, including even least-developed countries, as modern industrial organization opens up new opportunities. WEBB: There needs to be a lot more hard thinking and vigorous public debate about the channels through which resources flow. As Benedict XVI’s encyclical, “Caritas et Veritate,” aptly pointed out some four years ago, one can distinguish the spheres of market, state, and charity. Each has its own logic. There is a lot of attention today to market and state—in effect, to profit and coercion—but very little to how the texture of life can be improved by resources flowing through civil society. This is partly because the world’s influential strata tend to think in terms of large flows of resources rather than cultivating well-ordered ways of life. It is also because, in many countries— including some that have grown very fast in recent years—a vibrant civil society, with more spontaneous organization by ordinary people, might CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 7
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inconvenience a technocratic vision of order and progress. Q: What one book would you suggest to our readers in order to better understand the future of development? PLUMMER: Even though I might not agree with all its arguments, the one book that does the best job in getting people to think about development is Development as Freedom by Amartya Sen. Everyone should read this book, if for nothing else, to get the mental juices flowing in terms of thinking about these key development issues from a broad point of view. Then perhaps my book, Economic Integration and Development: Has Regionalism Delivered for Developing Countries? (Just kidding.) THOMAS: The book on which I’ve been most focused recently is my own, Governing While Poor, which will be published in 2015. It argues that we must engage the actual structures of power in poor countries. In the governance domain, we have often let the perfect be the enemy of the good
or the better. For us to be effective, we must take the constraints of poor governments seriously and understand that their governance strategies cannot be the same as those of rich governments. WEBB: I’m not sure where I’d start to answer that. I might just be contrarian and suggest that there are some timeless classics that are always worth re-reading. Schumacher’s Small Is Beautiful and GK Chesterton’s Outline of Sanity, while decades old, still speak to some perennial issues of what scale of development we should emphasize and what values should guide it. Q: What advice would you give a graduating student preparing to enter the field of development? WEBB: Make a point of gaining experience in more than one sector and in more than one part of the world. Becoming too narrowly ensconced in one region or one type of development activity can rather limit one’s skill set, and make it harder to adopt best practices from anywhere. SAIS has a lot of potential to push people more in these emerging directions, given its engagements on multiple continents.
THOMAS: While not the only advice I would give to a graduating student, attention to personal safety is of growing importance in the field. We’re putting more money into conflict countries and more junior people are headed to these areas. Think about taking responsibility for your personal security in the field by developing practices of situational awareness, and learning to drive a stick shift, basic first aid, and local languages. Make sure that you stay in contact with someone who can help you if you get into trouble. PLUMMER: The most important thing is to build the set of tools needed to understand development: a good understanding of economics, statistics, and econometrics, and a grasp of the very wide dimensions of development. Languages are important, as well as studying more than one region; I fundamentally do not believe that one can really understand development in one region without the context of comparison to another. In my mind, studying countries and regions is essential because it provides an understanding of development as it has been applied in the real world.
perspectives on the future of development
Future of Development
the Elusive Quest for Water and sanitation for All… TANVI NAGPAL AND mARK RADIN
he quest for universal access to water and sanitation began with the United Nations Water and Sanitation decade from 1980 to 1990. At the beginning of the decade, 56 percent of the world’s population (1.826 billion people) lacked access to safe water and 54 percent (1.734 billion) lacked access to sanitation.1 While substantial gains were made throughout the decade, and access to safe water extended to 80 percent of the world, sanitation lagged behind, reaching only 60 percent.2 Challenges threatening the realization of universal access to water and sanitation became evident: steady population growth, financial and administrative constraints, and poorly maintained hardware investments, which resulted in premature disrepair and disuse of pumps and toilets. At the close of the decade, the policy and programming of the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) sector began to incorporate lessons learned from the prior ten years. In a 1992 assessment, Sandy Cairncross, a public health engineer, epidemiologist, and professor at the London School of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, commented on this transition:
The principal challenges of the next decade will not be technological questions—the hardware of water supplies and sanitation—but the software issues: How are water and sanitation programs to be organized and financed? How can people be trained, organized and motivated to install, use, and maintain the facilities?
Professor Tanvi Nagpal is an Associate Practitioner-in-Residence at SAIS and teaches in the International Development Program. Her research focuses on the water and sanitation sector, especially in urban areas, and she regularly advises foundations and non-government organizations that are active in international development.
How can institutions develop the sector further and make improvements more sustainable? These are the questions for the 1990s.3
As a result, the policy pendulum swung toward community-managed infrastructure. With the belief that community-designed and managed water systems would be more sustainable, international development agencies shifted partnerships from local government departments to nongovernment organizations that supported, organized, and trained rural communities. Communities were no longer viewed as “beneficiaries,” but rather owners of infrastructure. Accordingly, the design and distribution of simple-to-use and easy-to-maintain infrastructure grew in importance as rural communities became the primary managers of their systems. Additionally, these changes fostered a dialogue on the relative merits of increasing water quantity versus improving its quality, leading to a series of studies on measurable health impacts of water supply advancements. Donors and policy makers realized that safe water supplies would have to be combined with sanitation and hygiene to reduce parasitic infections, diarrhea and dysentery, and eye and skin diseases. When the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were announced in 2000, they incorporated fundamental lessons learned from prior decades. Goal 7, to ensure environmental sustainability, set a target to halve the proportion of people without access to an improved
Mark Radin is a second-year MA candidate in the International Development Program. He has experience working and studying in China, Zimbabwe, and Jordan, and is most interested in improving service delivery for water and sanitation in lowincome countries.
drinking-water source or sanitation facility by 2015. It acknowledged the importance of water quantity and quality, stressing the integration of sanitation into program mandates to achieve desired health outcomes. Investments in water and sanitation made sound economic sense; benefits could lead to economic returns averaging two to seven percent of national GDP. Progress toward meeting the MDGs is measured through national, regional and global surveys compiled by the Joint Monitoring Program (JMP), a program created by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The JMP defines an improved drinking-water source as “by nature of its construction or through active intervention, protected from outside contamination, in particular from contamination with fecal matter,”4 and an improved sanitation facility as “one that hygienically separates human excreta from human contact.” By these definitions, the MDG goal of halving the percentage of people without access to an “improved source of water” was achieved in 2010.5 Over 2 billion people gained access to “improved water sources and 1.8 billion gained access to improved sanitation.”6 These were remarkable achievements for the water sector. Unfortunately, the sanitation target is proving more difficult to meet, and the goal of halving the percentage of people without sanitation will not be met by 2015. Furthermore, both sustainability and the integration of sanitation and hygiene—two important challenges of the first water decade—remained unresolved. When assessed for long-term financial sustainability, it was recognized that, despite gains from 2000 to 2010, routine maintenance and infrastructure replacement had failed to be addressed. Instead of shifting focus to sustainability, donors continued to finance capital CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 9
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investments. Despite lessons to the contrary from the first water decade, an expectation that aid-recipients would cover operating and maintenance costs persisted. As governments decentralized, they delegated responsibilities to local and regional governments, which
and hygiene services in schools and health centers, sustainability of services, and increased equality of access. New challenges are on the horizon making it even harder to meet these new and ambitious targets. Rapid urbanization, for example, presents an immediate challenge, as existing infrastructure is unable to meet growing population needs. More urban poor lack
If international goals are partnered with intelligent implementation strategies, the elusive quest for universal water and sanitation access may become a reality. were often unable to levy the taxes or collect fees sufficient to cover routine operations and maintenance. Likewise, rural communities held responsible for their own infrastructure proved unwilling or unable to finance long-term maintenance, repair, and replacement. Increasing sanitation coverage was met with similar challenges. Despite millions of dollars spent to create demand for sanitation—incorporating both behavior change interventions and encouragement of sanitation businesses—large parts of Africa and South Asia will not meet the MDGs before 2026.7 Consultations on the post-2015 WASH agenda began in 2011, and important policy goals were identified. Universal priorities for the next iteration of the MDGs were developed and recommended by the WHO and UNICEF. These included the elimination of open defecation, universal access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities, provision of proper sanitation
services than ever before.8 Infrastructure challenges come in the context of deep and widening income disparities both within urban areas and between urban and rural populations. While services may improve for those who can pay, a growing number of poor in urban slums or secondary towns have seen little to no progress. Continued urbanization will challenge governments to find and implement innovative pro-poor service delivery models. The global focus on improved access to important services, which began in 1980, evolved over thirty years to become more data-driven, specific, and pro-poor. The WASH sector has learned invaluable policy lessons, which are reflected in the recommendations for the post-2015 goals. International goals and targets establish universal visions, meant to inspire action. To achieve the change they espouse, such goals will require strong local institutions that can resolve long-standing challenges in service delivery: transparent
accountability mechanisms, rigorous monitoring, and accounting for long-term costs. New technologies and solutions to reduce water and energy waste must be explored and scaled. Likewise, national training programs for engineers, financial planners, community health workers, and other professionals will be critical to overcome current human resource deficits. If international goals are partnered with intelligent implementation strategies, the elusive quest for universal water and sanitation access may become a reality. Endnotes 1. Carter, R, S.F. Tyrell and P. Howsam. “Lessons Learned from the UN Water Decade.” Water and Environment Journal 7:6 (1993): 646–650. 2. WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation. “Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report.” 2000. http://www.unicef.org/wash/files/gafull.pdf.
the elusive quest for water and sanitation for all …
Water and Sanitation
3. Cairncross, Sandy. “Sanitation and Water Supply: Practical Lessons from the Decade.” Water and Sanitation Discussion paper Series Paper No. 9 (1992). 4. WHO / UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation. “Introduction.” Accessed February 3, 2014. http://www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/ introduction/. 5. UN Department of Public Information. “We Can End Poverty Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015.” 2013. http://www. un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Goal_7_fs.pdf. 6. Ibid. 7. UN Water, n.d. “Access to Sanitation.” Accessed February 25, 2014. http://www.un.org/ waterforlifedecade/sanitation.shtml. 8. The number of people un-served by improved sanitation in urban areas grew by 183 million between 1990 and 2010, and those using unimproved water sources grew by 21 million. Data from UNICEF and WHO (2012) Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012 Update.
Youth unemployment AN ISSUe We CAN No LoNGeR AFFoRD To oVeRLooK Seethal Kumar
n many developing countries, youth unemployment is more than a lost salary. It generates personal insecurity and frustration. It can delay the milestones of entering adulthood, such as financial independence and marriage. At its worst, it has the potential to spark political unrest and destabilization. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provided a laudable first step in instituting universal primary education, but to make educational goals sustainable, this needs to translate into employment and financial stability. Developing nations struggle to provide opportunities for their youth populations, which disproportionately affects young men due to cultural norms that require men to marry and provide for their spouses, children, parents, and sometimes extended relatives. A growing number of young men are unemployed or inactive, unable to start families, and at risk for social exclusion because they cannot find jobs. We can no longer afford to overlook this issue, as these young men provide a recruiting base for political movements, gangs, and even extremist groups, which heightens the risk of political protest and violence. Education at the Root of Youth unemployment
Many countries are on track to achieve, or are making significant strides toward, the MDG target for universal primary
Seethal Kumar is a first-year MA candidate in the International Development Program. She has experience working for a transfer pricing consulting firm and for the US government. This summer, she plans to continue working for the US government as a Middle East economic analyst.
school enrollment, however this does not necessarily translate into improved educational outcomes. Many public schools provide a substandard quality
for men. Unemployment is likely to disproportionately affect young men because of traditional views of men as the sole breadwinners. Young men who
Many studies focus on how low-quality education and limited job opportunities reduce a woman’s independence, but the same fate often carries greater stigma for men. of education and suffer high teacher absenteeism. Studies in Africa and South Asia show that children who have attended government schools through fourth or fifth grade lag far behind their private school peers, often struggling to write a single paragraph or use basic math.1 Additionally, many countries have limited enrollment capacity in national colleges, which excludes students who have a desire for higher education but whose families are not wealthy enough to send them abroad.2 The accumulated impact of low-quality education leaves a substantial number of young adults inadequately prepared for the job market. Even those who do receive a college education may lack the practical skills needed on the job due to a mismatch between curricula and employer needs. Due to youth bulges in the population and a higher proportion of women seeking employment, the number of entrants into the job market is also higher than it has been historically. Job growth in developing countries has not kept pace with growth in the labor pool, which often leads to prolonged or chronic unemployment.3 Consequences of unemployment for Young Men
Many studies focus on how low-quality education and limited job opportunities reduce a woman’s independence, but the same fate often carries greater stigma
lack employment options are frequently forced to depend financially on aging parents and to delay marriage; they are often socially ostracized for their inability to start families and integrate into society as adults.4 Employment obstacles faced by young males are fueling their frustration with their communities and governments, putting them at greater risk of engaging in criminal activities, abusing drugs, or being recruited into extremist groups. The uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in 2011 were triggered by high national unemployment, and a dearth of economic opportunities, which subsequently erupted into frustrations regarding religious divides and dictatorial rule. Prior to the Arab Spring, youth unemployment in the Middle East was the highest in the world; it was estimated to be as high 30 percent in 2013, and continues to rise.5 Studies have linked high youth unemployment to drug abuse in countries such as Tanzania and Iran.6 A UN study of sexual violence in six Asia-Pacific countries found that one of the main motivations of assault on women by men was boredom or a need for entertainment.7 In Latin America, nearly 20 percent of youth can be described as idle—neither working nor attending school—which is strongly correlated with increases in violence.8 Latin America has seen an uptick in violence committed by and against young CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 11
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people; the five countries in the world with the highest youth murder rates are all in this region. Globally, idle young men are easier recruits for extremist and militant organizations, especially if the organization educates the youth or pays for work, providing opportunities that local governments are unable to offer.9 Due to years of war, governments in conflict countries notoriously promote militarism among young boys with the view that soldiers are more valuable than educated professionals. A Way Forward
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 cited persistent youth unemployment as a worrying trend and discussed job development through infrastructure projects, sustainable development and green jobs, and support to existing small-to-midsize private enterprises—positions that often require education beyond primary school.10 As ambitious as the MDG to achieve universal primary education was, creating employment that matches the skills and size of the labor market is likely to be even more challenging. Strategies for the improvement of employment include:
may otherwise be malnourished and struggle to maintain energy levels and concentration throughout the school day.11 • Vocational Training: NGOs and outside experts can offer vocational training for jobs that are in continuous demand, such as nursing and healthcare.12 Additionally, training in urban areas should focus on computer literacy—a skill often not taught in schools in developing countries that could help young adults market themselves to employers. • Enhancing Public Services: Governments of developing countries—with the help of multilateral organizations or NGOs— could improve and expand public sector jobs.13 • Encouraging Private Sector Growth: Governments of emerging market countries can expand private sector opportunities by privatizing large state-run businesses and allowing foreign companies to enter jointventures. Additionally, loosening restrictive tax laws and red tape for start-up businesses could encourage greater formal sector participation and shrink the size of the informal sector.14 Youth unemployment is not merely
As ambitious as the MDG to achieve universal primary education was, creating employment that matches the skills and size of the labor market is likely to be even more challenging. an economic or human development issue. The consequences of chronic unemployment and idleness among young men have societal and political repercussions that will not be quieted by empty promises of future employment. In an increasingly globalized world where labor and technology flow fluidly across borders, governments cannot just replicate old models of increasing employment through low skill job creation. Technology is quickly replacing
Endnotes 1. See Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty. New York: Public Affairs, 2011, 75–88; Tooley, James and Pauline Dixon. “Private Education is Good for the Poor: A Study of Private Schools Serving the Poor in LowIncome Countries.” The CATO Institute (2005): 23–35. http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ pubs/pdf/tooley.pdf. 2. See Wang, Li. “Social Exclusion and Inequality in Higher Education in China: A Capability Perspective.” International Journal of Educational Development 31 (3) (2011): 277–286; Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad. “Intense Competition for University Admission Drives Families to Stress and Education Policies to Reform.” The Brookings Institution. 2007. http://www.brookings.edu/research/ opinions/2007/12/21-youth-salehi-isfahani; Lee, Jiyeon. “South Korean students’ ‘year of hell’ culminates with exam day.” CNN. November 13, 2011. http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/10/world/ asia/south-korea-exams. 3. World Bank. “World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation,” (2006): 68–114. 4. See Dhillon, Navtej. Interviewed by Now, “The Middle Eastern Marriage Crisis.” Now. PBS, July 11, 2008; Gale, Faye and Stephanie Fahey. “Youth in Transition: The Challenges of Generational Change in Asia.” UNESCO (2005): 28–29. 5. See Kadri, Ali. “The Arab Spring and the ‘Unemployment Trap.” Center for Global Research. December 15, 2011; United Nations Development Programme. “Arab Human Development Report: Arab Spring: Demographics in a region in transition.” UNDP (2013). 6. See “Drug addiction in Iran: The Other Religion.” The Economist, August 17, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-eastCoNTINUeD oN PAGe 12
• Improving Education: Governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can work to better train teachers, increase the teacher to student ratio, and monitor schools to ensure that teachers are present, and encouraging analytic thinking rather than rote memorization. NGOs in India and Kenya have successfully increased student enrollment and attendance by providing free lunches in schools to low-income students who
many labor-intensive jobs that require employees to read and write fluently, think analytically, and use computers—all of which require secondary education. As long as there is a mismatch between what employers seek and the skills—or lack thereof—that jobseekers have, inequality and unemployment will only worsen. The MDGs shed light on the need to improve quality of health, access to primary education, and other living standards in developing countries to help children reach adolescence. Now it is time for the dialogue to look forward and address the needs of youth: better education, job opportunities, and social integration.
Youth unemployment CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 11
and-africa/21583717-why-so-many-youngiranians-are-hooked-hard-drugs-other-religion; Msigwa, Robert and Erasmus Fabian Kipesha. “Determinants of Youth Unemployment in Development: Evidences from Tanzania.” Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 4:14 (2013): 67–76; World Bank. “World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation,” (2006): 123–125. 7. Fulu, E. et al, eds. “Why Do Some Men Use Violence Against Women and How Can We Prevent It?” UNDP (2013).
8. Salazar-Xirinachs, José Manuel. “Generation Ni/Ni: Latin America’s Lost Youth.” America’s Quarterly (Spring 2012). 9. Winthrop, Rebecca and Corinne Graff. “Beyond Madrassas: Assessing the Links Between Education and Militancy in Pakistan.” The Brookings Institute Center for Universal Education (2010): 21–34. 10. United Nations. “Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.” (2012). 11. Upton, David et al, eds. “Akshaya Patra: Feeding India’s Schoolchildren.” Harvard Business School (2007); Bundy, Donald et al, eds. “Rethinking School Feeding: Social Safety Nets, Child Development, and the Education Sector.”
The World Bank and World Food Programme (2009). 12. International Labor Organization. “The Youth Employment Crisis: A Call for Action.” ILO (2012): 7–9. 13. Coenjaerts, Claudia et al, eds. “Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Employment.” OECD (2009): 122–123. 14. Jütting, Johannes and Juan de Laiglesia. “Dealing with Informal Employment: Towards a Three-Pronged Strategy.” In Is Informal Normal? Towards More and Better Jobs in Developing Countries, edited by Johannes Jütting and Juan de Laiglesia, 147–151. Development Center of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2009.
the Importance of Measuring the Distribution of health lauren hartel
ew topics are as challenging to the study of economics as health care. Health is double-counted as a commodity and a human right and fails the main conditions of a perfectly competitive market. It is also intimately entwined with philosophical questions that economists are frequently unable to answer satisfyingly, such as how to value a life.1 As unappealing as this makes health to economists, they cannot help but encounter it in their studies. Not only is health a crucial element of individual and population welfare, but it also has direct impacts on local and national economies by affecting labor efficiency and consumer market participation. In the past half-century, health economics as a subject has grown substantially. Yet, economic analysis of
Lauren Hartel is a first-year MA candidate in the International Development Program, currently studying in Bologna, Italy. Previously, she worked as a consultant on patient flow optimization, implementing datadriven capacity management solutions for hospitals and hospital systems across the US. After SAIS, she hopes to work in healthcare system strengthening.
health distribution in and of itself— particularly in developing countries— remains nascent. The few studies that exist tie health to other socioeconomic variables such as income or income inequality, confounding the examination of health distribution. The United Nations’s health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) also neglect health inequality.2 Instead of recognizing health equality as a means to eradicating extreme poverty, the goals focus on increasing specific health outcomes, such as child and maternal mortality, and the spread of communicable diseases. While these measures are certainly useful, they are not sufficient on their own. When Max Lorenz created the first curve measuring income inequality, he argued that no matter how income distribution is valued, the importance of knowing the distribution in the first place is undeniable. This logic easily extends to healthcare: no matter one’s view on the benefits of equal health distribution, it must be agreed that the distribution itself is worth examining. The proposed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), should therefore include measures of health distribution in addition to absolute health measures. One such measure can be created in the form of a Health Inequality Index (HII), presented herein—the first attempt at directly
quantifying inequality of health burden. The HII uses World Health Organization (WHO) indicators to calculate Gini coefficients for health burden inequality, and to create modified Lorenz Curves to be combined into Overlaid Health Lorenz Curves (OHL curves). To better understand the meaning of a health burden distribution, it is helpful to follow an approach similar to that of data scientists at the University of South Florida3, who build upon the work of inequality measurement by Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett.4 Equation 1 illustrates a nation-state’s population N, with fi denoting the number of citizens of the nation-state. It illustrates the overall health burden of a nation H as a sum of each individual’s share of the health burden hi. N
∑ f h = H i
In a nation-state experiencing perfect equality, each individual would bear an equal share of the health burden (Equation 2). Often this equal share is the expectation ei of an individual (Equation 3). Therefore, the inequality I is the difference between the expected health burden and the actual health burden (Equation 4). CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 13
tABLE 1: GLOBAL hEALth BuRDEN INDICAtORs
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health Burden Indicator
life expectancy and mortality
Infant mortality rate—probability of dying between birth and age one per 1,000 live births
_ 3. ei = h
Cause-Specific mortality and morbidity
maternal mortality per live 100,000 births
Selected Infectious Diseases
tuberculosis—new and relapsed cases
4. ei – hi = I
health Service Coverage
Births not attended by skilled health personnel (%)
Children aged < 5 years who are underweight (%)
lack of physicians per 100,000 individuals
1 — 2. N
∑ h = h i
Alker’s work on inequality focused on the distribution of a single value. Health, however, is extremely multifaceted, and must be dissected into smaller pieces. Here, six global health indicators published by the WHO are used as a proxy for the composite nature of health. The indicators describe overall health burden H as a function of life expectancy and mortality L, cause-specific mortality and morbidity M, selected infectious diseases D, health service coverage C, risk factors R and health systems S (Equation 5).5 5. H = f(L,M,D,C,R,S) In reality, it is impossible to define the function f describing how these variables together produce an individual’s overall health. Herein, overall health is defined as the summation of the six factors at the population level in Equation 6 (and at the individual level in Equation 7). While this is an approximation of the true relationship, it provides a useful starting point for analysis, and allows us to see potential relationships between these variables that would otherwise be hidden.
The purpose of a Lorenz Curve is to visualize the difference between the ideal distribution and the actual distribution of a given value or commodity across a population. In the case of the OHL Curves, a 45 degree line indicates an equally distributed health burden, ∑Ni=1 fiei, while a second line shows the actual distribution of the health burden ∑Ni=1 fihi. The area between these two lines—constituting inequality—is then quantified as a Gini coefficient. This
number ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 corresponding to perfect equality, and 1 representing complete inequality. Turning to an example of how the HII can be utilized, Figure 1 displays a model of OHL curves for Western Africa.6 It immediately reveals some overarching characteristics of the regional health status. The most equally distributed health indicators are easily identifiable as those closest to the line of equality. Health
the importance of measuring the distribution of health
Distribution of health
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FIGuRE 1: OvERLAID hEALth stAtus LORENz CuRvE FOR WEstERN AFRICA
6. H = L+M+D+C+R+S 7. hi = li+mi+di+ci+ri+si
∑ f ( l +m +d +c +r +s =H i
Combining the original definition of a nation’s health burden (Equation 2) with its dissection at the individual level (Equation 7), it can be rewritten as Equation 8. This final equation is the foundation from which to create a national OHL Curve that illustrates national health burden distribution.
the importance of measuring the distribution of health
Distribution of health CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 13
Service Coverage, for example, has the smallest area of inequality, with the lower
Because these measurements are anonymous and exhibit scale and population independence, the Health Inequality Index remains accurate and applicable to any health distribution
[N]o matter one’s view on the benefits of equal health distribution, it must be agreed that the distribution itself is worth examining. 50 percent of the population having only a mildly disproportionate share (58 percent) of the births unattended by skilled health personnel. Conversely, Selected Infectious Diseases has the most unequal distribution with the lower 50 percent of the population carrying approximately 80 percent of the disease burden. The OHL Curves also highlight where in the population inequality is highest. For example, there is a slight “bump” in inequality between the 50th and 60th percentiles of the population for Health Systems and Selected Infectious Diseases. This raises important research and policy questions: What is it about Health Service Coverage, Risk Factors, and Life Expectancy & Mortality that cause their distributions to be so similar? What causes the middle class to be at increased risk for unequal Health Systems and Selected Infectious Diseases burdens? What programs are being implemented or have been implemented in the recent past that may affect these distributions? Such questions are essential in working towards the eradication of extreme poverty and the HII produces the data practitioners need to raise and address them. Moreover, by providing Gini coefficients for each indicator, the HII also facilitates goal-setting and crosspopulation comparisons. Since the data collection of the WHO provides the opportunity to calculate Lorenz Curves and Gini coefficients for each of over 80 health metrics that comprise the six global health indicators, the HII can present a detailed hierarchy of metrics covering all aspects of health.
in any size economy or population. Therefore OHL curves and Gini coefficients are particularly useful in evaluating developing countries, where health communities vary in size from multinational regions (such as malaria hot zones) to villages and neighborhoods, and where geographical barriers often prevent the implementation of health programs over a large population. Of course, the methodology has limitations. In order for the health inequality index to be fully functional, a large amount of data is needed, however collection is often challenging in developing countries. Additionally, even though the data in the health inequality index can be viewed in real-time, certain health outcomes (such as malnutrition) take years, even generations, to manifest in the data. The index’s potentially greatest limitations, however, are the distortion produced in the aggregation process, and the approximation of the health burden function in Equation 7. This Health Inequality Index proposal should therefore not be considered complete. Instead, it forms a basis upon which other researchers may expand. Future studies should focus on enhancing the formula for health burden measures, and optimizing the use of data, and explore the possibility of reintroducing socioeconomic factors to see how inequality of health impacts other aspects of life. Too often health equality is excluded from the study of health economics. This is unfortunate because it is not until the distribution of health across a
population is thoroughly examined and understood that it becomes possible to identify and execute efficient policies. For this reason, the proposed HII could significantly strengthen the utility of the SDG framework, and would help bridge the gap between scholarly research and application by practitioners. If the HII was incorporated into the SDGs, academics could continue to question and refine the theoretical framework behind the index while practitioners developed the application of the index into something truly relevant to fieldwork. Through this dual evolution, major strides can be made in the analysis of causes, characteristics, and implications of health inequality. Endnotes 1. Many economists have been criticized for attempting to quantify life. In the Affordable Care Act in the United States, cost-effectiveness analysis using quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) is forbidden because of the political sensitivity to assigning monetary values to health outcomes (Health Affairs, 2010). 2. United Nations. “Millennium Development Goals Indicators,” Effective January 15, 2008. http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host. aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm. 3. Berndt, Donald J., John W. Fisher, and Rama V. Rajendrabab. “Measuring Healthcare Inequities using the Gini Index.” Presented at the 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Waikoloa Village January 6–9, 2003. 4. Alker, Hayward R. and Bruce M. Russett. “On Measuring Inequality.” Behavioral Science 9(3) (1964): 207–218. 5. See Table 1. 6. This is used solely to show the abilities of the overlaid curves, and not to assess the health trends of Western Africa, as at present the poor data quality does not permit this. Data comes from the World Health Organization’s Data Repository World Health Statistics. http://apps. who.int/gho/data/node.main.1?lang=en. The model includes data from 2005-2007, although due to lack of availability, some data dates back as far as 2003. Western Africa is defined as Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
the Forgotten and the hard-to-Reach INCoRPoRATING THe CHILD ReFUGee RIGHT To eDUCATIoN INTo THe PoST-2015 AGeNDA Irena GrIzelj
We’re not being educated, and without education there is nothing. We’re heading towards destruction. — 14-YEAR-OLD SYRIAN REFUGEE IN IRBID, IRAQ1
reviously the second largest host country of refugees, Syria is now producing one of the largest refugee exoduses in recent history. Since the conflict within its borders escalated in early 2011, over 2.5 million people, half of them children, have fled Syria.2 Displaced from their homes, Syrian school-age refugee children are more likely to be out of school than in, frequently for years.3 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) 1951 International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which 144 countries are signatories, every refugee child has a legal right to education.4 Unfortunately, many do not receive it, threatening their future livelihoods and the stabilization of their home states.5 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have mobilized international action “to achieve universal primary education” by 2015. This target, however, has neglected the education of vulnerable displaced children and failed to address the quality of the schooling they receive. By paying greater attention to education for refugee children in the post-2015
Child Refugee Right to Education
Children have a legal right to education under international law. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), derived from the principles of the Universal Declaration
fallen significantly from 1.91 billion in 1990 to 1.22 billion people in 2010, it is estimated that for the first time in history the majority of the world’s poor will soon live in fragile and conflict-affected states.9 This is not limited to low-income countries; today close to half of fragile states are middle-income countries, including Pakistan, Côte d’Ivoire, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.10 Education is a means for individuals to escape from
the increasing number of refugee and displaced children demands a change in the approach to the post-2015 agenda. of Human Rights (UDHR), is the first legally-binding international instrument endorsing children as rights-bearers.6 It was universally ratified by 1990 and incorporates the full range of human rights—civil, cultural, economic, political, and social—to safeguard children against vulnerability, and to acknowledge the rights to which they are entitled, including the right to education. A decade later, the world community reaffirmed these rights to refugee children. At the World Education Forum held in Dakar in 2000, the world’s education ministers endorsed the CRC principles and pledged to “meet the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities, and instability.”7 One outcome was the creation of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) that sets minimum standards for education in emergencies. Prior to the INEE, no basic standard for education in emergencies existed.8 Global shifts in the geography and context of poverty make the issue of child refugees’ right to education especially pertinent. Although the total number of people living in extreme poverty has
or prevent the fall into poverty. At a societal-level, it is inextricably linked to the stabilization of conflict-affected countries, as it helps children find employment as adults and contribute to their communities as constructive citizens.11 Notably, “it is the refugees with an education, above all, who provide leadership during displacement and in rebuilding communities recovering from conflict.”12 The shift of the poverty ratio towards conflict-affected countries demands that education for refugee children be incorporated into long-term development goals. Issues with Millennium Development Goal Approach to Emergency Education
The MDGs have played an invaluable role in promoting child access to education. Between 2000 and 2011, the number of children out of school declined by almost half, from 102 million to 57 million. Despite these promising gains, the decline has slowed considerably since 2008, and the target CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 16
Irena Grizelj is a first-year MA candidate, concentrating in Conflict Management. Prior to SAIS, she interned with Search for Common Ground in Zanzibar, reaffirming her motivation to work on child protection and child rights issues in emergency contexts.
agenda, we can simultaneously improve the future welfare of individuals, and that of fragile societies worldwide.
the forgotten and the hard - to - reach
the Forgotten CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 15
of universal primary education will not likely be met by 2015.13 Several further issues arise regarding the approach of the MDG for universal primary education. One major criticism regards the emphasis on the number of children completing primary education, which means that the children easiest to reach have had the greatest opportunities, while the most vulnerable and marginalized groups have been left behind.14 Focusing on the quantity of children in school has also failed to address the quality of education outcomes. Just because they are in school does not mean that children are learning. India, for example, has made great improvements in primary school enrollment, increasing it by 16 million between 2002 and 2009.15 Despite these improvements, India’s Annual Status of Education Report (2010) highlighted that the overall quality of education in India had deteriorated.16 If children are not learning, then higher enrollment rates have little meaning.17 Finally, though the MDGs derive inherently from the UDHR, the right to education guaranteed in the CRC and reinforced by INEE standards, is neither mentioned nor implied in the MDGs. As the CRC is the only legally-binding treaty addressing children’s right to education, a child-rights approach to education in the post-2015 agenda could ensure both the quality of education and the inclusion of the most vulnerable children.
Moving Beyond 2015
The increasing number of refugee and displaced children demands a change in the approach to the post-2015 agenda. Not only are these children being deprived of a fundamental human right, they represent a significant population which the MDGs have left behind. For refugee children, the importance of a quality education is equated to that of nourishment, shelter, and health
services.18 Education can equip children with the skills, knowledge, and capacities to realize other fundamental rights as adults. At a societal-level, education is inextricably linked to the stabilization of conflict-affected countries19 where poverty rates are rising. By utilizing a child-rights approach in the post-2015 development agenda that focuses on quality of education and inclusion of marginalized displaced children, we can better the futures of refugee children, and thus fragile states, worldwide. Endnotes 1. Quote from 14-year-old Syrian refugee in Irbid, Iraq in UNHCR. “The Future of Syria: Refugee Children in Crisis.” November, 2013. 52. https:// s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/unhcrcampaigns/ childrensreport/Future-of-SyriaUNHCR-v13. Pdf: 52. 2. Save the Children, UNICEF, UNHCR, and World Vision. “Syria Crisis: Education Interrupted.” December 13, 2013. 3. UNICEF, UNHCR, Save the Children, World Vision Joint. “Syria Crisis: Education Interrupted—Global action to rescue the schooling of a generation.” December 13, 2013. 4. UNHCR States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html. 5. World Bank. “Stop Conflict, Reduce Fragility, End Poverty” May 2013: http://www.worldbank. org/content/dam/Worldbank/Feature%20Story/ Stop_Conflict_Reduce_Fragility_End_Poverty. pdf. 6. UNICEF. “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” http://www.unicef.org/crc/. 7. World Education Forum, Dakar, Senegal Report. “Education For All: Meeting Our Collective Commitments.” 26-28 April 2000. http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/fr/ed_for_ all/dakfram_eng.shtml. 8. Anderson, Allison, Jennifer Hofmann and Peter Hyll-Larsen. “The Right to Education for Children in Emergencies.” International Humanitarian Legal Studies 2 (2011): 84–126. http:// www.ineesite.org/uploads/files/resources/ RTE_ article_Anderson_Hofmann_Hyll-Larsen. pdf. 9. See World Bank. “Poverty Overview.” http:// www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/ overview; Kharas, Homi. and Andrew Rogerson. Horizon 2025: Creative Destruction in the Aid Industry, Overseas Development Institute, 2012; Chandy, Laurence and Geoffrey Gertz. “Poverty in Numbers: The Changing State of Global Poverty from 2005 to 2015.” The Brookings Institution. 2011.
10. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). “Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind: 2013 Factsheet on Resource Flows and Trends.” OECD 2013. http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/ FragileStates2013.pdf. 11. “Ending Extreme Poverty Hinges on Progress in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations.” The World Bank Feature Story. April 30, 2013. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/ feature/2013/04/30/ending-extreme-povertyhinges-on-progress-in-fragile-and-conflictaffected-situations. 12. UNHCR. “Education: A Basic Right for a Better Future.” http://www.unhcr.org/ pages/49c3646cda.html. 13. United Nations. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2013. http://www. un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/report-2013/mdgreport-2013-english.pdf. 14. See Tomaševski, Katarina. “Human rights obligations: making education available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable.” Right to education primers No. 3. Raoul Wallenberg Institute and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency: 2001, 43. http://www.right-to-education.org; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “Claiming the Millennium Development Goals: A human rights approach.” New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2008. http:// www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/ Claiming_MDGs_en.pdf; United Nations. “Post-2015 Global Thematic Consultation on Education Summary Report of the e-Discussion on Equitable Access to Education.” February 1, 2013. www.worldwewant2015.org/file/305744/ download/332027. 15. “Elementary education in India: quality or quantity?” East Asia Forum, December 25, 2012. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/25/ elementary-education-in-india-quality-orquantity/. 16. ASER. “Annual Status of Education Report (Rural) 2010.” January 2, 2011. http://www. pratham.org/aser08/ASER_2010_report.pdf. 17. INEE. “The right to education in emergencies.” http://www.ineesite.org/en/ education-in-emergencies/right-to-education. 18. Sinclair, Margaret. “Education in Emergencies.” Commonwealth Education Partnerships. Commonwealth Secretariat, 52–56. Cambridge: Nexus Strategic Partnerships Limited. 2007. 19. “Ending Extreme Poverty Hinges on Progress in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations.” The World Bank Feature Story. April 30, 2013. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/ feature/2013/04/30/ending-extreme-povertyhinges-on-progress-in-fragile-and-conflictaffected-situations.
Addressing the Most Marginalized CoNSIDeRING SexUAL oRIeNTATIoN AND GeNDeR IDeNTITy IN DeVeLoPmeNT PoST-2015 mItChell Delaney
n increased focus on legal recognition for same-sex couples has taken place all around the world. The first legal recognition of samesex couples occurred in 1989 in Denmark, and since then, the number of inclusive policies and laws across Europe, North and South America, New Zealand, and South Africa has dramatically increased. These advances nevertheless do not sufficiently address fundamental concerns of grave legal, social, political, and economic barriers facing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people, especially in developing countries. Previous development agendas targeting vulnerable populations have failed to capture the hurdles that place LGBT people into poverty, and impede their capacity to rise from it. Thus, the post-2015 Development Agenda would be importantly advanced and critically improved by the institutionalization of sexual orientation (SO) and gender identity (GI). A practical focus on data collection, with specific indicators for SO and GI, will form the necessary basis to provide evidence-based support for the economic, social, political, and legal benefits of this more inclusive agenda. The report, Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity, published in October 2013, is the first from the World Bank that consistently and explicitly considers SO and GI issues, acknowledging SO as one of the most common areas of exclusion at
care, homelessness, discrimination in employment, and poverty levels.6 The challenges are even more severe for people who simultaneously belong to or identify with the LGBT community and other marginalized groups, based on race, ethnicity, age, or disability.7 More systematic collection of data would serve to surface such inequalities, and support the formation of appropriate policy responses. For instance, current estimates place LGBT people at 3.5 percent of the overall US population; yet 20–40 percent of homeless youth identify as LGBT, indicating a case of disproportionate representation within a specific population segment.8 Only when supplied with adequate knowledge
Previous development agendas targeting vulnerable populations have failed to capture the hurdles that place LGBt people into poverty, and impede their capacity to rise from it. and European Union representatives in September 2013.3 These efforts represent the first—and crucial—steps toward finally addressing the challenges faced by LGBT people worldwide.4 Yet, much remains to be done. The systematic collection of data for formulating policies and monitoring progress toward the institutionalization of SO and GI in the development agenda is a critical next step. The US Institute of Medicine recently stated that the lack of data on SO and GI is one of the greatest health challenges for the LGBT population.5 Where data does exist, it highlights significant stigmas, disparities, and disproportionalities faced by LGBT people when compared with their heterosexual and cisgender counterparts, in a wide range of issues including health status, substance abuse, access to health
can policymakers formulate targeted responses appropriate to such specific marginalized groups. Inadequate data also perpetuates the marginalization and exclusion of LGBT people from the development process, as lack of evidence to the contrary allows countries to continue dismissing the LGBT community entirely, or deny that SO and GI are critical issues. The assumption that homosexuality is a Western idea encapsulates this attitude, even as news around the victimization and criminalization of LGBT people abound. For instance, only a month after the research of World Bank and NTF was announced, a controversial ruling of the Indian Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of homosexuality. Cases of violence towards LGBT people CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 18
Mitchell Delaney is a first-year MA candidate at SAIS and previously worked in Washington, DC at the World Bank. He has a passion for human development interests and sees great capacity in future development agendas to alleviate worldwide poverty and address inclusion challenges.
“substantial social, political, and economic costs.”1 Similar efforts include soon-tobe-published research from the World Bank and the Nordic Trust Fund (NTF) for Human Rights, estimating that a failure to address SO and GI in policies against workplace discrimination, health disparities in Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), suicide, and depression could cost between US$1.9 million to upwards of US$31 billion per year in India alone.2 The first panel discussion on SO and GI at the United Nations was hosted in March 2012; subsequently, the Ministerial Declaration on Ending Violence and Discrimination Against Individuals Based on their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity was endorsed by eleven countries
addressing the most marginalized
the Most Marginalized
CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 17
occur weekly—and many more cases go unreported. Just within the month of February 2014, a dozen gay men in Nigeria were killed by vigilante mobs with government complicity, and Uganda passed strong anti-gay legislation asserting that homosexuality is a choice and curable.9 As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rightly acknowledged, “gay people are born into and belong to every society in the world.”10 While systematic research and data collection represent significant progress, future development efforts must institutionalize SO, GI, and other vulnerable populations into all areas of development policy. The Beyond 2015 Global Civil Society Campaign notes that the post-2015 development framework will “only have legitimacy if it responds to the needs of all citizens, in particular those most marginalized who face ongoing exclusion from development processes.”11 Beyond the imperative of decriminalization, concerns of the LGBT community must be integrated into the broader development agenda. Today’s single-issue conversations about SO or GI must be expanded to address LGBT disparities horizontally and emphatically across all areas. Concrete examples of this, using the eleven themes of the World We Want Platform, illustrate that there is a place in every theme for addressing the economic, social, legal, and political challenges facing LGBT people. The post-2015 development agenda serves to guide efforts toward tackling the most fundamental challenges of development—alleviation of poverty, respect for human rights, elimination of violence, and the protection and advancement of excluded persons— calling upon new thinking to address pre-existing priorities and challenges. Discussions about SO and GI must not be limited to the silos of HIV and marriage inequality; rather, LGBT people must be included in every conversation within the development process in order to achieve a world of prosperity, equity, and dignity.
thematic Consultation 1. Inequalities
Examples of language that connect themes to sexual Orientation or Gender Identity • legally recognized same-sex relationships • access to legal, welfare, social, education services
• access to high-quality culturally competent services and providers12 • Data collection for SO and GI on health forms • Inclusion of SO and GI on death certificates to measure possible lGBt related suicides
3. Food Security and nutrition 4. Water 5. energy
• Data collection for SO and GI to ensure equitable access to cash transfer programs, subsidies, purchasing assistance, welfare, and other support systems
6. environmental Sustainability
• acknowledgement of lGBt populations wherever other vulnerable groups are referenced
• Inclusion of lGBt people in regional and international human rights standards and mechanisms • repeal of discriminatory and criminalization laws
• Public awareness and education, including of law enforcement and government officials • Inclusion of lGBt populations, gender education, and sexualities education in all schools • Data collection for SO and GI on highereducation admissions forms
9. Conflict and Fragility
• elimination of punishments for consensual sex and restrictions on freedom of expression, movement, and association • Data collection for SO and GI on police incident forms
10. Growth and employment
• anti-discrimination content for SO and GI within employment laws • Procedural rule of law for harassment based on sexual orientation • Data collection for SO and GI on job and unemployment applications
11. Population Dynamics
• reproductive and family planning services for lGBt populations • legalization of same-sex couple adoptions • national census of lGBt populations
Endnotes 1. World Bank. Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013. DOI: 10.1596/978-14648-0010-8. 2. Houdart, Fabrice. Communication with author, January 2014. 3. UNHCR. “Human Rights Council Panel on Ending Violence and Discrimination Against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.” Geneva: March 7, 2012. http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Discrimination/ LGBT/SummaryHRC19Panel.pdf. 4. The representatives endorsing the declaration include the US Secretary of State, the foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, El Salvador, France, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union. 5. Institute of Medicine. The Health of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People: CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 19
the Most Marginalized CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 18
Building a Foundation for Better Understanding. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2011, 122. 6. See IOM 66, 137, 142, 178; National Alliance to End Homelessness. “LGBTQ Homeless Youth Fact Sheet.” http://www.safeschoolscoalition. org/LGBTQhomelessFactSheetbyNAEH. pdf; Center for American Progress. “Gay and Transgender Youth Homelessness by the Numbers.” Last modified June 21, 2010. http:// www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/ homelessness_numbers.html; MAP-Movement Advancement Project. “The Momentum Report: An Analysis of Key Indicators of LGBT Equality in the US” August 2011; Badgett, M. V. Lee, Lau, Holning, Sears, Brad, and Deborah Ho.“Bias in the Workplace: Consistent Evidence of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination.” The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law. Last modified June 2007. http://williamsinstitute. law.ucla.edu/research/workplace/bias-in-the-
workplace-consistent-evidence-of-sexualorientation-and-gender-identity-discrimination/; Sears, Brad and Lee Badgett. “Beyond Stereotypes: Poverty in the LGBT Community.” Tides: Momentum. (June 2012). http://momentum. tides.org/beyond-the-stereotypes-poverty-in-thelgbt-community/. 7. See Wilson, Patrick A. and Hirokazu Yoshikawa. “Improving Access to Health Care Among African-American, Asian and Pacific Islander, and Latino Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations,” in The Health of Sexual Minorities: Public Health Perspectives on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Populations, ed. Ilan H. Meyer and Mary E. Northridge. New York: Springer 2007, 607-637; US Department of Health and Human Services. Healthy People 2010: Understanding and Improving Health. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000. 8. See Sears and Badgett, 2012; Gates, Gary J. “How Many People are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender?” The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law. Last modified April 2011. http:// williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-
lgbt-demographics-studies/how-many-people-arelesbian-gay-bisexual-and-transgender/. 9. See Nossiter, Adam. “Mob Attacks More Than a Dozen Gay Men in Nigeria’s Capital.” New York Times. February 16, 2014; New Vision. “Museveni responds to Obama on anti-gay bill.” February 21, 2014. http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/652797museveni-responds-to-obama-on-anti-gay-bill. html. 10. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland. December 6, 2011. 11. Vives, Gerad. “Setting Out a Framework for the Post-2015 Framework.” Beyond 2015. January 31, 2013. http://www.beyond2015. org/news/setting-out-framework-post-2015framework%E2%80%A6. 12. For more on culturally competent care for LGBT populations see http:// www.lgbthealtheducation.org/wp-content/ uploads/12-054_LGBTHealtharticle_v3_07-0912.pdf.
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Imports A CASe STUDy IN DeVeLoPING HAITI’S eNeRGy SeCToR CHARLoTTe BLommeSTIJN, mARINA GRUSHIN, eLoDIe mANUeL
Thirty percent access to electricity is unacceptable. The population cannot be living in the dark ages. — RENé JEAN-JUMEAU, HAITIAN MINISTER FOR ENERGY SECURITY
eeks after the earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010, electricity service in the capital of Port-au-Prince remained in disorder. Experts estimated the damages to the electricity system at $40 million.
Marina Grushin is a second-year MA candidate concentrating in Energy,
Minister for Energy Security, was well aware that economic recovery and growth would depend on reliable, affordable energy. In order to overcome the current crisis, his ministry’s strategy would need to focus on several key goals:
Resources, and Environment and International Finance. Her work experience prior to SAIS includes research in the energy and infrastructure sectors for Ergo, a boutique advisory firm specializing in emerging markets.
SAIS, she worked as a Department of Labor contractor on issues related to international labor rights and regulations. She also worked on economic development and women’s economic empowerment initiatives at the World Bank. Elodie was born in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
Elodie Manuel is a second-year MA candidate in the Energy, Resources, and Environment Program. Prior to
1) ensuring sufficient energy supply to meet demand and support economic growth; 2) promoting energy savings and efficiency; 3) developing indigenous renewable sources of energy; and CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 20
Charlotte Blommestijn is a second-year MA candidate concentrating in Energy, Resources, and Environment and International Finance. Prior to SAIS, she spent three years at the European Union Institute for Security Studies working as a project and research assistant.
Access to electricity in the capital dropped by nearly 50 percent. In addition, the disaster exposed the urban vulnerabilities of Port-au-Prince, the heart of Haiti’s struggling economy. The hundreds of thousands of people relocating to Port-au-Prince from affected areas in the periphery were putting more pressure on the city’s electricity sector. On a macroeconomic scale, the earthquake intensified the development challenges Haiti already faced. With an income per capita below $700, Haiti was the least developed nation in the Western Hemisphere. René Jean-Jumeau, the
LNG Imports CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 19
4) creating a regulatory framework to encourage the development of supply while protecting the environment. the Development Challenge
Haiti’s energy sector has been in a critical state for decades. Most households rely on biomass,1 particularly in the form of charcoal, for cooking—with detrimental implications for the country’s environment and the health of its people. Substituting biomass with cleanerburning fuel would have considerable benefits, but high switching costs and a lack of incentives limit the penetration of fuel alternatives. The electricity industry, meanwhile, suffers from insufficient supply and inadequate service.2 More than seven million Haitians lack access to electricity and half of the approximately 1.2 million who do have access are connected illegally to the grid. To put this into perspective, per-capita electricity consumption in Latin American countries is about 85 times that of Haiti.3 Nearly 45 percent of installed generation capacity is not available on a regular basis, leaving just 150 MW operational. As a result, power plants fall short of
REsIDENtIAL ENERGY usE
addressing demand. This unreliability forces businesses and residences to opt for expensive and environmentally unsound individual electricity generators.4 Electricity prices in Haiti and the wider Caribbean are very high by global standards. Power prices depend on the costs of crude oil and oil products, which generate more than 70 percent of Haiti’s electricity. Crude imports from Mexico and Venezuela are a major financial burden to the Haitian government, despite subsidized payment terms from Venezuela. High fuel costs, as well as processing and distribution expenses, elevate final electricity tariffs. Currently, consumers pay as much as $0.35 per kWh, which gas-fired power could decrease by 75 percent or more.5 The state-owned utility, Electricité d’Haïti (EdH), has a monopoly over the provision of electricity services. EdH has a record of poor operational and financial performance. Even prior to the earthquake, its revenue loss was 53 percent. Despite relatively high electricity tariffs, EdH cannot fully recover its costs due to non-payment of electricity bills, a low count of metered customers, and widespread theft through illegal power connections. Political meddling, poor governance, and corruption contribute to EdH’s failure.6
tOtAL ENERGY CONsuMPtION
oil Products 3.48%
commerce and Public service 2.02%
Source: IEA. “Dataset: World Energy Statistics”, 2011.
Weighing the Options
Minister René Jean-Jumeau, who had recently been brought in to coordinate the Haitian government’s energy efforts, knew that Haiti’s energy problems would require a multi-pronged solution. No single project or program could address environmental concerns, improve access and affordability, and increase efficiency. Meeting energy needs was a priority. Specifically, adequate power supply and reliable access to electricity was critical to business growth and job creation. Yet, increasing Haiti’s dependence on oil would be environmentally damaging and financially unsustainable. Natural gas stood out as a potential alternative and was in abundant supply since the boom in US shale gas production. It could be used in both cooking and power generation, with fewer carbon dioxide emissions than oil and charcoal. Most importantly, natural gas was less costly to import than either coal or oil. The timing for gas imports seemed right: LNG, a liquefied form of natural gas shipped by tanker, had steadily gained popularity among gas consuming countries over the past twenty years. In fact, the neighboring Dominican Republic inaugurated its own LNG import terminal earlier in 2010.7 While gas-fired power plants would require capital expenditures up front, studies showed that they would produce cheaper electricity.8 The Dominican Republic was experiencing this firsthand: its LNG terminal was generating savings of $1 billion per year, which is 2.5 percent of its GDP.9 In Haiti, lower prices for power would benefit customers, including businesses and industrial users. Yet the greatest impact would come from maximizing LNG use beyond the electricity sector. Piping the gas into Portau-Prince for use in cooking would tap into Haiti’s largest urban market. It would also facilitate the much-needed transition away from biofuels in households, the largest consumer group. However, implementation would require significant CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 21
CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 20
investment in new cooking appliances. It would also involve the construction of gas distribution infrastructure in an area vulnerable to seismic tremors—a risky investment. The terminal itself involved certain risks. For example, most existing LNG terminals had hundreds of thousands of cubic meters in storage capacity. Haiti, with its limited infrastructure and underdeveloped electricity sector, would need something much smaller. Would typical LNG carriers, which rely on large cargoes to turn a profit, be willing to make small shipments to Haiti? Resolving the Crisis
and Agence Française de Développement (AFD) all showed interest in financing the project, though no commitments have been made. With the proposal finalized, Minister Jean-Jumeau now had an option for energy-sector development. Haiti’s reconstruction and development depended in no small part on initiatives
More than seven million haitians lack access to electricity and half of the approximately 1.2 million who do have access are connected illegally to the grid. of the terminal, 40 MW power plant, pipeline and satellites, and would achieve the 72 MW of distributed generation. Haytrac Power and Gas would provide 100 percent of the upfront investment. However, financial support from multilateral stakeholders would be critical in moving the project forward. The World Bank’s International Finance Corporations (IFC), the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB), the European Investment Bank (EIB),
approved by his ministry. He knew the country needed a dramatic change, and this was a drastic new solution. JeanJumeau gave the project a green light. Over the coming months, Haytrac laid the groundwork for financing, securing support from international institutions and agencies. In August 2013, the terminal developers announced the start of construction on an artificial island where the terminal would be situated, CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 22
Taking this and other concerns into account, a consortium of companies came together to develop a proposal for Minister Jean-Jumeau to consider. Haytrac Power and Gas would serve as the primary project developer. GasEner, a Dominican contractor with experience in the LNG business, would conduct the Front-End Engineering and Design (FEED). The developers settled on a “mini” terminal with an initial storage capacity of 15,000 cm, located 14 km north of Portau-Prince. In order to secure supplies on a small scale, the companies would procure gas from intermediary LNG storage facilities elsewhere in the Caribbean. The terminal would supply users in Portau-Prince and seven other cities, as well as a 40 MW gas-fired power plant near the capital. The developers estimated that the terminal could serve up to 1,000 large industrial and commercial users, and 92,000 residential users: 82,000 residential users in Port-au-Prince, and at least 10,000 in each of the seven satellite cities. Gas would reach users in Port-au-Prince directly by pipeline. For other cities, specially equipped trucks would transport liquefied LNG to satellite regasification sites. Gas would then be fed
into a pipeline network for use by each city. Most of the requisite infrastructure would need to be constructed, adding to the project’s scope and costs.10 Overall, the terminal would cost $52.3 million, exclusive of the surrounding infrastructure. The initial phase, would amount to $170.1 million, and cover the cost of development and construction
LNG Imports CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 21
and the Prime Minister applauded the project as a promising sign for Port-auPrince. Breaking ground was a critical first step, not only in the construction of the terminal, but also in changing the development agenda in Haiti. Will LNG be the new fuel to drive Haiti’s growth? Endnotes 1. Biomass includes charcoal and primary solid biofuels which the IEA defines as “any plant matter used directly as fuel or converted into other forms before combustion”, including a multitude of woody materials generated by industrial process or provided directly by forestry
and agriculture (firewood, wood chips, bark, sawdust, shavings, chips, sulphite lyes (black liquor), animal materials/wastes and other solid biomass).
6. Inter-American Development Bank. “Haiti: Energy Sector White Paper.” 2010. http:// www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-descriptiontitle,1303.html?id=ha-t1130.
2. World Bank. “Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant to the Republic of Haiti for a Rebuilding Energy Infrastructure and Access Project.” 2012.
7. Transferring small quantities of that gas by truck to Haiti was feasible, but expensive. At the same time, constructing a pipeline to import larger volumes would be politically difficult due to long-standing tensions between the two countries’ governments.
3. Lucky, Matt. “The Role for Liquefied Natural Gas in Small Island States.” Worldwatch Institute, June 9, 2012. http://blogs.worldwatch. org/revolt/the-role-for-liquefied-natural-gas-insmall-island-states/.
8. Gerner, Franz, and Megan Hansen. Caribbean Regional Electricity Supply Options. Washington: The World Bank, 2011.
4. Inter-American Development Bank. “Haiti: Institutional Transformation and Modernization Program of the Energy Sector-I.” 2011. http:// www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-descriptiontitle,1303.html?id=HA-L1083.
9. Latin American Herald Tribune. Dominican Republic Inaugurates Latin America’s First LNG Distribution Terminal. http://www. laht. com/article. asp?ArticleId=351552&Category Id=14092.
5. Gerner, Franz, and Megan Hansen. Caribbean Regional Electricity Supply Options. Washington: World Bank, 2011.
10. Gasener. MB LNG Import Terminal. http:// www. gasener. com/smalllngimportterminal. html.
Leveraging the strength of the Private sector in Increasing Governance THe SomALI CASe amBer SteWart
n Somalia, while the international community has focused its efforts on humanitarian response and political reconciliation, entrepreneurs have arisen to meet the demands of the population. The success of the Somali business community is a positive story within the
Amber Stewart is a second-year MA student at SAIS. Prior to SAIS, she worked as an analyst in the defense sector, on a program aimed at building capacity in foreign militaries. Reorienting to a career focused on a more positive and quantitative aspect of international affairs, Amber spent her first year at SAIS in Bologna studying the role of the private sector in development. Over the summer Amber worked at the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation. She will continue to pursue her interest in this area post-graduation through a career in corporate social responsibility or social enterprise.
context of war, famine, and instability. A closer examination of this progress makes for an insightful case study in the role of the private sector in state formation. Background
The push toward growth in the Somali private sector came with the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime and the influx of aid that followed. Barre, a military dictator with a socialist economic ideology, ruled Somalia during the 22 years prior to the 1991 coup. His policies cultivated inefficiency, nepotism, and fraud in state-run industries, with high military expenditures leaving little money for human capital investment. The resulting economy was in dismal shape, with commercial activity limited to a few well-connected elite at the time of the state’s collapse. International actors, such as the United States and the United Nations (UN), attempted to minimize the violence and famine due to the ensuing civil war
and the 1992 drought. Large amounts of aid flowed into the country. Without a state to facilitate relief distribution, the UN relied on local entrepreneurs to support operations as well as to supply goods and services. Such activity launched a class of Somali entrepreneurs who substituted for the public sector in the years to come. the Private sector steps In
Due to the failure of the US-led UN peacekeeping mission in the mid-1990s, support and aid from the international community evaporated. Entrepreneurs became the sole providers of a wide array of goods and services, flourishing under the fierce competition that takes root in places with little to no government intervention. For most Somalis, entrepreneurship became the only source of livelihood. Relying on the reputation and trust embedded in Somalia’s clan networks, these CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 23
CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 22
entrepreneurs facilitated access to basic services, provided alternatives to hard and soft infrastructure, and expanded the traditional private economy. The private sector found creative ways to provide public services. With water infrastructure limited to cities, entrepreneurs owning donkeys and trucks developed systems to deliver water to rural areas at a reasonable price. In Somaliland, the city of Hargeisa managed to form a public, but independent and financially sustainable, water agency. Somali entrepreneurs responded to electricity demand by selling contracts to households wherein diesel generators provided power by the hour for designated purposes. As a result, electricity rates are comparable to other African countries, and access levels expanded since the Barre era.1 Entrepreneurs even developed alternatives to hard and soft infrastructure. To make up for dilapidated roads, the Somali airline industry has blossomed to increase the number of routes offered in the post-state era. The industry accommodates safety and security concerns through wet-leasing and basing operations out of foreign countries. In addition to offshore registration, the demand for legal and judicial processes is met through other mechanisms, such as xeer, Somali customary law, and privately-
also shown remarkable progress in the traditional private sector. Livestock exports have risen exponentially, aided by the abban protection system comprised of brokers at the Kenyan border who certify that transactions do not involve stolen animals.3 Intense competition and partnerships with international corporations like Sprint, ITT Corporation, and Telenor enabled seven mobile phone companies to offer Somalis the lowest rates in Africa.4 The money transfer system, known as hawala, extended its market penetration as a result of the diaspora’s growth and its correspondent remittances. The ability to transmit remittances as high as $2 billion, as well as the widening array of banking services offered, including travelers checks, deposit services, and even consumer lending, are evidence of the strength and efficiency of the system.5 Bringing Back the Government
Private sector initiatives have been so successful that welfare may have improved since the fall of the government, with poverty at lower levels than in richer, more stable African countries.6 In this way, progress in the private sector could actually impede state formation, as Somalis may rationally believe that they have little to gain under a new government. A new government would undoubtedly raise the cost of doing business through tax collection
[P]rogress in the private sector could actually impede state formation, as somalis may rationally believe that they have little to gain under a new government. and regulation expenses. The business community will need to be persuaded that its achievements will not be wiped away under an institutionalized state. An episode from the 2011 droughtinduced famine demonstrates the complexities of this issue. Some entrepreneurs benefited as rising food prices increased profits. The UN and
Somalia’s war has ebbed and flowed across the country, providing sufficient levels of stability to give rise to an unexpectedly dynamic private sector. It is a testament to the fact that stateless does not inherently mean chaos and stagnation. Insofar as the ability to work through the crises of the past twenty years demonstrates a magnitude of tenacity and awareness, entrepreneurs should be tapped to apply these skills towards the formation of an effective, well adapted, and credible government. Yet there is reluctance within the international community to leverage the strengths of the private sector. While part of the hesitancy to work CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 24
funded courts. These solutions—covering dispute resolution, contract enforcement, resource use, marriage, and other issues—are supported through the trust, reputation, and religion central to clan networks. In some areas arbitration is fairer than under the Barre regime.2 In addition to filling in for the state, the Somali business community has
other humanitarian organizations, on the other hand, offered free or low-priced food, crowding out these entrepreneurs. Seeing an opportunity to gain local support from the private sector, al-Shabaab, a militant Islamist group periodically controlling much of Southern Somalia, restricted access to relief services so that businesses could maintain revenue.7 At least two negative effects relevant to the discussion on government credibility can be distilled from this incident. First, by harming the local private sector, international agencies undermined their reputations in the business community, which is vital to efforts aimed at establishing peace and forming a government. Partnering with entrepreneurs for relief provision could address this issue in the future and also help reorient business models away from an emphasis on short-term profits.8 Second, it reinforced any pre-existing perceptions among entrepreneurs that state alternatives like al-Shaabab are better poised to respond to their needs than a hypothetical future government. Given entrepreneurs’ indispensable role in providing for the population throughout the Somali crisis, it is especially important that they be convinced of the advantages of having an official state organization.
lever aging the strength of the private sector in increasing governance
Private sector CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 23
with entrepreneurs may be explained by risks related to money laundering and inadvertent financing of terrorists, the long-term benefits to engagement are high enough to merit the time and effort required to find a way around those challenges. Herein lies the lesson for the development community: Bringing the private sector into the discussion is imperative to create a sense of ownership in the political process. The international community can incentivize the business community’s participation by building awareness of the benefits of a wellfunctioning government, and by aiding in the prioritization and implementation of reforms that will bring these benefits sooner. For many people that have
lived so long without a constructive government, it is rational to dismiss the value that proper governance can bring. Changing this perception is neither easy nor quickly done, but necessary for creating sustainable, inclusive political systems. Endnotes 1. See Nenova, Tatiana and Tim Hartford. “Anarchy and Invention: How Does Somalia’s Private Sector Cope without Government?” Public Policy for the Private Sector. Note No. 280, November 2004. http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/ WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/12/30/000 090341_20041230141703/Rendered/PDF/31027 0PAPER0VP2801nenova1harford.pdf; Shortland, Anja, Katerina Christopoulou, and Charalampos Makatsoris. “War and famine, peace and light? The economic dynamics of conflict in Somalia 1993–2009.” Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 50, No. 5 (2013): 6. http://jpr.sagepub.com/ content/50/5/545. 2. Leeson, Peter T. “Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse.”
Journal of Comparative Economics. Vol. 35, Issue 4 (December 2007): 705-706. http:// www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S0147596707000741. Leeson. “Better off stateless.” 689–710. 3. “Somalia.” The CIA World Factbook. https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/so.html. 4. See Cassanelli, Lee. “Private Sector Peacemaking: Business and Reconstruction in Somalia.” Accord Issue 21 (2010): 2. http:// www.c-r.org/accord-article/private-sectorpeacemaking-business-and-reconstructionsomalia; Nenova, Tatiana. “Private sector response to the absence of government institutions in Somalia.” World Bank Working Paper (2013): 4. 5. Ibid, 6. 6. See Nenova and Hartford. “Anarchy and Invention;” Cassanelli. “Private Sector Peacemaking;” Leeson. “Better off stateless.” 7. Carpenter, Samuel. “Somalia’s private sector can help rather than hinder development.” The Guardian. May 23, 2012. http://www. theguardian.com/global-development/povertymatters/2012/may/23/somalia-private-sectordevelopment. 8. Ibid.
the Role of Institutions in Development CoNTemPoRARy DeBATe AND APPLICATIoN To CôTe D’IVoIRe’S exPeRIeNCe BeTWeeN 1960–1990 aySO van eySInGa
the Relevance of Institutions
t our current juncture, due to the lack of a fundamental explanation for the huge variation in growth trajectories of countries, the role of institutions has become increasingly important in theories of economic development. The importance of “good” endogenous institutions that
Ayso van Eysinga is a first-year MA candidate at SAIS in the African Studies Program, currently studying in Bologna, Italy. He worked for two years in Ghana prior to SAIS for a large cocoa farmer’s cooperative, focusing on improving certification processes and technology development for smallholder farmers.
assure long-term, inclusive growth and development is now accepted in theory and practice; however, the question of how such institutions are established remains a matter of debate. Theorists contend whether institutions are the prerequisite to development, or if they can improve during the process of development. While there now exists general consensus around the critical importance of institutions in development, the heterogeneity of experiences of developing countries in the post-colonial world cannot be overlooked. Policies on institutional development must be grounded in the multiplicity of experience across the developing world, as the one-size-fits-all approach so popular in the past failed to achieve sustained economic growth.
the Place of Institutions in Development: the theoretical Debate
Institutions are a broad concept, with the most widely accepted definition being “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction,”1 thus implicitly including both political and economic institutions that shape incentive structures, whether promoting or hindering the development process. The view that institutions are inherently endogenous and prerequisites for development, especially in the long-run—what Przeworski refers to as “new institutionalism”—dominates the institutional discourse.2 Political and economic institutions are inherently linked. Political institutions CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 25
CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 24
Exclusive institutions with inclusive elements also formed the foundation for the post-colonial political and economic framework under Côte d’Ivoire’s first leader, Félix Houphoüet-Boigny. Houphoüet-Boigny and his political
Policies on institutional development must be grounded in the multiplicity of experience across the developing world, as the one-size-fits-all approach so popular in the past failed to achieve sustained economic growth. development are endogenous, countering persistence theory and pointing to randomness in country-specific contexts that can lead to institutional change.8 Attributing development to “confluence factors”, including critical junctures, existing institutions, and even a dose of luck, paves the way for targeted development policies within each country’s unique context. Why theory and Reality Fail to Conform: A Case study of Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire’s post-colonial trajectory is an ideal example of such a pragmatic approach, as its path cannot be explained by either primacy of institutions or modernization theory, but instead exhibits features of both. The complexity of the Ivorian experience must be contextualised with its colonial history. The French had a particular style of colonization in SubSaharan Africa, centered on an extractive, export-centric economy, and an eliteeducated class of Africans that assimilated into French culture. Starting from an initially exclusive political institution, the French gradually increased the level of inclusion of Ivorian elites in an attempt to justify and maintain control over the colony, particularly with the erosion of their power after the Second World War due to national and international pressures. The French model can therefore be characterized as a mixture of exclusive and inclusive institutions.
machine, the Parti Démocratique du Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), consolidated power through a combination of elite cooperation from the pre-colonial period, and a policy of co-option that allowed for the entry of new actors into the political power balance as seen necessary for stability. Thus, institutions continued to be exclusive to elites, while adopting a process of inclusion, thus allowing for a degree of ambiguity in power structures, and an expansion of the political and economic base over time.9 Despite its ostensibly extractive political institutions, Côte d’Ivoire prospered under the PDCI, with gains reaching all levels of society, albeit unequally. Autocratic rule, with state-led growth based on extraction from export-centric agriculture, led to Côte d’Ivoire’s “economic miracle” from 1960 to 1980, with an average growth rate of 7 percent over this period, refuting predictions of the vicious cycle of persistence.10 The late 1970s saw the PDCI at the height of its power, profiting from a commodity boom that spurred massive government spending and high hopes for the future.11 The success of benevolent autocracy seems to have proven that modernization works; that development, both of a country and its institutions, can catalyze growth, regardless of the context. Yet Côte d’Ivoire subsequently collapsed in the 1980s, as commodity prices fell and the PDCI could no longer sustain increasingly inefficient para-statal industries, an enormous public sector, CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 26
shape economic institutions, which in turn generate economic outcomes that reinforce political institutions in perpetual feedback. The emergence of institutions is based on the endowment of power—a balance between the de-jure power of political institutions, and the defacto power of economic strength due to the distribution of resources—producing institutions that vary in their degree of accountability to the majority of people. In this model, “good” institutions are those that provide a secure environment for the majority of the population through economic and political inclusion, and are committed and credible; conversely, “bad” institutions favour a small elite, are unstable and insecure, and therefore do not incentivize development.3 “Bad” institutions persist insofar as political institutions captured by elites lead to extractive economies, which then produce economic outcomes that only benefit the elite. This vicious cycle often stems from colonial history, and the path to breaking the cycle is neither agreed upon in theory, nor clear from experience.4 One school of thought stresses the primacy of political institutions, asserting that stable institutional change—and therefore growth and development—is not possible without first improving political institutions.5 The policy implications of this school of thought are limited, as selfreinforcing institutions cannot be altered exogenously; hence the outlook is bleak for countries trapped in this vicious cycle. The alternate view is more optimistic: Building upon Lipset’s Modernization theory, the “growth” school of institutional development stresses the direct link between institutions and economic growth, pointing to empirical evidence that growth can lead to institutional reforms through human and civic capital.6 Beyond these two contradictory views, a more pragmatic approach considers the “large element of context specificity, arising from differences in
historical trajectories, geography, political economy or other initial conditions.” 7 The heterogeneity of countries implies that conforming to one model is inherently flawed. The contextual approach contends that both institutions and
the role of institutions in development
Role of Institutions
the role of institutions in development
Role of Institutions CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 25
and artificially high commodity prices. Economic malaise across the country incited urban unrest and, in a last ditch attempt to maintain power, HouphoüetBoigny called for democratic elections in 1990.12 These elections marked the beginning of the prolonged civil instability that continues to plague Côte d’Ivoire, fragmenting society and increasingly creating an atmosphere of exclusion previously contained under the PDCI. The fall of Côte d’Ivoire was dramatic, as what was initially considered a “miracle” by the international community descended into a “mirage.”13 Three factors contributed to this decline: inherent changes in society since independence, exogenous commodity price shocks, and poor policies from the PDCI. The balance under the PDCI fractured as new political parties sought support through differentiation, and fueled by xenophobia and ethnicity—a by-product of rapid democratization. As political institutions fell apart, so did the economy, which was reflected in worsening living standards and falling growth rates. Institutional decay could either be attributed to failed attempts at institutional improvement, or the legacy of exclusive institutions; therefore, both modernization theorists and those who consider institutions as primary for development could use the Ivorian case of success and then decline to support their arguments. What is the Place of Institutions in Development?
The experience of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates the need for pragmatic approaches to development, institutionally and
otherwise, and the need to consider context-specific factors in policymaking. In the absence of such a contextual approach, any attempts to engage in exogenous reform by conforming to the constraints of a single theory will only result in the same failures that have marked prior attempts at development. Endnotes 1. North, Douglass. “Institutions.” The Journal of Economic Perspective Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter, 1991): 97. 2. Przeworksi, Adam. “The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development? (I).” European Journal of Sociology No. 45 (2004): 165. 3. See Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London: Profile Books, 2012: 74–75; Dixit, Avinash. “Evaluating Recipes for Development Success.” Oxford University Press (2007); Djankov, Glaeser et al, “The New Comparative Economics.” (April 2003); Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-DeSilanes, and Andrei Shleifer “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2004): 271–303; Przeworksi, Adam. “The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development? (I).” European Journal of Sociology No. 45 (2004): 178-185; Rodrik, Dani. “Institutions for High Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them.” Working Paper 7540, National Bureau of Economic Research. February 2000. 4. See Acemoglu and Robinson, Nations, 45–60; Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2004): 287–296; Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.” National Bureau of Economic Research (May 2004): 20–21. 5. See Acemoglu and Robinson, Nations; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, “Institutions;” Rodrik, “Institutions.” 6. See Barro, Robert. “Democracy and Growth.” National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper No. 4909, October 1994; Glaeser, Edward,
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2004). 7. Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Suramian, and Francesco Trebbi. “Institutions Rule: the Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9305 (November 2002): 23. 8. Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 9. See Crook, Richard. “Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic Development in Côte d’Ivoire.” African Affairs Vol. 88, No. 351 (April 1989): 205–228; Fauré, Yves. “Democracy and Realism: Reflections on the Case of Côte d’Ivoire.” Africa: Journal of the international African Institute Vol. 63, No. 3, Understanding Elections in Africa (1993): 313– 329; Toungara, Jeanne Maddox. “The Apotheosis of Côte d’Ivoire’s Nana Houphouet-Boigny.” The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1990): 23–54; Woods, Dwayne. “State Action and Class Interests in the Ivory Coast.” African Studies Review Vol. 31, No. 1 (April 1988): 93–116. 10. Hecht, Robert. “The Ivory Coast Economic ‘Miracle’: What Benefits for Peasant Farmers?” The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1983): 24–25. 11. See Fauré, “Democracy,” 314; Crook, “Patrimonialism,” 214. 12. See Hecht, “Miracle;” Akindès, Francis. “The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d’Ivoire.” Research Report No. 128, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstiuet, 2004: 11–12; Crook, Richard, “Politics, the Cocoa Crisis and Administration in Côte d’Ivoire.” The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1990): 649–66; Toungara, “Apotheosis,” 50–54. 13. Ridler, Neil. “Comparative Advantage as a Development Model: the Ivory Coast.” The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1985): 407.
Institutions Before Elections in the Central African Republic BIll GelFelD
ffective institutions are the bedrock upon which stable societies rest. They are fundamental systems and structures that give each society its unique shape, form, and functionality, and include judicial systems, police forces, and civil society. These institutions provide a level of predictability and stability that allow governments to function and their citizens to engage in productive activity. John Locke mused that the foundation of democracy was predicated upon the protection of life, liberty, and property.1 Historically, countries that have prospered, regardless of their form of government, have established dependable, effective institutions responsible for law enforcement, peacekeeping, and jurisprudence. In the absence of these institutions and the order they provide, society falls apart. The ongoing tragedy in the Central African Republic (CAR) provides a stark illustration of the consequences of wholesale institutional failure. In seeking to rebuild fragile or failed states, the international community should focus first and foremost on creating stable, resilient institutions rather than promoting the kind of quick, cosmetic changes offered by premature elections. The case of CAR provides a telling example of the consequences of complete
services are provided exclusively by NGOs, and security is present only where limited French and African Union troops can enforce it. Ordinarily, institutions in fragile states are conspicuous because they are compromised or highly corrupt. In the extreme case of failed states, they are almost wholly absent altogether. This is clearly the case in CAR. In fact, the lone institutions that remain standing, the respective religious communities, have struggled to promote peace even as they
the ongoing tragedy in the Central African Republic provides a stark illustration of the consequences of wholesale institutional failure. Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries, followed their own local commanders and flaunted their independence through their brutality and rapacity. His ministers were shuffled with alarming regularity and most government offices remained closed. To procure an entry visa required sending one’s passport to an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp, where the government official in charge of the process had fled after the December 5th coup attempt in Bangui. Over the course of the past year, the few institutions that functioned in CAR have completely disintegrated. The recently appointed transitional president, Catherine Samba Panza, faces a host of challenges, but none more daunting and pressing than reestablishing the foundational institutions that assure security and law and order. The glaring absence of the state in society has abetted the descent of the country into internecine violence. It can be witnessed in the lack of centralized authority, law and order, and provision of basic government services. Schools have been closed for over a year, health
have been blamed for fanning the flames of conflict. Religious leaders are trying to promote a nascent peace-building process, but in order for this to take root, the state must first provide some semblance of rule of law. The complete and rapid collapse of the state in CAR can be traced directly to its lack of institutions. Though CAR would never have been considered a model state before the recent crisis, the absence of a reliable police force, judiciary, or civil service meant that government failure translated into societal collapse. There was no tradition of or fidelity to rules, laws, or established procedures. When authority was deposed, communities fell victim to scapegoating and the muchpublicized religious violence between Christian and Muslim communities escalated. The reprisal killings persisted because there was no faith in conflict mitigation or official justice. Absent these mechanisms, communities that had coexisted mostly peacefully for decades descended into unspeakable CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 28
Bill Gelfeld graduated from SAIS in 2010 with a concentration in International Development. Since graduation, he has worked on a variety of programs including post-earthquake reconstruction in Haiti, emergency and disaster response throughout Central America and the Caribbean, and most recently in emergency response and relief in the Central African Republic from November 2013 to March 2014.
institutional breakdown. CAR is a country with a tumultuous past, with all but one of its former leaders since independence in 1960 coming to power through a coup d’état. The most recent coup, in March 2013, deposed an interim president, Michel Djotodia, who wielded little authority and commanded little respect; in truth, he exercised almost no power outside of the capital of Bangui. His loose coalition of fighters (known as “Seleka” or coalition in Sango), themselves mostly
institutions before elections in the centr al african republic
Central African Republic CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 27
brutality. Parents were killed in front of their children. Body parts were paraded around IDP camps. Whole families were dismembered and burned by roving mobs. Without the unifying effect of institutions to stitch different groups together, the societal fabric unraveled. The attempt to aid the suffering communities of CAR has also met great difficulty because of the lack of security
right direction, but CAR must begin to repair its institutions if it is to have any hope of long-term viability as a state. Reconstituting institutions, like the national police force and the judiciary, will help reinforce lasting change. It will create confidence in governance, consistency, and permanence that may convince people that they can rely on the state as an effective arbiter of conflict. An independent election commission is also essential, and must be established well before elections themselves take
[Elections] are a result of good democracy rather than a panacea for troubled regimes. institutions and the resultant instability. In many of the most populous IDP camps, the World Food Program and various NGOs attempted to distribute food, only to be forced to flee by violent elements at each site. Even the presence of foreign troops was often unable to provide the requisite security to allow for distributions. The breakdown of law and order that prevented the delivery of aid was the same factor that motivated the reprisal killings and vigilante justice—a lack of faith in the state to ensure basic order or to adjudicate cases of wrongdoing. The appointment of a new interim president—one with genuine leadership credentials—is certainly a step in the
place. It is imperative that all of these institutions are loyal to the state rather than any one administration or party in power. Institutional strength is grounded in durability and predictability, from administration to administration; but it is precisely these facets that have been lacking in CAR. The timing of the next elections in CAR remains contentious. The French, in particular, have been advocating for elections in September 2014, rather than the March 2015 deadline set by the 2012 Libreville Accords. But the debate misses the broader point that elections absent institutional reforms are meaningless— and potentially dangerous. If elections occur before the country is prepared, they
could cause further strife and renewed violence among competing factions. Furthermore, they risk being co-opted by the strongest interest groups involved, be they foreign or domestic.2 The way forward is fundamental institutional reform, not cosmetic changes brought about by virtue of elections. While important for ensuring that democracy continues, elections by no means ensure the conditions for democracy to flourish. Independent and impartial courts accomplish this. Accountable systems of law enforcement assure this. And transparent government ministries support this. Elections are only as good as the institutions that support them. They are a result of good democracy rather than a panacea for troubled regimes. Going forward, the international community should throw its weight behind building institutions rather than promoting elections or other quick fixes. We who would see lasting change in the Central African Republic would do well to seek to repair the country’s fractured institutions before touting elections as the cure to end all ills. Endnotes 1. Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980. 2. Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs November/ December 76 (1997): 22–44.
sDGs, the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the Challenges of Consensus Decision-Making lynn WaGner
t the end of 2014, a multipleyear consultation process to develop the next set of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and negotiations to identify Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are expected to merge, and United Nations member states will attempt to create a single set of goals. The process currently underway to develop the â€œpost-2015â€? agenda offers the international community the opportunity to chart a new direction for intergovernmental cooperation. First, however, international actors will need to overcome the decision-making challenges they have faced for the past twenty years. Governments developing this post-2015 development agenda will face the challenges associated with reaching consensus-based negotiated agreements. The MDGs, which were to be achieved by 2015, were not originally negotiated. Rather, world leaders called for a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty in the Millennium Declaration, which was adopted at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, following which the MDGs were elaborated based on consultations among representatives of international institutions. The United Nations Secretary-General presented what are now called the MDGs to the UN General Assembly in 2001, at which
that have affected the construction of intergovernmental response mechanisms to sustainable development challenges over the past 20 years. In particular, the international approach to develop plans of action on sustainable development has focused on the negotiation and adoption of international law, particularly through consensus-based negotiations, especially since the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.1 At the same time, there has been a shift in the norm of participation in intergovernmental environmental negotiations, with the expectation of universal participation (i.e. all UN member states) taking hold.2 As a result of these factors, the complexity involved in reaching an agreement through sustainable
the negotiating rooms themselves have become crowded, with delegates from the now 193 uN member states being joined by representatives from civil society and intergovernmental organizations. across national boundaries. Recognizing the power of the MDGs to focus international efforts, as well as the need to incorporate additional concepts into them, delegates at the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD, or Rio+20) called for the creation of a universally applicable set of goalsâ€”the SDGs. Also representing a break with the past, the process to develop the goals has been much more inclusive this time around. The broad consultation process and open negotiating format that has been followed so far could help when it comes time to implement the goals, but introduces challenges for the decision-making process itself. The process to develop these goals will be shaped by a number of influences
development negotiations has increased. The negotiating rooms themselves have become crowded, with delegates from the now 193 UN member states being joined by representatives from civil society and intergovernmental organizations. And the negotiating calendar has become extremely crowded, with each treaty requiring negotiations that extend over a number of years, following which parties to the treaty meet to consider the implementation of its provisions. Also as a result of this expanding negotiating system, the focus of discussions has moved from initial framework agreements, designed to facilitate cooperation, to the identification of specific obligations within the agreed CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 30
Lynn M. Wagner received her Ph.D. from SAIS. Her research interests focus on the relationship between negotiation processes and outcomes, particularly for environmental negotiations. She regularly observes and analyzes multilateral environmental negotiations through her work with the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and its publication, The Earth Negotiations Bulletin.
point UN member states recommended that they be used as a guide to implement the Millennium Declaration. The process of developing the MDGs did not involve the challenges of intergovernmental, consensus-based negotiations, through which any one participating country could hold up agreement, but they also did not have country ownership, and were not immediately embraced by the international community. Nonetheless, the goals have served to focus actors at all levels on a shared understanding of how to collaborate and coordinate activities. At their most basic, the MDGs identify actions that the North can take to help the South develop. Sustainable development, however, requires all countries to address key issues at the national level, as well as to collaborate
sdgs , the post -2015 development agenda , and the challenges of consensus decision making
sDGs CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 29
framework, with attendant challenges for reaching consensus.3 In recent years, negotiators at a number of high-profile meetings have failed to reach consensus. At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, for example, talks broke down in part due to the lack of transparency and universal participation in the negotiation process on the Copenhagen Accord.4 Because they felt unrepresented in the negotiations, several countries insisted that the Accord not be adopted. Unlike the MDGs, the development of the SDGs will face these challenges. The negotiating process on the SDGs will face its real test during its second stage, which began in March 2014. The Open Working Group called for by Rio+20 met eight times between March 2013 and February 2014. The goal of these meetings was to help negotiators “diagnose” the issues that could be included in the SDGs and understand which ideas other governments are likely to support. As negotiators move from diagnostics to the development of a “formula”—or shared perception of the conflict that establishes the terms of trade or criterion of justice—and finalize details, the challenges of squeezing preferences of 193 UN member states into a handful of goals will emerge.5
Governments at the negotiating table have yet to agree on how to narrow down possible topics into a coherent set of SDGs. Some governments promote a process-based approach to the formula, suggesting that preferences be expressed in terms of targets arranged according to which goals best articulate the collective preference for targets. In this regard, speakers have presented the multidimensional impacts that, for example, a target to increase legal identity could have. Increased birth registration would affect efforts to improve maternal health, lead to improved educational and employment opportunities, and ensure ability to own property. Others have focused on identifying preferred goals first, to ensure their favorites make the final cut. Some have argued, for example, that since oceans and forests are home to the vast majority of Earth’s biodiversity, that they should each be the focus of a “stand-alone” goal. The negotiations to elaborate the final details will look different, depending on which approach is taken, but the complexity of ensuring that all countries feel their key issues are represented in the final outcome will be considerable. If this complexity can be overcome, there is enormous potential for what the SDGs could deliver as a decisionmaking procedure that would not require frequent returns to the negotiating table. International treaties establish intergovernmental bodies that meet periodically to negotiate decisions on
further implementation. Goals, by contrast, provide a yardstick against which implementation efforts can be assessed, but are not be driven by a meeting schedule. Delegates at Rio+20 recognized that the SDGs would give the international community a chance to spur implementation efforts through a different mechanism than consensusbased negotiations. However, the challenges that goals would allow the international community to avoid first have to be overcome: negotiations must reach consensus. Endnotes 1. Chasek, Pamela S. and Lynn M. Wagner. The Roads from Rio: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations. New York: Routledge, 2012. 2. Hoffmann, Matthew J. Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: Constructing a Global Response. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 3. See Wagner, Lynn M. “A Forty-Year Search for a Single-Negotiating Text: Rio+20 as a Post-Agreement Negotiation.” International Negotiation 18 (2013); Chasek, Pamela S. and Lynn M. Wagner. The Roads from Rio: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations. New York: Routledge, 2012. 4. Meilstrup, Per. “The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15, the UN Climate Change Conference.” Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies (2010): 113–135. 5. Zartman, I. William and Maureen R. Berman. The Practical Negotiator. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
Aid on the Edge of Chaos By BeN RAmALINGAm revIeW By lauren FreDerIC
The true voyage of discovery lies not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes. —MARCEL PROUST
id on the Edge of Chaos” is an eye-opening book that examines international aid: when it works, why it fails, and how it can be improved.1 Author Ben Ramalingam, a researcher with the Overseas Development Institute, focuses on how insights from “complexity science” can help practitioners re-think aid in the post-Millennium Development Goal (MDG) world. Ramalingam reflects on the business model and institutions of aid, and how ideas from complexity science can—and have—been applied to development. He concludes with some exciting prospects for the future of the aid industry. Complexity science is an emerging inter-disciplinary field focused on the study of complex systems. Such systems are composed of interconnected and interacting parts. These parts have little significance individually, and instead must be analyzed in the broader context of the system to which they belong. For real world examples think of an ant colony, a metropolitan city, or agriculture. The objective of complexity science is
to understand the collective behavior of these systems, and how they interact with and adapt to their environments. (For a great overview of complexity science and its application to the global financial sector, I suggest viewing the TED Talk by James B. Glattfelder called “Who controls the world?”).2 While complexity science is employed in several scientific fields, its application to the humanities is largely uncharted. Before applying complex science to development, Ramalingam examines the inner workings of the aid industry and where it has failed. He argues that aid itself, while well intentioned, often undermines development goals such as participation, ownership, and relevance. Central to this problem are the numerous assumptions aid organizations make—for example, that a certain level of investment will lead to economic growth—that shape how the industry learns, makes decisions, and assesses itself. Ramalingam cites the design and implementation of the MDGs as a classic example of prescriptive and ultimately ineffective development. He claims, “At their worst, [the MDGs] are a donor-led, top-down, reductionist agenda—‘minimum development goals’— that pays little attention to locally defined and owned definitions of progress and development.” While some of Ramalingam’s critiques of the MDGs—that they lack accountability, flexibility or local considerations—are not new, he does well framing them within the context of the aid industry. He claims that the aid industry has a tendency to reinforce,
rather than challenge, poor practices, and how this can manifests itself in development organizations. Ramalingam’s insights here can benefit both students and practitioners of development as they reflect on the kind of work environment best suited to learning and professional development. For example, does a potential employer emphasize learning and experimentation, or long standing “best” practices? When projects fail, is the organization willing to abandon ineffective strategies, or does it simply refine existing processes? Ramalingam believes that complexity science can help us understand the shortcomings of development organizations and the aid industry. He describes the evolution of cities to demonstrate the way complex systems develop through a variety of random, historic, and physical characteristics that interact with each other and adapt over time. Like cities, Ramalingam argues that humans have adapted in much the same way, and that human behavior is a result of constant change. He contrasts this theory with that of the ‘rational choice’ actors traditionally presumed in political science and economics. Further, he contends that the problems facing humanity—such as poverty and disease— are also adaptive. Once we recognize these challenges as complex systems, we realize that traditional aid blueprints that target the part rather than the whole are liable to fail. While Ramalingam’s account of complexity is at times dense and CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 32
Lauren Frederic is a first-year MA candidate in the International Development Program. Her interests include economic growth and market facilitation. Before SAIS, she spent four years working with an enterprise and livelihood development organization in Washington, DC.
[t]he aid industry should focus on facilitating adaptive processes that strengthen—rather than replace—local systems…
aid on the edge of chaos
Aid on the Edge of Chaos CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 31
rigorous, his central argument is clear: understanding complexity helps us question—and offer alternatives to—the core assumptions of the aid industry. In the process of developing this thesis, he draws on a rich collection of interventions that have harnessed complexity science in ways that are surprisingly unknown. For example, a complexity-based approach to analyzing and adapting farmer practices was employed to combat malaria in the Mwea region of Kenya. Instead of spraying insecticides—which can cause disease resistance—this approach deployed interventions such as better coordination of farmers, intercropping, using cattle as bait, and mosquitorepelling plants, which were pursued in concert with an understanding of Mwea’s social and political environment. This integrated approach has significantly reduced cases of malaria. Furthermore, complexity does not just apply to aid interventions. According to Ramalingam, development organizations themselves have much to learn from complexity science. He cites work from Eva Schiffer, a researcher who developed an approach to analyzing what Ramalingam calls “complex governance systems.” He argues that Schiffer’s network analysis tool can help groups of actors, such as multiple aid organizations working together in a complex humanitarian crisis, understand how they
are linked and their level of influence. This enables them to more effectively deploy aid. Thus, complexity can tell us a great deal about the process of development, and how aid organizations can be best positioned in the development landscape. I believe this insight has significant implications for the increasing fragmentation of aid, wherein bilateral, multilateral, public, and private donors are deploying efforts in uncoordinated and often conflicting ways. After exploring numerous examples of applied complexity, Ramalingam proposes some broad advice for the aid industry. He suggests that we focus on: • Developing tools to facilitate adaptive learning in the face of complex challenges, from poverty alleviation and food security to natural resource management; • Supporting organizational cultures of learning, with a willingness to accept change as inevitable, and an ability to engage in interventions as experiments; • Designing process-based approaches better suited to complex and unstructured problems; and • Striking a balance between no strategy at all and the inelasticity of universal blueprints. Overall, Ramalingam’s recommendations for the future of aid are informed and inspiring. He contends that the
successes of interventions that have taken on a more systemic and adaptive approach point towards a fundamental shift in development philosophy. Furthermore, I think Ramalingam would propose that static benchmarks—such like those outlined by the MDGs—be abandoned entirely. Instead, the aid industry should focus on facilitating adaptive processes that strengthen—rather than replace— local systems, which can experiment, investigate, and respond as new learning emerges. But just as Ramalingam has dismissed pre-packaged best practices in aid, he cautions readers not to misinterpret complexity as the panacea. While complexity science can guide the aid industry towards new possibilities and approaches, it cannot offer an exact blueprint for the future. The challenge for readers, especially those working in the aid industry, is to apply the approach outlined by Ramalingam to encourage this type of thinking where it currently does not exist. How can we as practitioners, after replacing our old eyes with new ones, begin the conversation regarding complexity in the face of aid’s current model? Endnotes 1. Ramalingam, Benjamin. Aid on the Edge of Chaos. Oxford University Press, 2013. 2. If interested in the TED Talk, see: http:// www.ted.com/talks/james_b_glattfelder_who_ controls_the_world.
International Development Program update Deborah Bräutigam, Director of the
book, Working with the Grain:
Katherine Diefenbach, now a full time
International Development (IDev)
Integrating Governance and Growth
ma student at SaIS concentrating in
Program and Professor of International
in Development Strategies, will be
african Studies, currently manages
Development and Comparative Politics,
published by Oxford university Press in
the IDev Summer Internship Program.
continues in her second year with
September of this year.
She also served as IDev Program Coordinator through january 2013.
the Program. her new book, with the working title Feeding Frenzy: China,
tanvi Nagpal is in her fourth year with
Africa, and Global Food Security, is
IDev as Professorial lecturer and
Marriet “tina” Evangelista, IDev’s
under contract with Oxford university
faculty advisor, and was just appointed
Program assistant, continues in her third year with the program.
Press. the book examines the myths
and realities of Chinese agricultural
Professor nagpal also leads the new
investment in africa in the context of
Robin Washington, Program administrator and Program
global concern about food security.
Dorothy sobol, coordinator for the
Coordinator, provides support to john
Cinnamon Dornsife is in her ninth
emerging markets specialization,
lipsky, Senior Fellow with the SaIS
year with IDev. She is now serving
remains an IDev Senior adjunct
Foreign Policy Institute (and former
as Senior associate Director and
First Deputy managing Director of the International monetary Fund). She also
continues in her appointment as associate Practitioner in residence.
Melissa thomas, Senior associate
supports a range of IDev leadership
Professor Dornsife is leading the
Professor of International
development activities, including the
work in expanding opportunities in
Development, continues in her ninth
new IDev Practicum, the Development
social entrepreneurship at SaIS, in
year with IDev. her book, with the
roundtable, and all other major IDev events.
collaboration with the SaIS net Impact
working title Governing While Poor,
and Careers in Development student
was accepted by Columbia university
clubs, where she serves as faculty
Press and will be published in 2015. the
Kisha Manning served as IDev
policy essay argues that the poverty
Program Coordinator from February
of some governments means that they
2013 through march 2014.
Maya Ajmera, in her third year as
not only govern less, but that they
visiting Scholar and Professorial
must govern differently.
all of us in IDev extend our deep appreciation and thanks to hilary
lecturer, is currently working on a foreign affairs book with the working
Bob thompson, visiting research
Kinka, editor-in-Chief of this year’s
title Invisible: The Plight of Children
Scholar and Professorial lecturer, with
SAIS Perspectives, and her outstanding
Globally in 21st Century.
a joint appointment in IDev and ere, is
editorial team: ally Carragher, julia
in his third year with SaIS. he leads the
Wallin, jenny lu, jacob morrin, and
William A. Douglas, IDev Poet laureate, serves IDev as a Senior advisor.
Alan trager joined IDev this year as
a visiting Scholar and Professorial
Brian Levy, Senior adjunct Professor,
lecturer. he is responsible for
continues his teaching at SaIS in
initiatives involving public-private
the fall semesters. his upcoming
Alumni update sushil Lamsal (IDev ‘13) re-joined
Benning, Georgia. he is conducting
and jobs. Check us out at www.
her previous job at the ministry of
his initial officer’s training in armor
Foreign affairs of the Government
and reconnaissance. Scheduled to
of nepal after graduating from SaIS
complete the training this summer,
Megan vaughan-Albert (IDev ’13)
matt will then be assigned to the 2nd
works for the avascent Group, a
at the South asia Division, where
Stryker Brigade Combat team, 2nd
research and consulting firm in
her job is to brief policy makers on
Infantry Division out of Fort lewis,
DC, participating in the limited
recent developments in the political,
Washington, where he hopes to lead
international development and non-
economic and social spheres. her
a platoon. Despite his career choice
profit consulting her firm pursues.
little son, born three days after she
being largely absent of IDev, he has
She spends the majority of her time
joined SaIS, is now 30 months old, and
zero regrets for having chosen the
researching the business environment
observing how he is growing takes the
best concentration offered at SaIS,
of Federal government information
rest of Sushil’s time and attention.
technology and communications
Ingrid Larson (IDev ’13) graduated
Nadir shams (IDev ’13) started
and has been living happily ever after.
from SaIS in may 2013, and joined
work as a Consultant at Dalberg
in may 2013. She is under Secretary
markets. megan got married in august
Global Development advisors in
at the World Wildlife Fund (WWF),
nairobi, Kenya in September 2013,
in nairobi since graduation from SaIS
a leading international conservation
and is working on strategy and
in 2012. She currently works in mobile
organization. She helps manage
data collection, but has also started
WWF’s global partnership with the
based on evaluations of large
a business selling bags made from
Coca-Cola Company to conserve
regional development institutions.
used leather jackets and african fabric.
freshwater resources and improve
Organization range from a top-10
Check out her site at https://zokobags.
environmental performance across the
private financial institution to a high-
company’s value chain.
end agricultural bioscience laboratory facility focused on developing african
tricia Cuna Weaver (IDev ’12) is
Carolyn Nash (2013 Perspectives
scientists. While still settling into the
a Consultant at enclude (formerly
editor-in-Chief, IDev ’13) and Jason
nairobi community, he and fellow
ShoreBank International), an advisory
Loughnane (2012 Perspectives editor-
alumni look forward to entertaining
firm focused on promoting inclusive,
in-Chief, IDev ’12) were married on
sustainable growth in emerging
2013. the ceremony was officiated by
Marisol trowbridge (IDev ’13) has
Inclusive Finance practice, with a focus
markets. She works primarily in the
the national mall on September 1st,
zoe Cohen (IDev ’12) has been living
the Private Sector engagement team
joseph t. Wilson (2012 Perspectives
been working to launch Puzzle
on strengthening financial institutions’
editor, IDev ’13) and documented by
apparel, an online custom fashion
capacity to lend to small and medium
photographer Kishor nagula (SaIS
company that allows shoppers
enterprises (Sme) through Sme
’12). two days after their nuptials,
to style their own clothes using
banking assessments and credit
the couple moved to nairobi, Kenya,
handmade accent materials by
scorecard development. Based in DC,
where jason is an Investment Fellow
american artisans. they support
she travels frequently to countries
with Grameen Foundation’s Capital
american makers by producing
including romania, Pakistan, armenia,
markets team, and Carolyn works as
everything in the uS, and promote
the Communications Coordinator for
sustainable fashion by offering classic
refugees united, a technology nGO
styles and heirloom products to last
that reconnects separated refugee
a lifetime. you might think that an
a monitoring and evaluation team at
families. Carolyn and jason would like
IDev concentrator would be overseas
the World Bank. Since graduation from
to thank Professor Cinnamon Dornsife
doing this, but while exploring
SaIS, she has been blogging about
saudamini Dabak (IDev ’12) works on
business models at SaIS, marisol
books and movies, hiking whenever
had a lot of people from her home
possible, and recently started
Matt Putkoski (IDev ’13) is serving as a
state, maine, ask why she had to go
Second lieutenant in the united States
overseas to make a difference when
army, currently stationed at Fort
people at home also needed support
for her prescient hiring decisions.
CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 35
continent, sailing on weekends, and
Donika hristova (IDev ’09) recently
CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 34
rediscovering her roots.
launched a socially responsible
sam Duncan (IDev ’12) moved to
Marguerite Nowak (IDev ’11) worked
called amore. She is excited to bring
london to take on the position of
in South Sudan, during its first two
gelato that is made with organic
associate Director of Impact at
years of independence, with the un
milk and cream, fresh ingredients,
leapFrog Investments in april 2013.
Development Programme on several
and no preservatives to the DC
She now leads leapFrog’s social
state-building projects. there were
area, while also supporting the
impact assessment initiatives and
many other SaISers in the country
local community: 5 percent of all
global framework on profit with
and she had frequent visits from
sales are contributed to the poverty
meredith Street (IDev ’11). after a
alleviation efforts of martha’s table.
gourmet gelato company in DC
short break to travel around the
amore gelato has an online store
uS (and re-connecting with many
and delivers anywhere in the DC
in nairobi for Dalberg Global
SaISers), she is heading off to
Development advisors, a strategy-
afghanistan with unhCr.
Marcus Watson (IDev ’12) works
consulting firm doing international
Ayesha Wagle (IDev ’08) left her
development-related work. he
Kris Cronin (IDev ’10) recently moved
position at microCredit enterprises
focuses primarily on the role of the
back to the DC area from london,
last year to join Komaza, a social
private sector in development and
where she was leading monitoring
enterprise working to grow trees
advises governments, investors,
and evaluation teams on two large
and create sustainable economic
corporations and foundations
DFID-funded programs for justice
opportunities for rural dryland
on strategy, performance and
in Sudan and public administration
farmers in Kenya. She is based in San
reform in nigeria. She and her
Francisco, but visits Kenya often!
husband just bought a house in
Joe Wilson (IDev ’12) cashed in
Kensington, mD, and are looking
Nichole Graber-simmons (IDev
a lifetime of good karma points
forward to catching up with SaISers!
’07) currently works for uSaID as
law ’11) hand in marriage over
Kristina Ortiz (IDev ’10) is currently
Governance Officer. after finishing a
the 2013 holiday season on a
working on an early Warning
tour in haiti, she is now the Director
beach in zanzibar. (hat tip to two
System for Food Security in
of the Office of Citizen Security
fellow Perspectives editors for their
to secure jung hwa Song’s (Int’l
a foreign service Democracy and
madagascar under a uSaID Food
in Kingston, jamaica, where she
role in the proposal.) the couple
For Peace program called SalOhI
manages programs related to at-
lives in DC where jung hwa is
(Strengthening and accessing
risk youth, workforce development,
finishing her j.D. at Georgetown
livelihood Opportunities for
community-based policing, rule of
law and joe is working for uSaID’s
law, anti-corruption, and education.
and Impact. Wedding bells are
vanessa Fajans-turner (IDev ’09)
Jeffrey A. Brez (IDev ’06) has
planned for may 2015.
is the assistant director of the
joined the Department of Public
Center for accelerating Innovation
Information at the united nations
Amina Muhtar (IDev ’11) has been
she manages a diverse portfolio
Secretariat in new york. he is
living in nigeria since graduating
of climate change and sustainable
Chief of nGO relations, advocacy
from SaIS. amina initially worked
energy initiatives. her role with the
and Special events. In this
on setting up one of the first
Foundation continues to build on
capacity, jeffrey develops creative
conditional cash transfer programs
her SaIS training and international
partnerships with television, film and
for rural primary health care facilities
interests, taking her to amazonian
celebrity advocates. Follow him on
under a nationwide maternal and
Brazil, the mongolian Steppe, rural
Child health initiative for the Federal
Kenya and special economic zones
Government of nigeria. amina
across China. She is currently with
Jeremiah Grossman (IDev ’05) is
currently works as a consultant
the production team for the climate-
now married with a young daughter.
with mcKinsey & Company’s lagos
focused television series yearS OF
he is working as a consultant on
office and spends a lot of time
lIvInG DanGerOuSly, which will
legal and regulatory issues related to
serving clients in West africa.
premiere on Showtime in april 2014.
financial inclusion. Based in the DC
She enjoys travelling across the
CoNTINUeD oN PAGe 36
avatar alliance Foundation, where
Blair Glencorse (IDev ’04) continues
everyone there. She is working for the
CoNTINUeD FRom PAGe 35
to run the accountability lab,
asian Development Bank (aDB) on a
which he founded in 2012. the lab
project to engage civil society and put
area, he travels overseas regularly for
co-creates innovative solutions to
together a strategy for ensuring civil
corruption across africa and South
society participation in aDB-financed
asia, and has won a number of awards
projects in myanmar. lainie’s portfolio
Anne Knight (IDev ’05) left the
for its new ideas in the field. Blair is
covers Southeast asia, and so through
humanitarian assistance policy
also advising the Club de madrid—a
work she’s meet up with many SaIS
position she held for two years in
group of former Presidents and Prime
alums in Cambodia, thailand, manila,
the Office of the under Secretary
ministers—on youth leadership issues.
and vietnam, which she enjoyed. aDB
of Defense for Policy last may. She
he can generally be found drinking
has a growing SaIS alumni network
then became Program manager for
tea in either Kathmandu, monrovia, or
itself, with over a dozen now.
the Department of Defense’s largest
capacity-building program, which
susannah Leisher (SC&D ’92) is very
provides training and equipment to
Rachel Wax (SC&D ’02) has been
much enjoying her second year of the
countries to enable them to effectively
working as an independent consultant
mSc in epidemiology at the london
conduct counterterror and stability
in Dakar, Senegal for the past 4 years.
School of hygiene and tropical
operations. anne recently led program
She is there with her husband and two
medicine, and is planning to finish
assessment trips to afghanistan and
young daughters. Before Senegal, she
the degree next year. She has been
Kenya, the latter of which found her
worked on post-conflict programming
researching classification systems
in nairobi just as the Westgate mall
for uSaID from Washington DC and
for causes of stillbirth and neonatal
attack began. as a former Peace
death with the mater medical research
Corps volunteer, Foreign affairs Lainie thomas (SC&D ’96) has had
presented initial results at the annual
Communication Strategist at uS africa
quite a year! On november 8th, the
International Stillbirth alliance
Command, anne enjoys talking with
most powerful typhoon to ever hit
conference in hanoi, vietnam last
SaIS students about their career goals
land devastated a huge swath of
October. her husband, Craig, continues
and encourages current students to
the Philippines. although in manila
at the nature Conservancy. they enjoy
contact her (through the IDev office)
at the time, which was not hit, the
raising their fantastic boys, zimri, 13,
if interested in learning more about
typhoon had a tremendous impact on
Kai, 12, and Ilem, 10, in new jersey.
careers with the federal government.
Institute in Brisbane, australia, and
Officer at the State Department, and
about thE baCk CovEr PhotograPh Photographer: Jen Ottolino Location: Between Ngorongoro Crater and Serengeti, Tanzania Date: February 2014 â€œThe Maasaiâ€? was taken in early February, during a visit to a Maasai village located on the northern Tanzanian safari route between Ngorongoro Crater and Serengeti. The
Maasai are a semi-nomadic tribe whose lands extend from southern Kenya through northern Tanzania. They graze small herds of cows and goats on these territories, setting up and then dismantling small villages as they go. The Maasai women in the photo greeted us wearing the flowing purple, blue and red robes that are typical of the Maasai, and then performed a traditional song and dance.
thE viSion oF thE Front and baCk CovErS The front and back covers are meant be juxtaposed to reflect the focus of this issue: a place where the vastness of development potential intersects with the individual character of emerging and developing communities. How can we, as interested participants who study these issues from varying angles, provide balanced solutions that account for economic progress while at the same time respecting and leaving room for
simultaneous evolutions of cultural and community traditions? Marwa Yasmine Abdou is a secondyear MA candidate concentrating in International Development. She worked as a consultant for Ernst & Young MENA and the OECD, and plans to continue focusing on trade and development issues in South Asia and Francophone Africa going forward.
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) International Development Program 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Office 728 Washington, DC 20036 202.663.5929