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Philippine Institute for Development Studies

Local Government Financing of Social Service Sectors in a Decentralized Regime: Special Focus on Provincial Governments in 1993 and 1994 Rosario G. Manasan DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 97-04

The PIDS Discussion Paper Series constitutes studies that are preliminary and subject to further revisions. They are being circulated in a limited number of copies only for purposes of soliciting comments and suggestions for further refinements. The studies under the Series are unedited and unreviewed. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute. Not for quotation without permission from the author(s) and the Institute.

February 1997 For comments, suggestions or further inquiries please contact: The Research Information Staff, Philippine Institute for Development Studies 3rd Floor, NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, Philippines Tel Nos: 8924059 and 8935705; Fax No: 8939589; E-mail: publications@pidsnet.pids.gov.ph Or visit our website at http://www.pids.gov.ph


Rosario G. Manasan

,August

1996


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

7.

i

INTRODUCTION

1

1.1 1.2

6 7

Objectives Organization of the Study

DEGREE OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

7

2. I 2.2

8 10

All LGUs Provincial Governments

LGU INCOME

10

3.1 3.2

13 13

All LGUs Provincial Governments

LGU EXPENDITURES

17

4.1 4.2

17 20

All LGUs Provincial Governments

SOCIAL SERVICE EXPENDITURES AND AFTER DEVOLUTION 5.1 5.2

6.

SUMMARY

BEFORE

All LGUs Provincial Governments

23 23 25

DETERMINANTS OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS' SOCIAL AND HUMAN PRIORITY EXPENDITURES

28

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

33

BIBLIOGRAPHY

36


LIST OF TABLES Page Table 1

Devolved Functions of National Government Agencies

Table 2

Number of Devolved Personnel, 1992

4

Table 3

Agency Budgets and Devolution, 1992 (in thousand pesos)

5

Table 4

Decentralized Ratios for All LGUs, 1985-1993

9

Table 5

Financial Autonomy Ratio of Different Levels of Local Governments, 1985-1993

11

Top 10 and Bottom 10 Provinces with Respect to Financial Autonomy Ratio

12

Top 10 and Bottom 10 Provinces with Respect to Per Capita IRA & Per Capita Local Source Revenue

14

Top 10 and Bottom 10 Provinces with Respect to Per Capita Total Social Service Expenditures & Per Capita Human Priority Expenditures

21

Top 10 and Bottom 10 Provinces with Respect to Social Allocation Ratio and Human Development Priority Ratio

22

Local Government Expenditure Before and After Devolution (in million pesos)

24

Difference Between 1993 and 1991 Per Capita Real Expenditure Levels and Real Per Capita Net Resource Transfer

26

Difference Between 1994 and 1991 Per Capita Real Expenditure Levels and Real Per Capita Net Resource Transfer

27

Determinants of 1993 Per Capita Provincial Government Expenditure in Social Sectors

30

Determinants of 1994 Per Capita Provincial Government Expenditures in Social Sectors

32

Table 6

Table 7

Table 8

Table 9

Table 10

Table 11

Table 12

Table 13

Table 14

2-3


LIST OF FIGURES

Page Figure 1

Revenue Structure of All Local Governments, (Ratio to GNP in Percent) 1981-1994

15

Revenue Structure of All Local Governments, (Ratio to Total Income in %) 1981-1994

16

Ratio to GNP of Local Government Expenditures (in percent)

18

Sectoral Distribution of Local Government Expenditures (in percent)

19

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

LIST OF ANNEX TABLES

Annex Table 1

Annex Table 2

Annex Table 3

Annex Table 4

Annex Table 5

Financial Autonomy Ratio of Provincial Governments, 1991, 1993 and 1994

37

Per Capita IRA, Local Revenue and Total Receipts of Provincial Governments, 1991, 1993 and 1994

38

Ratio of Local Source Revenue and IRA to Total Receipts, 1991, 1993 and 1994 (in percent)

39

Per Capita Total Social Sector Expenditures and Per Capita Human Priority Expenditures, 1991, 1993 and 1994

40

Social Allocation Ratio and Human Development Priority Ratio, 1991, 1993 and 1994

41


LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING OF SOCIAL SERVICE SECTORS IN A DECENTRALIZED REGLA4E: SPECIAL FOCUS ON PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS IN 1993 AND 1994

Rosario G. Manasan

*

The mandated transfer to LGUs of functions previously discharged by national government agencies caused a major shift in the size and composition of LGU budgets. Aggregate LGU expenditure rose from 1.9 percent of GNP in 1991 (the yearprior to the implementation of the Local Government Code) to 3.3 percent in 1994 (the second year of devolution). The share of social services in the LGU budget expanded from 15.4 percent to 27.0 percent. In the case of provincial governments, their total expenditure grew from 0.5 percent of GNP in 1991 to 0.8 percent of GNP in 1994. The share of social services in provincial governments' budgets increased from 17.9 percent to 36.3 percent.

*

In 1993 and 1994, a good number of provinces failed to allocate adequate resources to preserve their 1991 expenditure levels on the social sectors in real terms after adjusting for the cost of devolved functions. For instance, 32 provinces in 1993 (13 provinces in 1994) allocated less on the social sectors in the aggregate than what is needed to maintain their 1991 expenditure level in real terms after adjusting for the cost of devolved functions. Similarly, 47 (22) provincial governments spent less resources on health in 1993 (1994) than what one would expect if they had preserved their 1991 expenditure level in real terms. Likewise, 27 (30) provinces allotted less resources on social welfare in 1993 (1994) than what is needed to preserve the 1991 real expenditure level.

*

An analysis of the determinants of LGU spending on social services and human development priorities in 1993 and 1994 show that: (i) Higher per capita IRA tends to be associated with higher per capita social sector expenditure and higher per capita human priority expenditure. (ii) Provincial governments which were relative losers in 1993/1994 (in terms of their per capita net resource transfer _) tend to spend a higher portion of their IRA on the margin on social services and human development priority. Despite this, however, many

INet resource transfer

is equal to the difference between the increase in the IRA and the cost of devolved thnctions

resulting from the implementation

of the Local Government

Code.


provincial government which had low net resource transfer in 1993 and 1994 were not able to maintain their 1991 social sector spending in real per capita terms in 1993. (iii) the budget allocation of provincial governments on the social sectors (and on human development priorities) is not consistent with objective, indicators of need (i.e., human development status). That is, provincial government expenditures on social services and human development priorities appear to be unrelated to the human development index in the current year. *

The findings of the study suggest the need to establish the link between social service expenditures and human priority expenditures, on the one hand, and human development outcomes, on the other hand, in the consciousness of local government officials.

*

There is also a need to review the IRA allocation formula with the end in view of developing a system that will equalize net fiscal capacities (i.e., revenue potential less expenditure need) of LGUs. While the revision done in 1994 attempted to address this problem more remains to be done.


1.

INTRODUCTION

The enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC or the Code) of 1991 represents a major shift in local governance. It mandates the devolution to local government units (LGUs) of many of the functions previously discharged by central government agencies. Prior to the implementation of the Code, the functions assigned to LGUs were limited to levying and collecting local taxes, issuing and enforcing regulations (primarly those related to the operation of business activities in their jurisdictions), and administering certain services and facilities like garbage collection, public cemeteries, public markets, and slaughterhouses. Then, LGUs played a secondary role in agricultural planning and extension, construction and maintenance of local roads and public buildings, and operation of high schools, hospitals/health services with national government agencies carrying the primary responsibility for the delivery of said services. In contrast, the LGC mandated the transfer from national government agencies to LGUs of the primary responsibility and authority for delivering basic services and facilities within their localities in the following areas: agricultural research extension, social forestry, environmental management and pollution control, primary health care and hospital care, social welfare services, repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, water supply projects and communal irrigation projects and land use planning (Table 1). The devolution is substantial not only in terms of the sheer number of functions that were shifted but more so in terms of number of personnel transferred (Table 2) and the corresponding reductions implied in national agency budgets (Table 3). The Code also provides for a higher LGU share in internal revenue taxes and in the proceeds from the development and extraction of natural resources. Furthermore, it allows LGUs greater atttonomy not only in mobilizing revenue from local sources but also in allocating their resources to their various needs. Thus, the Code expanded the tax base of LGUs to include products, activities and sectors (like agricultural products sold by non-marginal farmers and fishermen, forest concessions and products sold by the concessionaire themselves, mines, mining operations and mineral products when sold domestically by the primary producers themselves, printing and publication of newspaper, magazine, review or bulletin appearing at regular intervals and having fixed prices for subscription and sale, banks and other financial institutions) that used to be outside the reach of local taxation. At the same time, the Code increased the maximum allowable rates at which most local taxes may be levied. However, it effectively reduced the assessment levels (for purposes of real property taxation) for residential land, all types of buildings and improvements, and all types of machinery. The Code, likewise, repealed some of the statutory requirements that limited the latitude of LGUs in allocating their budgets. For instance, the mandatory contribution to the Philippine National Police (equal to 18 percent of LGUs' annual general fund regular income) and to hospitals operated by the Department of Health (equal to 3-5 percent) were abolished. However, other mandatory expenditure items like the statutory reserves for calamities were increased. The Code also increased the number of mandatory positions in the local bureaucracy.


._.,

Table 1 DEVOLVED FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAGENCIES* ., ,:,,:,,., :,,,,.-_i,,,!,:,,, :,,i_,• ":'-'...,i ,, ,, ,:.,, ,,, ,,, • ....."::" NGAs "i:,, ,,

, I

,

...... •" .... ,

"

"l

DePartment of Agrarian Reform

"

""

' ::" , ..FUNCTIONS._ .....

,, "

.. :. "

-,,

:

, ,.i":

,i,_,:,;,i _, • ,.,,,_,!:,'

..-ii"... " . ..-.i,:i: "

.;,i'i;,,

land and homwdevelopment improvement projects.

Department of Agriculture

- agricultural and fisheryextension services; - regulationof agriculturaland fishery activity; - conduct of agriculturaland fishery research activities; - procurementand distributionof certified seeds; - purchase, expansionand conservationof breedingstocks; - construction, repairand rehabilitationof water impounding systems; - support to fishermen, including purchase of fishing nets and other materials.

....................................................................................................................

'_ E i ,E

Department of Budget and Management

- local governmentbudgetofficer services.

Department of Environment and Natural Resources

- forest managementservices; mine and geo-sciencesservices; environmentalmanagementservices; reforestationprojects; integratedsocial forestryprojects; watershed rehabilitationprojects.

Department of Health

extension of medical and health services through provincialhealth office, district, municipaland medicare communityhospitals; purchase of drugs and medicines; implementationof primaryhealth care programs; field health services; aid to puericulture; construction,repair, rehabilitation and renovation of provincial, district, municipal and medicare hospitals; and provisionfor the operationof 5-bed health infimaries.

:..- ......................................

• ...............

1/2 2


Table 1 DEVOLVED FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAGENCIES* .,"i:

"

"

'i'_. " -": .iI

.:: --

"

_.... . '"

NGAS:.:/ ,i_ii/.:_ i:i • ,'. ,

_' ...... ::

,,..

" :

'..

FUNCTIONS

Department of Public Work and Highways

repairand maintenanceof infrastructurefacilities; water supplyprojects;and communalirrigationprojects.

Department of Social Welfare and Development

implementationof community-based programforrebel returnees; provisionfor the operationof a daycarecenterin everybarangay; provisionfor povertyalleviationin low-incomemunicipalities and depressedurbanbarangays.

Department of Tourism

domestictourismpromotion; tourism standard regulation.

Department of Trade and Industry

promotionand developmentof trade, industry and related institutionalservices.

Department of Transportation and Communication

telecommunicationservices; transportationfranchisingand regulatoryservices.

Cooperatives Development Authority

promotion,developmentand regulation of cooperativesfunction; cooperativesfield operationfunction.

Housingand Land Use Regulatory Board

regulation of human settlement plans and programsfunction.

Philippine Gamefowl Commission

regulation and supervisionof cockfightingfunction.

. .: _ :

'il ...._:: i_i i:: ... ..._i:_:_-.

.-

2/2 • In addition, functions and locally-funded projects of the Commission on Population, Fiber Industry Development Authority, NationalAgricultural Fishery Council, Livestock Development Council and National Meat Inspection Commission are also devolved. Source: Executive Order 507 fn: Igctbl .wkl 8-9-96 3


Table 2 NUMBER OF DEVOLVED PERSONNEL, 1992 r

.. '

" '

" •

" " •

. •.]

' ". ,:. -.

.,"'

..

..

,

"

:: EPARTMENTIAGE ' ..... ............. , :

D t

' "

-

, ,,,..-...-.

;,.,.. ,.

:

• .

E

..

.

NCY

:,, .... .

....

PERSONNEL : . ' :'BEFORE DEVOLUTION, •NUMB ROF

,

: •.

......- .:

i...,-..:.T, " -..,,,, .,...

PERSONNEL.. : NUMBEROF:-_;-::: . ........ AFTER :-: -, ; DEVOLVED.i::-:: DEVOLUTION PERSONNEL. NUMBER OF::"-- : ::: :::: : -i: ':' " -:i -:::::

Department of Agriculture

29,638

11,965

17,673

Office of the Secretary National Mea_ Inspection Commission Department of Budget and Management Department of Environment and Natural Resources Department of Health Department of Social Welfare and Development Other Executive Offices

29,234 404 3,532 21,320 74,896 6,932 • 191

11,570 395 1,882 20,425 29,000 2,788 166

17,664 9 1,650 895 45,896 4,144 25

166

25

Philippine Gamefowl Commission Total

191 136,509

Source: 1993 National Expenditure Program, Regional Coordination Staff

fn: Igctb2.wkl 8-9-96

66_226

...

70,283=


Table 3 AGENCY BUDGETS AND DEVOLUTION, 1992, (In thousand pesos) :'""

....... DEVOLVED AGENCY

" ',

" ""'

:

:

BUDGET BEFORE 'DEVOLUTION

• Department of Agrarian Reform Department of Agriculture De _artment of Budget and Management De _artment of Environment and Natural Resources De _artment of Health De 3artment of Public Works and Highways De _artment of Social Welfare and Development De Jartment of Tourism De _artment of Transportation and Communication Philippine Gamefowl Commission Total

1,842,374 5,210,028 465,379 1,941,782 9,991,392 27,109,267 1,320,708 207,721 7,563,929 15,208 ___5_5,667,788

1,832,985 4,154,408 292,532 3,774,107 6,140,313 26,012,920 454,288 204,968 7,563,832 6,503 ___5_0,436,856

.....

,/ Based on the 1992 Expenditure Program and incorporates full year impact of the functionslprojectslactivities devolved. Captures only expenditures of devolving agencies (i.e., Office of the Secretary of Departments except for the Department of Agriculture which also includes the National Meat Inspection Commision). Source: 1993 National Expenditure Program

fn: Igctb3.wkl 8-9-96

"

"

i,

BUDGET i i:i ' . . .::.:;;:!:i_:i;;. AFTER :: .... ' DEVOLVED ii_i?::::;:ii DEVOLUTION : ::':: BUDGET: ;:;_;i:::iZ;:.:;ill ,i i: ::::;_ 9,389 1,055,620 172,847 167,675 3,851,079 1.096,347 866,420 2,753 97 8,705 7,_230,932 t


Since the implementation of the Code, significant progress has been achieved in devolving personnel, assets and functions from national government agencies to LGUs. At the same time, the LGU share in internal revenue taxes (most commonly referred to as the internal revenue allotment or IRA) has more than doubled relative to GNP and in real per capita terms between 1991 and 1994. The present study documents how LGUs are budgeting the larger resource pool that is now available to them in the new decentralized regime. The importance of this exercise is grounded on three points. First, while the increase in the IRA is sufficient to cover the cost of the devolved functions in the aggregate, it cannot be denied that there is a mismatch of the financial resources and the expenditure responsibilities that were transferred to LGUs as a result of the 1991 LGC at the micro level. Thus, the increase in the IRA share of some LGUs in 1993 and 1994 is not enough to finance the functions that were devolved to them. This problem was particularly pronounced in 1993. The partial realignment of the IRA distribution formula (with the distribution of the cost of devolved functions) in 1994 alleviated but did not totally eliminate the problem. Second, the IRA is an unconditional block transfer from the national government. As such, the provision of adequate funding support for devolved functions through the IRA does not necessarily guarantee that LGUs will in fact set aside the appropriate level of resources for these functions. Devolved functions will have to compete with other spending priorities of local officials. Third, LGU spending behavior, particularly with respect to the social sectors, bears close monitoring at this point because a substantial portion of health and social welfare functions have been shifted to LGUs. Unlike before, it is no longer enough to keep track of changes in the size and composition of central government expenditures. More than ever, it is critical that one accounts for local governmer_t expenditures on the social sectors. 1.1.

Objectives

The general objective of this paper is to determine whether local governments, in general, and provincial governments, in particular, allocate their budget resources in accordance with human priority development imperatives in the context of the more decentralized environment. More specifically, this study aims: *

to analyze the expenditure pattern of provincial governments before and after devolution;

*

to relate provincial governments' spending on social and human priority needs to the provinces' human development status; and

*

to investigate the impact of local revenues and IRA shares on the expenditure pattern of provincial governments.

While the Code in 1993. In response devolved activities, the equivalent to 50 percent

itself took effect in 1992, the devolution program was completed only to pressure from LGUs which experienced difficulties in financing central government decided in 1994 to provide each LGU an amount of the total cost of devolved functions before apportioning the remaining


IRA (after deducting the amount distributed according to the cost of devolved functions) according to the distribution formula prescribed in the LGC. Thus, being a transition period, the situation in 1993/1994 was rather fluid as LGUs adjust to the new environment. Admittedly, this condition limits the conclusions of this study. However, it cannot be denied that a better understanding of the transition and early problems of Code implementation is important in itself if the decentralization process is to be sustained. Finally, it should also be emphasized that efficient expenditure management (i.e., ensuring that the government gets the biggest bang for the buck) is as important as securing adequate levels of government expenditure on social and human development priorities. Thus, by focusing only on the social and human development priority ratio and on per capita levels of social and human development expenditures, this paper does not quite capture the possibility that some local governments may derive better outcomes from the same expenditure levels than others. 1.2.

Organization

of the Study

The next Chapter provides an overview of the trends in fiscal decentralization in 19851994 using four alternative measures: the revenue decentralization ratio, the expenditure decentralization ratio, the modified expenditure decentralization ratio and the financial autonomy ratio. Chapter 3 paints a picture in broad strokes of the changing size and composition of local government income while Chapter 4 focuses on local government expenditure. Chapter 5 evaluates whether LGUs have indeed contributed positively to increasing public sector spending on social services in the post devolution period. It is argued that it is not enough to compare the nominal levels of LGU expenditure before and after devolution. Rather, it is essential that the analysis takes into account adjustments for the cost of devolved functions. Chapter 6 studies the determinants of the LGU social sector spending using regression analysis. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the study and draws some of policy implications. 2.

DEGREE OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

In this section, four alternative indicators of fiscal decentralization were used. First, the venue decentralization ratio (RDR) measures the relative significance of local revenues in neral government revenue._ It is defined as the share of LGUs in total general government venue. Second, the expenditure decentralization ratio (EDR) measures the importance of local penditures in general government expenditures. It is defined as the share of LGUs in general _Jvernment expenditure. Third, the modified expenditure decentralization ratio (MEDR) takes into account the fact that some government expenditures like those on debt service are difficult to decentralize. The MEDR, thus, nets out debt service from total expenditures in arriving at the expenditure decentralization ratio. Finally, the financial autonomy ratio (FAR) provides an

IGeneral government

is comprised

of the central governm.-nt and local government units.

7


indication of local government independence from central government funding. percentage of locally raised revenue to total local expenditure.

It is the

The financial autonomy ratio as well as the revenue decentralization ratio focus on the relative significance of locally sourced revenues. As such, these indicators may be misleading indicators of local autonomy in cases (like the Philippines) where taxes assigned to LGUs are rather limited and where transfers from the central government to the local governments are mandated by law to be substantial. It should be noted that while Philippine LGUs have relatively little scope for raising own source revenues, they do exercise considerable autonomy in deciding how to spend their total resources including their share in internal revenue taxes collected by the central government. Moreover, while the IRA is a transfer from the national government to LGUs, it is not clear that it should be viewed as a grant but rather as the rightful share of local governments in national taxes. However, LGU-to-LGU variations in the RDR and the FAR do measure the extent to which some LGUs are more (or less) financially autonomous relative to others. That is, LGUs that impose higher local taxes and collect them more efficiently will score higher on the RDR and the FAR than others. In sum, the expenditure decentralization ratio provides a better picture of the degree of fiscal decentralization over time in the Philippine case. It captures very well the shift in expenditure responsibilities that devolution brought about. However, the revenue decentralization ratio and the financial autonomy ratio are superior in focusing attention on how well local governments have performed to relative each other in utilizing their revenue raising powers to finance local needs. 2.1.

All LGUs

Public sector finance in recent Philippine history is largely concentrated at the center with local governments accounting for 4.9 percent of total general government t revenue on the a_,erage between 1985 and 1991 (Table 4). Contrary to initial expectations, the revenue decentralization ratio rose only slightly to 5.4 percent in 1992-1994. This occurred as the share of LGUs in general government revenue declined from 4.6 percent in 1991 to 4.4 percent in 1992 before making a quick recovery to 6.4 percent in 1993 and finally settling down at 5.4 percent in 1994. However, the degree of fiscal decentralization appears to be slightly higher and to have intensified significantly with the enactment of the 1991 LGC if one looks at the expenditure decentralization ratio. Thus, LGUs accounted for 7.0 percent of general government expenditure (or 1.6 percent of GNP) in 1985-1991. As expected, fiscal decentralization deepened in 19921994 with the share of LGUs rising to 12.6 percent of general government expenditure or 2.7 percent of GNP (Table 4). The discrepancy between the two measures of decentralization cited above is due to the higher levels of intergovernmental transfers (in the form of IRA) in I992-

IGencral government

is comprised

of the central or national government and local government

8

units or LGUs.


Table 4 Decentralization Ratios for All LGUs, 1985-1993

: ;'

RDR

• . " "" .....

1985

EDR :.'..

:

....

: ,.

"" " i

MEDR .

" •

:"

"._ " " "_" "

: "

"

.,..."

.,. ,., .,,' • ,'., _:.,

5.93

9.12

11.42

51.10

1986

5,50

6.92

9.06

52.90

1987

4.52

5.70

10.04

50.90

1988

4.67

6.21

10.48

49.20

1989

4.85

7.36

10.62

55.90

1990

4.87

6.75

11.21

51.40

1991

4.55

7.70

12.61

44.60

1992

4.35

18.98

14.26

42.14

1993

6.36

12.88

19.97

43.33

1994

5.41

15.09

21.87

34.00

4.86 5.41 5.12

7.04 12.56 9.42

11.00 19.10 14.54

51.60 38.80 44.20

Average 1985-1991 1992-1994 1985-1994

Notes: RDR EDR MEDR FAR

= Ratio of LGU revenue from local sources to general government revenue = Ratio of LGU expenditure to general government expenditure = Ratio of LGU expenditure net of debt service to general government expenditure net of debt service = Ratio of LGU revenue from local sources to LGU expenditure

fn: Igctb4.wkl

(8/6/96)


1994 which supported the increased levels of LGU spending even if local resource mobilization was basically stagnant. The degree of fiscal decentralization rises some more if one looks at the modified expenditure decentralization ratio (MEDR), i.e., the share of LGUs in general government expenditure net of debt service. The modified expenditure ratio was 11.0percent on the average in 1985-1991, 4 percentage points higher than the simple expenditure decentralization ratio. Similarly, the modified expenditure decentralization ratio was 19.1 percent in 1992-1994, 6.5 percentage points greater than the simple expenditure decentralization ratio. The financial autonomy ratio (FAR) is still another way of measuring the degree of fiscal decentralization. It is defined as the ratio of LGU revenue to LGU expenditure. In contrast to the other measures of decentralization discussed above, the FAR declined with the implementation of the Code. Thus, the FAR dropped from 51.6 percent in 1985-1991 to 38.8 percent in 1992-1994 as a result of the higher IRA mandated by the Code (Table 4). Some variation in the financial autonomy ratio across different levels of local governments is evident. Table 5 shows that cities enjoy the highest degree of financial autonomy. In 1985-1991, their FAR was highest at 66.4 percent compared to the municipalities' 48.3 percent and the provinces' 34.3 percent. With the implementation of the Code, the FAR of all levels of local government declined. Nevertheless, cities continued to post higher FAR than municipalities and provinces. In 1992-1994, the FAR of cities was 49.7 percent, that of municipalities was 38.7 percent and that of provinces was 23.6 percent. 2.2.

Provincial

Governments

The financial autonomy ratio for individual provincial governments exhibit the same trend. 2 However, Annex Table 1 shows that the FAR of individual provincial governments is widely dispersed. In 1991, the FAR of provincial governments ranged from a low of 0.4 percent (Lanao del Sur) to a high of 72. I percent (Bulacan). In 1994, the FAR ranged from 1.2 percent (Maguindanao) to 44.2 percent (Bataan). The top 10 provinces and the bottom 10 -rovinces with respect to FAR are presented in Table 6.

LGU INCOME This chapter provides a broad picture of the changing size and composition of LGU income in 1991-1994. The dramatic rise in the share of the IRA in LGU income during the period at all levels of government is notable.

21t is not possible to measure the revenue decentralization ratio nor the expenditure decentralization ratio a(the micro level because data on the geographical distribution of central government revenue/expenditure are not available.

10


Table 5 Financial Autonomy Ratio of DifferentLevels of Local Governments 1985-1993 L

Provinces

Municipalities

Cities

1985

31.79

55.19

64.23

1986

31.49

57.01

67.13

1987

30.73

53.45

65.03

1988

32.31

44.65

68.61

1989

48.71

48.89

72.39

1990

36.02

48.63

68.45

1991

28.24

43.07

61.55

1992

29.72

41.98

50.98

1993

24.04

48.88

51.09

20.51

28.90

48.29

34.32 23.59 28.65

48.33 38.74 42.75

66.41 49.70 56.65

1994 Average 1985-1991 1992-1994 1985-1994

fn:Igctb5.wkl (8/6/96)

11


Table 6 Top 10 and Bottom 10 Provinces with Respect to Financial Autonomy Ratio

•. • •

" • "

.

.

;•

..

","

.... ' , i,

i994 .

,

"."'i"'

' i: :

"

Top 10

... _i".::i.: ..... .... ,

Bottom 10

Bataan Laguna Rizal Misamis Oriental Bohol Batangas Cavite Ilocos Sur Bulacan La Union

44,16 42.72 41.84 41.45 40.03 39.34 38.17 36.18 35.61 33.05

Maguindanao Abra Biliran Sulu NorthernSamar Kalinga Apayao Quirino Ifugao Western Samar Batanes

1.18 2.02 2.13 3.25 3.27 4,04 4.18 4.39 4.56 4.69

1993

Top 10 Rizal Laguna Misamis Oriental Bohol Bataan AIbay Cavite Batangas Camarines Sur Bulacan

Bottom 10 .,_

60.08 49.48 49,23 42.89 42.47 39,81 39.03 36,99 33.14 32.69

Tawi-Tawi Sulu Maguindanao Ifugao Abra Northern Samar Kalinga Apayao Camiguin Quirino Mountain Province

0.17 1.73 1.76 1.97 2.68 2.89 3.61 3.76 3.86 4.47

1991

Top 10 Bulacan Bohol Rizal Bataan Tarlac Negros Occidental Davao del Norte Misamis Oriental Cavite Leyte

Bottom 10 72.07 57.51 56.90 55.97 52.86 47.91 46.46 45.33 41.63 40.76

Lanao del Sur Tawi*Tawi Sulu Mountain Province Biliran Basilan Palawan Eastem Samar Southern Leyte Western Samar

fn: Igctb6.wk I (08/10/96) 12

0.36 1.31 1.76 4.57 5.26 5.57 5.96 7.69 8.06 8.07


3.1.

All LGUs

Total receipt of all LGUs in the aggregate was equal to 1.7 percent of GNP on the average in 1985-1991 (Figure 1). This amount was divided almost equally between locally .. sourced revenue and externally sourced revenue. In 1992-1994, the share of income from external sources (largely derived from the IRA and other intergovemmental transfers) to total LGU receipts registered a marked increase: from 52.0 percent in the earlier period to 63.9 percent (Figure 2). This occurred as the LGU income from external sources rose dramatically from 0.9 percent to 1.8 percent of GNP while LGU income from local sources inched up from 0.8 percent to 1.0 percent of GNP (Figure 1). There is substantial variation in the importance of externally sourced income in the total receipts of different levels of local governments. Provinces are largely dependent on non-local sources of income which comprised 65.1 percent of their total income in 1985-1991 (Figure 2). On the other hand, externally sourced income contributed 54.2 percent of the total income of municipalities and 38.6 percent of the total income of cities in the same period. In all cases, the contribution of externally sourced income to the total receipts of LGUs was magnified in 1992-1994, reaching an average of 77.9 percent in provinces, 63.3 percent in municipalities and 54.8 percent in cities. Moreover, the share of IRA alone in total LGU income rose from 42..3 percent in 1991 to 74.9 percent in 1994 in the case of provinces, from 41.7 percent to 69.6 percent in the case of municipalities, and from 35.3 percent to 47.2 percent in the case of cities. 3.2.

Provincial

Governments

The changing Size and composition of the total income of individual provincial governments before and after Code implementation is summarized in Annex Table 2 and Annex Table 3. As expected, the contribution of IRA to total receipts of individual provincial governments expanded markedly between 1991 and 1994. While per capita IRA of provinces almost quadrupled on the average between 1991 and 1994, the increase in their per capita locally sourced revenue was minimal (Annex Table 2). Large differences in the composition of total LGU income are evident across individual provincial governments. The share of IRA in their total income varied from a low of 11.5 percent (Cebu) to a high of 99.6 percent (Lanao del Sur) in 1991 and from 44.4 percent (Rizal) to 98.0 (Abra) in 1994 (Annex Table 3) (?). Per capita revenue from local sources ranged from PI.06 (Sulu) to P176.28 (Rizal) in 1991 and from P2.37 (Maguindanao) to P198.77 (Misamis Oriental) in 1994. On the other hand, per capita IRA varied from P38.09 (Laguna) to P314.79 (Batanes) in 1991 and from P109.98 (Rizal) to P2628.92 (Batanes) in 1994 (Annex Table 2). The top 10 provinces and the bottom 10 provinces with respect to per capita revenue from local sources and per capita IRA in 1991, 1993 and 1994 are presented in Table 7.

13


Table 7 Top 10 and Bottom t0 Provinces with Respect to Per Capita IRA & Per Capita Local Source Revenue

-

' " -:

::.-

-..:..,:.... •/..,. ,"

"' ' " : ::::;:.:i I i {:.::::ii?i.:":: Pet"Capita IRA i:'i:,. :,

Top 10 Batanes Camiguin Siquijor Quirino Mountain Province Kalinga Apayao Ifugao Aurora Abra Palawan

"

..

.":

:

. .../.

" ..' ".i..::::.:. :!" .:::;!ii._.:-. i

Bottom 10 2628.92 696,33 640,63 604,83 595.73 560.82 503.45 493.27 481,98 449.13

Top 10

Rizal Pampanga Bulacan Laguna Cavite Iloilo Pangasinan Camarines Sur Tarlac Cebu

109,98 139,20 139.49 153.47 154.89 162.93 164.41 167.82 168.29 172.35

Misamis Oriental Bataan Balanes Laguna Rizal Ilocos Sur Bohol Batangas Cavite La Union

:. ;;,i

Per capita LSR

.-...:

::... ..... :.....:..:i ...:.i

Bottom 10 198.77 183.12 135.80 124.91 112.71 106.55 102.90 97.92 89.95 86.08

Maguindanao Sulu Abra Northem Samar Western Samar Biliran Eastern Samar Isabela Zamboanga del Sur Sultan Kudarat

2,37 4,19 9.65 9.95 15.61 17.18 17.75 18.61 18.96 19.01

1993 Per Capita IRA

Per Capita LSR

t.-__

Top 10 Batanes

Bottom 10 1871.39

Top 10

Bottom 10

Bulacan

101.49

Bataan

166.33

Tawi-Tawi

0_37

Camiguin Quirino Mountain Province

539.06 472.00 458.13

Pampanga Rizal Laguna

104.30 108.21 112.11

Misamis Oriental Batanes Rizal

155.49 127.90 101.58

Sulu Maguindanao Northem Samar

2,78 3.31 7.40

Siquijor Aurora

452.33 411.94

Camarines Sur Cavite

112.79 114.26

Laguna Sohol

95.46 90.32

Ifugao Zamboanga del Sur

7.42 7,78

Kalinga Apayao Palawan Abra

411.21 362.32 357.65

Iloilo Tadac Cebu

127.00 127.48 127.82

Albay Benguel Ma_nduque

83.49 79.84 69.96

Abra Easlem Samar Ilocos Sur

7.79 10,33 13.33

Ifugao

354.43

Pangasinan

131.61

Batangas

65.53

Pangasinan

15.50

1991 Per Capita IRA

Top 10

Per Capita LSR

Boltom 10

Top 10

Batanes Kalinga ApayaO Quirino Aurora

314.79 120.19 115.01 109.77

Laguna Cavite Rizal Bulacan

38.09 38.42 42.30 42.65

Rizal Cebu Batanes Bataan

Camaguin Siquijor Mountain Province Abra Palawan • Ifugao

108.62 101.92 100.45 97.99 96.79 93.43

Pampanga Balangas Pangasinan Cebu Iloilo AIbay

43.15 45.24 45.26 45.36 46.80 48.33

Tadac Bohol Misamis O_iental Laguna Davao del Notre Negros Occidental

......

rn;Isclb'/.v_k I (Og/l_J'_)

-........

-_ ,.._......_=.

........

Bottom 10 176_28 158_37 129_51 79.58 63_27 62.42 53_93 40.88 39_33 38.41 - .......

Sulu Biliran Masbate Basilan

1.06 4.52 4.70 5.81

Maguindanao Mountain Province Southern Leyte Western Samar Eastern Samar Ilocos Sur

6.18 6.63 6.63 7.01 7.08 7.26


Figure 1 STRUCTURE OF ALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, [Ratio to GNP in Percent)

REVENUE

1981-1994 REVENUE

STRUCTURE

OF ALL 1.GUS,

RATIO

TO GNP

REVENUE

STRUCTURE

OF PROVINCt, AL GOVERNMENT.

RATIO

TO GNP

ii=.1

............................

, ..........

2.5[" .........................

"

"

"

'_/

sTRUCTURE

OF MUNICIPALrTIE.S

(Ratio

REVENUE

STRUCTURE

OF CrT1ES |Ralio

to GNP _

%1

4-_b

1.4

1.4

1,2

1.2 1

1

0.8

0.8

0.4

0.4

0 19_95

. •

o , , , , 19.0 , , ' ' 19,4 _9951.8. 19.? 1999199. 1"ol 19921.3

to GNP ;_ %1

ms

O.,¢;;

.....

0.8

o , , , 199919,0 , , ts,t , , , 1,85 1999199719.8 199219,_ 1,9,

REVENUE

".

_

I 1989

._

I 1987

........................

i 1988

I 1988'

I 1990

I 1991

0.21

I 1992

I 1993

1994

0 1995

I 1986

I 1987

| 1998

I 1989

I 1990

I 1991

I 19_

I 1993

1994


Figure 2 REVENUE STRUCTURE OF ALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, (Ratio to Total Lncomein %t 1981-1994 REVENUE

STRUCTURE

PERCENT

OF AM. LGUS.

TO TOTAL

REVENUE

q-,.1

STRUCTURE

INCOME

PERCENT

OF PROVINCIAL TO TOTAt

GOVERNMENT,

INCOME

I 80

............................

801

4_ / 20 t

..........................................

0 _ 1985

198(;

"-"--

1987

1988

Local' Souroe

20

1989

1990

1991

--.F-- Extemmal Source

1992

--t--

1993

0 1985

1994

...........

! 1996

iRA

_

I 1887

1 1988

1 1989

Local Source

I 1990

I

Exla.n_

I 1991

I 1992

Sotarc_

i,

f 1993

1994

I 1993

1994

IRA

C_ R_UE

STRUCTUR_

,-b

,_,j

_0

OF MUNICIPAL

PERCE]I_F TO TOTAL

GOVERNMENT.

RE'VENUE

iNCOME

,'_.b

.........................

80

....

0 1:905

20

1980

_-

1907

_

1088

_

1909

1900

--4"-" External

1991

8e_oo

1992

_

1993

IRA

1994

STRUCTURE PERCENT

OF CITY

TO 3"OTAL

GOVERNMENT.

INCOME

...........................................

.................................................................

0 1985

I 1986

_

'I 1987

L_

I 1B98

SOL_

I 1989

"_

| 1990

External

t 1991

S_ce

I 1992

_

IRA


4.

LGU EXPENDITURES

This chapter describes the changing size and composition of LGU expenditures in 19911994. Consistent with the devolution program, LGU spending on social spending rose markedly at all levels of government during the period. 4.1.

All LGUs

LGU expenditure was equal to 1.6 percent of GNP on the average in 1985-1991 (Figure 3). During this period, 42.8 percent of total LGU expenditure was spent on general public services, 32.9 percent on economic services and 20.5 percent on social services (Figure 4). The composition of LGU expenditures varies according to the level of government. Thus, general public services captured the lion's share of municipal government budgets while the plurality of provincial government spending went to economic services, in contrast, the expenditure of city governments were more evenly distributed across sectors. During this period, the social allocation ratio of provinces was highest at 21.1 percent while that of municipalities was lowest at 14.7 percent. 3 The mandated transfer to LGUs of functions previously discharged by national government agencies caused a major shift in the size and composition of LGU expenditure. Thus, aggregate LGU expenditure rose from 1.9 percent of GNP in 1991 to 2.7 percent of GNP in 1993, the first year devolution was implemented, to 3.3 percent in 1994 (Figure 3). Most of the increment in LGU spending went to social services (whose budget increased by 0.5 percent of GNP between 1991 and 1994) and general public services (whose budget also increased by 0.5 percent of GNP). In contrast, LGU spending on economic services rose by

3 To hel l) governments design and molfitor expenditure programs that are highly focused on the attainment development objectives, the Human Development Report (UNDP 1991) recommends the use of tour ratios: *

public

*

social allocation

*

social priority

concerns;

expenditure

ratio - the percentage ratio,

ratio

the percentage - the percentage

of GNP that goes into government of government of government

expenditure social

of human

expenditure;

set aside for social services;

expenditure

allocated

for human

priority

and *

human expenditure

ratio - the percentage

of national income earmarked

for human priority

concerns.'

The HDR noted that the human expenditure ratio may need to be in the vicinity of 5 percent ifa country wishes to perform well in terms of human development. Various combinations of values for the public expenditure ratio, the social allocation ratio and the social priority ratio will yield the targeted human expenditure ratio. However, the report pointed out that "a preferred option is to keep the public expenditure ratio moderate (around 25 percent), allocate much of this to the social sectors (more than 40 percent), and focus on the human priority areas (giving them more than 50 percent of total social sector expenditures)."

allocation

째 The Human expenditure ratio is a product ratio and (c) the social priority ratio.

of three ratios: (a) the publie expenditure

17

ratio, (b) the social


Figure 3 RATIO

TO GNP OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT lin percent)

EXPENDITURES

PROVINCES

ALL LGUS 3,5

1.4

3

...............................

1,2i

2.5

................

2

1

................................... •.-

.....

.

....................................................

0.9

"" "

1,5 1

........................

..........................

0.6

..................

" "

0.4

.........

'0,2 f 0 1995

1966

196"/

1968

1989

--'l--

To_ldIrJcp_u_dl_u ml

199'_

IggZ

1'3931

1994

_,

1996

196'7

1988

1999

1990

+

SocialScrod©as

_

,,

MUNICIPALITIES

1991

1992

1993

1994

Economic Sen_cel

TolmlEzper_dL1urma

tr¢or_om._c 8*r,,rLcoe

1.4

O_

Public S*rv_©oo

CtT1FS

1,4

1.2

...........

....

1

1.2

...........

0.8 0.6

• '

0 1985

•-B-- Oam.Puldl¢_c*a

•'411-- So_.d £H.n_e* O0

1990

. .........

.....................

1

.....................

0,9

...........................

........

0.4 0,21 0 !989

0.2_ O' 1986

19,87

1998

1989

1990

1981

1992

Tot,.I I[il_Wl_rm

_

Economic:Ssr_4cee

w-,,dldIkl_z_

"El"

O_",, P_Ie eqz¢,#,¢l*

1993

1994

1995

1989 1986

1987

ToeafExpemdilurae --III-- S_,_Ia('Illor_4@a,t

1990

1891

1992

1988 ")"

E©onoml4Ge,_o_,o

_

Oo_..P,aWIohr_cso

1993

1994


Figure 4 SECTORAL

DtSTRIBUTION

OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT (in

EXPENDITURES

percent)

,,. ALL LOUS

PROVINCES

. 70 f

6O 60

5O

50 40

_

40,

20,

20

................................ 10

10

.....

........... | I

1985

1986

--

¢ 1987

114:0FIO41_¢: _Mi, r_¢41t

z

1

1888

1999

+

t 1980

5 1991

_.o(_il 1_i1'_¢:141

+

i 1992

i 1993

O 1994

I

995

Oe."+.pu_4i¢ Gnr_coe

1986

+

i

¢ 1987

El:onomi¢ I_l)P._ce=

I

|

l

i

I 1993

1998

1989

--('--

,I,

Sod'el

1990

r=+o_ael

1991

_

1994

1992

O_¢,. P_t=lt¢ S+I_¢.e

CITIES

MUNICIPALITIES

%

70 70 6C

'

S0 I .

.

90 40 40

......

20

'

20" 30 10

_

0 1985

10 30_

+'

I I98,6

I 198.7

I 1988

| 1989

i 1990

.

I' 1991

T 1882

= 199'3

1 _94

0 985

.............. 1

_ 1986

I 1987

,.-.e.,,- 'l_e+.Cm,_.f+Se,p+4mell +

I¢.en+ndc

bnf_e=

"-I"

l_"i_l

Ik,,,_4cu

_

0_m,, Puld'+©Ge,'.I¢e.

I 1989

I' 1989 _

I 1990

80f._lll 8,l.P_¢ill

I 1991 _

I 1992,

I 1893

Oem, Public :llilJ_,o,li_

1",194


only 0.2 percent of GNP during the period. Consequently, while the share of social services in total LGU expenditure rose by 11.6 percentage points to 27.0 percent, that of economic services and general public services contracted by 9.5 percentage points and 4.5 percentage points to 26.3 and 40.1 percent, respectively, between 1991 and 1994 (Figure 4). In all levels of local government, there was an expansion of the budget share of the social sectors relative to the economic sectors and general public service sectors. Consistent with the fact that provinces absorbed the bulk of devolved social service functions, their social allocation ratio expanded the most (by 18.4 percentage points from its 1991 level to 36.3 percent in 1994). Likewise, the social allocation ratio of municipalities rose substantially (by 12.5 percentage points to reach 21.8 percent in 1994). In contrast, the share of social services in total expenditure of cities also increased (by 5.0 percentage points to 26.2 percent) but to a lesser degree (Figure 4). The increase in LGU expenditure on social services between 1991 and 1994 went to health, education, housing and community development, and social welfare, in that order. This is largely due to the fact that the cost of devolved health functions accounted for more than half of the total cost of all devolved functions. At the same time, the cost of devolved social welfare functions, although not as large, was also significant. Thus, higher LGU spending on health and social welfare in 1994 is consistent with the new expenditure functions assigned to them. Meanwhile, higher LGU expenditures on education and housing in 1993 largely reflect the higher priority that local officials assign to these sectors in the more decentralized regime since the direct impact of the devolution program on these sectors was not substantial. 4.2.

Provincial

Governments

Annex Table 4 shows that, on the average, per capita governments on all the social sectors combined rose dramatically from in 1994. The biggest growth was posted by health expenditures, Meanwhile, per capita expenditures on human development priorities P4.11 to P28.21.

spending of provincial P8.95 in 1991 to P91.70 a sixteen-fold increase. increased 7 times, from

Similarly, the average social allocation ratio of provincial governments expanded from 9.3 percent in 1991 to 34.9 percent in 1994. Likewise, their human development priority ratio increased from 4.3 percent to 10.7 percent (Annex Table 5). Despite these improvements, the average social allocation ratio of provincial governments is still some 6 percentage points below the UNDP target of 40 percent while their average human development priority ratio is just about half of the UNDP 20/20 target. The top 10 provinces and the bottom 10 provinces with respect their per capita social service expenditures and per capita human priority expenditures in 1991, 1993 and 1994 are presented in Table 8. On the other hand, the top 10 provinces and the bottom 10 provinces with respect to their social allocation ratios and their human development priority ratios are shown in Table 9. 20


=

Table 8 Top 10 and Bottom 10 Provinceswith Respectto Per Capita Total Social Service Expenditures& Per CapitaHuman Priority Expenditures

i:i::iii"_:;ii:.i_;;?:iS;ii :&::::_:_:-!::_:i::::_i_:i_ ....;::ii::_iiiiiiiii::i::ii;iiiiiii ii_:J_:; _ i :i_. i_::iiiii::;_:._: iii_; ' :!ii

Top 10 Batanes KalingaApayao Bataan Quirino Sudgaodel Node Abra MountainProvince Camiguin Siquijor Biliran

:_...................................................... ; i _._: i:.ii_:i_:i!i::zi]:::: ...................... ii::_: _::ig9_:iiiiiiii::i::::::: _.................... _:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:_"_=":::: ,i _:_:_"": :":::_:_:._: '__`._;i,_:=_:_._:_:_:_::_:;_;::_:_.,._,_;_:_._`.:_ :.!i,::i :i;z..;:i:.:.;i!ilil;:

Bottom10 950.27 330.04 264.53 257.35 230.77 205.93 199.73 186.43 181.58 179.72

Maguindanao Sulu Davaodel Norte Sarangani NorthCotabato CamadnesNode Bukidnon Cebu SultanKudarat Pampanga

Top 10 3.15 3.69 35.16 42.12 45.91 46.58 49.67 53.98 54.81 54,85

Batanes Catanduanes Siquijor Ifugao Batangas IlocosSur LanaodelNode KalingaApayao AgusandelSur Quezon

Bottom10 923.67 166.29 166.22 154.60 101.23 90.28 78.49 74.01 71.10 70.29

Aurora MountainProvince MisamisOccidental IlocosNorte Capiz WesternSamar Biliran Aklan CamarinesNotre Abra

0.42 0.76 2.05 2.33 2.38 2.40 2_45 2.58 2_61 2.75

_i i!_i iii_ !if:i iii i!i', iiiii', iii', il',iii iiiii', :iii iiil i', !iil iii_ iii', !', i', iiili_iii', i',', ',', i', i!i_ii!',_,',i',i','; i',i!i i!i'iii,! ',i ',; ii',!il i', i',;',', ;!',iii ':i',i ',', :', !i:,:,_, ',i i:,;i;;;';',_i i ,::_', _' ,_;,'_',';_i',_i!i _;!;:!i :,_, i,_:::-:;:::: ii;ii:i :ti: f,"i :::: i_;! 'i_i,_: ;i',:';:',:i:',:',:i:i:i:i !ii_',:'_i ;,i !=i_ _ ;,:i:: :::ii::_::; ,:-,,, :,;i! ',;,',i _i !', ii_', ',i _i ii:'iiii:_::_:: ',i i_i '!;i"i, :,!i"_ iiiiiii", iiii',iiii:ii:ii_:, !ili :_i i'i_ ,! iiiiii!iiii! iiii ',i',_ii:iii _i! ::_:_ :,_: :,:,'_,_, _;!:_;!!il iiii_

t':!i:i.i!ii:ii:j;:.: ;i!:iii i:,:.!!!::.;i ]!i:.i! :!.:.:i :!:i_e_]Ca _i_ i_o_li:.:.S ocJaJI:.E xpei_ai{0res:_, •i_ ::= !ii:!ii!:i'_,i'"::iii:]i ;_.i:]:;i]:i:i.i':.i::; :_;::._i_:: ]:i::.;::::i::::::i;::::i::;ii::ili::i::i:.!.;:;iiiili;;:i! !i'=::;i ::i!i):.::j :]!]:..; 'l_e:ri:._:a p'it_ii_:Naln!i!_:rio:ri_ii_E_:_ndi_ures':ii .:;i.!:.-i:::iiiiii::;ij::ii:::iii::::iii_ Top 10 I I Batanes I Bataan I Camiguin Catanduanes Isabela KalingaApayao Quirino MisamisOccidental Lanaodel Notre MountainProvince

Bottom 10 745.95 271.74 213.51 179,25 175,23 174.01 172.37 159.81 150.79 146.17

Tawi-Tawi Maguindanao Sulu NorthColabato Abra Pangasinan Davao del Norte Bukidnon Sarangani Sultan Kudarat

Top 10 1,15 2.64 6.25 26.23 26.45 28.16 31.59 33.53 37_38 38.04

Batanes Catanduanes LanaodelNotre Siquijor Isabela Aurora Guimaras KalingaApayao SouthernLeyte Aklan

Bottom10 619.72 135.85 117.44 101.06 98.09 88.32 68.66 64.28 61.21 57.45

Maguindanao MountainProvince Tawi-Tawi Ifugao Oriental Mindoro Zamboanga del Nort Romblon Tarlac Abra Bataan

,__]_.._: :_;:_:.._:._.::_:_::)::_;::_):_);_::_::)P:_:_.;:_:..S_c.ia._.: _xpe noit ur_s_:_;_:_::::_;._:_:._._":_:;:_::_::_:._:._ _._. ,,_,,_.:_:::.:._._ _:_:,_::::_:._._._:_::_:_.:_]_]:.:_::_::_:..:.:_: :___;.: :... p er,CaI_!t_::_i_PHi_i_'.EX_:.i! Top 10 Bataan Rizal Tarlac Bulacan Batanes Batangas NegrosOriental Nueva Ecija Laguna Quirino

Bottom10 48.21 36.76 23.21 20.20 18.66 17.95 17.57 14_94 14.65 . 11.77

Abra Lanaodel Norte Biliran Siquijor NorthCotabato Agusandel Notre OdentalMindoro Maguindanao SultanKudarat MisamisOccidental

Top 10 0.05 0.68 0.75 0.89 1.22 1.30 1.75 1.77 1.78 1.90

Tarlac Laguna La Union Pampanga Quezon Cagayan Benguet IlocosNorte Rizal Leyte

fn;Igctbg.wkl (08/12/96)

21

0.78 1.02 1.15 1.19 1.63 1,80 2.07 2.43 2.56 2.62

R_i'iel/ii:::;i:::.,ii':...!],i':i:_ii_l

Bottom 10 13.74 12.05 8.85 8.61 8.53 7.78 7.59 6.68 6.80 6.34

Sorsogon Northern Samar Abra Siquijor Biliran Romblon Guimaras NorthCotabato Agusandel Norte MountainProvince

0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.48 0.55 0.75 0.69 1.24


Table 9 Top 10 and Bottom 10 Provinceswith Respect to Social Allocation Ratio and Human DevelopmentPriority Ratio

!!::!!!:::::!::.i:.;!::i::::.:: i :!,,!:.: ..::_:.:::_.:S.6cia_!:_I_.cati_n:.Rat_._:_i_:!_!:_!:r:.:_._.::_:_::_:_:_:_::_:: _::!::_:_:i:_!::!_::;i!::_::::::_i_:::_:::::;:_H:u_man_Deve 6_ _::_a:_ioi:::: Top 10

Bottom10

Top 10

:.

!i

Bottom10

Bataan Kalingaapayao Isabela Batangas Iloilo Pangasinan Laguna Romblon Quezon

63,79 58.86 58,06 56.66 54,95 50,19 48,41 45,68 44.11

Maguindanao Sulu Davaodel Norte Sarangani CamarinesNotre MisamisOriental Palawan Basilan Aurora

1.57 1.98 14.12 16.12 16.95 19,99 20.44 21.51 22.00

Batangas Catanduanes Quezon Pangasinan Ifugao Batanes IlocosSur Siquijor Lanaodel Norte

40.68 39.65 34.93 32.25 32.13 31.92 30.65 26.61 25.12

Aurora MountainProvince Biliran Mis_misOccidental Cami_uin Abra WesternSamar Palawan IlocosNorte

0.07 0.11 0.30 0.45 0.45 0.57 0.70 0.76 0.77

CamarinesSur

43.40

Biliran

22.29

NorthCotabalo

21.63

Aklan

0.79

:;:if:; .i::i :.i. i::i i:: i:: i:: ii:i!.ii!ii:!_! .i_.; !::;. :.:.::: :.:::::: .::.ii:i;:_ iii:i:iii iiiiii iiiii_ :._i_ i_i:;_ii_ii_ ::E_ti:.o_:: ::iii i!i:l;::i:i :ii!::i.; :.i !.-.. i_ i:.::.; i!? ;.:... :.:.ii :::::. i::: :::: !iiii::!i!iii:.iiiiiiiiiiii iiiii iiiii:: :.i !!i:, ii!:'. !!!;''.! :'_ ':. i;iii!iil ::i::::;i_ ii-iil i::iii i:: !i;.;! .::.! i_ : _:_,.0,v_io_:_ii_ri_i :iE_i_i:: i!iii_:: ii:: i_ i!il::i:_i::i !i!::;:: :ii:: i:iii"!:!.;, :::;i ii.!/_: Top 10 Bataan Isabela Iloilo Nueva Ecija MisamisOccidental IlocosSur Catanduanes Capiz Romblon Batangas

Bottom10 69,39 66,12 54.53 50.51 48.77 48.59 48.13 47.76 47.42 47.18

Top 10 Bulacan Bataan Nueva Ecija Batangas Iloilo NegrosOriental Tadac Quirino Pampanga Quezon

Tawi-Tawi Maguindanao Sulu Abra NorthCotabato Pangasinan MisamisOriental Bohol Davaodel Norte Lanaodel Norte

Top 10 0.53 1_40 3.69 9.11 15.38 19.36 20.74 21.99 22.30 22.49

Isabela Catanduanes SouthernLeyte Akla_ Batanes Siquijor Aurora DavaoOriental NegrosOriental Guimaras

Bottom10 39,51 33,90 22.62 22.06 21.44 20.43 19.39 16.65 15,66 15,07

Abra Siquijor Biliran Lanaodel Norte Agusan del Norte Palawan MisamisOccidental North Cotabato Oriental Mindoro Camiguin

Bottom10 37.01 36.48 29.90 28.05 28.01 25.98 23.92 22.80 20.90 20.20

Top 10 0,07 0.62 0.87 1.04 1.57 1.81 1,82 1,82 1,83 1.95

Pampanga Quezon Laguna Tadac La Union Cagayan Iloilo Leyte Bukidnon Zamboangsdel Sur

fn:lgctb9.wkl (08/|_96)

22

MountainProvince Ifugao Maguindanao Tawi-Tawi Camiguin Bataan Zamboangadel Nort Palawan Abra OrientalMindoro

0.24 0.32 0_42 0.53 0.56 0.67 0.75 0.86 0.88 0.96

BoRom10 14.20 12.06 11.63 11,48 1tOO 10.17 8.35 8,06 7.79 7.64

NorthemSamar Siquijor Abra Sorsogon Biliran Romblon Guimaras Palawan MountainProvince Cebu

0.04 0_04 0_07 0.08 0.09 0.60 0.70 0.74 0.85 0.93


5.

SOCIAL SERVICE EXPENDITURES BEFORE AND AFTER DEVOLUTION

The previous chapter established that there has been a dramatic increase in local government social service expenditures in nominal terms in 1993 and 1994 following the implementation of the devolution program. Part of this increase may be explained by the significant shift in expenditure responsibilities from central government agencies (DOH and DSWD) to LGUs. Note that substantial amounts were simultaneously withdrawn from the budgets of these national government agencies because of the said transfer of some of their functions to LGUs. Consequently, it is not obvious whether the higher allocations of local governments to social services in 1993 and 1994 have indeed been enough to cover the cost of devolved social service functions so as to result in a real augmentation of total social service expenditures going to local communities. To be able to assess whether LGUs have indeed contributed positively to increasing public sector spending on social services, it is essential that the analysis takes into account adjustments for the cost of devolved functions. 5.1.

: _

All LGUs

Table 10 attempts to answer the question: what would the LGU expenditure level in 1993/1994 be if LGUs continued to spend what they actually did in 1991 and if, in addition, they allocate an amount equal to what the national agencies used to spend on devolved functions prior to devolution? It provides three counterfactual estimates of local government expenditures after adjusting for the cost of devolved functions: (i) the levels that would have maintained government expenditures at their 1991 levels in nominal terms, (ii) the levels that would have preserved aggregate government expenditures at their 1991 level in real terms (i.e., after adjusting for inflation) and (iii) the levels that would have sustained government expenditures .... at their 1991 level in real per capita terms (i.e., after adjusting for inflation and population growth). _ These three counterfactual estimates are then compared with actual LGU expenditure level in 1993/1994. Table 10 shows that, in the aggregate, actual LGU spending in 1993 was more than enough to maintain the 1991 spending level in real per capita terms. There is a great deal of intersectoral variation, however. While actual LGU spending on general public services and on social services were more than sufficient to sustain the 1991 level in real per capita terms, that on economic services was not even enough to preserve the 1991 spending level in real terms. Within thesocial sectors, intra-sectoral variation was also pronounced. Actual LGU spending on education in 1993 was ahnost three times the amount necessary to keep up with both inflation and populatio n growth (Table 10). In this regard, provinces, municipalities and cities consistently gave education high priority. Likewise, aggregate LGU expenditure on housing and community development in 1993 was more than 70 percent higher than the amount required to

41n arriving (net of the cost computed based rat_ is assumed

at this estimates, it is assumed that the national government maintains its spending level at the 1991 level of devolved functions) in nominal, real and real per capita terms째 respectively. The inflation rate is on the GNP hnplicit Price Index (7.9 percent in 1992 and 6.7 percent in 1993) and population growth to be 2.3 percent.

23


;

Table 10 .. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1993 {actual)

EXPENDITURE BEFORE (In million pesos)

AND AFTER

DEVOLUTION

1993 (levels that wo,.dd have preserved 1991 levels qn nominal terms )

1993 ".levels 1hal would have preserved 1_ levels _nreal ten'ns)

......

.......

GRAND TOTAL

NET OF DEBT SERVIC

Toisi .........

40361

P_ov_;

3

..........

10167 0

M'_"ls

........... Citrus

17450.3

Tolal

12744 O

Prey,noes

29235

4

9581 6

Cllies

t2098

4

3755.1

3829.0

c._26 8

3438 7

3516 8

2671.3

T_al

11394 0

38656

4121.7

3406 7

8111 6

3530 2

2852.1

1729 3

521.0 2488 9 1122

13:31_8 1745 5 482.5

1065 1 997 6 277 0

843 3 4756 6 1357 5

109 1 2471.0 16l 6

352 5 1571 9 781.5

Hous,'_g _ Gan_el

Lu,bor & Other Soc Ss

Community Devek:)pment

2371.5

Putdi¢ Serve.as

Ptd_l¢ Adrniniel_'alion Peace and Order OU'_ere

381 7 723 7 414.3

6

.........

11033.2

_nPs

.........

13931.3

Ci't'_-s"--

Total

provinces

870(3.1

35231.0

Mun_'s

C_es

11546.6

14579.5

9104.9

4144.0

4238.0

3219.1 2083.9

3959.7

4049 6

30";'6.0

11601.1

9340 5

4065.0

3284.2

1991.3

9775.1

4254.2

3437.0

971.1 5488.7 1563.2

125.6 2845.3 166.3

405.9 ';610 1 8(39 9

1016.2 5744.1 1635.9

131.5 2977.7 195.0

424.8 1894.3 94t.7

439.6 833 3 477.1

:

-

460.0 872,1 499,3

743.5

560 9

1067.1

t 144 2

788 4

146 2

209 5

1317.5

9_7.8

168.4

241.3

1378.8

950.1

176.2

252.6

166309

3143 2

8908 2

4579 4

10586 9

2368 5

5365 4

2953 0

12306.0

2727.3

6178.3

3400.4

12878.6

2854.2

6465.7

3558.6

16327 5 303 4

3103 0 40.3

8804 9 103 3

4419 7 159 8

10593 3 93 6

2367 0 1 5

5341 6 23 8

2884 9 68 2

12199 2 107 6

2725 6 1.8

6150.8 27.5

3321.8 78 6

12765.7 t_2.8

2852.4 t.9

6437.0 28.7

3476.4 82.2

19249

3306

6652

9269

610 1

244 2

364 1

201 9

932 8

281.2

4192

232.5

9762

294.2

438.7

243.3

i

1994 (actual) .....

Pro_'_$

11085.3

2827.5

2917 9 5233 0 671 6

' Tolai .....

33664

10411 5

5o¢_1S_s

'

7555 4

To_a[ Ec:onom¢ Servcea

Ed_.alKm Heath Sooal Wallets.

To4al"

Provu"lP._$........

.

1994 (_vels Ihat v,_o'JIdhave preserved 1991 levers m nom_at lerms) Mu_i"a .........

C4,e_

1oral

Prov,ncos

L........................................................................................................... 1_3

Mun,'s

1993 [levels Ihal would have pceserved 1991 levels _nreal per cal_La terms)

Mum's "

MUnro

1994 (kJvele 1hot woulcr have presaged 1991 levels in tesll_er _¢_'da terms) Cdi(_,_ ........

"rota_-'T'--"Pr-ov_.._s

_'l_un_---I--

Cities

.................................................

4

13782.7

4

9561 6

12098 4

7555 4

37041

9572.?

39656.4

12997.0,.

16410.8

10246.6

3872.8

4816 6

6140 4

£*626 8

3438 7

3516 8

'2671 3

12197 2

43569

4455,6

33645

13058,3

4664.5

4770,4

3623,4

Total $o¢.ml Servcee

15206

5055.1

47202

54309

8111 6

35302

2652 1

17293

102774

4472.8

3619.6

2191.0

11003.0

4788.5

3868.9

2345.7

703 0 3046 9 230 2 10750

1355 2 1980 3 607.4 777 2

I947 0 1507 5 4173 15590

843 4766 1357 1144

3 6 5 2

109 1 2471 0 161 6 7884

352.5 1571 9 761 5 146 2

138.2 3130.7 2050 996.9

446.6 1991.7 990.1 1653

149.0 3351.7 219.4 1069.4

479.1 2t32.3 1060.0 1984

517.6 981.7 _2.0 284.3

Pub_=¢ Set're.el

Public Adm_sVal_:m P_u_c._ar,d Order OL,_era

fr* I_blOw_l item f_:lg_

(8-12-961 63f.w'x_; & I_c61941.wkl

{rgm)

29235

........

14630 0

Ger_ral

5

Prov_.._s

55620

4005 2 6534 6 12550 3411 2

20262

"

Total Ecumenic Serves

Educal_on Hee_'_ Socie_',,_'aFe, L_>o¢ & OL_m¢8o¢. 8e Ho_,ng w'¢l Cornmu_ndy Oavelop_'ne_t

2

" Total

GRAND TOTAL ,NET OF DEBT SER'_qC

1

21555

1994 {levels thai would have preserved 1991 levels tn real terms

• " Citba';.

381.7 723 7 414.3 2096

3

10665 6039 3 1720.0 1449 7

12139.9

15328.6

483.6 618r9 524.9 265 5

1'_43.9 6465.6 1641.4 1552.0

22579.2

4153.7

11070.1

7355 4

10G86 9

2368 5

5365.4

2953 0

13540.3

3000.9

6798.0

3741.5

14496.2

3212.8

7277.9

4005.6

22220 7 3585

4100 7 530

10983 3 566

7136 7 2166

10593 3 936

2367 0 I 5

5:341.6 238

2884.6 68.2

13421 7 1186

2998.9 2.0

6767.8 30.2

3655.0 865

14369.2 127.0

3210.7 2.1

7245.5 32,3

3913.0 92.6

3005 1

7Ot I

810 1

244 2

364 1

201.9

10264

309 4

461.3

2556

1096.9

331.2

493.8

273.8

946.1

13558


preserve the 1991 level in real per capita terms. Housing and community development expenditures of cities and municipalities exhibited significant growth in real per capita terms. However, housing and community development expenditure of provincial governments in the aggregate in 1993 was not sufficient to maintain the 1991 expenditure level in real terms. In contrast, actual 1993 expenditure of all LGUs on social welfare was not enough to maintain the 1991 level even in nominal terms. This observation holds true for provinces, municipalities and cities. In like manner, the 1993 spending level of all LGUs on health was below the amount needed to sustain the 1991 level in real terms. This holds true for provincial and municipal governments. In contrast, 1993 health expenditure of city governments was a little larger than the amount needed to preserve the 1991 level in real per capita terms. LGUs, in general, appear to have "underspent" on health and social welfare in 1993 if the spending levels of national government agencies on devolved functions prior to devolution is used as the reference point. A similar picture is observed for 1994 (Table 10). 5.2.

Provincial

Governments

An analysis analogous to that done in Table 10 was conducted using provincial level data. The results indicate that, in 1993, 40 provincial governments (out of 66 provincial governments with complete data) allocated less in the social sectors in the aggregate than what is needed to maintain their 1991 expenditure level in real per capita terms (Table 11). Similarly, 52 (33) provincial governments did not allocate enough resources on health (social welfare) than what one would expect if they had preserved their 1991 expenditure in real per. capita terms. In contrast, only 3 provincial governments reduced their 1993 education budgets in real per capita terms relative to 1991. Complete data is available for 15 out of the 19 priority provinces under the Social Reform Agenda. After making adjustments for the cost of devolved functions, 10 of these provinces registered lower real per capita expenditures in total social services, in health and in social welfare in 1993 relative to 1991. Table 12 presents the results for 1994. It shows some improvements. For instance, only 16 (out of 68 provincial governments with complete data) had lower total social sector expenditures in the aggregate than what is required to maintain their 1991 expenditure level in real per capita terms. Similarly, 32 (25) provincial governments did not provide sufficient resources on health (social welfare) than what one would expect if they had preserved their 1991 expenditure in real per capita terms. On the other hand, only 5 of the 15 SRA provinces with complete data suffered effective reductions in real per capita total social service expenditures in 1994. Seven (6) of the SRA provinces likewise registered reductions in real per capita health (social welfare) expenditure.

25


-

-

L"

-

z

::;_

E

_o

-__

_

_

_'_

.............. z

_

z

-

-

z

o

'_

5._

_ ....

E

, _., ,

_..( _'w

N ....

z

_ .... , . . ,

ffl

r_

F

o

Z

..


Tab|l 1:) Diff*mn©e BoOth

.:'.".",

..

. I.

1994 and lg91Pwt CaplLt Real E_pendilutl

.

/.,

..

Lewd_ and RealPw Cap;_ Ntt Resource _lr_er

....... " ', •

Actual 1994 Expe_dik_'esLess 1991 ex;_¢itx_

,,: :,... ,: ..

EducaSon •

Popula_

_

Wdal-.,

Acfjus_dfor1_0a_on,

T¢_1.5¢_d ......

P_

_s

ILOCO$ REGION 11 2, 3. 4,

_ Node Ik;¢os _ La Union plmgaslnan

5.61 3,:33 8.43 3.96

110.221 (10.01) 03,79 14.'I21

(0,461 (1.24) (0.36) 7_63

17,9"31 (I$, "tK) 77,20 22.66

18.39) 84.25 (0.35) 55.16

67.58 10.96 22.15 25,30

85,31 17.14 10,151 2.05 0.7G

6,27 (6.711 (24.83) (16.911 (57,63)

6.17 tie 2-63 _).?O) 11.021

97.75 9.67 ('Z2_951 125.26 (58,27)

2.66 15.47 149.75 69,31 10.611

103.77 36,50 48,86 61.10 28,25

23.61 4 20 5,46 4 25 22 86

96,07 4.94 (12.41) (6,121 190

(7.63) 1.14 2.5.94 Z67 953

1641 8 63 86,42 12.311 61.30

n,a. (:1,951 4,45 10 53 17,50

245.92 71.62 ;)5,86 10,44 .59.01

30.17 25,34 13.86 5,86 1.16 10.00

(7.57) 114,51) 3261 (2.)'4) 2.51 5.83

1.2_ 4 19 17.85 (026) 160 (0,25}

67.80 13.95 )'3.04 2.62 702 15 58

17 04 6 49 1462 244 (2631 9.90

(15 4_) 13 45 62_,5 21,43 31.45 30.00

n,a, 23.91 19 24 $7 27 11.40 4 I_0 5 63 779 298 1146 51_

rL_, 1622 (4.70) 5 29 11 I1 5 99 g 93 1476 B_ 903 (110)

n._, (0,161 (0 02) I,)'3 766 (0 1.51 (0 04| ;341 6:;_ 195 1015)

n,_, 7003 14.49 67 04 "toO1 1064 1642 2_96 1164 3023 196

ha, 94.62 23.97 48 015 5483 2 .51 n• 2,11 5947 2831 50_

11443 $561 24 B0 22 50 5_J_ 73 19 4332 t_6 '_2 2434 ?'67 1720

15 56 2 )'7 _a. hi.

(3 23) (_3,411 na fla.

(3 351 1120) he. ha.

6 67 (19 611 ha rill.

17,84 (0 251 na ni na

27 47 33 115 3917 (411191

071

140

76A

• 34 2 51 1105 1"127 15_

,570 [2 I_) 699'4 940 (6 _))

(0241 0 91 _$Z 005 4 _9

T37 6 50 5_59 41 10 1§?7

407 (O571 |3_2 3 73

3_6 (9 _4) 3_.0 (•4 91)

019 (0 17) 003 (0 _4)

904 (10 39) 514 141 44)

905 7 6.5 •_Pi 16_ 13

343: ) _ C5 4_07 69 t3

2 35 2 36 1747 491 (1 141 ? 12

6S 6_ (19 1Z) (1986) 115361 121 64) 169

9 10 0 09 0:]0 009 (005) 49_1

76 43 116 66) (3311 (_67) 119 12) 1943

2 35 7 96 1645 $17 527 056

63 16 _9 65 19_ 1594 807 7461

_a. 409 2,98

hi. (2.57) (S, 13)

fl_. I¢0 3.44

hi. 148 80I

ni 3286 "_990

na 7564 45 96

4 49 86 21 9 46 6 84 069 17 78 4 35

(4 t 091 7 12 (0 I_) (_8 27) (42 _71 11 76 39 05

(0 52) 046 0 _L1 (1 34) (0_ I 50 3 63

(37 29) 6S_0 9 05 (39 101 141 661 _8 13 45.69

4 19 67 58 ) 07 0 30 (026| _ 57 1061

2)' 48 6509 62 65 75 99 674.5 61 74 12O)'

369 IS15 7 79 1243 ha. np

1.40 1157 1407 (5 05) hi. el.o

991 2.08 9 _ I 03 n• nl

657 Z2,52 32 33 9 F_S nil na

712 25:27 91 83 7 37 nl nl

54)69 4807 65 O_ (26.001 4419 el.

(19_) 11,70 1.43

3.32 (0 63) 2.57

{12.131 15.78 11.53

78.49 43 34 12.06

21.17 63,80 M 54

(I.0_) eL n.l, 000

074) flit ha. 091

0.22 n. na 091

)'689 _'_ 2 I eta. 7_T'l

i,

CAR, COR01LLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 1, 2. 3. 4. 5, II,

Ai0nl Benguel If_gao K,ilingll )_Qayao Mountain Pm_nCe

CAGAYAN VALLEY 1. 2, 3. 4, S,

III

Ratanes Ca0_yan Isabel• Nueva Vi$¢,,-ya Qu_no

CENTRAL LUZON 1. 2. •t 4 5. 6.

IV.

Eat_4n Oul,ican Nueva E_a ParrC_r_a Tarl;hc Z an',T_k_s

SOUTHERN TAGALOG 1, 2. 3, 4 6 6 7 & 9 10 II

V

A_icmil B_Lan,lS Cavite Laguna Ma_ndU¢lU4 Ocr.x_mta[Mindo¢o Ot_enta_MttldKx.o Pal•wan Outzc_ R_zal R0n_lo_

91COL REGION

V1

1 2 3 4

Ali_y C•m.annes No*'t* C.v_ne s 5ut C•t,ln_J 1mes

6

._4_*s_

2 I • 5 6 . VII

5 7

2539 . 414:_" 11202 1547 63 93

B<_hol Ctt_ N¢,_'o $O t'_ llrlt,,11 S_qu,io,r

l_i*r;_ Easlem Sam_r Ley_e Southem i.wytll N_lt_m Saff_r _Neslier1.S4zl,,It

IBisdln Z_=olJ_a _1Nor_ Z_m,dpoang, e de; _

AgQsan¢4dNode Agusan del 5ut Buk_Vv(_ Cam_p_ M._I O¢o_lntal M_san_sO_erdal 5_g•O ¢_1Noele

,5OUTNERN MIN DANAO I 2 3. 4 .5 6.

XII,

4 6.5 (1 471 1:_53 17_ 2? 6.5

NORTHERN MINI[)ANAO I. 2 3 4.

Xl

Anbque Capri[ G_m_•ras ILO,10 Ne_os _ntal

WI_$TERN MIND,*J_AO 1. 2. 3.

X,

2001

EASTL:RN ViSAYAS I Z 3 4 .5 6

IX.

1246

CENTR_l. VI_.AYAS 1

ViII

5

_,'E STERN Vt._?u_YAS

IDa_IO_ NO_e L'_vso""I _ Oavl_ _1 ,Sd_lhCotJM_O S_ d4i _W ,_

CENTRAL MINOANAO 1.. 2, 3,

l_nJ¢ d41N0V14 Nor_ Co.bate SuAanKu_4tlt

2.92 3 07 )'.82

t. 23. 4

Sulk_ TIm'i,-T_ Lam4m¢kl4_ar Ml_u_daP,_

(0.14) na. _ll, 020

ARMM 0_ R,*. n,l, 0.71


6.

DETERMINANTS OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS' SOCIAL AND HUMAN PRIORITY EXPENDITURES

To study the determinants of provincial governments' social expenditures, the aggregate level as well as the various components of social sector outlays in per capita terms - (i) education expenditures, (ii) health expenditures, and (iii) human development priority expenditures or HPE - are regressed against the variables listed below: LGU income. Obviously, LGU expenditure will be limited by LGU income because of the budget constraint. In the analysis that was done for this study, two major components of LGU income (namely, IRA and LGU regular income from local sources, LSR) were considered as explanatory variables. Net resource transfer as a result of the LGC. While the increase in the IRA (as a result of the implementation of the 1991 Local Government Code) is sufficient to cover the cost of devolved functions in the aggregate, it cannot be denied that there is a mismatch, at the LGU level, between the financial resources and the expenditure responsibilities that were transferred to LGUs. Thus, the increase in the IRA share of some LGUs is not enough to finance the functions devolved to them.s In 1993, the per capita net resource transfer (i.e., per capita 1993 IRA less per capita 1992 IRA less per capita cost of devolved functions adjusted for inflation) to LGUs as a result of Code implementation is negative in 37 out of the 66 provinces for which data is available (see column 6 of Table 12). It is worth noting that 22 out of the 40 provinces whose total social service outlays declined in real per capita terms in 1993 (relative to 1991) suffered negative per capita net resource transfers. Although only 3 provincial governments had negative per capita net resource transfer in 1994 there is considerable variation in said variable across individual LGUs. A dumnay variable, D1, (which takes on the valueof 1 when the per capita net resource transfer to the province is above the median and 0 otherwise) was thus included as one of the explanatory variables in the regression analysis. This variable was included in order to verify whether the budget allocation behavior of the (relative) gainers from the devolution program differ significantly from that of the losers. Human development index. The analysis also tested whether or not lagged (or contemporaneous) values of the composite human development index, HDI, and its various components (like infant mortality rate, life expectancy, and functional literacy rate) influence the budget allocation of provincial governments in the social sectors in the current year. This is an attempt to determine if provincial governments' spending on the social sectors is responsive to objective indicators of need. In the 1993 equations, 1990 HDI values were used while 1994 HD1 values were used in the 1994 regressions. Two alternative functional specifications were tried: linear and double logarithmic. The results of double logarithmic equations are largely consistent with those of the linear equations

5The IRA increment increment

in 1993 is defined

in 1994 is analogously

as the difference

computed.

28

between the 1993 IRA and the 1992 IRA.

The IRA


in terms of signs and significance of the coefficients. The linear specification was found to have better fit for the regressions explaining per capita total social expenditure, per capita HPE, and per capita health expenditure. In contrast, the double logarithmic form was better suited to the per capita education equations. White's (1980) test was used to detect heteroskedasticity. The test is based on the regression of the squared residuals from the original regression on the original set of explanatory variables plus the squares of the those variables. Where heteroskedasticity was present, the procedure suggested by White was used to correct the standard errors and t-statistics. The results of the regression analysis for 1993 reveal that the per capita total social sector expenditure of provincial governments is positively related with their per capita IRA (Table 13). 6 That is, higher per capita IRA (PCIRA) tends to be associated with higher per capita social service expenditures. This relationship was found to be statistically significant in the case of total social service expenditure, human priority expenditure, and health expenditure. On the other hand, the relationship between per capita local source revenue, on the one hand, and per capita total social sector expenditures, per capita human priority expenditures and per capita health expenditure, on the other, was not statistically significant. This may be indicative of the tendency of many provincial governments to rely on the IRA rather than on locally generated revenue in financing local programs. In contrast, the opposite is true in the case of education expenditure. Thus, the positive relationship between per capita education expenditure and per capita local source revenue is statistically significant. However, the positive relationship between per capita IRA and per capita education expenditure was not. This may be attributed to the existence of the Special Education Fund (SEF). The SEF is an additional levy on real property earmarked for the education sector. The analysis also demonstrates that provincial governments which were relative losers as a result of Code implementation behaved differently from those which posted positive net resource transfers. Specifically, the gainers' marginal propensity to spend on all the social sectors out of their IRA is lower than that of the losers. Note the negative coefficients for the D I*PCIRA variable. 7 This result indicates that provincial governlnents adjust their spending behavior to compensate for the net transfers they received. Thus, the net losers tend to spend a bigger share of their IRA on the social sectors at the margin in an attempt to reach their "target" expenditure level because their IRA share is small relative to their expenditure requirements. In contrast, the net gainers tend to spend a smaller portion of their IRA on social services because their IRA share is high relative to their expenditure needs. However, Table I 1 indicates that, despite these adjustments, provincial governments which suffered negative net

hAthere heteroskedasticity 7The co_fticients health expenditures

was fou.d to be a problem, the correction suggested by White was used.

are statistically

significant

tbr total .social service expenditures,

but not tbr education expenditures.

29

human priority _xpenditures

and


DETERMINANTS

• Table 13 OF 1993 PER CAPITA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

EXPENDITURE

IN SOCIAL SECTORS

.

Dependent Variable

'c, on-stant............P_erC-apita IRA

DI* Per Capita IRA

-35.424 (-I .355)

Human Priorib/ Expenditure,

-80.495 (-2.856) ""

0.296 (7.557)'*

-132.097 (-2.634) ""

0.391 (31.023) ""

Health Expenditure,

Education Expenditureb

o

, b • "

0.031 (0.007)

0.362 (24.305) ""

-0.269 (-1.198)

0.396 (1.264)

82.019 (1.561 )

-0.084 (- 1.999)"

0.127 (0.980)

77.970 (1.888) *

-0.161 (-7.301) ""

0.067 (0.734) 0.844 (3.550) °°

linear specification double logarithmic specification statistically.significant at 5% statistically significant at 1%

Notes:

Expenditures are expressed in per capita terms Numbers in parenthesis refer to t-values. When the White chi-square is signiScant, the t-values are derived from White chi-square heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix,

fn: Igctb13.wkl (8-12-96)

Rate

-0.170 (-4.671 ) ""

0.008 (0.185)

. ....

IndependentVa.dab!es ............................................................................... R2 DW ..."i IWhiie ." Per Capita HDI Life Functional Adjusted .... : Chi- :_ Local Source Expectancy Literacy : Square Revenue

Totat Social Service Expenditure,

.

2.037 (2.608) "* 0.210 (0.184)

:

ii: i-:

0.885

1.961

34.960 *°

0.771

1.652

24.130 *"

0.945

2.140

9.720

0.258

1.920

1.820


transfers were not able to maintain their 1991 social sector spendingin real per capita terms in 1993. In particular, 26 of the 37 provinces which suffered negative net resource transfers had lower total social expenditures in real per capita terms in 1993 relative to 1991. This result suggests the need to revisit the IRA allocation formula since the said formula appears to have a negative impact on the way provincial governme_its allocate their resources on social and human development priorities. Table 14 also reveals that the budget allocation of provincial governments on the social sectors (i.e., total social services, education, health, and human development priorities) is not consistent with objective indicators of need (i.e., human development status). There is a positive relationship between 1993 per capita total social service expenditures (and per capita I-IPE) of provincial governments and 1990 human development index (HDI)? That is, governments of provinces which posted higher HDIs spent more on all the social sectors combined (and on human priority needs) on a per capita basis than those with lower HDIs. Similar results were established between per capita education expenditure and functional literacy and between per capita health expenditure and life expectancy. 9 The regression results for 1994 are largely congruent with those for 1993 (Table 14). However, it is notable that the differential in the marginal propensity to spend on the social sectors between the fiscal gainers and losers is lower in 1994 than in 1993. The 1994 modification in the IRA distribution formula appears to have alleviated the inequities in the IRA formula somewhat. Also, the human development outcome variables turned out to be statistically significant in 1994 in contrast to the situation in 1993 although they still retain their perverse relationship with the expenditure variables. Abstracting from the problems with the IRA allocation formula, it cannot be denied the provincial governments' budget allocation for the social sectors and for human priority expenditures is the outcome of priority setting at the local level. As mentioned earlier, while the proportion of provincial budgets allocated to the social service sectors rose from 9.3 (?) percent on the average in 1991 to 33.5 percent in 1993, this expansion did not quite bring up the social allocation ratio to the 40 percent target of the human development framework. At the same time, the proportion of provincial budgets allocated to human development priorities is less than 10.3 percent in 1993. This is just about half of the 20 percent ratio recommended by the human development framework. Together with the perverse relationship between HDI and social sector expenditures, this observation indicate the scope for advocating improvements in budget restructuring for the social sector at the provincial government level.

SHowever,

tile relationship

9The relationship

was not significant,

for the health sector was statistically

significant while that for the education ._-_tor w=¢,;not.

31


DETERMINANTS

Dependent Variable

Table 14 OF 1994 PER CAPITA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

'Con,siant ......... PerCapita IRA

DI* Per Capita _RA

IN SOCIAL SECTORS

Independent vad..able,s ......................................................................... Per Capita HDI Life Functional Local Source Expectancy Literacy Revenue Rate

Rz Adiusted

DW . :: .. '.

Total Social Service Expenditure,

-91.936 (-3.721) **

0.402 (11.414) "°

Human Pdority Expenditure•

-152.648 (-3.393) •°

Health Expenditure,

Education Expenditureb

-0.061 (- 1.756) *

0.240 (1,077)

148.947 (2.950) °°

0.274 (3.738) *"

0.039 (0.641 )

0.268 (1.603)

150.030 (1.957)"

- 199.155 (-3.317) ""

0.446 (20.725) *"

-0.095 (-5.090) ""

0.114 (1.441)

-10.976 (-2.045)

-0.569 (-2.341) °

0.100 (2.389) °

0.602 (3.704) °*

• linear specification b double fogarithmicspecification • statisUcalty significant at 5% • * statistically significant at 1%

Notes:

Expenditures are expressed in per capita terms Numbers in parenthesis refer to t-values, When the White chi-square is significant, the t-values are delved from"White chi-square heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix,

fn: IgctblZl.wkl (8-12-96)

2.549 (2.783) ** 3.135 (2.541) "°

'

'

'i-

White ChiSquare : " " "

"

0.901

2.310

15.620 *

0.807

2.128

34.110 °*

0.983

2.466

9.620

0,330

1.860

11.520


7.

..

SUMMARY

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The mandated transfer to LGUs of functions previously discharged by national government agencies caused a major shift in the size and composition of LGU budgets. Aggregate LGU expenditure rose from 1.9 percent of GNP in 1991 to 2.7 percent in 1993, the first year devolution was implemented. Most of the increment in LGU spending went to social services partly as a result of the transfer of a big number of DOH and DSWD personnel and assets to LGUs. Consequently, while the budget share of the social service sector expanded those of the economic service sectors and general public services contracted. Intra-sectoral variation is quite marked. While higher LGU expenditures on certain social services in 1993 were more than sufficient to support the cost of devolved functions such that there is a real augmentation of the given services at the local community level, this is not generally true. Compared to their 1991 levels, actual LGU expenditures on education and housing and community development in 1993 were greater than the amount needed to cover inflation, population growth and the cost of devolved functions. In contrast, after making adjustments for the cost of devolved functions, 1993 LGU expenditure on health was below the level needed to sustain the 1991 level in real terms. Also, LGU social welfare expenditure declined in nominal terms relative to the 1991 level. The present study indicates that 32 out of 62 provincial governments with complete data allocated less on the social sectors in the aggregate than what is needed to maintain their 1991 expenditure level in real terms after adjusting for the cost of devolved functions. Similarly, 47 (27) provincial governments did not allocate enough resources on health (social welfare) than what one would expect if they had preserved their 1991 expenditure in real terms. In contrast, only 3 provincial governments reduced their 1993 education budgets in real terlns relative to 1991. The resuhs of the regression analysis suggest that higher per capita IRA tends to be associated with higher per capita social sector expenditures. The relationship was found to be statistically significant in the case of the IRA, on the one hand, and total social service expenditure, human priority expenditure, and health expenditure, on the other. On the other hand, the relationship between the latter set of variables and local source revenue was not statistically significant. This may be indicative of the tendency of many provincial governments to rely on the IRA rather than on locally generated revenue in financing local programs. In contrast, the opposite is true in the case of education expenditure. That is, the positive relationship between per capita education expenditure and per capita locally sourced revenue is found to be statistically significant while that between the former and per capita IRA is not. This may be attributed to the existence of the Special Education Fund (SEF). The SEF is an additional levy on real property earmarked for the education sector.

33


The analysis also reveals that the marginal propensity to spend on the social sectors out of the IRA of provincial governments which had higher than average net transfers in 1993/1994 was lower than those of provincial governments which had lower than average net transfers. This result suggests that provincial governments adjust their spending behavior to compensate for the net transfers they received. However, the study shows that despite these adjustments the losers were not able to maintain their 1991 social sector spending in real terms in 1993. This is indicative of the need to revisit the IRA allocation formula since the said formula appears to have a negative impact on the way provincial governments allocate their resources on social and human development priorities. While some improvement was observed in 1994 (as evidenced by the lower coefficients for the D I*PCIRA variable), the problem still persists. If one assumes that the national agency budgets (which formed the basis for estimates of the cost of devolved function) in the various sectors before devolution represent the appropriate spending levels, then one can say that LGUs "underspent" on health and social welfare in the decentralized regime. However, one can also argue that the very essence of decentralization lies in giving LGUs the freedom to make their own spending decisions based on their assessment of what their constituents need. If the latter premise holds, then the 1993 actual LGU expenditure levels represent the optimal levels from the LGU perspective. At this point, it is not a simple matter to establish which of these alternative viewpoints is the more relevant one. It is likely that both of them are applicable. If LGUs are given expenditure responsibilities with significant spillover effects (i.e., responsibilities whose benefits are not exclusively enjoyed by their constituents like public health services) then it is expected that LGUs will underprovide for these services if there were no additional financial support from the central government perhaps in the form of matching grants_ If the externality is localized, cost sharing among the LGUs that benefit from the service, rather than matching grant from the central government, may be the more appropriate arrangement. Abstracting from spillover effects, LGUs should be allowed to decide on the quantity and quality of local public goods and services that they will finance without interference from the center. The only caveat to this being the need to ensure that LGUs have sufficient fiscal resources to finance said expenditure responsibilities. In this regard, there is a need to review IRA allocation formula with the end in view of developing a system that will equalize net fiscal capacities (i.e., revenue potential less expenditure need) of LGUs. Finally, the study also shows that the budget allocation of provincial governments on the social sectors (i.e., total social services, education, health, and human development priorities) is not consistent with objective indicators of need (i.e., human development status). There is a statistically significant positive relationship between 1993/1994 per capita total social service expenditures of provincial governments and 1990/1994 human development index. That is, governments of provinces which registered higher human development index spent more on all the social sectors combined on a per capita basis than those with lower HDI. Similar results were established between per capita education expenditure and functional literacy and between per capita health expenditure and life expectancy although the relationship was significant in 1994 but not in 1993. Abstracting from the problems with the IRA allocation formula, it cannot be denied that the provincial governments' budget allocation for the social sectors and for human priority 34


expenditures is the outcome of priority settingat the local level. While the proportion of provinci_ budgets allocated to the social service sectors rose from 9.3 percent on the average in 1991 to 33.5 percent in 1993 this expansion did not quite bring up the social allocation ratio to the 40 percent target of the human development framework. At the same time, the proportion of provincial budgets allocated to human development priorities is less than 10:3 percent in 1993. This is just about half of the 20 percent ratio recommended by the human development framework. Together with the perverse relationship between HDI and social sector expenditures, this observation indicates the scope for advocating improvements in budget restructuring for the social sector at the provincial government level. fn:spefocrm.rgm rg m/2-.I.-97

35


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Judge, George, R. Carter Hill, William Griffiths, et al. Introduction the Theory and Practice of Econometrics. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987. Manasan, Rosario, Gilberto Llanto and Wilfredo Nuqui. "Financing Social Programs in the Philippines: Public Policy and Budget Restructuring." Final Report submitted to the UNICEF (Manila), March 1994. Parker,

David and Eva Jespersen. "20/20, Mobilizing Resources Children in the 1990s." UNICEF Staff Working Paper No. 12. New York: United Nations Children's Programme, January 1994.

White, Halbert. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity", Econometrica, vol. 48, pp. 817-838, 1980. United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994. New York: Oxford University Press. 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994.

36


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63.96 $3,9! 45.91 45,25

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296,01 z2g.50 lg0.72 164A1

3113 7.26 21.16 7.27

31_10 13..73 26,42 15.50

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97.99 64,20 93.43

357,65 222.60 354,43

481.98 251.06 503,45

11_17 :36.05 20.32

7_79 _.84 7.42

9.65 75.:)8 21.10

120.19 100.45

411.21 458,13

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51.03 42,65 49.91 43.18 50,48 66.02

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109.77

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!

1. 23, 4,

I

Ilocos Notre Jl_os _ La Unmn pangasman

32,80 1%87 24,90 13.63

12,40 6.97 15,67 10,54

lB. _¢ 31.09 30.84 11.04

072--_ M13 ST_75 EA08

0?I_ 93.n_ en,f 89,46

01, _ 68,32 68,32 08.96

5,3,4 32.17 17.09 15,18 426

2_12 26,40 2.05 3,74 3_91

1.96 20,57 3,96 3.88 9.13

40,.82 _729 82_14 14,82 04,51

97.51 73,_ g7_96 96,10 96,96

96,04 75.91 95,:10 96_12 90.84

CAR. CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION • • * " • " Ii.

III,

1, 2. 3, 4. 5.

CAGAYAN VALLEY 1.

Batanei

2S,96

8.40

4.91

80.97

93.60

95.09

2, 2. 4, 5.

Cagayan isabela Nuova Vi_P.._aya Quirlno

12.52 31.35 24.45 g,57

8,67 9,86 9.'¢¢ 3,_

10.53 7.91 g 41 4.20

78..53 58.3_ "_527 79_i

91,33 62.37 J¢¢.41 {2621

79.60 90.87 BO,,_i 05.01

56.33 45,10 15,79 34.23 82.98 10.04

43.86 3,4.89 15,47 22.42 24,P_6 14.02

4326 34.84 12.16 20.82 22.74 10.85

36 12 5335 _'6.72 61.4Q 4_.27 70 57

40.10 8,4.57 87,03 71_78 75.14 J85.09

85,51 6,488 83 96 74.07 70.63 89.15

17.83 31,96 3,8,57 49.:bl 27 79 1309 12.71 11.12 13,91 eO0_ 10.77

6.53 31_71 34 67 45.98 21.63 8.71 10.71S 10.09 11,15 47._ 7 &l

7.33 34.24 35.42 44,87 17."u* 8.37 11,29 46,4 1404 45.45 6.41

7681 52_13 49.01 4585 57,11' 7642 87.24 1847 7-/72 1020 7"/08

8989 8729 03 31 54.00 70.17 91.09 79.94 8927 0981 51.09 _2.39

91.13 64.15 f_).g5 55.13 76.29 _,23 75.35 75.99 85,96 44,35 _.73

12.64 1624 27.27 1327 721 1825

37,0_ 10.58 26,77 7.16 n= n.a

2258 g 49 1104 &5_ nj. 11.12

6062 Tg r_ 5783 ._..09 B_K) _=_27

62.14 80.15 73.13 01,30 ha. n.I,

72.42 72.90 87,M _K).18 na, 87.32

_5 25 17 14 10 92 12 44 20 89 40 4_

15.13 1202 8 47 nI 19 20 24 _,_

I1 42 1030 1127 9 44 18 _'0 2421

_37¢' T0;l[i 71 16 ;'8 _ 71 55 52 II .

74.48 8}'98 91 $3 n• 79 22_ 74 66

7721 850_ 68 73 _0 21 57 5_ 75 79

55 42 40 00 23 88 1348

3g 55 24 37 1476 821

36 25 21 57 1022 521

44 ,'58 1t 46 67 25 7041

80 45 75 63 82 26 9053

63 75 70 33 87 47 0479

5 06 747 _ _7 8 36 118 t 8 24

n• 4 Ig 24 51 7 85 $ 25 nI

"t98 497 20 24 7 62 3_ 468

_pt19 8505 0 [ 22 77 09 65 41 /_108

_1a 9881 7549 92 15 _ 52 na

_50._ 9503 79 75 86 94 _ _7 95 24

7.23 12.70 1882

na 8.78 4,9_

n,_, 1105 7 85

_20 64 _ 81.11

nl 83 21 95 05

na I)8.14 70 04

17.4$ 1409 1463 17.6,1 15 8_ 42.07 20,1_

8.92 13.15 13.32 387 8 54 40.1_) 88,)

12.33 754 10.75 49,4 7 $2 4306 88_

7241 _r_8_ 72.17 82.''u_ 64 53 45 37 &SC_i

7102 854 _: 85 56 9.462 96.4_ 47.71 8774

67 ,_ 7480 83.12 95OS 92,40 5.470 90._

42 01 3072 13 87 2155 _009 n.l,

_1.10 11.21 0.24 1281 1604 n•

1089 1460 8.64 1180 11.00 10K/t

57 _ 01_0 _ 77 8430 09.'_4 i'Ll.

79.75 0004 93.76 0682 77.76 I1l.

02._1 8520 83.30 7592 73.16 81 32

22.64 18&1 17.45

17 gl 9.17 063

12.M 12.93 8.84

M 09 6090 0976

82.09 _020 00.17

67 42 86.94 0309

1,78 105 037 9 33

1.74 0.17 ha. 1.75

2.23 8 _4 n.I. 1.19

0101 96.05 _H_3 9003

09._ ge 83 n.& 09.07

86.71 91.96 n.4, 94.29

30 24

18.)'7

17,E0

5557

76 87

'7002

CENTRAL LUZON 1, 2, 3, 4. 5, 6,

IV.

1, 2, 3. 4. 5, 0. 7. JEt. g. 10. 11.

1 2. 3, 4. 5 0.

I. 2. 3 4, 5 0.

"

t, 2. 3.

1, 2. 3, 4, 5. 0 7.

Ba _an Zin'dxl4mg,IIdel No_le Z_o=_)a '4"1Sut

AguMel _ N¢_tle AgQSafldel ,_ Euludllml _ M_t,lm_| Occl_nt/I Miiinll O_l_n_l Sut_)ao d_ Norle

5OUTHERN MINDANAO 1, 2. 3, 4. 5, 8.

XII,

6,hran E,;stom S;Im,'i¢ Ley'le E,o_Jthem Leyle N_'i,"mm Sim•r Western -¢,_mat

NORTHERN MINOANAO

"

XI.

1 2 3 4 5 0

WESTERN MINOANAO •

X_

Eo/1_ Cetx._ Neg,'osO_ental $1qutl_

EASTERN VISAYAS • "

iX.

J_lan A/'_p,le Cal_Z G u,'_Mll$ iio,lo Ne;ttS OP._nt_l

CENTRAL. VI,_AYA$ I 2 3 4

vii;

AJl_ly Ca_mann4sNorle Cam•ntis S_ C;=landuarms Mast_lte Sof.._,go_

W_STERN V1SAY_S

VII

Aumca Ba=ngas Cev_te Laguna M I I_lUq_ O_ntal Mindom Ohental Mmdom pzlawan Ouezon R_z_I Rom_

RICOL REGION

VI.

Bataan Oulilc,,_n Nueva Ec_4 Pampinga T_da¢ Zambales

SOUTHERN TAGALOG

• V.

A,bcl Benguet Ifug;o KallngaAl:layao Mounta;nProvince

Oavlm _11Ng_,l DAY1@del ,_w Oiv_m Or_nta_ _;o_mCotabato SumS)40_H Sur 1_dlrlttQ41fl4

CENTRAL MINDANAO I. 2, 3.

Lenlo del t_ Notlh Cota0elO 5/u_ia'_KuCWal

1, 2, 3, 4,

Suu' Tev_-TIm_ LIm4_ 4_dBur M_Nmd=Nm

ARMM • •

N_lh;mai Avenlge

39


P41rC_pl.

. .'. •,,: ..',.-....

, L

Total Social ,_4c10_-,_lpIndilumi & pit ¢lpita Hurrah priority E[_IX_IutIS 1991, lg_ l lSS4

REGION/PROVINCE . . i. .'...,, "'..,,,.. • .. ..

... .

.

• ,......... '.. _1': • . .: :...

:T0msooel_ Ezz_mstwe -.-'.1_3 ." /..., :,....:...:..

19S4

"--_|

. , , HumanPho_E_,, :.. I_l_ .... .1_i--. . ,/.'. .. . ...

ILOCOS REGION 1. 2. 3. 4.

no¢os

N_

10,_

110¢o4Sut La Unk_ pang•stash

82155

6.M

6.36 11.20 6.4_

102.35 ?6.22 28.18

_._

94.74 92.69 09.00

4,76 8.8.5 1,58

§Jm 20,05 10.37

7_

90.20 10.85 47,14

___

0.0.5 8.47 4,01 4,07 3,35

_.45 I07_9 148.40 174.01 146.17

20.5.93 107.50 157.75 330.04 140.73

0.05 7.59 3,03 3.71 1_4

2_56 17.11 !.!8 64.28 1.02

2.75 25.09 1_4.60 74.01 0.76

18.66 9,09 10.56 4.57 11,77

745.95 57.70 17523 100.44 172.37

g40.27 79.89 134.81 149 23 257.35

n.a. 7_7it 5.45 3 57 3.18

619,72 13.91 SO.09 8,0_ 20.31

923.67 8,91 11,35 15.06 21.$2

48,21 20.20 14,94 9.49 '23.21 3,48

271.74 58.A_ 48.47 46,70 63.39 St.SO

264.53 8952 107.03 _1.8.5 79.14 112.47

4 62 213 4 68 it 61 13.74 348

2.62 32._'_ .5.04 0 15 2.43 6.17

22 89 8,19 20.54 13.3.5 14,77 14.32

nJ. 17.95 7,00 14,6-=; 4.16 §,1.5 1,75 4 18 1066 :1676 2.59

107.23 83.'ut S3._6 82.18 91,40 9_.0_ 5624 8._g¢ 85.31 5'5.31 100.14

123.47 141.01 77.52 141.54 124,41 114.87 69 43 114 (}4 68.7.5 103.10 15`2.73

n a, 569 2 SO 12,0.5 2.89 .5.11 ha 1.70 0 53 6.80 048

S9.32 22.39 S..57 23,19 5.Q6 4."m, 1163 3.21 6.50 18.48 2.07

0.42 101.23 27.64 61.33 _.40 9,28 _.52 4,26 70.20 36.92 $.57

6 5_ 2._ n i. _a 2.75 5`31

5`997 51.$2 4_._J 1792,5 n4 n•

87 8'5 49.5.9 69,51 172 31 nl 91.72

3 49 2 25 na na 2.14 0 04

6 SO 3604 11,63 13._,it.5 n.J. n a.

22 26 2 81 1g.57 166 29 tii. 12.5`1

5`$3 0 20 3 7'5 2 40 10OZ 9 90

9000 70.54 99 19 10246 07$4 5.4Tit

12020 104 '55 103 '52 132 _9 115¢,2 80 80

404 5 5`5 2 04 it 55 3 91 4 ,5S

5`7,45 1660 3 '52 68 £=8 1909 12 93

258 11 '57 2.38 14 22 22.79 20.80

.586 I0 tO 1757 0'59

4630 4033 7871 14343

'52O0 53 90 10'555 101 _8

3_ • 2;' 1 "_3 006

4 16 8 28 43 5`7 101C6

13 95 13 00 0 ,_3 15,522

0 75 5`40 084 662 213 55_

7B97 it2'57 7782 7087 8999 n•

179 T2 1.;045 8967 10213 961,5 11391

0 07 I 01 634 100 004 145

35`9 0 74 1401 6121 1175 nl

2 45 IO 2'5 24,1,5 745 5`33 240

3 24 4,04 5`27

n I. 77,42 43.32

59 69 SO2'5 02.09

3 03 n a. 4 711

nI I 60 3.9.5

28,34 32.66 46,04

I ._'t 347 7.r_ 2 82 1.90 9.SO 2.2'5

g,4.SO 67,29 33.53 213.51 190 ,51 _.$I 103.44

107 _ 132.19 49 it7 106 43 157 ,51 95`07 230.77

OBit 2._0 6 10 2 10 104 .555 109

3 B(I 5`2¥ 0 50 3.38 4.g9 16,.5.5 5.33

5`.31 71.10 10.87 2.97 2.05 33.71 12.94

A41 9 65 6.j:n 4 44 nil nl

31.59 8202 70.4'5 .5224 9041 37 "m

3518 711,5 99 36 73,83 11it 04 42.12

4 70 $ D8 5` 38 2 9_ na nl.

10.65 2'5.03 40.79 g n4 tOM 409

13,00 32.72 68 64 0 9_ 42.75` SM

8939 45`91 5481

n a. 0 75` 1 78

117.44 21.84 9.97

78,49 44 31 14 30

CAR. CORDILLER.A.AOMINISTRATIVE REGION • • • • • it,

1, 2. 3. 4. 5.

CAGAYAN VALLEY •

lit.

NX8 Eenguel _ KalmQ.iApeyao Mmmtam _

1, 2. 3, 4. 8,

Batanes CIQayan isabelNueva Vt_.ay= Oui_urto

CENTRAL LUZON I. 2, 3. 4, 5, 6.

IV,

SOUTHERN TAGALOG •

• V,

I. 2, 3. 4. .5, 8, 7. 9. 9, 10 II.

1, 2. 3. 4, 5`. 5

AJt_ty Camar.nes N(xte C4rr_nnes Sur Cala.-l_ua, les Ma.sbaie Sot_._

_;E$TERN V15AY,_.<;

" •

Vll

_rx)_ ElatAr_0as Ca_tA Lagun4 Mann_%.:_e (_oLM Mmdo,'_ OrientAlMmd_Q Palaw_n QuezOn RLzal R_x_

elCOL REGION

,..1.

Ba(aan Rul;b¢_a Nuova Eoja P;_ml_ga T;uta¢ Zamb_k_S

1, 2. 3 4 '5 6

AJdan ._bqu* C=I:_Z Gu,n'_ras I_lO Ne0r0s O,¢o_r, tA=

CENTRAL VI,_J_Y A_ t 2 3 4

VIII

EASTERN VI.%AY AS " • •

IX.

1. 2 3

OlSd_n 7.Jml_,_a Zan_

_ _

No,"le .T_

1, 2. 3, 4. .5 6. 7.

A0uS_lmd4_Norm Ag_t.ln mdSur Eiui,_k_n Canv_ M_sarr=sO¢odent,ld M,zsrr=sOn_ntA_ Sungao d41Node

SOUTHERN MINOANAO

Xit

B,_'an Easlem Sar_,lr Leyte _,o_em Leyt_ Nov_llemS,11n_r Western ,_rr_r

NORTHERN MIN_

XI,

1 2 3 4 5 8

WESTERN MINI_U_tAO •

X.

Sohol CeL_ Negros Onen_zi S_tJ,lOr

1, 2. 3, 4 5`. S.

Oavamde( No*le Oav_ Oel _ur [)avaloOn4m_d 5oQfftCcN,tb.ab_ ,_ del S_ Safillg4inl

CENTRAL MINON_LAO I 2. 3.

_ del Nor'4 Nor_l Ced_l_l_) Sultan Kud_ral

0 88 1 22 1.78

I _n.70 20 23 M._4

I. 2. 31 4

S,du TIk_Ta_ L_ _ 5_r Magumdsl*q_

4.28 n4, _|. 1.77

8,25 1.1.5 n0, 2.64

8.95`

_q.09

AJRMM

National Av_Oe '*SRA Pmvi_'_s _: Jgc.att),4.v_l

369 ha. n4, 3.1=; 91.70 ....

(/_.

9. I_)

gO

2,73 hi. n6 I T7 4 ti

B 15 1,10 n._, 8 7.5 17.00

3 68 nL no, 3,15` 20,25


$o¢141A|lo¢ilJo*l _t_o and HUl'mln Ot_lOpmlni 1_1,1993 & 1294

.:"::;i.::" Reoio_c_,cE :. " ." " : -.., .":", ---'_91 '._R,*• ,: 19_0. • ..

,,.

'l,

...

.

H

,

, ,

.

-.

Pdo_/R,tI_

199,;I

. '..

I_1

_e;;;K_-a:--__,_ _¢93 I;944 •

.,,

ILOCOS REGION 1, 2. 3. 4,

I_s Node IIo¢os _ La Un_o_ Pana4inan

9.36 0.33 14.01 13,36

30,44 48.99 41.87 19."uL

27.39 32.17 35.58 S0,1g

6.;19 6,514 11_09 3,22

2.97 2_71l ]JR) 7.13

0_T/ 30.$5 4_17 32.25

0.07 6.65 3.99 3.11 2.31

9_11 43.76 38,._ 39,2Z 35.n=

43.g_ 26,40 32.79 ._d_.8_l 28.65

0_07 8.94 3,01 2.84 0.85

0.N 6,9_1 0,32 14.51 0-24

0.$7 5.63 32.13 13.20 0.11

3.70 11.89 12,11 4.09 164_

33,72 33.32 66.12 40.97 3.%72

32.04 31.55 58.C_ 40.06 3g.._J

e_a. 10.17 6.24 3,_J 4.$0

26.01 8,02 37.01 3.63 4.21

31,92 2,33 4.89 4,04 3.30

33.10 39.51 22.82 15.66 19,39 4 16

69.39 25.26 50.51 ::16.431 37_4! 33.72

63"/9 42.70 41,41 35.19 37.:_5 34.01

3_5 4 16 7 14 1420 11.46 4 16

067 10.?.1 5,25 634 1.44 2.5S

5.52 4.27 7.80 8._ 6.0-/ 4,33

n a, 22.09 9 54 14,14 3.57 5.82 1.83 1.01 15.07 11 07 3 :_2

29,04 47_15 34.46 42.r_ 31.S7 26.NI 'L1.03 23.0_ 43.75 32.71 4-/.42

22.09 $6 66 32,90 46 41 34.90 211.41 22.87 20.44 44 11 36._8 45 _

r_a_ 6 99 3.99 1163 2.4_ 4 84 n,a 0 74 12._5 2.19 0_

25._ 12.64 4.23 12.02 1,75 125 0 96 Ot_ 4._6 10.93 O.M

0,07 40.63 11_73 20,96 19.21 2.29 20,93 0.76 :_1.4.93 1371 1.70

7,47 3 86 n a. n4 492 .. "" 1024

2B 54 26 62 3-/,72 46 13 na na

34,82 1693 43 40 41 09 ha. "_,_109

3 95 3 2<3 n a_ ha. 383 00_

3,29 2002 9,34 _.46 ha. n4

6 54 0_1 12_0 39 65 nl. 5.19

761 1062 S 45 309 2144 1245

4393 4062 47 76 ._ _5 _.45_ 31-/-/

394-/ :_ -/5 _ -/3 29 33 5495 3566

571 7 ly 4 _ 0 70 635 $_1

2605 6 151 I -/4 20.20 122_" 751

0.79 4 "_2 0 I}4 3 I$ 106_ 12_

540 2Z3 20 43 062

219_ 2:)43 37 7_ _

_41:_ 2575 39 :_0 ._907

3_ 093 t 5-1 004

197 401 20 90 2598

5.43 620 2 32 2651

0_7 ._9S 1123 8 05 2 19 6 40

,_S;'0 4] 08 39_ :_1.52 35 1"t n_

22._9 _ 2" 4186 3:) 9.5 31 641 33 2;'

009 I 97 I609 2 19 0 04 I 67

I 17 4 09 7._4 _ 99 3 42 ni

0._0 3 09 114:) 2 4S I ?$ 0 70

3.10 453 0 42

hi. /J_3gl 26.82

21 $1 3322 25 3_

2_Q hi. 7 64

nl. 0-/$ 2 6.1

9,13 1107 1602

1,._7 2.33 8,94 195 I 8.1 6 30 236

28.11 24.31 24.1k_1 _150 40.7-/ 20,-/4 4038

2)'95 "t0.09 23?0 2853 34 66 1999 3365

109 187 7.79 1.41, 1.76 4 67 174

109 I.S10 4 8_ 0.5_ I_ 5 24 2.0_

1_1 16.1-/ 5,18 045 0.45 7.03 169

994 9 61 881 309 nl Ni

2230 _4 ._) 3227 2701 2403 _.60

14 12 32 _4 31 26 2_68 35_'7 16,12

5SO $ 9-/ 538 1 04 hi. hi.

752 I*' 49 22.a0 4T_ 299 357

5.25 1405 21 80 361 1284 224

23,$1 22.41 22.17

n l, 1.12 2_3

12$1 12.61 671

423.12 21.63 6 04

434 ha. it,i 2.7_

3,63 053 ¢i_ 042

4_J

6.87

CAR. CORDILLERAAOMINISTRATWE REGION • " " • • II.

1. 2. 3, 4. S.

CAGAY_'_I VALLEY 1. 2. 3, 4. .5.

III.

1. 2, 3. 4. _,, 6. 7. 8, 9. 10. 1I.

I, 2. 3 4 5. 6,

S. 6

AJdan A_bque Capz Ou_maras IIodo Neg/_S O¢_'e nt.l_

Boh_ Co_ Negt_s One_ltal S._.J_

EASTERN VISAYA5 •

IX,

-

CFNTRAL VIS.AYAS I 2 3 4

VIII

A/O.ly Cln_4nne$ N0¢1e Camannes S_r CatJnduanes M_,s_t_ Sors_;.:q

VVC__._T FRN VI,I_'AYAS I, 2. 3.

VII

Aura ElaLanas Ca_I4 L_gun_l Mannduque OccK_ntal MCKIO_ Onenhll M.-<_-o Pala-.van Ouezc_n R_zal Rom[_o_

81COL REGION

• VI

Basin EulsDc..1.1 Nueva EcJja Psmp.lnga T_da_ Zar_ales

SOUTHERN TAGALOQ "

V

Batanes Cag4yin I$_;bela Nuev;I Visclya Cluinno

CENTRAL LUZON 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

IV,

Abq Bonuet Itug;io KaEngJ1.4,_lyaO Moun_n _

I 2 3 4 S 6

IBd_ra_ Faslem $lmar Leyte _umern Leyle No4'tl_em$4rr_r We_ltemSam.it

_STERN •

X.

1. 2. 3. 4. 3, 0. 7,

Agus.l_ d41Ncx'l¢ AguSmld4| Cur Buk_tOn Cim.9_ M_|at1"lsO¢odent_d Mvslnll 4_ntat Su,_gaode_N_te .

SOUTHERN MINOANAO

*

XII,

8asdan ZI41_11 _ N_'le Zinlb_lmgl eel 5ur

NORTHERN MINDANAO

XI,

1 2. 2,

UINDANAO

1 2 3, 4 S 6

OavlO d4i ;_:_14 OIvlO _ _ OavioOnental 5o_h Colal=4t_ Su/l_l_ _k_tSW $14"ln_Mnl

CF.NTRAL MINOANAO 1. 2, 3.

Llnl, o d4{NcXle N_'_b'lCoLsblm Sultin K_<l_l_41

I 04 1 J_ 2.23

22.40 13,_1 25,59

1, 2. 3. 4,

_ Tav_Tmd I._m40401Sur Mauenmm_o

7,12 n.L ha. 2.73

360 0.5-') nL 1.40

ARMM • "

N.elk_malAverage

934

$434

1.941 ha, hi. 1 $7 3460

1.99 n4 tl.i, 157 1074

;


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