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in association with rossiyskaya gazeta, russia THE times of india wednesday_JUNE 29_2011
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International
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Afghan villagers watch as NATO soldiers patrol a small town in the Arghandab district.
Strategy The West will never win in Afghanistan by purely military means; building infrastructure holds the key
Stalling Taliban: The Soviet experience
As the world marks the 10th anniversary of 9/11 this autumn, the US should avoid mistakes made by the Soviet Union to stall a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Vladimir Snegirev Specially for RIR
The US-led coalition's war against the Taliban and the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, although separated in time and space, have much in common. There are, however, also differences, the chief one being that Moscow in 1979 sent its divisions to protect a friendly regime from hostile forces and to prevent Afghanistan from dropping out of its sphere of influence. The West committed its troops to destroy terrorist bases. In the former case, it was an episode in the global confrontation between the “socialist camp”and virtually the rest of the world. In the latter case, it was the White House’s response to 9/11. Thirty-two years ago, when the Soviet Union’s generals found themselves in Afghanistan, they did not even bother to provide basic accommodation for their units as they assumed that they would quickly defeat Islamic guerillas armed with outdated weapons and return home. However, the bearded mujahideen were supported by the colos-
sal resources of the US, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan, Egypt, Israel and many others who declared the Soviet Union an“evil empire” and dragged it into a prolonged war of attrition with the aim of winning the Cold War. The coalition fighting the Taliban-al-Qaeda combine, on the contrary, has the support of practically the whole world, including Russia. But despite these seminal differences, there are certain similarities.Thirty-two years ago, as soon as they entered Kabul, Soviet Special Forces began by liquidating Hafizulla Amin, the Afghan leader who was suspected of collaborating with the CIA. Babrak Karmal was brought in to replace Amin and was thoroughly briefed by the Kremlin on how to run the country “correctly”. The US-NATO invasion was also preceded by the high-profile political assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the only Afghan at the time who had a chance to become a genuine national leader. The official story is that forces close to the Taliban masterminded the murder, but not many give credence to this. The truth is that at the time Massoud did not suit anyone, whether it be the Americans, the “black mullahs” or members of his circle who wanted nothing but to enjoy the spoils of the jihad
victory.The way the assassination was organised and the tracks covered up shows that serious professionals were at work. The Taliban? This does not look like their work. Subsequently, the White House installed Hamid Karzai at the Ark Palace and then did everything to legitimise him in the eyes of his own citizens. The Soviets were zealously imposing on Afghanistan their own ideas of state structure and public life.The Americans are committing the same mistakes, vainly trying to graft their “democratic values” on the Afghan tribes. The appearance of NATO and
ISAF units in Afghanistan, like the invasion by the“limited Soviet contingent”, has given a powerful impetus for a guerilla war. The Russians failed to achieve victory, but arguably managed to do what the West has yet to achieve: to create a viable government, to form, arm and train the army and police and ensure control of most of the country’s territory. My foreign colleagues sometimes ask me why many Afghans, even former mujahideen, have fond memories of the Russians while showing no warm feelings for those who today risk their lives to defend them against the Tali-
ban and Al-Qaeda. I think the answer is obvious.The trick is that we did not only fight the fundamentalists, but also invested billions of dollars in various construction projects. Almost everything Afghanistan has today – roads, bridges, tunnels, farms, schools, grain elevators, residential neighborhoods – were built by or with the assistance of the Soviets.Tens of thousands of Afghans were educated in Russia and other Soviet republics. Such things are not easily forgotten. Surgical military operations must be, therefore, accompanied by important infrastructure
projects that change the face of the country and the mentality of its people. In the early 1990s, one could often hear people in Russia saying that“sending troops to Afghanistan was a tragic mistake, but pulling them out was an unpardonable crime”.Winning the jihad turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory: chaos, civil war, still greater casualties culminating in the seizure of power by the Taliban, and Afghanistan becoming the centre of international terrorism. Today, the world is different. But the danger of such a catastrophe repeating itself has not subsided.
book review
Revisiting 1979: A gory tale of revolution, coups, murders
TITLE: Virus A Authors: Vladimir Snegirev, Valery Samunin
As the Afghan endgame begins with the phased withdrawal of Western forces in July, a new book revisits the Soviet misadventure in Afghanistan, which may have lessons for the future of the country as well. Virus A, authored by Vladimir Snegirev and Valery Samunin (published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta) traces back the chain of tragic and bloody events that led to the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979. In the book subtitled “How we be-
came consumed with invading Afghanistan,” the authors take April 27, 1978 as the starting point of their research when the Saur (April) Revolution roared through Kabul. On this fateful day, Afghan President Muhammad Daoud Khan, his family and supporters were brutally murdered, and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan took power. On December 27 1979, Soviet Special Forces arrived in Afghanistan, their official mission be-
ing to provide protection for Afghan President Hafizullah Amin. The authors believe that this 20-month period from April 27, 1978 to December 27, 1979 played a defining role not just in Afghanistan’s modern history, but also impinged on how global politics would play out in the future. The book reads like a thriller and bristles with torrid sub-plots involving a variegated cast of personalities ranging from politburo members to lowranking Afghan revolutionaries.