the Allies in the Summer and Autumn of 1918. The upshot was that. between the 30th November and the 6th December, the British lost most of the ground previously gained and, after an even more serious setback had been avoided thanks only to the valour of a few units. practically the same balance of forces and positions as prior to the attack was restored. "A gloomy sunset after such a brilliant dawn" were the vivid words used by liddell Hart in the book cited above. We shall return to the significance of these remarks of his in our conclusion. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNT
On 19th November 1917 (it is again liddell Hart who describes the events, and not without a note of humour) the German troops before Cambrai were contemplating, with serene con~ fidence. the calm hovering over the sector. In the well-appointed trenches of the Hindenburg Line they compared their peaceful situation with the much more difficult one of their comrades in the Ypres zone. On 20th November, 381 British tanks, followed by a comparatively small number of infantry units. carried out a dawn advance which took the Germans utterly by surprise: The defenders were almost incredulous before the unpleasant novelty of an attack carried out using unusual weapons and tactics and, above all. executed without the customary artillery warning which almost always left the defenders a few days in which to prepare a suitable welcome for the attackers. On 21st November the church-bells of London were rung joyfully to announce a triumph. which appeared at the time as the prelude to imminent final victory. On his return to his HO. Field Marshal Ludendorff hastily drafted his <;>rders for a general withdrawal. Both the London church-bells and Ludendorffs draft orders were reliable
line of contact at Nov. 30th. Morning Line of contact at Nov. 30th. Night
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prophets. only that they were some nine months ahead of the real events. On balance, the outcome of the Cambrai operation left the British with comparatively little of the ground they had seized (ironically, that little included the position of Flesquieres, the site of the main setback of the 20th November). At the end of three weeks' fighting, British and German losses, excluding the British tanks (about 200). were also indicative of a disappointing relative equilibrium. The British
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had lost 44,000 men, 145 artillery pieces. 456 machine-guns. and the German 41,000 men. 145 artillery pieces and 500 machineguns. Both sides learned numerous lessons from the battle of Cambrai which, from the standpoint of military history. can be considered as the successful rediscovery of the fundamental principle of surprise. However. the beneficial effects of this rediscovery were cancelled out by repeated violations of the equally essential principle. of the economy of forces. which was 77