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Figures

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 14.1 16.1 33.1 33.2 38.1 38.2 39.1 40.1 40.2 43.1

The double auction The cost-of-effort schedule Relation of contracted and delivered effort to worker wage (141subjects) Average contributions over time in the partner, stranger, and perfect stranger treatments when the punishment condition is played first Countries judged highly democratic Antisocial punishment leads to low payoffs The social and environmentally responsible (SER) product differentiation and the asymmetric costs of SER distance Use of social media/Web 2.0 services by foundation leaders A prisoner’s dilemma: single-period payoff to help (H) and don’t help (D) Public goods game with punishment, average contributions over time The repeated game equilibrium set XAE The Binmore-Rawls egalitarian social contract The third sector in the welfare triangle The basic trust game The generic trust game Classification of economic goods

23 27 28 32 39 40 151 168 328 330 388 391 407 413 414 445

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M3119 - BRUNI TEXT.indd viii

27/02/2013 08:27

HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE  

Ricardo Abramovay: Philanthropy beyond the sectoral approach

HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISE  

Ricardo Abramovay: Philanthropy beyond the sectoral approach

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