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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow The Regent’s Report 2015


Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow The Regent’s Report 2015

© Regent’s University London. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form by any means without permission of the publishers. The Regent’s Report (Print) ISSN 2057-1429 The Regent’s Report (Online) ISSN 2057-1437 First published in Great Britain in 2015 by Regent’s University London, Regent’s Park, London, NW1 4NS Printed by Belmont Press Typeset in Baskerville / Gill Sans Produced by External Relations at Regent’s University London The information in this publication is distributed on an “as is” basis, without warranty. While every precaution has been taken in the preparation, neither the authors nor Regent’s University London shall have any direct liability to any person or organisation with respect to loss or damage caused or allegedly caused by use of the information provided. For more information please contact research@regents.ac.uk Errata: Any corrections or amendments made after publication can be found at regents.ac.uk/europereport/errata


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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

Reykjavik

Europe and its Neighbours

ICELAND

EU member states Non-EU countries

DENMA Dublin

IRELAND UNITED KINGDOM Amsterdam

London

NETHERLAND BELGIUM G Brussels Paris

Luxembou

LUXEM FRANCE

Bern

SWITZERLAN

Lisbon

Madrid

PORTUGAL SPAIN

Rabat

Algiers

Tunis

MOROCCO ALGERIA TUNISIA

Regent’s Report 2015


Europe and its Neighbours

SWEDEN FINLAND NORWAY RUSSIA Helsinki

Oslo Tallinn Stockholm

ESTONIA

ARK

Riga

Moscow

LATVIA

Copenhagen

LITHUANIA Vilnius Minsk Berlin

DS

Warsaw

POLAND

GERMANY rg

BELARUS Kiev

Prague

CZECH REPUBLIC

BOURG

UKRAINE SLOVAKIA

Bratislava Vienna

D

AUSTRIA Ljubljana

SLOVENIA

Chisinau

Budapest

HUNGARY

MOLDOVA ROMANIA

Zagreb Belgrade

Baku

Tbilisi

Bucharest

CROATIA Sarajevo SERBIA BOSNIA OSNIA KOSOVO Sofia -HERZ. Podgoica Rome Pristina BULGARIA MONT. Skopje Tirana ITALY MACEDONIA ALBANIA

GEORGIA

AZERBAIJAN Yerevan

ARMENIA Tehran

Ankara

IRAN

TURKEY

GREECE Athens

s Baghdad

SYRIA

Nicosia

CYPRUS

MALTA

Beirut

Damascus

LEBANON

IRAQ

Amman

Tripoli

ISRAEL Jerusalem

JORDAN LIBYA

Cairo

SAUDI ARABIA

EGYPT Regent’s Report 2015

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow Page 6 ›

Preface Professor Aldwyn Cooper,Vice Chancellor, Regent’s University London

Page 8 ›

Foreword Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission

Page 10 › Editors’ Introduction Dr Martyn Bond, Honorary Senior Fellow, and Professor John Drew, Chancellor, Regent’s University London, and Director, Institute for Contemporary European Studies Page 14 › Hard and Soft Power in the European Neighbourhood Professor Jolyon Howorth, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Yale University Page 18 › The European Neighbourhood Policy Dr Kataryna Wolczuk, Reader in Politics and International Studies, University of Birmingham Page 24 › Energy Issues Andy Lebrecht, former UK Deputy Permanent Representative in Brussels Page 30 › EU Trade with its Neighbours Dr Nicholas Bowen, President of the Chartered Institute of Linguists and former Principal Lecturer, European Business School, Regent’s University London Page 36 › Managing Migration in Europe Professor Ibrahim Sirkeci, Director of the Centre for Transnational Studies, Regent’s University London Page 42 › Europe and the Need for Democratic Security Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General, Council of Europe, Strasbourg Page 46 › Morocco Dr Abdul-Kader Aljandali, Senior Lecturer in Quantitative Finance, and Amal Laaribi, PhD Researcher, ISCAE, Casablanca Page 52 › Algeria Dr Elias Boukrami, Principal Lecturer in Banking, Regent’s University London Page 58 › Tunisia Chris Stephen, Correspondent for The Guardian, and Zeineb Marzouk, Tunisian journalist and analyst Page 64 › Libya Chris Stephen, Correspondent for The Guardian Page 70 › Egypt Dr Sara Bazoobandi, Lecturer in International Political Economy, Regent’s University London Page 74 › Israel Uri Dromi, Director of the Jerusalem Press Club Page 82 › Lebanon, Syria and Jordan Jonathan Fryer, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London Regent’s Report 2015


Page 90 › Turkey Michael Lake, former EU Ambassador to Turkey, and Hungary Page 96 › Azerbaijan Adam Hug, Policy Director, Foreign Policy Centre, London Page 102 › Georgia Denis Corboy, former EU Ambassador to Armenia and Georgia, and Dr Nino Kereselidze, Research Assistant, University of St Andrews Page 108 › Armenia Mikayel Zolyan, Regional Studies Centre, Yerevan Page 116 › Serbia Dr Neven Anjelic, Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Human Rights, Regent’s University London Page 122 › Bosnia-Herzegovina Dr Martyn Bond, Honorary Senior Fellow, Regent’s University London Page 126 › Kosovo Colin McIntyre, former Reuter’s Chief Correspondent for Eastern Europe Page 132 › Macedonia Ana Alibegova, Mladiinfo International, Skopje Page 138 › Montenegro Dr Kenneth Morrison, Reader in Modern South-East European History, De Montfort University, Leicester Page 144 › Albania Zenel Hoxha, President of the UK-Albania Chamber of Commerce, Tirana Page 150 › Moldova Bogdan Ivanel, Researcher in International Public Law and Human Rights, Institut d’études politiques de Paris (SciencesPo), Law School, Paris Page 158 › Ukraine Anthony Cary, former Chef de Cabinet to External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten, UK Ambassador to Sweden and High Commissioner to Canada Page 164 › Belarus Juliya Slutskaya, Belarus Press Club, Warsaw Page 170 › Russian Federation Rodric Braithwaite, former UK Ambassador to the Russian Federation Page 176 › The EFTA Countries: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland Graham Avery, St Anthony’s College, Oxford, and European Policy Centre, Brussels Facts and Figures:/LIR2MVR½IPH6IWIEVGL3J½GIV6IKIRX´W9RMZIVWMX]0SRHSRTVSZMHIHIWWIRXMEPWXEXMWXMGWSRIEGL country, covering key demographic, economic and social indicators, sourced essentially from the World Bank, Eurostat and the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. Regent’s Report 2015


Preface Professor Aldwyn Cooper Vice Chancellor, Regent’s University London

“Regent’s Reports are published to [\QU]TI\MLMJI\MIVLPMTXÅVL[WT]\QWV[ \WXZWJTMU[QLMV\QÅML1PWXM\PI\\PQ[ Report will help to illuminate issues and assist in developing good policy” Professor Aldwyn Cooper


Preface

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LIVIMWEKVS[MRKWXSVQSJGSR¾MGXERHHMWWIRXEFVSEH It is created by dissatisfaction with the pace of socioeconomic development and the exclusion of large swathes of society from improved material conditions. The power of this global storm is increasing quickly from brisk breeze to destructive tempest.

divisions in Europe and around its periphery. There is a risk that we shall see the rise of populist political parties whose declared aim is to unleash xenophobia in our societies. The EU and its member states should work together closely, with each other and with neighbouring nations, to mitigate this risk and reverse this trend.

Corruption, competition for resources and the continued pressures of a growing population fuel this deteriorating situation. Already in the 1970s the iconic Club of Rome report underlined the ‘limits to growth’ and showed that SRP]F][SVOMRKXSKIXLIV[MPPHIZIPSTIHREXMSRW½RH optimum solutions for sustainable living.

Fortunately at the University we can register hopeful signs that most educated young people, such as those in the Regent’s family, do not share the same divisive views as their elders. Our task is to enhance this openness, this sense of enquiry, this tolerance of diversity, and to ensure they are not subverted by irrational and distorted world views.

After a half century of relative stability, Europe now ½RHWMXWIPJHVMJXMRKMRXSXLII]ISJXLMWLYVVMGERI8LIVIMW already a highly developed network of inter-dependence between European states and their neighbours, but we are at a delicate and dangerous period of history. Any JEMPYVIXS[SVOXSKIXLIVJSVXLIFIRI½XSJEPP¯[MXLMR each of our nations, across the European Union and with RIMKLFSYVMRKWXEXIW¯VYRWXLIVMWOSJJERRMRKXLI¾EQIW SJGSR¾MGXERHJSVGMRKIWXEFPMWLIHEPPMERGIWXSFVIEOETEVX Such a development could create social and economic chaos, undermining individual nation states and ultimately the European Union itself. That would be to the detriment of all.

Regent’s Reports are published to stimulate debate and LIPT½RHWSPYXMSRWXSTVSFPIQWMHIRXM½IH-LSTIXLEXXLMW 6ITSVX[VMXXIRF]I\TIVXWMRXLIMV½IPHWERHSRGIEKEMR ably edited by Professor John Drew and Dr Martyn Bond, will help to illuminate the issues and assist in developing good policy Professor Aldwyn Cooper Vice Chancellor and Chief Executive Regent’s University London

As its mission, Regent’s University London has the aim of ³'VIEXMRKXSQSVVS[´WKPSFEPPIEHIVW´-XVI¾IGXWXLI>YPY philosophy, Ubuntu, that guides the work of Desmond Tutu, with whose Foundation Regent’s collaborates. Ubuntu recognises that no individual or nation can succeed without XLILIPTSJSXLIVW¯³-EQFIGEYWI[IEVI´8LIIWWIRXMEP aim of social life is collaboration and the development of a sense of ‘family’. It is only through developing shared understanding and a willingness to work together that global problems will be solved. This view is promoted strongly by Regent’s University London. Our students and staff are drawn from more than 140 nations, working together to create deeper understanding, a university community and the Regent’s family. We promote mutual respect, which develops humanity through recognition of others in their uniqueness and difference. After the slow but real progress in understanding, mutual recognition and social inclusion of the past 50 years, we are witnessing again damaging national, ethnic and religious

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Foreword Federica Mogherini 0QOP:MXZM[MV\I\Q^MWN \PM-]ZWXMIV=VQWVNWZ.WZMQOV)‫ٺ‬IQZ[IVL Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission

“These new, more challenging times call for a new approach to our region” Federica Mogherini


Foreword

YVSTIQYWXPSSOSYX[EVHW¯XLMWLEWRIZIVFIIREW clear as it is today. The crises at our borders impact on our everyday life. It is not just about the unprecedented ¾S[SJVIJYKIIWMRXSSYVGSRXMRIRX*VSQIRIVK]WIGYVMX] to the risk of radicalisation in our societies, the European Union has a strong and urgent interest in a stable and peaceful neighbourhood.

E

These new, more challenging times call for a new approach to our region. First of all, a European approach. The threats are too big to be looked at through national lenses, or to be tackled by nation states on their own. When I took SJ½GIEWXLI)9,MKL6ITVIWIRXEXMZIJSV*SVIMKR%JJEMVW and Security Policy, many asked me whether I would prioritise our southern neighbourhood or our eastern neighbourhood. But to prioritise one over the other would lead us nowhere. If we only dealt with Syria and forgot about Ukraine, or the other way round, we would not be making Europe a safer place. There is only one European RIMKLFSYVLSSH¯³JVSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[´EWXLI Regent’s Report reminds us. Secondly, we need an approach based on partnerships. A European neighbourhood policy for the 21st century cannot be built on a 20th century mind-set. It cannot resort to a QIRXEPMX]SJFPSGWSVWTLIVIWSJMR¾YIRGI%RHMXGERRSXFI patronising or paternalistic. To face the current challenges we need partners, and strong ones. -RXLIWIXMQIW[IGERRSXWMQTP]VI¾IGXSR[LEX[IGER do forSYVRIMKLFSYVW;IQYWXVI¾IGXSR[LEX[IGERHS withSYVRIMKLFSYVW-RHITIRHIRXVIWIEVGLERHXLMROMRK¯ XLIZIV]EMQSJXLMW6ITSVX¯MWEGVYGMEP½VWXWXIT Federica Mogherini High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission

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Editors’ Introduction Dr Martyn Bond Honorary Senior Fellow, Regent’s University London

Professor John Drew Chancellor, Regent’s University London, and Director, Institute for Contemporary European Studies

“Good governance – democracy with respect for human rights and the rule of law, however generously interpreted – goes with reduced corruption, and riches follow” Dr Martyn Bond and Professor John Drew


Editors’ Introduction

VSYRH)YVSTI¯JVSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[¯ violence, corruption, incompetence, mismanagement and external meddling have created unstable states and exacerbated situations that pose enormous problems for us inside the European Union (EU). Nearly two years ago The EconomistHYFFIH)YVSTI´WTIVMTLIV]XLI³VMRKSJ½VI´ The situation is even more disturbing now.

A

So this Report makes uncomfortable reading. Whether you read the cross-cutting essays on migration, energy and trade or the contributions from the 20 or so individual GSYRXVMIW]SY½RHMWWYIWXLEXGV]SYXJSVWSPYXMSRWXSFI taken on a common basis by the European Union as a whole rather than by its individual member states. And the Union is as yet only half-equipped to deal with them. In foreign trade and development aid the EU may already have a major role to play, but in the harder-edged activities SJTIEGIOIITMRKMXMWERI[GSQIVMRXLI½IPHERHMR peace-making it is not yet at the starting gate. Yet stability is what its periphery is crying out for. Nor is its frontier force, Frontex, adequately resourced yet to cope with the size of the immediate and pressing refugee problems it is called upon to solve on Europe’s borders. A common policy regarding migration has yet to be thought through, and in handling migration effects within XLI9RMSR&VYWWIPWWXVYKKPIWXSI\IVXXLIQSVEP¯PIXEPSRI TSPMXMGEP¯EYXLSVMX]MXRIIHW%WMXXVMIWXSIRKMRIIVIUYMXEFPI solutions among the member states, national politicians are mainly concerned with minimising both economic and social costs for their own domestic electorates. The size of the migration problem has stunned EU governments. From a manageable trickle just a few years ago it has grown to a mighty stream of around 10,000 would-be refugees moving into Europe every day. The consequences of this human upheaval are seen nightly on our television screens. States need help in maintaining order and providing practical support for migrants in such numbers. Public opinion is divided between those who generously welcome them and those who warn of dire consequences for society in their own nation state as well as in Europe more generally. The political consequences of this have yet to be played out in elections across Europe, FYX½VWXMRHMGEXMSRWEVIXLEX\IRSTLSFMGTSPMXMGEPTEVXMIW that want to keep migrants out are steadily gaining ground. &ILMRHXLIQYGLMRGVIEWIH¾S[SJQMKVERXWPMIGEYWIW within their countries of origin and those through which

XLI]XVERWMX¯XLEX³VMRKSJ½VI´¯[LMGLWLSYPHKMZI)YVSTI even more cause for concern. By reviewing each country on Europe’s periphery, this Report brings together analyses that highlight the commonalities of the situation. Strong government in the ring can offer stability in relations with the EU, but often at the cost of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law as we in Europe interpret them. The collapse of strong government, on the other LERH¯7]VMEERH0MF]EEVIXLIQSWXSFZMSYWGEWIW¯GER lead to a failed state in which such rights have no chance SJ¾SYVMWLMRKEXEPP2YHKMRKXLMVHGSYRXVMIW MIXLSWI SYXWMHIXLI)9 JVSQEYXSGVEG]XSHIQSGVEG]¯EOI] KSEPSJ)YVSTIERMRHIIH;IWXIVRJSVIMKRTSPMG]¯GER easily nudge the baby out with the bathwater. Here the experience of the Council of Europe, a rules- and valuesbased organisation with much wider membership than XLI)YVSTIER9RMSRMW[SVXLGSRWMHIVMRK¯EGEWIGPIEVP] argued by its Secretary General in his contribution on ‘democratic security’. But the issues are not simply ethical or political in the broadest sense. They are intermingled with economic interest, and the essays on energy and trade, among others, clearly make this point. The European Union is immensely rich by comparison with states outside its magic circle, but it is also dependent on some of them for vital imports and they serve as necessary export markets. 8LI³JEGXWERH½KYVIW´EXXLIIRHSJIEGLGSYRXV]IWWE]WIX out the bare essentials of this material relationship. They list population, gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign XVEHI½KYVIWERHWYVZI]MWWYIWSJMRXIVREXMSREPGSRGIVR affecting that country, including the scourge of illicit drugs, international and cyber crime. Our sincere thanks go XS/LIR2MVR½IPH6IWIEVGL3J½GIV6IKIRX´W9RMZIVWMX] London, for compiling them. They make interesting reading alongside the arguments of the various contributors. Broadly speaking, the poorer the state, the more corrupt it is, a relationship easily grasped by comparing GDP per head and each state’s position on the Transparency International (TI) corruption index. This ranks states in order from 1 to 175 based on the level of corruption in their public administration. 8S[LIX]SYVETTIXMXIJSV½KYVIW)9WXEXIWVERKISRXLI TI corruption index from among the top ten to as low as 69 (Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and Greece) with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Croatia also scoring a poor 51. No

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

state on the periphery, however, ranks better than 50 with the notable exception of Israel, which is placed 37th. When it comes to GDP per head, EU countries are also as a bloc well ahead of the states on the periphery. Leaving aside the anomaly of Luxembourg with GDP per head of $91,000, EU states range from over $45,000 for Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Sweden down through a spread of $25,000 to Croatia at just over $20,000, and tail-markers Romania at $18,000 and Bulgaria at $15,000. With the exception of the three rich west European states, -GIPERH2SV[E]ERH7[MX^IVPERH¯EPQSWXTVS\]QIQFIVW XLI)9¯)YVSTI´WRIMKLFSYVLSSHMWVIPEXMZIP]TSSV%TEVX from Israel at $33,000 per head and Russia with $25,000, all the peripheral states have a GDP per head below $20,000, scaling down at the very bottom to Moldova with little over $4,500. This is not to say that masses are migrating into Europe simply because it is so much richer than where they come from. Essentially it is more stable, peaceful and better governed. Concomitantly it is also richer. To be sure, it QYWXSJXIRFIHMJ½GYPXXSHMWXMRKYMWLFIX[IIRXLIX[S attractions in migrants’ minds, but in practical terms those migrants who make good and earn an average income in Europe can send remittances back to their families in their countries of origin, and very many do so. These remittances help to redress the balance, improve directly GDP per head in the periphery, and hence reduce the economic incentive to move. -RER]GEWIQMKVEXMSR¾S[WEVIRSXWSPIP]JVSQ)YVSTI´W periphery. Many states there are transit countries as well as countries of origin for migrants. Eritrea, Afghanistan and Pakistan, even Iraq, are not so close to Europe as are Albania, Libya and Syria, yet the exodus towards Europe stems from these states as well. A table in the essay on migration gives numbers detained for illegal entry and shows the wide variety of states from which they come. This Report on Europe’s neighbours also casts some light on the EU’s policy towards its periphery. In part this must always remain a bilateral relationship between Brussels and the national administration of each state. Each has a separate history, several of them closely linked with one SVSXLIVSJXLI)9QIQFIVWXEXIWERH¯JSVKSSHSV MPP¯XLEXLMWXSV]VIWSREXIWXLVSYKLXLITVIWIRX%PKIVME like Israel, means different things in Paris, in London and in Berlin.

Regent’s Report 2015

Putting together a common European policy that reconciles internal divergences of view inside the EU, while at the same time responding as positively as possible to the needs of particular target or partner countries, is a multi-dimensional task of which the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) still has little experience. Much is asked of it in these turbulent times, and relatively little support is given to it by sometimes jealous foreign services, in particular in the larger member states. Like them, it has its triumphs and it makes its mistakes, but they should be appreciated as shared triumphs and shared mistakes by all members, not causes for envy or derision. The value-added the EEAS does bring to the diplomacy of the member states is a sense of urgency and of shared responsibility. The frequency of meetings of heads of state in Brussels has ensured the foreign affairs of Europe have greater salience in public opinion, and that public opinion in different member states is informed about the reactions of their partners within the EU. We are each less an island to ourselves than we used to be. There have been moves to group Brussels’ approach XSWXEXIWMRSRIVIKMSRSVERSXLIV¯XLI³IEWXIVR neighbourhood’, the Mediterranean, the western Balkans ¯[MXL½RIKVEHEXMSRWSRSJJIVXSSRISVXLISXLIV *I[SFWIVZIVWXLMROXLMWLEWFVSYKLXFIRI½XWERHSZIV XMQIXLIRSXMSRXLEXIEGLGSYRXV]LEWWTIGM½GMWWYIW and requirements has won through. It has also allowed the EU to back away from labelling them all as ‘nonaccession states’. None of them wants to know that their own particular road to Brussels is barred by the poor performance of others. None believes that it cannot make MXWTEVXMGYPEVGEWI¯JSVGPSWIVEWWSGMEXMSRSVIZIRJSV QIQFIVWLMT¯SRMXWS[RQIVMXW-JXLI[IWXIVR&EPOERW can qualify, so runs their argument, then what stops others EWOMRKJSVXLIWEQI¯SVERIUYMZEPIRX¯TVM^I# Europe’s enlargement a decade ago to include 10 states from former eastern Europe and the Mediterranean has proved a fundamental success, transforming the Union as a whole and those new members in particular. The process of enlargement has slowed, but it has not stopped. The conditionality implied by negotiations for membership is one of the strongest levers of foreign policy that Brussels LEWMRMXWEVQSYV],S[IZIVETEVXJVSQXLIYR½RMWLIH business of the western Balkans, none of the north African, Middle Eastern or Caucasus states is at this stage a candidate for membership, with the exception of Turkey.


Editors’ Introduction

Turkey and the western Balkans pose a large enough problem to keep the EU busy on that front for several years yet. 2SRIXLIPIWWXLI)9MWEXTEMRWXS½RHJSVQWSJEWWSGMEXMSR for the other peripheral states that will improve relations JSVXLIQYXYEPFIRI½XSJFSXLWMHIW%WWSGMEXMSRQMKLX become a more reasonable target for some states if they WGSVIH¯SVXVMIHXSWGSVI¯SRXLI8-MRHI\ERHXLI+(4 measure at least as well as the back-markers already inside XLI)92SRI]IXHS+SSHKSZIVRERGI¯HIQSGVEG][MXL respect for human rights and the rule of law, however KIRIVSYWP]MRXIVTVIXIH¯KSIW[MXLVIHYGIHGSVVYTXMSR and riches follow: a lesson some of the back-markers themselves still have to learn. As Dr Johnson insisted: ‘Mankind needs reminding more than it needs informing.’ Meanwhile expanding trade relations with peripheral states by strengthening the free trade aspects of arrangements between them and the EU will remain the order of the day. Opening greater investment opportunities, upgrading XLISJJIVWJSVVIWIEVGLERHIHYGEXMSR¯MRFVMIJXLI[LSPI XVEHMXMSREPTEPIXXISJQEXIVMEPEMH¯RIIHWXSFIYWIH energetically to stop the periphery descending further towards the worst examples of failed and failing states seen there already. Co-operation has a security aspect, in particular in terms of anti-terrorism. The EU has a right to expect this in exchange for its assistance, both direct and indirect, to all these states. Development aid is not Danegeld, paid periodically, indeed repeatedly, to prevent the worst, but an investment to improve the situation in the recipient WXEXI)YVSTI[MPPRIIHXSHIZIPSTMXWGETEFMPMXMIW¯WLSVX SJHMVIGXMRXIVZIRXMSR¯XSIRGSYVEKIVIJSVQWMRSVHIVXS ensure that governance continues and good governance results. The spectre of Libya is still there to haunt the dreams of Brussels, as of the ministries of foreign affairs in the major capitals. Bombing key targets is not enough to win a war. Beyond controlling territory also lies the battle for hearts and minds. ISIS plays both cards with a perverse skill that bedazzles the West. What countervailing measures GER)YVSTIHITPS]ETEVXJVSQEMVWXVMOIW#

to reverse Russia’s decisions and restore the status quo ante, or whether and what more needs to be done. The Russian Federation’s recent gearing up of its activities in Syria remains to be assessed. Articles on both Russia and Ukraine, as well as tangentially also on Belarus, throw much light on this costly, important yet delicate issue. Russia, too, is part of Europe’s periphery, a more developed and richer state than all of the others. But how much the regime there wishes to play a constructive role in reducing tensions and promoting good governance in the region has yet to be seen. The contributions of so many respected and authoritative individuals to this third Regent’s Report are the personal views of the authors and not necessarily of the organisations they come (or have come) from. The role of Regent’s University London has been to bring them together to provide a snapshot in fast-changing times of the situation in so many different countries, and through that to provide an opportunity for independent research ERHXLMROMRK¯[LMGLEWXLI,MKL6ITVIWIRXEXMZISJXLI European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy WXEXIWMRLIVJSVI[SVHMWE³GVYGMEP½VWXWXIT´ Professor John Drew Chancellor, Regent’s University London. Professor of European Business & Management Director, Institute of Contemporary European Studies Dr Martyn Bond Senior Honorary Fellow, Regent’s University London

And then there is Russia. Its annexation of Crimea and its activities in eastern Ukraine have triggered economic sanctions from the EU as an economic and political VIWTSRWIXS¾EKVERXQMPMXEV]MRXIVZIRXMSREMQIHEX overthrowing the territorial settlement of post-war Europe. Time will tell whether these sanctions are enough

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Hard and Soft Power in the European Neighbourhood Professor Jolyon Howorth 8ZWNM[[WZWN 8WTQ\QKIT;KQMVKMIVL1V\MZVI\QWVIT)‫ٺ‬IQZ[AITM=VQ^MZ[Q\a

“The biggest challenge facing the EU has not been integrating those member states from central, eastern and southern -]ZWXM\PI\M^MV\]ITTaIKKMLML1\PI[ been trying to forge a policy for those states that remained outside” Professor Jolyon Howorth


Hard and Soft Power in the European Neighbourhood

he European Union inhabits a tough neighbourhood. From the Arctic to the Black Sea and from the Bosphorus to the Atlantic, the entire periphery is awash with security challenges.

T

In a sense, this has always been the case. Europe, over the centuries, has been the theatre of countless wars. During the Cold War, there was one major challenge which required the permanent presence, across the western half of the continent, of the United States. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Union has faced the multiple challenges of stabilising the neighbourhood. It has adopted a number of policies and strategies to deal with this situation. None of them has been particularly successful.

VIEPMWIHMXWHIITIVWMKRM½GERGI 6YWWMEMRXLI97%SYXERH XLIGIRXVEPERHIEWXIVR)YVSTIERWGSR½RIHXSRSQER´W land) that they turned against it. The scheme went down in EFPE^ISJ½VIEXXLIZIV]QIIXMRKMR4VEKYIMR.YRI that was intended to launch it. The debate at the time pitted those who felt that deepening the existing institutions and procedures of the EU should take precedence over widening the Union. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, most west European statesmen concentrated on the former, while the new leaders of central and eastern Europe hankered for the latter.

A Long, Slow Process Early Challenges 8LI½VWXGLEPPIRKIGEQIJVSQGIRXVEPERHIEWXIVR)YVSTI the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Was enlargement XLIWSPYXMSR#-RMXMEPP])YVSTIERTSPMXMGEPPIEHIVW[IVI cautious or frankly negative. Margaret Thatcher tried hard XSTVIZIRXIZIR+IVQERVIYRM½GEXMSR XLI½VWXWYGL IRPEVKIQIRX ERH[IRXXSI\XVESVHMREV]PIRKXLWMRLIV¯ YPXMQEXIP]JYXMPI¯EXXIQTXXSGVIEXIER%RKPS*VIRGLJVSRX to resist it. 'SRGIVREFSYX+IVQERYRM½GEXMSR[EWRSXGSR½RIHXS west European statesmen. In February 1990, the then Prime Minister of Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was so concerned that he called for the Warsaw Pact to be strengthened and for Russian troops to remain in both Poland and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In response, former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing stated bluntly that he would not wish to belong to a Europe that included Poland. During the press conference following the hastily convened 18 November 1989 European Council meeting at the Elysée Palace, just nine days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, François Mitterrand remarked that: ‘The German question is a European question.’ What he meant was that enlargement could only FIIRZMWEKIHEWTEVXSJEKVERHWXVEXIKMG¯ERHGSPPIGXMZI¯ European project. 8LIMRMXMEPIQTLEWMW[EWWUYEVIP]SR³WSJXTS[IV´¯XLI power of attraction. But Mitterrand’s proposal, on 1 January 1990, to create a European ‘Confederation’ comprising all the countries of continental Europe, including Russia, was a thinly disguised attempt to offer the central and eastern Europeans an alternative to EU membership. East European leaders such as Vaclav Havel were initially enthusiastic about the Confederation project. It was only when they

It rapidly became clear that EU enlargement was going XSFIEPIRKXL]ERHI\XVESVHMREVMP]GSQTPMGEXIH¯ERH IWWIRXMEPP]MRWXMXYXMSREP¯TVSGIWW-R.YRIXLI ‘Copenhagen criteria’ were elaborated by the European Council as the targets that any aspiring EU member states from central and eastern Europe had to meet in order to qualify for accession, namely: ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union’. At the same time, there were widespread fears that unresolved security problems left over from the 1919 :IVWEMPPIWWIXXPIQIRX¯GSRGIVRMRKFSVHIVWERHQMRSVMXMIW EGVSWWQYGLSJGIRXVEP)YVSTI¯[SYPHKIRIVEXIGSR¾MGXW similar to those that had erupted in Yugoslavia in June 1991. 8LI&EPPEHYV4PERMR¯REQIHJSVXLI*VIRGL4VMQI Minister who had pondered the lessons of Mitterrand’s failed Confederation project, was a complex diplomatic process whereby all central and eastern European countries were obliged to sign treaties with all their neighbours testifying to the resolution of all outstanding security issues between them. This too was a condition of accession to the EU. These treaties are collectively lodged with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). EU enlargement became a major obstacle course, and it was not until 15 years after the end of the Cold War, in 2004, that the central and eastern European countries, along with Cyprus and Malta and the three Baltic WXEXIW[IVI½REPP]EHQMXXIH

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

An Uncommon Policy Meanwhile, the implosion of Yugoslavia in summer 1991 posed a major hard-power security challenge to the nascent 9RMSR%PEWXLIGLEPPIRKIGEQIJEVXSSWSSRÂŻMRIJJIGXSRP] weeks after the announcement in February 1991 of plans for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The reaction to the Yugoslav crisis by the EU’s member states was anything but ‘common’. While France supported the maintenance of the Yugoslav central state under Serb dominance, Germany supported self-determination for Yugoslavia’s separate republics. The UK, desperate to avoid another Northern Ireland, looked to Washington for a solution. But neither President Bush Sr nor President Clinton had any desire to get involved. Europe’s (considerable) military capacity was still tied up (and dug in) around the Fulda Gap in central Germany and effectively useless for peace-making missions in the Balkans. After a disastrous experimentation with a UN ‘protection force’ in which key member states played a major part, it took US air power in both Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) to stabilise the western Balkans. Thereafter, the prospect of EU accession became the main driving force behind the progressive modernisation of the region. There was really no alternative. The western Balkans are not part of Europe’s periphery. They are located geographically inside the borders of the Union. Eventual membership has always been inevitable. The biggest challenge facing the EU has not been integrating those member states from central, eastern and southern Europe that eventually acceded. It has been trying to forge a policy for those states that remained outside. 8LI)9YRHIV*VIRGLMQTYPWMSR½VWXFIKERXSXLMROEFSYX this problem under pressure from the countries south of the Mediterranean who felt they had missed out on the TVSQMWISJIRPEVKIQIRXÂŻXLIPMSR´WWLEVISJ[LMGLMR went to central and eastern Europe. In 1995, the Union created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, otherwise known as the Barcelona Process, in an attempt to inject a measure of stabilisation into the southern neighbourhood. At its crudest, this amounted to a Faustian pact between the EU and the encrusted dictators of north Africa, according to which the latter would keep terrorists and migrants at bay and the former would disburse (relatively modest) sums of money while turning a blind eye to human rights abuses south of the Mediterranean. But the Barcelona Process proved to be a dead-end long before the collapse of the Middle East peace process and XLI%VEF7TVMRKGSR½RIHMXXSXLIVYFFMWLLIETSJLMWXSV]

Regent’s Report 2015

In late 2002, European Commission President Romano Prodi initiated a new policy direction that was to lead, in 2004, to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The underlying thinking was to avoid the creation of new divisions in Europe by creating a ‘ring of friends’ around the entire periphery. This might appear to be a noble ambition. &YX[LEXI\EGXP]HMHMXQIER# 8LIVI[IVIXLVIIJYRHEQIRXEPžE[WMRXLIMQTPIQIRXEXMSR SJXLI)248LI½VWX[EWXLIEXXIQTXXSHIZMWIEÂłWMRKPI´ policy for a neighbourhood that, by any measure, contains ELSWXSJ[MHIP]HMJJIVMRKRIMKLFSYVW8LIÂłSRIWM^I½XW all’ approach was characterised by an assumption in Brussels that the disbursement of large sums of aid and the negotiation of trade deals (conditional on movement towards European democratic norms) would transform the neighbours into clients prepared to do the EU’s bidding. 8LIWIGSRHžE[[EWXSSJJIVETSPMG]XLEXLIPHSYXEPPWSVXW of prospects other than accession. For states that were keen to accede, such as Ukraine and Georgia, this approach spelled endless frustrations. For states with no interest in accession, the EU’s insistence on conditionality consigned the policy to virtual irrelevance. 8LIXLMVHžE[EVKYEFP]XLIQSWXWIVMSYW[EWXLEX the ‘policy’ was entirely stripped of any geo-political considerations. It was conducted by the European Commission as a purely technocratic and formulaic exercise. This succeeded in frustrating almost all partner GSYRXVMIWFYXQSVIWMKRM½GERXP]MXJIPPXIVVMFP]JSYPSJXLI major geo-strategic player in the neighbourhood: Russia. Seldom in the history of international relations has there been such a vast gulf between intentions and outcome

Further Reading ‘France and the Mediterranean in 1995: from tactical ambiguity to inchoate strategy’ by Jolyon Howorth, Mediterranean Politics:SP2STTÂŻ ‘The Barcelona Process, The Role of the European Union and the Lesson of the Western Mediterranean’ by Fulvio Attina, The Journal of North African Studies, 9/2, 2004 ‘The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy’ by Karen Smith, International Affairs, 81/4, 2005 ‘The Challenges of the European Neighbourhood Policy’ by Michele Cornelli, The International Spectator, 39/3, 2004


The European Neighbourhood Policy Dr Kataryna Wolczuk Reader in Politics and International Studies, University of Birmingham

“The apparent simplicity of the objective of the ENP belies an overtly ambitious and complex policy, encompassing wideranging domains and a vast array of instruments, initiatives and platforms for engagement� Dr Kataryna Wolczuk


The European Neighbourhood Policy

n parallel with its expansion to include 10 new member states from eastern and southern Europe in 2005, the EU has stepped up its engagement with neighbouring countries. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) aims to promote ‘prosperity, stability and security’ in the vicinity of the EU. The apparent simplicity of the objective of the ENP belies an overtly ambitious and complex policy, encompassing wide-ranging domains and a vast array of instruments, initiatives and platforms for engagement.

I

The ENP has now been in place for over a decade. The policy has been castigated for failing to deliver on its aims. Instead of being surrounded by a ‘ring of friends’, the EU MWWYVVSYRHIHF]E³VMRKSJ½VI´EWThe Economist put it. However, much of the critique of the ENP takes the EU’s own proclamations at face value rather than critically assessing them.

ENP or Enlargement The ENP was conceived in 2002 as a ‘Wider Europe’ initiative, and by 2003 it became known as the New Neighbourhood Policy, eventually to evolve into the European Neighbourhood Policy by May 2004. During that period the geographical scope of the policy widened from the original focus on two post-Soviet states, Ukraine and Moldova, to a total of 16 states to the south and east of the Union’s borders (while Russia declined to participate). The inclusion of the Mediterranean neighbours, at the request of the EU southern member states, carried the promise of creating a coherent and comprehensive framework for conducting relations with all of the EU’s neighbours. Even though enlargement of the EU itself in 2004 was proclaimed the most successful EU foreign policy, the ENP MWXLI½VWXTVSTIVJSVIMKRTSPMG]SJXLI9RMSRVIPEXMRKXS countries without the formal membership perspective. 1ER])9SJ½GMEPWMRZSPZIHMRXLIPEYRGLSJXLI)24LEH ½VWXLERHI\TIVMIRGISJIRPEVKIQIRXERHYWIHMXXS devise the new policy. Like enlargement, the ENP is a GSQTSWMXITSPMG]WXVEHHPMRKQER]HMQIRWMSRW¯HIQSGVEG] economic growth and security. The policy follows the logic of enlargement by advocating extensive domestic reforms in partner countries, during which the adoption of EU rules, the acquis, is viewed as a key to democratisation and socio-economic modernisation. Crucially, however, the ENP was conceived as an alternative to enlargement by offering countries around the periphery credible and effective integration without membership.

The ENP is driven by competing pressures within the EU. On the one hand, the EU is keen to assert its value-driven JSVIMKRTSPMG]TVS½PIERH³XVERWJSVQEXMZITS[IV´[LMGLMX developed during eastern enlargement. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty obliges the EU to uphold its values in its foreign policy. On the other hand, the EU attempts to exercise its ‘transformative power’ without bearing the political and economic costs of enlargement. Thus the ENP lacks what is called a ½REPMXq¯EGPIEVWIRWISJ[LEXXLIIRHKSEPSJ relations with the neighbours actually is. This lack of ½REPMXq VI¾IGXWXLIHMWEKVIIQIRXEQSRKXLIQIQFIVWXEXIWEW to the extent to which the EU should become a driver for reforms in general and offer attractive incentives in particular which might be potentially costly and/or sensitive for the EU.

ENP Action Plans At present, 16 countries are covered by the ENP JVEQI[SVOSJ[LMGLEVIEPVIEH]JYPP]¾IHKIHTEVXRIVW in the ENP: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia in the south and, in the east, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In formal terms, XLITEVXMGMTEXMSRMWGSR½VQIHF]EHSTXMRKEGSYRXV] WTIGM½G)24EGXMSRTPER%PKIVMELEWFIIRRIKSXMEXMRKXLI plan since 2012, whereas Belarus, Libya and Syria have no action plans and remain outside most of the ENP instruments. 8LIEGXMSRTPERMWE¾EKWLMTMRWXVYQIRXSJXLI)24ERHMW jointly agreed with partner countries on a bilateral basis. All ENP action plans consist of an extensive list of wideranging objectives that each partner country is required XSJYP½PMRSVHIVXSFIRI½XJVSQ³GPSWIVMRXIKVEXMSR[MXL the EU’. In general, the plans are relatively standardised HSGYQIRXWVI¾IGXMRKXLI)9´WHIWMVIXSQEMRXEMR consistency across the neighbourhood. The action plans contain an ambitious reform agenda for XLITEVXRIVGSYRXVMIW¯MRGPYHMRKHIQSGVEXMGWXERHEVHW judicial and administrative capacity-building, energy issues, agriculture, competition, environment, and justice and home affairs. Thus the reform agenda incorporates not only adherence to the EU’s norms and values, but also legal ETTVS\MQEXMSR¯REQIP]XLIEHSTXMSRSJTEVXSJXLIacquis. -REHHMXMSRXSQSHIVRMWMRKFIRI½XWXLIPIKEPETTVS\MQEXMSR of the acquis¯MREVIEWWYGLEWJSSHWEJIX]WXEXIEMHSV MRXIPPIGXYEPTVSTIVX]VMKLXW¯MWRIGIWWEV]KMZIRXLEXQYGL of the acquis pertains to the functioning of the internal market, access to which is a key reward for implementing the reforms.

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

Over the last decade a growing part of the EU’s bureaucracy has been devoted to monitoring the implementation of the action plans and their successors, association agendas. An extensive body of literature has grown up analysing action plans and progress reports. Yet, notwithstanding their central role for the ENP, the action plans were essentially political documents with a large number of priorities, often ambiguously or vaguely JSVQYPEXIHERHRSXRIGIWWEVMP]PMROIHXSER]WTIGM½GERH measurable incentives. The ENP country progress reports, most of which offer WSFIVMRKVIEHMRKEQTP]GSR½VQXLIPMQMXIHMQTEGXSJXLI action plans on shaping domestic developments. In many respects the reports, with their vague statements, are impressive not for the successes they list but because of XLIHIGEHIPSRKXIREGMX]HMWTPE]IHF])9SJ½GMEPWJEGMRKXLI indifference of neighbouring states to deliver the intended content of the action plans in terms of domestic reforms.

Conditionality and Incentives The effectiveness of the ENP depends on the interest in reforms from the neighbouring countries. The EU can only have an impact if there is demand for change in the partner countries. Areas where most effective reforms can be recorded at a sectoral level include food safety, energy IJ½GMIRG]ERHQMKVEXMSR8LYWWIGXSVWTIGM½GGSRHMXMSREPMX] is effective in areas in which there is an actual demand for reform templates from the EU and/or the incentives are WM^EFPIERHXERKMFPIIRSYKLJSVXLIIPMXIWERHWXEXISJ½GMEPW XSIQFEVOSRVIJSVQW)24IJJIGXWEVIPEVKIP]GSR½RIH XSWTIGM½GWXEXITSPMGMIWERHMRWXMXYXMSRWERHMXMWJEMVXS conclude that they hardly contribute to broader patterns of democratisation. 8SIRGSYVEKIVIJSVQWXLI)9SJJIVW½RERGMEPERHXIGLRMGEP EWWMWXERGI%WQER]VIJSVQWEVIGSWXP]ERHXLIMVFIRI½XWSRP] long-term, EU assistance often offers the key incentive to change, since all ENP states, except Israel, are considerably poorer and less developed than the EU average. In theory, the wide range of assistance instruments under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) allows the EU to accommodate partner countries’ needs, including in particular budgetary support. In practice, however, EU assistance is fraught with cumbersome procedures, especially at the programming stage, which requires a large number of steps and extensive consultations, all of which take time. Lengthy procedures hamper ad hoc adjustments, which are nonetheless frequently needed in a fast-changing environment in order to maintain the reform momentum.

Regent’s Report 2015

Under the ENPI, the EU has focused on cooperation with partner countries’ governments. This is because most aspects of the reforms promoted by the EU relate to various state policies and institutions, such as intellectual copyright, penal systems, regulation of state aid, migration, criminal justice, phyto-sanitary standards, and so on. This QEOIWMXHMJ½GYPXXSIRKEKIRSRKSZIVRQIRXEPSVKERMWEXMSRW and a broader domestic audience. Non-state actors, who could in many cases help the EU to ensure that governments of recipient countries keep their side of the deal when it comes to the conditionality of aid, are relatively neglected as regards direct EU assistance, despite various attempts to overcome this in the southern and eastern neighbourhoods. The budget of the European Neighbourhood Instrument

)2- JSVXLITIVMSHÂŻMWÂşFMPPMSRGSQTEVIH XSÂşFMPPMSRJSVXLI)YVSTIER2IMKLFSYVLSSH4SPMG] -RWXVYQIRX )24- HYVMRKÂŻ8[SXLMVHWSJXLIJYRHW are earmarked for the southern neighbours and one third for the eastern neighbours. There is hardly any consistency MREPPSGEXMRKEWWMWXERGI*SVI\EQTPIHYVMRKÂŻ 8YRMWMEVIGIMZIHÂşTIVGETMXETIV]IEV[LIVIEW1SPHSZE ÂŻXLITSSVIWXGSYRXV]MRXLIIEWXIVRRIMKLFSYVLSSH

ERHMR)YVSTI ¯VIGIMZIHPIWWXLERº9OVEMRI[LMGL is interested in a much closer relationship with the EU, VIGIMZIHSRP]ºTIVGETMXE¯ETTVS\MQEXIP]XLIWEQI amount as Azerbaijan, which is interested in limiting cooperation to energy issues. At the same time, Algeria, [LMGLLEWRSEGXMSRTPERMRTPEGI¯ERHLIRGILEWRS EKVIIH³VIJSVQLSQI[SVO´¯VIGIMZIHºTIVGETMXE %TEVXJVSQ½RERGMEPEWWMWXERGIXLITEVXRIVGSYRXVMIWEVI GPIEVP]MRXIVIWXIHMRTEVXMGYPEVFIRI½XWWYGLEWQEVOIX liberalisation in food produce or movement of people. &YXWIGXSVEPFIRI½XWEVIHMJ½GYPXXSEKVIISR[MXLMR the EU. Member states’ representatives meet regularly in Brussels in the framework of the Maghreb-Mashreq countries (called MAMA) and the Eastern Europe and Central Asia working party (COEST). These bodies engage in discussions on the partner countries and act as a key forum for consensus building, but it is not always feasible. Among EU institutions, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Directorate General Neighbourhood and Enlargement are focused on the political aspects of the ENP, whereas decisions and negotiations on trade are the competence of the Directorate General Trade. The latter often approaches any negotiations with third countries (i.e. those outside the EU) in terms of what the EU market can withstand, rather than in terms of a strong set of


The European Neighbourhood Policy

incentives for the neighbouring countries. This problematic coordination of incentives is most noticeable with regard to sensitive issues, such as visa liberalisation or market liberalisation for agricultural products, both in the southern and eastern neighbourhood.

Revisions and Upgrading of the ENP Realising its limited effectiveness, the EU institutions and individual member states have sought to upgrade the policy to motivate the ‘partners’ through various initiatives, such as the Governance Facility, the Mediterranean Union, ‘ENP Plus’, the Black Sea Synergy Strategy and the Eastern Partnership. Indeed, since its inception the ENP has been under ‘perpetual construction’ as evidenced by continuous IJJSVXWXSVIHI½RIMXWWGSTIMRWXVYQIRXWTVMRGMTPIWERH incentives. The latest review of the ENP was launched in the spring of 2015. However, the revisions do not tackle the deeper contradictions underlying the ENP, and only incrementally respond to the neighbouring context through sub-regional ERHGSYRXV]WTIGM½GHMJJIVIRXMEXMSR The shortcomings in the generic design of the ENP prompted some member states to differentiate between the EU’s policy towards the east and the south. On the initiative of France, the Mediterranean Union was launched in 2008 with a permanent secretariat in Barcelona, but it has remained largely dormant. Then Poland and Sweden PEYRGLIHEWTIGM½GIEWXIVRHMQIRWMSR¯XLI)EWXIVR 4EVXRIVWLMT¯JSGYWWMRKSRWM\TSWX7SZMIXWXEXIW1SPHSZE Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Partnership offers the prospects of ‘political cooperation and economic integration’ through agreements, free-trade areas and full visa liberalisation in the long-term. To this end, like the ENP at large, the Eastern Partnership promotes long-term, low level ‘technocratic’ engagement to facilitate domestic reforms in the post-Soviet states. 8LIRIMKLFSYVMRKWXEXIWEVII\TIGXIHXSFIRI½XJVSQ developing and modernising their public policies and economies by anchoring them to the EU model of governance, notwithstanding their actual aspirations or their capacity to achieve this. At last, the 2015 ENP Review acknowledged the limits of the ENP. In particular, the EU-driven format fuelled the view in partner countries that the ENP is ‘too prescriptive’, ERHMW³RSXWYJ½GMIRXP]VI¾IGXMRKXLIMVVIWTIGXMZIEWTMVEXMSRW´ As a solution, the Commission proposed differentiation

and greater mutual ownership to be the hallmark of the new ENP. These are hardly ground breaking new principles and have even been highlighted in previous reviews. But this time the EU does seem to have conceded that the SRIWM^I½XWEPPTSPMG]GERRSXFIGVIHMFP]YTLIPHER] longer. Hence, the standardised progress reports are also to be dropped. +VIEXIVHMJJIVIRXMEXMSRSJJSVQWSJVIPEXMSRW¯IWTIGMEPP] MRXIVQWSJPIKEPEKVIIQIRXW¯[MPPVI¾IGXXLIMRXIVIWXW of the partner countries more closely. But this will not mean that relations will be free of dilemmas, tensions and challenges, especially when it comes to balancing economic cooperation with the promotion of democracy in the EU’s interactions with authoritarian regimes in the neighbourhood, such as Egypt or Azerbaijan. Overall, the VIZMI[VI¾IGXWXLII\TPMGMXVIEPMWEXMSRXLEXXLI)9 has limited leverage in the neighbourhood and that it must scale down expectations of what the ENP can actually achieve. While the ENP will remain a generic, umbrella policy for the whole neighbourhood, the evident demand for more tailored relations with individual countries is to be factored into it in a major way.

Association Agreements with DCFTA – A Key Upgrade The most important upgrade of the policy has been a shift to a new generation of agreements for a Deep and 'SQTVILIRWMZI*VII8VEHI%VIE ('*8% 8LMW[EW½VWX offered to Ukraine in the mid-2000s, then to other eastern neighbours and is now being rolled out to the southern neighbours. The Association Agreement represents a watershed in the EU’s relations with the partner countries because, unlike the ENP action plan, it offers a highly legalised, binding framework for progressive economic integration. The DCFTA goes beyond a ‘standard’ FTA agreement in its focus on both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. The DCFTA entails a profound impact on the regulatory framework of the country associated with the EU in a wide range of areas. It aims to prevent selective implementation based on self-serving interpretations of the country entering into an association with the EU. It is a deliberate shift from vague and non-binding reform agenda MRXLIEGXMSRTPERWXSEPIKEPJVEQI[SVO[MXLWTIGM½GHIXEMPIH commitments on regulatory change and market access. This is uncharted territory. Until now access to the internal market and legal harmonisation have been used by the EU to pursue economic cooperation with small, rich and highly developed states which chose to eschew EU membership

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

but were keen to gain access to its market. These are the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries and the European Economic Area (EEA) countries, including Norway and Switzerland. The EEA/EFTA arrangements built SRPSRKWXERHMRKVIPEXMSRWFYXEPWSVI¾IGXIHXLITVSJSYRH economic, political and social similarities between the EEA/ EFTA countries and EU member states. The same cannot be said about the southern and eastern neighbouring states. Thus, there are questions as to whether the acquis, developed in the process of economic integration of EU member states, is appropriate as a blueprint for reforms in non-member states at a lower stage of development. The suitability of the common market acquis as a template for post-communist reforms was already questioned during enlargement. Indeed, the EU’s rules were never designed EWEHIZIPSTQIRXEKIRHEJSVTSSVIVGSYRXVMIWMRWXIEH they are the results of agreements and compromises between highly developed member states on common rules for themselves. These are not trivial issues at the time when relatively poor countries, such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, embark on the complex and costly implementation of DCFTAs, and Morocco and the EU are already negating their DCFTA. All the countries concerned, except Israel, are poorer than the EU average, with low-quality infrastructure and a lack of the institutional and administrative capacity to approximate the acquis and implement it. Yet, this challenge has hardly been recognised and acknowledged in the EU’s approach.

ENP and Crises in the Neighbourhood The ENP has been devised as an administrative framework for promoting reforms and delivering assistance. In the southern and eastern neighbourhoods, the EU established action plans with political regimes, such as Egypt and Azerbaijan, which could hardly be described as democratic. Broadly speaking, the EU has prioritised stability over democracy. In essence, the ENP has been designed for ‘stable times’, working with the incumbent regimes rather than against them. In the south, the EU implicitly supported the authoritarian regimes in exchange for their cooperation on security concerns such as migration and counter-terrorism for the EU. Accordingly, across the neighbourhood impact has been much stronger in sectoral reform and economic integration than in promoting democratisation and good governance.

Regent’s Report 2015

The ENP is not concerned with enhancing security of the partner countries, nor with crisis management. Where the ENP promotes security, it is primarily security for the EU rather than security for the partner countries. For example, in the post-Soviet space, the EU has promoted ‘good KSZIVRERGI´EWEPSRKXIVQWSPYXMSRXS³JVS^IR´GSR¾MGXW rather than strong engagement in actually solving them. 8LMW[IEOGSR¾MGXQEREKIQIRXVSPIWXIQWJVSQHMZIVKIRX views within the Union on the strategy towards the postSoviet states, which is greatly accentuated by differences of view on how to deal with resurgent Russia. The latter has RSXWMQTP]WYWXEMRIHXLI³JVS^IR´GSR¾MGXWMRXLITSWX7SZMIX space, but has annexed Crimea and more recently fuelled ZMSPIRXGSR¾MGXMRIEWXIVR9OVEMRI 8LI%VEF7TVMRKGEYKLXXLI)9[VSRKJSSXIH¯MX[EW engaged in working with the authoritarian regimes, which were toppled by the mass revolts in the region. The Arab E[EOIRMRKGVIEXIHRI[PMRIWSJGSR¾MGX-RXLIGEWISJ0MF]E the EU remained reluctant to organise an international MRXIVZIRXMSRYRHIVMXWS[R¾EK-R7]VMEXLI)9LEWRSX been able to respond in a strategic and timely way as the country descended into civil war. Sanctions have been adopted, but bloodshed has not been prevented. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU launched new instruments such as the SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) to provide additional funding to the countries committed to democracy. It also extended the Mobility Partnership ERH('*8%WXSXLIWSYXLIVRRIMKLFSYVWSTXMSRW[LMGLXMPP then had only been available to eastern neighbours. These instruments hardly represent an adequate short-term response to upheaval, instability and counter-revolution in the southern neighbourhood. At the same time, the EU is reluctant to apply negative conditionality, such as sanctions, even in cases of serious breaches of democratic standards and human rights, as indicated by the EU’s reaction to Egypt’s coup in the summer of 2013. (MZIVWITVMSVMXMIWEQSRK)9QIQFIVWXEXIWVI¾IGX different degrees of sensitivity emanating from the historical ERHTSPMXMGEPGSRXI\X¯LIRGIXLIMVHMZIVWITSWMXMSRWSR GSR¾MGXWMRXLIRIMKLFSYVLSSH'SYRXVMIWWYGLEW4SPERH and Estonia have been highly concerned over Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In contrast, France has been promoting relations with the French-speaking southern neighbours, whereas from the French historical perspective, Ukraine is a kind of ‘Russia’s Gabon’.


The European Neighbourhood Policy

Given different interests, the political format of crisismanagement is often dependent on initiatives of smaller groups of EU member states. This was evident following the Arab Spring in the southern neighbourhood and during Russia’s war with Georgia (2008) and the current violence in Ukraine. During the crises in the neighbourhood, the )24PMOIXLI)9EXPEVKIPEGOWPIEHIVWLMT¯ERHMXWLS[W

Wars and revolutions have engulfed the neighbourhood. The ENP was never designed to deal with such crises and simply relies on the mechanisms developed earlier as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). (IWTMXIXLIPSJX]EMQWSJXLI)24XLI)9MWETEGM½G bystander, struggling to come up with concerted action during instability.

1SVISJXIRXLERRSX[LIRGSRJVSRXIH[MXLGSRžMGXXLI EU adopts a ‘wait-and-see’ policy, as evidenced since the Arab Spring and the protests in Ukraine in the winter SJÂŻERHXLIERRI\EXMSRSJ'VMQIE8LYWXLI)9 loudly proclaims its ‘commitment to peace and security’ but lacks a clear plan of how to ensure it.

The ENP will remain a common policy umbrella framework, which organises the relations with the EU’s neighbouring states. It creates organisational structures within the EU institutions and provides a reference point for the EU’s engagement with those countries. Ultimately, however, the ENP with its ambitious aims, proliferation of instruments and inherent inconsistencies amply illuminates the paradoxes and, ultimately, limitations of the EU as an international actor, even in its direct neighbourhood

Despite revolutions, counter-revolutions and wars, there has been a remarkable degree of continuity in the ENP. It has undergone many reviews already, and the 2015 review hardly betrays any appetite for far-reaching change. By now the ENP hardly offers a coherent vision or set of policy MRWXVYQIRXW8LIVIMWPMXXPIIZMHIRGIXLEXXLMW[MPPFIVIGXM½IH any time soon.

Conclusions The ENP is an umbrella policy with multiple and overlapping instruments, the sheer number of which fails to mask an essential mismatch between its lofty objectives and its modest outcomes. Notwithstanding its grand aims, the ENP has been devised as a relatively low-cost, low-commitment administrative framework. In exchange for granting neighbours ‘access to the internal market’, the EU asks for extensive reforms from its partners. And yet, the implementation of many of the reform measures, especially with regard to democracy, rule of law and anti-corruption measures, would jeopardise the regimes and the interests of the incumbent elites. Hence, they have not been eager to implement them, even when making declarative commitments to reform. Ultimately, what the EU is reluctant to acknowledge is that in its neighbourhood the ENP cannot replicate the success of enlargement as it lacks any viable substitute for the perspective of membership. At the same time, the EU is not ready to acknowledge explicitly the limits SJMXWMRžYIRGIMRXLIRIMKLFSYVLSSH9RHIVXLI)24XLI EU’s role is not much different from other democracypromoters, trade partners and developmental agencies, even in its own backyard.

Further Reading Âł4MSRIIV)YVSTI#8LI)24EWE8IWX'EWIJSV)9´W*SVIMKR Policy’ by Laure Delcour and Elsa Tulmets, European Foreign Affairs Review  TTÂŻ Shaping the Post-Soviet Space? EU Policies and Approaches to Region-building by Laure Delcour, Ashgate, 2011 ‘Institutional Governance of European Neighbourhood Policy in the Wake of the Arab Spring’ by Gergana Noutcheva, Journal of European Integration  TTÂŻ 2014 ‘EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From 0IZIVEKIXS+SZIVRERGI#´F]7ERHVE0EZIRI\ERH*VERO Schimmelfennig, Democratization  TTÂŻ The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact by Richard G Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds), Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 ‘Joint Communication: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Commission, Brussels, 18 November 2005

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Energy Issues Andy Lebrecht Former UK Deputy Permanent Representative in Brussels

“Creating a fully functioning internal energy market requires the abolition of physical barriers to the movement of energy around EU territory, the removal of legal and technical obstacles to crossborder movement of energy and the prevention of anti-competitive behaviour� Andy Lebrecht


Energy Issues

nergy forms a central element of the European Union’s (EU’s) relationship with many of its neighbours. The EU as a whole is currently dependent on imports of energy for some 53% of its needs, comprising 88% for oil, 66% for gas and 42% for solid fuels. This external dependence has been KVS[MRKERHMWYRPMOIP]XSGLERKIWMKRM½GERXP]EPXLSYKLMR absolute terms imports of hydrocarbons are projected to JEPPMRVIWTSRWIXS)9TSPMGMIWERHQEVOIXHIZIPSTQIRXW¯

WII½KYVI 8LI6YWWMER*IHIVEXMSRMWXLI9RMSR´WPEVKIWX WYTTPMIVSJIEGLSJXLIXLVIIQEMRJYIPW WII½KYVIW¯  and some member states are wholly or nearly dependent on Russia for supplies of gas and/or electricity. Norway and some North African countries are important suppliers of SMPERHKEW[LMPIXLI'EWTMERVIKMSRERHRI[½RHWMRXLI eastern Mediterranean are potential sources of supply to the EU market.

E

A key concern of the EU is to reduce its external energy dependence while securing and diversifying its supplies. But it is clear that for the foreseeable future it will continue to PSSOXSMXWRIMKLFSYVLSSHJSVEWMKRM½GERXTVSTSVXMSRSJMXW energy requirements.

EU Energy Policy – The Challenges The objectives of EU energy policy, as set out in the Treaties (the EU’s constitutional basis), are to ensure the functioning of the energy market, ensure security SJIRIVK]WYTTP]TVSQSXIIRIVK]IJ½GMIRG]HIZIPST new and renewable forms of energy and promote the interconnection of networks. The context of the Union’s GSQTIXIRGIJSVIRIVK]MWUYEPM½IHYRHIVXLI8VIEXMIWXLI member states themselves are responsible for determining the conditions for exploiting their energy resources, their mix of energy sources and the general structure of their energy supplies. This means in effect that it is the member states that determine their own energy priorities, without necessarily considering the implications for the rest of the )9¯+IVQER]´WHIGMWMSRMRXSTLEWISYXRYGPIEV energy production being an example of this. Nevertheless, the member states’ actions have been progressively contained within a framework of EU legislation determined primarily by single market or environmental considerations. An essential element of the Union’s energy policy is its climate change strategy, which includes long-term commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by 80% of their 1990 level and to have virtually carbonfree electricity generation by 2050. On the road towards delivering these commitments it has agreed targets to achieve by 2030:

ˆReductions in greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% compared to 1990 levels ˆA minimum 27% share of renewable energy in energy consumption ˆAt least 27% energy savings. The European Commission’s communication launching XLI9RMSR´W¾EKWLMTTSPMG]³)RIVK]9RMSR´MR*IFVYEV] MHIRXM½IWXLIKSEPSJE³VIWMPMIRX)RIVK]9RMSR with an ambitious climate policy at its core… to give EU consumers… secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable energy’. It makes clear that there is much to be HSRIXSJYP½PIEGLSJXLI8VIEXMIW´IRIVK]TSPMG]SFNIGXMZIW and asserts that achieving the goal of ‘Energy Union’ ‘will require a fundamental transformation of Europe’s energy system’. The Commission’s analysis highlights a number of key failings. The single market in energy is not working properly across the whole of the EU’s territory. This is evidenced F]MRWYJ½GMIRXMRZIWXQIRXMREHIUYEXIGVSWWFSVHIVIRIVK] ¾S[WXLIGSRXMRYMRKI\MWXIRGISJIRIVK]MWPERHWRSX connected to the main EU networks and the inability of the QEVOIXXSVIWTSRHXSGVMWIWF]VIHMVIGXMRKIRIVK]¾S[W The underlying causes include physical barriers such as XLIEFWIRGISJMRXIVGSRRIGXMSRERHVIZIVWI¾S[JEGMPMXMIW uncompetitive behaviour by dominant suppliers, the failure by some countries to implement fully the EU’s Internal Energy Market (IEM) legislation, and ‘nationalistic’ behaviour by some regulators. )\XIVREPWYTTPMIWIWTIGMEPP]SJKEWEVIRSXWYJ½GMIRXP] secure. The turmoil following the 2011 Arab Spring led to reductions of gas and oil supplies from some sources. More acutely, Russian gas supplies to the Union were temporarily cut off in 2006 and 2009 as a consequence of disputes between Russia and Ukraine. Despite considerable investment since then, several EU countries remain heavily dependent on Russia for their gas and do not yet have the RIGIWWEV]¾I\MFMPMX]SJTVSZMWMSRERHWXSVEKIXS[MXLWXERHE lengthy interruption of supplies. Many of the former Sovietbloc countries are subject to restrictive agreements with their Russian supplier which prevent them operating freely within the EU’s single market. The infrastructure and market construction necessary to support the Union’s planned development of renewable energy is inadequate and faces obstacles in terms, for example, of public acceptance and international co-ordination (though it is worth noting that the challenge

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

SJFYMPHMRKEJYPP]JYRGXMSRMRKQEVOIX[MXLWMKRM½GERX amounts of intermittent energy is shared across all similar global markets). There are similar public acceptance obstacles in some countries in relation to the development of unconventional reserves such as ‘fracking’ for shale oil and gas, new technologies such as carbon capture and storage, and certain types of renewable energy such as onshore wind, as well as nuclear.

EU Energy Policy – The Way Forward The Energy Union has been awarded high priority by the European Council, which expressed concern at the EU’s vulnerability. The Commission’s attitude accordingly represents a more comprehensive and strategic approach to energy policy than has existed hitherto. None of the individual solutions proposed by the Commission to address these failings marks a major departure from recent policy. Nor is it proposing any radical shift in the balance of powers between the Union and the member states. There is widespread support among the member states for the strategic objectives, even though there are inevitably differences about the details of how to achieve them. The EU’s way forward is based on three essential components: a fully functioning internal market which nevertheless respects member states’ competence to HIGMHIXLIMVS[RIRIVK]QM\WIGYVIWYTTPMIWSJMQTSVXIH IRIVK]GSQMRKJVSQEHMZIVWMX]SJWSYVGIWERHVSYXIW and a progressive reduction in the Union’s requirements for hydrocarbons. All three are interlinked and necessary to deliver secure, sustainable, competitive and affordable supplies to EU consumers.

MRGPYHMRKKEWVIZIVWI¾S[JEGMPMXMIWKEWWXSVEKIJEGMPMXMIW PMUYI½IHREXYVEPKEW 02+ XIVQMREPWERHRI[IPIGXVMGMX] KVMHW8LIFYPOSJXLMWMRZIWXQIRX[MPPFI½RERGIHF]XLI private sector, which in turn requires the more secure legal and competitive framework also envisaged. However, some ½RERGMRKERHWYTTSVXMWEZEMPEFPIJVSQ)YVSTIERWSYVGIW including the European Investment Bank, Connecting Europe Facility, Structural and Cohesion Funds and the European Fund for Strategic Investments. The Union’s Connecting Europe Facility, for example, includes funding SJWSQIºFMPPMSRFIX[IIRERHXSWYTTSVX ‘projects of common interest’ designed to help create an integrated EU energy market. The core legal and regulatory framework for the internal energy market is largely in place, in the form of the Third Internal Energy Market (IEM) Package of 2009 and established competition law. The European Commission has in the past used competition law against incumbent energy monopolies that have abused their dominant position to the detriment of consumers and competition. It has recently indicated its intention to pursue this course rigorously in future and, in April 2015, it formally accused Gazprom of abusing its dominant position in eight EU member states. The Commission has moreover proposed a role for itself in scrutinising draft energy agreements between member states and third countries (i.e. those outside Europe) to ensure they are consistent with EU law. This is aimed at preventing third countries or their energy suppliers using their market power to impose restrictive and illegal conditions in or alongside those agreements.

A Fully Functioning Internal Energy Market (IEM) Creating a fully functioning internal energy market requires the abolition of physical barriers to the movement of energy around EU territory, the removal of legal and technical obstacles to cross-border movement of energy, and the prevention of anti-competitive behaviour. Adequate storage and (in the case of electricity) back-up facilities are necessary to provide resilience. The removal of physical barriers requires investment in QSHIVRKIRIVEXMSRERHRIX[SVOWXSIRWYVIIRIVK]¾S[W respond rapidly to changing price signals in a liquid and transparent market, particularly at times of stress. The 9RMSRMWIWXMQEXIHXSVIUYMVIWSQIºFMPPMSRERRYEPP] MRZIWXIHMRIRIVK]KIRIVEXMSRRIX[SVOWERHIJ½GMIRG] in the next decade. Such investment includes new gas pipelines and electricity cables, new interconnectors

Regent’s Report 2015

The Commission has equally indicated it will use all its powers to ensure member states fully apply the Third IEM package, which was due to be in force by 2014. This package, in creating the regulatory framework governing the EU’s gas and electricity industries, requires the ‘unbundling’ of energy transmission from its supply. It thus entails the break-up of the major energy ‘utilities’ which were dominant in most EU countries but whose monopoly control of national or local markets has militated against competition and cross-border activity. The legislation also created a number of EU-wide regulatory institutions. The Commission proposes that these be substantially strengthened to ensure they act in the interest of the single IRIVK]QEVOIXWEWE[LSPIVEXLIVXLERYRHYP]VI¾IGXMRK national interests.


Energy Issues

The next step will be the forthcoming electricity market design package. This will adapt the internal market to take EGGSYRXSJGLERKIWMRWYTTP]¯RSXEFP]SJMRXIVQMXXIRX renewable energy, including from a multitude of new TVSHYGIVW¯ERHIRGSYVEKIGPSWIVMRXIKVEXMSRSJQEVOIXW including on a regional level. Reform also needs to reduce the need for member states to develop individual ‘capacity mechanisms’ to ensure security of supply in the context of increasing dependence on intermittent renewables. A solution will be required that enables countries to KYEVERXIIXLMWWIGYVMX][LMPIRSXYRHIVQMRMRKXLIFIRI½XW of the internal market.

Secure and Diverse Energy Supplies Achieving secure and diverse energy supplies requires enhancing exploitation of member states’ indigenous resources, including renewables and shale oil and gas, reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels by TVSQSXMRKRI[XIGLRSPSKMIWERHMQTVSZIHIJ½GMIRG] investment in storage and acquiring new sources of imported gas supplies. As described above, the main threats to Europe’s energy security in recent years have related to gas supplies. The oil market, while historically volatile, has rarely failed to deliver supplies, and the Union’s strategic stocks regime is robust. Similarly, electricity is produced from a diversity of sources which (in the main) assures robustness. However, gas supply MWF]MXWREXYVIPIWW¾I\MFPIIZIRMJXLII\TIGXIHKPSFEP MRGVIEWIMR02+WYTTPMIWWLSYPHMRGVIEWI¾I\MFMPMX] The Union in 2012 produced just 150 million tonnes oil equivalent (mtoe) of the 400 mtoe of gas it consumed, requiring the remaining 250 mtoe to be secured through MQTSVXW¯6YWWMEERH2SV[E]FIMRKXLIQENSVWYTTPMIVW

WII½KYVI 6YWWMELS[IZIVMWRSXSRP]XLIPEVKIWX supplier of gas to the Union, it is also a monopoly supplier to several member states and it has proved itself an unreliable partner. The interruptions in supply in 2006 and 2009 were especially severe in their impacts and Gazprom stands accused of anti-competitive practices in relation to virtually all the EU countries that were formerly part of the Soviet bloc. Russia continues to use Ukraine’s dependence on gas imports as a destabilising factor in its approach to that country, which in turn is a threat to EU interests. While the EU would undoubtedly wish to have a normal trading relationship with Russia, as it does with Norway, that is clearly not possible at present. The EU’s strategic

response to the potential risks involved in excessive dependence on Russian gas is to reduce its exposure by seeking alternative supplies, and using the development of XLIMRXIVREPQEVOIXXSIRWYVIIPIGXVMGMX]ERHKEWGER¾S[ to where they are needed. As the world’s largest trading bloc, the EU is able to PIZIVEKIXLIMR¾YIRGIXLMWKMZIWXSLIPTEHHVIWWMXWIRIVK] security challenges, whether through trade agreements or other means. Its energy imports alone are worth QSVIXLERºFMPPMSREHE]ERHEVIXLIVIJSVISJQENSV potential value to suppliers. The Commission’s aim is to establish strategic energy partnerships with increasingly important producing and transit countries, many of which are neighbourhood countries, including Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Norway. It has established the Euro-Mediterranean gas platform with the aim of deepening co-operation with southern and eastern Mediterranean countries. Middle Eastern, African and North American countries are also important suppliers or potential suppliers of energy, including gas, to the Union. LNG offers a key alternative source of gas supplies, and the establishment of import terminals, including in vulnerable regions such as the Baltic, is a priority for the Connecting Europe Fund. Some 20% SJXLI9RMSR´WKEWMQTSVXW[IVIMRPMUYI½IHJSVQMR though this has fallen subsequently. Qatar is the major supplier to what is a growing world market. Potentially the US could also become an exporter of LNG, which would offer an important option to the Union. A further priority is the ‘southern corridor pipeline’, which has the potential to bring large volumes of gas to the Union from the Caspian region via Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and potentially also from the Middle East and east Mediterranean. This project is well advanced and expected to bring gas to the Union by the end of the current decade. Its success would make a major contribution to the Union’s goal of diversifying its sources of gas supply.

Reducing the Union’s Requirements for Fossil Fuels The third element of the Union’s vision is a progressive reduction in its requirements for fossil fuels. While reducing dependence on hydrocarbons inevitably brings important FIRI½XWMRXIVQWSJIRLERGIHIRIVK]WIGYVMX]XLIQEMR HVMZIVMWJYP½PQIRXSJXLI9RMSR´WGSQQMXQIRXWXSVIHYGI GHG emissions under its climate change strategy. Its key policy instruments aim either to reduce demand for energy

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28

Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

in whatever form or to substitute low- or zero-carbon energy sources for high-carbon sources. They include: ˆ)RIVK]IJ½GMIRG] WEZMRK XEVKIXWHIWMKRIHXS achieve reductions in energy use compared to expected use. Main responsibility for adopting measures to deliver the savings rests with the member states, although EU legislation on new building standards and energy labelling of consumer products, for instance, has an important part to play. Many countries provide incentives and SFPMKEXMSRWXSMQTVSZIXLIIRIVK]IJ½GMIRG]SJ buildings, including public buildings, amongst other measures ˆThe emissions trading scheme (ETS) designed to TYXETVMGISRGEVFSRMRSVHIVXSHVMZIIJ½GMIRG] and innovation in the use of hydrocarbons, whether in industry or in electricity production combined with obligatory GHG emissions reduction targets for sectors not covered by the ETS ˆSupport and incentives for the introduction of electric, hybrid and non-oil-based fuels in transport, along with other measures (including obligatory GHG emission limits for cars and vans and inclusion SJEZMEXMSRMRXLI)87 XSVIHYGIJYIPGSRWYQTXMSR ˆ8EVKIXWERH½RERGMEPWYTTSVXXSMRGVIEWIXLI proportion of energy produced from renewable sources such as wind, solar, wave and biomass. The EU-wide target for 2030 is 27%, though several QIQFIVWXEXIWEPVIEH]I\GIIHXLMW½KYVI In the longer term (mid-century), the expectation is that virtually all electricity production will be carbon-free, though this may include production using fossil fuels combined with carbon capture and storage. Transport will be less dependent upon oil. Electricity from renewable sources will also be imported from the neighbourhood. For I\EQTPIXLI9/LEWTPERWXSMQTSVXWMKRM½GERXEHHMXMSREP hydro-generated electricity from Norway. Imports of solar energy from north Africa are being seriously explored. In the interim, while renewable energy will take an increasing share, it is also likely that generation from relatively lowemission gas will replace coal. Meanwhile, while generation JVSQRYGPIEV½WWMSR[MPPVIQEMRMQTSVXERXMRQER]QIQFIV WXEXIWXLITVSWTIGXWJSVMXXSTPE]EWMKRM½GERXP]PEVKIVVSPI across the Union as a whole look uncertain.

Regent’s Report 2015

Conclusion – Impact on Neighbouring Countries The size and wealth of the EU energy market means the EU’s energy policy is of major importance to all neighbourhood countries able to supply or transit to it. In the longer term, EU dependence on imported fossil fuels should reduce as climate change mitigation policies take effect. But the extent of this is inevitably subject to great uncertainty and, for the medium term, EU demand for oil ERHKEWMRTEVXMGYPEV[MPPVIQEMRWMKRM½GERX For certain countries, energy will be the dominant economic factor governing their relationship with the EU or individual member states. Norway, Russia, Algeria, Tunisia, Ukraine, Turkey and others will be important suppliers or transit countries for the foreseeable future. Others, such as Azerbaijan, Algeria and eastern Mediterranean countries, have potential to grow their energy relationship with the EU, not least in response to the Union’s search for HMZIVWM½GEXMSR7SQIGSYRXVMIWQE]FIEFPIXSWYTTP]XLI )9´WMRGVIEWMRKHIQERHJSVVIRI[EFPIIRIVK]¯IWTIGMEPP] solar energy. The most complex neighbourhood country relationship in this context is Russia, and with it Ukraine. Unlike Norway, the Union’s second largest supplier of gas and oil, Russia has chosen to leverage its power as supplier of gas and electricity to many of the central and eastern European member states in ways that are incompatible with the Union’s free-market principles. It has also exploited its supplier position with another neighbourhood country, Ukraine, with damaging consequences. This has had a direct impact on EU countries by disrupting supplies through Ukraine, and has a continuing indirect impact in hindering the EU’s attempts to help bring stability to Ukraine. It is not wholly clear how Russia will react to EU efforts to ensure Gazprom abides by Union law and to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, especially in the current GSRXI\XSJXLIYRVIWSPZIHGSR¾MGXSZIV9OVEMRI-XMW unlikely to be passive, however, as demonstrated by its reaction to the EU’s pursuit of alternative routes to deliver gas to EU territory avoiding Ukraine. Nevertheless, revenue from the European energy market is of major importance to the Russian economy, and it seems likely that Russia will weigh its options carefully before putting that in serious jeopardy


Energy Issues

Further Reading: EU energy security strategy: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy/ energy-security-strategy EU Energy Union: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/index_en.htm

Figure 2: Extra-EU imports of natural gas, energy share by main trading partners 2012 Peru 1% Trinidad and Tobago 1% Egypt 1% Libya 2% Nigeria 4% Not specified 7%

Russia 32%

EU Energy Policy: From the ECSC to the Energy Roadmap 2050 by Susanne Langsdorf, Green Energy Foundation, December 2011: http://gef.eu/uploads/media/History_of_ EU_energy_policy.pdf

Qatar 8%

Algeria 14%

Norway 31%

Figure 1: EU net imports in kilotonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) 1995–2012 and Commission projections Figure 3: Extra-EU imports of crude oil and LNG, energy share of main trading partners 2012

1995 1996 1997

Mexico 2% Angola 2% Algeria 3% Iraq 4%

1998 1999 2000

Azerbaijan 4%

2001 2002

Libya 8%

2003

Russia 33% Kazakhstan 5%

2004 2005

Nigeria 8%

2006 2007

Norway 11% Others 9%

2008 2009 2010

Saudi Arabia 9%

2011

Figure 4: Extra-EU imports of solid fuels, by main trading partners (energy share 2012)

2012 Projections 2020 * 2030 *

Ukraine 1% Canada 2% Not Specified 5%

2030 ** 0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000 1000,000 Indonesia 5% South Africa 6%

Source: Eurostat and European Commission projections based on the PRIMES model WGIREVMSVIžIGXMRKXLIJYPPMQTPIQIRXEXMSRSJXLI policies WGIREVMSVIžIGXMRKMQTPIQIRXEXMSRSJXLITVSTSWIH 2030 Climate and Energy policy framework

Russia 26% Australia 7%

United States 23%

Colombia 24%

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EU Trade with its Neighbours Dr Nicholas Bowen President of the Chartered Institute of Linguists and former Principal Lecturer, European Business School, Regent’s University London

“The generally positive trends of world trade in the 1980s and 1990s have been disrupted by a range of strong political, MKWVWUQKIVL[WKQITÆ]K\]I\QWV[QV\PM past decade. Trade relations of the EU with its neighbours have likewise been through a time of relative turbulence” Dr Nicholas Bowen


EU Trade with its Neighbours

uropean Union (EU) trade with 28 neighbouring countries is worth nearly €1,000 billion a year. The VIGSVHIH½KYVIMR[EWEFSYXºFMPPMSRERHXLEX ½XXIHMRXSEGSRXI\XSJEFSYXºFMPPMSRSJMRXVE)9 XVEHITPYWEFSYXºFMPPMSRSJXVEHIFIX[IIRXLI)9 ERHXLIVIWXSJXLI[SVPH2IEVP]SRIXLMVHSJXLI)9´W XSXEPJSVIMKRXVEHIMWXLIVIJSVI[MXLWSQISJMXWGPSWIWX neighbours, with Russia, Switzerland, Norway and Turkey VEROIHVIWTIGXMZIP]XLMVHJSYVXL½JXLERHWM\XLEWXVEHI TEVXRIVWMR

E

Multiple Agreements 8LIRIKSXMEXIHJVEQI[SVOJSVXLI)9´WXVEHI[MXLMXW RIMKLFSYVWIRGSQTEWWIWWIZIVEPX]TIWSJEKVIIQIRX grouped within two large policy envelopes: ˆ)YVS1IHMXIVVERIERTEVXRIVWLMTEKVIIQIRXWLEZI been negotiated with 10 states: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 0IFERSR0MF]E1SVSGGS4EPIWXMRI7]VME8YRMWMEERH 8YVOI]GSZIVMRKNYWXSZIV SJ)9I\XIVREPXVEHI 8LI)9´WEMQMWXSFYMPHEGSQTVILIRWMZI)YVS 1IHMXIVVERIER*VII8VEHI%VIE[MXLWXEXIWEPSRK XLIWSYXLIVRFSVHIVSJXLI)9 ˆ8LI)YVSTIER2IMKLFSYVLSSH4SPMG] )24 ETTPMIW XSWXEXIW8LIVIMWWSQIHIKVIISJSZIVPET [MXLXLI)YVS1IHTEVXRIVWLMT[MXL)K]TX-WVEIP 0IFERSR.SVHER1SVSGGSERH8YRMWMEEPWSLEZMRK EVVERKIHEGXMSRTPERW[MXLXLI)9MRXLI)24 JVEQI[SVOERH%PKIVMEGYVVIRXP]RIKSXMEXMRK SRI8LI)24EPWSMRGPYHIW%VQIRME%^IVFEMNER +ISVKME1SPHSZEERH9OVEMRI[LSWIEGXMSRTPERW

SVEWWSGMEXMSREKIRHEW EVIMRTPEGI4SXIRXMEP QIQFIVWEVI&IPEVYW7]VMEERH0MF]EFYXXLI] EVIWXMPPSYXWMHIEPQSWXEPPEVVERKIQIRXWVIPEXMRKXS XLI)24/SWSZSMWEWTIGMEPGEWI[MXLEsui generis TVEGXMGEPEVVERKIQIRX[MXLXLI)9 Generalisations about trade tend to elide the distinctions FIX[IIRHMJJIVIRXEVVERKIQIRXWSFWGYVMRKXLIKVEHYEXIH REXYVISJXLI)9´WXVEHITSPMG]XLIHMJJIVIRXWM^IHGEVVSXW XLEXXLI)9GERSJJIVGSYRXVMIWEXHMJJIVIRXWXEKIWSJ IGSRSQMGHIZIPSTQIRX -XMWRSXHMJ½GYPXXSIRZMWEKIWSQISJXLIRIMKLFSYVMRK WXEXIWSJXLI)YVSTIER9RMSRWXVIXGLMRKJVSQ1SVSGGS MRXLIJEV[IWXSJXLIRSVXL%JVMGERPMXXSVEPEPPXLI[E] through Algeria, Tunisia and Libya to Egypt, then turning RSVXL[EVHWYTXLIIEWXIVRGSEWXSJXLI1IHMXIVVERIER XLVSYKL-WVEIP.SVHER4EPIWXMRISVXLI3GGYTMIH8IVVMXSVMIW

0IFERSRERH7]VMEXS8YVOI]XLIRNYQTMRKXSXLI'EYGEWYW XLVSYKL%^IVFEMNER%VQIRMEERH+ISVKMEXSXLI6YWWMER *IHIVEXMSRERHXLIRGSZIVMRK9OVEMRI&IPEVYWERH 1SPHSZEFIJSVIHVSTTMRKFEGOXSXLI[IWXIVR&EPOERW ¯RS[ERIRGPEZI[MXLMRXLI)9¯XSMHIRXMJ]XLIJSVQIV =YKSWPEZ6ITYFPMGSJ1EGIHSRME%PFERME/SWSZS&SWRME ,IV^IKSZMRE1SRXIRIKVSERH7IVFME%HHMXMSREPP]XLIVIEVI XLIHMWXMRGXMZI)YVSTIER*VII8VEHI%VIE )*8% GSYRXVMIW SJ-GIPERH0MIGLXIRWXIMR2SV[E]ERH7[MX^IVPERH 8LMWKISKVETLMGEPTIVWTIGXMZIQE]SJJIVWSQIMRWMKLXW MRXSQSVIKIRIVEPTSPMXMGEPMWWYIW IKVIPEXMZIWM^IERH 6YWWMERMR¾YIRGI ERHQSVIWTIGM½GMWWYIW IKXVERWTSVX ERHTVS\MQMX] FYXMXHSIWRSXRIGIWWEVMP]FVMRKQYGL GSLIVIRGIXSEZMI[SJXLI)9ERHMXWXVEHMRKRIMKLFSYVW %RETTVSEGLFEWIHSRMRGSQIERHGSQTEVEXMZI EHZERXEKIWQE]SJJIVQSVIYWIJYPMRWMKLXW[MXLJSYV HMJJIVIRXX]TIWSJ)9RIMKLFSYV ˆdeveloped countries ˆIQIVKMRKYTTIVQMHHPIMRGSQIGSYRXVMIW ˆhydrocarbon countries ˆPS[IVQMHHPIMRGSQIGSYRXVMIW 8LI½VWXKVSYT HIZIPSTIHGSYRXVMIW MRGPYHIWWXEXIW such as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Israel, which are considerably wealthier than the EU average and in WSQIGEWIWEPWSFMKKIVXLERWSQIMRHMZMHYEP)YVS^SRI IGSRSQMIW8LIXVEHITSPMG]TEXXIVRSJEPPXLIWIHIZIPSTIH IGSRSQMIWMWWMQMPEVXSXLI)9´WGSRWMWXMRKSJPS[XEVMJJWJSV QERYJEGXYVIHKSSHWVIPEXMZIP]STIRWIVZMGIWIGXSVWERH LMKLPIZIPWSJTVSXIGXMSRJSVEKVMGYPXYVI8LIWIGSYRXVMIW I\TSVXWSTLMWXMGEXIHQERYJEGXYVIHTVSHYGXWXSXLI)9 ERHXLI]ERHXLI)9YWYEPP]EKVIIXSSTIRXLIMVQEVOIXW GSQTPIXIP]SREVIGMTVSGEPFEWMWXSIEGLSXLIV 8LIIGSRSQMIW[MXLMRXLIWIGSRHKVSYT IQIVKMRKYTTIV QMHHPIMRGSQIGSYRXVMIW KIRIVEPP]LEZIEKVSWWHSQIWXMG TVSHYGX +(4 TIVGETMXEVERKMRKJVSQEFSYX XS1ER]SJXLIQLEZILEHH]REQMGIGSRSQMG KVS[XLVEXIWWMRGIXLIFIKMRRMRKSJFYXSJXIRLEZI LMKLP]¾YGXYEXMRKJSVIMKRMRZIWXQIRX%WEVIWYPXXLIMV MQTVIWWMZIMRGSQIKVS[XLQE]RSXFIWYWXEMREFPI8LIWI countries are generally characterised by relatively high EZIVEKIMQTSVXXEVMJJWJSVQERYJEGXYVIHKSSHWEW[IPP as agricultural produce vis-à-vis the EU. In addition, their WIVZMGIWWIGXSVMWKIRIVEPP]PIWWSTIRXLERXLI)9´W ;MXLMRXLMWGEXIKSV]9OVEMRIMWWSQIXLMRKSJEWTIGMEP GEWI8LIGSYRXV]LEWFIIREQIQFIVSJXLI;SVPH8VEHI

Regent’s Report 2015

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32

)YVSTI´W2IMKLFSYVW*VSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[

3VKERM^EXMSR ;83 WMRGIERHXLI)9VIGIRXP] WMKRIHE(IITERH'SQTVILIRWMZI*VII8VEHI%KVIIQIRX [MXLXLIGSYRXV]&YXVIGIRXWIGIWWMSRMWXQSZIQIRXW [MXLMR9OVEMRIERH6YWWME´WSGGYTEXMSRSJ'VMQIELEZI GVIEXIHSRKSMRKXVEHI½RERGMEPERHIGSRSQMGTVSFPIQW XLEXQEOIMXEPIWWWXEFPIXVEHMRKTEVXRIVJSVXLI)9-XEPWS GSQTPMGEXIWXLIVIPEXMSRWLMTGSRWMHIVEFP]JVSQETSPMXMGEP ERHQMPMXEV]TSMRXSJZMI[¯ETVSFPIQXLEXMWFI]SRHXLI WGSTISJXLMWGLETXIV 8LIXLMVHKVSYTGSRWMWXWSJL]HVSGEVFSRTVSHYGMRKERH I\TSVXMRKGSYRXVMIW7SQISJXLIQLEZIEZIV]LMKL HITIRHIRGISRI\TSVXWSJJYIPW ERHQMRMRKTVSHYGXW  [LMGLEGGSYRXJSVLMKLTIVGIRXEKIWSJXLIMVXSXEPI\TSVXW %PKIVME %^IVFEMNER 6YWWME 0MF]E  ERH7]VME (IWTMXIXLIZSPEXMPMX]SJXLISMPTVMGIERH XLISJXIRYRWXEFPITSPMXMGEPWMXYEXMSRSJWSQISJXLIWI countries – in particular Syria and Libya since 2011–12 ¯XVEHI[MXLXLMWKVSYTVIQEMRWGVYGMEPXSXLIWYGGIWWJYP IGSRSQMGHIZIPSTQIRXSJXLI)96YWWME%PKIVME0MF]E %^IVFEMNERERH7]VMEXSKIXLIVEGGSYRXJSVEPQSWXLEPJSJ XLI)9´WSMPMQTSVXWERHEGGSVHMRKXS½KYVIWJVSQ EFSYX SJXLI)9´W½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´W'SVVYTXMSR4IVGITXMSRW-RHI\ [LIVI (IRQEVOMWERH7SQEPMEMW XLIMVVEROMRKW EVI%PKIVME%^IVFEMNER6YWWME7]VMEERH Libya 166. %WQMKLXFII\TIGXIHXLITEXXIVRSJXVEHIFIX[IIRXLI )9ERHXLIWIGSYRXVMIWVIPMIWSRI\TSVXWSJSMPERHKEWXS XLI)9MRI\GLERKIJSVMQTSVXWSJQERYJEGXYVIHKSSHW TPYWWSQIWIVZMGIWERHEKVMGYPXYVEPTVSHYGXWJVSQXLI)9 8LMWWXVSRKHITIRHIRGISRL]HVSGEVFSRI\TSVXWVEMWIW ERYQFIVSJTSPMXMGEPERHXVEHITVSFPIQWJSVXLI)9MR TEVXMGYPEVWIGYVMX]SJWYTTP]+E^TVSQXLI6YWWMERI\TSVX QSRSTSP]HMWVYTXMRKKEWWYTTPMIWMRERH LMKLPMKLXIHXLMWEWHMHWYTTP]HMWVYTXMSRWGEYWIHF]0MF]E´W HIWGIRXMRXSGMZMP[EVJVSQ

Regent’s Report 2015

%TEVXJVSQ6YWWMERSRISJXLIWIGSYRXVMIWFIPSRKWXSXLI ;83WSXLIVIMWRSEGGIWWJSVXVEHMRK½VQWXSIZIRXLI PS[IWXGSQQSRHIRSQMREXSVSJMRXIVREXMSREPP]EGGITXIH XVEHIPE[W-REHHMXMSRXLIXVEHITSPMGMIWSJXLIWIGSYRXVMIW EVIVIPEXMZIP]TVSXIGXMSRMWX[MXLELMKLVEXISJEZIVEKI MQTSVXXEVMJJWSRQERYJEGXYVIHKSSHWERHLMKLPIZIPWSJ TVSXIGXMSRMWQMRXLIWIVZMGIWWIGXSV 8LIGSYRXVMIWMRXLI½REPGEXIKSV]SJXLMWJVEQI[SVO SJEREP]WMWEVIXLI)9´WTSSVIWXRIMKLFSYVW1SPHSZE 1SVSGGS)K]TX%VQIRMEERH+ISVKME-RKIRIVEPXLI] LEZIMRGSQIPIZIPWPIWWXLERLEPJSJXLI)9´WTSSVIWX QIQFIVWXEXI&YPKEVME[LIVI+(4TIVGETMXEMR [EWFEVIP]-R1SPHSZE1SVSGGS)K]TX%VQIRME ERH+ISVKMEMXVERKIHJVSQFEVIP]HS[RXSEW PMXXPIEWTIVLIEH %WEGSRWIUYIRGISJXLIMVWM^I%VQIRME+ISVKMEERH 1SPHSZEEVIRSXQENSVXVEHIXEVKIXW[MXLPMQMXIH GSQQIVGMEPTSXIRXMEPJSVXLI)9ERHEKVMGYPXYVEPKSSHW HSQMREXMRKXLIMVI\TSVXWXSXLI)98LI)9I\TSVXWFSXL industrial and agricultural products, and these nations TYVWYIXVEHITSPMGMIWXLEXEVIMRWSQIVIWTIGXWQSVISTIR XLERXLSWI[MXLMRXLI)9[MXLPS[XEVMJJWERHEVIPEXMZIP] PMFIVEPVIKMQIJSVXVEHIMRWIVZMGIW

Climbing a Ladder of Privileged Access The trade policy that the EU applies to its neighbours, [LMGLIZIVGEXIKSV]XLI]FIPSRKXSMWXSRIKSXMEXIHMJJIVIRX PIZIPWSJWXEXYWSVTVMZMPIKIHEGGIWWXSXLI)9QEVOIX VEXLIVPMOISJJIVMRKTEVXRIVWXEXIWEPEHHIVXSGPMQF %XXLIFSXXSQMW;83WXEXYW[LMGLEPQSWXEPPWXEXIW MRUYIWXMSRLEZIRS[EGLMIZIH8LIRI\XWXITMWEGGIWW XSXVEHITVIJIVIRGIWYRHIVXLI+IRIVEPMWIH7]WXIQSJ 4VIJIVIRGIW +74 SV+74VIKMQIW8LIWIVIKMQIWEVI EPWS[MHIP]SJJIVIHXSHIZIPSTMRKGSYRXVMIWMR%JVMGEXLI 'EVMFFIERERHXLI4EGM½G8LIRXLIVIMWXLITVSWTIGXSJ EJVIIXVEHIEKVIIQIRX[LMGLQE]KMZIFIXXIVEGGIWW XSGIVXEMRTEVXWSJXLI)9QEVOIXHITIRHIRXSRWSQI GSRHMXMSREPMX]SJXVEHIEGGIWWMRXLITEVXRIVGSYRXV]ERH EPWSWSQIWSGMEPERHTSPMXMGEPGSRWMHIVEXMSRWHIWMKRIH XSIRGSYVEKIKSSHKSZIVRERGIERHXLIVYPISJPE[8LI RI\XWXEKIMWEQSVIIPEFSVEXIJVIIXVEHIHIEP[MXLMR EREWWSGMEXMSREKVIIQIRXERHXLIWXEKIFI]SRHXLEXMW E(IITERH'SQTVILIRWMZI*VII8VEHI%VIE ('*8%  EKVIIQIRX[LMGLQE]MRGPYHIQER]SXLIVEWTIGXWSJTSPMG] ¯IRZMVSRQIRXEPXVERWTSVXERHPEFSYVQSZIQIRXJSV MRWXERGIEW[IPPEWQSVIWTIGM½GWSGMEPERHTSPMXMGEPXEVKIXW


EU Trade with its Neighbours

8LIEFMPMX]XSSJJIVEGGIWWXSXLIZEWX)9QEVOIXSJSZIV QMPPMSRGSRWYQIVWKMZIWXLI)9'SQQMWWMSR¯WYFNIGXXS QERHEXIWKVERXIHXSMXF]XLIQIQFIVWXEXIWJSVIEGLXVEHI negotiation – considerable leverage with its neighbours. 3RXLILMKLIWXWXITSJXLIPEHHIVEVIGSYRXVMIWMRXLI )YVSTIER)GSRSQMG%VIE ))% WYGLEW-GIPERH2SV[E] ERH0MIGLXIRWXIMR8LIWITEVXRIVWEVIQSWXGPSWIP]FSYRH MRXSXLI)YVSTIER7MRKPI1EVOIXERHEVISFPMKIHXSETTP] )9VYPIWEW[IPPEWXLIEGGYQYPEXIHacquis communautaire but do not take part in the EU political institutions and XLIHIGMWMSRQEOMRKTVSGIWW8LI]OIITXLIMVJSVQEP WSZIVIMKRX]MRXVEHITSPMG]ERHEVIRSXTEVXSJXLI 'SQQSR%KVMGYPXYVEP4SPMG]%ZEVMERXSRXLIEVVERKIQIRX with Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein is the one with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positive than in previous decades. 8LIXLMVHGEXIKSV]MRGPYHIWXLI[IEOIVXVEHIEKVIIQIRXW XLEXEVIGYVVIRXP]MRJSVGIMRXLI)YVSTIERRIMKLFSYVLSSH 8LIWIEVIXLIJVIIXVEHIEKVIIQIRXW[MXLXLI1MHHPI )EWXIVRERHRSVXLIVR%JVMGERIGSRSQMIW8LI]IQIVKIH JVSQXLIW&EVGIPSRE4VSGIWWKVSYTIHYRHIVXLI YQFVIPPESJ)YVS1IH%WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRXW 8LIJSYVXLGEXIKSV]MRGPYHIWL]HVSGEVFSRI\TSVXIVW 6YWWMEERHWSQISJXLI)9´WTSSVIWXRIMKLFSYVWMRXLI 'EYGEWYW8LI)9SJJIVWYRMPEXIVEPXVEHITVIJIVIRGIWXS MXWTSSVIWXRIMKLFSYVWYRHIVXLI+74WGLIQIERHLEW VIGIRXP]PEYRGLIHJVIIXVEHIRIKSXMEXMSRW[MXLXLIQ WIXXMRKYTEGXMSRTPERWMRQER]GEWIW&YXMRXLIGEWISJ Russia, trade relations have been seriously curtailed by XLIMQTSWMXMSRSJ)9WERGXMSRWMRVIWTSRWIXS6YWWMER ERRI\EXMSRSJXLI'VMQIEERHQMPMXEV]MRXIVJIVIRGIMR eastern Ukraine.

Neighbours to the East and to the South 8LIFVSEHIWXGSRXI\XJSVXLI)9ERHMXWRIMKLFSYVWMW VITVIWIRXIHF]XLI)YVSTIER2IMKLFSYVLSSH4SPMG] )24  through which the EU works with its southern and eastern neighbours to achieve closer political association and a LMKLIVHIKVIISJIGSRSQMGMRXIKVEXMSR8LMWKSEPFYMPHWSR GSQQSRMRXIVIWXWERHZEPYIWHIQSGVEG]XLIVYPISJPE[ VIWTIGXJSVLYQERVMKLXWERHWSGMEPGSLIWMSR 8LI)24MWEOI]TEVXSJXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR´WJSVIMKRTSPMG] ERHMWENSMRXP]S[RIHMRMXMEXMZIMRXLEXMXWMQTPIQIRXEXMSR requires action by both the neighbours and the EU. The TSPMG]LEWEKVIEXIVGSLIVIRGIXLVSYKLGSSTIVEXMSR FIX[IIRXLIVIPIZERX'SQQMWWMSRIV )24ERH)RPEVKIQIRX 2IKSXMEXMSRW ERHXLI)YVSTIER)\XIVREP%GXMSR7IVZMGI

))%7 %PXLSYKLXLI)24MWGLMI¾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closer relations between each country and the EU, as [IPPEWQSVITIEGIJYPERHGSSTIVEXMZIVIPEXMSRWEQSRK XLIQIQFIVW-RHIIHMRXLISVMKMREPGSSTIVEXMSR EKVIIQIRXW[IVIVIPEYRGLIHEWQSVIWSTLMWXMGEXIH IGSRSQMGERHXVEHMRKEVVERKIQIRXWYRHIVXLIPEFIPSJ XLI9RMSRJSVXLI1IHMXIVVERIER 9J1 [LMGLRS[LEWE TIVQERIRXWIGVIXEVMEXFEWIHMR&EVGIPSRE &YXEOI]MWWYIMWXLIHITXLSJXLIEVVERKIQIRXWMRXLMW JVEQI[SVO[LMGLWIZIVEPGSQQIRXEXSVWGSRWMHIVXSS WLEPPS[7IZIVEPWXYHMIWEWWIWWMRKXLI)YVS1IH)9XVEHI WXVEXIK]LEZIFIIRGVMXMGEPERHXLIMVGSQQSRGSRGPYWMSRW suggest that: ˆ8VEHIEKVIIQIRXWVIEGLIHXLYWJEVHSRSX WMKRM½GERXP]PMFIVEPMWIXVEHIFI]SRHXLIFIRGLQEVO WIXF]XLI;83´WFSH]SJVYPIW ˆ%KVIIQIRXWJSGYWEPQSWXI\GPYWMZIP]SR QERYJEGXYVIHKSSHW[MXLPMXXPIEXXIRXMSRTEMHXS agriculture or services

Regent’s Report 2015

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34

)YVSTI´W2IMKLFSYVW*VSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[

ˆ;LIVIEKVMGYPXYVIMWGSRWMHIVIHXLIVIMWERYQFIVSJ )9VIWXVMGXMZIVIKYPEXMSRWXLEXLEZIERIKEXMZIMQTEGX SRRIMKLFSYVMRKTEVXRIVW´XVEHITSPMGMIW¯XLIWIEVI related to: KIRIXMGEPP]QSHM½IH +1 TVSHYGXWJSVGSVR soybeans and rapeseed TVSXIGXIHKISKVETLMGEPMRHMGEXMSR 4+- TVSHYGXMSRWXERHEVHWVIKEVHMRKERMQEP[IPJEVI and organic origin IRZMVSRQIRXEPMQTEGXWSJJEVQMRKWYGLEWGEVFSR IQMWWMSRWERHIGSPEFIPPMRK ˆ8LIVYPIWSJSVMKMRXLVIWLSPHEVISJXIRXSSVIWXVMGXMZI XSEPPS[XLIMQTSVXSJKSSHWMRXSXLI)9MJ¯  SJETVSHYGX´WZEPYIRIIHWXSFITVSHYGIHPSGEPP]JSV MXXSLEZIHYX]JVIIWXEXYW ˆ%KVIIQIRXWLEZIRSXVIEPP]JSWXIVIHMRGVIEWIHMRXVE 1IHMXIVVERIERXVEHIERHMRXIKVEXMSREQSRKXLI)9´W partners

Bilateral or Multilateral? 3RISJXLISPHIWXERHQSWXHMZMWMZIEVKYQIRXWEFSYX trade policy relates to the priority to be given to bilateral EWSTTSWIHXSQYPXMPEXIVEPEVVERKIQIRXW8LI)9´WVIGIRX IQTLEWMWSRFMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWVIMRJSVGIHEKEMRIEVP]MR LEWJSYVTSWWMFPII\TPEREXMSRW -RXLI½VWXTPEGIFMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWEVIIEWMIVXS GSRGPYHI&SXLTSPMXMGMERWERHFYWMRIWWTISTPI½RHXLMW ETTVSEGLZIV]EXXVEGXMZIFIGEYWIXLI]EVIPSSOMRKJSVUYMGO VIWYPXW7IGSRHP]FMPEXIVEPXVEHIEKVIIQIRXWGERGSZIV QSVIEVIEWHIEPMRK[MXLMRZIWXQIRXGSQTIXMXMSRXIGLRMGEP WXERHEVHWPEFSYVWXERHEVHWSVIRZMVSRQIRXEPTVSZMWMSRW [LIVIXLIVIQMKLXRSXFIGSRWIRWYWEQSRKEKVSYTSJ negotiating partner states. Thirdly, there are political or geopolitical considerations whereby developing countries, RIKSXMEXMRK[MXLXLI)9YWYEPP]LEZII\TIGXEXMSRWSJ I\GPYWMZITVIJIVIRXMEPFIRI½XWHIZIPSTQIRXEWWMWXERGIERH SXLIVRSRXVEHIVI[EVHWXLYWTSXIRXMEPP]VEMWMRKXLIGSWX JSVXLI)9*MREPP]FMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWGERSJXIRFIYWIH EWMRWXVYQIRXWJSVHSQIWXMGVIJSVQMRETEVXRIVGSYRXV]

GSRHMXMSREPMX] [LIVIXLIQYPXMPEXIVEPW]WXIQSJJIVWPIWW leverage. ,S[IZIVFMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWEPWSLEZIPMQMXEXMSRW*MVWXP] FMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWGERGVIEXIHMWGVMQMREXMSR3RI country will try in its subsequent negotiations to obtain XLIWEQIEHZERXEKIWEWERSXLIV[LSWIRIKSXMEXMSRWLEZI EPVIEH]FIIRGSRGPYHIHMRSVHIVRSXXSFI³WLSVXGLERKIH´ 'SYRXVMIWSYXWMHIEREKVIIQIRX[MPPXV]XSGSRGPYHI EKVIIQIRXW[MXLXLSWIMRWMHIWSEWXSEZSMHXVEHIHMZIVWMSR

Regent’s Report 2015

4VIJIVIRGIWSFXEMRIHXLVSYKLJSVQMRKETVIJIVIRXMEP EKVIIQIRXEKEMRWXGSQTIXMXSVWMRSRIRIKSXMEXMSRGERFI WLSVXPMZIHEWSXLIVWSFXEMRWMQMPEVXVIEXQIRX 7IGSRHP]FMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWGERRSXWSPZIW]WXIQMGMWWYIW WYGLEWVYPIWSJSVMKMRHYQTMRKERHERXMHYQTMRKQIEWYVIW SVWYFWMHMIW RSXEFP]EKVMGYPXYVEPERH½WLIV]WYFWMHMIW  ERHWXEXIEMHW8LMVHP]XLITVSPMJIVEXMSRSJMRHMZMHYEPSV WQEPPVIKMSREPXVEHIEKVIIQIRXWGERKVIEXP]GSQTPMGEXI XLIXVEHMRKIRZMVSRQIRXGVIEXMRKE[IFSJMRGSLIVIRX VYPIWXLEXVIWXVMGXSVHMZIVXXVEHI*SVI\EQTPIVYPIWSJ SVMKMRGSQTPMGEXIXLITVSHYGXMSRTVSGIWWIWSJFYWMRIWWIW XLEXQE]FISFPMKIHXSXEMPSVXLIMVTVSHYGXWJSVHMJJIVIRX TVIJIVIRXMEPQEVOIXW *MREPP]JSVQER]WQEPPERH[IEOHIZIPSTMRKGSYRXVMIW IRXIVMRKMRXSEFMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRX[MXLXLI)9QIERWXLI] have considerably less leverage and a weaker negotiating TSWMXMSRXLERXLI][SYPHLEZI[MXLQER]TEVXRIVWMR QYPXMPEXIVEPRIKSXMEXMSRW 0MXXPI[SRHIVXLI)9TVIJIVWFMPEXIVEPRIKSXMEXMSRW[MXL MRHMZMHYEPWXEXIWIZIRMJMXXLIRTEGOEKIWXLIWIXVEHMRK relations within overarching policy initiatives such as the )YVSTIER2IMKLFSYVLSSH4SPMG]XLI)YVS1IHMRMXMEXMZI ERHXLI9RMSRJSVXLI1IHMXIVVERIER

Conclusion 8LIXVEHIVIPEXMSRWSJXLI)9ERHMXWTPYWRIMKLFSYVW TEPIMRXSWSQIHIKVIISJMRWMKRM½GERGI[LIRGSRWMHIVIH MRXLIGSRXI\XSJSXLIVMWWYIWEJJIGXMRKXLI)9ERHMXW surrounding regions. 8LIGSVISJXLI)9¯XLIQIQFIV)YVS^SRI¯LEW FIIRQSWXWIVMSYWP]GLEPPIRKIHF]XLITVSFPIQSJXLI +VIIOHI½GMXERHXLIPIRKXL]HIFEXISZIV[LIXLIV+VIIGI QMKLXEFERHSRXLIIYVS3RXSTSJXLEXXLI)YVS^SRIERH XLI)9LEZILEHXSGSTI[MXLXLI[MHIVMQTPMGEXMSRWSJXLI ¯FEROMRK½RERGMEPERHIGSRSQMGGVMWMWMRGPYHMRK SXLIVQIQFIVWXEXIW[MXLFYHKIXERHHI½GMXTVSFPIQW XLIRIKSXMEXMSRSJPEVKIXVIEX]EVVERKIQIRXWWYGLEWXLI 8VERWEXPERXMG8VEHIERH-RZIWXQIRX4EVXRIVWLMT 88-4 ERH TIVWMWXIRXP]WPYKKMWLIGSRSQMGKVS[XL The EU has also been concerned with security on the FSVHIVWSJXLIVIKMSRIWTIGMEPP][MXL6YWWMEREKKVIWWMSR XS[EVHW9OVEMRIERHXLI&EPXMGWXEXIWXLIGSRWIUYIRGIW SJ XLIXIVVSVMWXEXXEGOWMRXLI97SR7ITXIQFIV  ERH-WPEQMGVEHMGEPMWQXLVIEXWSJMRXIVREXMSREP XIVVSVMWQMPPIKEPQMKVEXMSREGVSWWXLI1IHMXIVVERIERXLI


EU Trade with its Neighbours

WTVIEHSJIYVSWGITXMGMWQERHIZIRXLIJSVXLGSQMRKMRSYX &VMXMWLVIJIVIRHYQ 8LIKIRIVEPP]TSWMXMZIXVIRHWSJ[SVPHXVEHIMRXLIW ERHWLEZIFIIRHMWVYTXIHF]EVERKISJWXVSRK TSPMXMGEPIGSRSQMGERHWSGMEP¾YGXYEXMSRWMRXLITEWX HIGEHI8VEHIVIPEXMSRWSJXLI)9[MXLMXWRIMKLFSYVWLEZI PMOI[MWIFIIRXLVSYKLEXMQISJVIPEXMZIXYVFYPIRGI;MXLMR XLIGSRXI\XSJVIGIRXXVEHI½KYVIWXLILIEHPMRI½KYVIJSV EU trade with its 28 neighbours (close to €1 billion) looks VIPEXMZIP]MQTVIWWMZIFYXMWJEVFIPS[XLITSXIRXMEPXLEX QMKLXLEZIFIIRTVIHMGXIHMR

&PEGO7IE7XYHMIW9RMZIVWMX]SJ4IPSTSRRIWI 8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREP  Corruption Perceptions Index[[[XVERWTEVIRG]SVKGTMVIWYPXW ;SVPH&ERO  GDP per capita: LXXTHEXE[SVPHFEROSVKMRHMGEXSV2=+(44'%4'(

8LITEXXIVRWSJ)9XVEHI[MXLMXWRIMKLFSYVWEVI unsurprisingly very varied, as shown by the analysis above. The largest neighbours, such as Russia and Turkey, VITVIWIRXEWMKRM½GERXTVSTSVXMSRSJXLMW)9XVEHI   ERH ERHVEROIHXLMVHERHWM\XLVIWTIGXMZIP] EWHS XLIWQEPPIVLMKLP]HIZIPSTIHGSYRXVMIWWYGLEW7[MX^IVPERH ERH2SV[E]  ERH ERHVEROIHJSYVXLERH½JXL VIWTIGXMZIP] &]GSRXVEWXQSVIXLEREHS^IRWQEPP RIMKLFSYVW WYGLEW/SWSZS.SVHERERH%PFERME ERHQSVI TSTYPSYWRIMKLFSYVW[MXLGSRWMHIVEFPIIGSRSQMGERH TSPMXMGEPTVSFPIQW WYGLEW0MF]E)K]TXERH9OVEMRI GEWX EWLEHS[SZIVXLITSXIRXMEPSJXLI[LSPI8LIJYXYVIJSV )9XVEHI[MXLXLIWIQER]RIMKLFSYVWQE]FITSWMXMZIFYX MXVIQEMRWTVSFPIQEXMGERHEFSZIEPPIEGLTEVXRIVSJJIVWE WTIGM½GREXMSREPQEVOIXXLEXMWLMKLP]MRHMZMHYEP

Further Reading Trade Policy in the EU’s Neighbourhood. Ways Forward for the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, F]-ERE(VI]IV7XYHMIWERH6IWIEVGL2SXVI )YVSTI[[[RSXVIIYVSTIIYQIHME-(VI]IVC 8VEHI4SPMG]-R)92IMKLFSYVLSSHC2)C1E]THJ Countries and Regions(+8VEHI)YVSTIER'SQQMWWMSR LXXTIGIYVSTEIYXVEHITSPMG]GSYRXVMIWERH VIKMSRW European Neighbourhood Policy))%7LXXTIIEW IYVSTEIYIRTEFSYXYWMRHI\CIRLXQ Joint Consultation Paper: Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy))%71EVGL?VIJ.3-2   ½REPALXXTIGIYVSTEIYIRPEVKIQIRXRIMKLFSYVLSSH GSRWYPXEXMSRGSRWYPXEXMSRTHJ EU trade policies towards neighboring countriesF]4EREKMSXMW 0MEVKSZEW;SVOMRKTETIV-RXIVREXMSREP'IRXIVJSV

Regent’s Report 2015

35


Managing Migration in Europe Professor Ibrahim Sirkeci Director of the Centre for Transnational Studies, Regent’s University London

“Europe is currently facing its biggest migration challenge ever, with millions gathering at its borders in the hope of escaping insecurity and extreme violence� Professor Ibrahim Sirkeci




LVSYKLSYXLMWXSV]KSZIVRQIRXWEVSYRHXLI[SVPH LEZIJEMPIHXSGSRXVSPLYQERQSFMPMX]JYPP]1ER] KSZIVRQIRXWXSHE]LEZIQSZIHJVSQ³GSRXVSPPMRK´QMKVEXMSR XS³QEREKMRK´QMKVEXMSRMRXLIJEGISJXLIMQTSWWMFMPMX]SJ EGLMIZMRKWIXXEVKIXW8LIGSRXVEHMGXSV]REXYVISJQMKVEXMSR GSRXVSPF]³PMFIVEP´KSZIVRQIRXW[LSEPWSTYWLJSV FSVHIVPIWWXVEHIERHI\GLERKIMWSFZMSYW8LMWHVIEQSJE FSVHIVPIWW[SVPHEPWSMQTPMIWYRMZIVWEPTIEGI

T

Migration Then and Now )YVSTIMWGYVVIRXP]JEGMRKMXWFMKKIWXQMKVEXMSRGLEPPIRKIIZIV [MXLQMPPMSRWKEXLIVMRKEXMXWFSVHIVWMRXLILSTISJIWGETMRK MRWIGYVMX]ERHI\XVIQIZMSPIRGI)K]TX0MF]E7]VME8YRMWME Turkey, Ukraine and several other troubled countries are MRXLMWXSYKLRIMKLFSYVLSSHSJ)YVSTI-RERMRGVIEWMRKP] QSFMPIERHGSRRIGXIH[SVPHXLI)YVSTIERRIMKLFSYVLSSH MWEPWSMRXSYGL[MXLEQYGL[MHIVKISKVETL]¯[MXLREXMSRW ERHGSR¾MGXWXLVSYKLSYX0EXMR%QIVMGE%JVMGEERH7SYXL Asia. Wars, insurgencies, and widespread inequalities and MRNYWXMGIMRQER]GSYRXVMIW¯FYXTEVXMGYPEVP]MRRIMKLFSYVMRK SRIW¯EVIXLIGSQFMRIHHVMZIVWSJXLI[EZISJLMKL QMKVEXMSRJEGMRK)YVSTIXSHE],YQERQSFMPMX]VIQEMRWER I\GITXMSRRSXERSVQFSXLJSVMRHMZMHYEPWERHGSQQYRMXMIW FYXMXMWHVMZIRF]GSR¾MGXWFMKERHWQEPPF]YRVIWXWSGMEP XIRWMSRWERHF]XLIGPEWLSJMRGSQTEXMFPIMRXIVIWXW8LI QSVISJXLIWIXLIVIEVIXLILMKLIVXLI[EZI 2IXQMKVEXMSR¾S[WJSVXLI9/¯MRERHSYX¯HYVMRKXLI last century were virtually balanced, the overall population neither increasing nor decreasing appreciably. In that GSRXI\XSJSZIVEPPWXEFMPMX]SJRYQFIVWVIGIMZMRKGSYRXVMIW EGVSWWRSVXLIVR)YVSTIMRIGSRSQMGRIIHSJQMKVEXMSR

MIKYIWX[SVOIVW GSTIH[MXLXLIWIGSRHSVHIVGYPXYVEP TVSFPIQW[LIRVIGIMZMRK8YVOWSV1SVSGGERW MRFSXL GEWIWRSR)YVSTIERWERH1YWPMQW 2IMXLIV8YVOI]RSV 1SVSGGS[IVIHIQSGVEXMGWEJILEZIRWMRXLIWSV WFYXXLSWI[LSGEQIGEQIEW[SVOIVWZMXEPJSVXLI Wirtschaftswunder ³IGSRSQMGQMVEGPI´ ERHXLIIGSRSQMG FSSQMRRSVXLIVR)YVSTI &YXEWXMQIWGLERKIHKVS[XLJEPXIVIHERH[EVWERH VIZSPYXMSRWFVSOISYXEVSYRH)YVSTI´WTIVMTLIV]QER] QMPPMSRWYRWYVTVMWMRKP][MWLIHXSJSPPS[XLIQSRXLI VSEHXS)YVSTI¯XLMWXMQISJXIREWVIJYKIIWERHEW]PYQ WIIOIVW8LIWIPEXIVEVVMZEPWXLIJEQMPMIWERHJVMIRHWSJXLI ZIV]WEQITISTPI[LSEVVMZIHFIJSVIXLIW[IVI SJXIRWIIREWMPPIKEPQMKVERXW4YFPMGSTMRMSRMR)YVSTI KVI[GSRGIVRIHERH[ERXIHXSLEPXXLMWQMKVEXSV]¾S[ IZIR[LIRRI[GSQIVWEPWSHIQSRWXVEXIHE[MPPXS[SVO wherever they had the chance.

1EREKMRK1MKVEXMSRMR)YVSTI 37

2IMXLIV8YVOI]RSV1SVSGGSRSVQER]SXLIVWSYVGI GSYRXVMIWJSVQMKVERXWEVI]IXHIQSGVEXMGWEJILEZIRW8LI] QE]FIIGSRSQMGEPP]WPMKLXP]VMGLIVXLEREKIRIVEXMSREKS FYX¯EKEMRYRWYVTVMWMRKP]¯SYX[EVHWQMKVEXMSRJVSQXLIWI GSYRXVMIWGSRXMRYIW8LIVIEWSRWFILMRHMXEVIX[SJSPH ½VWXP]EHIKVIISJMRWIGYVMX]IMXLIVJSVIGSRSQMGSVTSPMXMGEP VIEWSRWERHWIGSRHP]ERIWXEFPMWLIHGYPXYVISJQMKVEXMSR between receiving and source countries. This has grown up, FYMPXSRXLI[MHIWTVIEHI\TIVMIRGISJQMKVEXMSRSZIVXLI WIGSRHLEPJSJXLIPEWXGIRXYV] %GYPXYVISJQMKVEXMSRMWRIZIVESRI[E]WXVIIX;LMPI XLIPEXIWX9/GIRWYWVITSVXW8YVOMWLFSVRVIWMHIRXW MRXLIGSYRXV]XLIVIEVIEPWSERIWXMQEXIH&VMXMWL VIWMHIRXWMR8YVOI]'SRXVEV]XSGSQQSRFIPMIJQSWX IQMKVEXMRK&VMXWEVIRSXTIRWMSRIVWFYXSJ[SVOMRKEKI 7MQMPEVP]ERIWXEFPMWLIHQMKVEXMSRGSVVMHSVFIX[IIR 8YVOI]ERH+IVQER]LEWWIIREVIZIVWEPSJRIXQMKVEXMSR ¾S[WVIGIRXP]¯8YVOI]LEWFIIREXXLIVIGIMZMRKIRHSJ QMKVEXMSRJVSQ+IVQER]WMRGI 8LIXSXEPRYQFIVSJIQMKVERXWJVSQXLIWM\PEVKIWX GSYRXVMIWSJ)YVSTI +IVQER]9/-XEP]*VERGI7TEMRERH 4SPERH MWEFSYXQMPPMSREGGSVHMRKXSXLI;SVPH&ERO 8LI9/MWRS[SRISJXLIXSTGSYRXVMIW[MXLXLI PEVKIWXIQMKVERXWXSGOMRXLIVIWXSJXLI[SVPH-RXLIPSRK VYRX[S[E]¾S[WEVIXSFII\TIGXIHMREPPQMKVEXMSR corridors when both sending and receiving countries are WEJIERHWXEFPI7SMX[SYPHFIRExZIXSMQEKMRIEHIGPMRIMR LYQERQSFMPMX]IZIRMJTIEGI[IVIXSVIXYVRXS)YVSTI´W TIVMTLIV]'SRRIGXIHRIWWSRGIIWXEFPMWLIHMREGYPXYVI SJQMKVEXMSRIRWYVIWGSRXMRYMX]SJTSTYPEXMSRQSZIQIRXW between related countries.

Conflicts Lead to Displacement ,YQERQSFMPMX]MWIWWIRXMEPP]EJYRGXMSRSJGSR¾MGX'SR¾MGX GERVIJIVXSE[MHIEVVE]SJWMXYEXMSRWVERKMRKJVSQPEXIRX tensions to violence and wars. Individuals, households and GSQQYRMXMIWSRP]GSRWMHIVQSZMRKEWEVIWYPXSJGSR¾MGX XLEXQEOIWXLIMVIRZMVSRQIRXYRFIEVEFP]MRWIGYVI 8LIWIGSR¾MGXWGEREVMWIJVSQPEGOSJIGSRSQMG STTSVXYRMXMIWGPMQEXIGLERKITSPMXMGEPIXLRMGSVVIPMKMSYW HMWGVMQMREXMSRJEQMP]JIYHMRKSVYRJEZSYVEFPIKIRHIV VIPEXMSRW7SQISJXLIWIEVISFNIGXMZIP]QIEWYVEFPI[LMPI others are not. However, qualitative studies provide IZMHIRGIJSVXLIWIRSXWSSFZMSYWP]QIEWYVEFPIJIEXYVIW XSS7XEXMWXMGEPHEXETVSZMHIHF]KSZIVRQIRXWERH international agencies, such as the United Nations High 'SQQMWWMSRIVJSV6IJYKIIW 92,'6 EVIRSXEFPIXS

Regent’s Report 2015


38

)YVSTI´W2IMKLFSYVW*VSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[

GETXYVIEPPXLIWIGSR¾MGXWFYXXLI]HSTVIWIRXETMGXYVISJ XLISYXGSQIW 3ZIVXLIPEWXHIGEHISVWSXLIRYQFIVSJTISTPIHMWTPEGIH LEWFIIREXMXWLMWXSVMGTIEOTEVXMGYPEVP]FIGEYWISJXLI VIGIRX7]VMERGVMWMW8LMW[EWERSYXGSQIXLEXGSYPHLEZI FIIRI\TIGXIHEW[ILEZIWIIRWMQMPEVTEXXIVRWIQIVKI [MXLXLI[EVWMR%JKLERMWXERERH-VEU,S[IZIVGSR¾MGXMW RSXPMQMXIHXSQMPMXEV]MRXIVZIRXMSRW)GSRSQMGGYPXYVEPERH TSPMXMGEPHMWTEVMXMIWI\TVIWWIHMRTS[IVWXVYGXYVIWEVSYRH the world, particularly in developing countries, contribute XSXLIWTIGXVYQSJGSR¾MGXWXLEXGVIEXIXLIWIRWISJ MRWIGYVMX]ERHIZIRXYEPP]PIEHXSMRXIVREXMSREPQMKVEXMSR

;LEX)YVSTIMWJEGMRKEXMXWI\XIVREPFSVHIVWXSHE]MW EVI¾IGXMSRSJXLEXKPSFEPTLIRSQIRSR-XMWRSXSRP] 7]VMERWSV%JKLERW¾IIMRK[EVFYXQER]SXLIVWEPWS¾IIMRK MRWIGYVMX]EW[MXRIWWXLI-VEUMERH)VMXVIERRYQFIVW %RSXLIVMRHMGEXSV TEVXMEPFIGEYWISJMXWREXYVIEWE QIEWYVISJMPPIKEPMQQMKVEXMSRRSXSZIVEPPRYQFIVWWIIOMRK EW]PYQ MWXLIPMWXSJXLIXSTREXMSREPMXMIWJSYRHXSFI MPPIKEPP]VIWMHIRXMR)YVSTI%PFERMEGSQIW½VWX[MXLRIEVP]  SJEPPTISTPIETTVILIRHIHFIX[IIR ERHERHRIEVP]LEPJXLIPMWXMWTSTYPEXIHF]XLI GSYRXVMIWSJ)YVSTI´WTIVMTLIV] ³TIVMTLIVEPWXEXIW´½KYVIW are shown in bold).

The top 20 nationalities illegally resident in Europe 2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Total

Total

















Albania

72,660

68,975

52,370

17,225

18,610

27,035

31,620

288,495

Afghan.

















Morocco

39,775

32,555

29,675

28,845

27,880

26,780

31,735

217,245

Syria

4,545

4,650

4,095

5,380

17,050

32,025

111,290

179,035

Pakistan

















India

20,280







16,100







Algeria

15,775

15,920

19,230

17,955

17,290

14,225

15,255

115,650

Iraq







12,100









Eritrea

21,060







6,020

10,080





Tunisia

14,065

13,880

10,765

24,125

17,525

12,550

16,035

108,945

Nigeria

















Brazil

















Ukraine

14,000

11,220

10,875

11,880

12,555

12,060

16,460

89,050

China*









10,020







Somalia



16,610



8,820









Serbia

13,325

8,335

12,045

9,305

10,420

10,495

14,100

78,025

Russia

10,225

10,330

9,020

9,365

10,205

15,030

10,140

74,315

Turkey

13,925

11,760

10,720

10,385

9,290

8,895

8,220

73,195

Bangld.







11,260









Iran





10,110









66,210

MRGPYHMRK,SRK/SRK

Regent’s Report 2015




%WQMKLXFII\TIGXIHXLIVIMWIZMHIRGIXLEXERMRGVIEWI MRZMSPIRGIMRXLMVHGSYRXVMIW XLSWISYXWMHI)YVSTI QE] XVMKKIVMRGVIEWIHQMKVEXMSRXS)YVSTIERHIWXMREXMSRW 8LVSYKL[IPPIWXEFPMWLIHERHMQTSVXERXQMKVEXMSR GSVVMHSVWMR¾S[WXSXLI9/JVSQ4EOMWXERERHXS+IVQER] JVSQ8YVOI]ETTIEVXSQEXGLVMWMRKERHJEPPMRKPIZIPWSJ ZMSPIRGIMRXLIWSYVGIGSYRXVMIWEPFIMXWSQIXMQIW[MXLE XMQIPEK2IMXLIV4EOMWXERRSV8YVOI][EWMRZSPZIHMR[EV [MXLERI\XIVREPIRIQ]MRXLMWXMQITIVMSHFYXXLI]LEH XLIMVS[RMRXIVREPGSR¾MGXWERHXLI][IVIRIMKLFSYVWXS [EVXSVR%JKLERMWXERERH-VEUVIWTIGXMZIP] 8LIWIXVIRHWMPPYWXVEXII\MWXMRKGYPXYVIWSJQMKVEXMSREWFSXL 4EOMWXERERH8YVOI]LEZIWXVSRKHMEWTSVETSTYPEXMSRWXLI JSVQIVMRXLI9/ERHXLIPEXXIVMR+IVQER]8LIMQTPMGEXMSR MWXLEXRS[RSQEXXIV[LEXQE]LETTIRMRXIVQWSJ HMQMRYXMSRSJGSR¾MGXERHXLIVIXYVRSJWSGMEPTIEGIXS XLSWIGSYRXVMIWQMKVEXMSR¾S[WFIX[IIRXLIWIWSYVGIERH destination countries are likely to continue. 7MQMPEVP]EJXIV½ZI]IEVW[MXLQEWWSYX¾S[WJVSQ7]VMEERH Iraq, Turkey and other European recipient countries are PMOIP]XSWIIGSRXMRYMRKMQQMKVEXMSR¾S[WJVSQXLSWIWXEXIW

1EREKMRK1MKVEXMSRMR)YVSTI 39

JSVXLIJSVIWIIEFPIJYXYVI3RGIEGVMXMGEPQEWWSJTISTPI LEWQSZIHERHWIXXPIHIPWI[LIVIXLI]HIZIPSTRIX[SVOW FIX[IIRXLIMVGSYRXV]SJSVMKMRERHXLIMVRI[GSYRXV] SJEFSHI[LMGLJEGMPMXEXIJYVXLIVQMKVEXMSR¯EGPEWWMG MPPYWXVEXMSRSJXLIGYPXYVISJQMKVEXMSR

Fortressing Europe: How Long? %GGSVHMRKXS)YVSWXEX XLIWXEXMWXMGEPSJ½GISJXLI)9 SR .ERYEV]QMPPMSRTISTPIVIWMHIRXMRXLI)9LEH FIIRFSVRSYXWMHISJXLIQIQFIVWXEXIW%JYVXLIV QMPPMSRVIWMHIRXW[IVIFSVRMREHMJJIVIRX)9QIQFIV WXEXIJVSQXLISRI[LIVIXLI][IVIVIWMHIRX8LIWI½KYVIW VI¾IGXGSRWMHIVEFPIMRXIVREPQMKVEXMSR[MXLMR)YVSTIEW [IPPEWGSRWMHIVEFPIMQQMKVEXMSRMRXS)YVSTIJVSQSYXWMHI 1IEWYVIHEKEMRWXXSXEPTSTYPEXMSR½KYVIWXLIXEFPIFIPS[ WLS[WREXYVEPMRGVIEWI½KYVIWEPSRKWMHIRIXQMKVEXMSR ½KYVIWGPIEVP]YRHIVPMRMRKXLIVSPISJQMKVEXMSRMRXLIXSXEP TSTYPEXMSRSJXLI)98LIMRGVIEWISJETTVS\MQEXIP] QMPPMSRMR[EWQEHIYTSJRIEVP] REXYVEPMRGVIEWI ERHSZIV QMKVEXMSR-RXLIWQEPPIVMRGVIEWI SZIVEPP[EWQEHIYTTVSTSVXMSREPP]JI[IVFMVXLW SZIV HIEXLW ERHTVSTSVXMSREPP]QSVIRIXQMKVEXMSR

EU Births, Deaths, Migration (in thousands) Year

Population Live births

%

Deaths

%

Natural change

%

Net migration

Total change

2012















882,200









10.0







0.1





8LI)YVSTIER9RMSRSZIVEPPERHIEGL)9QIQFIVWXEXI EVIEXXLIWEQIXMQIWSYVGIERHHIWXMREXMSRGSYRXVMIW XLSYKLYWYEPP][MXLGSRWMHIVEFP]QSVIQMKVERXWQSZMRKMR SRIHMVIGXMSRXLERXLISXLIV8LIXSXEPRYQFIVSJTISTPI [LSPIJXER)9GSYRXV]MRXLIPEWXHIGEHISVWSMWEFSYX QMPPMSREGGSVHMRKXS)YVSWXEX8LIFEPERGISJMQQMKVEXMSR ERHIQMKVEXMSRMRMRHMZMHYEPQIQFIVWXEXIWQE]WSQIXMQIW WIIQI\XVIQIFYXSZIVEPPJSVXLI)9XLI½KYVIWWYKKIWX PMXXPIQSVIXLERERMQFEPERGISJQMPPMSRSZIV]IEVW E½KYVIWQEPPIVXLERQER]SFWIVZIVW[SYPHI\TIGXJSVE XSXEPVIWMHIRXTSTYPEXMSRSJSZIVQMPPMSR 2IZIVXLIPIWWGSRGIVREFSYXMQQMKVEXMSRMWWIPHSQ MRVIPEXMSRXSXLIVIEPWM^ISJXLIMWWYI4STYPEVYRIEWI VIWSREXIWEQSRKTSPMG]QEOIVWERHXLIKIRIVEPTYFPMG

IZIRXSXLITSMRXSJL]WXIVMEHITIRHMRKSRTIVGITXMSRW XLEXQE]SVQE]RSXGSMRGMHI[MXLVIEPMX]%WEVIWYPXSJXLMW perceived concern, European countries individually, and the )9NSMRXP]LEZIMRZIWXIHQYGLSZIVXLIPEWXX[SHIGEHIW MRWIGYVMRK)YVSTI´WI\XIVREPFSVHIVWF]ZEVMSYWTL]WMGEP QIERWWYGLEWWIXXMRKYTFSVHIVTEXVSPWERHI\XIVREP GLIGOTSMRXWEW[IPPEWMRGVIEWMRKHMTPSQEXMGTVIWWYVISR RIMKLFSYVMRKGSYRXVMIWXSGSRXVSPIQMKVEXMSR 8LI)YVSTIER'SQQMWWMSRERHXLIQIQFIVWXEXIW LEZIWTIRXQYGLSJXLIMVQMKVEXMSRVIPEXIHFYHKIXWSR JSVXVIWWMRKFSVHIVW8LIVIMWWSYRHIZMHIRGIJVSQXLI 9RMXIH7XEXIW1I\MGERFSVHIVXLEXWYGLIJJSVXWEVIRSX WYGGIWWJYP8LIRYQFIVSJMVVIKYPEVQMKVERXWMRXLI97VSWI WLEVTP]EXXLIWEQIXMQIEWWTIRHMRKSRXLIWSYXLIVR

Regent’s Report 2015


40

)YVSTI´W2IMKLFSYVW*VSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[

border increased over the last two decades. There is RSGSQTIPPMRKVIEWSRXSFIPMIZIXLEXWMQMPEVTSPMGMIW[MPP WYGGIIHMR)YVSTI-RHIIHXLIWIMRXIRWM½IHWIGYVMX] QIEWYVIWGSMRGMHIH[MXLMRGVIEWIHMRWIGYVMX]MRXLI MQQIHMEXIRIMKLFSYVLSSHRSXEFP]XLI%VEF7TVMRKERH XLI7]VMERGVMWMW8LIVIWYPXMRKGPEWLYRJSVXYREXIP]GERLEZI XVEKMGGSRWIUYIRGIWEW[MXRIWWXLIGPSWIXSQMKVERX PMZIWPSWXMRXVERWMXEXXIQTXMRKXSVIEGLXLIFSVHIVWSJXLI )9WMRGIEWVITSVXIHF]%QRIWX]-RXIVREXMSREP %QSVIVIEPMWXMGTVSWTIGXMWXLEXQSVITISTPI[MPPXV] to reach Europe as desperation grows in bordering VIKMSRW%PVIEH]SREZIVEKISZIVLEPJEQMPPMSRQMKVERXW EVIETTVILIRHIHEW³MPPIKEPW´EGVSWWXLI)9QIQFIV states every year, because they have not been registered EWEW]PYQWIIOIVWSVVIJYKIIW2YQFIVWSJVIKMWXIVIH VIJYKIIWMRXLI)9LEZIMRI\SVEFP]VMWIRJVSQXIRWSJ XLSYWERHWERRYEPP]XSLYRHVIHWSJXLSYWERHWERHRS[XS QMPPMSRWIZIV]]IEV 8LI³RIMKLFSYVLSSH´MWWXMPPWIIXLMRK[MXLJVIWLGSR¾MGXW EVSYRH)YVSTI´WFSVHIVWPIEHMRKXSMRGVIEWMRKQMKVEXMSR TVIWWYVIW8YVOI]MWWXVYKKPMRK[MXLSZIVQMPPMSRVIJYKIIW [LSLEZI¾IHJVSQ7]VMEERH-VEU.SVHERLSYWIWQSVI XLERLEPJEQMPPMSRQSVIERHEXPIEWXEWQER]EVIRS[MR 0IFERSR0MF]EMWMRGLESWSJJIVMRKERYRVIKYPEXIHTSMRX SJI\MXJSVXLSWI[LSHEVIXSXEOIXLIPSRKIVWIEVSYXI XS)YVSTI1SVSGGSMWYREFPIXSEGGSQQSHEXIXLIQER] QMKVERXWQSZMRKMRXLVSYKLMXWWSYXLIVRFSVHIVW8LIXLVII QEMRGSVVMHSVWMRXSXLI)9¯F]PERHXLVSYKL8YVOI]XS &YPKEVMESV+VIIGI XLIIEWXIVR1IHMXIVVERIERVSYXI  EGVSWWXLIWIEJVSQ0MF]EXS0EQTIHYWE1EPXESV7MGMP]

XLIGIRXVEP1IHMXIVVERIERVSYXI SVEGVSWWXLIWIEJVSQ 1SVSGGSXS7SYXLIVR7TEMR XLI[IWXIVR1IHMXIVVERIER VSYXI ¯LEZIEPPFIIRW[EQTIH[MXLQMKVERXWSZIVVIGIRX QSRXLWQEOMRKLIEHPMRIRI[WMRQIHMEEGVSWWXLI)9

Dispersal, Integration, Assimilation? +MZIRXLIIWXEFPMWLIHHMEWTSVEGSQQYRMXMIWERHTEWX QMKVEXMSRI\TIVMIRGIMR)YVSTIMXMWPMOIP]XLEXXLIGYVVIRX GSYRXVMIWSJSVMKMR[MPPGSRXMRYIXSHSQMREXIXLI¾S[SJ QMKVERXWIRXIVMRKXLI)9JSVEGSRWMHIVEFPI[LMPI]IX2I[ GSR¾MGXWLS[IZIV[MPPKIRIVEXIRI[QMKVERXWERHIZIV] EHHMXMSR[MPPMRIZMXEFP]GSQTPMGEXIXLIHIFEXIVIKEVHMRK MRXIKVEXMSRMRXLITEVXMGYPEVQIQFIVWXEXIEW[IPPEWMR Europe as a whole. Already there are tensions between GSYRXVMIW[LIVIQMKVERXW½VWXEVVMZIXVERWMXGSYRXVMIW ERHGSYRXVMIWSJ½REPHIWXMREXMSR[MXLMR)YVSTI&YVHIR WLEVMRKEWEGSRGITXWXMPPLEWEPSRK[E]XSKSFIJSVI being established in this European debate. Who should be

Regent’s Report 2015

½RERGMEPP]VIWTSRWMFPIJSVMQQMKVEXMSRGSYRXV]F]GSYRXV] ERHFIEVXLIWSGMEPGSWXWJSV8YVOWMR+IVQER]JSVMRWXERGI SVJSV%PKIVMERWMR*VERGISVWSYXL%WMERWMRXLI9/# 8LIWIKVSYTWLETTIRXSWLEVIXLIWEQI1YWPMQJEMXL ERHMRXSXEPWSQI SJXLI)9TSTYPEXMSR¯VSYKLP] QMPPMSRTISTPI¯HIGPEVIXLIQWIPZIWXSFI1YWPMQ8LI] JEGIGSRWMHIVEFPIHMWGVMQMREXMSRERHRS[MRGVIEWMRKP] MHIRXMJ]XLIQWIPZIWEWEGSQQYRMX]EGVSWWREXMSREPFSVHIVW [MXLMR)YVSTI8LIMVRYQFIVWLEZIFIIRMRGVIEWMRKJSVXLI reasons considered above – in particular growing tensions ERHGSR¾MGXWMR1YWPMQVIKMSRWEW[IPPEWXLIIWXEFPMWLIH TEXXIVRWSJTVIZMSYWQMKVEXMSR They are strikingly disadvantaged in European labour QEVOIXWERHXLIVIEVILMKLPIZIPWSJSZIVUYEPM½GEXMSR EQSRKXLIQ7SPZMRKXLMWTVSFPIQSJSZIVUYEPM½GEXMSR E TVSFPIQEPWSWLEVIH[MXLQER]IEWX)YVSTIERQMKVERXW in west European countries) would help boost European IGSRSQMGVIGSZIV]EWXLIVIMWEKVIEXHIEPSJYRXETTIH WOMPPERHXEPIRXEQSRK)YVSTI´WMQQMKVERXQMRSVMXMIW-RXLI RIEVJYXYVIXLIVI[MPPFIQSVIEHHMXMSRWXSXLEXTSSPERH MXMWYTXS)YVSTIXSHIGMHI[LIXLIVXSFIRI½XJVSQMXSV to waste it.

The Language of Debate -RHMWGYWWMRKQMKVEXMSRMWWYIWMXMWMQTSVXERXXSYWI[SVHW GEVIJYPP]EWMREGGYVEXISVHS[RVMKLXFMEWIHVITSVXMRK GERI\EGIVFEXIERI\XVIQIP]WIRWMXMZIWMXYEXMSRMRLSWX GSYRXVMIW8LIGYVVIRXERXMMQQMKVEXMSRHMWGSYVWISJXIR YWIWWMQTPMWXMGIGSRSQMGQSHIPW¯WYGLEWTYWLTYPP¯ [LMGLTIVLETWSZIVIQTLEWMWIXLIFIRI½XWJSVQMKVERXWSJ EVVMZMRKMR)YVSTISV2SVXL%QIVMGE8LMWPMRISJXLMROMRK EWWYQIWEVEXMSREPGLSMGIF]MRHMZMHYEPW[LS³REXYVEPP]´ WIIOKVIIRIVTEWXYVIWSVIZIR³[IPJEVIFIRI½XW´0SEHIH ZSGEFYPEV]WYGLEW³FIRI½XXSYVMWQ´ERH³FSKYWEW]PYQ´ IEWMP]JYIPWEHMWGSYVWISJLEXVIHERH\IRSTLSFME8LIJEGX VIQEMRWXLEXQSWXTISTPIQSZIEWWXEXIHEXXLISYXWIX FIGEYWISJYRFIEVEFPIGSR¾MGXWEXLSQIRSXFIGEYWIXLI] I\TIGXXS½RHEHIPIGXEFPI7[MWWGLEPIXPMZISJJIKKWERH GVIEQSVPMWXIRHEMP]XSXLI&IEXPIW 8LIFEXXPIWLSYPHFIXSHIJIEXXLIXVERWREXMSREPIZMPWSJ inequality, intolerance, and war at their origin. This is not a FEXXPIXSFIJSYKLXSRXLIWXVIIXWSJ0SRHSRSVIZIRSR XLIWLSVIWSJXLI1IHMXIVVERIER1EREKMRKQMKVEXMSRMW RSXEQEXXIVSJMRXIVREXMSREPFSVHIVWFYXSJXVERWREXMSREP TIEGI)WXEFPMWLMRKTIEGIERHQEMRXEMRMRKMXMRYRWXEFPI areas around its periphery is the issue that Europe and MXWQIQFIVWXEXIWJEGIXSHE]*VSQPIJXERHVMKLXXLIVI




EVIGEPPWJSVQSVILYQERIETTVSEGLIWERHIQTEXL]JSV XLSWIQMKVERXWVMWOMRKXLIMVPMZIWXSKIXXS)YVSTIMRXLI 1IHMXIVVERIER8LEXMWVMKLXERHTVSTIV&YXXLIVIMWEGPIEV RIIHXSKSJEVFI]SRHWYGLLYQERMXEVMERIQTEXL]ERH the gesture politics associated with it, in order to treat the TVSFPIQWSJLYQERMRWIGYVMX]EXXLIMVVSSXW 8LI)9´WGSRGIVR[MXLQMKVEXMSRPMOIEQIHMGEPGSRHMXMSR can be diagnosed into chronic or continuing aspects on the one hand, and acute or pressing issues on the other. The JSVQIVEVI[IPPORS[RERH[IPPVILIEVWIHMREVKYQIRX FIGEYWIXLIMQQMKVERXGSQQYRMXMIWEVI[IPPIWXEFPMWLIH 8LIPEXXIVEVIQSVIYVKIRXERHWYVTVMWMRKWYGLEWXLI VIGIRXYRI\TIGXIHMRGVIEWIMRRYQFIVWMRTEVXMGYPEVJVSQ 7]VME[MXLHVEQEXMGWGIRIWSR+VIIOMWPERHWEX&YHETIWX VEMP[E]WXEXMSRERHEXXLILEWXMP]IVIGXIH[MVIJIRGIWEXXLI ,YRKEVMER'VSEXMERERH7PSZIRMERFSVHIVW ;LMPIXLIPSRKIVXIVQGSRGIVRWEVIIWWIRXMEPP]WSGMEP¯ HIKVIIWSJMRXIKVEXMSRMWWYIWSJMHIRXMX]VIWMPMIRGISJWSGMEP MRJVEWXVYGXYVIMRIHYGEXMSRERHLIEPXLJSVMRWXERGI¯XLI MQQIHMEXIMWWYIWEVIIWWIRXMEPP]LYQERMXEVMER¯VIGITXMSR JEGMPMXMIWXIQTSVEV]PSHKMRKMHIRXM½GEXMSRERHVIKMWXVEXMSR &SXLEWTIGXWEVITSPMXMGEPFYXXLIPEXXIVLEZIXLITS[IV XSJSVGITSPMXMGMERWMRXSMQQIHMEXIEGXMSR¯JSVI\EQTPI %RKIPE1IVOIP´WSJJXLIGYJJWXEXIQIRXXLEXEPMQMXPIWW RYQFIVSJVIJYKIIW[IVI[IPGSQIMR+IVQER]¯[LMPI XLIJSVQIVEVIWIIRQYGLQSVIMREHQMRMWXVEXMZIXIVQW FYHKIXMRKMRZSPZIQIRXSJPSGEPERHVIKMSREPEYXLSVMXMIWERH WSJSVXL

1EREKMRK1MKVEXMSRMR)YVSTI 41

³(IQERHERHWYTTP]SJWOMPPIHPEFSYVERHSZIVIHYGEXMSR MR)YVSTIEGSYRXV]PIZIPEREP]WMW´F]+MYWITTI'VSGIERH )QERYIPE+LMKRSRMComparative Economic Studies  TT ¯ World Handbook of Political Indicators IV DataF].'.IROMRW '08E]PSVERH1%FFSXXLXXTWSGMSPSK]SWYIHY worldhandbook, ³)QMKVEXMSRJVSQXLI9/´F]61YVVE]IXEP,SQI3J½GI [[[KSZYOKSZIVRQIRXYTPSEHWW]WXIQYTPSEHW EXXEGLQIRXCHEXE½PILSVVVITSVXTHJ ³;EVMR-VEU)RZMVSRQIRXSJMRWIGYVMX]ERHMRXIVREXMSREP QMKVEXMSR´F]-FVELMQ7MVOIGMInternational Migration   TT¯ ³8VERWREXMSREPQSFMPMX]ERHGSR¾MGX´F]-FVELMQ7MVOIGM Migration Letters  TT¯;SVPH&ERO

)YVSTI´WPIEHIVWEVIWPS[P]KIXXMRKXLIMVEGXXSKIXLIV XSXEGOPIWSQISJXLIPSRKIVXIVQMWWYIW¯[MXRIWWXLI VIGIRXWYQQMXQIIXMRKMR1EPXE[LMGLTPIHKIHGPSWIXS ºFMPPMSRJSVEXVYWXJYRHJSV%JVMGEEWEquid pro quoJSV %JVMGERWXEXIWXEOMRKQIEWYVIWXSTVIZIRXQMKVEXMSREX WSYVGI&YXJSPPS[MRKXLIVIZIPEXMSRXLEXSRISVQSVISJ XLIJYRHEQIRXEPMWXTIVTIXVEXSVWSJXLIVIGIRXXIVVSVMWX SYXVEKIWMR4EVMWQE]LEZIFIIREVIGIRXMQQMKVERX WITEVEXMRKXLITSPMXMGEPP]GLEVKIHHIFEXISRQEWWQMKVEXMSR JVSQXLIHIWXVYGXMZIMQTEGXSJJYRHEQIRXEPMWXXIVVSVMWQMW XLIKVIEXIWXGLEPPIRKIRS[JEGMRK)YVSTIERPIEHIVW

Further Reading The Human Cost of Fortress Europe%QRIWX]-RXIVREXMSREP [[[EQRIWX]IYGSRXIRXEWWIXW6ITSVXW)96CCC *SVXVIWWC)YVSTICGSQTPIXIC[IFC)2THJ Cultures of MigrationF].IJJVI]'SLIRERH-FVELMQ7MVOIGM 9RMZIVWMX]SJ8I\EW4VIWW

Regent’s Report 2015


Europe and the Need for Democratic Security Thorbjørn Jagland Secretary General, Council of Europe, Strasbourg

“The test for our leaders is to recognise fully the intertwined nature of civic empowerment, the rule of law, human rights and stability” Thorbjørn Jagland




MGXSV,YKSSRGIVIQEVOIHXLEX]SYGERVIWMWXER MRZEHMRKEVQ]FYX]SYGERRSXVIWMWXERMHIE[LSWI XMQILEWGSQI³(IQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]´MWSRIWYGLRSXMSR -RHIIHMXMWLS[[IOIITMRZEHMRKEVQMIWEXFE]

V

)YVSTIERHXLI2IIHJSV(IQSGVEXMG7IGYVMX] 43

ˆ8LIJYRGXMSRMRKSJHIQSGVEXMGMRWXMXYXMSRW ˆ8LIMRGPYWMZIREXYVISJWSGMIXMIWERHE[MHIP]WLEVIH WIRWISJHIQSGVEXMGGMXM^IRWLMT

Democratic Security in Practice What is Democratic Security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½GMIRXMRXLI TYVWYMXSJPEWXMRKWXEFMPMX] 8LIGSRGITXMXWIPJMWRSXRI[1ER]EXXVMFYXIMXWSVMKMRW XSXLI+IVQERTLMPSWSTLIV-QQERYIP/ERX[LSEVKYIH in his Essay on Perpetual PeaceTYFPMWLIHMRXLEX EVQIHGSR¾MGX[SYPHFIGSQIMRGVIEWMRKP]VEVI[LIVIZIV MXVIUYMVIHGMXM^IRW´GSRWIRX3ZIV]IEVWPEXIV JSPPS[MRKXLI7IGSRH;SVPH;EVXLIMHIE[EWIRWLVMRIH MRXLI)YVSTIER'SRZIRXMSRSR,YQER6MKLXW¯E KVSYRHFVIEOMRKXVIEX]XLEXKEZIPIKEPTVSXIGXMSRXSXLI JYRHEQIRXEPVMKLXWERHJVIIHSQWSJEPPTISTPIMRSVHIV XSLIPTTVIZIRXXLIVIXYVRSJJEWGMWQ7MRGIXLIRXLI 'SRZIRXMSRLEWFIIRMRXIKVEPXSERYQFIVSJMRXIVREXMSREP TIEGIEKVIIQIRXWMRGPYHMRKXLI(E]XSR4IEGI %GGSVHXLI+SSH*VMHE]%KVIIQIRXERHXLI %LXMWEEVM4PERJSV/SWSZSVIGSKRMWMRKXLIVSPISJYRMZIVWEP LYQERVMKLXWTVSXIGXMSRWMROIITMRKXLITIEGI

=IX[LMPIQER]SJ)YVSTI´WTSPMG]QEOIVWWYTTSVXXLIWI EMQWXLIMVMQTSVXERGI[MXLMRWIGYVMX]TSPMG]MWJVIUYIRXP] YRHIVTPE]IH8LMWMWHIWTMXIXLIJEGXXLEXXLIYQFMPMGEP PMROFIX[IIRHIQSGVEG]ERHWXEFMPMX]MWFIMRKYRHIVPMRIH F]WSQISJXLIFMKKIWXWIGYVMX]GLEPPIRKIW)YVSTIERW TVIWIRXP]JEGI 8LIWYVKIMRI\XVIQMWQXLEXLEWW[ITXEGVSWW)YVSTIMR VIGIRX]IEVWLEWFIIREGEWIMRTSMRX-XWQSWXWLSGOMRK QERMJIWXEXMSRWLEZIGSQIMRXLIJSVQSJZMSPIRXXIVVSVMWX EXXEGOW8LMWMRGPYHIWXLIQYVHIVSJWGSVIWSJXIIREKIVWSR 2SV[E]´W9X ]E-WPERHMRXLIWLSSXMRKWMR4EVMW ERH'STIRLEKIR[LMGLXEVKIXIHGEVXSSRMWXWERHQIQFIVW SJXLI.I[MWLJEMXLERHXLIQSWXVIGIRXXIVVSVMWXEXVSGMXMIW MR4EVMW8LIWIIZIRXWLEZIXEOIRTPEGIEKEMRWXEKVS[MRK EXQSWTLIVISJLEXIERHMRXSPIVERGIMRQER])YVSTIER GSYRXVMIW-RMXWQSWXVIGIRXWXYH]XLI'SYRGMPSJ)YVSTI´W )YVSTIER'SQQMWWMSREKEMRWX6EGMWQERH-RXSPIVERGI

)'6- JSYRHEHVEQEXMGMRGVIEWIMRERXM7IQMXMWQ -WPEQSTLSFMEERHSRPMRILEXIWTIIGLEGVSWWXLIGSRXMRIRX -RQER]TPEGIW[ILEZIWIIRTSTYPMWXWKEMRMRKKVSYRH8LI TIXX]REXMSREPMWQERHVLIXSVMGEPGLEYZMRMWQXLEXNYWX½ZI ]IEVWEKS[SYPHLEZINEVVIHMJHIPMZIVIHF]QEMRWXVIEQ TSPMXMGMERWRS[JIIPGLMPPMRKP]GSQQSRTPEGI

-REGEHIQMGGMVGPIWHIQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]IRNS]WEVEVI GSRWIRWYWMXMWSRISJXLIJI[RSXMSRWSR[LMGLQSWX TSPMXMGEPWGMIRXMWXWGEREKVII;LMPIHMJJIVIRGIWSJSTMRMSR I\MWXSRXLIFIWX[E]MR[LMGLXSHIPMZIVMXMXMWJEMVXSWE] XLEXER]WXEXIXLEXGERGPEMQXSFIHIQSGVEXMGEPP]WIGYVI [MPPWGSVILMKLP]SR½ZIJVSRXW

8LII\TPEREXMSRMWGSQTPI\*VEKQIRXEXMSR[MXLMR SYVWSGMIXMIWQYWXFIYRHIVWXSSHMRXLIGSRXI\XSJ KPSFEPMWEXMSR-RQER]GSQQYRMXMIWXLIXVEHMXMSREP[E]SJ PMJIMWGLERKMRK[MXLHM^^]MRKWTIIHTVSZSOMRKJIEVERH YRGIVXEMRX]4VSPSRKIHEYWXIVMX]ERH[MHIRMRKMRIUYEPMX] have also taken their toll on social cohesion. Whatever the VIEWSRLS[IZIVSRIXLMRKMWGPIEVHMZMWMSR¾SYVMWLIWQSWX [LIVIHIQSGVEXMGPMJIMW[IEO-XVIPMIWSRXLIEPMIREXMSR ERHQMWXVYWXXLEXEVISRP]TSWWMFPI[LIRGSQQYRMXMIWHS RSXWYGGIWWJYPP]MRXIKVEXIERH[LIVIQMWYRHIVWXERHMRKW EFSYRH3YVFIWXERXMHSXIF]GSRXVEWXMWXLIHIQSGVEXMG IRKEKIQIRXXLEXEPPS[WTISTPIXSHIZIPSTQYXYEP YRHIVWXERHMRKSJSRIERSXLIVEW[IPPEWEWLEVIHWIXSJ GMZMGZEPYIWXLEXGERI\MWXEPSRKWMHIXLIMVHMJJIVIRXFIPMIJW

ˆ8LII\MWXIRGISJIJ½GMIRXERHMRHITIRHIRX judiciaries ˆ+IRYMRIJVIIHSQSJI\TVIWWMSR ˆ8LIVMKLXXSJVIIHSQSJEWWIQFP]ERHJVIIHSQSJ association

8LIPMROFIX[IIRHIQSGVEG]ERHWIGYVMX]LEWEPWSFIIR underscored by events in Ukraine. It is beyond question XLEX6YWWME´WMPPIKEPERRI\EXMSRSJ'VMQIE[EWHIITP] HIWXEFMPMWMRK,S[IZIV[IQYWXRSXJSVKIXXLEX9OVEMRI´W XVSYFPIWFIKER[MXL[MHIWTVIEHTYFPMGHMWMPPYWMSRQIRX[MXL

Regent’s Report 2015


44

)YVSTI´W2IMKLFSYVW*VSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[

MXWMRWXMXYXMSRW-RXLIJYXYVIPEWXMRKWXEFMPMX][MPPSRP]FI TSWWMFPIMJ/]MZGERHIPMZIVEVIRI[IHTSPMXMGEPWIXXPIQIRX FEWIHSRERMRGPYWMZIGSRWXMXYXMSRWXVSRKIVLYQERVMKLXW TVSXIGXMSRWERHXLIHIGIRXVEPMWEXMSRSJTS[IV -R1SPHSZEXSS[ILEZIWIIRKVS[MRKTYFPMGYRVIWXEW EVIWYPXSJXLIGSYRXV]´WHIQSGVEXMGWLSVXGSQMRKW%X XLIXMQISJ[VMXMRKXLSYWERHWSJTVSXIWXIVWLEZIFIIR HIQSRWXVEXMRKSRXLIWXVIIXWSJXLIGETMXEP'LMWMREYMR WGIRIWVIQMRMWGIRXSJXLI1EMHERVIZSPYXMSR8LI]EVI VIXEPMEXMRKEKEMRWXXLI³FMPPMSRHSPPEVFEROJVEYH´MR[LMGL ZIV]PEVKIWYQWSJQSRI]Q]WXIVMSYWP]HMWETTIEVIHJVSQ XLVIISJXLIGSYRXV]´WFEROWTPYRKMRKXLIGSYRXV]MRXS ½RERGMEPGVMWMW*SVQER]XLMWWGERHEPLEWITMXSQMWIHXLI W]WXIQMGGSVVYTXMSRXLEXLEWOITX1SPHSZE[IEOERHMXW TISTPITSSV;MXLSYXJEVVIEGLMRKVIJSVQXSVIQSZITS[IV JVSQXLILERHWSJSPMKEVGLWERHVMHXLIGSYVXWSJTSPMXMGEP MRXIVJIVIRGIYTLIEZEP[MPPFII\XVIQIP]HMJ½GYPXXSEZSMH (IQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]¯SVEPEGOSJMX¯LEWEPWSTPE]IH EVSPIMR)YVSTI´WVIGIRXQMKVERXERHVIJYKIIGVMWMW-XMW XVYIXLEXVIJYKIIWIWGETMRKXLI7]VMERGMZMP[EVEVI¾IIMRK EREFWIRGISJWIGYVMX]JYPPWXST&YXMXMWEPWSXVYIXLEX MXMWXLIFVIEOHS[RSJPE[ERHSVHIVMR0MF]EXLEXLEW EPPS[IHWSQER]XSEXXIQTXXLITIVMPSYWNSYVRI]EGVSWW XLI1IHMXIVVERIER-RXLIGEWISJXLIQMKVERXWLIEHMRKXS +IVQER]ERHSXLIV[IWXIVR)YVSTIERWXEXIWJVSQXLI [IWXIVR&EPOERWXLITYWLJEGXSVMWRSXSRP]IGSRSQMG LEVHWLMTFYXEPWSHIITJVYWXVEXMSR[MXL[MHIWTVIEH corruption and injustice. As we look across Europe today the link between HIQSGVEG]ERHWXEFMPMX]WLSYPHFIGPIEV;LIR[INSMRXLI HSXWXLIPIWWSRMWXLEXSYVWIGYVMX]QYWXFIKVSYRHIHMR liberty and law.

The European Picture: What are the Trends? *SVXLMWVIEWSR-LEZIVIEWWIVXIHHIQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]EWXLI SZIVVMHMRKSFNIGXMZISJXLI'SYRGMPSJ)YVSTI&YMPXSYXSJ XLIVYFFPISJXLI7IGSRH;SVPH;EV[IEVIXLIKYEVHMER SJXLI)YVSTIER'SRZIRXMSRSJ,YQER6MKLXWLSQIXS 7XVEWFSYVK´W)YVSTIER'SYVXSJ,YQER6MKLXWERHXLI SRP]MRXIVKSZIVRQIRXEPSVKERMWEXMSRXSW[IITXLIPIRKXLSJ XLI)YVSTIERGSRXMRIRXIRGSQTEWWMRK)YVSTIERWXEXIW ;I[SVO[MXLIEGLSJSYVQIQFIVWSRXLI½ZIJVSRXW QIRXMSRIHEFSZINYHMGMEVMIWJVIIHSQSJI\TVIWWMSR JVIIHSQSJEWWIQFP]ERHEWWSGMEXMSRJYRGXMSRMRK institutions and inclusive societies, tailoring our support XSWYMXXLIMVHMJJIVMRKRIIHW-RXLIWEQIZIMR[IVYR

Regent’s Report 2015

cooperation projects with our neighbours, notably Jordan, 1SVSGGSERH8YRMWME%RHMREHHMXMSRXSXLMWWXEXIF]WXEXI ETTVSEGLMXMWMQTSVXERXXSYRHIVWXERHXLEXXLIVIMWE GVSWWGSRXMRIRXEPTMGXYVIXSSGSRXVEV]XS[LEXQER][SYPH EWWYQIMRE)YVSTIERJEQMP]XLEXMWWSPEVKIERHHMZIVWI -XSSOXLISTTSVXYRMX]SJQ]QSWXVIGIRXERRYEPVITSVXXS assess the degree to which European states are delivering HIQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]%OI]EMQ[EWXSMHIRXMJ]XVIRHWXLI VIGYVVMRKMWWYIWXLEXEVIRSXGSR½RIHXSEWQEPPQMRSVMX]SJ GSYRXVMIWFYX[LMGLETTIEVMRHIQSGVEGMIWSPHERH]SYRK ERHEVIXLIVIJSVITVIWWMRKTVSFPIQWVIUYMVMRKEGSPPIGXMZI response. 3YVEREP]WMWJSYRHX[SWYGLXVIRHW8LI½VWXMW[MHIWTVIEH [IEORIWWIWMR)YVSTI´WNYHMGMEVMIW'PIEVP][MXLMR)YVSTI XLIVIEVIWXEXIWXLEXFSEWX[IPPIWXEFPMWLIHGSYVXW]WXIQW [LMGLQIIXMRXIVREXMSREPWXERHEVHWERHEVIMRHIIHYWIH EWEXIQTPEXIJSVWMQMPEVMRWXMXYXMSRWEVSYRHXLI[SVPH ,S[IZIVWIVMSYWWLSVXGSQMRKWGEREPWSFIHIXIGXIHMR SZIVEXLMVHSJXLI'SYRGMPSJ)YVSTI´WS[RQIQFIVWXEXIW -RQER]GEWIWSRP]TSSVWEJIKYEVHWI\MWXEKEMRWXGSVVYTXMSR ERHTYFPMGXVYWXMRXLIW]WXIQMWPS[7SQIKSZIVRQIRXW EVIQEOMRKMQTSVXERXMQTVSZIQIRXWJSVI\EQTPIMRXLI way judges are appointed, in providing greater transparency, ERHMRMQTVSZMRKNYHMGMEPTVSJIWWMSREPMWQ=IXIPWI[LIVI XLIWMXYEXMSRMWHIXIVMSVEXMRK[MXLXLINYHMGMEPW]WXIQFIMRK QERMTYPEXIHJSVTSPMXMGEPIRHW 7YGLHIZIPSTQIRXWWLSYPHRSXFIHS[RTPE]IH,SRIWXERH HIGIRXGSYVXWEVIXLIGSVRIVWXSRISJEVSFYWXW]WXIQSJ GLIGOWERHFEPERGIW;MXLSYXXLIQI\IGYXMZIWGERRSXFI VIWXVEMRIHJEMXLMREYXLSVMXMIWTPYQQIXWERHXVSYFPISJXIR ensues. 8LIWIGSRHTER)YVSTIERXVIRHMW[SVWIRMRKGSRHMXMSRW JSVJVIIQIHME3YV½RHMRKWWLS[XLEXXLITVSFPIQMW bigger, deeper and geographically wider than was previously YRHIVWXSSH2IEVP]LEPJSJ)YVSTIERWXEXIWEVIJEMPMRKXS KYEVERXIIXLIWEJIX]SJNSYVREPMWXWSVSXLIVWTIVJSVQMRK ETYFPMG[EXGLHSKJYRGXMSRRSVHSXLI]IRWYVIWYJ½GMIRX EGGIWWXSMRJSVQEXMSRLIPHF]TYFPMGEYXLSVMXMIW)ZIR [LIVIXLISZIVEPPWMXYEXMSR[MXLVIKEVHXSQIHMEJVIIHSQ MWWEXMWJEGXSV]EWMKRM½GERXRYQFIVSJWXEXIWEVIVIKVIWWMRK ERHMRSZIVEXLMVHXLITVSXIGXMSRJSVNSYVREPMWXWJVSQ violence and threats is actively deteriorating. Increasingly we are seeing disproportionate tactics IQTPS]IHXSWYTTVIWWHMWWIRXEW[IPPEWQSVIERHQSVI GEWIWSJKSZIVRQIRXWMRXVSHYGMRKPIKMWPEXMSR[MXLXLI




WXEXIHEMQSJMQTVSZMRKREXMSREPWIGYVMX]FYX[LIVIXLI MQTPMGEXMSRWJSVJVIIHSQSJI\TVIWWMSREVI[SVV]MRK particularly online. In states that are traditionally considered XSLEZIEQSVISTIRERHHMZIVWIQIHMEPERHWGETIXLIVI EVIEPWSWMKRM½GERXTVSFPIQW[MXLXLISZIVGSRGIRXVEXMSR SJS[RIVWLMTERHEVVERKIQIRXWXLEXKMZIMRGYQFIRX TSPMXMGMERWERYRJEMVEHZERXEKI *VSQEHIQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]TIVWTIGXMZIXLIWIEVIWIVMSYW GLMROWMR)YVSTI´WEVQSYV8LI'SYRGMPSJ)YVSTILEW XLIVIJSVIVEQTIHYTMXWEGXMZMX]SRFSXLJVSRXW8LMWMRGPYHIW WXITTMRKYTXLIXVEMRMRKSJNYHKIWERHPIKEPTVSJIWWMSREPWERH helping national authorities ensure ethical conduct. We are I\TIHMXMRKETER)YVSTIER%GXMSR4PER¯SRP]XLIWIGSRH SJMXWOMRH¯XSYRMXISYVQIQFIVWEVSYRHTVSKVEQQIW XSMQTVSZIXLIMRHITIRHIRGISJXLIMVNYHMGMEVMIWEW[IPPEW [SVOMRK[MXLKSZIVRQIRXWXSLIPTXLIQXEOIWXSGOSJXLIMV [IEORIWWIWERHTYVWYIXLIVMKLXVIJSVQW ;IEVIEPWS[SVOMRK[MXLREXMSREPEGXSVWXSMQTVSZI the protections given to journalists, including through SQFYHWQIRTVIWWGSQQMWWMSRIVWERHRSRKSZIVRQIRXEP SVKERMWEXMSRW 2+3W ;ILEZIPEYRGLIHERI[[EVRMRK W]WXIQ¯ERSRPMRI4PEXJSVQJSVXLI4VSXIGXMSRSJ .SYVREPMWXW¯XSWSYRHXLIEPEVQSRXLVIEXWXSNSYVREPMWX WEJIX]ERHSTIRXLI[E]JSVHMEPSKYI[MXLXLIEYXLSVMXMIW where reporters are threatened. We will shortly publish an SZIVZMI[SJREXMSREPTVEGXMGIWXLEXFPSGO½PXIVERHVIQSZI internet content. Where necessary, we are seeking to work [MXLSYVQIQFIVWXEXIWXSMQTVSZIXLIMRHITIRHIRGISJ VIKYPEXSVWERHEHHVIWWMWWYIWSJSZIVGSRGIRXVEXMSRXSS

)YVSTIERHXLI2IIHJSV(IQSGVEXMG7IGYVMX] 45

'SRZIRXMSRSR,YQER6MKLXWERHI\TVIWWIHXLVSYKL XLIHIGMWMSRWSJMXW'SYVX8LI'SRZIRXMSRVIQEMRWXLI SRP])YVSTI[MHIPIKEPMRWXVYQIRXWIXXMRKGSQQSRP] EKVIIHWXERHEVHWERHSJJIVMRKSFNIGXMZINYHMGMEPVIZMI[SJ GSQTPMERGIMREPPSJXLIOI]EVIEWSJHIQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]-X TVSZMHIWKYMHERGIEXREXMSREPPIZIPERHWYFWMHMEV]VIQIHMEP EGXMSREX)YVSTIERPIZIPERHMXSJJIVWKSZIVRQIRXWE JVEQI[SVOJSVHMEPSKYISRHIQSGVEG]LYQERVMKLXWERH JYRHEQIRXEPJVIIHSQW 8LI'SRZIRXMSRMWLS[IZIVSRP]EWWXVSRKEWXLITSPMXMGEP [MPPYRHIVTMRRMRKMX;LIRWXEXIWHIPMFIVEXIP]¾SYXXLIMV SFPMKEXMSRWXLI]YRHIVQMRIEW]WXIQXLEXWYTTSVXW JVIIHSQERHWXEFMPMX]JSVQMPPMSR)YVSTIERW8LIWEQI ETTPMIWXSER]QEMRWXVIEQTSPMXMGEPTEVXMIW[LSTYFPMGP] HIRSYRGIMRXIVREXMSREPLYQERVMKLXWTVSXIGXMSRWJSVXLI WEOISJTEVXMWERKEMRKMZMRKWYGGSYVXSTSTYPMWXW[LS HSXLIWEQI*EVFIXXIVXLEX[IRS[VIGSQQMXXSXLI YRMZIVWEPLYQERVMKLXWERHVYPISJPE[SR[LMGLSYVWLEVIH WXEFMPMX]HITIRHW8LIKIRIVEXMSRSJPIEHIVW[LS½VWXHVI[ YTXLI'SRZIRXMSR[IVIEFPIXSXYVRETEKISR)YVSTI´W HEVOTEWXFIGEYWIXLI]WE[XLIKPEVMRKPIWWSRSJSYVXMQI XLEX[IPMZIMRE[SVPH[LIVIWXEFMPMX]ERHHIQSGVEG]QYWX KSLERHMRLERH;IQYWXWIIMXXSS

Whether we can reverse these trends, however, and [LIXLIV[IGERFYMPHVIEPQSQIRXYQFILMRHXLI HIQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]EKIRHE[MPPRSXFIHIGMHIHMR 7XVEWFSYVKEPSRI-XMWEUYIWXMSRSJTSPMXMGEP[MPPMRIEGL REXMSR8LIXIWXJSVSYVPIEHIVWMWXSVIGSKRMWIJYPP]XLI MRXIVX[MRIHREXYVISJGMZMGIQTS[IVQIRXXLIVYPISJ PE[LYQERVMKLXWERHWXEFMPMX]'VYGMEPP])YVSTIERREXMSRW QYWXYRHIVWXERHXLEXXLMWMWEGSPPIGXMZIIRHIEZSYVKMZIR LS[IEWMP]HIQSGVEXMG[IEORIWWMRSRI)YVSTIERWXEXI GERJYIPMRWIGYVMX]MRSXLIVW-RXLMWWIRWISYVREXMSRWEVI PMOIPMROWMREGLEMRERHHIQSGVEXMGWIGYVMX]MWEGSQQSR goal, best pursued through cooperation and adherence to MRXIVREXMSREPRSVQW8LIXVIRHXS[EVHWREXMSREPMWQERH GLEYZMRMWQXLEXLEWIQIVKIHMRQYGL)YVSTIERTSPMXMGW works against the grain. In one sense Europe is lucky: we already have the laws ERHTVEGXMGIWXSKYMHIYWIQFSHMIHMRXLI)YVSTIER

Regent’s Report 2015


The EU and Morocco: Stability in the Near Abroad? Dr Abdul-Kader Aljandali Senior Lecturer in Quantitative Finance

Amal Laaribi PhD Researcher, ISCAE, Casablanca

“For Morocco the agreement with the EU remains the most important of them all, particularly when the volatile political environment in the Arab region – including the refugee crisis – is taken into account” Dr Abdul-Kader Aljandali and Amal Laaribi




LIVIPEXMSRWLMTFIX[IIR1SVSGGSERHXLI)YVSTIER Union (EU) is rooted in history and has particularly WXVIRKXLIRIHSZIVXLIPEWXJI[]IEVWPIEHMRKXSEGSQQSR ZMWMSRERHETEVXRIVWLMTSJKVIEXMQTSVXERGIMRXLIGSRXI\X SJXLIVEHMGEPGLERKIWEJJIGXMRKXLI[MHIVVIKMSR

T

8LI[EZISJKPSFEPMWEXMSRXLEXLEWW[ITXXLI[SVPHSZIV XLIPEWX]IEVWLEWMQTSWIHERI[TEVEHMKQ[LIVI XIVVMXSVMEPJVSRXMIVWEVIFPYVVIHERHTVMRGMTPIWEKVIIQIRXW EVIVIZMI[IHXSEHETXXSXLIJEWXGLERKMRKRIIHWSJ those involved. Globalisation usually leads to the rapid HIZIPSTQIRXSJRISPMFIVEPGETMXEPMWQWXVSRKP]MR¾YIRGIH F]MRXIVREXMSREPQIHMEERHXIPIGSQQYRMGEXMSRW

The Background to the EU-Morocco Relationship 1SVSGGSSJXIRHIWGVMFIHEW)YVSTI´WKEXI[E]XS%JVMGE LEWLEVHP]FIIRERI\GITXMSRXSXLIKPSFEPTVSGIWW -RHIIHXLVSYKLSYXXLIGSYVWISJLMWXSV]XLIGSYRXV]LEW EP[E]WJSPPS[IHEJSVIMKRTSPMG]SJSTIRRIWWXS[EVHWMXW RIMKLFSYVW0SGEXIHSRP]OMPSQIXVIWJVSQXLI7TERMWL GSEWX[MXLEKVSWWHSQIWXMGTVSHYGX +(4 XSXEPPMRK FMPPMSRERHETSTYPEXMSRSJSZIVQMPPMSRXLIOMRKHSQSJ 1SVSGGSMWERMQTSVXERXWXVEXIKMGTEVXRIVJSVXLI)9ERH MWIUYMTTIH[MXLXLIIGSRSQMGERHGYPXYVEPTVIVIUYMWMXIW XLEXGSYPHTVSQSXIEWYGGIWWJYPMRXIVREXMSREPWSYXLRSVXL relationship – a bridge between the EU and its north and [IWX%JVMGERRIMKLFSYVW 8LIGYVVIRXVIPEXMSRWLMTFIX[IIR1SVSGGSERHXLI)9 VI¾IGXWQYXYEPMRXIVIWX&YXXLIVIPEXMSRWLMTMWRSXIUYEPP] MQTSVXERXFIX[IIR1SVSGGSERHEPP)9QIQFIVGSYRXVMIW *VERGIERH7TEMREVI1SVSGGS´WTEVXRIVWSJGLSMGIERH LEZIFIIRWSJSVEPSRKXMQI8LIGSPSRMEPLMWXSV]SJXLIWI X[S)YVSTIERGSYRXVMIWLEWQEVOIHXLIIZSPYXMSRSJXLI VIPEXMSRWLMTSZIVXMQIERHLEWLEHERMQTEGXSRTSPMXMGEP IGSRSQMGERHWSGMEPEWTIGXWSJXLIGYVVIRXVIPEXMSRWLMT *VIIHJVSQXLIWLEGOPIWSJGSPSRMEPMWQMR1SVSGGS WXEVXIHRIKSXMEXMSRWMR[LMGLPIHXSEXVEHIEKVIIQIRX [MXLXLI)9MR%WIGSRHEKVIIQIRXGEQIMRXS JSVGIMRXSWIXYTFYWMRIWWERH½RERGMEPTVSZMWMSRW JSVIGSRSQMGERHWSGMEPHIZIPSTQIRX*SPPS[MRKXLI &EVGIPSRE'SRJIVIRGIMRXLI1SVSGGS)9%WWSGMEXMSR %KVIIQIRX[EWWMKRIHMRERHGEQIMRXSJSVGIMR 7MRGIXLIRXLITEGISJVETTVSGLIQIRXLEWMRGVIEWIH ERHGLERKIWLEZILETTIRIHQSVIUYMGOP]-RXLI )9PEYRGLIHMXW)YVSTIER2IMKLFSYVLSSH4SPMG] )24  XSJYVXLIVWYTTSVXXLI)YVS1IHMXIVVERIERTEVXRIVWLMT

1SVSGGS 47

-RHIIHXLI)24LEWIZSPZIHXSSJJIVETSPMXMGEPJVEQI[SVO EW[IPPEWJYVXLIVIGSRSQMGMRXIKVEXMSRGVIEXMRKRI[ STTSVXYRMXMIWJSV1SVSGGS The two partners have also negotiated action plans MRGSVTSVEXMRKVIJSVQSFNIGXMZIWJSVEFSYX½ZI]IEVWMREPP EVIEWSJGSSTIVEXMSR8LI½VWX)91SVSGGSEGXMSRTPER [EWEZEPYEFPIXSSPJSVFSXLTEVXMIWERH[EWVIGIRXP] VIZMI[IH-R1SVSGGS[EWKVERXIHXLILMKLP]WSYKLX EJXIV³EHZERGIHWXEXYW´TEVXRIVWLMT[MXLXLI)9[LMGL GSR½VQWMXWTSWMXMSREWERMRGVIEWMRKP]WMKRM½GERXTPE]IV EVIKMSREPEGXSVERHEOI]MRXIVPSGYXSVJSVXLI)9MRXLI %JVMGERGSRXMRIRXEW[IPPEWMRXLI1MHHPI)EWX2SVXL%JVMGE

1)2% VIKMSR8LIEHZERGIHWXEXYWTEVXRIVWLMTLEWXLI SZIVEVGLMRKSFNIGXMZISJTVSQSXMRKTIEGIWXEFMPMX]ERH prosperity in the EU neighbourhood, based on the core ZEPYIW1SVSGGSERHXLI)9WLEVI¯XLEXMWXLIVYPISJPE[ KSSHKSZIVRERGIERHVIWTIGXSJLYQERVMKLXW 8LMWTVMZMPIKIHWXEXYWLEWEPWSIREFPIH1SVSGGSXSVIGIMZI EHHMXMSREP½RERGMEPEMH¯GYVVIRXP]FIX[IIRºQMPPMSR ERHºQMPPMSRJSVXLITIVMSHXS8LMW GSQTEVIW[MXLºQMPPMSRJSVXLI¯TIVMSHERH ºQMPPMSRHYVMRKXLI¯TIVMSH&SXLTEVXMIWEVI GYVVIRXP]GSSTIVEXMRK[MXLEZMI[XSERMRGVIEWIMR½RERGMEP EMHMRXLIRI\XTIVMSHERHEPWSXSMQTPIQIRXMRKXLI(IIT ERH'SQTVILIRWMZI*VII8VEHI%KVIIQIRX ('*8% 8LMW MREHHMXMSRXSVIQSZMRKXEVMJJW[MPPEPWSSTIRYTQEVOIXW JSVWIVZMGIWMRZIWXQIRXERHTYFPMGTVSGYVIQIRXEW[IPPEW ETTVS\MQEXMRKVIKYPEXSV]MWWYIW 8LIQEVGLSJKPSFEPMWEXMSRGSQFMRIH[MXLXLIWTIGM½GW SJMXWEHZERGIHWXEXYWMRVIPEXMSRXSXLI)9LEWQIERX 1SVSGGSLEWLEHPMXXPIGLSMGIFYXXSIRWYVIXLEXXLI VMKLXJSYRHEXMSRWEVIMRTPEGIXSFIRI½XJVSQJYVXLIV MRXIRWM½GEXMSRSJMXWVIPEXMSRWLMT[MXLXLI)98LITMPPEVW SJXLEXVIPEXMSRWLMTMRZSPZI½VWXP]ETSPMXMGEPERHWXVEXIKMG HMEPSKYIPIEHMRKXSWXVIRKXLIRMRKXLIVYPISJPE[ HIQSGVEG]ERHKSSHKSZIVRERGI8LIRMXGSZIVWMWWYIW SJPEFSYVQSFMPMX]QMKVEXMSRERHWIGYVMX]IGSRSQMGERH WSGMEPVIJSVQXVEHIQEVOIXERHVIKYPEXSV]VIJSVQERH EWWMWXERGIJSVMRJVEWXVYGXYVITVSNIGXW[MXLHYIVIWTIGXJSV IRZMVSRQIRXEPGSRGIVRWERHWYWXEMREFPIHIZIPSTQIRX &I]SRHXLIWIIWWIRXMEPP]IGSRSQMGEWTIGXWXLIVIPEXMSRWLMT EPWSIRGSQTEWWIWGSSTIVEXMSRMRIHYGEXMSRLMKLIV education and vocational training as well as research and HIZIPSTQIRXERHMRJSVQEXMSR 1SVSGGS´WEFMPMX]XSQIIXXLIHIQERHWSJEGPSWIV VIPEXMSRWLMT[MXLXLI)9MWGYVVIRXP]FIMRKXIWXIH8LIQEMR

Regent’s Report 2015


48

)YVSTI´W2IMKLFSYVW*VSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[

GLEPPIRKIMWXSJYP½PXLIGVMXIVMEHIQERHIHF]XLI)9ERH EPWSXSKYEVERXIIELEVQSRMWIHERHWQSSXLEHSTXMSRSJ PIKMWPEXMSRMRPMRI[MXLXLI)9´WS[Racquis communautaire ¯ETVSGIWWHIWGVMFIHEW³PIKEPERHIGSRSQMGIRKMRIIVMRK´ RIIHIHXSWYGGIWWJYPP]EGLMIZIXLIRIGIWWEV]GSRZIVKIRGI 8LYW1SVSGGSMHIRXM½IHZEVMSYWTVMSVMX]HIZIPSTQIRX areas which should guarantee a sustainable relationship with the EU and also with other partners. They include: ˆNew global businesses to be established in 1SVSGGSSJJWLSVMRKEYXSQSXMZIEIVSREYXMGW IPIGXVSRMGWXI\XMPIWPIEXLIVERHJSSHTVSGIWWMRK ˆ7IGXSVWMR[LMGL1SVSGGSLEWELMWXSVMG GSQTEVEXMZIEHZERXEKIEKVMGYPXYVI½WLMRKGVEJXW XSYVMWQERHXLITLSWTLEXIMRHYWXV] +VIIR 1SVSGGS4PERJSVEKVMGYPXYVI,EPMIYXMW4PERJSV ½WLMRK:MWMSRJSVXSYVMWQGVEJXWERHXLIRI[ TPERJSVTLSWTLEXIWZEPYEXMSRTSPMG] ˆSectors corresponding to the strategic challenges XLEX1SVSGGS[MPPJEGIMRXLIRIEVJYXYVIIRIVK] [EXIVFMSXIGLRSPSK]LIEPXLRI[MRJSVQEXMSR XIGLRSPSKMIWERHXIPIGSQQYRMGEXMSRW ˆ&EROMRK½RERGIMRWYVERGIERHXLIWXSGOQEVOIX ˆ1ENSVMRJVEWXVYGXYVITVSNIGXWTSVXW 8ERKIV1IH  LMKL[E]WVSEHWEMVTSVXWVEMP[E]WXVEQWERHXLI LMKLWTIIHXVEMRPMROMRKXLIRSVXLSJXLIGSYRXV]XS the southern region

JSV1SVSGGSXLIEKVIIQIRX[MXLXLI)9VIQEMRWXLIQSWX MQTSVXERXSJXLIQEPPTEVXMGYPEVP][LIRXLIZSPEXMPITSPMXMGEP IRZMVSRQIRXMRXLI%VEFVIKMSR¯MRGPYHMRKXLIVIJYKII crisis – is taken into account. 8LITSPMXMGEP[MPPMRKRIWWJSVEWYWXEMRIHERHGPSWI relationship between both parties is certainly present, but TVEGXMGEPHIZIPSTQIRXWEVIRIIHIHXSIRWYVIMXHSIWRSX WXEPPSVKSMRXSVIZIVWI8LIMQTSVXERGISJXLI)9EWE XVEHITEVXRIVJSV1SVSGGSMWEGVMXMGEPJEGXSVMRXLMW-XMWMR XLIMRXIVIWXSJ1SVSGGSXSQEMRXEMREGPSWIVETTVSGLIQIRX [MXLXLISPHGSRXMRIRX[LMPIJVSQXLI)9´WTIVWTIGXMZIMXMW TEVXMGYPEVP]MQTSVXERXXSOIITEGPSWIVIPEXMSRWLMT[MXLSRI SJXLIQSWXWXEFPIGSYRXVMIWMRMXWRIEVEFVSEH

Trade aggregates in Morocco from 2000 to 2012 (index year, 2005) International Monetary Fund figures 18 14 10 6 2 -2 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 -6 -10 -14

Overall demand: EU demand: Non-EU demand:

1SVSGGSLEWLEWJYPP]IQFVEGIHXLIKPSFEPMWEXMSRTVSGIWW ERHLEWWMKRIHXVEHIEKVIIQIRXW[MXLWXEXIW8LI] VERKIJVSQJVIIXVEHIEKVIIQIRXW[MXLXLI97XLI )YVSTIER*VII8VEHI%WWSGMEXMSR )*8% GSYRXVMIWERH 8YVOI]XSPMQMXIHTVIJIVIRXMEPEKVIIQIRXW[MXL%PKIVME 0MF]E1EYVMXERME7IRIKEPXLI6ITYFPMGSJ+YMRIEERH 'LEHEW[IPPEWXLI+VIEXIV%VEF*VII8VEHI%KVIIQIRX [MXL&ELVEMR0MF]E4EPIWXMRI7YHERXLI9RMXIH%VEF )QMVEXIW/Y[EMX5EXEV7]VME=IQIR-VEU0IFERSR3QER ERH7EYHM%VEFMEERHXLI%KEHMV*VII8VEHI%KVIIQIRX IRGSQTEWWMRKFMPEXIVEPJVIIXVEHIXVIEXMIW[MXL.SVHER Tunisia, Egypt and the UAE. %WVIKEVHWMXWVIPEXMSR[MXLXLI)91SVSGGSGSYPHLEZIMXW WXEXYWYTKVEHIHXSER³EWWSGMEXIHWXEXI´SRGIMXWETTPMGEXMSR MWVEXM½IHF]XLI'SYRGMPSJ1MRMWXIVWMR&VYWWIPW;LIR XLMWLETTIRW1SVSGGS[MPPFIRI½XJVSQXLIWEQIWXEXYW EWGSYRXVMIWWYGLEW8YVOI]ERH&SWRME,IV^IKSZMREERH [SYPHFIEFPIXSMRXIRWMJ]XVEHIWSGMEPTSPMXMGEPERHWIGYVMX] PMROW[MXLXLI)9%WXLISRP]%VEFGSYRXV]XSFIRI½XJVSQ WYGLGPSWIKISKVETLMGEPTVS\MQMX]XSXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR

Regent’s Report 2015

Insights into the Relationship between Morocco and the EU *VSQXSXLI)9EFWSVFIH SJ1SVSGGER I\TSVXWERHWYTTPMIHSZIV SJMXWMQTSVXW[LMGLQEOIW XLI)91SVSGGS´WQSWXMQTSVXERXXVEHMRKTEVXRIV-RJEGX XLI)9[EWXLIWSYVGISJ SJXVEZIPVIGIMTXW[LMPI  SJXVERWJIVWERH SJJSVIMKRHMVIGXMRZIWXQIRXW *(-W  [IVISJ)9SVMKMR*VERGIERH7TEMREVIXLIX[SGSYRXVMIW [MXL[LMGLXLMWXVEHMRKTEVXRIVWLMTMWTEVXMGYPEVP]MQTSVXERX ERH1SVSGGS´WHIQERHJSV)9I\TSVXWMWWXVSRKP] GSVVIPEXIHXSXLIGSYRXV]´WIGSRSQMGTIVJSVQERGIEWSRI [SYPHEWWYQI 8LIGLEVXEFSZIVITVIWIRXWETPSXSJ1SVSGGERI\TSVXW SZIVXMQIMRVIPEXMSRXS)9ERHRSR)9HIQERH1SVSGGS´W JSVIMKRXVEHIWYJJIVIHJSPPS[MRKXLIVIGIRX½RERGMEPGVMWMW

¯ WIIMRKE[SVWIRMRKSJXLIHI½GMXMRXLIXVEHI FEPERGISJ SJ+(4EKEMRWX HYVMRKXLITIVMSH ¯-RWMHIXLI)9*VERGIMW1SVSGGS´WQEMRXVEHMRK TEVXRIVGSRXVMFYXMRK SJXSXEPI\TSVXWMRERH




 SJXSXEPMQTSVXW8VEHI[MXL*VERGIWYJJIVIHJVSQE HI½GMXSJQSVIXLERFMPPMSR1SVSGGERHMVLEQW 1%( %W JSV7TEMR1SVSGGS´WWIGSRHXVEHMRKTEVXRIVMXGSRXVMFYXIW  SJXSXEPI\TSVXWERH SJXSXEPMQTSVXW8VEHI[MXL XLMWGSYRXV]VIGSVHIHEHI½GMXSJ1%(FMPPMSRERHE GSZIVEKIVEXISJ 

1SVSGGS 49

Contribution of free trade agreements to the Moroccan global trade deficit All free-trade agreements EU free-trade agreements

40 35 30

8LIWI½KYVIWWLS[XLEX1SVSGGSLEWELYKIXVEHI FEPERGIHI½GMXXSGSRXIRH[MXL[LMGLTYXWTVIWWYVISRMXW FEPERGISJTE]QIRXWEW[IPPEWMXWI\GLERKIVEXI1SVSGGS VIKMWXIVIHEWMKRM½GERXXVEHIHI½GMXSJ1%(FMPPMSR MRXLI½VWXIMKLXQSRXLWSJ7XEXMWXMGWGSPPIGXIHJVSQ XLI3J½GIHIW'LERKIWMRHMGEXIXLEXI\TSVXW 1%( FMPPMSR MRGVIEWIHF] [LMPIMQTSVXW[IRXYTF]  8LMWTIVJSVQERGI[EWQEHITSWWMFPIHYIXSJI[IVGIVIEP TYVGLEWIWXLIJEPPSJSMPTVMGIWERHMRTEVXMGYPEVXLIHIGMWMSR SJ6IREYPXXSVIPSGEXIMXWTPERXXS8ERKMIVMR¯ETPERX [MXLETVSHYGXMSRSYXTYXXLEXVIEGLIHZILMGPIWMR 1E]

25 20 15 10 5 0

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

What Does the Future Hold? ,EZMRKXSHIEP[MXLXVEHIHI½GMXW[MXL)9TEVXRIVW 1SVSGGSLEWQEHIXLIWXVEXIKMGGLSMGIXSXYVRXSMXW WSYXLIVRRIMKLFSYVWMRXLI%JVMGERGSRXMRIRX(YVMRKXLI PEWXGSYTPISJ]IEVW1SVSGGSLEWWMKRIHZEVMSYWXVEHI EKVIIQIRXW[MXL-ZSV]'SEWX+EFSR+YMRIE'SREOV] ERH7IRIKEP8LMWQEVOIHEXYVRMRXLITSPMG]SJXLI OMRKHSQFYXLEWFIIREQSZI[IPGSQIHF]GMXM^IRWERH EHQMRMWXVEXMSREPMOI8LIIGSRSQMGKVS[XLTSXIRXMEPMR %JVMGEMWWMKRM½GERXERH1SVSGGS[MWLIWXSXETMRXSXLI VIWSYVGIWSJXLIGSRXMRIRXEW[IPPEW½RHMRKRI[QEVOIXW JSVMXWI\TSVXWTEVXMGYPEVP]EWXLI)9´WIGSRSQMGWPS[HS[R MRXLIPEWXGSYTPISJ]IEVWEJJIGXIHRIKEXMZIP]XLIHIQERH JSV1SVSGGERTVSHYGXW

Morocco’s main suppliers (billions of MAD) 2013 60000

Spain France USA China Saudi Arabia Italy Germany Russia Turkey Iraq

45000

30000

15000

0 Suppliers countries

'SRXVMFYXMSRSJJVIIXVEHIEKVIIQIRXWXSXLI1SVSGGER KPSFEPXVEHIHI½GMX

8LIVIPEXMSRWLMTFIX[IIR1SVSGGSERHXLI)9MW[IPP IWXEFPMWLIHERHFSXLTEVXMIWWIIQXSFIGSQQMXXIH XSETTP]MRKXLIEKVIIHGSYVWISJEGXMSR1SVSGGSMW HIXIVQMRIHXSTVIWIVZIMXWTVMZMPIKIHVIPEXMSRWLMT[MXL the EU. Its starting point is to strike a balance between XLIVIUYMVIQIRXWSJXLMWVIPEXMSRWLMTERHXLIRIIHWSJXLI 1SVSGGERTISTPI1SVSGGSMWEPWSOIIRXSHIZIPSTWMQMPEV VIPEXMSRWLMTW[MXLMRMXWS[RGSRXMRIRX[LMGLQMKLXPIEHXSE regional leadership role. It has taken an approach that could FIHIWGVMFIHEWTVEKQEXMGKMZIRXLIXVSYFPIHERHYRWXEFPI GMVGYQWXERGIWXLEXLEZIJSPPS[IHXLIIZIRXWSJXLI%VEF 7TVMRKMR8YRMWME0MF]EERH)K]TX EW[IPPEWSXLIVTEVXWSJ XLI1MHHPI)EWXERH2SVXL%JVMGE?1)2%AVIKMSR FYXEPWS FIGEYWISJXLIWIIQMRKP]YRWXEFPITSPMXMGEPWMXYEXMSRMRFSXL 2MKIVERH1EPM 8LI)9WYTTSVXW1SVSGGS´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xZI XSMQEKMRIXLEXXLMWMWEWXVEMKLXJSV[EVHTVSGIWWIWTIGMEPP]

Regent’s Report 2015


50

)YVSTI´W2IMKLFSYVW*VSQ1SVSGGSXS1SWGS[

KMZIRXLII\XVIQIP]ZSPEXMPIXMQIWXLEXXLMWVIKMSRLEW I\TIVMIRGIHVIGIRXP]1SVSGGSMWSJJIVMRKEREXXVEGXMZI TEGOEKISJXE\MRGIRXMZIWIGSRSQMG½RERGMEPERHLYQER resources to ensure success in attracting European investors.

Further Reading

Despite this, the EU has on occasion dictated harsh GSRHMXMSRW[LMGLLEZIRIKEXMZIP]EJJIGXIHXLITVSGPEMQIH WIRWISJGSSTIVEXMSRFIX[IIRXLIX[STEVXMIW8LIXSQEXS I\TSVXWGVMWMWERHXLI½WLMRKEKVIIQIRXWHIEHPSGOGSYPH FIGMXIHEWI\EQTPIW-RJEGXXLIGYVVIRXWIRXMQIRXMR 1SVSGGSMWXLEXXLI)9MW³YWMRK´1SVSGGSVEXLIVXLER GSSTIVEXMRK[MXLMX8LMWMWWSQIXLMRKXLEXLEWKIRIVEXIH QYGLHIFEXIMRXLIQIHMEEW[IPPEWMRXLI1SVSGGER TEVPMEQIRX

()4* (MVIGXMSRHIW)XYHIW)X(IW4VqZMWMSRW*MRERGMrVIW  WYVZI]WSJ1SVSGGS[[[½RERGIWKSZQE(SGW HITJCGSQTIXMXMZMXIHIWI\TQEVSGEMRICFMPERCQEM THJ

&SXLTEVXMIWEVII\TIGXIHXSGSQQMXXSVIEPHMEPSKYIMRE GSRXI\XSJIUYEPTEVXRIVWLMTZS[MRKXSXEOIGSSTIVEXMSR XSXLIRI\XPIZIP[IPPFI]SRHER]TYVIP]GSQQIVGMEPERH IGSRSQMGMRXIVIWXW8LMWMWTEVXMGYPEVP]MQTSVXERXKMZIRXLEX 1SVSGGSGERKEMREPSXJVSQXLI)9MRXIVQWSJIHYGEXMSR WSGMEPTVSNIGXWERHPIKEPTVSGIWWIW1SVSGGSLEWQEHI WMKRM½GERXEHZERGIWMRVIPEXMSRXSLYQERVMKLXWMRXLIPEWX X[SHIGEHIWERHMXGERSRP]FIFIRI½GMEPXSGSRXMRYI XLMWXVIRH[MXLXLIWYTTSVXSJELMKLUYEPMX]TEVXRIVWYGL EWXLI)98LMWMWXLIYPXMQEXIKYEVERXIIJSVEWYGGIWWJYP TEVXRIVWLMT[LMGL[MPPFVMRKVIEPFIRI½XWXSXLI[LSPI GSQQYRMX]VEXLIVXLERNYWXVIQEMRMRKWTPEWLIWSJMRO WTVIEHSZIVI\TIRWMZITETIVHIEH[SVHWSRETEKI 8LIGYVVIRXVIJYKIIMQQMKVERXGVMWMWLEWKMZIRXLI VIPEXMSRWLMTFIX[IIR1SVSGGSERHXLI)9ERI[ HMQIRWMSR-XMWRSXI[SVXL]XLEXQSWXVIJYKIIWERH MQQMKVERXW[LSEVVMZIHMRXLI)9MRXLIPEWXJI[QSRXLW HITEVXIHJVSQ0MF]ESV8YVOI]VEXLIVXLERJVSQ1SVSGGS 8LIVIPEXMSRWLMTFIX[IIRXLI)9ERH1SVSGGSGERFI seen as strong evidence that a close association, where the parties involved are working together, can guarantee EHIGIRXPMZMRKJSVXLIVIWTIGXMZIGSQQYRMXMIWERHEGX EWEHIXIVVIRXXSTVSWTIGXMZIQEWWQSZIQIRXSJXLI TSTYPEXMSR-JSRIGSRWMHIVWXLIKEMRWERHSVXLIWEZMRKW XLEXXLI)9GSYPHLEZIQEHILEHXLMWFIIREGLMIZIH with other countries in the region, one will realise the TSXIRXMEPFIRI½XWXLEXWSYRHEKVIIQIRXWGERGVIEXIMR XLIPSRKIVXIVQ)YVSTIMWXLIGVEHPISJHIQSGVEG]ZEPYIW YRMZIVWEPTVMRGMTPIWERHLYQERVMKLXW(IZIPSTQIRXSJXLI VIPEXMSRWLMTFIX[IIRXLI)9ERH1SVSGGSGERSRP]FI FIRI½GMEPMRERIVESJI\GITXMSREPWOITXMGMWQERHSRKSMRK GSRGIVRMRXIVQWSJMRXIVREXMSREPWIGYVMX]ERHI\XVIQMWQ

Regent’s Report 2015

)\GLERKI3J½GISJ1SVSGGS[[[SGKSZQETSVXEP 1SVSGGER1MRMWXV]SJ)GSRSQMGWERH*MRERGI [[[½RERGIWKSZQE

³'SQQIP´)YVSTIW´IWWSYJ¾IPI1EVSGZEVIWTMVIVIR %JVMUYI´F],EQ^E6OLE'LELEQLe Monde1E] [[[PIQSRHIJVEJVMUYIEVXMGPI GSQQIPIYVSTIWIWWSYJ¾IPIQEVSGZEVIWTMVIVIR EJVMUYICCLXQP )96ITSVXSR1SVSGGS  (SWWMIVMRWXMXYXMSRRIPHY 'SRWIMPHIP´9RMSR)YVSTqIRRI 20) 3)'(SJ½GMEPVITSVXSR1SVSGGS [[[EJVMGERIGSRSQMGSYXPSSOSVK [[[HMTPSQEXMIKSYZJVJVHSWWMIVWTE]WQEVSGPYRMSR IYVSTIIRRIIXPIQEVSG )YVSTIER9RMSR[[[IIEWIYVSTEIYHIPIKEXMSRW QSVSGGSMRHI\CJVLXQ


Facts and Figures: Morocco Geography/Demography %VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMX]TIVWUOQ 0MJII\TIGXERG]]IEVWMR ]IEVWMRYVFER GSRXI\X]IEVWMRVYVEPGSRXI\X 7SYVGI,EYX 'SQQMWWEVMEXHY4PER1MRMWXV] Growth rate: 1.02%

GSRWYQTXMSRSJLEWLMWLQEVMNYERELEWHMQMRMWLIHMR VIGIRX]IEVWEWLEWGSRGIVRSZIVLYQERXVEJ½GOMRK7SQI TVSFPIQWVIQEMREW1SVSGGSMWYWIHEWEXVERWMXGSYRXV] JSVHVYKWJVSQ7SYXL%QIVMGEXS[IWXIVR)YVSTI 8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

Economy +(4FMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH +VS[XLVEXI 1MPMXEV]I\TIRHMXYVI SJ+(4 4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI  FIPS[TIV person per day)

% of economy in %KVMGYPXYVI  -RHYWXV]  Services: 61.1%

Foreign trade Exports:FMPPMSR GPSXLMRKERHXI\XMPIWEYXSQSFMPIW IPIGXVMGGSQTSRIRXWMRSVKERMGGLIQMGEPWXVERWMWXSVW GVYHIQMRIVEPWJIVXMPMWIVWTIXVSPIYQTVSHYGXWGMXVYWJVYMXW ZIKIXEFPIW½WL Imports:FMPPMSR GVYHITIXVSPIYQXI\XMPIJEFVMG XIPIGSQQYRMGEXMSRWIUYMTQIRX[LIEXKEWERHIPIGXVMGMX] transistors, plastics) Main export partners: *VERGI7TEMR&VE^MP97 Main import partners: 7TEMR*VERGI'LMRE97 Saudi Arabia

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Drugs and other criminality issues -RXIVREXMSREPGSRGIVREXHSQIWXMGTVSHYGXMSRERH

Regent’s Report 2015


Algeria: A Distant Neighbour? Dr Elias Boukrami Principal Lecturer in Banking, Regent’s University London

“Algeria has a considerable unused capacity for natural gas and liquid natural gas supply to the EU, but the EU is buying less and less gas as its energy mix is changing, both with the increasing use of coal and also because of stagnating economic growth overall” Dr Elias Boukrami


Algeria

lgeria is a vast country in the heart of the Mediterranean Sea region; a major and axial neighbour state of the European Union (EU). It is the 10th largest country in the world, with a surface area of more than 2.38 million square kilometres. The largest African state, Algeria is also important because of its population of nearly 40 million people and a diaspora estimated at 4 million people, mostly based in France. Algeria is a potentially important neighbour due to geographic, geopolitical, historic and demographic factors, and – last but not least – its economic potential. The question is whether this important neighbour could also become a close and helpful partner for the EU.

A

The Economic Relationship The economic relations between Algeria and the EU are WMKRM½GERXMRTEVXMGYPEVJSVXLI%PKIVMERWMHIWMRGIXLI EU is by far the largest supplier to the country and the largest importer from Algeria. But the relationship is also important for the EU, as Algeria is also the third largest supplier of natural gas to the European Union. Historically, the Algerian side has always claimed to be a stable and constant supplier of energy to Europe. In 2006, Algeria imported $11.73 billion from the EU, which represented 54.67% of its total imports in that year. In the same year, Algeria exported more than $28.75 billion to the EU, representing 52.64% of the total Algerian exports during that year. By 2014 Algerian exports to XLI)9LEHVIEGLIHFMPPMSREWMKRM½GERXWLEVISJ more than 64.3% of its total exports. However, imports from the EU were $29.49 billion, representing 50.56% of Algeria’s total imports. Despite the fact that the share of the EU in Algerian exports showed a considerable increase, Algerian imports from the EU increased in value while the market share of the EU into the Algerian imports remained stable. 8LIKVS[XLWSJXLIWI½KYVIWVI¾IGXMRETVEGXMGEP[E] the effects of the 2005 Association Agreement between Algeria and the EU, in addition to the widening of these arrangements in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Algerian Customs also published data showing the ‘opportunity cost’ that the Association Agreement generated and would generate between 2005 and 2020, such as the loss of alternative markets, sales at lower than market prices, and so forth. The Algerian foreign affairs minister, Ramtane Lamamra, was referring to this opportunity cost when he claimed that Algeria ‘gave more

than it received’ as a result of this agreement: around $17.9 billion for the entire period and $1.85 billion for the single year 2014, he estimated. On the other side, during the ninth session of the Association Council EU-Algeria, held in June 2015 in Brussels, in its assessment of the Association Agreement the EU stressed the structural and administrative reforms undertaken by the Algerian government. The EU claimed it was following with interest the initiatives taken by the government, including the development of an organic law on information, the modernisation of the justice sector and social security, the administrative reorganisation of the territory, and the establishment of facilities to improve citizens’ access to the administration. The EU even went so far as to remind Algeria of its obligations and to ‘encourage’ the government to deepen its previously announced reforms, including a revision of the Constitution. The EU is concerned about the conditionality of the agreement, hinting that the Algerian side has further to go in encouraging civil society and protecting fundamental rights and freedoms. For instance, the EU regrets the constraints that prevent certain national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from working in Algeria following the adoption of the new law on associations, and also certain restrictions on the rights of assembly and demonstration. Likewise, it emphasises the need to ensure freedom of civil societies and the importance of social dialogue – an essential component of decent work. In the same vein, the EU welcomes some VIJSVQWEHSTXIHMRXLI½IPHSJLYQERVMKLXWMR%PKIVME including the protection and promotion of women’s VMKLXW¯TEVXMGYPEVP]XLIQSHM½GEXMSRSJXLIJEQMP]GSHI to penalise violence against women – and urges their full implementation.

Oil and Gas: Economy and Diplomacy In February 2015 the European Commission published its ‘Energy Union Package’ detailing ways of reducing the dependence of the 28 EU countries on Russian gas and oil. 8LMW[MPPVIUYMVIHMZIVWM½GEXMSRXSQER]SXLIVGSYRXVMIW including Algeria. Like many other commentators, Francis Perrin, a petroleum expert and editor-in-chief of Arab Oil & Gas (AOG), claims that Europe has to increase its imports of Algerian gas in order to reduce its dependence on Russia – a particularly WIRWMXMZIMWWYIKMZIRXLIGSR¾MGXMR9OVEMRI,S[IZIV he questions the ability of Algeria to deliver long-term

Regent’s Report 2015

53


54

Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

commitments if domestic consumption keeps rising at its current pace. Moreover, Perrin argues that Algeria should begin a dialogue with Europe to negotiate its long-term market share and reassure the EU of its ability to increase its export potential, which requires putting in place a management strategy for its domestic consumption. Algeria is directly connected to Europe through three pipelines: Enrico Matei (connecting Algeria to Italy via Tunisia), Pedro Duran Farrel (linking Algeria to Spain via Morocco) and Medgaz (connecting Algeria directly to Spain). In addition there is Galsi, a new pipeline currently under construction, which will connect Algeria directly to Italy. The three operational pipelines enjoy a transportation capacity of 54 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year. Miguel Arias Canete, Energy Commissioner of the EU, who visited Algiers in May 2015, considers that the EU can persuade Sonatrach, the Algerian state oil and gas company, to ‘be more open’ to foreign investment, particularly in respect of foreign shares in the upstream operations (exploration and production). Europeans also press for Sonatrach to abandon its insistence on long-term contracts and accept the ‘market’ TVMGIW½\IHEXXLIGIRXVIWSJ)YVSTIERKEWI\GLERKI-R compensation, Algeria would be assured of an ‘interesting part’ in western Europe markets – hardly an attractive deal as it stands. Brussels is legitimately concerned about whether Algeria LEWXLIKEWI\TSVXGETEGMX]RIIHIHXSJYP½PJYXYVI commitments vis-Ă -vis Europe. Domestic demand in Algeria is rising very fast, largely due to the hugely subsided price, and estimates suggest it will absorb 70% of production by 2030. If this upward trend in internal consumption GSRXMRYIWLS[[MPP7SREXVEGLJYP½PMXWI\TSVXXEVKIXW# International experts argue that Algeria must begin a dialogue with Europe to negotiate its long-term market share and reassure the EU of its ability to increase its export potential, while at the same time putting in place a management strategy for its internal consumption. Despite its strategic position with Europe, Algeria has lost a lot of ground in recent years due to its decrease in exports in terms of both volume and price. To remedy this, it must ensure that it exploits its strengths: its proximity with Europe and its privileged position as a traditional supplier for its neighbours north of the Mediterranean. The urgency of the situation is illustrated by the recent auction by Sonatrach of the exploration rights to 33 blocks

Regent’s Report 2015

[MXLLMKLWLEPIKEWERHSMPTSXIRXMEP3RP]½ZIGSRXVEGXW were signed, with Repsol, Shell, Statoil and Dragon OilEnel. Sonatrach will own at least 51% of each project, as required by Algeria’s foreign investment law. This lack of MRXIVIWXVIžIGXIHMRHIGPMRMRKMRZIWXQIRXWMRXLISMPERH gas sector, has resulted in a serious decline in the volumes of energy produced during the last 10 years, and this has become a major issue for the Algerian authorities. The recent severe decline in oil prices makes these issues not only important but urgent as well. (YVMRKXLI½VWXWIQIWXIVSJXLIIRIVK]WIGXSVMR %PKIVMEVIGSVHIHWMKRM½GERXRIKEXMZIKVS[XL-RXLI country exported via the three constructed pipelines about 27.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas – just over half of its estimated capacity of 54 bcm. During the WEQI]IEV%PKIVMEI\TSVXIHNYWXSZIVFGQSJPMUYI½IH natural gas (LNG) to various markets of the world (including Asian markets) out of an operational capacity of 25 bcm and an installed capacity of 34 bcm. Algeria has a considerable unused capacity for natural gas and LNG supply to the EU, but the EU is buying less and less gas as its energy mix is changing, both with the increasing use of coal and also because of stagnating economic growth overall. The Algerian government has followed the 2015 Greek crisis with particular attention and notes that most of the EU countries have problems in generating economic growth. In its eyes, the EU needs to demonstrate that its member states represent a safe longterm energy client for Algeria. Algeria is also keenly aware that any major strategic and long-term political engagement in the energy sector needs to take account of the interests of, and developments in, the US. It was America who played a major historical role MRHIZIPSTMRKXLIPMUYI½IHKEWMRHYWXV]XLEXQEHI%PKIVME ETMSRIIVERHWLS[GEWIJSV02+MRXIVREXMSREPP]8LI½VWX LNG mega-contract (the El-Paso contract, for 10 bcm) was signed by Sonatrach in the late 60s with a US company. In 1966, less than four years after Algerian independence, an American company SEDCO (owned by Bill Clements) and Sonatrach created ALFOR (Algerian Drilling Company). A little later Sonatrach created ALGEO (Algerian Geophysical Company) with another US company. Those newly created companies were active partners in the exploration and production of Algeria’s own oil and gas.


Algeria

The paradox is that during that time, which witnessed historic and major cooperation between Algeria and the US in the energy sector, the two governments did not yet have any formal diplomatic relations in place. British +EW[EWXLI½VWXJSVIMKRGSQTER]XSSTIVEXIMR%PKIVME back in 1963, just one year after independence. The HIZIPSTQIRXSJXLI%PKIVMERIRIVK]WIGXSV½XWMRXSEQYGL more complex and global geopolitical framework than XLIWTIGM½G%WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRXSVIZIRXLIFVSEHIV European Neighbourhood Policy.

position lies probably somewhere between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, all at sea if you stand resolutely in just one camp or the other

Conclusions For the time being, the Algerian economy continues to be static, showing close to zero growth. The government relies heavily – perhaps exclusively – on its oil and gas revenues and its foreign exchange reserves for ‘social peacekeeping’, as the latest Complementary Finance Act of 2015 VIMXIVEXIW8LIWMKRM½GERXTEVXTPE]IHF]WSGMEPXVERWJIVWMR XLIIGSRSQ]ERHXLIRIIHXS½RHVIWSYVGIWXSGSRXMRYI XLIQLEWPIHXSE½WGEPEQRIWX]ERHXSGEWLGSPPIGXMSR from the important informal economic actors. The decline in oil prices over recent months constitutes a serious source of concern for the Algerian authorities. However, the latest Finance Act did not include any adjustment in spending, despite the fact that the foreign exchange (FX) reserves lost more than $50 billion, and are estimated to fall to less than $145 billion by the end of 2015, from nearly $200 billion in early 2014. The Algerian economy, whether under the planned state economy in the period from 1962 to 1990 or under the ‘free market’ economy from 1990 to the present day, has never been an economically rational construct, perhaps VI¾IGXMRKXLISVKERMGERHMVVEXMSREPREXYVISJWSGMIX] more generally. John Maynard Keynes wrote: ‘The market can stay irrational a lot longer than you can stay solvent,’ and it looks as if that dictum will apply to Algeria and its IGSRSQ]VI¾IGXMRKXLIWXVYKKPIFIX[IIRXLIMVVEXMSREPMX] SJWSGMEPTVIWWYVIWERHXLIMRI\SVEFPITVIWWYVISJ½RERGI and economics. Algeria is an important country that could do much better and much more – both internally and externally – for the region than it is currently doing. This role will surely MQTVSZIMRXLIJYXYVIFYXQE][IPPKIX[SVWI½VWX0SSOMRK and listening to both sides – Algeria and the EU – you can see how each has quite different priorities and uses very different arguments to support them. While neither of the parties is wholly correct, nor wholly wrong, a convergent

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Facts and Figures: Algeria Geography/demography Area: 2,381,741 sq km Population: 38,813,722 Density: 16.3 per sq km Life expectancy: 76.39 years Growth rate: 4%

Economy GDP (purchasing power parity – PPP): $552.6 billion GDP (PPP) per head: $14,300 Growth rate: 5.5% Military expenditure (% of GDP): 4.48 Population below poverty line: 23% (2006 est) % of economy in Agriculture: 8.6% Industry: 48.3% Services: 43.1%

Foreign trade Exports: $62.1 billion (petroleum, natural gas and petroleum products) Imports: $55.36 billion (capital goods, foodstuffs, consumer goods) Main export partners: Spain, France, UK, US, Netherlands, Canada Main import partners: France, China, Italy, Spain, Germany

Government budget Revenue: $79.53 billion Expenditure: $89.21 billion Public debt: 7.5% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Transnational issues Algeria rejects Moroccan administration of Western Sahara, with each nation accusing the other of harbouring militants and arms smuggling.

Refugees 90,000 (western Saharan Sahrawi, mostly living in Algeriansponsored camps in the south-western town of Tindouf)

Drugs and criminality Increase in the use of cocaine, cannabis, tranquilisers, and sedatives. Algeria is a transit, destination, and source

Regent’s Report 2015

country mainly for women subjected to forced labour and WI\XVEJ½GOMRK'VMQMREPRIX[SVOWI\XIRHMRKXSWYF7ELEVER Africa and to Europe are involved in human smuggling. Transparency International corruption index: 100.


Tunisia: A Glass Half Full, Half Empty Chris Stephen Correspondent for The Guardian

Zeineb Marzouk Tunisian journalist and analyst

“Perhaps the single biggest problem confronting Tunisia, and confounding \PM-=¼[W‫ٺ‬MZ[WN PMTXQ[\PI\[WKQM\a remains much as it was under Ben Ali: a rich elite commands the economy, leaving the majority stuck in or near poverty” Chris Stephen and Zeineb Marzouk


Tunisia

unisia is a glass half-full, half-empty. Half-full, because democracy, proclaimed in the Arab Spring revolution, has survived; half-empty because many are poorer now than under the dictatorship. Half-full, because Tunisia is an island of stability in a violent region; half-empty because the former dictatorship’s business elite still hold the power and money, bringing with it the possibility of new unrest. Halffull, because political violence is rare and the population moderate; half-empty because Tunisia has nevertheless supplied 3,000 ISIS volunteers for Iraq and Syria, and recent ISIS attacks have ruined the tourism industry.

T

How We Got Here Tunisia’s overlapping civilisations stretch back thousands of years, most famously seeing the rise of the Phoenician city of Carthage from 9th century BC. During the Punic wars (264– 146BC) its leader Hannibal attacked Rome by marching Africans through Spain and Gaul and across the Alps into Italy. An epic painting of his battle in the snowbound mountains, complete with elephants, hangs in the entrance hall of the Interior Ministry headquarters in Tunis. Rome later crushed Carthage, then built its own thriving colony in the breadbasket of the Mediterranean. The remains of Roman villas, many not yet excavated, lie along the shores around the ruins of Carthage on the outskirts of Tunis, the modern capital. Islam arrived in the second LEPJSJXLIWIZIRXLGIRXYV]ERH7YPIMQERXLI1EKRM½GIRX conquered the region for the Ottoman Turks in 1534. Ottoman decline led to a French invasion in 1881, and France declared the country a ‘protectorate’ – naturally without asking Tunisians if they agreed to this protection. World War Two weakened French colonial power and afterwards came protests, skirmishes and terror attacks on Tunisian nationalists by the ultra-nationalist French colonist group Red Hand. As with much of its recent history, Tunisia’s political turmoil was less severe than the upheavals of its neighbours. While Algeria endured a brutal war with France in the 1950s ERHWERH0MF]EWYGGYQFIHXS1YEQQEV+EHHE½´W tyranny in 1969, Tunisia gained independence from France by mutual agreement and a phased withdrawal in 1956, leaving behind much affection between the two states. Independence leader Habib Bourguiba became president, but his Constitutional Democratic Party was neither democratic nor constitutional, and the promise of elections was soon forgotten. In 1987 his prime minister Zine El Abidine Ben Ali turned on him, seizing power in a bloodless coup.

&IR%PMHMHLSPHIPIGXMSRWFYX½\IHXLIVIWYPXWXSIRWYVI sky-high victories for himself. In power, Ben Ali and his family established a reputation for corruption stellar even by the standards of contemporary dictators. He plundered an estimated $12 billion in state funds, building opulent palaces, while his wife Leila spent so lavishly on shopping trips to Europe that she used the presidential plane as her shopping trolley to bring all her goods back home. Political repression tended to be jail and harassment, rather than the mass hangings and murders practised in neighbouring Algeria and Libya. Characterising Tunisia’s repression as ‘mild’ is not a term those beaten, jailed and raped would recognise, yet in comparison with other local tyrants, Ben Ali was restrained. Activists could expect jail and exile, rather than execution, and a very small number of semi-independent political parties were allowed conditional freedom. This situation gave Tunisians greater personal freedom, and a wider view of the world than their neighbours, perhaps explaining why Tunisia was the place where the revolutions of the Arab Spring began. On 17 December 2010 a 26-year-old market trader, Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself ablaze in frustration at police harassment and bureaucracy that forbade him selling from his stall. Sympathy at his despair provoked riots across XLIGSYRXV][LMGLMRXIRWM½IH[LIR&SYE^M^MHMIHWSQI weeks later on 4 January. Ten days later, Ben Ali fell from TS[IVPIJXXLITVIWMHIRXMEPTEPEGIERH¾IHXLIGSYRXV]8LI rebellion had been violent, certainly by Tunisian standards, leaving over 200 dead, yet the revolutionary blood-letting was mild and short compared to neighbouring Libya, which endured an eight-month civil war and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing, or Egypt, where nearer a thousand died. A transitional government was proclaimed in Tunis, which organised elections in 2011. They were won by the moderate Islamist party Ennahdha, a distant cousin of the Muslim Brotherhood, while centrist politician Moncef Marzouki, admired for his opposition to the Ben Ali regime, was elected president. A new constitution was passed and fresh elections called in 2014 which saw Ennahdha defeated by a new centreright party, Nida Tounis, led by 79-year-old Bej Caid Essebsi. Essebsi is liked by much of the former elite, having served as interior minister in the Bourguiba dictatorship, albeit as a moderate, and calling at the same time for more democracy.

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

8LITEXXIVRSJ-WPEQMWXW[MRRMRKXLI½VWXTSWXVIZSPYXMSR elections, only to later taste defeat, was repeated following the Arab Spring in Egypt and Libya. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood was deposed by the army in a popular coup, while in Libya the Brotherhood lost elections in 2014 and civil war erupted. By contrast Tunisia’s changeover of power following elections was peaceful. Essebsi was elected president and Tunisia had completed a cycle stretching through revolution, caretaker government, elected transitional government, new constitution and fresh elections. By then, all the other Arab Spring states – Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen – had collapsed back into war or new dictatorship. As Bloomberg reported: ‘In a region where standards of government run from anarchy (Libya) to dictatorship (Algeria and Egypt), Tunisia’s democracy is an impressive achievement.’ Tunisia may be free, but many here point out that you can’t eat freedom. Tunisia needs food as well as freedom.

The Here and Now Five years ago the popular occupation of the capital’s broad tree-lined Bourguiba Avenue symbolised victory in the Arab Spring, A stroll through the coffee bars along that Avenue today reveals a population frustrated that freedom does not pay the bills. The World Bank reports that the economy has actually contracted since the revolution and, as they count the dinars, Tunisians now tell pollsters by a majority of three-to-one that they value prosperity more than democracy. Bad debts from the Ben Ali regime, corruption and cronyism among the business elite, restrictive labour laws, weak bankruptcy rules and unemployment at 30% in some rural districts combine to paint a gloomy economic picture. There are some bright spots, with a healthy business in the export of auto parts, electronics and clothing. There has been a sharp rise in sales of olive oil after the EU raised import quotas. Against that, two recent ISIS terrorist attacks, killing 21 tourists at the Bardo museum in March and 38 more at Sousse in June, have led to the collapse of the tourist industry, threatening to wipe out 350,000 jobs and 7% of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). Yet Tunisia is bursting with potential. It has Africa’s highest literacy rate, a family planning framework that has limited population growth to 1% per year, and respectable, if

Regent’s Report 2015

unspectacular, oil exports of 97,000 barrels a day. Tunisia also has the strongest women’s rights in north Africa, with 24% of its MPs female, and tolerance is hard-wired into the population. Disputes, which in neighbouring countries degenerate into violence, are in Tunisia often resolved peacefully. In September 2015 mass protests were planned to oppose draconian laws for combating terrorism and at the same time giving amnesties to corrupt businesspeople. In response, police fenced off the entire kilometre-long Bourguiba Avenue, leading from the French Embassy to the Interior Ministry. Protest organisers vowed to break the cordon. The city braced for violence and embassies told staff to stay away. But the night before the demonstration a deal was cut: police would let the protestors in if they agreed to searches and refrained from violence. The protestors, grateful also that the searches would weed out agitators, agreed, and the police stood by as noisy, colourful, passionate but peaceful protests unfolded throughout the day. While the Tunisian constitution requires the president to be Muslim, the functions of state and religion are separate. Ninety-eight per cent of the population are Sunni Muslim of the Maliki school, noted for the square minarets of the country’s mosques, but small Christian and Jewish minorities worship freely. Indeed, Tunisia is home to the world’s oldest synagogue in continuous use, El Ghirba on the island of Djerba, reputedly built from the stones of Solomon’s temple. There is high internet use, and a laissez-faire outlook to social life. The pious and the liberal tolerate one another. When Morocco banned a September 2015 conference SJ,YQER6MKLXW;EXGLSJ½GMEPWJVSQEVSYRHXLI[SVPH Tunisia was happy to provide the new venue. Tunisians are well informed and well travelled: of the 11 million population, over 1 million are working abroad at any one time. On the other hand, while there is no formal censorship, much of the media is controlled by the same people who controlled it during the Ben Ali era, resulting in only muted criticism of the current government. Selfcensorship is common among many journalists.

Enter the Union The European Union (EU) and Tunisia are already economically joined at the hip: 75% of Tunisia’s exports žS[XSXLI)9ERH SJMXWMQTSVXWGSQIFEGOXLI other way. A raft of agreements have eased trade tariffs and


Tunisia

guest worker programmes, and until the terrorist horrors of 2015, more than a million Europeans annually made the country their holiday destination. The EU’s task is both simple and complex. Simple, because Tunisia is an island of stability in a turbulent region; complex because that help must come for many purposes simultaneously, and must be linked to the government continuing its promised reforms. Aid should stimulate economic growth and at the same time modernise Tunisian society. Perhaps the single biggest problem confronting Tunisia, and confounding the EU’s offers of help, is that society remains much as it was under Ben Ali: a rich elite commands the economy, leaving the majority stuck in or near poverty. Imaginative voices have suggested a compact between the former rulers and those they formerly ruled: in exchange for the rich not being prosecuted, they should agree to share, if not directly their wealth, than at least their opportunities. By opening up the economy to everyone, breaking up monopolies, allowing economic competitors to thrive and encouraging social mobility, the compact would deliver a stable package with social justice and economic growth. ,IVIXLI)9GSYPHLIPTMRX[S[E]W½VWXF]TVSZMHMRKXLI expertise to formulate policy, draft laws and streamline new institutions with unfamiliar modern roles; and second, by making aid and trade conditional on reform promises being honoured by government. Some symbolic steps of approximating to modern Western standards, such as toleration of homosexuality rather than jailing homosexuals, might be the trigger for increasing aid for more general social progress. Aid must be multi-layered and multi-faceted. There is no silver bullet to success, because no one area of reform can work unless there is reform, simultaneously, in many others. Legal reform is not enough without reform of banking, business and governance to which those laws apply. A constitutional court is no use without trained judges. Police training is no good without guarantees that the police, most recruited under the dictatorship, act in the interests SJXLITISTPI½VWXRSXXLIWXEXI

Some imagination must also be deployed in designing these training schemes. Direct assistance to political parties, for instance, may provoke allegations of interference, but there are many non-governmental groups operating in the political sphere, such as animal welfare organisations SVHSGXSVW´EWWSGMEXMSRW[LMGL[SYPHFIRI½XJVSQRYXW and-bolts advice on how to manage their organisations and better achieve their goals. If aid to trades unions or to business groups might trigger allegations of political bias, then expertise and advice could be given to both sides, as well as to those groups mediating between the two. What Tunisia does not lack is a lively civil society. There are young EGXMZMWXWMRIZIV]½IPHGV]MRKSYXJSVXVEMRMRK[ERXMRKEFSZI all to learn from the mistakes of others so as to avoid making them themselves. Aid to Tunisia must be conditional on the government building an inclusive society. Legislation recently approved, concerning a state of emergency and anti-terrorism, give wide and vague powers to the police and are a danger to civil liberties. A proposed restitution law threatens to give amnesty to a raft of super-rich and corrupt businesspeople, allowing them to keep much of their ill-gotten gains with no questions asked, and undermining the Truth and Dignity 'SQQMWWMSRWIXYTWTIGM½GEPP]XSWLMRIEFVMKLXPMKLXMRXS the dark corners of the former dictatorship. Without the rule of law, democracy, human rights and transparency, 8YRMWMEGSYPH¾SYRHIV In helping Tunisia, Europe can also help itself. The EU is facing unprecedented tensions, with migration and the Euro threatening to tear the Union apart. These crises have provoked much soul-searching, and calls for ‘new thinking’ – though the callers too often are unable to suggest what these new thoughts should be. Some of the answers are so obvious they can be easily overlooked. The EU needs to return to its core values; democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and transparency. Help to Tunisia should be guided by the same philosophy on which the EU was built. In encouraging Tunisians to follow these principles, European Union leaders might be jolted into rediscovering them for themselves

On the plus side, knowledge transfer is something Europe is good at, and Brussels and the member states will be relieved to learn that it is know-how, rather than hard cash, that Tunisia needs most from the EU.

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Facts and Figures: Tunisia Geography/demography Area: 163,610 sq km Population: 10,937,521 Density: 66.8 per sq km Life expectancy: 75.68 years Growth rate: 0.92%

Economy GDP: $125.1 billion GDP per head: $11,400 Growth rate: 2.8% Military expenditure (% of GDP): 1.55 Population below poverty line: 15.5% % of economy in Agriculture: 8.7% Industry: 29% Services: 62.3%

Foreign trade Exports: FMPPMSR GPSXLMRKWIQM½RMWLIHERHXI\XMPIW agricultural products, mechanical goods, phosphates and chemicals, hydrocarbons, electrical equipment) Imports: $23.4 billion (textiles, machinery and equipment, hydrocarbons, chemicals, foodstuffs) Main trading partners: France, Italy, Germany, Libya, China, US

Government budget Revenue: $12.43 billion Expenditure: $15.57 billion Public debt: 49.9% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Refugees 35,214 from Eritrea, 12,542 from Sudan; 10 stateless.

Drugs and other criminality issues Concern about ecstasy, cocaine, and heroin abuse; drugs arrive from Lebanon and, increasingly, from Jordan. Moneylaundering centre and growing cybercrime. Transparency International corruption index: 79.

Regent’s Report 2015


Libya and the EU: Out of Control? Chris Stephen Correspondent for The Guardian

“The onset of war has revealed the EU’s impotence. Its pronouncements on Libya are muddled and confused” Chris Stephen


Libya

XLEWXEOIRJSYV]IEVWJSVXLI%VEF7TVMRKXLEX¾SYVMWLIH in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt to move to Arab Winter, and for the three states across the Mediterranean to move from hope to crisis. The malaise that has crippled the European Union (EU) on so many fronts has seen it take no decisive action to deal with the problem. This needs to change. What is needed from the EU is not new thinking but a return to founding principles.

I

Fourth, there is leverage the EU can deploy. Libya does not VIGIMZIWMKRM½GERXJSVIMKREMHERHLEWPEVKIVIWIVZIWSJSMP and cash, making it impervious to economic sanctions.

Taking control of Libya is a non-starter. Neither the EU nor the UN has a mandate for such action. Ordinary Libyans would resist imposing a consul and peacekeeping forces. A consul would have no means of enforcing decisions to be made, and peacekeepers would face terrorist attack from -WPEQMG7XEXI -7 ERHVMWOFIMRKHVE[RMRXSGSR¾MGX

But there is one tool that can achieve strong results, which is personal sanctions on Libyan leaders. Already EU foreign ministers have mulled the idea of asset freezes and travel FERWSR½ZIREQIH0MF]ERPIEHIVWEGGYWIHSJSFWXVYGXMRKXLI UN peace process. This tool is highly effective, because Libyan leaders keep their assets abroad and, with their own country in chaos, rely on foreign abodes to enjoy comfort and security. Individual sanctions on named leaders who commit [EVGVMQIWSVSVKERMWIEVQIHKVSYTWMRHI½ERGISJXLI elected government, will have a powerful effect, combined with a second, deterrent, effect on remaining leaders.

What Can the EU Do?

Did the EU Drop the Ball?

First, the EU should re-state its commitment to supporting democracy. The current war is being fought by a Libya Dawn militia alliance that rebelled against the elected government because it did not like the result of the June 2014 elections. The EU must make clear to the rebels that it will only support power through the ballot box. It must also make clear to the elected government that support from Brussels is conditional on it remaining democratic, with transparency and commitment to the rule of law enshrined.

As they contemplate the chaotic shambles of today’s Libya, many in Europe take the view that the West collectively ‘dropped the ball’ – bombing the Arab Spring rebels to victory in 2011 and then turning its back on the country. It is a view popular with commentators with no experience of Libya, offering a simple explanation for the emergence of one of the most problematic of Europe’s neighbours. But it ignores a reality in which help was offered, only to be blocked by chaos, corruption and violence. To drop the ball, XLIVIQYWX½VWXFIEFEPPXSHVST

Second, the EU must act to enforce the United Nations (UN) arms embargo. The January 2015 report by the UN Security Council’s panel of experts reveals companies in more than 14 states selling weapons to Libya, including several in EU members. The panel further reports that requests for information to states including Hungary and Italy have gone unanswered. This must end, and the EU must enforce the embargo, including stop-and-search operations by its naval units already on migrant patrol in the Mediterranean. The most effective tool to end Libya’s ½KLXMRKMWXSWXEVZIXLITVSXEKSRMWXWSJ[IETSRW

Expectations were high when the European Union despatched its headline aid mission to Libya, the European Union Border Assistance Mission, known by its acronym EUBAM, in 2012. Libya, along with neighbours Egypt and Tunisia, had overthrown a tyrannical governments in the Arab Spring that swept north Africa.

Third, EU nations, who make up a large portion of the States Parties of the International Criminal Court, must ensure the court’s chief prosecutor investigates war crimes by Libya’s armed leaders. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is mandated by the UN to keep a watching brief over Libya, and there is an accumulation of evidence from rights groups and international embassies of war crimes, but the ICC has launched no investigation since 2011.

Libya in particular looked to be the pearl of the new north Africa. Its six million population was highly educated, and sitting on top of Africa’s biggest oil reserves. Add in the $168 billion in foreign reserves, and the country appeared to have a bright future. Because security was seen as the pre-requisite to every other kind of reform, that was the EU’s focus. EUBAM despatched more than 100 experts in coastguard, border patrolling, customs regulations and associated crafts, and they moved into the luxury Corinthian hotel on the Tripoli waterfront. 8LI½VWXTVSFPIQ[EWXLIEXSQMWEXMSRSJ0MF]ERWSGMIX] Libya is a relatively young country, formed by Italy – which

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

coined the name – from former Ottoman provinces only in the 1930s. For nearly half its history it had been ruled by XLIMHMSW]RGVEXMGERHFVYXEP+EHEJ½HMGXEXSVWLMT Dominating Libyan society are the tribes. Tribal leaders have no political clout, but tribal loyalties trump all others. Mutual suspicion between tribes gets in the way of any projects that require more than one tribe to participate. 0MF]ERWEVKYIVMKLXP]XLEX+EHEJ½´WTSPMG]SJXYVRMRKSRI tribe against another, plus his energetic secret police, worsened the hostility and suspicion across Libya. It is a feature of Libyan life that Libyans across the country have broadly similar political views, wanting democracy and personal freedom. Yet in each region and tribe, they are sure that the other regions and tribes are conspiring against them. Libyans themselves have a saying: In Libya it is region against region, and within regions, tribe against tribe, and within tribes family against family. An early surprise for foreign aid workers and diplomats was the lack of a spirit for collective action in Libya. Nepotism and corruption rule the roost, the tribal system providing a straitjacket against collaboration. The second problem facing EUBAM and all other initiatives [EWXLIQIWW+EHEJ½LEHPIJXFILMRH0MF]EMWEGSYRXV] with a broken administration, with no real civil law or courts system. The country has no railway; it has ageing bus stops but no public bus services, yellow post boxes but no mail service. Government ministries have no reception desks and few landlines. In this technology age, foreign SJ½GMEPWJSYRHXLISRP]QIERWXSGSRXEGXEQMRMWXIV[EWXS hope his cell phone, or that of a close advisor, happened to be switched on. It was soon clear that reform, if it was to happen at all, must start in parliament.

The Reality of Power Libyans elected a transitional parliament, the General National Congress, in July 2012 but it quickly became log-jammed. In among a labyrinth of tribal and regional disputes, a fault line developed between the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party and the centre-right National Forces Alliance. The Brotherhood, with other Islamist parties and tribal support from western coastal towns, won a narrow majority in parliament, but it was never enough to allow cohesive government. Foreign diplomats urged a more cooperative spirit in congress, offering any number of good governance

Regent’s Report 2015

workshops, but the outside world had no mandate in Libya. There was resistance to outside help from many leaders across the political spectrum. Many feared foreign help would show up their own incompetence, or threaten treasured business monopolies. And nothing, anywhere, could happen without a bribe. EUBAM nevertheless made some progress. One bright day it invited journalists to inspect its programme to train the coastguard, already focused on the growing migration TVSFPIQ%X8VMTSPMTSVXEJI[HS^IROIIRSJ½GIVWMRGVMWT blue uniforms showed off their single rigid-hulled patrol boat. Another dozen rigid boats sat on the quayside, having been recently bought by a ministry from Korea. The TVSFPIQ[EWXLEXXLIFSEXW[IVIXSS¾MQW]JSVWIE[SVO something the coastguard would have pointed out to the ministry, but they were never asked. Nor had the ministry given the coastguard life jackets, until, fearing a bad press reaction, these were hurriedly provided at the last moment. Meanwhile, at the top, political deadlock in congress meant nothing got done. A visit to the justice ministry was instructive. With the amount of reforms needed, the place should have been buzzing with activity. Instead, GSVVMHSVW[IVIWMPIRXSJ½GMEPWWMXXMRK[MXLPMXXPIXSHSMRXLIMV GYFF]LSPISJ½GIW8LINYWXMGIQMRMWXIVGSQTPEMRIHXLEXLI had no means of exerting his authority, such as sacking MRGSQTIXIRXNYHKIW,ITSMRXIHXSEZEWISJ¾S[IVWPIJX on his desk as a present by a militia who had given him FEGOLMWSJ½GIEJXIVSGGYT]MRKMXJSVX[S[IIOW³-GERSVHIV that vase to be moved,’ he said. ‘But beyond my door, I have no power.’ By 2013 the country had begun to seize up. Early that year a group of amputees wounded in the revolution took over congress, occupying the chamber and daring the authorities to throw them out. Not wanting to do so, congress instead moved its sessions to a nearby hotel. I met the amputees one night on their lonely vigil. They explained that there were about 600 wounded from the war, and the state had done nothing for them. Libya had no physical therapists, no occupational therapists, and no aids to be installed in the homes and cars of the disabled. One man in a rickety wheelchair, his right leg amputated below the knee, showed me a catalogue displaying modern wheelchairs given him by a German aid group. Libya could easily afford to buy those chairs, and buy in the necessary expertise to help these men. Instead, it had done nothing – TEVXP]FIGEYWITSPMXMGEPMR½KLXMRKHSQMREXIHGSRKVIWWERH


Libya

TEVXP]FIGEYWISJEVIPYGXERGISJLIEPXLSJ½GMEPWXSFVMRKMR foreign expertise to make up for their lack of it. A variation on this creeping paralysis was evident in Tripoli port. Lacking computerised management, its quays were in chaos. Each day a dozen merchant ships bobbed up and down at anchor beyond the breakwater. Contractual agreements obliged the Libyan state to pay upwards of $10,000 dollars per ship for each day a vessel was forced to wait to unload. 4SVXQEREKIVW[IRXXSWIIEXVERWTSVXSJ½GMEPXSWYKKIWX reforming the ports. It was easily done, they explained, simply by buying-in an existing management system from (YFEMSV6SXXIVHEQ8LIXVERWTSVXSJ½GMEPWLSSOLMWLIEH saying that the port managers might arrange a kickback from whichever port management system they chose. No problem, said the managers, we can put the port contract out to tender, to ensure no corruption. They told XLIXVERWTSVXSJ½GMEPXLIVI[IVIQER]JSVIMKRGSQTERMIW [LSWTIGMEPMWIHMRSVKERMWMRKXIRHIVW%LWEMHXLISJ½GMEP but then you will arrange a kickback with the tendering company. In vain, port managers explained that hiring a tendering company would not involve the sort of sums to QEOIOMGOFEGOWTSWWMFPI&YXSJ½GMEPW[IVIYRGSRZMRGIH No tendering was ever undertaken, the ports remaining in chaos. ‘This is worse than corruption,’ a port manager told me. ‘Corruption would imply forward movement.’

Violence versus Reform The biggest obstacle to reform was violence. Libya’s revolution was made by militias, and in peace those militias stuck around, battling one another. In September 2012 an Islamist militia killed the American Ambassador Chris Stevens and three of his staff in Benghazi. With a rocket attack on the British Ambassador and the car bombing of the French embassy in Tripoli, Libya was no longer safe. In 2013 a raft of foreign agencies and companies simply quit, and those that stayed were obliged to move around with armed guards. After an attack on the convoy of the EU ambassador outside the Corinthian, EUBAM staff were forbidden to leave the hotel, even to go shopping, without armed escorts. In October 2013 the Corinthia was stormed by an Islamist QMPMXME[LSFVMI¾]OMHRETTIH4VMQI1MRMWXIV%PM>EMHER-RXLI course of their action, the militiamen stormed and occupied XLI)9&%1WIGYVMX]SJ½GIPIEZMRKXLIWXEJJIJJIGXMZIP] unprotected. In this atmosphere, training missions were cut back and any meaningful help to Libya drained to nothing.

In all of this, outside powers watched helplessly. France’s then-president Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron had visited Tripoli right after the revolution to take credit for delivering democracy to Libya. Now world leaders stayed away. Diplomats and the United Nations urged Libyan leaders to focus on reform, but Libyan leaders were happy to ignore the advice. That is not to let Europe off the hook. In one matter European governments made things worse, with Britain, France and Italy competing with each other to sell Libya arms. Notwithstanding the UN arms embargo, and the fact the country was awash with weapons, each power backed its own defence companies to sell Libya new hardware. Britain even sent a Royal Navy frigate to Tripoli harbour to display the wares of UK defence companies, with journalists refused permission to see what was on sale. The European Parliament’s special rapporteur for Libya, Portuguese MEP Anna Gomes, highlighted the contradiction this entailed: on the one hand, European embassies preached transparency and openness to Libyans, while on the other they intrigued in defence deals that were anything but transparent. )9&%1LEHQSZIHJVSQXLI'SVMRXLMEXSEJSVXM½IH compound on the edge of Tripoli when the country tipped into full-scale war. The spark was elections held in June 2014 for a new parliament, the House of Representatives, which saw sharp reverses for Islamists and their allies. In reaction, Islamist and allied militias formed an alliance, Libya Dawn and went to war against pro-government militias. In WM\[IIOWSJ½KLXMRK0MF]E(E[RWIM^IH8VMTSPMXLIIPIGXIH TEVPMEQIRX¾IHXSXLIIEWXIVRGMX]SJ8SFVYOERHXLI country was at war. &].YP]QER]TEVXWSJ8VMTSPM[IVIEFEXXPI½IPHEW0MF]E Dawn militias battled pro-government militias with rockets and shelling. Foreign embassies evacuated, and EUBAM did likewise. One morning in late July a convoy of EUBAM jeeps headed out from its compound across Tripoli, avoiding western districts where shelling was taking place. Then came word that a British diplomatic convoy half an hour ahead of them had been machine-gunned on the city outskirts. Bulletproof glass had saved the British diplomats, but the EU staff decided to turn around. The little convoy headed for the city centre Mitiga airport, where an Italian air force C-130 had arrived to evacuate diplomats and assorted foreigners, MRGPYHMRKQ]WIPJ7TEGI[EWJSYRHJSVXLI)9&%1SJ½GIVW and when everyone was aboard the plane took off,

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climbing steeply away, bringing the EU’s involvement in Libya to an end. EUBAM relocated to neighbouring Tunisia, as did most foreign embassies that had been based in Tripoli, but as the war ground on, the mission was quietly disbanded. The EU no longer has a presence in Libya, beyond token communications with the House of Representatives – still the internationally recognised government.

EU Impotence? The onset of war has revealed the EU’s impotence, with foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini relegated to the role of an ambassador and the real foreign policy controlled by member governments. Its pronouncements on Libya are muddled and confused. In the spring of 2015 the EU suggested military action against smuggler boats, then pulled back from the threat when that failed to persuade the smugglers to stop. Far better perhaps not to LEZIQEHIXLIXLVIEXMRXLI½VWXTPEGI The EU’s last important decision will be whether to insist on Libyan democracy or back a peace deal that would share power between the elected parliament and Libya Dawn. The risk of such a deal is that the factions within that parliament conclude there is more to be gained by armed revolt than the ballot box, leading to its disintegration. The risk of backing the elected government is that more war will follow, as it seeks to crush Libya Dawn. Based on its record to date, the EU can be relied upon to send mixed signals, burying its collective head in the sand. Yet while the EU has done nothing to distinguish itself in Libya – its admirable EUBAM mission apart – neither can it be blamed for the country’s implosion. Neither the EU nor the UN had a mandate to interfere in Libya. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombs may have decided the revolution, but that revolution was made by Libyans themselves. Libya’s own leaders then drove their country into the ground. If there are lessons to be learned from this debacle, as Europe now faces a failed state across the sea, it is that not all the world’s problems can be solved by outside powers 8LIZMI[WMRXLMWTMIGIHSRSXRIGIWWEVMP]VI¾IGXXLSWISJ The Guardian.

Regent’s Report 2015

Further Reading Sandstorm – Libya from +EHEJ½ to Revolution by Lindsey Hilsum, Faber and Faber, 2013 Seeking +EHEJ½F](ERMIP/E[G^]RWOM(MEPSKYI A History of Libya by John Wright, Hurst and Company, 2012 Libya Herald, online English language newspaper: www. libyaherald.com Libya commentator and journalist Mohamed Eljarh – Twitter: @Eljarh – writes for Transitions at Foreign Policy. (IMF Libya country report): www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ dp/2012/1201mcd.pdf UN Security Council Resolution 1973 Panel of Experts report: www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. EWT#W]QFSP!7


Facts and Figures: Libya Geography/demography Area: 1,759,540 sq km Population: 6,244,174 Density: 3.5 per sq km (up to 90% desert) Life expectancy: 76.04 years Growth rate: 3.08%

Economy GDP: $103.3 billion GDP per head: $16,600 Growth rate of economy: -19.8% Military expenditure (% of GDP): no estimate Population below poverty line: approx 33% % of economy in Agriculture: 2% Industry: 45.8% Services: 52.2%

Foreign trade Exports: FMPPMSR GVYHISMPVI½RIHTIXVSPIYQ products, natural gas, chemicals) Imports: FMPPMSR QEGLMRIV]WIQM½RMWLIHKSSHW food, transport equipment, consumer products) Main export partners: Italy, Germany, France, US, Spain Main import partners: Italy, China, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia

FIX[IIRTVS+EHEJ½MERHERXM+EHEJ½JSVGIWMRTSWX +EHEJ½XVMFEPGPEWLIWERHGSRXMRYMRK 

Drugs and other criminality issues Libya is an established market and a transit zone for hashish, a transit point for heroin and cocaine, and – in the larger cities of Tripoli, Misurata and Benghazi – a nascent market for both heroin and cocaine. Cocaine and LIVSMREVIXVEJ½GOIHJVSQXLIWSYXL[IWXIMXLIVHMVIGXP] northward from Sebha or along the southern border and northward for onward movement through Egypt. Hashish is transported either from west Africa along the same routes as heroin and cocaine or eastward from Morocco along the Libyan coast to Egypt. Libya is also a destination and transit country for men and women from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia subjected to forced labour and prostitution; migrants en route to Europe are often subject to these pressures. Militia groups allegedly conscript children under the age of 18. There are no laws for cybercrime or telecommunications in Libya. Transparency International corruption index: 166.

Government budget Revenue: $18.24 billion Expenditure: $25.22 billion Public debt (as % of GDP): 2.9% -RžEXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Transnational issues Various extremist groups control different areas and smuggle weapons over its borders. Dormant disputes MRGPYHI0MF]ERGPEMQWSJEFSYXWUOQWXMPPVIžIGXIH on its maps of south-eastern Algeria and the ruling FLN’s assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in south-eastern Morocco. Various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region also reside in southern Libya.

Refugees 18,653 from Syria; 5,391 from West Bank and Gaza Strip QSVIXLERMRXIVREPP]HMWTPEGIHTIVWSRW GSRžMGX

Regent’s Report 2015


An overview of EU-Egypt relations Dr Sara Bazoobandi Lecturer in International Political Economy, Regent’s University London

“The acute challenges that other countries in the region have presented to the EU have relativised the importance of Egypt in the eyes of European policy-makers” Dr Sara Bazoobandi


Egypt

he overthrow of the Mubarak government in Egypt XVMKKIVIHXLI½VWXMREGLEMRSJYRI\TIGXIHGLERKIW in Egyptian politics. The victory of Mohammad Morsi, XLI-WPEQMWXTVIWMHIRXSJ)K]TXMRXLIGSYRXV]´W½VWX democratic election in over three decades became the next unexpected change of the direction of Egyptian politics. This was followed by the overthrow by the military SJXLI½VWXIZIV-WPEQMWXKSZIVRQIRXMR)K]TXWLSVXP]EJXIV Morsi’s election. The military intervention in July 2013, led by General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, ousted Morsi from the presidency and looked like a return full circle to the political philosophy of Egypt under Mubarak.

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Politics and the Military Many observers warned of a potential shift in Egyptian politics back to the pre-revolution period, and the return SJXLIQMPMXEV]XSTSPMXMGWLEWGVIEXIHEGPIEV½VQPMRI between those who support them and those who do not. Basically that divide is between Islamists and the military. However, General Sisi has made several moves since coming to power that have clouded this divide and made the opposition more diverse by drawing in different players. The more secular and liberal-leaning political players, who had given their full support to removal of Mohammad Morsi, had second thoughts when the constitution was passed in January 2014. Their support began to fall away, sometimes dramatically, as under the new constitution the power of all political parties was sharply limited. Curbing the role of secular political parties as well as the Muslim Brotherhood was a key factor in the falling away of support for Sisi among the political class. Sisi still enjoys some degree of popular support, most of it stemming from the lack of any acceptable alternative, and in particular the fear of an Islamist uprising. Some of the government’s anti-democratic policies can be seen as part of an effort by the military to belittle all political parties. At times this goes so far as to allow security forces to threaten politicians overtly. In addition, the continued delay in holding parliamentary elections has been widely criticised by various pro-democracy groups. A combination of all of these factors has increasingly soured political support for the government from within the various political factions in Egypt. Important sections of the military government have shown almost no desire or tolerance for democratic political activity, and even less for opposition. The Rabaa Massacre in August 2013 and the introduction of the Protest Law in November the same year were key turning points, disappointing those who anticipated a higher degree of

political freedom and protection of human rights in Egypt as a result of Sisi’s assumption of power. Most of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are now in prison. Any who avoided jail have simply been silenced or have left the country, seeing the lengths the state will go to under Sisi to quell dissent. The belief that there is any space for political discussion in Egypt has almost completely faded. The Egyptian economy has begun to improve slightly since the military command took over politics. However, MR¾EXMSRMWVMWMRKEKEMRWXEHIZEPYEXMRK)K]TXMERTSYRHWS the real cost of living is increasing. Ordinary people are more concerned with the risk of an increase to metro tickets in Cairo and the inexorable rise in the price of basic commodities. The population has increasingly become ³½RERGMEPP]YRGSQJSVXEFPI´FYXMWWYJJIVMRKMRWMPIRGI%WXLI risk of terrorism increases across the region, the Egyptian public fears that any societal demand for better economic conditions could lead to increased repression of dissent, and possibly to outbreaks of violence. They are deterred by the horrendous examples of Libya and Syria in their neighbourhood.

Egypt-EU Relations As the events of the past years have been unfolding in Egypt, the international community has shown various reactions. While many Arab countries welcomed the overthrow of the Islamist government in Egypt and turned a blind eye to the destruction of the nascent democratic changes brought to the country, European policy makers have remained skeptical about the aims and achievements of the Egyptian government under Sisi. European leaders LEZIWYTTSVXIHXLI½KLXEKEMRWXXIVVSVMWQ]IXSTIRP] criticised the abuse of political and human rights in Egypt. As a result, the European Union (EU) has struggled to QEMRXEMRMXWMR¾YIRGI[MXLXLI)K]TXMERKSZIVRQIRXSR policy areas beyond security. The EU has not made much progress, for instance, with the implementation of the Action Plan with Egypt, developed within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was to provide the basis for the EU to work with its southern and eastern neighbours to strengthen political association and economic integration. It was revised following the Arab uprisings, with the aim of supporting the transitions in several countries. The goal for the ENP was to build on key values of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and social cohesion. In Egypt, the EU has been waiting more than two years to see a road-map set out by the government in this context.

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Given the chain of post-Mubarak events in Egypt, the prospects for successful engagement by the EU there look remarkably unclear. The revised ENP was based on a ‘more for more’ principle that offers more economic engagement FIRI½XWJSVQSVITVSKVIWWSRHIQSGVEXMGVIJSVQW)ZIR some years after the overthrow of the old regime, there still appears to be very limited room for promoting human rights and political freedoms in Egypt. And the instruments available to the EU appear small and weak compared to what other states are able to offer. The political and social attitude in the country, which is marked by a strong desire to demonstrate independence from the West and to diversify the country’s foreign relations, presents additional challenges to EU engagement in Egypt. Over the past few years the Gulf States have been providing substantial, rapid and unconditional credit lines and foreign aid to Egypt. As these considerable funds GSRXMRYIXS¾S[MRXSXLIGSYRXV]IWWIRXMEPP][MXLSYX WXVMRKWEXXEGLIHXLI)9´WWQEPPIV½RERGMEPEWWMWXERGIXMIH to conditions that hope to incentivise the government in the direction of democratic reforms, has become much less important for the Egyptian government. EU leverage has shrunk.

Over the past few years, the Egyptian government has not had much success in addressing the underlying challenges that the EU recommendations have referred to. It is clear that, even though the ENP principles have been sweetened F]½RERGMEPMRGIRXMZIWXLI)K]TXMERKSZIVRQIRXLEWWLS[R very little interest in engaging with them. This has been the result of a combination of factors. Firstly, anti-Western sentiment has dramatically increased in the Arab world since the beginning of Arab uprising. The West’s responses to the Libyan and Syrian crises have created an all-time high degree of distrust across the Arab world against the motives of Western political leaders. The conditionality attached to European aid, which has always been seen by the Egyptian political leadership as an unnecessary interference in its internal affairs, is no longer EQEXXIVSJWIVMSYWGSRGIVRWMRGI½RERGMEPEWWMWXERGIJVSQ the oil-rich Arab ruling elites in support of anti-Islamist policies in Egypt has been on the rise. Finally, the European economic crisis and the EU response to the migrant crisis have damaged the reputation of EU policy-makers and [IEOIRIHXLIMVMR¾YIRGIEGVSWWXLI[LSPI%VEF[SVPH including Egypt.

Conclusions Against the background of declining leverage related to its VIPEXMZI½RERGMEPMVVIPIZERGIQSWXSJXLI)24´WWSGEPPIH ³QSVIJSVQSVI´EMQWLEZIVIQEMRIHYRJYP½PPIH8LI Egyptian government has been frequently invited by the EU to deliver on the key ENP recommendations and thereby to ‘earn’ increased support. These goals include: ˆImplementing constitutional provisions in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms ˆCreating conditions in support of independent civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) ˆProtecting women’s rights and gender equality ˆClosing down torture camps in Sinai and HMWQERXPMRKXLIVIKMSREPGVMQMREPXVEJ½GOMRK smuggling networks ˆOrganising genuine democratic presidential and parliamentary elections ˆTerminating the use of military courts to judge civilians ˆInvestigating cases of violence, including sexual abuse ˆImplementing macroeconomic reforms and introducing social safety nets

Regent’s Report 2015

The acute challenges that other countries in the region have presented to the EU have relativised the importance of Egypt in the eyes of European policy-makers. Over the past three years, Egypt has moved back to the political dynamics of its pre-revolutionary past. The new military strongman, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, has become the acceptable – if not entirely welcome – face of stability in Egypt, obscuring the current politics of polarisation and repression. The economic challenges for the country remain unresolved, however, despite the generous foreign aid provided by the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabian political IPMXI8LIGSYRXV]´WLMKLPIZIPSJMR¾EXMSR[MHIWTVIEH unemployment and increasing poverty all pose serious problems. The ENP’s revised principles have not achieved much success in Egypt, partly because the underlying challenges are so large and intractable. A common European strategy is much needed and would require serious engagement in Egypt as a priority. Stability in the short term must not prevent democratic transformation of Egypt in the long term. The one will not endure without the other


Facts and Figures: Egypt Geography/demography

Egypt frustrates efforts to investigate or prosecute potential cybercrime.

Area: 1,001,450 sq km Population: 86,895,099 Density: 86.7 per sq km Life expectancy: 73.45 years Growth rate: 1.84%

Further Reading

Economy

European Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR): www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Europes_Neighbourhood.pdf

GDP: $945.4 billion GDP per head: $11,100 Growth rate of economy: 2.2% Military expenditure: 1.72% of GDP Population below poverty line: 26% % of economy in Agriculture: 14.6% Industry: 38.9% Services: 46.5%

Foreign trade Exports: $27.15 billion (crude oil and petroleum products, fruits and vegetables, cotton, textiles, metal products, chemicals, processed food) Imports: $55.26 billion (machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, chemicals, wood products, fuels) Main export partners: Italy, India, Saudi Arabia, China, Germany Main import partners: China, US, Italy, Ukraine, Turkey, Germany

Transparency International corruption index: 94.

European External Action Service (EEAS): http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ Human Rights Watch Reports on Egypt: www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-africa/egypt ‘Egypt’s Durable Misery: Why Sisi’s Regime Is Stable’ by Eric Trager, The Washington Institute, July 2015: www. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/egypts-durablemisery-why-sisis-regime-is-stable ‘Gulf States Pledge Aid to Egypt, US Balks’ by Jay Solomon and Nicolas Parasie, Wall Street Journal, March 2015: www. wsj.com/articles/gulf-states-pledge-additional-12-billion-inaid-to-egypt-1426262660

Government budget Revenue: $65.48 billion Expenditure: $99.14 billion Public debt: 93.8% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Refugees 70,023 from West Bank and Gaza Strip; 12,730 from Sudan; 5,149 from Iraq; 134,329 from Syria; 7,365 from Somalia.

Drugs and other criminality issues Transit point for cannabis, heroin and opium moving to Europe, Israel, and north Africa; transit stop for Nigerian drug couriers. Money laundering due to lax enforcement of ½RERGMEPVIKYPEXMSRW8LIPEGOSJWTIGM½GG]FIVGVMQIPE[WMR

Regent’s Report 2015


The European Union and Israel: Partners with History Uri Dromi Director of the Jerusalem Press Club

“For Israel, confronting the EU is bad; ignoring it, though, is worse� Uri Dromi


Israel

he relationship between the European Union (EU) and Israel is rooted deeply in a loaded historical background. Nineteenth and 20th century Europe, plagued by antiSemitism, was fertile ground for the rise of Zionism. The Holocaust, a unique European phenomenon, destroyed one third of the Jewish people, but with the realisation that there must be a place on earth that the Jews can call their home also opened the way for the creation of the State of Israel.

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Over the years, Europe has been perceived by many Israelis as pro-Palestinian, but at the same time it has become the biggest trade partner of Israel. Europe, in the words of former Israeli ambassador to the EU Oded Eran, has offered the Jewish state – which has always been isolated in the hostile Middle East – a ‘hinterland’. No wonder, then, that in light of all this, the relationship is rightly called ‘special’.

Developing the Special Relationship -RXLI½VWXX[SHIGEHIWEJXIVMXWIWXEFPMWLQIRXMR Israel’s relations with Europe focused on Germany and France. David Ben Gurion, the founder of the State of Israel ERHMXW½VWX4VMQI1MRMWXIVHIGMHIHXLEXXLI]SYRKWXEXI surrounded by enemies and struggling to absorb hundreds of thousands of new immigrants, needed all the support it GSYPHQYWXIV,IHIGPEVIHXLEXMX[EWNYWXM½EFPIXSPIX³RI[ Germany’ repent of the crimes of the old, Nazi state, and assist the newborn Jewish one. The Reparations Agreement between Germany and Israel, signed in 1952, and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1965, signalled the beginning of a strong alliance between the two states. France became another ally of Israel in the mid 1950s, when the two countries were bonded together by a joint enemy, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt, who had been supporting the Algerian uprising on the one hand, ERHWIRHMRKEVQIHMR½PXVEXSVW fedayeen) into Israel on the other. France supplied Israel with modern weapons and, together with Great Britain, colluded to topple Nasser in the ill-fated Operation Musketeer – the Suez crisis of 1956. The honeymoon with France came to its crashing end in 1967 when, following the Six-Day War, Charles de Gaulle imposed an arms embargo on Israel, thus forcing the latter to look for an alternative in America. Relations between Israel and the European Economic Community – the forerunner of the EU – were established in 1959. In 1975, with the signing of the Free Trade Agreement aimed at reducing customs duties on Israeli goods exported to the EU, relations were launched on to

an upward track, offering Israel – a non-member country, outside the European continent – a unique status. This WXEXYW[EWMRHIIHGSR½VQIHEXXLI)YVSTIER'SYRGMP meeting in Essen in 1994, when heads of government stated: ‘The European Council believes that Israel, on account of its high level of economic development, should enjoy special status in its relations with the EU on the basis of reciprocity and common interests.’ The next landmark came shortly afterwards, when the Association Agreement was signed in Brussels in 1995 and VEXM½IHMR8LMWEKVIIQIRXI\TERHIHXLIGSRGIWWMSRW of 1975, aiming at granting customs duty exemption to up to 90% of Israeli agricultural exports. Two bodies were established to monitor and promote the process: a ministerial-level EU-Israel Association Council, and an SJ½GMEPPIZIP)9-WVEIP%WWSGMEXMSR'SQQMXXII

From Association to Action Plan The Association Agreement must be seen in light of two major developments at the time. First, the EU had just launched its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, known also as the Barcelona Process, which aimed at upgrading Europe’s relations with the countries on its southern ¾ERO8SHSXLMWMXEMQIHXSGVIEXIMRXLIVIKMSREWTLIVI of peace and tranquility by expanding a free-trade zone, promoting human rights and democracy, and encouraging joint projects. The second development was the Oslo Process, which EMQIHEXVIWSPZMRKXLI-WVEIPM4EPIWXMRMERGSR¾MGX*SV Europe, these two enterprises were perceived as a golden opportunity to establish itself as a major player in the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East – a role otherwise held by the US. Israel, on the other hand, looked at these ambitions with suspicion. Already the 1995 Essen Declaration included the telling words: ‘In the process, regional economic development in the Middle East, including in the Palestinian areas, will also be boosted.’ And the Association Agreement stipulated that: ‘Relations between the Parties… shall be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guide their internal and international policy and constitutes an essential element of this agreement.’

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In the following years, it turned out that the EU took these words seriously, at times trying to coerce Israel to change its policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians, while Israel preferred to restrict the relationship to the purely economic and WGMIRXM½GWTLIVIWVINIGXMRKXLITSPMXMGEPWXVMRKWEXXEGLIH Indeed, while concrete collaboration kept developing, the basic gap in the two parties’ perspectives was never bridged. With the Israeli-Palestinian peace process coming to a deadlock, with another intifada and three military operations in Gaza, EU-Israel relations were heading towards a turbulent period. In the meantime, however, the two parties made great progress in the non-political domains. EU trade with Israel rose from €19.4 billion in 2003 to €31.4 billion in 2013, making the EU Israel’s biggest trade partner. The special status for Israel, promised two decades previously, had MRHIIHQEXIVMEPMWIH-WVEIP[EWXLI½VWXRSR)YVSTIER country to be admitted to the European science SVKERMWEXMSR')62XLI½VWXRSR)YVSTIERGSYRXV]XSFI accepted by the Framework Program for Research and Technical Development, RTD; and it joined the Galileo project for a global navigation satellite. Overall, Israeli scientists and researchers were engaged in European projects worth more than €4 billion by 2010. While -WVEIPMWGLSPEVWEVXMWXWERH½PQQEOIVWEGGIWWIHKVERXW from MEDA (the EU programme to help Mediterranean non-member countries reform their economic and social structures), Israeli participants were associated with many more European projects.

‘working together with the EU, on a bilateral basis and as a member of the Quartet, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli/ 4EPIWXMRMERGSR¾MGXERHETIVQERIRXX[SWXEXI solution with Israel and a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security’.

Context for the Peace Process So relations continued under the shadow of the IsraeliPalestinian peace process. When the Annapolis Summit in 2007 offered some promise for progress towards peace, the EU, in the eighth Association Council meeting in June 2008, decided to upgrade and intensify relations, for example, by opening the European Health Programme 2008–13 to Israel and adjusting Israeli legislation to European law (acquis). But when Operation Cast Lead – the Israeli incursion into Gaza in January 2009 – rocked the boat again, the EU decided to freeze these steps.

2004 marked a departure from the ambitious goals of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was replaced with the Neighbourhood Policy. This was intended to differentiate and highlight special relations between the EU ERHMRHMZMHYEPRSRQIQFIVWFEWIHSRXLIMVWTIGM½GPIZIP of progress, rather than trying to impose a comprehensive framework on everyone. The new concept, entitled Wider Europe, produced an Action Plan for each partner, and one such plan was signed with Israel in the same year.

This linkage between the peace process and EU-Israel relations notwithstanding, other factors were in play at the same time, making the picture more complex. Following the 9/11, Madrid and London terror attacks in 2001, 2004 ERHVIWTIGXMZIP])9-WVEIPMGSPPEFSVEXMSRMR½KLXMRK crime and terror was boosted. After the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007, the EU decided not to recognise or support the new government there – something the Israeli government viewed with great satisfaction. And although Israel looked with suspicion at the Quartet (the body comprised of the US, Russia, the United Nations ERHXLI)9XSHIEP[MXLXLI-WVEIPM4EPIWXMRMERGSR¾MGX  it agreed to the deployment of European forces in Lebanon after the Second Lebanon War. Finally, the EU shared some of Israel’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear race, but eventually sided with the deal President Obama negotiated with Iran, to which Israel vehemently objected. 2SSRIMRSJ½GMEP-WVEIPFIPMIZIHXLI[SVHWSJ)9JSVIMKR policy chief Mogherini in Vienna in July 2015, that this accord ‘will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful’.

This Action Plan was received with satisfaction by Israeli leaders, because it boosted Israel’s special advantages in science, hi-tech, agro-tech and more. It turned out to be a double-edged sword, however, because this bilateral agreement did not relieve Israel of political expectations from the EU, but on the contrary, put even more pressure on Israel. The Action Plan stated clearly that it saw Israel:

8LIWI¾YGXYEXMSRWRSX[MXLWXERHMRKMX[EWXLIWIXXPIQIRXW that remained a constant issue of deep disagreement. In 2013 the EU adopted a binding directive, according to which the Israeli government will be required to state in any future agreements with the EU that settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are outside the state of -WVEIP¯EKEMRWSQIXLMRKSJ½GMEP-WVEIPJSYRHERHGSRXMRYIW XS½RHHMJ½GYPXTIVLETWMQTSWWMFPIXSEGGITX

Regent’s Report 2015


Israel

Entrenched Positions It seems that the prospects of Israel-EU relations improving, or even of being upgraded, are not so bright. The main reason is the seemingly unbridgeable gap in the parties’ ETTVSEGLXSXLI4EPIWXMRMER-WVEIPMGSR¾MGX8LI)9FIPMIZIW in a two-state solution as the only viable way to solve the JIYHFIX[IIR%VEFWERH.I[W[LSLEZIFIIR½KLXMRKSZIV the same piece of land for over a century. Israel, or at least the current Israeli Government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, does not. While Netanyahu, in his Bar Ilan speech of 2009, reluctantly said he favoured the idea of a Palestinian state living in peace next to Israel, in his actual conduct he has clearly been demonstrating that he remains loyal to his old belief – strongly expressed in his book A Place Among the Nations – that such a Palestinian state would pose a mortal danger to Israel. Naftali Bennett, a senior minister in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government, said it loudly last February, when – as reported in the Times of Israel – he dismissed the idea of a two-state solution, adding that ‘if it means that the world will penalise us, that is unfair, but so be it’. *MREPP]-WVEIPM4VIWMHIRX6IYZIR6MZPMREW]QFSPMG½KYVILIEH who nevertheless enjoys great popularity in Israel, speaks openly about one state between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, where Arabs and Jews would be equal citizens. The Israelis are not indifferent to these shifting nuances: a recent poll, published in The Times of Israel in June 2015, shows that support for a two-state solution dropped in 2015 to 51 percent, from 62 percent in 2014. Meanwhile, the EU is not only entrenched in its strict support of the two-state solution, but it is also taking practical steps to try and coerce Israel to follow the same path. A report of the European Council on Foreign Relations in July 2015, entitled EU Differentiation and Israeli Settlements, puts it in no uncertain terms: “Under its own regulations and principles, Europe cannot legally escape from its duty to differentiate between Israel and its activities in the occupied Palestinian territories.” Labelling products originating from Jewish settlements in the West Bank has been in practice for quite a while, but the report also suggests targeting Israeli banks operating MRXLI;IWX&EROEWIVMSYWWXIT[LMGL-WVEIPMSJ½GMEPWZMI[ as equal to BDS (boycott, divestment, sanctions). Indeed, a total boycott of Israel by the EU is not ruled out in Israeli SJ½GMEPXLMROMRK%WIGVIXVITSVXF]XLI-WVEIPM1MRMWXV]SJ Finance in 2013 warned that such a boycott would cost the country some $23.3 billion of exports, cut $11 billion from

the gross domestic product and lose 36,500 jobs. In light of all this, no wonder Jean Techau, Director of Carnegie Europe, wrote a paper titled EU-Israel Relations: Hijacked by Settlements? The two-state solution, then, positions Israel and the EU on a collision course. Israelis are bitter because they feel – not without some justice – that the EU puts the onus on them only, while ignoring the contribution of the Palestinians to sinking the two-state option. After all, Israel argues, by avoiding direct negotiations with Israel and going to the UN and the International Criminal Court, Mahmoud Abbas is bypassing the only way to a two-state solution. And if Abbas keeps his word about resigning, who knows how VEHMGEP[LSIZIV[MPPVITPEGILMQGSYPHFI#%RH[LEXX[S state solution is in sight anyway, with Hamas-ruled Gaza and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-run West &ERORIZIVWSHMZMHIHEWXLI]EVIRS[#

Prospects The EU, however, does not seem to be impressed. On the face of it, Federica Mogherini exchanged smiles with Benjamin Netanyahu when she last stood next to him in a press conference in Jerusalem. Behind the scenes, though, things look much grimmer. Mogherini recently received a blunt letter from the European Eminent Persons Group, which includes former prime ministers, foreign ministers and ambassadors, in which the signatories, who have spent years trying to promote the two-state solution, urge her to adopt a harsher stance vis-à-vis Israel. ‘We seem to forget that the context in Palestine is one of 47 years of military occupation,’ they write in unprecedented strong language, ‘characterized by grave violations of international law.’ 8LIVIJSVIXLI]JIIPXLEX³)YVSTILEW]IXXS½RHERIJJIGXMZI way of holding Israel to account for the way it maintains the occupation.’ This is not a ranting of has-beens. This may well be the direction the EU is going to take. If further proof were needed, then the acting foreign ministers of the EU just sent Mogherini a sharp letter urging her to move ahead with the marking of Israeli products produced in the settlements – a measure that already has been EXLSVRMRXLI¾IWLSJVIPEXMSRW*YVXLIVQSVI*VERGI perhaps spearheading a motion that the EU as a whole might follow, is now considering the recognition of a Palestinian state. This could throw Israel-EU relations back by decades, perhaps to the dark days of 1980 when, following the Venice Summit, which called for two states for two peoples, then Prime Minister Menachem Begin

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equated that declaration with Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Indeed, following the EU parliament’s motion in September 2015 to label products from Jewish settlements, Benjamin Netanyahu said: ‘We remember history, and we remember what happened when the products of Jews were labelled in Europe.’ For Israel, confronting the EU is bad; ignoring it, though, is worse. In November 2013, the Israeli government hesitated over whether or not to join the Horizon 2020 WGMIRXM½GGSSTIVEXMSRTVSKVEQQI[MXLXLI)9FIGEYWI of the political caveats attached regarding settlements and relations with the Palestinians. This caused Professor Ruth Arnon, then President of the Israel Academy of Sciences, to issue an unprecedented harsh statement urging the Government to sign. Professor Arnon explained that the EZIVEKIEGGITXERGIVEXIJSV-WVEIPMTVSTSWEPWJSVWGMIRXM½G collaboration stood at 60%, compared to the European average of 9%. She warned that failing to sign would result in ‘disaster’ with irreversible consequences for the Israeli WGMIRXM½GGSQQYRMX])ZIRXYEPP]XLI-WVEIPMKSZIVRQIRX signed the agreement, despite its reservations. There has always been a feeling among Europeans dealing with Israel, that Israel – perhaps because of its close alliance with the US – does not take Europe seriously enough. Also, they probably heard Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly urging his ministers to travel to China and sign trade and other contracts there. This perceived Israeli indifference towards Europe caused the French Ambassador to Israel, Patrick Maisonnave, to take an unprecedented step. In an open letter to the Israeli public, published in Haaretz newspaper in January 2014, he complained that the EU had just offered Israel a Special Privileged Partnership – WSQIXLMRKTISTPISYXWMHI)YVSTIEVI½KLXMRKXSKIXÂŻSR condition that peace with the Palestinians is concluded, and that nobody in Israel even cared to respond. Israel should work proactively for a two-state solution, not to please the EU, but rather to save both its democracy and its Jewish character. In doing so, however, Israel will also save its relations with Europe, which took decades of hard work to establish and promote

Regent’s Report 2015

Further Reading EU-Israel relations: Confrontation or co-operation? By Yehuda Ben-Hur Levy, Centre for European Reform, 2014 The European Union and Israel: A lasting and Ambiguous ‘Special’ Relationship by Caroline Du Plessix, English translation by Judith Grumbach, Bulletin du Centre de recherche français Ă JĂŠrusalem, 2011 The Middle East under Fire? EU-Israel Relations in a Region FIX[IIR;EVERH'SRžMGX6IWSPYXMSR by Roby Nathanson and Stephan Stetter, Eds, Israeli-European Policy Network, May 2007 Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union by Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Lexington Books, 2010 8LI)9ERHXLI-WVEIPM4EPIWXMRMER'SRžMGX-R Pursuit of a Just Peace by Anders Persson, Lexington Books, 2015. The website of the EU’s delegation in Israel: www.eu-del. org.il


Facts and Figures: Israel Geography/demography

Refugees

Area: 20,770 sq km. Absolute population number: 7,821,850 Density: 376.6 per sq km Life expectancy: 81.28 years Growth rate: 1.46% (2014)

35,214 from Eritrea, 12,542 from Sudan

Economy

Transparency International corruption index score: 37.

Drugs and other criminality issues; 400,000 cybercrime attacks against Israeli targets in 2014. Illicit drugs enter from Lebanon and Jordan.

GDP: $268.3 billion GDP per head: $33,400 Growth rate: 2.5% Military expenditure (% of GDP) 5.69% Population below poverty line: 21% ($7.30 per day) % of economy in Agriculture: 2.4% Industry: 25.7% Services: 71.9%

Foreign trade Exports: $63.21 billion (machinery and equipment, software, cut diamonds, agricultural products, chemicals, textiles and apparel) Imports: $69.73 billion (raw materials, military equipment, investment goods, rough diamonds, fuels, grain, consumer goods) Main export partners: US, Hong Kong, UK, Belgium, China Main import partners: US, China, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium

Government budget Revenue: $73.44 billion Expenditure: $81.82 billion Public debt: 67.4% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Transnational issues West Bank is Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement – permanent status to be determined through further negotiation. Israel has withdrawn its settlers and military from the Gaza Strip. The Golan Heights, originally Syrian, have been held by Israel since 1967, a position not recognised by the international community.

Regent’s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: West Bank and Gaza Palestinian Territories: West Bank and Gaza Geography/demography Area: West Bank 5,860 sq km; Gaza 360 sq km Population: West Bank 2,790,000; Gaza 1,760,000 Density: West Bank 493 per sq km; Gaza 4,822 per sq km Life expectancy: West Bank 72 years (m); 75 years (f). Gaza 71 years (m); 74 years (f) Growth rate: West Bank 1.99%; Gaza 2.91%

Drugs and other criminality issues 1MRSVREVGSXMGWXVEJ½GOMRKERHREVGSXMGWFEWIHQSRI] laundering. Cash smuggling, intellectual property rights violations and counterfeit currency issues, tradebased money laundering and customs fraud common. Transparency International reports that corruption is ‘endemic in the Palestinian Authority, the private sector and NGOs’ operating in the Palestinian Territories and cost the EU over €2 billion in aid misused and diverted between 2008 and 2012.

Economy GDP: West Bank $5.065 billion; Gaza $1.878 billion. GDP per head: West Bank $2,051; Gaza $1,878. Growth rate: West Bank 0.7%; Gaza 6.3% Population below poverty line: West Bank 18% (2011 est.) Gaza 39% % of economy in Agriculture: West Bank 2.9%; Gaza 8.4% Industry: West Bank 23.6%; Gaza 12.3% Services: West Bank 73.5%; Gaza 79.3%

Foreign trade Exports: West Bank $777.685 million; Gaza $4.683 million (stone, olives, fruit, vegetables, limestone; from Gaza: irregular shipments) Imports: West Bank $4,305.590 million; Gaza $391.766 million (food, consumer goods, construction materials, petroleum, chemicals) Main export partners: Israel, Jordan, UAE, Algeria, Egypt Main import partners: Israel, Jordan, Turkey, China

Government budget Revenue: $2.742 billion Expenditure: $4.279 billion Public debt (as % of GDP): 41% -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Refugees 762,288 + 1,258,559 (Palestinian refugees from occupied territories, according to United National Relief and Works Agency). Gaza also has 263,500 internally displaced persons (IDP).

Regent’s Report 2015

No TI index score.


Syria, Lebanon and Jordan: Uneven Engagement with the EU Jonathan Fryer School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

“The deteriorating security situation in the region during 2014 has meant that LQ[\QVK\LQ‫ٺ‬MZMVKM[PI^MM^WT^MLQV\PM TM^MT[WN MVOIOMUMV\Ja\PM-=QV;aZQI 4MJIVWVIVL2WZLIVº 2WVI\PIV.ZaMZ


Syria, Lebanon and Jordan

uropean Union (EU) attitudes and actions in relation to the Levant are largely framed within the European Neighbourhood Policy as applied to the eastern Mediterranean. But the deteriorating security situation in XLIVIKMSRHYVMRKEWEVIWYPXSJXLIGSR¾MGXWMR7]VME and Iraq and the rise of ISIS/Da’esh has meant that distinct differences have evolved in the levels of engagement by the EU in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.

E

Syria The legal basis for EU relations with Syria remains the 1977 bilateral Cooperation Agreement (amended in 1986 and 1994). However, events since the start of anti-government protests in Syria in March 2011, and the subsequent civil war and humanitarian crisis, have radically changed the nature of the relationship, as well as changing European priorities, and have prompted the Agreement’s suspension. The EU has also made clear its determination that, in the IZIRXSJEWYGGIWWJYPWIXXPIQIRXSJXLIGYVVIRXGSR¾MGX¯ LS[IZIVVIQSXIXLEXQE]WIIQ¯XLSWIVIWTSRWMFPIJSV the numerous grave violations of human rights and the killing of thousands of civilians must be held accountable. There will also be a pressing demand for reconstruction throughout the country. But beyond that, it may be a reasonable assumption to conclude there will be a return to the status quo ante in terms of economic cooperation. The Cooperation Agreement largely covers trade issues, in particular providing for duty-free access to the EU market for most Syrian industrial goods and offering assistance to the country’s production and economic infrastructure. Until the launch of the Barcelona Process (forming the basis for Euro-Mediterranean partnership) in 1995, the Cooperation Agreement provided the source of funding for the EU’s development cooperation with Syria. In Syria’s case, implementing the outcomes of the Barcelona Process has proved singularly problematic. Between 1998 and 2004, a European-Syrian Association Agreement was negotiated and initialled, though not signed, as at the time the EU felt the political circumstances in Syria were not right. In 2009, following a series of political reforms brought in by President Bashar al-Assad, the EU member states unanimously agreed that they wished to sign the Agreement, but this time the hesitation was in Damascus, not Brussels. The Syrian government responded to the European Council’s invitation to sign with a request to study the Agreement further. Intervening developments have now put the matter on hold.

If and when both sides feel the moment is opportune to sign the Association Agreement, it will (unless extensively amended) cover three main areas: ˆ An institutional framework for regular political dialogue on bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest and an instrument to foster mutual understanding ˆ The creation of a free-trade area between the EU and Syria through tariff dismantlement over a period of 12 years. Trade will be facilitated through regulatory approximation, as well as administrative and economic reform ˆ'SSTIVEXMSRMRE[MHIVERKISJ½IPHWMRGPYHMRK education and science, cultural heritage and environmental protection, agriculture, health, MRZIWXQIRXERHXLI½KLXEKEMRWXSVKERMWIHGVMQI In May 2011, following the violent suppression by the Syrian authorities of anti-government protests, the EU suspended its bilateral cooperation programmes with Syria ERHJVS^IMXW½RERGMEPERHXIGLRMGEPEWWMWXERGI6IWXVMGXMZI measures in areas such as oil, banking and trade were progressively implemented and travel bans imposed on a VERKISJ7]VMERSJ½GMEPWERHQMPMXEV]½KYVIW,YQERVMKLXW violations were condemned by the EU in the strongest terms, and in June 2013 the EU set out a comprehensive ETTVSEGLMRVIWTSRWIXSXLIGSR¾MGX¯FSXLMRWMHI7]VME ERHMRRIMKLFSYVMRKGSYRXVMIW¯MRENSMRXGSQQYRMGEXMSR This stated that the aim of an EU policy should be to: ˆ Support a political process that brings a sustainable solution to the crisis ˆ Prevent regional destabilisation from the spill-over SJXLIGSR¾MGXXSRIMKLFSYVMRKGSYRXVMIW ˆ Address the dramatic humanitarian situation and assist the affected populations ˆ%HHVIWWXLIGSRWIUYIRGIWSJXLIGSR¾MGXSRERHMR the EU %QSRKXLIWTIGM½GQIEWYVIWSYXPMRIHMRXLI communication, the EU declared its intentions to: ˆ Engage with the Syrian opposition ˆ Increase support for hosting communities in the countries neighbouring Syria, in order to support and enhance their capacity to deal with the refugees ˆ Prevent the radicalisation of EU citizens and deal [MXLXLI)9³JSVIMKR½KLXIVW´XLEXLEZIXVEZIPPIHXS

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XLIGSR¾MGX^SRI ˆ4VITEVIJSVXLITSWXGSR¾MGXVIGSRWXVYGXMSRERH rehabilitation phase In October 2014 a meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council endorsed a Syria and Iraq Counter-Terrorism/ Foreign Fighters Strategy, which aimed to enhance or restore conditions conducive to political stability in the region. The strategy acknowledged that counter-terrorism cannot operate in isolation from the wider political process, but must be woven into the international community’s agenda as part of a comprehensive approach, including an emphasis on preventive work. The intention of this is to provide a longer-term framework that would minimise the risks to Europe and European interests and the threat to regional stability from terrorism emanating from Syria and Iraq, while contributing to the strategic defeat of ISIS/ Da’esh and Jabhat al-Nusra, including their violent ideology. This Counter-Terrorism/Foreign Fighters Strategy then FIGEQIERMRXIKVEPTEVXSJER)96IKMSREP7XVEXIK]JSV Syria, Iraq and the Da’esh Threat, adopted by a Council meeting in March 2015. The EU reiterated the urgent RIIHXS½RHETSPMXMGEPWSPYXMSRXSXLIGVMWMWEW[IPPEW its willingness to work with interested parties, including the United Nations (UN), the League of Arab States and other regional and international partners. While fully supporting the efforts of the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, to de-escalate the violence little by little in preparation for a broader, sustainable political process, XLI)9IQTLEWMWIWXLEXXLISZIVEPPSFNIGXMZIVIQEMRWE Syrian-led process that meets the aspirations of all the Syrian people, based on the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 and in line with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In the meantime, the Syrian crisis has produced the worst humanitarian disaster of recent years, to which the EU and its constituent member states have been leading the international response. As the largest donor, they have mobilised over €3 billion in humanitarian and HIZIPSTQIRXEMHWMRGIXLIGVMWMWFIKER¯EMHXLEXLEWFIIR dispensed both within Syria and to refugees and their host communities. Among other things, humanitarian funding has been providing medical emergency relief, food and nutritional assistance, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and logistics services. More than 4 million Syrians have ¾IHXLIGSYRXV]ERHEPXLSYKLXLIQENSVMX]LEZIJSYRH WERGXYEV]MRRIMKLFSYVMRKGSYRXVMIW¯RSXEFP]8YVOI] 0IFERSR.SVHERERH-VEU¯SXLIVWLEZIXVMIHXSVIEGL

Regent’s Report 2015

Europe, often by clandestine means and at considerable risk to their lives. This situation reached a crescendo in the late summer of 2015 as many tens of thousands set their WMKLXWSRVIEGLMRK+IVQER]ERHSXLIVEJ¾YIRX)9QIQFIV states. In May 2015, shaken by the number of deaths by drowning of Syrian refugees and other migrants in the Mediterranean, the EU decided to establish a naval force ¯)92%:*36¯[MXLXLIEMQSJHMWVYTXMRKXLI[SVOSJ GVMQMREPTISTPIWQYKKPIVWERHXVEJ½GOIVW'LEMVMRKXLI QIIXMRKXLI)YVSTIER,MKL6ITVIWIRXEXMZIJSV*SVIMKR Affairs, Federica Mogherini, said the naval force was part of a comprehensive approach to solving the wider migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Greece and Italy in particular have both been put under enormous pressure because of the volume of arrivals, especially from Syria. 9RHIVXLI(YFPMR6IKYPEXMSREW]PYQWIIOIVWEVIWYTTSWIH XSFITVSGIWWIHMRXLI½VWX)9GSYRXV]XLI]IRXIVFYX the system broke down in the late summer of 2015, particularly after many thousands of Syrians and others entered Hungary from Serbia within a matter of days. Germany then announced that it would accept Syrian VIJYKIIW[LSWYGGIIHIHMRVIEGLMRKXLI*IHIVEP6ITYFPMG Several other EU member states indicated that the urgency of the situation meant the rules would have to be bent. The possible knock-on effect of all this could be huge, not NYWXJSV7]VMERERHSXLIVEW]PYQWIIOIVWFYXEPWSJSVXLI principle of free movement within the EU and subsequently the cohesion of the Schengen Agreement

Further Reading European-Syrian Cooperation Agreement: http://eeas. europa.eu/delegations/syria/eu_syria/political_relations/ agreements/index_en.htm Association between the EC and Syria: http://register. consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09921.en09.pdf EU approach to the Syrian crisis: http://eeas.europa. eu/statements/docs/2013/130624_1_comm_native_ NSMRCCCGSQQYRMGEXMSRCJVSQCGSQQMWWMSRCXSCMRWXC en_v10_p1_7332751.pdf


Facts and Figures: Syria Geography/demography

Drugs and other criminality issues

Area: 185,180 sq km Population: 17,951,639 Density: 96.9 per sq km Life expectancy: 68.41 years Growth rate: -9.73%

A transit point for opiates, hashish and cocaine bound for regional and Western markets. Weak anti-money-laundering controls and bank privatisation may aggravate situation. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians, foreign migrant workers, ERHVIJYKIIWLEZIžIHXLIGSYRXV]ERHEVIZYPRIVEFPI XSLYQERXVEJ½GOMRK0EGOSJWIGYVMX]ERHMREGGIWWMFMPMX] of most of the country makes it impossible to conduct a thorough analysis, but Syria is a source and destination GSYRXV]JSVQIR[SQIRERHGLMPHVIRWYFNIGXIHXSJSVGIH PEFSYVERHWI\XVEJ½GOMRK8LI7]VMEREVQ]ERHSTTSWMXMSR forces are said to be using Syrian children in combat, in support roles, and as human shields.

Economy GDP: $107.6 billion (2011) GDP per head: $5,100 (2011) % of economy in Agriculture: 17% Industry: 16% Services: 67% Growth rate of economy: Approx -40% over the past four years

Transparency International corruption index: 159.

Foreign trade Exports: $2.031 billion (crude oil, minerals, petroleum TVSHYGXWJVYMXWERHZIKIXEFPIWGSXXSR½FVIXI\XMPIW clothing, meat and live animals, wheat). Imports: $7.657 billion (machinery and transport equipment, electric power machinery, food and livestock, metal and metal products, chemicals and chemical products, plastics, yarn, paper). Main export partners: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Libya Main import partners: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, China

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR Expenditure: $5.5 billion Public debt: 57.3% of GDP -RžEXMSRVEXI  EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW

Transnational issues Refugees 4EPIWXMRMERVIJYKIIW 9RMXIH2EXMSRW6IPMIJERH;SVOW %KIRG]½KYVIW ERHERYRHIXIVQMRIHRYQFIVJVSQ Iraq. The ongoing civil war has created almost 4 million Syrian refugees, dispersed in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and an increasing number to western Europe. In addition there are 7.6 million internally displaced persons (IDP).

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

Lebanon Bilateral relations with Lebanon are based on the EU-Lebanon Association Agreement of 2006, which established a framework for political dialogue as well as boosting trade and promoting cooperation in both IGSRSQMGERHWSGMEP½IPHW-RXLMW[EWIPEFSVEXIHMRXS a very detailed Action Plan for EU-Lebanon Partnership ¯VI¾IGXMRKXLIJEGXXLEX0IFERSR´WWYGGIWWMZI governments have shared a commitment to political ERHIGSRSQMGVIJSVQWXLVSYKLPIKMWPEXMSREHNYWXQIRX of policies and improvements in public administration. 0IFERSR[EWXLYWMRTSPITSWMXMSRXSFIRI½XJVSQXLI)9´W revised European Neighbourhood Policy, which aims to: ˆProvide increased assistance to partners who engage in deepening democracy and respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms ˆSupport the development of a sustainable and inclusive economy that reduces social and regional MRIUYEPMXMIWGVIEXIWNSFWERHMQTVSZIWXLIPMZMRK standards of the population ˆEstablish a closer partnership with the peoples and civil societies of the partner countries 8LI%GXMSR4PERJSV)90IFERSR4EVXRIVWLMTMHIRXM½IH WTIGM½GEVIEWEWTVMSVMXMIWJSVEGXMSRVERKMRKJVSQ VIJSVQMRKXLINYWXMGIERHTVMWSRW]WXIQWXSIRLERGMRK the effectiveness of the Lebanese parliament, to implementing a national education strategy, and to developing an energy strategy aimed at extending power supply and promoting the use of renewable and low-carbon energy. In all 13 areas, benchmarks were IWXEFPMWLIHERHMRHMGEXSVWHI½RIHXSIREFPIEGVMXMGEP appraisal of the success of the Plan’s implementation. Though the Plan initially runs for only three years, the hope is that, if successful, it will be extended. Under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (the QEMRVIPIZERX)9½RERGMEPMRWXVYQIRXJSVXLITIVMSH ¯ 0IFERSRVIGIMZIWºQMPPMSRTIV]IEVMR ½RERGMEPEWWMWXERGI-R7ITXIQFIVXLI)YVSTIER Commission published a Single Support Framework for )9EMHXS0IFERSR ¯ EGORS[PIHKMRKWSQISJXLI particular challenges that Lebanon faces. First, Lebanon is a fragile state, characterised by weak institutions that are prey to entrenched confessional divisions, which makes the adoption and implementation of non-sectarian government policies, including the national defence WXVEXIK]ERHXLIFYHKIXHMJ½GYPX7IGSRH0IFERSRLEW

Regent’s Report 2015

FIIRTEVXMGYPEVP]FEHP]EJJIGXIHF]XLI7]VMERGSR¾MGXHYI to its geographical position and historic, economic and social ties. Though Lebanon disassociated itself from the Syrian GSR¾MGXMRXLI&EEFHE(IGPEVEXMSRSJMXLEWMRIZMXEFP] been profoundly affected, not least by the arrival of well over 1 million Syrian refugees who are a very visible presence throughout the small country. The EU has devised programmes that are in line with the Lebanese KSZIVRQIRX´WTPERMRVIWTSRWIXSXLMWVIJYKIIMR¾Y\3RI I\EQTPIMWXLITVSKVEQQI6IEGLMRK%PP'LMPHVIR[MXL Education, launched by the Ministry of Education. It aims to ensure that vulnerable school-age children affected by the Syria crisis have access to both formal and non-formal learning opportunities of high quality. The EU also strongly supports the International Support Group for Lebanon convened by the United Nations and takes an active part in its meetings. Despite this strong focus on the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon, the EU in 2014 also reviewed the longerterm issue of Palestinian refugees in the country, noting several encouraging improvements. The Palestinians’ living GSRHMXMSRWERHPIKEPVMKLXW[IVINYHKIHXSLEZIMQTVSZIH through new employment opportunities and access to property, education and health services. The infrastructure in the Palestinian refugee camps had been rehabilitated and upgraded. Moreover, dialogue between the Lebanese authorities and Palestinian refugees had improved, including on such matters as legal status, human rights issues and governance mechanisms in the camps

Further Reading Euro-Mediterranean agreement with Lebanon: http://eeas. europa.eu/lebanon/docs/euro_mediterranean_agreement_ en.pdf Action plan for EU-Lebanon partnership: http://eeas. europa.eu/lebanon/docs/action_plan_for_eu-lebanon_ partnership_and_cooperation_2013-2015_en.pdf


Facts and Figures: Lebanon Geography/demography

Illicit drugs and other criminality issues

Area: 10,400 sq km Population: 5,882,562 Density: 565.6 per sq km Life expectancy: 77 years Growth rate: 9.37%

'ERREFMWGYPXMZEXMSRHVEQEXMGEPP]VIHYGIHSTMYQTSTT] GYPXMZEXMSRQMRMQEPQSRI]PEYRHIVMRKSJHVYKTVSGIIHW JYIPWGSRGIVRXLEXI\XVIQMWXWEVIFIRI½XMRKJVSQHVYK XVEJ½GOMRK%PWSWSYVGIERHXVERWMXGSYRXV]JSV[SQIRERH GLMPHVIRWYFNIGXIHXSJSVGIHPEFSYVERHWI\XVEJ½GOMRK Despite government’s good intentions, refugee women and children in Lebanon are at increased risked of sex XVEJ½GOMRK0IFERSR´W']FIVGVMQIERH-RXIPPIGXYEP4VSTIVX] &YVIEY?%6AIWXEFPMWLIHMRRSXMQQYRIJVSQ TSPMXMGMWEXMSREPWSWLSVXSRGETEGMX]ERHJYRHMRK

Economy GDP: $80.51 billion GDP per head: $17,900 Growth rate: 2.3% Military expenditure: (% of GDP): 4.04 Population below poverty line: 28% % of economy in Agriculture: 6.3% Industry: 21.1% Services: 72.6%

Transparency International corruption index: 136.

Foreign trade Exports:FMPPMSR NI[IPPIV]FEWIQIXEPWGLIQMGEPW consumer goods, fruit and vegetables, tobacco, electric TS[IVQEGLMRIV]ERHW[MXGLKIEVXI\XMPI½FVIWTETIV Imports: $21.2 billion (petroleum products, cars, medicinal products, clothing, meat and live animals, consumer goods, paper, textile fabrics, tobacco, electrical machinery and equipment, chemicals) Main export partners: South Africa, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Syria, Switzerland, Iraq Main import partners: US, Italy, China, France, Germany, Turkey, Egypt

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR Expenditure: $14.89 billion Public debt (as % of GDP): 142.4% -RžEXMSRVEXI  EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW

Transnational issues Lebanon’s borders with Syria and Israel remain unresolved. :EVMSYWI\XVIQMWXKVSYTWERHEVQIHQSZIQIRXWSTIVEXI from its borders, the largest being Hezbollah.

Refugees JVSQ7]VME4EPIWXMRMERWJVSQ-VEU 19,719 internally displaced persons.

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

Jordan The EU continues to have excellent relations with Jordan on the basis of an Advanced Status Partnership agreed in 2010, which recognises that the Hashemite Kingdom TPE]WEWXEFMPMWMRKERHQSHIVEXMRKVSPIMREHMJ½GYPX regional environment, while at the same time pursuing efforts to strengthen democracy and the rule of law. The legal basis for the bilateral relationship is an Association Agreement that entered into force on 1 May 2002, but the main priorities for the current agenda for EU-Jordan relations are set out in an Action Plan under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), adopted in 2005. A second EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan, scheduled to run for ½ZI]IEVW[EWJSVQEPP]EHSTXIHMRGSZIVMRKEZIV] wide range of bilateral cooperation in keeping with Jordan’s ‘advanced status’. The following year, a three-year National Indicative Programme (with a budget of â‚Ź223 million) was successfully completed. This pursued four main priorities: ˆSupporting Jordan’s reforms in the areas of HIQSGVEG]LYQERVMKLXWQIHMEERHNYWXMGI ˆTrade, enterprise and investment development ˆSustainability of the growth process ˆSupport for the implementation of the Action Plan In 2014, funding to Jordan through the European Neighbourhood Initiative (ENI) was â‚Ź104.5 million, GSRGIRXVEXIHSRX[STVSKVEQQIWÂłTYFPMG½RERGI management and public administration reforms’ and ‘skills for employment and social inclusion’. In addition, Jordan FIRI½XIHJVSQÂşQMPPMSRSJ)VEWQYWJYRHMRKJSGYWIH mainly on education. Smaller amounts were also made available through the European Instrument for Democracy ERH,YQER6MKLXW8LI)2-JYRHMRKJSVXLITIVMSH ÂŻMWI\TIGXIHXSFIMRI\GIWWSJÂşQMPPMSRERH will be particularly targeted at reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery, employment and private sector development, and VIRI[EFPIIRIVKMIWERHIRIVK]IJ½GMIRG] Like Lebanon, Jordan has been impacted severely by the 7]VMERGSRžMGXMRGPYHMRKEGGSQQSHEXMRKVIJYKIIWQSVI than 600,000 of whom had registered with the UN High 'SQQMWWMSRIVJSV6IJYKIIW 92,'6 MR.SVHERF] February 2015. Jordan has accordingly been included in the EU’s regional strategy in response to the Syria and Iraq GSRžMGXWERHXLI(E´IWLXLVIEXEHSTXIHMR1EVGL The EU, its participating member states and Jordan also agreed the setting-up of a mobility partnership, in which

Regent’s Report 2015

they committed themselves to ensuring that migration is managed as effectively as possible, to improve the situation of migrants, especially asylum seekers. -REHHMXMSRXSXLIVIJYKIIMRžY\MR.SVHERWYJJIVIH the loss of trade routes, markets and energy supplies EWEVIWYPXSJXLIGSRžMGXWRIEVF]-RMXW)24'SYRXV] 4VSKVIWW6ITSVXJSVXLI)9GSRKVEXYPEXIH.SVHER for showing great resilience in the face of regional crises and for remaining a moderate and tolerant key player regionally. In particular, the EU noted that, in spite of the WMKRM½GERXXLVIEXWJVSQVIKMSREPGSRžMGXW.SVHERQEREKIH to maintain domestic stability and to press ahead with its democratic transition process, including an expansion of XLINYVMWHMGXMSRSJER-RHITIRHIRX)PIGXSVEP'SQQMWWMSR and the elaboration of a new legal framework for political TEVXMIW1SVIRIKEXMZIP]MRXLI½IPHSJLYQERVMKLXW.SVHER was criticised for suspending its moratorium on the death penalty, executing 11 individuals in December 2014 and two more in February 2015. Nonetheless, the EU and Jordan have continued to prepare negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area which, when completed, will give Jordan enhanced access to EU markets and further strengthen an already close relationship

Further Reading EU/Jordan ENP Action Plan: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/ THJEGXMSRCTPERWCNSVHERCEGXMSRCTPERCIRTHJ


Facts and Figures: Jordan Geography/demography Area: 89,342 sq km Population: 7,930,491 Density: 88.7 per sq km Life expectancy: 74.1 years Growth rate: 3.86%

Economy GDP: $79.77 billion GDP per head: $11,900 Growth rate of economy: 3% Military expenditure (% of GDP): 4.65 Population below poverty line: 14.2% (2002) % of economy in Agriculture: 2% Industry: 20% Services: 78%

Foreign trade Exports: $8.556 billion (clothing, fertilisers, potash, phosphates, vegetables, pharmaceuticals) Imports: FMPPMSR GVYHISMPVI½RIHTIXVSPIYQ products, machinery, transport equipment, iron, cereals) Main export partners: Iraq, US, Saudi Arabia, India, UAE Main import partners: Saudi Arabia, China, US, India, Italy

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR Expenditure: $11.42 billion Public debt (as % of GDP): 90% -RžEXMSRVEXI  EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW

Transnational issues 2004 agreement settles border dispute with Syria still pending demarcation.

Refugees 4EPIWXMRMERWJVSQ-VEUJVSQ 7]VMEZEVMSYW Transparency International corruption index: 55.

Regent’s Report 2015


Turkey and the EU in a Wider Context Michael Lake Former EU Ambassador to Turkey, and Hungary

ยน<]ZSMaร…VL[Q\[MTN VW__PMZMQ\PI[ JMMVW^MZUIVaaMIZ["LMXMVLMV\WVI [MK]ZQ\aTQVS_Q\P\PM=;IVLWVIV MKWVWUQKZMTI\QWV[PQX_Q\P\PM-=ยบ 5QKPIMT4ISM


Turkey

urkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) MRIZMXEFP]MRZSPZIEQENSVXLMVHTPE]IVXLI9RMXIH States of America. Economics may well dominate relations with the EU, but during the Cold War and after, Turkey’s pre-eminent foreign policy priority was its strategic relationship with the United States, reinforced by its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The end of the Soviet threat in 1991 allowed the economic aspects of relations with the EU to assume an increasing importance across Europe. Alongside the goal of strategic security, Turkey has pursued a long-term goal of economic development, for many years associated with full membership of the European Union.

T

The 1963 Association Treaty between Turkey and the then European Economic Community (EEC) opened that TVSWTIGXXLI'YWXSQW9RMSREGLMIZIHMRGSR½VQIH MXERHMRWTMXISJTVSPSRKIHHIPE]WRIKSXMEXMSRWJSV QIQFIVWLMT[IVI½REPP]STIRIHMR At that time popular support in Turkey for negotiating full membership was more than 70%. Hopes were high in EPPWIGXSVWSJWSGMIX]ERH¯[MXLJI[I\GITXMSRW¯QSWX EU member states also welcomed the prospect. But as negotiations revealed the reality of interests on both sides, public support for the process both within and outside Turkey fell away to below 50%. Negotiations have only GPSWIHSRIGLETXIVWSJEV¯VIPEXMRKXSWGMIRGIERHVIWIEVGL ¯ERHLEZIPIJXSXLIVWMRGSRGPYWMZI1SVIXLERSXLIV topics have not yet even been broached. More recently, instability in the aftermath of the second Iraq war, the re-emergence of Iran as a regional player, and the threat of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ¯PIXEPSRIRS[MRWMHIXLI)9¯LEZIYRHIVPMRIHXLI importance of security. Turkey’s close relationship with the European Union survived the freezing of negotiations for membership. Policy has not been reversed. Indeed, the VIGIRX¾S[SJVIJYKIIWJVSQ7]VMEXSXLI)9LEWKMZIRVMWI to a new deal between the EU and Turkey.

A Modernised and Expanded Customs Union Early in 2015 the two parties agreed a new approach to reinforce and expand the existing Customs Union. This falls short of full membership, but builds on the basis of the economic relations that the two sides have developed over more than 50 years, with expanding two-way trade and KVIEXP]MRGVIEWIH¾S[WSJJSVIMKRHMVIGXMRZIWXQIRXJVSQ the EU to Turkey.

Within a few years of agreeing the Customs Union, the last traditionally secular government, under Bulent Ecevit, started the essential reforms long needed to improve and stabilise Turkey’s economy and to get the best out of the new trade regime. Foreign direct investment in Turkey, which had been historically low, increased dramatically. Foreign companies were attracted by the prospect of producing in low-wage Turkey and exporting tariff-free into the richer European market. 6IGIT8E]]MT)VHSKEREXXLILIEHSJXLIWYGGIWWSV%/4 government, continued the reforms and managed to VIHYGIXLIVEXISJMR¾EXMSRXSWMRKPI½KYVIWJVSQELMKLSJ around 90 per cent. The government also reformed the banks, which subsequently largely withstood the rigours of the 2008 worldwide recession. In addition it increased employment, raised personal incomes and built more housing. Certainly in the larger cities, economists could WTIEOJSVXLI½VWXXMQISJ8YVOI]EWEGSRWYQIVWSGMIX] Income per head has almost tripled in about 20 years. In 2014 trade with the EU totalled nearly €130 billion, making the EU by far Turkey’s biggest trading partner. Negotiations on an updated and improved Customs Union would include provisions on public services, further liberalisation of trade in agricultural products, and the politically sensitive issue of strict EU rules on public procurement. The expanded Customs Unions would require public contracts over a certain value to be open to )9[MHITYFPMGXIRHIV8YVOMWLGSQTPMERGI¯IWWIRXMEPXSE RI[EKVIIQIRX¯[SYPHSTIRKSZIVRQIRXTVSGYVIQIRX in Turkey to EU competition and weaken the potential for political intervention in business that bolsters patronage. Media proprietors with other industrial and commercial MRXIVIWXWVIQEMRPS]EPXSXLIGYVVIRXTSPMXMGEPPIEHIVWLMT¯ XLI%/44EVX]ERH4VIWMHIRX)VHSKER¯MRSVHIVXSTVSXIGX those very interests. Hence their media also support the government line, starving the opposition of publicity. As a result, many of Turkey’s most distinguished and experienced MRHITIRHIRXNSYVREPMWXWLEZIFIIRJSVGIHSYXSJXLIMV NSFW7SQIEVIMRTVMWSRSXLIVWEFVSEHERHXLI[MHIV electorate suffers from one-sided political reporting.

Restarting the Accession Programme 6IWXEVXMRKRIKSXMEXMSRWSRWXEPPIHGLETXIVWMR8YVOI]´W EGGIWWMSRTVSKVEQQI¯XLIRIGIWWEV]WXITF]WXIT TVSKVIWWXS[EVHWEPMKRMRKMXWIPJ[MXL)9PE[¯MWRS[FEGO on the political agenda as a direct result of the refugee and migration crisis now confronting the EU. The German

Regent’s Report 2015

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Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

Chancellor, Angela Merkel, visited Ankara recently to seek GPSWIVGSSTIVEXMSRJVSQ8YVOI]MRWXIQQMRKXLIžSSHSJ migrants coming through Turkey to the EU. A second round of Turkish elections in 2015, held in November, restored the governing AK partyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s overall QENSVMX]MRXLI8YVOMWL4EVPMEQIRXPSWXMRIPIGXMSRWIEVPMIV in the year. The campaign was marked by a complete FVIEOHS[RSJXLIXVYGIMRXLIPSRKWXERHMRKGSRžMGX between Turkey and the Kurdish PKK, widely regarded as EXIVVSVMWXSVKERMWEXMSR8LIIPIGXMSR[EWEPWSQEVOIHÂŻSV QEVVIHÂŻF]WIVMSYWXIVVSVMWXEXXEGOWRSXEFP]MR%ROEVE EXXVMFYXIHXS-7-7I\XVESVHMREV]MRXIVZIRXMSRMRXLIIPIGXMSR campaign in favour of the AK party by President Erdogan, [LSMWGSRWXMXYXMSREPP]VIUYMVIHXSFIRIYXVEPXLIGSQTPIXI exclusion of all opposition parties from state television ERHVEHMSERHGSRXMRYMRKTVIWWYVISRXLIQIHMEMRGPYHMRK RYQIVSYWEVVIWXWSJSTTSWMXMSRNSYVREPMWXW-XGYPQMREXIHMR the AKP takeover of an entire industrial conglomerate of 22 companies, including a prominent newspaper, Bugun, and a popular television channel. This caused widespread uproar in Turkey, and both the EU and the United States expressed XLIMVGSRGIVRÂŻHMTPSQEXMGEPP]7MRGIXLIIPIGXMSRTVIWWYVI SRXLIQIHMELEWMRXIRWM½IH[MXLELMKLP]TYFPMGMWIHTSPMGI VEMHSJEQENSVSTTSWMXMSRRI[WTETIVZaman. One of the essential criteria for membership of the EU is that candidate states should be functioning democracies. This requires a free press and freedom of expression, as well as the rule of law, together with independence of XLINYHMGMEV]'YVVIRXP]QSVINSYVREPMWXWEVIMQTVMWSRIH MR8YVOI]XLERMRER]SXLIVQENSVWXEXIXLEXTVSJIWWIWXS observe the rule of law. On this criterion alone, Turkey does not currently meet the political standards required JSVQIQFIVWLMTSJXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR8LINYHMGMEV]LEW also been so undermined as to no longer meet European standards of independence. Both the US and the EU are called on to square the circle of cutting some slack to an ally important to them in security terms. They do this by soft-pedalling criticism of Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s civil and human rights at the same time as asserting the importance of key democratic values, which they claim to represent not only domestically but also in their foreign policies. They lay themselves open to criticism of using double standards, and are forced to try to VIGSRGMPIXLIWIGSRžMGXMRKGPEMQWMRXLIMVTYFPMGWXEXIQIRXW Nevertheless the annual report of the European 'SQQMWWMSRSR8YVOI]´WGERHMHEG]ÂŻTYFPMGEXMSRSJ

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015

which was delayed until after the November elections ÂŻYRHMTPSQEXMGEPP]GSRXEMRIHYRTVIGIHIRXIHGVMXMGMWQ-X pointed out that Turkey had slipped backwards in ensuring many basic freedoms, including press freedom and the MRHITIRHIRGISJXLINYHMGMEV]-X[SYPHFIREMZIXSI\TIGX Erdogan to reverse his increasingly authoritarian stance, but if serious progress is to be made on upgrading the 'YWXSQW9RMSRERH8YVOI]´WEGGIWWMSRTVSGIWWÂŻERH4VMQI Minister Davutoglu has repeated that Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s continuing KSEPMWXSNSMRXLI)9ÂŻXLMWWXEXISJEJJEMVWQYWXGLERKI

Preparations Continue for Adopting EU Norms Preparations for EU membership may seem frozen in public, but progress continues below the surface. Turks have claimed for decades they are already European, but becoming â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;more Europeanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; is part of the modernisation process in Turkey. Throughout Turkish society the QSHIVRMWMRKMRžYIRGISJ)YVSTIMWIZMHIRX 8LMWMWVIžIGXIHMRXLIWSGMEPERHTSPMXMGEPQETSJXLI country. The AKPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s conservative support is strong in rural areas, where traditional Islam and lower population density TVIZEMP-RGMXMIWERHEVIEWQSVISTIRXSJSVIMKRMRžYIRGI especially tourism, more liberal and more secular parties ½RHKVIEXIVWYTTSVX8LIYWIJYPRIWWSJEPMKRMRKFYWMRIWW practices and even legal requirements, irrespective of the progress of diplomatic negotiations, is clearly evident. From NYHKIWSJXLI'SRWXMXYXMSREP'SYVXXSIQTPS]IVWERH workers in the industrial sector, and even to farmers toiling MRXLI½IPHWXLITVSGIWWSJQIIXMRKXLIVIUYMVIHWXERHEVHW putting in place legislation, and aligning norms and standards to those required by the EU continues across Turkey. 8LI)9ERHXLI8YVOMWLKSZIVRQIRXTVSQSXIERH½RERGI XLMWHIZIPSTQIRX7MRGITVIEGGIWWMSR½RERGMEP assistance to Turkey has grown to â&#x201A;Ź5.4 billion. Over XLITIVMSHÂŻXLIEZIVEKIERRYEPEPPSGEXMSRXS Turkey will be â&#x201A;Ź630 million, amounting to another â&#x201A;Ź3.8 FMPPMSR8LMWQSRI]KSIWMRXSXVEMRMRKNYHKIWGMZMPWIVZERXW EHQMRMWXVEXSVWPSGEPKSZIVRQIRXSJ½GMEPWGSQQYRMX] leaders and those working in the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector. -VIGEPPEWIRMSVQMPMXEV]PIKEPSJ½GIV[LSLEHFIIRIRKEKIH in prosecuting politicians after the 1980 coup, telling me XLEXLIRS[WTIRXQSWXSJLMWXMQIMRWXVYGXMRKSJ½GIVWMR )9PE[8LIWI]SYRKIV8YVOWEVIEHNYWXMRKERHEHETXMRKXS )9PE[GVIEXMRKRI[MRWXMXYXMSRWERHMRJVEWXVYGXYVIÂŻJVSQ XVERWTSVXRIX[SVOWXSWI[EKI[SVOWÂŻERHGVIEXMRKE culture among thousands of civil servants and others of


Turkey

‘belonging to Europe’. The EU delegation in Ankara, which MWMRZSPZIHMRQEREKMRKLYRHVIHWSJPSGEPTVSNIGXWMWXLI biggest EU diplomatic delegation in the world. There are two main reasons for the delay in negotiations on membership. In 2007 the new French President, Nicholas Sarkozy, blocked Turkey from opening any but XLIQSWXXIGLRMGEPGLETXIVW¯RSXLMRKXLEX[SYPHXSYGL the more political and fundamental issues of membership. -RHSMRKXLMW4VIWMHIRX7EVOS^]FVSOIEQENSVXIRIXSJ MRXIVREXMSREPXVYWXERHTVEGXMGI¯XLIVYPIXLEXEKVIIQIRXW reached in good faith should be respected: pacta sunt servanda. The EU as a whole, including France, had indeed solemnly agreed to open negotiations leading to membership. Other states, however reluctant to see enlargement to include Turkey, had never interrupted XLITVSGIWW6IRIKMRKSRXLMWTVMRGMTPI¯PEVKIP]YRHIV *VIRGLTVIWWYVI¯HEQEKIH)YVSTI´WVITYXEXMSRMR8YVOI] On the other hand, Turkey’s refusal to recognise Cyprus under the rules of the Customs Union and to open its ports and airports to Cypriot transport, led the EU to block the opening of a number of trade-related chapters. This eventually led to a situation where the formal talks stalled and no new chapters were opened. More recently progress has been made in UN-sponsored inter-communal negotiations in Cyprus which, if successful, could take this MWWYISJJXLIXEFPIJSVXLI½VWXXMQIWMRGIXLIWM\XMIW

Authoritarianism and Instability Over the last three years, meanwhile, upheavals in the GSYVXWXLITSPMGIERHXLIQMPMXEV]VI¾IGXHIITTIVWSREP as well as political divisions between Erdogan and his former ally, the retired imam Fetullah Gulen, now living in the United States. Thousands of public servants, including NYHKIWERHWIRMSVTSPMGISJ½GIVWWYWTIGXIHSJFIMRK ‘Gulenists’ have had their careers blocked, been moved XSPIWWMQTSVXERXTSWXWSVPSWXXLIMVNSFWEPXSKIXLIV1SVI generally Erdogan has grown extremely sensitive to criticism of his government and its policies, which he often regards as personal attacks on himself, and by extension on the state and the nation. In many cases criticism has led to prison. Erdogan’s enemies include not only the media, but important Turkish industrialists and businesspeople. 8S[EVHWXLIIRHSJ.YP]ERYRMHIRXM½IHXIVVSVMWXQEWWEGVIH 35 Kurdish and other students at an open-air rally at Suruc on the Turkish border with Syria. The outlawed Kurdish PKK blamed the AKP government for negligence in not protecting the protesting Kurdish students, and in retaliation it renewed attacks on Turkish police and soldiers.

The government then immediately began a series of air and ground attacks on PKK terrorist outposts in both Turkey and northern Iraq, hoping this nationalist line would MR¾YIRGIZSXIVWMRXLIJVIWLIPIGXMSRWGEPPIHJSV2SZIQFIV Several hundred soldiers and many Kurds were killed in these attacks. Two weeks before the elections, the PKK ERRSYRGIHEYRMPEXIVEPGIEWI½VIEMQMRKXSGPEMQXLIQSVEP high ground at the ballot box. In mid-October a two-man suicide bomb attack on a largely Kurdish, peaceful demonstration in Ankara killed more than a hundred people and wounded more than another hundred in the worst such atrocity in the history SJQSHIVR8YVOI]-RZIWXMKEXSVWMHIRXM½IHSRISJXLI bombers as the brother of the suicide bomber at Suruc, both known to the police as members of an ISIS group. More than a thousand people have been arrested on XIVVSVMWXGLEVKIWMRVIGIRXQSRXLW¯QSWXP]/YVHWFYXEPWS an increasing number of suspected ISIS supporters. The government has made several threats against the largely Kurdish HDP party, which broke the 10% threshold in the earlier 2015 elections and entered parliament with 80 seats, helping to deprive the ruling AKP then of its overall QENSVMX]8LI,(4LIEHUYEVXIVWMR(M]EFEOMV[EWFSQFIH GEYWMRKJSYVHIEXLWERHQER]MRNYVMIW -RXLI2SZIQFIVIPIGXMSRWXLI%/4HYP][SREQENSVMX]MR the Turkish parliament. The Kurdish Party, which scraped into TEVPMEQIRXNYWXEFSZIXLI XLVIWLSPH[EWVIPIKEXIHXS representation solely in the south and east of the country, and the moderate secular opposition limited to the western coast and to European Turkey north of the Bosphorus.

New Elections, New Risks 8LIVIGIRXXYVQSMPMR8YVOI]HSIWRSXMRWTMVIGSR½HIRGI in either its democratic or its economic future. The Turkish lira is now down against the dollar to a rate almost a third lower than at the start of the year. Turkey’s foreign policy, which had called for a world of peaceful coexistence with all of its neighbours, now lies in tatters. Turkey has war and turmoil on its borders and in its wider neighbourhood, and no diplomatic relations with Syria, Yemen, Israel, Egypt SV0MF]E8LIWIWXEXIWMRGPYHIHQENSVI\TSVXQEVOIXW (especially for the construction industry) as well as Turkey’s most important collaborator concerning secret MRXIPPMKIRGIERHQMPMXEV]XVEMRMRK¯-WVEIP1YGLSJXLMW diplomatic shambles results from intemperate and populist MRXIVZIRXMSRWF]4VIWMHIRX)VHSKER¯MRTEVXMGYPEVGPYQWMP] offensive statements aimed at Israel and Egypt.

Regent’s Report 2015

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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

Towards the end of July 2015 a dramatic change of policy by the Turkish government allowed the United States XS¾]QERRIHERHYRQERRIHEMVGVEJXJVSQXLI-RGMVPMO and Diyabakir air bases to attack ISIS. These bases are located much closer to Iraq and Syria than alternatives available to the US, and the gesture certainly contributed to strengthening the US-Turkey relationship. The fact that Turkey has used its own large and experienced air force XSWXVMOI-7-7XEVKIXW¯EPFIMXQYGLPIWWSJXIRXLERMXLEW EXXEGOIHXLI4//¯LEWMQTPMGEXMSRWJSVEPPXLITPE]IVWMRXLI region. In particular it reassures the United States to know that a NATO ally of Turkey’s military strength and resilience is involved in the Syrian imbroglio alongside the US, French ERHTSXIRXMEPP]XLI9/EMVJSVGIWEXEXMQI[LIR6YWWMELEW NSMRIHMRSRXLIWMHISJ7]VMER4VIWMHIRX&EWLEVEP%WWEH

¯[MXLXLI)9;LIXLIV8YVOI]½REPP]EMQWJSVERIRLERGIH Customs Union or full membership of the EU, its continued prosecution of legitimate Kurdish politicians, outspoken NSYVREPMWXWERHMRHITIRHIRXNYHKIWQE]]IXJVYWXVEXIXLMW process. Much depends on the positions that President Erdogan may take, and also perhaps on how long he remains on the political stage

Further Reading Turkey: A Short History by Norman Stone, Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2012 Rebel Land: Among Turkey’s Forgotten Peoples by Christopher de Bellaigue, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010 The Turks Today by Andrew Mango, John Murray, 2005

During the past year, however, Turkey has also been accused of not doing enough to prevent the movement of [SYPHFINMLEHMWXWEGVSWWMXWFSVHIVWXSNSMR-7-7/YVHWMR particular, who have successfully fought against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria, suspect Turkey of facilitating the movement of ISIS recruits into the region. By the end of July, Turkey had decisively re-opened its war with the Turkish PKK, and attacked the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds far more heavily than it attacked ISIS. This move, which in the eyes of Western observers looks PMOIEGSRJYWMSRSJJVMIRHWERHIRIQMIWVI¾IGXW8YVOI]´W PSRKWXERHMRKSFWIWWMSR[MXL/YVHMWLMR¾YIRGIFSXLMRWMHI ERHSYXWMHI8YVOI]¯EGSRGIVRXLEXPSRKTVIGIHIWXLI arrival of the AKP government. But it also strains relations with the Americans, as well as the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, who are in practice vital allies against ISIS. %WXLI2SZIQFIVIPIGXMSRGEQTEMKRHIZIPSTIHXLI¾S[ of migrants from Syria through Turkey to Greece increased dramatically. Two members of the European Commission ERHXLIRXLI+IVQER'LERGIPPSV¾I[XS%ROEVEXSSJJIV the Turkish government several billion euros, a more liberal visa regime and re-opening the long-stalled negotiations on Turkey’s membership of the EU in exchange for reducing XLMW¾S[SJQMKVERXW8LIZMWMXWERHXLISJJIVGEYWIHKVIEX controversy in Europe because they appeared to reward Turkey’s poor record on human rights, especially its attacks SRXLIQIHMEJVIIHSQSJI\TVIWWMSRERHXLINYHMGMEV] giving security priority over other values. 7S8YVOI]½RHWMXWIPJRS[[LIVIMXLEWFIIRSZIVQER] years: dependent on a security link with the US and on an IGSRSQMGVIPEXMSRWLMT¯[SVXLEFSYX SJMXWIGSRSQ]

Regent’s Report 2015

Ataturk: The Biography by Andrew Mango, John Murray, 2004 Middle East Eye: www.middleeasteye.net %P1SRMXSV¯8LI4YPWISJXLI1MHHPI)EWX www.al-monitor.com


Facts and Figures: Turkey Geography/demography Area: 783,562 sq km Population: 81,619,392 Density: 104 per sq km Life expectancy: 73.29 years Growth rate: 1.12%

2015 more than 132,000 refugees and migrants crossed the border to Turkey. These include over 78,000 from Syria, over 32,500 from Afghanistan, and over 6,500 from Pakistan. Numbers have risen sharply in the second half of 2015. Turkey has close to 1 million internally displaced TIVWSRWQSWXP]/YVHWHYIXS½KLXMRKFIX[IIRXLI/YVHMWL PKK and Turkish military.

Economy GDP: $1.515 trillion GDP per head: $19,600 Growth rate: 2.9% Military expenditure (% of GDP): 2.29 Population below poverty line: 16.9% (2010) % of economy in Agriculture: 8.2% Industry: 26.9% Services: 64.9%

Drugs and other criminality issues

Foreign trade

Transparency International corruption index: 64.

Key transit route for south-west Asian heroin to western )YVSTIERHXSEPIWWIVI\XIRXXLI97¯F]EMVPERHERH WIE8YVOMWLERHMRXIVREXMSREPXVEJ½GOMRKKERKWSTIVEXISYX of Istanbul. Laboratories to convert imported morphine FEWIMRXSLIVSMRI\MWXMRVIQSXIVIKMSRWSJ8YVOI]EW[IPP government maintains control over legal opium poppy GYPXMZEXMSRERHSZIVSYXTYXSJTSTT]WXVE[GSRGIRXVEXIPE\ enforcement of money-laundering controls.

Exports: $176.6 billion (clothing, foodstuffs, textiles, metal manufactures, transport equipment) Imports: FMPPMSR QEGLMRIV]GLIQMGEPWWIQM½RMWLIH goods, fuels, transport equipment) Main export partners: +IVQER]-VEU9/6YWWME-XEP] France Main import partners: 6YWWME'LMRE+IVQER]-XEP]97-VER

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR Expenditure: $209.7 billion Public debt: 36.5% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Transnational issues Complex maritime, air and territorial disputes with +VIIGIMRXLI%IKIER7IEWXEXYWSJRSVXL']TVYW7]VME ERH-VEUTVSXIWX8YVOMWLL]HVSPSKMGEPTVSNIGXWXSGSRXVSP YTTIV)YTLVEXIW[EXIVW8YVOMWLGSRGIVRSZIVXLIUYEWM MRHITIRHIRXWXEXYWSJ/YVHWMR-VEU2IMXLIV8YVOI]RSV %VQIRMELEWVEXM½IHXLI7[MWWFVSOIVIHEKVIIQIRX re-establishing diplomatic ties.

Refugees At least 103,000 in 2014 from Iraq and 1,772,535 from 7]VME-REHHMXMSR*VSRXI\IWXMQEXIWXLEXMRXLI½VWXLEPJSJ

Regent’s Report 2015


Azerbaijan and the EU: I,Q‫ٻ‬K]T\*ITIVKQVO)K\ Adam Hug Policy Director, Foreign Policy Centre, London

¹)bMZJIQRIVXW[M[-=XWTQKaUISMZ[I ^MZaZMITKPITTMVOM[M\\QVO\PMQZMKWVWUQK QV\MZM[\[IOIQV[\\PMQZI^W_ML[]XXWZ\NWZ \PM^IT]M[WN P]UIVZQOP\[LMUWKZIKa IVLOWWLOW^MZVIVKMº Adam Hug




6

IPEXMSRWFIX[IIR%^IVFEMNERERHXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR (EU), indeed with ‘the West’ in general, are going XLVSYKLETIVMSHSJWMKRM½GERXWXVEMR%^IVFEMNERTSWIW)9 policy-makers a very real challenge, setting their (short- to medium-term) economic (and possibly strategic) interests against their avowed support for the values of human rights, democracy and good governance. 4VIWMHIRX%PM]IZ´WEFWIRGIJVSQXLI6MKE)9)EWXIVR Partnership summit in May 2015 was perhaps the strongest MRHMGEXSVXSHEXISJ%^IVFEMNER´WEXXMXYHIXS[EVHWXLI)9 ERHMXWRIMKLFSYVLSSHTSPMG]8LISJ½GMEPVIEWSRKMZIR for his non-attendance was the proximity to the start of the European Games in Baku at the beginning of June, FYXKVS[MRKGVMXMGMWQJVSQSJ½GMEP)YVSTIERWSYVGIWERH JVSQMRXIVREXMSREPGMZMPWSGMIX]SZIV%^IVFEMNER´WLYQER rights record, combined with Aliyev’s limited interest in the multinational Eastern Partnership format, were seen by many observers as being more important motives for the snub.

Energy and Economic issues %^IVFEMNER´WTSXIRXMEPEWEWYTTPMIVSJ¯ERHXVERWMXGSYRXV] JSV¯REXYVEPKEWGSQMRKMRXS)YVSTIJVSQRSR6YWWMER sources sometimes leads to it being described as a strategic partner for the EU. It has relatively large reserves of natural gas and even larger reserves of oil, and for much of the previous decade the EU had been giving considerable WYTTSVXXSETVSTSWIHTMTIPMRITVSNIGXGEPPIH2EFYGGS which would have provided a European-owned pipeline XSXVERWTSVX%^IVFEMNERMKEWJVSQXLI8YVOMWL+ISVKMER FSVHIVXS:MIRRE3[RIHF]%YWXVME´W31:,YRKEV]´W 1306SQERME´W8VERWKE^&YPKEVME´W&YPKEVKE^+IVQER]´W 6;)ERH8YVOMWLWXEXIIRIVK]½VQ&38%7XLITVSTSWIH pipeline had an initial capacity of 31 billion cubic metres

&'1 &YXMXWPSRKXIVQZMEFMPMX]VIPMIHSRXLITVSNIGX attracting additional gas supplies from other sources, either from northern Iraq or from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan through a long-mooted but never developed trans-Caspian pipeline. The EU’s strategic dream of the Nabucco route died in 2012 when, after years of political manoeuvring, the KSZIVRQIRXWSJ%^IVFEMNERERH8YVOI]HIGMHIHXSQSZI ELIEHMRWXIEH[MXLXLIMVNSMRXP]S[RIH8VERW%REXSPMER Pipeline (TAP) to move the gas by a different route across Turkey, removing any European control of the supply before it arrives at the EU border. Nabucco limped on for two more years as the truncated ‘Nabucco West’ plan that would have collected the gas at the Turkish border, but

%^IVFEMNER 97

XLEXXSS[EWVINIGXIHMRJEZSYVSJEWLSVXIV8VERW%HVMEXMG Pipeline (TAP) that would take gas from Greece to Italy. 8LIEQSYRXSJEHHMXMSREPKEW%^IVFEMNER[MPPFIEFPI to provide through TAP to European markets upon full HIZIPSTQIRXSJXLI7LEL(IRM^--KEW½IPHMWEVSYRH BCM per year, a useful but not game-changing 2% of the EU’s current 500 BCM annual gas requirement. Wider GLERKIWMRKPSFEPKEWQEVOIXWLEZIWIIREQENSVVMWIMRXLI use of shale gas, particularly in the US, and the knock-on effect of this has been to free up liquid natural gas supplies XS)9QIQFIVWXEXIW%WEVIWYPX¯ERHHIWTMXIXIRWMSRW [MXL6YWWME¯XLIWXVEXIKMGMQTEGXSJ%^IVFEMNERMKEWMWRSX what it once might have been. Progress in the decades-long wrangling over the TransCaspian pipeline to provide European access to the much larger volumes of gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan would change this dynamic, but that is not currently in sight, HIWTMXIMRGVIEWMRKP]YTFIEXXEPOJVSQ%^IVFEMNERMSJ½GMEPW Long-standing issues remain around the demarcation of the 'EWTMERFSYRHEVMIWERH6YWWMERERH-VERMERSTTSWMXMSRXS XLITPERFPSGOWWMKRM½GERXTVSKVIWW;LIRXLIWIMWWYIWEVI combined with ever-increasing Chinese demand for central Asian gas, the viability of the scheme becomes marginal. But irrespective of its potential strategic value, the wealth KIRIVEXIHF]%^IVFEMNER´WSMPERHKEWQEOIWXLIGSYRXV] EWMKRM½GERXGSQQIVGMEPTEVXRIVJSVXLI)9MRE[E]XLEX other Eastern Partnership states at this stage are not. %^IVFEMNERSJJIVWEQEVOIXJSVE[MHIVERKISJ)YVSTIER goods and services, from London taxis to designer brands.

Human Rights 8LILYQERVMKLXWWMXYEXMSRMR%^IVFEMNERTEVXMGYPEVP] for civil society and opposition activists, has become increasingly desperate over recent years. Only a relatively WLSVX[LMPIEKS%^IVFEMNER[EWORS[RJSVMXWZMFVERXQM\SJ HSQIWXMGGMZMPWSGMIX]EGXMZMWXWERHMRHITIRHIRXNSYVREPMWXW battling to hold a semi-authoritarian regime to account. They have been thoroughly squeezed by a government increasingly intolerant of both domestic and international criticism of its actions. Many of civil society’s leading lights have either had to mute their critiques dramatically, change careers, leave the GSYRXV]SVJEGINEMP8LIVILEWFIIRERYRTVIGIHIRXIH GVEGOHS[RSRHMWWIRXXLEXLEWWIIREGXMZMWXW¯SPHERH ]SYRK¯NEMPIHJVSQZIXIVERW0I]PEERH%VMJ=YRYWXSPIEHIV SJXLI%VXJSV(IQSGVEG]1SZIQIRX6EWYP.EJEVSZ8LI

Regent’s Report 2015


98

Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

E[EVH[MRRMRKMRZIWXMKEXMZINSYVREPMWX/LEHMNE-WQEMPSZE was the most recent recipient of a seven-and-a-half-year sentence condemned by international observers. After a further tightening of the law on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in early 2014, Ministry of Justice approval is now required for international grants, and there is a legal prohibition on making payments to unregistered NGOs. Indeed, many groups were not EPPS[IHXSVIKMWXIVMRXLI½VWXTPEGIERHWSJEGIH½RERGMEP problems immediately. With a track record of bureaucratic obstruction blocking requests for approval relating to independent NGOs, these measures effectively stopped funding to all independent groups and activists. This tightening of the law affecting NGOs and their work in %^IVFEMNERLEWWIXXLIWXEKIJSVXLIVIGIRXGVEGOHS[RSR human rights activists who had earlier received funds from abroad.

Azerbaijan’s Self-Image %JXIVVIGIRXLMKLTVS½PIMRXIVREXMSREPIZIRXW¯MRGPYHMRK XLI)YVSZMWMSR7SRK'SRXIWXERHXLI½VWX)YVSTIER+EQIW ¯[IVIYWIHF]GEQTEMKRIVWEWE[E]XSHVE[EXXIRXMSR XSLYQERVMKLXWEFYWIW%^IVFEMNERWIIQWXSLEZIFIGSQI less interested in persuading the wider international public SJMXWGLEVQW6EXLIVXLER[MRSZIVEFVSEHMRXIVREXMSREP EYHMIRGIXLI%^IVFEMNERMKSZIVRQIRX´WWXMPPTVSHMKMSYW international public relations effort appears to concentrate now more on managing domestic perceptions of the country’s self-image. In this it is helped by a supportive national press which has muted all internal criticism in the QEWWQIHME2IZIVXLIPIWW%^IVFEMNERWXMPPVIQEMRWOIIRXS persuade commercial audiences abroad that it is a country to do business with, and it continues to actively lobby political stakeholders in particular about its importance to European energy security.

Nagorno-Karabakh +MZIRXLIHMJ½GYPXMIWJYPP]MRHITIRHIRXLYQERVMKLXW2+3W RS[LEZIMRSTIVEXMRKSRXLIKVSYRHMR%^IVFEMNERXLI)9 should strongly look at utilising diaspora groups for funding opportunities provided by some of its programmes, such as the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the )YVSTIER-RWXVYQIRXJSV(IQSGVEG]ERH,YQER6MKLXW

)-(,6 IGLSMRKXLIETTVSEGLSJXLIVIGIRXP]IWXEFPMWLIH European Endowment for Democracy that was designed JVSQXLIWXEVXXSFIEQSVI¾I\MFPIJYRHIV The EU has yet to face the sustained political attack that US donors and even government institutions have been JEGMRKJSVWSQI]IEVWRS[6EHMS*VII)YVSTI6EHMS 0MFIVX]LEHMXWSJ½GIWGPSWIHMRERHXLIVILEZIFIIR sustained attacks on US grantees, such as internationally VIWTIGXIHQIHMESVKERMWEXMSR-6)<8LI97[EWEPWSXLI primary target of a recent 60-page document by the head SJXLITVIWMHIRXMEPEHQMRMWXVEXMSR6EQM^1ILHM]IZ[LS IGLSMRKWMQMPEV6YWWMERGVMXMGMWQWEGGYWIH2+3WMRVIGIMTX SJJSVIMKRJYRHMRKEWFIMRKE³½JXLGSPYQR´[LSWITYVTSWI [EWXSTVITEVIE³GSPSYVVIZSPYXMSR´MR%^IVFEMNEREWMR SXLIVJSVQIV7SZMIX6ITYFPMGW+IVQER]EPWSVIGIMZIH WMQMPEVXVIEXQIRXJVSQSJ½GMEPWSYVGIWERHTVSKSZIVRQIRX media after some of its NGOs and media organisations LEHFIIRGVMXMGEPSJXLI%^IVFEMNERMKSZIVRQIRX8LEXXLI EU itself has taken fewer diplomatic direct hits is in part EJYRGXMSRSJER%^IVFEMNERMETTVSEGLXSHMTPSQEG]XLEX favours ‘divide and rule’ by selective targeting, and also VI¾IGXWXLIHMZIVWMX]SJTSWMXMSRWEQSRK)9QIQFIVWXEXIW XS[EVHW%^IVFEMNER

Regent’s Report 2015

%^IVFEMNER´WMRGVIEWMRKP]EWWIVXMZIJSVIMKRTSPMG]MW intertwined with tough rhetoric on the lack of progress EVSYRHXLIYRVIWSPZIH2EKSVRS/EVEFEOL 2/ GSR¾MGX XLEXHEXIWJVSQXLIIEVP]W8LIGSR¾MGXPIJX%VQIRME in control of the former autonomous oblast of Nagorno/EVEFEOLERHWIZIRWQEPPIVWYVVSYRHMRK%^IVFEMNERM regions, an occupation that has created 606,363 internally HMWTPEGIHTISTPI -(4W [MXLMR%^IVFEMNER+SZIVRQIRX VLIXSVMGEPWSMRGPYHIWHVE[MRKWMKRM½GERXTEVEPPIPW[MXL the Armenian genocide, with particular references to the /LSNEP]QEWWEGVIHYVMRKXLI[EVMR[LIVILYRHVIHW SJ%^IVFEMNERMW¯XLII\EGX½KYVIWEVIWXVSRKP]HMWTYXIH¯ were killed by Armenian forces. Any EU engagement must take seriously the depth of JIIPMRKMRXLIGSYRXV]GEYWIHF]XLIGSR¾MGXERHXLI[E]W in which it is used both as a mechanism for encouraging domestic unity politically and as a means to apply pressure on the international community. The IDP issue is sometimes YWIHEWEVLIXSVMGEPHIZMGIXSHI¾IGXGVMXMGEPEXXIRXMSRF] the West from matters that are the direct responsibility SJXLI%^IVFEMNERMKSZIVRQIRXSRXSXLITPMKLXSJXLI ZMGXMQWSJEQYPXMREXMSREPMRXVEGXEFPIGSR¾MGX8LMWHSIWRSX however, mean that it is not a real issue impeding both the political and strategic development of the country. )RWYVMRKXLEX-(4MWWYIWVIQEMRELMKLTVS½PIIPIQIRXSJ )9IRKEKIQIRX[MXL%^IVFEMNER[MPPFIMQTSVXERXSZIV the coming years. The EU should look at technical support QIEWYVIWMRGPYHMRK½RERGMRKMJRIGIWWEV]ERHWXITWXS ensure the IDPs are not forgotten diplomatically.




8LISZIVEPPIRZMVSRQIRXJSVGSR¾MGXVIWSPYXMSRMW more challenging, with increasingly bellicose rhetoric JVSQFSXL%^IVFEMNERERH%VQIRMEERHERMRGVIEWMRK number of deaths along the contact line between them. %WXLIGYVVIRXGSR¾MGXVIWSPYXMSRFSH]JSV³XVEGOSRI´ international diplomacy is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group (led F]XLI97%6YWWMEERH*VERGI XLI)9´WVSPIJSVXLIXMQI being will remain secondary, supporting the efforts of the Minsk co-chairs. But it is a big enough player to add political weight to the debate. %XTVIWIRXXLIVIMWHMWEKVIIQIRX[MXLXLI%^IVFEMNERM government about whether to include a reference to the 37')´W³1EHVMH4VMRGMTPIW´JSVVIWSPYXMSRSJXLIGSR¾MGXMR ER]RI[)9%^IVFEMNEREKVIIQIRX8LI1EHVMH4VMRGMTPIW WIXSYXMRFVSEHXIVQWGSR¾MGXVIWSPYXMSRTEVEQIXIVW including: ˆ6IXYVRSJXLIXIVVMXSVMIWWYVVSYRHMRK2EKSVRS /EVEFEOLXS%^IVFEMNERMGSRXVSP ˆAn interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance ˆA corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh ˆ*YXYVIHIXIVQMREXMSRSJXLI½REPPIKEPWXEXYW of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will ˆThe right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence ˆInternational security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation 8LI%^IVFEMNERMKSZIVRQIRXEVKYIWXLEXXLI)9LEWRSX required other Eastern partners to acknowledge any other principle than the respect for territorial integrity, such as in the EU agreements with Ukraine, Georgia or 1SPHSZE8LI)9EVKYIWXLEXXLIWTIGM½GMXMIWSJIEGL GSR¾MGXEVIHMJJIVIRXERHMRXLI+ISVKMERGEWIJSVMRWXERGI the EU’s acknowledgement of the separatist entities KSIWWMKRM½GERXP]JYVXLIVXLERMRXLI2EKSVRS/EVEFEOL proposal, since on a practical level it pursues an approach characterised by ‘engagement without recognition’. However, restating the principle that the EU cannot accept XIVVMXSVMEPGLERKIEWXLIHMVIGXVIWYPXSJGSR¾MGX[SYPH FILIPTJYPMRXLI%^IVFEMNERMGSRXI\X-XMWFSXLI\TIHMIRX ERHVMKLXJSVXLI)9XSWYTTSVXEPPQIEWYVIWJSVGSR¾MGX resolution. However, EU and member state support for people-to-people ‘track two’ contact with Armenian civil

%^IVFEMNER 99

society has faced both sustained rhetorical attack from XLIKSZIVRQIRXSJ%^IVFEMNERERHTVIWWYVISRXLI2+3W participating in such work. That, too, will colour the EU ETTVSEGLXSXLIGSR¾MGXYRHIVHMWGYWWMSR

What Next? %^IVFEMNERLEWFIIRI\TPMGMXXLEXMXHSIWRSX[ERXXS proceed with the standard Eastern Partnership offer of an Association Agreement, and it could not form a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) even if it wished to, due to lack of progress on its World Trade Organization

;83 QIQFIVWLMTETTPMGEXMSR8LI%^IVFEMNERM government has also shifted its position as a result of the changed circumstances in Ukraine, where events have also LEHERMQTEGXSREWMKRM½GERXWIGXMSRSJXLIIPMXIERHQEHI them more sceptical of Western intentions. It has been GPIEVJSVEPSRKXMQIXLEX%^IVFEMNERHSIWRSX[ERXXSFI WIIREWNYWXERSXLIVSRISJXLI)9´W)EWXIVR4EVXRIVW-XLEW strongly advocated a relationship that is less prescriptive in XIVQWSJHYXMIWMQTSWIHSR%^IVFEMNERF]XLI)9 %^IVFEMNERMWIWWIRXMEPP]PSSOMRKJSVSTTSVXYRMXMIWXSFSSWX IGSRSQMGHIZIPSTQIRXGIRXVIHSR¯FYXRSXVIWXVMGXIH XS¯IRIVK]-XHSIWRSX[ERXXSFIVIUYMVIHXSQEOI WMKRM½GERXWXVYGXYVEPGLERKIWFYXHSIW[ERXQIEWYVIWXLEX WYTTSVXERHFSPWXIV%^IVFEMNER´WMRXIVREXMSREPTVIWXMKI8S that end, it is demanding a short ‘Strategic Modernisation Partnership’ document, to replace the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement from 1999 that even EU SJ½GMEPWEVKYIMWWSSFWSPIXIMXMWFIGSQMRKYRYWEFPI ,S[IZIVKMZIRXLIVETMHHS[R[EVHXVENIGXSV]MRLYQER rights standards in the country, the question remains as to whether now is really the right time to be pursuing a formal YTKVEHIMRVIPEXMSRW[MXL%^IVFEMNER1YHHPMRKXLVSYKL with the current arrangements would seem preferable. An updated partnership and cooperation agreement might FISJJIVIHSREGSRHMXMSREPSVMRXIVMQFEWMWFYX%^IVFEMNER QE][IPPVINIGXER]EPXIVREXMZIETTVSEGLXLEXHSIWRSX QIEWYVIYTXSMXWI\TIGXEXMSRWERH½X[MXLMXWVIUYIWXW *SPPS[MRKXLIPEGOSJTVSKVIWWMR6MKE4VIWMHIRX8YWO´W statement on his visit to Baku talked of setting ‘a brisk pace for our talks toward an agreement on strategic partnership’. However there is no sign yet that either side is ready to push forward to achieve an early resolution. If the EU YTKVEHIWVIPEXMSRWEWGYVVIRXP]HIQERHIHF]%^IVFEMNER against the backdrop of continuing internal repression, it would further damage its credibility as an advocate for its values in the wider region.

Regent’s Report 2015


100 Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

%^IVFEMNERVIQEMRWEXVSYFPIWTSXJSVXLI)9´W neighbourhood policy. The EU has to deal with a government that has no real interest in the Eastern 4EVXRIVWLMT´WOI]XSSPW¯XLISJJIVSJER%WWSGMEXMSR Agreement and a DCFTA. The EU will continue to move cautiously with different internal and external actors arguing over the relative merits of economic engagement for mutual advantage and political pressure to improve domestic human rights standards. However strategically desirable strengthening cooperation between Europe ERH%^IVFEMNERQE]FIXLIWGSTIJSVEHIITIVERHQSVI meaningful relationship remains limited while current political conditions remain unchanged

Further Reading 8LMWIWWE]LEWFIIRHIZIPSTIHJVSQ½RHMRKWMRMXMEPP] included in the publication produced by the Foreign Policy Centre: Trouble in the Neighbourhood? The future of the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Eastern Partnership (February 2015): http://fpc.org.uk/ publications/trouble-in-the-neighbourhood Âł%^IVFEMNERMKEWTMTIPMRIEMQWXSGEVZISYXERMGLIEGVSWW Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; by Guy Chazan, Financial Times, January 2014: www. ft.com/cms/s/0/174b403e-6c87-11e3-ad36-00144feabdc0. html#axzz3O3r1uelt Statement by the spokespersons of EU High 6ITVIWIRXEXMZI'EXLIVMRI%WLXSRERH'SQQMWWMSRIV Stefan Fule on the enactment of amendments to the PIKMWPEXMSRSRRSRKSZIVRQIRXEPSVKERMWEXMSRWMR%^IVFEMNER February 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/ docs/2014/140212_01_en.pdf Âł%^IVFEMNERM8:FVSEHGEWXIV[MRW½VWX)YVSTIER Endowment for Democracy grant in time for presidential electionsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, October 2013, [[[IRTMMRJSIYIEWXTSVXEPRI[WPEXIWX%^IVFEMNERM 8:FVSEHGEWXIV[MRW½VWX)YVSTIER)RHS[QIRXJSV Democracy-grant-in-time-for-presidential-elections. Âł%^IVFEMNER´92,'6.YP] www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48d1e6.html Âł8EGOPMRK%^IVFEMNER´W-(4&YVHIR´-RXIVREXMSREP'VMWMW Group, February 2012, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/ IYVSTIGEYGEWYWE^IVFEMNERFXEGOPMRKE^IVFEMNERWMHT burden )9%^IVFEMNER'SQQMXQIRXXS[MHIRGSSTIVEXMSRERH support modernisation: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015

release_MEMO-13-755_en.htm See also http://ec.europa. eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2013/pr_aap_2013_aze.pdf


Facts and Figures: Azerbaijan Geography/demography Area: 86,600 sq km Population: 9,686,210 Density: 111.85 per sq km Life expectancy: 71.91 years Growth rate: 0.99%

Bilateral talks continue with Turkmenistan on dividing the WIEFIHERHGSRXIWXIHSMP½IPHWMRXLIQMHHPISJXLI'EWTMER

Refugees 3ZIVLEPJEQMPPMSRIWWIRXMEPP]JVSQGSR¾MGX[MXL%VQIRME over Nagorno-Karabakh. Around half the internally displaced persons (IDPs) live in the capital, Baku.

Economy GDP: $168.4 billion GDP per head: $17,900 Growth rate: 4.5% (2014) Military expenditure: 5.2% Population below poverty line: 6% (2012) % of economy in Agriculture: 38.3% Industry: 12.1% Services: 49.6%

Illicit drugs Limited illicit cultivation of cannabis and opium poppy, mostly for Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) GSRWYQTXMSRWQEPPKSZIVRQIRXIVEHMGEXMSRTVSKVEQQI XVERWMXTSMRXJSVWSYXL[IWX%WMERSTMEXIWFSYRHJSV6YWWME and to a lesser extent the rest of Europe. Transparency International corruption index: 126.

Foreign trade Exports: $30.89 billion (oil and gas, machinery, foodstuffs, cotton) Imports: $10.68 billion (machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, metals, chemicals) Main export partners: Italy, Indonesia, Thailand, Germany, France, India Main import partners: 8YVOI]6YWWME9/+IVQER]'LMRE Ukraine

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR Expenditure: $25.24 billion Public debt: 10.7% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Transnational issues %^IVFEMNER/E^EOLWXERERH6YWWMEVEXM½IHXLI'EWTMER seabed delimitation treaties based on equidistance, while -VERGSRXMRYIWXSMRWMWXSRESRI½JXLWPMGISJXLIWIE8LI dispute over the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region and the Armenian military occupation of surrounding lands in %^IVFEMNERVIQEMRWXLITVMQEV]JSGYWSJVIKMSREPMRWXEFMPMX] Local border forces struggle to control the illegal transit of goods and people across the porous, un-demarcated %VQIRMER%^IVFEMNERMERH+ISVKMERFSVHIVW

Regent’s Report 2015


Georgia and the EU: Exceptional Engagement? Denis Corboy Former EU Ambassador to Armenia and Georgia

Dr Nino Kereselidze Research Assistant, University of St Andrews

¹?PQTMQ\Q[LQ‫ٻ‬K]T\\WR]LOM\PM M‫ٺ‬MK\Q^MVM[[WN -=XWTQKaQV\PM;W]\P +I]KI[][JaM`IUQVQVOKWUUQ\UMV\[ IOIQV[\ZM[]T\[Q\Q[KTMIZ\PI\QV\MZU[ WN LMUWKZI\QKLM^MTWXUMV\Z]TMWN TI_ IVLOWWLOW^MZVIVKM/MWZOQIPI[JMMVI []KKM[[[\WZaº ,MVQ[+WZJWaIVL,Z6QVW3MZM[MTQLbM


Georgia 103

he signing of the Association Agreement (AA) and JVIIXVEHIHIEPMRQEVOIHEWMKRM½GERXQSQIRX in the 20 years of relations between Georgia and the European Union (EU).

T

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European Food Aid Emergency Programme, launched with a budget of more than half a billion US dollars, brought essential [LIEXERH¾SYVXSWXEVZMRKTSTYPEXMSRWMRXLIXLVII Caucasus countries. The programme created counterpart JYRHW[LMGLTVSZMHIHMRMXMEP½RERGIJSVREXMSREPFYHKIXW until taxation systems could be put in place. Within a couple of years of this initiative the European Commission

)' STIRIHMXW½VWXHIPIKEXMSRMRXLI7SYXL'EYGEWYWMR Tbilisi. From 1995 onwards other development and aid programmes followed. ;LMPIMXMWHMJ½GYPXXSNYHKIXLIIJJIGXMZIRIWWSJ)9TSPMG] in the South Caucasus by examining commitments against results, it is clear that in terms of democratic development, rule of law and good governance Georgia has been a success story. Despite the fact that the new AA does not have a QIQFIVWLMTTIVWTIGXMZIEQENSVMX]XLIVIWIIMXEW[EWXLI GEWIMR)EWXIVR)YVSTIEWE½VWXWXITMRXLEXHMVIGXMSR

regular part of the itinerary of visiting Western politicians to the Soviet Union. It contrasted with the drab conformity of an overbearing Soviet Moscow. Over the years, Georgia has been successful in maintaining its cultural traditions, customs and unique language. Historically the autonomous status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Soviet constitutions and the rapid growth of I\XVIQIREXMSREPMWXQSZIQIRXWKEZIVMWIXSIXLRMGGSR¾MGXW that erupted in post-independence civil wars in South 3WWIXME ¯ ERH%FOLE^ME ¯ 8LI+ISVKMER central government did not succeed in establishing its NYVMWHMGXMSRSZIVWIQMEYXSRSQSYW%HNEVEYRXMPVIPEXMZIP] recently (2004). 6YWWME´WEQFMZEPIRXJSVIMKRTSPMG]XS[EVHW+ISVKMEFIGEQI apparent in its duplicitous role of simultaneously supporting separatists in these territories while acting as peacekeeper ERHMRXIVPSGYXSV¯EHYEPVSPIXLEXSRP]MRGVIEWIHMRLIVMXIH distrust. There was also ambiguity over Georgia’s foreign TSPMG]EKIRHEEWMXNSMRIHXLITSWX7SZMIX'SQQSR[IEPXL of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, and a year later the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), created by 6YWWMEEWEREPXIVREXMZIWIGYVMX]SVKERMWEXMSR[LMGL+ISVKME only managed to leave after the war in 2008.

What Makes Georgia Different? EU involvement in Georgia is exceptional for several reasons. In contrast to the other South Caucasus republics SJ%VQIRMEERH%^IVFEMNER6YWWMELEWFIIRMRZSPZIHIZIR more heavily in Georgia, confronting the EU more directly. Georgia is a strategically important transit route for the HMZIVWM½GEXMSRSJIRIVK]WYTTPMIWXS)YVSTIERHXLI³*MZI (E];EV´FIX[IIR+ISVKMEERH6YWWMEMRWLS[IH that instability in the region can have grave consequences for the entire EU eastern neighbourhood. Over the years, the EU has viewed the region in several HMJJIVIRX[E]WEWXLI7SYXL'EYGEWYW¯EVIKMSRMRMXW S[RVMKLXEWTEVXSJMXWIEWXIVRRIMKLFSYVLSSHHIWTMXI XLIKISKVETLMGEPHMWXERGIJVSQSXLIVQIQFIVWSVEW a region characterised by proximity to the Black Sea. Each of these approaches offered different political and social connotations, but in the broader and longerterm perspective it makes more sense to position Georgia geographically and politically in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood. Apart from the Baltic States, Georgia is the most culturally European and liberal of the former Soviet republics. Throughout the Soviet years, Georgia’s capital Tbilisi was a

8LEX]IEV6YWWMEVIGSKRMWIHXLIde facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and vetoed the proposal to prolong the mandates of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in Abkhazia and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Georgia was GEYKLXMREHMPIQQESJVIWXSVMRKVIPEXMSRWLS[IZIVHMJ½GYPX with its largest neighbour (which occupied nearly a quarter of its territory) while strengthening its future relationship with the EU. %JXIV4VIWMHIRX1MOLIMP7EEOEWLZMPMPIJXSJ½GIMRXLI new Prime Minister, Irakli Gharibashvili, set out as his two foreign policy priorities to continue with European and Euro-Atlantic integration and simultaneously improve VIPEXMSRW[MXL6YWWME8LMW)YVSTIERGSQQMXQIRXLEWFIIR GSR½VQIHF]XLIWMKRMRKERHVEXM½GEXMSRSJXLI%% In its working relations with Moscow, Georgia has separated the political and economic aspects. In the absence of diplomatic relations, the new government established the post of Prime Minister’s Special 6ITVIWIRXEXMZIJSV6IPEXMSRW[MXL6YWWMEXSGSRHYGXEHMVIGX political dialogue with Moscow. In the economic sphere,

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104 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

trade routes and road transportation were reopened in &]PEWX]IEV6YWWME[EWEKEMRSRISJ+ISVKME´WQEMR trading partners. Despite this practical improvement on the ground, political relations with Moscow continue to be strained and unpredictable. The EU is and has been the largest international donor to Georgia. Since 1997, European assistance programmes LEZITVSZMHIHGVMXMGEPWYTTSVXERH½RERGIXS[EVHWXLI stabilisation and modernisation of the country. Between 1992 and 2006, that support amounted to €505 million in grants. In terms of providing a solid basis for democratic governance, the EU assisted in the drafting of the new constitution, which was followed in 1995 by free and fair elections for the president and parliament. Two years previously the EU launched the Transport 'SVVMHSV)YVSTI'EYGEWYW%WME 86%')'% XSJEGMPMXEXI regional cooperation between the South Caucasus, the GIRXVEP%WMERWXEXIWERH)YVSTIMRXLI½IPHWSJXVERWTSVX and energy. Today, Western governments and transnational GSVTSVEXMSRWFIRI½XJVSQEGGIWWXSGIRXVEP%WMERIRIVK] VIWSYVGIWZMEXLVIIQENSVSMPTMTIPMRIWXLEXGVSWW+ISVKMER territory: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline. The EU concluded Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with all three South Caucasus states in 1996. These were focused on political cooperation and economic reforms, with different degrees of success and outcomes in each of the countries. In the 2000s, by extending its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP) instruments, the EU made this into a wider and deeper relationship, which recognised Georgia’s commitment to democracy and good governance. The new AA and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) provide the legal framework for integration in many spheres. Georgia will align its national legislation with that of the EU, adopting EU directives and regulations. The AA provides for participation in all EU programmes short of full membership, from educational, XSPIKEPERHNYHMGMEPVIJSVQWXSYVMWQWTSVXERHQER] other areas. The trade deal provides for the gradual harmonisation of Georgia’s trade legislation to allow products made in Georgia to be exempt from all customs duties. With 80% of the agreement implemented, there is already a 12% increase in EU-Georgia trade, despite continuing concern as to how Georgian products will fare in the enormous EU marketplace.

Regent’s Report 2015

8LITSWXSJ)97TIGMEP6ITVIWIRXEXMZIJSVXLI7SYXL Caucasus was created in 2003. After the August 2008 war it fell to the EU to take the lead in negotiating the terms of EGIEWI½VIERHWYFWIUYIRXP]MRQEMRXEMRMRKXLITIEGI8S WYTIVZMWIXLIGIEWI½VIEKVIIQIRXXLI)9EPWSHITPS]IHXLI European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM). The Special 6ITVIWIRXEXMZILEWLEHERMQTSVXERXVSPIMRXLI+IRIZE International Discussions (GID) and in other forums. Initially XLI)9[EWLIWMXERXXSIRKEKIMRGSR¾MGXQEREKIQIRXMR Georgia. This was due to the absence of a common policy among member states and the consideration that other more important international issues elsewhere necessitated 6YWWMERGSSTIVEXMSR[LMGLGSYPHLEZIFIIRIRHERKIVIHMJ the EU was too closely involved there. Georgian forces have played an active role in the EU’s international peacekeeping operations under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean (EUCAP Nestor), in Mali (EUTM Mali), and in Libya (EUBAM Libya). By signing a Framework 4EVXMGMTEXMSR%KVIIQIRXEXXLI:MPRMYW7YQQMXMR Georgia committed to continuing participation in the EU’s peace missions. Similarly with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions, such participation has strengthened political links with the European institutions while also enhancing national security capacity. Georgia’s commitment to NATO military missions such as Afghanistan has per capita been larger than any other non-NATO member country. But recently Georgian public opinion has begun to question the value of Georgia’s disproportionate contribution to these international peacekeeping missions.

Conclusions The EU’s ‘more-for-more’ principle of offering greater incentives for democratic reforms has had positive VIWYPXWMR+ISVKME,S[IZIVXLI)9´WMREFMPMX]XSTVSNIGX EWXVSRKIVMQEKIMRXLIJEGISJ6YWWME´WVIKMSREPTS[IVMW weakening support among the Georgian public. The latest National Democratic Institute (NDI) poll shows that 31% SJXLITSTYPEXMSRWYTTSVXNSMRMRK6YWWME´W)YVEWMER9RMSR Over 60% of the Georgian public still support Western integration but that percentage is declining. In summary, many Georgians see the EU as too indecisive and blame it for failing to keep its promises and commitments. While the social-economic development strategy, ‘Georgia 2020’, is a good road map for the future, the current KSZIVRQIRX¯[LMGLMWJEGMRKIPIGXMSRWMR¯[MPPRIIH


Georgia 105

to communicate to the Georgian public in clear terms their policy directions. 8LI)9RIIHWXSIRKEKIQSVIGPSWIP]XS½RHWSPYXMSRW XSXLITVSXVEGXIHGSR¾MGXWMR+ISVKME-RXLITSPMG]SJ ‘engagement without recognition’ in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there is more scope for the EU to engage with civil society, so that the isolation of the de facto independent territories does not lead to their being totally absorbed MRXSXLI6YWWMER*IHIVEXMSR The highest priority for the EU is to fully implement the AA and free-trade deals, including the commitment to visa-free travel, as soon as possible. More broadly, the EU needs to VIFSSXERHWXVIRKXLIRVIPEXMSRWRSXNYWX[MXL+ISVKMEFYX with all the South Caucasus states, so that relations are not GSQTVSQMWIHSRXLIJEPWITVIQMWISJETTIEWMRK6YWWME

Further Reading The Caucasus, an Introduction by Thomas De Waal, Oxford University Press, 2010 ‘EU and Georgia Sign Framework Agreement on Participation in EU Crisis Management Operations’, European External Action Service press release 131129/02, 2013 ³+ISVKME6IZSPYXMSRERH;EV´F]6MGO*E[REuropean SecurityTT¯ Government of Georgia Social-Economic Development Strategy, Georgia 2020, GoG, 2015 Reassessing the European Neighbourhood Policy by Felix Hett, Sara Kikic, and Stephan Meuser (eds), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015 ‘The Caucasus and Central Asia: Towards a Non-Strategy’ by Neil S MacFarlane, European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards Neighbourhood StrategyIHMXIHF]6SPERH (ERRVIYXLIVTT¯6SYXPIHKI ³+ISVKMEERH6YWWME%KVIIXS6ISTIR6SEH8VEJ½G&SVHIV´ Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia, GoG, 2013

Regent’s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: Georgia Geography/demography Area: 69,700 sq km Population: 4,935,880 Density: 70.8 per sq km Life expectancy: 75.72 years Growth rate: -0.11%

Economy GDP: $34.27 billion GDP per head: $7,700 Growth rate of economy: 5% Military expenditure (% of GDP): 2.8 Population below poverty line: 9.2% (2010) % of economy in Agriculture: 55.6% Industry: 8.9% Services: 35.5%

Foreign trade Exports: $4.493 billion (vehicles, ferro-alloys, fertilisers, nuts, scrap metal, gold, copper ores) Imports: $8.328 billion (fuels, vehicles, machinery and parts, grain and other foods, pharmaceuticals) Main export partners: %^IVFEMNER%VQIRME8YVOI]9OVEMRI Bulgaria, US Main import partners: 8YVOI]'LMRE9OVEMRI%^IVFEMNER 6YWWME+IVQER]

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR Expenditure: $5.048 billion Public debt: 36.3% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Transnational issues 6YWWME´WQMPMXEV]MRZEWMSRMRWYFWIUYIRXVIGSKRMXMSR and continuing support of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence continue to sour relations with Georgia.

Refugees/IDPs 232,700 displaced in the 1990s as well as in 2008 as a VIWYPXSJGSR¾MGXMRXLIFVIEOE[E]VITYFPMGWSJ%FOLE^ME and South Ossetia. Transparency International corruption index: 50.

Regent’s Report 2015


*Z][[MT[WZ5W[KW_')ZUMVQI between European and Eurasian Integration Mikayel Zolyan Regional Studies Centre, Yerevan

¹)ZUMVQIPI[\WKWWXMZI\M_Q\P:][[QI in order to maintain its security in a \ZW]JTMLZMOQWVJ]\Q\\]ZV[\W-]ZWXMIV QV[\Q\]\QWV[NWZPMTXQVJ]QTLQVOIUWLMZV XWTQ\QKITIVLMKWVWUQK[a[\MUJI[MLWV »-]ZWXMIV^IT]M[¼º 5QSIaMTBWTaIV


Armenia 109

rmenia, like other states of the post-Soviet space, has been dealing with the delicate task of balancing VIPEXMSRW[MXL)YVSTIERH6YWWMEJSVHIGEHIW-RXLIGEWI of Armenia the situation is further complicated by the JVS^IRGSR¾MGXMR2EKSVRS/EVEFEOLERHXLIYRVIWSPZIH issues in Armenian-Turkish relations. The response of Armenian ruling political elites to this situation has been the awkwardly named policy of ‘complementarism’, i.e. QEMRXEMRMRKEGPSWITSPMXMGEPERHQMPMXEV]EPPMERGI[MXL6YWWME [LMPIWMQYPXERISYWP]HIZIPSTMRKXMIW[MXLXLI;IWX¯ particularly with the European institutions.

A

Choosing not to Choose There is more to this policy than the desire to maintain good relations with several powerful players at the same XMQI-XVI¾IGXWEGSRWIRWYWEQSRK%VQIRMERIPMXIW EGGSVHMRKXS[LMGLEWXVEXIKMGTEVXRIVWLMT[MXL6YWWMEMR security matters is a necessity. But it is the European Union (EU) that can offer Armenia a model for development, both in political and economic terms. In other words, %VQIRMELEWXSGSSTIVEXI[MXL6YWWMEMRSVHIVXSQEMRXEMR its security in a troubled region, but it turns to European institutions for help in building a modern political and economic system based on ‘European values’, such as democracy, rule of law and a free market. Today the idea that European-inspired reform could be GSQTEXMFPI[MXLEQMPMXEV]EPPMERGI[MXL6YWWMEQE]WIIQ somewhat paradoxical. However, this was not the case MRXLIIEVP]W%XXLIXMQI6YWWMEIQTLEWMWIHMXW cooperation, rather than its differences with the West. The issue of whether Armenia was aiming to become a member of the EU some day was largely left unarticulated by the Armenian government. This was convenient since it helped to avoid creating suspicions of disloyalty in Moscow, while at the same time not scaring Europeans, weary of further enlargement. In 1999 the EU and Armenia concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which laid the basis for GSSTIVEXMSRMRZEVMSYW½IPHWWYGLEWTSPMXMGEPHMEPSKYI trade, investment, economy, law-making and culture. In %VQIRMEXSKIXLIV[MXL%^IVFEMNERFIGEQIEQIQFIV of the Council of Europe. The organisation was reluctant to discriminate between the two countries, in order not to be WIIREWFMEWIHMRXLI2EKSVRS/EVEFEOLGSR¾MGX8LIRI\X step that drew Armenia closer to the European Union was its inclusion, along with other Caucasus countries, in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004.

A new stage of cooperation between Armenia and the EU commenced with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative. Armenia was involved in negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Armenia was the only EaP country involved in DCFTA negotiations XLEXLEHEGPSWIQMPMXEV]TSPMXMGEPVIPEXMSRWLMT[MXL6YWWME ERHHMHRSXGPEMQEGGIWWMSRXSXLI)9EWERSFNIGXMZI=IX XLIRIKSXMEXMSRWWIIQIHWYGGIWWJYP¯EJXIVWIZIRVSYRHW they were completed in July 2013. The initialling of the EU-Armenia agreement was supposed to take place at XLI:MPRMYWWYQQMXMR(IGIQFIVXSKIXLIV[MXLXLI initialling and signing of similar agreements with other Eastern Partnership countries.

The Russian Factor However, things changed after Armenian President Sargsyan announced on 3 September 2013 that Armenia [SYPHFINSMRMRKXLI'YWXSQW9RMSRSJ6YWWME&IPEVYW and Kazakhstan (CU), effectively making the DCFTA deal with the EU impossible. The 3 September announcement triggered Armenia’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which replaced the former Customs Union. Agreement on Armenia’s accession to the EEU was signed on 10 October 2014 and came into force on 1 January 2015. The 3 September 2013 announcement came as a surprise and even a shock for many, both in Yerevan and in Brussels. By that time it seemed that Armenia had a good chance of becoming one of the success stories of the Eastern Partnership. While Armenia did not claim any intention XSNSMRXLI)9MRXLIJYXYVI¯YRPMOI9OVEMRI+ISVKME ERH1SPHSZE¯XLI%VQIRMERTSWMXMSR[EWUYMXIHMWXMRGX JVSQXLIMWSPEXMSRMWQXLEXGLEVEGXIVMWIH)9%^IVFEMNER and EU-Belarus relations. According to the EaP European MRXIKVEXMSRMRHI\¯E]IEVP]WXYH]SJXLITEGISJVIJSVQMR )E4GSYRXVMIWGSRHYGXIHF]EGSEPMXMSRSJ2+3W¯MR Armenia’s progress in advancing the reform agenda set by the EaP was comparable to that of Georgia and Moldova, and in certain spheres Armenia even outpaced Ukraine. ;LMPI6YWWMEQEMRXEMRIHEWXVSRKMR¾YIRGISZIVXLI Armenian economy, trade patterns also seemed to lead Armenia towards closer cooperation with the EU. The European Union was Armenia’s largest trade partner, with EU-Armenia trade (at €951 million) representing 32% of Armenia’s foreign trade overall (as of 2012). (MXGLMRKXLIHIEPMRJEZSYVSJNSMRMRKXLI'YWXSQW9RMSR[EW a controversial choice, at least economically. Armenia was

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110 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

EPVIEH]FIRI½XMRKJVSQEJVIIXVEHIEVIE[MXL6YWWMEERH other CU countries (the Commonwealth of Independent 7XEXIWJVIIXVEHIEVIE WSMXGSYPHGSRXMRYIIRNS]MRKXLIWI FIRI½XW[MXLSYXNSMRMRKXLI'YWXSQW9RMSR1SVIWYFWXERXMEP FIRI½XWJSVMRWXERGIJVSQXLIEFSPMXMSRSJGYWXSQWFEVVMIVW were unrealistic for Armenia, given that it did not share a common land border with any of the CU countries. Prior to the 3 September announcement, high-level %VQIRMERSJ½GMEPWMRGPYHMRKXLI4VMQI1MRMWXIVLEHVYPIH out Armenian membership of the Customs Union. Even EJI[HE]WFIJSVILERH%VQIRMERSJ½GMEPWERHVYPMRKTEVX] politicians were adamant that Armenia would pursue the DCFTA deal with the EU and there was no question of %VQIRME´WNSMRMRKXLI'9;L]XLIRHMH%VQIRMEVIZIVWI its course? Taking into account the later developments related to Ukraine, Armenia’s reversal of policies in 2013 is not only understandable, but seems to have even been predictable. Moreover, looking at the pressures applied by Moscow on other EaP countries in order to steer them away from the )YVSTIERTVSNIGXMXQE]WIIQWXVERKIXLEXEGSYRXV]EW dependent on Moscow as Armenia was allowed to go so JEVMRMXWVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)9-RHIIH[MXLXLIFIRI½XSJ hindsight, signs that Armenia would eventually be forced to make an unwilling choice between Brussels and Moscow were evident for quite some time in the run-up to the 3 September announcement. In the early 2000s the Armenian policy of ‘complementarism’, was consistent with a generally positive QSSHSJVIPEXMSRWFIX[IIR6YWWMEERHXLI;IWX8LI ½VWXGVEGOWMRXLITMGXYVIETTIEVIH[MXLXLI³GSPSYVIH´ revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, which were perceived by Moscow as Western meddling in its own backyard. However, as long as there was no open confrontation FIX[IIRXLI;IWXERH6YWWME%VQIRME[EWWXMPPEFPIXS pursue its policy of ‘complementarism’, though it certainly LEHXSXVIEHQSVIGEVIJYPP])ZIRXLI6YWWMER+ISVKMER[EV of 2008 did not change that pattern, as the deterioration of relations caused by the war did not last long and was followed by a ‘reset’. It seemed that Armenia was once again able to avoid QEOMRKXLIHMJ½GYPXGLSMGIFIX[IIR1SWGS[ERH&VYWWIPW Soon afterwards Armenia was included in the EaP and, though Moscow never hid its unhappiness about the MRMXMEXMZIMRKIRIVEPMXHMHRSXETTIEVXSSFNIGXXS%VQIRME´W TEVXMGMTEXMSR%VQIRMERSJ½GMEPW´VIEWWYVERGIWXLEXXLI

Regent’s Report 2015

GSYRXV]HMHRSXEMQXSNSMRXLI)9PIXEPSRIXLI2SVXL Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), seemed to be enough for Moscow, at least for the time being. However, as negotiations about the Association Agreement advanced, it became clear that relations between Armenia and the EU were reaching a new level. The DCFTA provisions meant that Armenia would become a part of a common economic space with the EU and would undergo reforms that could potentially transform not only its economy but its political system as well. In addition, Armenia’s Association Agreement negotiations became part of a ‘Great Game’ that was unfolding between the EU ERH6YWWME EXPIEWXMR1SWGS[´WTIVGITXMSR  It was in this context that signs of Moscow’s unhappiness with Armenia’s conduct emerged. These ranged from angry rants of pro-Kremlin political analysts to an eruption of anti-European propaganda, seizing on homophobic and XVEHMXMSREPMWXXLIQIWPIHF]PSGEPTVS6YWWMERSVKERMWEXMSRW inside Armenia. However, what was instrumental in convincing the Armenian authorities to turn away from the DCFTA was essentially the issue of security. As Armenia was negotiating the Association Agreement with the EU, Moscow MRXIRWM½IHMXWGSRXEGXW[MXL%^IVFEMNER-RTEVXMGYPEVXLMW included unprecedented arms sales, as well as a muchpublicised visit by President Putin to Baku. The message was clear: Moscow was warning Armenia not to move too far in its relations with the EU. For Armenia this was a gamechanger.

Why Security Matters: Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia-Turkey Relations For more than two decades Armenia has been locked in EGSR¾MGX[MXLRIMKLFSYVMRK%^IVFEMNERSZIVXLIQEMRP] Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is currently a de factoWXEXIWYTTSVXIHF]%VQIRME%^IVFEMNER JSPPS[MRKMXWQMPMXEV]HIJIEXMRXLI[EVSJ¯ embarked on an effort of outgunning Armenia, which led XSEREVQWVEGIMRXLIVIKMSR%^IVFEMNER[MXLMXWPEVKIV population and bigger economy, has used its windfall oil TVS½XWXSFIIJYTMXWEVQIHJSVGIW%VQIRMELEWEXXIQTXIH to counter this asymmetry through military cooperation [MXL6YWWME6YWWMEREVQWWYTTPMIWQSWXP]EXVIHYGIH TVMGIWE6YWWMERQMPMXEV]FEWIMR+]YQVMRIEVXLI8YVOMWL FSVHIVERHXLITVIWIRGISJ6YWWMERFSVHIVKYEVHWSRXLI Armenian-Turkish border are all important elements of Armenia’s security arrangements.


Armenia 111

In these last two instances the potential threat that %VQIRMER6YWWMERGSSTIVEXMSRMWLIPTMRKXSRIYXVEPMWI MWRSXXLISRIGSQMRKJVSQ%^IVFEMNERFYXVEXLIVXLI one from Turkey. Armenian-Turkish relations have been dominated by the debate over the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians in Ottoman Turkey in 1915. While Armenians insist it was genocide, Turkey refuses to acknowledge that the events constituted genocide, and claims that Armenian deaths were a consequence of wartime conditions. Contrary to common perceptions, however, it was not the genocide recognition issue that led to the closing of the %VQIRME8YVOI]FSVHIV-X[EWXLIGSR¾MGXMR2EKSVRS Karabakh that made Ankara seal the border with Armenia and refuse to establish diplomatic relations. 7MRGIXLIIEVP]W8YVOI]LEW½VQP]WYTTSVXIH %^IVFEMNEREGSYRXV][MXL[LMGLMXLEWGPSWIPMRKYMWXMGERH ethnic ties. During the Nagorno-Karabakh war Turkey even made (unsubstantiated) threats of military intervention. In any case, the fear of NATO’s second-largest army MRXIVJIVMRKMRXLIGSR¾MGXSRXLIWMHISJ%^IVFEMNER[EWJEV too serious for Yerevan to dismiss. Successive Armenian governments tried dealing with the potential threat of Turkish interference by cultivating a WIGYVMX]VIPEXMSRWLMT[MXL6YWWME8LSYKLMRQMPMXEV]XIVQW 6YWWMERFSVHIVKYEVHWERHXLI6YWWMERQMPMXEV]FEWIMR Gyumri are obviously no match for the Turkish army, they play a role as a political deterrent. If Turkish military were to cross the border with Armenia, this would automatically XVERWJSVQE8YVOMWL%VQIRMERGSR¾MGXMRXSE8YVOMWL6YWWMER SRI¯WSQIXLMRK8YVOI]MWLMKLP]YRPMOIP]XSVMWO¯LIRGI XLIOI]WMKRM½GERGIXLEX%VQIRMER6YWWMERGSSTIVEXMSRLEW for Armenia’s security. This arrangement has been a matter of necessity, rather than one of choice. Successive Armenian governments have tried to get out of this precarious situation by trying to mend relations with Turkey, but with little success. In ¯HYVMRKXLIWSGEPPIH³JSSXFEPPHMTPSQEG]´¯[LMGL started with the Armenian and Turkish presidents watching EJSSXFEPPKEQIXSKIXLIVMR=IVIZER¯MXWIIQIHXLEX Armenia and Turkey, helped by Swiss mediation, were close to a breakthrough. The support that this initiative received from the EU, 97ERH6YWWME[EWTIVGIMZIHEWEREWWYVERGIXLEXXLI international community would guarantee the deal. However, the Armenian-Turkish protocols, signed in Zurich

MR3GXSFIV[IVIRIZIVVEXM½IHF]IMXLIVSJXLI parties, with each one blaming the other for failing to stick XSXLIHIEP4VIWWYVIJVSQ%^IVFEMNER[LMGL[EWYRLETT] to see its ally (Turkey) mending relations with its archenemy (Armenia), was among the factors that led to the failure of the deal. With Armenian-Turkish relations stalled, %VQIRME´WVIPMERGISR6YWWMERWYTTSVXVIQEMRIHMRTPEGI 7MRGIXLIIEVP]W6YWWMELEWFIIRGSRWSPMHEXMRKMXW MR¾YIRGIMROI]WIGXSVWSJXLI%VQIRMERIGSRSQ]ERH its dominant position in the security sector meant that 1SWGS[[EWEPWSEFPIXSEHZERGIMXWMR¾YIRGIMRSXLIV ½IPHW'YVVIRXP]6YWWMERGSQTERMIWGSRXVSPWIZIVEPOI] sectors of Armenia’s economy, including energy and communications: ˆGazprom’s subsidiary Gazprom Armenia has a QSRSTSP]SRREXYVEPKEWWYTTPMIW ˆ7SYXL'EYGEWYW6EMP[E]W =9/>,( EFVERGLSJ 6YWWMER6EMP[E]W 6>,( GSRXVSPWEPPSJ%VQIRME´W railways ˆ6YWWMERS[RIH)PIGXVMG2IX[SVOWSJ%VQIRME controls electricity distribution, and a large part of Armenia’s electricity generating capacity is also GSRXVSPPIHF]6YWWME ˆTwo of the country’s three mobile operators are WYFWMHMEVMIWSJ6YWWMERGSQTERMIW 8LIXLMVHSRI French-owned Orange Armenia, announced that it was leaving the Armenian market as this article went to press.) ˆ%RSXLIVJSVQSJ%VQIRME´WHITIRHIRGISR6YWWME is its dependence on money transfers coming from Armenian migrant workers and ethnic Armenians VIWMHMRKMR6YWWME ˆ*MREPP]6YWWMERQIHMELEWWMKRM½GERXMR¾YIRGI MR%VQIRME6YWWMERWXEXIXIPIZMWMSRMW[MHIP] watched and remains one of the main sources of information about regional and international affairs. %PPXLMWLEWFIIRXVERWJSVQIHMRXSTSPMXMGEPMR¾YIRGI;LMPI independent media and parts of civil society tend to be UYMXIGVMXMGEPSJ6YWWMERMR¾YIRGITSPMXMGEPTEVXMIW[LIXLIV pro-government or opposition, are wary of appearing to be critical of Moscow. %VQIRME´WGSR¾MGXW[MXL%^IVFEMNERERH8YVOI]LEZIPIHMX XSVIP]SR6YWWMEMRQEXXIVWSJWIGYVMX]ERHXLMWVIPMERGI MRXYVRLEWEPPS[IH6YWWMEXSEGUYMVIWMKRM½GERXMR¾YIRGI in various spheres of Armenia’s life. Therefore, while %VQIRMELEWWLS[RWMKRM½GERXMRXIVIWXMR[MHIVERHHIITIV

Regent’s Report 2015


112 Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

cooperation with the EU, the degree of this cooperation is GETTIHF]XLIPIZIVEKISJ6YWWMERMRXIVIWXWMRXLIGSYRXV] However, it would be wrong for Europe to write off %VQIRMEEWEQIVI6YWWMERWEXIPPMXI

Not Giving Up on the European Option: Armenia-EU Relations Today While Armenia-EU relations have often been limited in XLIMVWGSTIF]6YWWMERMRžYIRGIMR%VQIRMEXLISTTSWMXI MWEPWSXVYI6YWWME´WMRžYIRGIMR%VQIRMEMWXSERI\XIRX counterbalanced by the ties Armenia has built through the years with European institutions. In spite of Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s accession into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Yerevan still has a strong rationale for continued cooperation with the EU. This rationale goes beyond simply hedging bets in case Moscow loses in its GSQTIXMXMSR[MXLXLI)9SVWIIOMRK)YVSTIER½RERGMEP aid. There is a virtual consensus among Armenian elites XLEX6YWWMER%VQIRMERGSSTIVEXMSRMWMRHMWTIRWEFPIJSV Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security at the current stage. However, there is also an understanding among parts of the Armenian TSPMXMGEPIPMXIXLEXRIMXLIV6YWWMERSVXLI))9[SYPHFIEFPI (or willing) to help Armenia develop economically in any long-term perspective. Although the Armenian authorities have loudly trumpeted XLITSXIRXMEPFIRI½XWSJ)YVEWMERMRXIKVEXMSRJSV%VQIRME the reality so far has been somewhat different. The economic HS[RXYVRMR6YWWMEGSYTPIH[MXL;IWXIVRWERGXMSRWERH JEPPMRKSMPTVMGIWLEWLYVX%VQIRMERI\TSVXWXS6YWWME8LI JEPPMRKVSYFPIERHMRGVIEWMRKP]WXMJJQMKVEXMSRTSPMGMIWMR6YWWME LEZIVIWYPXIHMREHIGVIEWIMRVIQMXXERGIWJVSQ6YWWME-R EHHMXMSRXLITIVJSVQERGISJ6YWWMERS[RIHGSQTERMIWMR Armenia has often been controversial, to say the least. Thus, 6YWWMER6EMP[E]WLEWJEMPIHXSJYP½PMXWTVSQMWIWXSQSHIVRMWI the Armenian railway system, which remains in a poor GSRHMXMSRÂŻMXXEOIWEFSYXLSYVWXSKIXJVSQ=IVIZERXS Georgian capital Tbilisi by train, compared to six hours by FYW%RSXLIV6YWWMERS[RIHGSQTER])PIGXVMG2IX[SVOW SJ%VQIRMELEWFIIREGGYWIHSJMRIJ½GMIRXQEREKIQIRX-X demanded a serious hike in domestic electricity prices this WYQQIVGEYWMRKQEWWTVSXIWXW[LMGL6YWWMERQIHME[EW quick to label the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Armenian Maidanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; or â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;electro-Maidanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; with obvious reference to the Ukrainian Maidan revolution. %HHMRKMRWYPXXSMRNYV]1SWGS[LEWFIIRVIPYGXERXXSKVERX XLI%VQIRMERKSZIVRQIRXXLIKIRIVSYW½RERGMEPMRGIRXMZIW it has offered other EEU members, such as Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. While Armenia did indeed gain from

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preferential prices on energy imports, this achievement seems today less impressive than it did in late 2013, given the falling international price of oil and natural gas. The JYXYVISJXLI))9EWERMRXIKVEXMSRTVSNIGXEPWSVIQEMRW YRGPIEVEW6YWWMERS[½RHWMXWIPJMRGSRJVSRXEXMSR[MXLXLI ;IWXERHXLIVIEVIWMKRM½GERXHMWEKVIIQIRXWFIX[IIR))9 members. In other words, contrary to the upbeat rhetoric of the Armenian government, the future of Armenia within the EEU seems uncertain. During the past year it has become obvious that even Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s inclusion in the EEU has not stopped the country continuing cooperation with European institutions, though the scope of this cooperation has been reduced. Naturally, after Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s accession to the EEU, the option of a DCFTA is off the table. However, both Yerevan and Brussels have shown interest in continuing negotiations on a new Association Agreement, which would set up a framework for cooperation as wide as possible within the limits of present conditions. This Agreement would probably focus on assistance to political reform, as well as those trade provisions that would not contradict Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s obligations under the EEU treaty. %VQIRMEGSRXMRYIWXSIRNS]+IRIVEPMWIH7GLIQISJ 4VIJIVIRGIW4PYW +74 WXEXYWMRMXWXVEHI[MXLXLI)9 ERHXSVIGIMZI)9½RERGMEPEMH%ZMWEJEGMPMXEXMSREKVIIQIRX between the EU and Armenia came into force in 2014, though in practice receiving a visa to travel to the EU is still a complicated task for most Armenian citizens. Armenia has a relatively high degree of civil and political liberty, compared to other EEU countries, and the continuing cooperation with the EU is, arguably, one of the factors contributing to that.

Conclusions While Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s membership in the EEU has placed WMKRM½GERXPMQMXEXMSRWSRXLI[MHXLERHHITXLSJXLI countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s cooperation with the EU, Armenia remains interested in continuing this cooperation. The short-term effects of Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s accession to the EEU have been disappointing, and its long-term perspectives remain unclear. 8LIHIGMWMSRXSNSMRXLI))9[EW½VWXERHJSVIQSWXE result of security considerations, related to Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s GSRžMGXIHVIPEXMSRW[MXLMXWRIMKLFSYVWERH6YWWME´WVSPIMR Armeniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security arrangements. There is an understanding among at least a part of the Armenian elite that integration with the EEU is unable to contribute to modernisation and development of Armenia in the same way as cooperation with the EU would have done.


Armenia 113

As for Brussels, the initially reserved treatment that %VQIRMERSJ½GMEPWVIGIMZIHMRXLIMQQIHMEXIEJXIVQEXLSJ the 3 September announcement has been replaced by a more accommodating approach. The war in Ukraine had added weight to Armenia’s arguments that its decision to EFERHSRXLI%WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRX[MXLXLI)9ERHNSMR the EEU was a necessity, rather than a decision taken by choice. While the resources for advancing relations with Armenia in today’s conditions are quite limited, there is also a determination on the part of the EU not to turn its back SR%VQIRMEMRXLIHMJ½GYPXGSRHMXMSRWXLEXMXMWGYVVIRXP] facing

Further Reading European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan, Armenia: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/action_plans/armenia_ IRTCETC½REPCIRTHJ Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Armenia Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions: http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2015/armenia-enpreport-2015_en.pdf

Regent’s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: Armenia Geography/demography

Refugees

Area: 29,743 sq km Population: 3,060,631 Density: 102.9 per sq km Life expectancy: 74.12 years Growth rate: -0.13%

JVSQ7]VME¯IXLRMG%VQIRMERWJVSQXLI GSR¾MGX[MXL%^IVFEMNERSZIV2EKSVRS/EVEFEOL stateless.

Economy GDP: $24.31 billion GDP per head: $7,400 Growth rate: 3.4% Military expenditure (% of GDP): 3.92 Population below poverty line: 32% % of economy in Agriculture: 21.9% Industry: 31.5% Services: 46.6%

Foreign trade Exports: $1.519 billion (pig iron, unwrought copper, nonferrous metals, gold, diamonds, mineral products, foodstuffs, energy) Imports: $4.402 billion (natural gas, petroleum, tobacco products, foodstuffs, diamonds, pharmaceuticals, cars) Main export partners: 6YWWME&YPKEVME&IPKMYQ-VER97 Canada Main import partners: 6YWWME'LMRE+IVQER]9OVEMRI Turkey, Iran

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR Expenditure: $3.01 billion Public debt: 42.4% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Transnational issues (MWTYXI[MXL%^IVFEMNERSZIVXLIFVIEOE[E]2EKSVRS Karabakh region remains the primary focus of regional instability. Local border forces struggle to control the illegal transit of goods and people across the un-demarcated %VQIRMER%^IVFEMNERMERH+ISVKMERFSVHIVW)XLRMG Armenian groups in the Javakheti region of Georgia seek greater autonomy from the Georgian government.

Regent’s Report 2015

Drugs and other criminality issues Illicit cultivation of small amounts of cannabis for domestic GSRWYQTXMSRQMRSVXVERWMXTSMRXJSVMPPMGMXHVYKW¯QSWXP] STMYQERHLEWLMWL¯QSZMRKJVSQWSYXL[IWX%WMEXS 6YWWMEERHXSEPIWWIVI\XIRXXLIVIWXSJ)YVSTI&EWIJSV growing cybercrime operations. Transparency International corruption index: 94.


Serbia and the EU: National Values or European? Dr Neven Anjelic Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Human Rights, Regent’s University London

“The process of ‘Europeanisation’ in Serbia can only be described as a partial success. While the country is open to the process of democratisation and European integration, Kosovo is still a critical issue” Dr Neven Anjelic


Serbia 117

n October 2014 the European Union (EU) lifted sanctions against Slobodan Milosevic and his family, stating as the reason ‘their lack of relevance for relations between Serbia and the EU’. The former Serbian leader could not have felt any satisfaction as he had died in 2006 while standing trial for war crimes before the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. But this empty gesture illustrates in miniature the turbulent relationship between Serbia and the EU; a relationship that has often lacked reason and moderation on both sides.

I

Turbulent Break-Up of Yugoslavia While still under communist control, Yugoslavia was the ½VWXWSGMEPMWXWXEXIXSHIZIPSTHMTPSQEXMGVIPEXMSRW[MXL the then European Economic Community. It positioned itself as somewhere between Moscow and Brussels, and WSYKLXXSIRNS][LEXIZIVQEXIVMEPFIRI½XWMXGSYPH[MXLSYX undermining the political structures of the state. For many years on this basis it enjoyed privileged status in trade relations with the member states of the Community. The break-up of Yugoslavia brought to an end the good relations developed between the two partners. While Yugoslavia disintegrated, the processes of European integration among the member states of the European Communities gathered pace, resulting in the creation of the European Union in 1993. The popularity of the EU reached its all-time peak as a series of post-Yugoslav wars resulted in Serbia being placed under international sanctions. Successor states opted for independence, but Serbia decided to form a common state with Montenegro under the name Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) before this union also broke apart and both Serbia and Montenegro became independent states in 2006. During the existence of this smaller Yugoslav union, the international community – and the EU in particular – supported and encouraged tiny Montenegro towards independence in an effort to undermine Milosevic. Under his regime, Serbia became a pariah state in European eyes. Reacting against this international pressure, many Serbs supported Milosevic and instead of growing dissent within Serbia, there was noticeable resistance to the ‘new world order’ being imposed upon her. Many Serbs saw it as American-led, strongly supported by the EU. Traditional anti-German feeling in Serbia, nurtured under the communist regime but with deeper historical roots, blossomed further during the post-Yugoslav crisis. The people, impoverished due to successive wars in the 1990s

and also by international sanctions, adopted strongly isolationist feelings. Milosevic’s regime not only survived for several years, but was strongly entrenched in popular attitudes even when he fell, despite the suffering of the people inside the country and diplomatic, economic and military pressure exerted from outside. While the rest of the states of eastern and central Europe were competing in fast opening up and joining the EU integrative process, Serbia was closing down what few initiatives there were to re-join the international community. The heritage of the old Yugoslavia as a pioneering socialist country became irrelevant. The regime became increasingly autocratic and suppressed signs of dissent at home, controlled the media, refused basic human rights to the Albanian QMRSVMX]MR/SWSZSERHSTTSWIHMRXIVREXMSREPIJJSVXWXS½RH EWSPYXMSRERHTVIZIRX]IXERSXLIVTSWX=YKSWPEZGSR¾MGX European integration was a non-issue in Serbia in the 1990s.

Security Security in the Balkans was clearly threatened by the Serbian regime at this time and the North Atlantic Treaty 3VKERM^EXMSR 2%83 ½REPP]HIGMHIHXSFVMRKERIRHXS this threat by military intervention. But the damage that Serbs suffered from the NATO air strikes strengthened anti-Western feelings. Milosevic judged that he could call elections immediately after this military defeat and confront NATO politically. His attempt to manipulate the election, LS[IZIV½REPP]YRMXIHEQENSVMX]SJ7IVFWEKEMRWXLMQERH they violently ousted him from power in 2000. The EU’s policies towards the western Balkans since then could best be described as dualist in character. On the one hand they have been collective in approaching common regional issues, and on the other individualistic in their approach to separate Balkan states. The EU has indicated that all the countries of the region will be encouraged eventually to join the Union, but it has stressed that each will make progress towards integration at its own speed. Thus the Zagreb Summit of the EU and western Balkans countries organised in 2000, and the 8LIWWEPSRMOM7YQQMXXLEXJSPPS[IHMRGSR½VQIHERH VIGSR½VQIHXLI)YVSTIERSVMIRXEXMSRSJXLI[IWXIVR Balkans, but spelled out how the individual progress of each state was to be monitored. The example of visa-free access demonstrates this well. The visa regime was relaxed for some states early in the decade, but for Serbian citizens only in 2009 – and then still with the exception of the UK and Ireland.

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118 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

The complicated legal status of the state union of Serbia ERH1SRXIRIKVS[EWEPWSVI¾IGXIHMRXLI)YVSTIER Partnership Agreement with both states and in the ‘twin track’ approach. Trade aspects of the Agreement on Association and Stabilisation were negotiated separately with each country, while political ones were discussed with the joint delegation. Negotiations on the Agreement started in November 2005 but were cancelled by the EU due to Serbia’s lack of cooperation with The Hague Tribunal for War Crimes. One month later Montenegro declared MRHITIRHIRGIPIEZMRK7IVFME½REPP]EPSRI9RIRGYQFIVIH by other attachments, it was able to enter into relations with the EU as a single, sovereign state.

ethnic Albanian authorities. Serbia insists that its territorial integrity includes Kosovo, but it does not exercise any authority in the territory. Both the Serbian and Kosovan authorities refused for WIZIVEP]IEVWXSQIIXERHHMWGYWWXLIMWWYIFYXXLI½VWX agreement on normalisation of relations was eventually signed by the Serbian and Kosovan Prime Ministers in April 2013. This was immediately followed – as a political reward – by the European Commission’s recommendation to the Council to open negotiations with Serbia on its EU membership. The two issues are so closely bound together that negotiations on EU membership are conditional on progress in relations between Serbia and Kosovo.

Formal Progress for Serbia The EU deserves credit for reacting promptly to the democratic revolution in Serbia. It quickly signed a Framework Agreement in November 2000 to bolster economic and political reforms. Serbia subsequently concluded negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2007. It was signed in 2008, VEXM½IHF]XLI)YVSTIER4EVPMEQIRXMRERHF]EPP)9 member states by the end of 2013. In parallel with this, Serbia applied for EU membership in December 2009. Later the following year the European Commission recommended Serbia for candidate status, [LMGLXLIQIQFIVWXEXIWEKVIIHMR1EVGL8LI½VWX phase of the Serbian negotiations with the EU opened in .ERYEV]ERH½RMWLIHMR1EVGL None of this diplomatic progress, however, means that Serbs had become European-minded in general. When talking about Europe, the Foreign Minister, Ivica Dacic, TSWIHEVLIXSVMGEPUYIWXMSR³;LIR[MPP)YVSTI½REPP] come to Serbia?’ He alleged that there were certain values presumed to be European but which were not widely respected or accepted in Serbia. Despite the government’s determination to join and speed up the European MRXIKVEXMZITVSGIWWWSGMIX]HSIWRSXWIIQXSVI¾IGXXLI same determination. Strong anti-European rhetoric is still to be found across all of Serbian society. This is because of the elephant in the room: relations with Kosovo. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, and EPPFYX½ZISJXLI)9QIQFIVWXEXIWLEZIVIGSKRMWIHMX F] 2015) as a state. Indeed, it is now recognised by just over half of the world’s states, but is still not accepted at the UN and remains outside most international organisations. The EU administers the territory in collaboration with local

Regent’s Report 2015

Symbols and Sentiment It is symbolic that the European Council decided to open negotiations on accession with Serbia on 28 June.This is St Vitus (Vidovdan) Day, one of the most sacred dates in Serbian history.The famous Battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of the &PEGOFMVH [LIVIXLI3XXSQER)QTMVI½VWXSZIVVER7IVFME took place on this date in 1389.The shots that triggered the *MVWX;SVPH;EV[IVI½VIHMR7EVENIZSF]ERIXLRMG7IVF on this date in 1914, Stalin issued his resolution against Tito’s VIKMQIMR=YKSWPEZMESRXLMWHEXIMRERH½REPP]1MPSWIZMG was extradited to The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes on 28 June 2001. 7IVFMELEWFIIRVILEFMPMXEXIH[MXLEWMKRM½GERXHIPE][MXLMR Europe. It is not considered a security threat any more, state and society have been democratised, and the government is fully co-operative with the international community. The issue of Kosovo, however, has not gone away. The (IQSGVEXMG4EVX][LMGL[EWXLIQSWXMR¾YIRXMEPEXXLI beginning of this century, has to a large extent disintegrated and been replaced by nationalists, but opposition to the MRHITIRHIRGISJ/SWSZSMWXLIMWWYIXLEXWXMPPYRM½IWXLI majority of Serb society across most, if not quite all, political parties. The process of ‘Europeanisation’ in Serbia can only be described as a partial success. While the country is open to the process of democratisation and European integration, Kosovo is still a critical issue in its dealings with the EU. Serbia was bombed by NATO because of Kosovo, and many Serbs still bear grudges towards the West.

Minority Rights The irony is that the current nationalist government, led by the Progressive Party, is more cooperative with Western institutions than the previous government led by the Democratic Party. The Serbian Progressive Party


Serbia 119

has abandoned some of its traditional nationalist rhetoric since coming to power. Perceived as the proven protector of the national interest, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic’s party has to negotiate a thin line between accepting steps towards Brussels without betraying the Serbian electorate’s perceived interests. It always risks their feeling betrayed again, as the examples of Milosevic and several other nationalist politicians suggest. A striking example of possible problems that Vucic’s government may face is the issue of sexual minorities’ rights. European Union representatives see this as a key indicator of the progress of Europeanisation in Serbia. Previous attempts at organising gay pride parades in Belgrade resulted either in last-minute cancellation by the authorities or violence triggered by right-wing youths, sometimes leaving hundreds of injured among both supporters of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights and the police. It may be that the Serbian police are not adequately trained to deal with this kind of urban violence, or that the number of radical Serbs biased against LGBT rights is too high for it to be possible to create a safe environment for sexual QMRSVMXMIW)MXLIV[E]XVEHMXMSREPJEQMP]ZEPYIWEWVI¾IGXIH by the most conservative part of Serbian society, remain an obstacle to the thoroughgoing Europeanisation of Serbia. The QSWXVIGIRXKE]TVMHITEVEHI[EW½REPP]SVKERMWIHYRHIVXLI ever-mindful eye of the all-powerful Prime Minister, who thus managed to demonstrate his point that Serbia was making progress in the right direction. While it does not mean that minorities in Serbia now enjoy full equality, it had a symbolic importance as a step forward for the LGBT community. The ‘Atlantic’ aspect of Serbia’s modernisation represents the other facet of its aspiration to join the European Union. 8LMWMWI\IQTPM½IHF]XLITVSWTIGXSJ7IVFMESRIHE] joining NATO. This association often clouds the emotional response of Serbs to the EU, since there is no popular will to join NATO – hardly surprising given the recent history of being bombed by planes from that organisation. It is an open question whether membership of these two organisations runs hand in hand. Would Serbia be ready to join NATO as part of the price of joining the EU, while NATO is still considered an enemy by many Serbs? Even if Serbia could join the EU without joining NATO at the same time, the issue of Kosovo remains a major obstacle. It is highly unlikely it could be solved in any long-term sense, despite some signs of partial progress.

Serbia might be slowly making up its mind to co-operate more fully with the EU in near future, but its negotiation of membership will take a long time yet. At this point in time, it is hard to see any other candidate country that will take longer than Serbia to reach the point where it can become EJYPP]¾IHKIHQIQFIVSJXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR

Further Reading ‘What’s Wrong with Serbia?’ by Dejan Anastasijevic, European Stability Initiative, 2008: www.esiweb.org/index. php?lang=en&id=310 ‘With the help of some (expensive) friends’ by Florian &MIFIVLXXT¾SVMERFMIFIVSVK[MXLXLILIPT of-some-expensive-friends/ ‘The Missing Democratic Revolution and Serbia’s Anti-European Choice: 1989–2008’ by Anna Di Lellio, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 22, No 3, 1989 and Beyond: The Future of Democracy, pp 373–384, September 2009 ‘”There’s Nothing Anyone Can Do about It”: Participation, Apathy and “Successful” Democratic Transition in Postsocialist Serbia’ by Jessica Greenberg, Slavic Review, Vol 69, No 1, pp 41–64, spring 2010 ‘Post-socialist identity, territoriality and European integration: Serbia’s return to Europe after Milosevic’ by Denisa Kostovicova, GeoJournal, Vol 61, No 1, pp 23–30, 2004 ‘Stronger than the State? Football Hooliganism, Political Extremism and the Gay Pride Parades in Serbia,’ by Christian Axboe Nielsen, Sport in Society, Vol 16, No 8, pp 1038–1053, 2013 ‘From Nightmare to Pragmatic Partnership: Serbia and the EU’ by Christian Axboe Nielsen in Playing Second Fiddle?: Contending Visions of Europe’s Future Development, eds Hans-Ake Persson, Bo Petersson, Cecilie Stockholm Banke, Universus Academic Press, 2015 ‘Europeanising the “Kosovo Question”: Serbia’s Policies in the Context of EU Integration’ by Jelena ObradovicWochnik and Alexander Wochnik, West European Politics, Vol 35, No 5, pp 1158 –1181, September 2012 Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space by Branislav Radeljic (ed), Ashgate, 2013

Regent’s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: Serbia (excluding Kosovo) Geography/demography Area: 77,474 sq km Population: 7,209,760 Density: 93 per sq km Life expectancy: 75 years Growth rate: -0.46%

UNHCR estimates that 2,000 refugees and migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Africa cross the Serbian border daily, en route for Hungary, Austria and Germany. Frontex estimates that over 100,000 refugees and migrants used XLI[IWXIVR&EPOERVSYXIMR½VWXLEPJSJ

Drugs and other criminality issues Economy GDP: $89.59 billion GDP per head: $12,500 Growth rate: -1.8% Military expenditure (% of GDP) 1.44% Population below poverty line: 9.2% % of economy in Agriculture 21.9% Industry: 15.6% Services 62.5%

Foreign trade Exports: $14.84 billion (iron and steel, rubber, clothes, wheat, fruit and vegetables, nonferrous metals, electric appliances, metal products, weapons, automobiles) Imports: $20.65 billion Export trade partners: Italy, Germany, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia, Romania Import trade partners: Germany, Russia, Italy, China

Government budget Revenue: $16.38 billion Expenditure: $19.32 billion Public debt (as % of GDP): 71% -R¾EXMSRVEXI  EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW

Transnational issues Serbia protests other states’ recognition of Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence. Ethnic Serbian municipalities EPSRK/SWSZS´WRSVXLIVRFSVHIVGLEPPIRKI½REPWXEXYWSJ Kosovo-Serbia boundary. Serbia has delimited about half of the boundary with Bosnia-Herzegovina – sections along the Drina River remain in dispute.

Refugees 32,408 from Croatia; 11,325 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 97,000 mostly Kosovar Serbs and Roma, also 3,578 IDPs (stateless persons in Kosovo).

Regent’s Report 2015

Transshipment point for south-west Asian heroin moving to western Europe on the Balkan route. Economy vulnerable to money laundering. Transparency International corruption index: 78.


Bosnia-Herzegovina: Nearly a Failed State? Dr Martyn Bond Honorary Senior Fellow, Regent’s University London

“Bosnia-Herzegovina is essentially a state still under tutelage, since the European powers (and the United States) do not yet \Z][\Q\_Q\PQ\[W_VI‫ٺ‬IQZ[NWZNMIZ\PI\Q\ will revert to old ways and trigger violent KWVÆQK\·IOIQV·_Q\PQV-]ZWXMº Dr Martyn Bond


Bosnia-Herzegovina 123

ou cannot choose your family, and the same goes for your European neighbours. Geography chooses them for you. A glance at the map shows that the western Balkans – the states of the old Yugoslav Federation – are not scattered around the periphery of Europe. They are not neighbours in the strict sense of the word, people outside the European house. They sit right inside the boundaries of the European Union (EU): west of Romania and Bulgaria, north of Greece and south of Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia, XLIPEWXX[SXLIQWIPZIWXLI½VWXWXEXIWXSFIWEPZEKIHJVSQ the wreck of the old Federation and brought into the new Union. The EU really has no choice but to integrate the rest of old Yugoslavia, to make them full members of the club.

Y

In the Recovery Ward Bosnia-Herzegovina is recovering from a devastating threeyear war which accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. It has been recovering for 20 years, and still has a very long way to go. 8LIGSQTPMGEXIHFPSSH]ERHTVSXVEGXIHGSR¾MGXJVSQ to 1995 centred on whether Bosnia should stay in the Yugoslav Federation, be divided between Croatia and Serbia, or become an independent state with a dominant ethnic core of Bosniak citizens. It also concerned what borders it might have, and how many of its two other ethnic groups – Croats and Serbs – would live inside those borders. The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BH) was 3,791,622 in the 2013 census – nearly 600,000 less than lived there when Yugoslavia broke into its constituent republics in 1991. Bozniaks currently make up 48%, Serbs 37% and Croats 14%. Other groups make up less than 1%. All but 3% of the Bozniaks are Muslim; all but 1% of the Serbs are Orthodox; ERHEPPXLI'VSEXWEVI6SQER'EXLSPMG8LI½XSJVIPMKMSR with ethnicity is almost devastatingly perfect. The civil war cost BH more than half a million of its people – half of them were killed and the other half permanently emigrated. Almost one in two of the population was displaced internally, each ethnic group leaving areas dominated by an enemy community and moving closer to others of their own kind. The civil war also halved the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Now GDP per capita is barely 30% of the average of the EU. Unemployment is persistently high – the highest in Europe at nearly 40% – and although the growth rate of the economy is fairly strong at 5%, it is creeping up from a very low base. There is very little foreign investment.

One indicator of BH’s craving for good statistical news MWXLIEWWIVXMSR¯SJXIRUYSXIHF]SJ½GMEPWSYVGIW¯XLEX the country will have the third highest growth rate for tourism earnings in the world by 2020 when compared with a baseline of 1995. It sounds exceptionally good, until you recall that the baseline was the end of the war, when tourism contributed next to nothing to GDP.

Things Fall Apart Under a powerful ruler and in a more stable age, peace was maintained among these mutually suspicious minorities F]ERMVSR½WX7EVENIZSXLIGETMXEPSJXLIVIKMSR[EWJEQIH internationally for the tolerance shown to all religions, the variety of languages spoken there, and the cultural riches of the region. But even a quick survey of the history of the region shows just how deeply the animosities are rooted and on what historical grievances they have fed. From 1463 to 1878 Bosnia was part of the Ottoman Empire. Following an agrarian revolt by largely Roman Catholic farmers in the north, the European powers intervened to make it a protectorate of the AustroHungarian Empire (at the Treaty of Berlin). The Hapsburgs GSR½VQIHXLIMVLSPHSRXLIXIVVMXSV]F]ERRI\MRKMX¯ despite Russian objections – in 1909. It was in Sarajevo that a Bosnian Serb nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated the Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, triggering an AustroHungarian ultimatum to Serbia, Russian support of the Serbian government, German support of Austria, French and British support of Russia, and the collapse of the whole tower of cards – the alliances that were meant to keep Europe safe from war through the balance of power. When Europe emerged from the First World War, Bosnia was attributed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, only to collapse again 20 years later into internecine warfare when the invading Germans attributed the territory to Croatia. The Nazis tolerated Islam in order to co-opt the Bosniaks to their cause, but persecuted the Orthodox Serbs. The Chetniks (Serbian royalists) fought the Ustase (Bosnian supporters of the Nazis), and Tito’s partisans fought both. When the Second World War was over,Yugoslavia was held together by Tito, who carefully balanced the various ethnic groups and the different constituent republics in the communist but non-aligned Federation, until his death in 1980. As the Soviet Union collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s, so the glue that held the Yugoslav Federation together grew brittle. Separatist movements and old alliances led to declarations of independence by most of the constituent

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124 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

republics. As Yugoslavia broke apart and an uncertain future of democracy and independence dawned, tolerance evaporated. After a brief war in the north, Slovenia established itself as an independent state, which quickly found a place in the EU. 'VSEXME[EWMRZSPZIHMREFPSSH]GSR¾MGX[MXL7IVFMETEVXP] fought out in Bosnia, and which fuelled what amounted to a civil war there. In BH, each of the ethnic/religious communities tried to ensure its own safety and to secure its share – and more – of the spoils of the new situation. A more unholy and intolerant mess was hard to imagine.

A Complex Status Quo Bosnia-Herzegovina is now – in international law – an independent state, but it is still under international administration. It has an extremely complex system of public administration with three ‘entities’ administering the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republica Srpska (the area in the north and east of the country where most of the Serbs live) and the district of Brcko, a small area jointly administered by the two other entities. In addition the country is divided into 10 cantons and a further 74 municipalities, to which you GEREHHXLIWTIGMEPWXEXYWSJJSYV³SJ½GMEP´GMXMIW&ERNE0YOE Mostar, Sarajevo and East Sarajevo. An upper chamber, the House of the Peoples, is made up SJ½ZIVITVIWIRXEXMZIWJVSQIEGLSJXLIXLVIIQENSVIXLRMG groups. Nationwide elections send 42 members to the lower chamber, the House of Representatives, on the basis of proportionality, with two-thirds of the seats reserved for Bosnia-Herzegovina and one-third for Republica Srpska. Not surprisingly BH suffers from over-government in the sense that there are far too many bureaucrats and politicians for such a small country, all receiving salaries and perks out of proportion to the poverty of the country. It is also considered one of the most corruption-prone states in Europe, partly on account of the legacy of deep ethnic and political divisions left by the 1992–95 war, and partly because of the country’s complex administrative framework. This whole structure is overseen by a High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina who is appointed by the EU and has the power to dismiss appointed – and in certain GMVGYQWXERGIWIZIRIPIGXIH¯SJ½GMEPWERHXSFPSGOSV rescind legislation. The High Representative is the state’s ultimate authority, responsible for implementing the 1995 Dayton Agreement which brought an end to the bloodshed but entrenched the results of ‘ethnic cleansing’, cementing the divide in the country. He has the power to ‘compel the entity governments to comply with the

Regent’s Report 2015

terms of the peace agreement and the state constitution’. And to ensure fair play, in addition to Bosniak/Croat and Serb judges in the Constitutional Court, three judges are appointed by the European Court of Human Rights, whose QEMRUYEPM½GEXMSRMWXLEXXLI]QYWXRSXFIPSRKXSER]SJ the ethnic communities of the country. BH is essentially a state still under tutelage, since the European powers (and the United States) do not yet trust it with its own affairs for fear that it will revert to old ways and XVMKKIVZMSPIRXGSR¾MGX¯EKEMR¯[MXLMR)YVSTI%WQEPP)9 peacekeeping force monitors the situation, and BH will remain under international supervision until the country is deemed ‘politically and democratically stable and self-sustaining’. Early in 2007 the International Crisis Group, a think tank, warned: ‘Bosnia remains unready for unguided ownership of its own future – ethnic nationalism remains too strong.’

Overcoming the Past? In a bid to encourage Bosnia to resolve its ethnic divisions and eventually qualify for EU membership, EU foreign ministers gave the go-ahead in late 2005 for talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the country. Initially signed in 2008, its implementation was delayed by Bosnia’s failure to make the constitutional amendments called for by the European Court of Human Rights. Years PEXIVXLI&SWRMERERH7IVFIRXMXMIW½REPP]EKVIIHERHXLI)9 resolved to go ahead with the Agreement in March this year. In the meantime, the prospect of talks with the EU increased pressure for the capture of two key Bosnian Serb war crimes suspects, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. After nearly 13 years on the run, Radovan Karadzic was arrested in July 2008 by Serbian security forces in Belgrade. His trial on war crimes charges opened at the UN tribunal in The Hague in October the following year. Ratko Mladic [EWEVVIWXIHF]7IVFMERMRXIPPMKIRGISJ½GIVWMREZMPPEKIRIEV Belgrade in May 2011. But the Bosnian Serb leadership continues to be resentful at having to accept the authority of the High Representative, giving rise to suspicions that its ultimate goal is for the Republika Srpska to break away from the Bosniak-Croat Federation. In all elections that have been held since the end of the 1992–95 war, the country’s different communities have almost invariably voted along ethnic lines, with nationalist parties usually doing better than more moderate ones – a tendency that has inevitably reinforced the ingrained disunity of the Bosnian state. Much remains to be done in Bosnia-Herzegovina before there can be any serious prospect of EU membership


Facts and Figures: Bosnia-Herzegovina Geography/demography Area: 51,197 sq km Population: 3,871,640 Density: 75.6 per sq km Life expectancy: 76.33 years Growth rate: -0.11%

Economy GDP: $38.08 billion GDP per head: $9,800 Growth rate of economy: 1.1% Military expenditure: 1.35% of GDP Population below poverty line: 17.2% (2011 est) % of economy in Agriculture: 8% Industry: 26.3% Services: 65.7%

to western Europe; minor transit point for marijuana. Highly vulnerable to money-laundering activity, given a primarily cash-based and unregulated economy, weak law enforcement, and instances of corruption. The government has not yet amended all sub-national laws to criminalise EPPJSVQWSJXVEJ½GOMRK&SWRME,IV^IKSZMREMWEWSYVGI destination and transit country for men, women and GLMPHVIRWYFNIGXIHXSWI\XVEJ½GOMRKERHJSVGIHPEFSYV Bosnian women and girls are also sexually exploited domestically, and Roma children forced to beg and to marry by local organised crime groups. Bosnians are also XVEJ½GOIHXSSXLIV)YVSTIERGSYRXVMIW Transparency International corruption index: 80.

Foreign trade Exports: $5.892 billion (metals, clothing, wood products) Imports: $10.99 billion (machinery and equipment, chemicals, fuels, foodstuffs) Main export partners: Slovenia, Croatia, Italy, Germany, Austria Main import partners: Croatia, Germany, Slovenia, Italy, Russia, Austria

Government budget Revenue: $8.672 billion Expenditure: $9.363 billion Public debt: 45.5% of GDP

Transnational issues Serbia delimited about half of the boundary with BosniaHerzegovina, but sections along the Drina River remain in dispute.

Refugees 6,703 from Croatia; 100,400 internally displaced (Bosnian Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks displaced by inter-ethnic ZMSPIRGILYQERVMKLXWZMSPEXMSRWERHEVQIHGSR¾MGXHYVMRK the 1992–95 war); 101 stateless.

Drugs and other criminality issues -RGVIEWMRKP]XVERWMXTSMRXJSVLIVSMRFIMRKXVEJ½GOIH

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Kosovo: Welcome to the EU? Colin McIntyre Former Reuter’s Chief Correspondent for Eastern Europe

“ Amid the gloom, there are signs that the enmity between Serbia and Kosovo’s new rulers could be softening, opening the way for both countries eventually to join the EU” Colin McIntyre


Kosovo 127

X½VWXWMKLXXLIMHIESJ/SWSZSFIGSQMRKEQIQFIV of the European Union (EU) in the foreseeable future looks to be little more than a pipe dream. The status of the territory itself is disputed, its unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008 unrecognised by half XLIGSYRXVMIWSJXLI9RMXIH2EXMSRW 92 MRGPYHMRK½ZI EU member states – Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus – three of which share Serbia’s Orthodox Catholic religion.

A

Historical Enmity Kosovo’s population is unequally split between around 2 million ethnic Albanians and some 100,000 ethnic Serbs, locked in mutual hatred and suspicion that goes back decades, even centuries. One of the poorest countries in Europe, with an annual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of only a few thousand pounds, according to the World Bank, Kosovo also has an estimated 40% unemployment and a reputation for institutionalised corruption, petty crime and the smuggling of drugs, people and weapons from southern to northern Europe by organised gangs. And yet, amid the gloom, there are signs that the enmity between Serbia and Kosovo’s new rulers could be softening, opening the way for both countries eventually to join the EU. In 2013 Serbia and Kosovo reached a landmark agreement, FVSOIVIHF])9SJ½GMEPWKMZMRK/SWSZS´W7IVFQMRSVMX]XLIMV own police and appeals court. More recently, in August 2015, the two sides reached another agreement setting up an association of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo and dealing with energy and telecommunications, including giving the country’s ethnic Albanian majority their own HMEPPMRKGSHIJSVXLI½VWXXMQI;LMPIJEPPMRK[IPPWLSVXSJ Belgrade’s demands for complete autonomy for the Serb minority, the accords were seen as opening the way for the start of negotiations for the two states’ accession to the EU.

The Long Road to Brussels Brussels had made it clear to Serbia that its EU membership would not be considered until it relinquished its de facto control over the Kosovo Serbs, largely concentrated in the northern district of Mitrovica. While the improvements for two warring communities achieved in the two recent accords might seem a poor return on months, even years, of tough negotiations, when set against the background of bloodshed and hatred that has dogged relations between the two communities they represent a breakthrough.

The low point in Serb-Kosovo relations came in 1998, when Belgrade responded to growing calls for Kosovo’s independence by sending in its troops to crush armed guerrillas and force ethnic Albanians from their homes. 7SQIIXLRMG%PFERMERW[IVIJSVGIHXS¾II to neighbouring countries, particularly Macedonia, in a campaign widely seen as genocide. At the same time Serbia sought by force of arms to realise its own ambitions for linking up Serb-populated regions in former Yugoslavia in a ‘Greater Serbia’. It was eventually halted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, with a three-month bombing campaign against Serbian troops and targets.

Shared History The starting point of Serbia-Kosovo relations goes back 1,300 years, when ethnic Serbs migrated to the central Balkans, then parts of the Roman and Byzantine empires. Kosovo became the centre of a Serbian empire and the site of Orthodox monasteries and churches, dozens of which have been destroyed during the ethnic troubles of the last few decades. To this day Serbs still regard Kosovo as the cradle of their national culture, even though few choose to go and live there. A key date in their shared history was the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, in Kosovo Polje (Field of the Blackbirds), when 7IVFPIHJSVGIW[IVIHIJIEXIHF]XLI8YVOWYWLIVMRKMR½ZI centuries of Ottoman rule which saw large numbers of Turks and Albanians moving into the territory. By the end of the 19th century Albanians had replaced Serbs as the majority population in Kosovo. The battle has been used by Serb nationalists in recent times to underline their case that Kosovo belonged to Serbia, overlooking historical evidence that other nationalities, including Bosnians, Albanians, Wallachians and Croats, were involved on the Serbian side and Greek, &YPKEVMERERH7IVFMERZEWWEPW[IVI½KLXMRKJSVXLI8YVOW The battle, though it was a crushing defeat, has become part of Serb legend and a rallying point of national E[EVIRIWWVI¾IGXMRKXLIFVEZIV]SJXLI7IVFJSVGIWMR taking on a much larger enemy – something that has been commemorated in song and verse ever since. It was no accident that a previously unremarkable Serbian GSQQYRMWXSJ½GMEPGEPPIH7PSFSHER1MPSWIZMGGLSWI/SWSZS Polje, a municipality close to the Kosovo capital Pristina and named after the ancient battleground, to launch his nationalist campaign that propelled him to the presidency

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128 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

of Yugoslavia, and led eventually to the bloody break-up of the multi-ethnic Socialist Federal Republic.

Basic Constitutional Structure Serbia re-acquired control of Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire during the First Balkan War of 1912, and after World War Two the territory became part of Yugoslavia, where its status became a political football for the next four decades between pragmatists, led by President Josip Broz Tito, and nationalists. The basic structure of Yugoslavia, which was formed as a kingdom after World War One from Serbia, Montenegro and parts of the defeated Austro-Hungarian empire – Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina – was established in 1943 when Tito came to power. It also included Macedonia as a constituent republic, and two provinces, Kosovo in the south, with its large Albanian population, and Vojvodina in the north, which had a WMKRM½GERX,YRKEVMERQMRSVMX]

EWXLI[SVPH´WSRP]SJ½GMEPP]EXLIMWXWXEXI-RLMWTYVWYMXSJ radical communism, in which all private cars were banned and all foreign travel was forbidden, Hoxha had broken ties with the Soviet Union and China, both considered not pure enough communist regimes. Yugoslavia’s moderate socialism, in contrast, allowed a large degree of private ownership and the opportunity to travel, and even work abroad. There was also cultural resentment among Serbs towards the Kosovo Albanians, who were generally looked down upon. Years later Belgrade’s efforts to encourage Serbs expelled from Croatia to migrate to Kosovo met with little success, largely for this reason. In one famous and long remembered incident, passengers in a bus carrying reluctant migrants to Kosovo put a gun to the driver’s head and ordered him to turn around and head north again. Meanwhile Serb emigration from Kosovo and the high birth rate of the Albanian population cut the Serb population there from around 28% in the 1960s to about 11% in 1991, with the Albanians clearly dominant at 82%.

Kosovo was declared to be a constituent part of Serbia in ERMRXIKVEXMSRMWXWXITXLEX[EW½IVGIP]HMWTYXIHF] Kosovo’s Albanian majority, who argued that the body that made the decision was unrepresentative. In 1963, a new constitution saw Kosovo being upgraded, marginally, to the status of an autonomous province, but a province of Serbia rather than of Federal Yugoslavia. This brought another storm of protest from Kosovo Albanians who sought equal status with the country’s other constituent republics.

Growing Antagonism

While Tito himself, born of a Croat father and Slovene mother, had an internationalist outlook that inclined towards more decentralisation, others in the Yugoslav communist leadership did not – especially the number three, Aleksandar Rankovic, who was a strong Serb nationalist, and blocked any such loosening of ties. It was not until three years later, when Rankovic was ousted, that Kosovo was upgraded as part of the Yugoslav Federation, with most of the rights enjoyed by the other republics – a status further improved by another new constitution in 1974 which gave Kosovo a status equivalent in most ways to those of a republic.

As nationalist feeling grew on both sides, the Serbian press began a campaign accusing Kosovo Albanians of atrocities, including raping Serb women in the territory. Things came to a head in 1987, when Milosevic seized his opportunity to overturn the political consensus, established and maintained by Tito, by turning one of its national groups against another. Carefully choosing the monument to the Battle of Kosovo in Kosovo Polje as his platform, he addressed a mob of angry Serbs organised by members of a hard-line Serb nationalist movement that opposed the 1974 constitution giving Kosovo a greater role in the federation. Fighting soon broke out, truncheon-wielding police intervened and beat the demonstrators, prompting Milosevic to issue the politically explosive words to the adoring crowd: “Nobody should dare to beat you again.”

The Shadow of Albania The reason Kosovo was historically denied full republic status was almost certainly based on fears that it would secede and join Albania – although reports at the time showed little evidence of support among Kosovo Albanians for its neighbour, run by arch-Stalinist dictator Enver Hoxha

Regent’s Report 2015

At the beginning of the 1980s resentment began to build in Kosovo, particularly among young people educated in the Albanian-language universities that had been initially FERRIHFYX[IVIEPPS[IHXS¾SYVMWLPEXIVEWTEVXSJXLI decentralisation process. Students came into the streets MRXLIMVXLSYWERHW¯XLI½VWXTVSXIWXWSRWYGLEWGEPIMR Yugoslavia since its foundation. Over 4,000 of them were arrested, tried and jailed.

With these words he transformed himself from a communist apparatchik into a ‘national’ leader, taking control of the Serbian party and purging the old guard of


Kosovo 129

internationalists. His rise alarmed the other republics, which decided eventually to break away from Serbian domination.

The Breaking of Yugoslavia Supported by the Serbian generals who made up the core leadership of the Yugoslav army, Milosevic tried – but was ultimately unable – to halt the disintegration. In response he attempted to create by force the dream of ‘Greater Serbia’, a state made up from the ethnic Serb communities in breakaway Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. That equally failed policy led to the Balkan wars of the 1990s, with hundreds of thousands of dead and homeless in the region. In Kosovo meanwhile, his government moved to restrict the powers of the Albanian majority, sparking new demonstrations led by the country’s miners who had taken a leading role in previous protests. Serbian troops were sent in, and a state of emergency was declared which led to the closure of the main Albanian-language newspaper and the Albanian Academy of Arts. With the sacking of almost all state employees, the Albanian community set up parallel state institutions, such as schools and hospitals, operating out of private houses. %WXLIWMXYEXMSRHIXIVMSVEXIHXLI½VWXWMKRWSJKYIVVMPPE activity emerged and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed. Its political leader Hashim Thaci went on to FIGSQI/SWSZS´W½VWX4VMQI1MRMWXIVERHMWGYVVIRXP] Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in the new government formed in 2014. The situation came to a head in January 1999 as the Serbian army battled the KLA in an all-out war which reached its low point with the massacre of 45 Albanians in the village of Racak. I reported the funeral of the victims, on a hillside overlooking the tiny rural village where horses ran through the empty streets after its remaining inhabitants had left to avoid shelling by Serbian artillery. The massacre prompted the international community to try XSIRHXLIGSR¾MGXFYXEJXIVXEPOWFIX[IIRXLIX[SWMHIW failed to achieve agreement, in March the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began its campaign of bombing &IPKVEHIERHSXLIV7IVFXEVKIXW8LMW½REPP]JSVGIHXLI7IVFW to withdraw their military and police forces from Kosovo.

determination of the territory’s future status. The UN-led process to decide on Kosovo’s status began in late 2005, but ended without agreement, and in February 2008 the Kosovo Assembly unilaterally declared the country’s independence – a decision since recognised by over 100 countries. In September 2012 the UN announced that it was ending its supervision and handing control of the country to the local government, leaving only a NATO-led peace-keeping force in charge of security and a European Union mission on the rule of law. Since that milestone decision, Kosovo has elected a new government, after a six-month stalemate, LIEHIHJSVXLI½VWXXMQIF]WSQISRIRSXGSRRIGXIHXS the KLA, veteran politician Isa Mustafa. 3RISJXLI½VWXGLEPPIRKIWSJXLIRI[KSZIVRQIRXJSVQIH in 2014 was to set up a special war crimes tribunal to MRZIWXMKEXIEPPIKIH[EVGVMQIWGSQQMXXIHF]/0%½KLXIVW during the independence struggle, including harvesting the organs from murdered Serb captives. The proposal to set up the court, created under pressure from the US and the EU to address the accusations against the KLA, was voted down by parliament in June 2015, but subsequently approved in August, though opposition parties have challenged the vote. It seriously divides the Kosovan community.

Looking to the Future The new government came into being at a time of rising unemployment and social discontent, largely due to a lack of foreign investment. According to foreign observers, many potential investors are put off coming into Kosovo because of high levels of corruption and a lack of rule of law, particularly when it comes to enforcing contracts. A 2014 report on Kosovo by the European Commission EPWSTSMRXIHXS[IEOEHQMRMWXVEXMZIGETEGMXMIWHMJ½GYPX EGGIWWXS½RERGIJSVFYWMRIWWIWERHPIRKXL]ERHGSQTPI\ privatisation procedures.

International Control of Kosovo

And there is no doubt that Kosovo badly needs foreign investment, as its infrastructure was starved of funds while part of Yugoslavia, and subsequently ravaged by the VIGIRXGSR¾MGX8LIEKVMGYPXYVEPWIGXSVMRTEVXMGYPEV[EW especially neglected by the federal Yugoslav authorities, who concentrated instead on putting a few heavy industries, such as power generation and chemicals, in the overwhelmingly rural country.

A United Nations Security Council resolution placed Kosovo under a transitional administration, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), pending

With only 14% of revenue coming from direct taxes, the economy is highly dependent on remittances from the

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130 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

diaspora, mainly Germany and Switzerland. A further 10% comes from direct donor assistance. On the plus side, the country is rich in natural resources, with an estimated 14 FMPPMSRXSRRIWSJPMKRMXIXLI½JXLPEVKIWXVIWIVZIWMRXLI world. It also has lead, zinc, silver, cobalt, copper, iron and bauxite. And then there is crime, both petty and organised, particularly around drugs. According to the latest International Narcotics Control Strategy Report in 2014, Kosovo is a main transit country for drugs destined for northern Europe, being located along a traditional smuggling route. The report said the country had an ineffective border management system, and there were ‘allegations’ that narcotics moved freely across borders, ³WSQIXMQIW[MXLXLITIVQMWWMSRSJFVMFIHPSGEPSJ½GMEPW´ The US State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in a 2012 report, said: ‘High unemployment and other economic factors encourage criminal activity in Kosovo’, rating the country ‘high’ for residential and nonresidential crime. Criminals often commit crimes while armed with handguns, ‘as weapons are fairly easy to obtain’, the report added. Despite all its problems, Kosovo is still planning to join the EU in the not too distant future. Since its past, and present, are so closely linked to Serbia, it would seem logical for both countries to be admitted at the same time. Serbian authorities have said they expect a decision on its membership to be taken before the end of the year, with the negotiating process ending in 2018, which would allow the country to join in 2020. But EU Commission President .IER'PEYHI.YRGOIVWEMHSRXEOMRKSJ½GIMRXLEXXLIVI [SYPHFIRSIRPEVKIQIRXMRXLIRI\X½ZI]IEVW ,S[IZIV[MXL+VIIGIFEXXIVIHF]E½RERGMEPGVMWMWERH 6YWWMEWIIOMRKXSKEMRQSVIMR¾YIRGIMRXLI&EPOEREVIE there could be growing pressure to formally link Serbia and Kosovo with the rest of Europe, even if the formal process of accession will take several years yet to complete

Further Reading: Kosovo: a short history by Noel Malcolm, MacMillan, 1998 European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailedcountry-information/kosovo/index_en.htm

Regent’s Report 2015

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/ )YVSTIER9RMSR3J½GIMR/SWSZSLXXTIIEWIYVSTEIY delegations/kosovo/index_en.htm 9RMXIH2EXMSRW3J½GISR(VYKWERH'VMQI[[[YRSHG org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_DT_ through_SEE_REPORT_2014_web.pdf US Overseas Security Advisory Council: www.osac.gov/ pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17444 World Bank: www.worldbank.org/en/country/kosovo


Facts and Figures: Kosovo Geography/demography

Refugees

Area: 10,887 sq km Population: 1,859,203 Density: 107.8 per sq km Life expectancy: 70.5 Growth rate: 0.9%

17,100 internally displaced persons, primarily ethnic Serbs displaced during the 1998–99 war and subsequent intercommunal violence.

Drugs and other criminality issues 1ENSVTSMRXJSVLIVSMRXVEJ½GOMRK

Economy GDP: $16.93 billion GDP per head: $8,000 Growth rate of economy: 3% Military expenditure (% of GDP): Population below poverty line: 30% % of economy in Agriculture: 12.9% Industry: 22.6% Services: 64.5%

Transparency International corruption index: 110.

Foreign trade Exports: $349 million (mining and processed metal products, scrap metals, leather products, machinery, appliances, prepared foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, vegetable products, textiles and apparel) Imports: $2.687 billion (foodstuffs, livestock, wood, petroleum, chemicals, machinery, minerals, textiles, stone, ceramic and glass products, electrical equipment) Main export partners: Italy, Albania, Macedonia, China, Germany, Switzerland. Main import partners: Germany, Macedonia, Serbia, Italy, Turkey, China.

Government budget Revenue: $1.396 billion Expenditure: $1.61 billion Public debt: 10.6% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Transnational issues Serbia and a minority of states at the UN protest Western recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence of February 2008. Ethnic Serbian municipalities along Kosovo’s RSVXLIVRFSVHIVGLEPPIRKIXLI½REPWXEXYWSJXLI/SWSZS Serbia boundary. Several thousand NATO-led Kosovo Force peace-keepers keep peace between the ethnic Albanian majority and Serb minority.

Regent’s Report 2015


From Regional Leader to European Laggard: European Integration of Macedonia Ana Alibegova Mladiinfo International, Skopje

â&#x20AC;&#x153;From a country progressing steadily towards European integration, Macedonia now lags behind its neighbours, preoccupied with internal problems which themselves block and delay European integrationâ&#x20AC;? Ana Alibegova


Macedonia

early a decade since the European Council decided to grant Macedonia candidate status for membership, the idea that Macedonia will become part of the European family is still a far-fetched dream. This tiny landlocked country in the heart of the Balkan peninsula, with a population of barely 2 million, has always been a crossroads of cultures and traditions.

N

Macedonia oscillates between three poles: Yugo-nostalgia â&#x20AC;&#x201C; being the only former Yugoslav state that avoided a spillover of the Yugoslav wars on its territory at independence; distant nationalism â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the megalomaniac policy of the ruling party VMRO-DPMNE, illustrated through their Skopje 2014 project, which cost over half a billion euros and focused SRÂłVIHI½RMRKREXMSREPMHIRXMX]XLVSYKLEVGLMXIGXYVI´ERH Europeanisation â&#x20AC;&#x201C; understood as integration of Macedonia in the European Union (EU) as a guarantee of stability, prosperity and security.

The Dynamics of European Integration in Macedonia Misha Glenny, a former BBC reporter from the Yugoslav wars and a well-known expert on the Balkan region, draws parallels between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. He notes that the two countries played a vital role in the region, Bosnia-Herzegovina on the Adriatic as a junction of Serb and Croat territorial expansion, and Macedonia as a crossing point â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;from north to south, from Orthodox Belgrade to Orthodox Thessaloniki, and west to east, from Moslem Durres in Albania to Moslem Istanbulâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. The period between Macedoniaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s declaration of independence and the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union was characterised by small but decisive steps forward. Only a year after its independence in September 1991, 1EGIHSRMEETTSMRXIHMXWSJ½GMEPVITVIWIRXEXMZIMR&VYWWIPW and in 1996 the country became a full partner in the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Phare programme for economic reconstruction. In 2000 1EGIHSRMERIKSXMEXIHMXWEGGIWWMSRXVIEX]MREWMKRM½GERXP] short period (Aprilâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;November) through three rounds of QEMRRIKSXMEXMSRWERH½ZIXIGLRMGEPQIIXMRKWEXI\TIVXPIZIP Macedonia started its EU relations as a leader among [IWXIVR&EPOERGSYRXVMIWFIMRKXLI½VWXJSVQIV=YKSWPEZ state to sign the SAA on 9 April 2001 in Luxembourg, almost seven months before Croatia. The EU Thessaloniki Summit held in June 2003 recognised the European perspective of all western Balkan countries and promoted dialogue among former enemies.

There were many positive signals from the EU towards south-east Europe, in particular towards Macedonia, and the SAA entered into force in April 2004. With the motto â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;The sun, too, is a starâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, the Macedonian government prepared its case for membership, and in March 2004, at a formal ceremony in Dublin, submitted its application for membership of the EU. In November the following year the European Commission recommended granting candidate status to Macedonia, and in December the European 'SYRGMPGSR½VQIHXLEX Macedonia once again was a leader in the western &EPOERKVSYTFIGSQMRKXLI½VWXGSYRXV]MRXLIVIKMSR XSWMKRE½RERGMRKEKVIIQIRXJSVMXW-RWXVYQIRX for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) national programme. After assessing progress achieved in regard to the SAA, compliance with the political criteria and the implementation of the acquis communautaire, the European Commission recommended in October 2009 that accession negotiations could start from the end of the same year. From the same date, citizens of Macedonia, and also Montenegro and Serbia, were granted visa-free access to the Schengen area, a gesture that in hindsight can be seen as the last â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;big treatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; given from the Union to Macedonia before a period of increasingly challenging relations between the two parties.

The Stumbling Blocks on the Macedonian Road to EU The status of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;candidate countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; granted to Macedonia in 2005 did not bring much in practice that helped the country on the road towards European integration, despite the Commissionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s encouraging recommendation to start the negotiations for full membership as soon as possible. The relative stasis that ensued meant that by 2009 the European Commission Report on Macedonia LIEZMP]UYEPM½IHMXWTSWMXMZIEWWIWWQIRXSJXLIWMXYEXMSRMR the country, noting that additional work was required to ensure transparency, professionalism and independence of public administration. It also registered problems with implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement on GSQQYRMX]VIPEXMSRWXLI½KLXEKEMRWXGSVVYTXMSRERH the name dispute with Greece. Ominously it added that žE[WSJXLINYHMGMEV]JYVXLIVRIKEXMZIP]EJJIGXXLIFYWMRIWW environment. By 2014 these concerns had become considerably more serious. The Progress Report for Macedonia then noted backsliding in relation to the previous year and the Commission required the authorities to take concrete

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134 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

actions against politicisation, to boost the independence of the judiciary and to promote freedom of expression. And the Commission once more drew attention to inter-ethnic relations, demanding that ‘greater trust’ should be built between the communities. In the newest progress report from November 2015, the European Commission went a step further and conditioned the recommendation to open accession negotiations with Macedonia based on ‘…the continued implementation of the June/July political agreement and substantial progress in the implementation of the urgent reform priorities’. The issue will once again be back on the table once the elections scheduled for April next year are completed. After being in the doldrums for 10 years and not having WXEVXIHJSVQEPRIKSXMEXMSRW1EGIHSRMELEW½REPP]EVVMZIHEX a stage where there is no positive scenario or perspective on how to implement the necessary reforms that would permit progress towards EU membership. Although the progress reports of the last few years stress that the EU remains a strategic national priority, the Macedonian government continues to ignore the Commission’s appeals and neglect its advice. From a country progressing steadily towards European integration, it now lags behind its neighbours, preoccupied with internal problems which themselves block and delay European integration: politicisation present in all societal areas, fragile inter-ethnic and regional relations, and the name dispute with Greece.

The Political Crisis and the Way Out of It The politicisation of Macedonian society is notorious. Not only has it been noted in general terms in the Commission’s progress reports, but it came into sharp focus in revelations about the political wiretapping scandal. The leader of the opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, Zoran Zaev, accused the government of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski of illegal surveillance, including tapping phone conversations of up to 20,000 people – mainly civic activists, religious leaders, ministers and state SJ½GMEPWIWTIGMEPP]QIQFIVWSJXLISTTSWMXMSRTEVXMIWEW well as 100 journalists. Zaev claimed that his information came from a whistleblower within the Interior Ministry, for whose work Gruevski and his cousin Sasho Mijalkov, Head of the Security Services, were directly responsible. The Prime Minister argued that the recordings were fabricated and that a foreign intelligence service was aiming to destabilise the country. The wiretapping scandal raised

Regent’s Report 2015

serious concerns about the work of the state organs and inspired widespread civic protests demanding the resignation of Gruevski and his government. The treatment of demonstrators sparked further protests, which reached their peak in May this year, when Interior Ministry forces used excessive force in dispelling protestors. Human Rights Watch strongly condemned the violence. Those incidents were compounded a few days later in Kumanovo, a city in the northern part of the country with an ethnically mixed population, where security police fought an armed group from Kosovo, with eight police and 14 gunmen killed. The immediate result was an anti-Gruevski rally in the capital, Skopje, where the GMXM^IRWYRMXIHYRHIVFSXL1EGIHSRMERERH%PFERMER¾EKW demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister and his government. This extremely tense political climate let the leaders of the biggest Macedonian parties – the ruling VMRO-DPMNE and the opposition SDSM – rally their members. The demonstrations culminated with rival tented camps: SDSM in front of the main government building demanding Gruevski resign and VMRO in front of the parliament in order, as some of the campers put it, ‘to defend their country’. But these fatal events in May 2015 have also served as an important catalyst in forming public opinion about the political crisis in the country. A big question mark remains for most citizens of Macedonia, both ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, about the ‘who?’ and ‘why?’ behind the clashes in Kumanovo. These clashes occurred at the same time as the anti-government rally where protestors were united in their demands, regardless of their ethnic status, and cynics would argue that they served to distract from the events in the capital. A survey conducted by the International Republican Institute shows that 49% of the surveyed citizens suspect that the armed group in Kumanovo was paid or engaged by a political or governmental entity to destabilise the country. 7XEXISJ½GMEPWEVKYIHXLEXXLIQMPMXERXW´EMQ[EWXSEXXEGO WXEXIMRWXMXYXMSRWMR1EGIHSRMEERHWSQISJXLI½KLXIVW who were killed were believed to be connected to the disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), an ethnic Albanian rebel group. They claimed that one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the Balkans had been neutralised. As a result, both the Minister of Interior, Gordana Jankuloska, and the Director of the Security Services, Sasho Mijalkov, resigned, but the government and the Prime Minister remained in power.


Macedonia

The uncertainty behind the events provided an opportunity for speculations and geo-political game-playing in the region. While the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), the ethnic Albanian coalition party in government, appealed for calm and avoidance of provocations, Bulgaria, one of the newest EU members, was quick to send soldiers to its border with Macedonia with a view to stopping spillover and a possible wave of refugees. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, used the opportunity to comment on the situation in Macedonia, criticising the approach of the European Union. He said that the EU was ‘ashamed to admit’ what was happening in Macedonia because ‘they are probably trying to justify the ineffectiveness of their efforts’. Such a statement raised fears that Macedonia might become a new hot-spot of 6YWWMERIGSRSQMGERHEPWSTSPMXMGEPMR¾YIRGIMRXLI&EPOERW

published report: Recommendations of the Senior Experts’ Group led by the retired Commission Director, Reinhard Priebe. The Senior Experts’ group insists on dialogue between the government and the opposition as ‘indispensable for the proper functioning of a parliamentary democracy’. The latest episode in the search for a solution to the Macedonian political crisis was the Agreement from Przhino, which came as a follow-up to the leadership meetings at the beginning of June this year. This time, after 13 hours of intensive negotiations, the leaders of the political parties, mediated by the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Johannes Hahn, made a step forward and put their signatures on a joint agreement. This stipulated that the opposition should take its seats again in the parliament in September. They had been forcibly removed, together with the press, for refusing to vote for the government budget in December 2012.

Last but not least, the dispute with Greece over the name ‘Macedonia’ continues to be one of the stumbling blocks on the way to EU integration. It has already taken much time and effort to reach even a provisional solution (FYROM, as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and it will take even longer to overcome the intransigence of both parties in this dispute. Although Greece presents an important trade partner for Macedonia, political relations between the two countries have deteriorated, in particular after the start of the project Skopje 2014 that aimed to strengthen the identity of Macedonians as descendants of the Ancient Macedonians.

At the same time, the agreement foresees that a new government will be formed in order to prepare for the elections planned for April 2016. However, the Prime Minister will again come from the ranks of VMRO-DPMNE. After days of intensive negotiation and an obvious lack SJ[MPPF]XLITSPMXMGEPIPMXIXS½RHRIGIWWEV]WSPYXMSRWJSV the crisis, a special prosecutor was elected and tasked to examine the wiretapping incident. In addition, in November the parties agreed to appoint several interim ministers and deputies from the ranks of the opposing SDSM.

The use of symbols and the creation of monuments recalling distant history exacerbated the dispute with Greece. Greece vetoed Macedonian accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and has vetoed the start the EU’s negotiations with Macedonia, even under the provisional reference of FYROM. Now Bulgaria has joined Greece in using its veto, in reaction to the representation of Bulgaria and Bulgarian history by the Macedonian authorities.

The Przhino Agreement, despite the praise showered on MXF])9SJ½GMEPWHSIWRSXKYEVERXIIEWSPYXMSRXSXLI political crisis within Macedonia. It does very little to bring back political trust into Macedonian society, nor does it offer tools to cope with the paralysed and completely politicised Macedonian media scene. The Przhino Agreement remains just one political point in the careers of the diplomats who were fast to conclude that ‘the citizens should be proud of their leaders’. But it was those same PIEHIVW[LSGVIEXIHXLIGVMWMWMRXLI½VWXTPEGIERHFPSGOIH the road to Macedonia’s European destiny.

The name issue intrudes into internal politics in Macedonia, with most of the ethnic Albanian parties not showing interest in joining the debate, while the main parties from the Macedonian block concentrate much of their political discourse on the name issue to the detriment of other and more practical policy issues.

New Wine in Old Bottles? %PPXLIWIMWWYIWERHQSVIEVIVI¾IGXIHMREVIGIRXP]

In order to be a functioning democracy as a candidate country ready to join the EU, Macedonia should break with the politicisation of society, create a constructive opposition that would work as a corrective to the power of government, and breed an independent business sector. It also needs a civil society with free, objective media and independent non-governmental organisations, as well as strong, motivated and persistent citizen activism.

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136 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

With far-reaching reforms to the spirit as well as the structure of politics and society, the country will be several steps closer to EU membership. That kind of Macedonia will continue to be a vital EU partner – and indeed an I\EQTPI¯MRXLIGSR¾MGXXSVR&EPOERVIKMSREFIEGSR at the crossroads where north and south, east and west intersect. And that will be the moment when Macedonia will have the right to ask for the ‘carrot’ of membership as a reward for its achieved stability

Further Reading Survey on Macedonian Public Opinion, International 6ITYFPMGER-RWXMXYXI[[[MVMSVKWMXIWHIJEYPX½PIW wysiwyg/2015-07-13_survey_of_macedonian_public_ opinion_june_6-15_2015.pdf. The Fall of Yugoslavia by Misha Glenny, Penguin Books, 1996 The Western Balkan EU Accession Process and the Greek Presidency 2014 by Pavlos Koktsidis et al 2014: www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ The-Western-Balkan-EU-accession-process-and-the-GreekPresidency-2014-FINAL-29-July-2014-PDF.pdf The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress Report, European Commission, 2014: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/ key_documents/2014/20141008-the-former-yugoslavrepublic-of-macedonia-progress-report_en.pdf ‘Macedonia: Police Violence at a Protest’, Human Rights Watch, 2015: www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/22/macedoniapolice-violence-protest ³1EGIHSRMETSPMGISJ½GIVWERH±EVQIHKVSYT²QIQFIVW killed during clashes’, The Guardian, Associated Press, 10 May 2015: www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/ macedonia-police-alleged-armed-group-balkans-kumanovo The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Recommendations of the Senior Experts’ Group on Systematic Rule of Law Issues Relating to the Communications Interception Revealed in Spring 2015, Senior Experts’ Group, June 2015: http://ec.europa. IYIRPEVKIQIRXRI[WCGSVRIVRI[WRI[W½PIWC recommendations_of_the_senior_experts_group.pdf The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress Report, European Commission, 2015: http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_ the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia.pdf

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Facts and Figures: Macedonia Geography/demography Area: 25,713 sq km Population: 2,091,719 Density: 81.3 per sq km Life expectancy: 75.8 years Growth rate: 0.21%

Economy GDP: $27.49 billion GDP per head: $13,200 Growth rate: 3.7% Military expenditure (% of GDP): 1.08 Population below poverty line: 30.4% (2011) % of economy in Agriculture: 18.3% Industry: 29.1% Services: 52.6%

Balkan route, including 29,245 from Afghanistan and 28,749 from Syria. Numbers increased in the second half of the ]IEV3J½GMEPWXEXMWXMGWWYKKIWXVIQEMRMR*=631EPWS 9,342 asylum seekers and 741 stateless persons.

Drugs and other criminality issues Major trans-shipment point for south-west Asian heroin and hashish; minor transit point for South American cocaine destined for Europe. Money laundering due to a mostly cash-based economy and weak enforcement. Transparency International corruption index: 64.

Foreign trade Exports: $4.934 billion (foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, textiles, miscellaneous manufactures, iron, steel; automotive parts) Imports: $7.277 billion (machinery and equipment, automobiles, chemicals, fuels, food product) Main export partners: Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, Serbia, Kosovo, Greece Main import partners: UK, Germany, Greece, Serbia, Italy, China, Bulgaria

Government budget Revenue: $2.89 billion Expenditure: $3.328 billion Public debt: 45.8% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Transnational issues Greece continues to reject the use of the name Macedonia or Republic of Macedonia.

Refugees As of late August 2015 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that at least 3,000 refugees and migrants arrived in FYROM daily due to the crisis in XLI1IHMXIVVERIER*VSRXI\IWXMQEXIWXLEXMRXLI½VWXLEPJ of 2015 102,342 refugees and migrants used the western

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Montenegro on the Road to Euro-Atlantic Integration Dr Kenneth Morrison Reader in Modern South-East European History, De Montfort University, Leicester

â&#x20AC;&#x153;The EU often touted Montenegro as a beacon of light in a region still beset with residual problems emanating from the disintegration of the Yugoslav state in the early 1990sâ&#x20AC;? Dr Kenneth Morrison


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t is almost a decade since Montenegro re-established independence from Serbia. Montenegro had previously been an independent state between 1878 and 1918, before becoming a constituent part of Yugoslavia. But a referendum in 2006, brokered by the European Union (EU), saw a narrow majority of 55.5% (the threshold was set at 55%) of the republicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s citizens opting for independence, heralding Montenegroâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s re-emergence as an internationally recognised independent state.

I

After Independence The respective â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;yesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;noâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; campaigns had been bitterly fought â&#x20AC;&#x201C; there were political casualties, and the Montenegrin body politic was sharply divided with a sense SJIQFMXXIVQIRXEQSRKXLIWMKRM½GERXQMRSVMX]   of the population) that had voted to retain the joint state with Serbia. Some within this group did not recognise the legitimacy of the referendum result. It was within this potentially problematic context that the Montenegrin government formally declared independence in June 2006, a decision fortunately not challenged with violence. Boosted by high levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and a daily diet of good news, the government FIRI½XIHJVSQEPIRKXL]TSWXVIJIVIRHYQLSRI]QSSR Montenegro was quickly recognised as an independent state and became a member of the United Nations (UN) and other international institutions while consolidating its position among its neighbours. A new constitution was VEXM½IHERHEHSTXIHMR3GXSFIV8LIKSZIVRQIRX EPWSQEHIWMKRM½GERXWXVMHIWXS[EVHEGLMIZMRKMXWGSVI objective â&#x20AC;&#x201C; embarking upon the process of Euro-Atlantic integration (EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] membership). The opposition, by contrast, seemed demoralised and directionless as it stumbled into the new reality, while the governing party, the DPS, and its allies enjoyed the spoils of victory. As early as June 2006, the same month as the declaration of independence, the EU established relations with Montenegro and all EU member states recognised the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s independence. In October 2007 Montenegro signed a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, and just over one year later (in December 2008) a formal membership application was submitted by the Montenegrin government. The government subsequently embarked upon the process of responding to the European Commissionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s detailed questionnaire on how the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s legislation conforms to the acquis communautaire (the existing EU body of law). Early indicators were very

positive, with the EU acknowledging the Montenegrin governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s open and constructive approach. 1SRXIRIKVSFIRI½XIHJVSQXLI)9´WRIIHXSGSRWXVYGXE positive narrative with regard to the western Balkans, a task QYGLQSVIHMJ½GYPXMRXLIGSRXI\XSJ7IVFME1EGIHSRME Albania or Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EU often touted Montenegro as a beacon of light in a region still beset with residual problems emanating from the disintegration of the Yugoslav state in the early 1990s. Such comments were, however, relative and framed within the wider context of the western Balkan accession process. Nevertheless, the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s endeavours were rewarded in December 2009 when Montenegrin citizens were granted visa-free travel within the Schengen zone; an important development because it provided tangible evidence that the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s endeavours were bearing fruit. In November 2010, the European Commission published its avis (opinion) on the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s bid to become a candidate for membership, and in December 2010, Montenegro was formally awarded candidate status by the EU. In December 2011, the accession process began and membership negotiations were opened on 29 June 2012.

Candidate for Membership Three years on, 18 Chapters have been opened and two have been provisionally closed: those focusing on â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;education and cultureâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (Chapter 26) and â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;science and researchâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (Chapter 25). But the European Commission has now insisted that Montenegro deal next with Chapters 23 and 24 (â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Judiciary and Fundamental Rightsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Justice, Freedom and Securityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;), widely assessed to be the most problematic for the government to tackle. The EU and the member states will be watching carefully to see whether the Montenegrin government can make progress on issues such as the independence of the judiciary, and tackling corruption and organised crime, key to the successful completion of these chapters. The EU has proved the most potent driver of reform in Montenegro since the reestablishment of Montenegroâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s independence, despite many critics arguing that the EU has a tendency to turn a blind eye to some problematic aspects. The latest EC Progress Report (2014) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the third since Montenegro opened accession negotiations â&#x20AC;&#x201C; was certainly more critical than previous reports, broadly implying that if the Montenegrin government fails to act upon the Commissionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s recommendations, then the pace of negotiations will slow. The language of this Report was noticeably sharper, though perhaps not as negative as many

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140 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

analysts in Montenegro had predicted, the government had feared or opposition parties had hoped for. 7YJ½GMIRXTVSKVIWWXLI6ITSVXWXEXIWLEWFIIRQEHIMRXIVQW of political criteria, forging a functioning market economy and developing the capacity to adapt to the challenges of EU membership.The Commission also notes improvements in Montenegro’s economic situation, while emphasising the need for further reforms to improve macroeconomic stability and labour market conditions.The Report also acknowledges that the Montenegrin government has continued to ‘broadly implement’ its international obligations and that it has played a constructive regional role.The Montenegrin government MWGVIHMXIH[MXLXEOMRKWYJ½GMIRXWXITWXSWXVIRKXLIRXLI protection of members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) population, noting in particular the October 2013 Pride Parade held in Podgorica which was ‘supported adequately by the authorities’. The Commission does, however, raise a number of ongoing concerns, particularly with regard to chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis8LIWIMRGPYHIXLIKSZIVRQIRX´WMRWYJ½GMIRXIJJSVXW in combating corruption and organised crime, lack of action over accusations of ‘electoral wrongdoing’ during recent municipal elections, and slow progress in the area of judicial reform. The Commission also urges the government to take action to ensure that recent attacks on journalists are investigated and that prosecutions should follow ‘as a matter of urgency’. Additionally, the Report stresses the need for the government to encourage and support media freedom and HIWMWXJVSQQEOMRKMR¾EQQEXSV]WXEXIQIRXWSVHIGPEVEXMSRW that could be interpreted as intimidation. It also expresses concern over a ‘lack of executive rotation’ implying excessive one-party control over the political process.

One Party Rule? Montenegro holds the unenviable record of being the only state in south-east Europe that has been governed, uninterrupted, by the same political party (the Democratic 4EVX]SJ7SGMEPMWXW¯(47 WMRGIXLI½VWXHIQSGVEXMG elections in 1990. The DPS, successor to the Montenegrin League of Communists (Savezkomunista Crne Gore – SKCG), is essentially a ‘state party’ and, to some extent, the party is the state. The DPS’s well-established control SZIVXLIMRWXVYQIRXWSJXLIWXEXIE[EVHWXLIQEWMKRM½GERX advantage over the opposition. Its budget for election GEQTEMKRWJSVI\EQTPIWMKRM½GERXP]SYXWXVMTWXLSWISJMXW closest competitors, and in elections voters continue to support the DPS because it is the likely victor. After all, the patronage of those in power is crucial to employment

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(particularly for those who work in the public sector) and social advancement. The party has been in power, albeit with its long-term coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and a number of other junior partners, for 25 ]IEVWERHXLI(47´W½KYVILIEH1MPS(NYOERSZMGLEWLIPH power as either Prime Minister or President consistently (give or take two short ‘sabbaticals’) since 1991. Political change has emanated from within the DPS and as a VIWYPXSJMRXVETEVX]GSR¾MGXWVEXLIVXLERXLVSYKLHIQSGVEXMG elections. In this respect, critics of the government have consistently argued that Montenegro does not function as a genuine parliamentary democracy – a message that often seemed to fall on deaf ears. The Montenegrin political system is, at least ostensibly, a democratic system with the necessary functions (a strong parliament, free elections, JVIITVIWWIJ½GMIRXERHMRHITIRHIRXNYHMGMEV]IXG FYX these often conceal the reality of a highly centralised partystate whose leadership displays authoritarian tendencies. In this context, prospects for political change, and thereby greater scope for democratic reform, have remained limited. For their part, external actors like the EU (which has acknowledged that ‘lack of rotation of executive power’ represents a barrier to democratic development) have attempted to work with the government to drive reforms.

Alternatives? The continued dominance of the DPS was, to some extent, challenged by the formation of the Democratic Front (DF), a centre-right coalition, comprising New Serb Democracy (NOVA), the Movement for Change (PzP), ERHWIZIVEPWIRMSV7SGMEPMWX4ISTPI´W4EVX] 724 SJ½GMEPW such as the party’s former leader, Predrag Bulatovic. Led by Miodrag Lekic (former Montenegrin Foreign Minister and Yugoslav Ambassador in Italy), the DF rapidly became a powerful political factor, with Lekic doing much to revive what had been a rather moribund opposition, ineffective and hampered by internal divisions. In the April 2013 presidential elections, Lekic won an impressive 48.8% of the vote, losing only marginally to the DPS candidate, Filip Vujanovic, who won 51.2%. Surprisingly, Lekic subsequently ran to become Mayor of Podgorica but was, again, narrowly defeated by the DPS candidate, Slavoljub Stjepovic. Despite its rapid ascendancy, cracks within the DF began to appear. After internal disagreements, Lekic left to form his own party, DEMOS, taking a number of key individuals with him. The fragmentation of the opposition weakened the DF, comprising only Andrija Mandic’s NOVA, Nebojsa Medojevic’s PzP and a number of smaller parties. The DF,


Montenegro 141

post-split, did not possess anything like the level of support the previous incarnation enjoyed. Weakened as a political force, the DF changed direction, opting not to challenge the DPS within the parliament, but instead using ‘the politics of the streets’ to meet its ends. Announcing that it would begin anti-government protests on 27 September 2015 by erecting a ‘tent city’ (which organisers HIWGVMFIHEWXLI³½VWXJVIIXIVVMXSV]MR1SRXIRIKVS´ SYXWMHI the parliament building, the DF sought to give the protests a distinct brand, akin to previous ‘revolutions’ in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia and, more recently, Tunisia and Egypt. Under the banner Slobodatraziljudi (Freedom Seeks People) it launched a dedicated website (slobodatraziljudi.me), Facebook page and Twitter account (FreedomCalling.me), which was used to raise awareness of the campaign. The DF also launched an innovative political funding scheme to ‘crowd-fund the revolution’ (though this met only with limited success). The Montenegrin government, and media close to government, tried to cast the demonstrations as anti-Montenegrin and anti-NATO, and accused them of being funded by a network of Serb nationalists with close ties to Russia.

Protests Boldly stating that it intended to continue its protests until the government resigned and a ‘technical government’ (which would oversee preparations for Montenegro’s ³½VWXJVIIERHJEMVIPIGXMSRW´ [EWJSVQIHXLI(*FIKERMXW campaign in earnest. The party’s myriad demands included not only free and fair elections but also the creation of an electronic electoral roll to prevent the manipulation of voter registration. They also included legislation designed to mitigate the abuse of state resources (in particular patronage for jobs, business opportunities and investments) in favour SJ(47WYTTSVXIVWERH½REPP]PIKMWPEXMSRXLEX[SYPHIRWYVI the editorial independence of public broadcasting media, particularly Radio I Televizija Crne Gore (RTCG). But such demands could only succeed if backed by pressure from a critical mass of voters, and there was little evidence to suggest that the government, having survived previous waves of protest (the largest in 2011), would be seriously threatened by the DF’s latest endeavours.The numbers involved in the protests were not only relatively small, but those on the frontline were rather familiar faces – well-known opposition ½KYVIW[MXLEPIRKXL]VIGSVHMRSTTSWMRKXLIKSZIVRQIRXLEH failed to reach into a wider and deeper electorate. By mid-October the small number of tents (around 50) encamped outside the parliament building gave the distinct

impression that the DF’s protest had failed to capture the public imagination. After 20 days of protest the Montenegrin government took the decision to dismantle the ‘tent city’ and clear the area of demonstrators on the basis that they had become an inconvenience to citizens. But the heavy-handed police operation (during which they used stun grenades and tear gas to disperse the small crowd) played straight into the hands of the DF. The level of aggression shown by the police in breaking the peaceful protests provided the DF with an opportunity to cast the protesters – and by extension the party – as victims of ‘police brutality’ and ‘state oppression’. Adept at using social media, they captured – largely on mobile phones – numerous images of police brutality in dealing with the demonstrators, which they then disseminated through Facebook and Twitter. This had the IJJIGXSJKMZMRKXLIIZIRXWELMKLTYFPMGTVS½PIQSWXQENSV international press agencies cut-and-pasted the DF narrative without providing much context. The images of the events of that Saturday evening changed the dynamics dramatically, exceeding even the expectations of the protest’s organisers. The moral victory belonged to the DF, and an opportunity to capitalise on this soon emerged. The following evening a much larger crowd of demonstrators descended on the Square of the Republic to demonstrate against the brutality of the police. Understanding that the dynamics had shifted, and seeking to capitalise on this, the DF announced that it would organise a large demonstration in Podgorica the following Saturday, 24 October. Events moved quickly during the week preceding the new wave of demonstrations, with much speculation about how many would attend. By early on the Saturday evening it became clear that the numbers far outstripped those seen in previous demonstrations. Estimates vary, but something in the region of 5,000 demonstrators gathered in the centre of Podgorica to lend their support to the DF’s protest. It became immediately evident, that the DF’s leaders saw this as perhaps their only opportunity to reach their stated objective – overthrowing the government. The crowd that subsequently gathered outside the parliament building clashed with police, who resorted to stun grenades and teargas to disperse the protestors. Prime Minister Djukanovic’s reaction was predictable. He described the protestors’ actions as an attempted coup d’état, while depicting the DF as Serbian and Russian proxies seeking to reverse Montenegro’s path to NATO membership and undermine the country’s young

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142 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

statehood. The protests, he said, ‘represent an attack on Montenegro’s independence’. The pro-government daily Pobjeda claimed on 26 October that ‘Serbian and Russian extremists’ were providing logistical support to the DF and that the Serbian nationalist groups Nacionalnistroj (National Alignment) and Obraz (Honor) had participated in the violence. The DF, meanwhile, claimed that those who had started the trouble had been ‘placed’ by the Montenegrin intelligence services to discredit the DF and derail the protests.

An Uncertain Future In the wake of the events of 24 October, the DF called on the other opposition parties to join them in further protests. As pressure grew on the leaders of those parties who had not supported the October demonstrations – Miodrag Lekic of DEMOS, Aleksa Becic of Democratic Montenegro and Zarko Rakcevic of United Reform Action (URA) – the DF called on the EU to mediate between the government and opposition parties. The EU, however, wary of entering into another political crisis such as that ongoing in Macedonia, made it clear that they would prefer internal Montenegrin matters to be solved ‘through dialogue not mediation’ and within existing state institutions. Without the support of other opposition parties, the DF continued with their protests nonetheless, holding gatherings in provincial towns – Herceg Novi, Berane, Pljevlja, Bijelo Polje and Niksic – before massing for another demonstration in Podgorica on Sunday 15 November. This time their strategy was to ‘lay siege’ to state institutions by surrounding them with a human chain; the slogan for these latest demonstrations being Opkoljeniste! (You are WYVVSYRHIH 4VSXIWXSVWWMKRM½GERXP]JI[IVMRRYQFIVXLER on 24 October, formed a human chain around government buildings in the latest of these manifestations held to put sustained pressure on the government. Whether the protests will bear fruit remains to be seen. For now, the ruling DPS-led coalition is focusing on Euro-Atlantic integration. EU membership is on the distant horizon, but is certainly not imminent; meeting the EU’s conditions for full membership represents a far tougher challenge than those overcome with relative ease thus far. While Brussels has made a number of statements reiterating the EU’s commitment to western Balkan integration, external conditions are not favourable. The Greek sovereign debt GVMWMWXLIGSRXMRYMRKIGSRSQMG¾Y\[MXLMRXLI)YVS^SRI the results of the 2014 European parliamentary elections,

Regent’s Report 2015

the recent migrant crisis and the impact of the Paris terror attacks have collectively diminished many existing EU member states’ appetite for further expansion. Though lacking the same popular domestic support, the path to NATO membership is, conversely, more or less assured. Events in eastern Ukraine (and the Montenegrin government’s subsequent rhetorical support for the Kyiv government) and NATO’s desire to strengthen its southern FSVHIVWMRXLIPMKLXSJGSR¾MGXMR7]VMEERH-VEUXLIVMWISJ Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the migrant crisis, may dictate that Montenegro joins NATO sooner than the EU. Montenegro has made considerable progress toward this goal, and received an invitation to join NATO as this Report was going to press in December 2015. The recent protests and the fall-out from them have created a febrile domestic political atmosphere, though it has had a negligible impact thus far on Montenegro’s path toward EU accession.The DPS-led government, while hardly on the verge SJGSPPETWIMWYRHIVWMKRM½GERXTVIWWYVI¯QSVIWSXLEREX any time since the 2006 referendum. Ultimately, the outcome of the recent protests might be to create a more balanced TSPMXMGEPTPE]MRK½IPHXLEX[SYPHFVIEXLIPMJIMRXS[LEXLEW become a rather stagnant situation. In the coming years it may also help to nurture a greater sense of accountability on behalf of the government (whichever factions take part in it), which would face the prospect of losing power if it failed to deliver on its promises.The elections planned for 2016 will GIVXEMRP]FI1SRXIRIKVS´WQSWX½IVGIP]GSRXIWXIH

Further Reading Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood by Florian Bieber (ed), Nomos, 2003 ‘Reconstructing the Meaning of Being “Montenegrin”’ by Jelena Dzankic, Slavic Review, Vol 73, No 2, summer 2014 Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space by Branislav Radeljic (ed), Ashgate Press, 2015 Montenegro: A Modern History by Kenneth Morrison, IB Tauris, 2009 ‘Change, Continuity and Consolidation: Assessing Five Years of Montenegro’s Independence’ by Kenneth Morrison, LSE/ LSEE Papers, 2011 The Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro by Elizabeth Roberts, Hurst & Co, 2007


Facts and Figures: Montenegro Geography/demography Area: 13,812 sq km Population: 650,036 Density: 47 per sq km Life expectancy: 74.65 years Growth rate: -0.49%

and the Balkan countries (mostly Albania and Kosovo) to Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, then to Croatia, Slovenia and other EU countries. Marijuana and heroin are the most popular in the domestic market, while synthetic drugs are less frequently used (and mostly by tourists in the summer tourist season) and consumption of cocaine is less prevalent due to its high price.

Economy GDP: $9.499 billion GDP per head: $15,200 Growth rate: 2.3% Military expenditure: 1.74% of GDP Population below poverty line: 8.6% % of economy in Agriculture: 8.3% Industry: 21.2% Services: 70.5%

Considerable corruption and lack of transparency; people XVEJ½GOMRKERHG]FIVGVMQIMWWYIWGSQTEVEFPIXSEHNSMRMRK western Balkan states. Transparency International corruption index: 76.

Foreign trade Exports: $370.2 million (raw aluminium, ships, wine, lead ore, scrap iron) Imports: FMPPMSR VI½RIHTIXVSPIYQGEVWWLMTW Main export partners: Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Italy, Greece Main import partners: Serbia, Greece, China, Croatia, Bosnia

Government budget Revenue: $1.56 billion Expenditure: $1.63 billion Public debt: 59.5% of GDP -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Refugees 5,633 from Serbia and Kosovo and 3,296 stateless.

Drugs and other criminality issues Montenegro is a transit area on a smuggling route of drugs moving from the Middle and Far East towards western Europe. International criminal groups, formed by association of criminal structures from Albania, Montenegro and other former Yugoslav republics, have been engaged in production, smuggling and distribution of marijuana for many years. The ‘Balkan Route’ is used to smuggle heroin that is mostly produced in Afghanistan, via Turkey

Regent’s Report 2015


The EU Integration Agenda: Albania and the Western Balkans Zenel Hoxha President of the UK-Albania Chamber of Commerce, Tirana

“Failures of leadership contrast with the Albanian public’s support for the EU project. Indeed, Albanian public opinion ratings in favour of the EU are the highest in the region” Zenel Hoxha


Albania 145

uring the early 1990s the Balkans region witnessed radical changes as a result of the disintegration of the bipolar international order of the Cold War. The region experienced the violent break-up of ex-Yugoslavia, with [MHIWTVIEHGSR¾MGXEGVSWWIXLRMGREXMSREPMWXERHVIPMKMSYW dividing lines. Both existing and newly emerging countries in the region embarked upon systemic transitions – from authoritarian/totalitarian communist regimes to democracy and a free-market economy. Notwithstanding differences among neighbouring countries, for the Balkans as a whole a new perspective opened up: a ‘return to Europe’. This also meant a new dimension for the European project: a Europe ‘made whole’ again.

D

This shift of perspective is made clear by the labelling of the region no longer as south-eastern Europe but rather as the western Balkans. Countries in the region were presented with a European integration perspective, conditional upon the 1995 Copenhagen criteria and standards regarding their political, economic and legal order. The 2003 8LIWWEPSRMOM7YQQMXGPIEVP]EJ½VQIHXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR

)9 EGGIWWMSRSYXPSSOJSV[IWXIVR&EPOERWGSYRXVMIWF] acknowledging them as potential candidate countries.

Different Speeds on the Road to Democracy At present countries in the region display a marked diversity of progress vis-à-visXLI)9VERKMRKJVSQ/SWSZS which has yet to enjoy freedom of movement in the Schengen Area, to Albania, which has achieved candidate status, to Croatia, which has become a full member of XLI9RMSR%PXLSYKLHMJJIVIRXGSYRXVMIWEVIXVEZIPPMRK at different speeds and there are various levels of development on the ground, they all share the common ZMWMSRSJFIGSQMRKQIQFIVWSJXLI)9JEQMP] (IWTMXIKPSFEPYTLIEZEPWERHXLI)9´WS[RIGSRSQMG ERH½RERGMEPGVMWMWXLI&IVPMR4VSGIWW[EWPEYRGLIH in 2014 giving a clear message of credibility to the western Balkans and defusing lingering concerns over ‘enlargement fatigue’. Aiming at building coherence and FSSWXMRKVIKMSREPMRXIKVEXMSRXLI&IVPMR4VSGIWWIRZMWMSRW ambitious and concrete benchmarks for cross-border cooperation, as well as an expanded and deepening partnership, both of individual countries and of the region [MXLXLI)9-RXLMWGSRRIGXMSR%PFERMEMWTMZSXEPP]TPEGIH given its recognised moderating and constructive role in the region, as well as the country’s strategic position in transport and energy markets for the Balkans and Europe.

;LIR%PFERMELIPHMXW½VWXTPYVEPMWXHIQSGVEXMGIPIGXMSRW in 1991, the country was the last in the region to shed EGSPPETWMRKGSQQYRMWXVIKMQI-XIQIVKIHXLIREWXLI poorest nation in Europe, experiencing a massive exodus of population that was traumatic for Albanian society, while also presenting a critical challenge for Europe at large, especially for particular recipient countries. The transition from a totalitarian and isolationist regime to a free democratic society based on the rule of law and a market economy has been continuous, albeit beset with delays and drawbacks, mostly due to hesitations and footdragging by the political elite. However, improvements over the past two decades have been dramatic. The country has now passed several milestones, that highlight the meaningful changes and developments achieved along the TEXLXS[EVHW)9MRXIKVEXMSR From the launch of the forward-looking Stabilisation ERH%WWSGMEXMSR4VSGIWW 7%4 F]XLI)9MR Albania embarked upon an ambitious reform agenda to meet a set of benchmarks and standards. The country’s 7XEFMPMWEXMSRERH%WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRX 7%% [MXLXLI )9[EWWMKRIHMRERHIRXIVIHMRXSJSVGIMR That very same year Albania submitted its application JSV)9QIQFIVWLMT[LMPIEPWSFIGSQMRKEJYPP]¾IHKIH member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

2%83 -RXLIJSPPS[MRK]IEVXLI7GLIRKIRZMWEVIKMQI [EWPMJXIHERH%PFERMERW½REPP]WXEVXIHIRNS]MRKJVIIHSQ of movement in Europe. 8LIPSRK[MRHMRKVSEHXS[EVHWXLI)9LEWJIEXYVIH various priority areas contingent upon domestic political life, but also larger regional and international developments. -R.YRI%PFERME´WGSQQMXQIRXERHEGLMIZIQIRXW IEVRIHXLIGSYRXV])9GERHMHEXIWXEXYWWYFWIUYIRXP] endorsed by the European Council. However, a lack of democratic culture due to XLIGSQQYRMWXTEWXERHGSR¾MGXYEPTEVX]TSPMXMGW characterising the country’s post-communist transition, have slowed Albania’s potential progress. Failures of leadership contrast with the Albanian public’s support JSVXLI)9TVSNIGX-RHIIH%PFERMERTYFPMGSTMRMSR VEXMRKWMRJEZSYVSJXLI)9EVIXLILMKLIWXMRXLIVIKMSR )9GERHMHEXIWXEXYWHIQERHWKVIEXIVVIWTSRWMFMPMX]ERH accountability by the political leadership, implying clear priorities for genuine change and achieving standards that match public expectations.

Regent’s Report 2015


146 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

The latest progress report issued by the European Commission brings into focus the following four key priority areas: ˆIJ½GMIRXERHHITSPMXMGMWIHTYFPMGEHQMRMWXVEXMSR ˆconsolidation of the rule of law and independent judiciary ˆ½KLXEKEMRWXGSVVYTXMSRERHSVKERMWIHGVMQI ˆprotection and promotion of fundamental human rights. These reforms are vital for genuine democratic institutionbuilding and for enabling sustainable growth and prosperity. Living up to these standards is clearly crucial for creating a functioning market economy driven by fair competition, inclusive and sustainable growth, as well as an attractive business climate for domestic and international investors.

Albania’s Potential There is only so much this ‘snapshot’ view can tell about %PFERME´WVMGLIWERHTSXIRXMEP-RHIIH%PFERMEJIEXYVIWE remarkable diversity and abundance of untapped resources. These suggest ample margins for future development in key sectors, including tourism, agri-business and mining as well as natural resources and water management. Currently Albania’s tourism industry avails of merely  SJXLIGSEWXPMRIJVSQXLIGSYRXV]´WEQE^MRK-SRMER and Adriatic Riviera. Mountain and outdoor tourism are currently limited to only a few months per year. 8LITSXIRXMEPJSVKVS[XLMWXIVVM½G%PFERMEMWVIGSKRMWIH as the last hidden gem of the Mediterranean, featuring majestic landscapes, rare natural habitats and extraordinary biodiversity – with national parks hosting some 30% of )YVSTI´WSZIVEPP¾SVEERHJEYRE%HHXSXLEXETVIGMSYW historical and cultural heritage spanning millennia, and the challenge for Albania is to develop year-round sustainable tourism that both empowers local communities and contributes to job growth, while showing due sensitivity for the protection of ecosystems and heritage. Other core sectors only partially exploited include mineral mining and natural resource extraction and processing. 8LIGSYRXV]MWFPIWWIH[MXLTPIRXMJYPLMKLUYEPMX]QMRIVEPW -XMWVMGLMRGLVSQMYQQEKRIWMYQGSTTIVERHELSWXSJ VEVIQMRIVEPW-XEFSYRHWMRJSVIWXWERHMWFPIWWIH[MXL water resources, ranking it among the top European GSYRXVMIWSJTIVGETMXE[EXIVVIWIVZIW-XMWEPWSIRHS[IH with known oil and natural gas reserves, with the prospect of considerable hydrocarbon reserves underneath the

Regent’s Report 2015

GSRXMRIRXEPWLIPJMRXLI-SRMER7IE4VIWWMRKGLEPPIRKIW for these and other extraction sectors involve not only GSQTPMERGI[MXL)9IRZMVSRQIRXEPWXERHEVHWFYXEPWS the harmonisation of their development with that of other strategic sectors such as tourism and agriculture. -QTSVXERXP]%PFERME[MPP[ERXXSMRGVIEWIXLI³EHHIHZEPYI´ of export commodities through support for domestic processing industries. 8LIGSYRXV]MWEPWSERSVGLEVHSJTVIQMYQUYEPMX] agricultural produce and a basketful of world-renowned medicinal plants and spices. Emergent agri-business and bio-diversity management offer enormous potential. To make these a reality, a long-term vision and investment framework are needed – serving not only agri-produce export growth, but also increased domestic consumption which will support a thriving tourism industry. National agricultural branding and marketing, coupled with EHLIVIRGIXS)9GIVXM½GEXMSRWXERHEVHW[MPPFISJTVMQI importance for the competitiveness and sustainability of Albanian agri-business. Sectoral government policies should EMQEXJEGMPMXEXMRKERHIRLERGMRKEGGIWWXS½RERGIERH support mechanisms, especially with a view to modernising the technological base for farming and increasing agricultural know-how. From a regional perspective, Albania has the potential to become a central hub of projects and platforms across multiple industry sectors including energy infrastructure, transport connectivity, natural resource preservation ERHGVSWWFSVHIVXSYVMWQ-XWTMZSXEPKISKVETLMGTSWMXMSR secured Albania a strategic role in the Trans-Adriatic 4MTIPMRI 8%4 TVSNIGXERIRIVK]VSYXISJMQTSVXERGI JSVXLIVIKMSR´WERHXLI)9´WIRIVK]WYTTP]ERHWIGYVMX] 7MKRM½GERXP]%PFERME´W³KEXI[E]´TSWMXMSRMRXLIVIKMSRLEW also secured it a critical role in the future development of EY\MPMEV]IRIVK]MRJVEWXVYGXYVIRIX[SVOWWYGLEWXLI-SRMER Adriatic pipeline. -XWKISKVETLMGEPTSWMXMSREPWSIRWYVIWXLEX%PFERMELEW stakes in major regional infrastructure projects under XLIWTSXPMKLXSJXLI&IVPMR4VSGIWW8LIWIMRGPYHIXLI ³&PYI,MKL[E]´EPSRKXLI%HVMEXMG-SRMERGSEWXPMRIXLI projected regional railway network, multi-modal ports and logistical centres, as well as telecommunications and HMKMXEPRIX[SVOW8LITER)YVSTIERVSYXI'SVVMHSV:--- also adds weight to Albania’s transport connectivity as ERMRXIVWIGXMSRSJOI]IEWX[IWXTEXL[E]WSJ[MHIV)9 relevance. Location clearly matters!


Albania 147

Reform and Leadership 8LI)9MRXIKVEXMSRTIVWTIGXMZIMWZMXEPXSXLIPEWXMRKTIEGI security and sustainable development of the region and )YVSTIEXPEVKI-RJEGXXLI)9TVSZMHIWE³GSRZIVKIRX vision’ of transformations across regional countries – informed by the values and principles of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights, as well as a free-market economy and sustainable development. However, leadership at the domestic level needs to engage in reform agendas not with a view to matching formal criteria on paper, but rather with the aim of engendering and nurturing meaningful and lasting changes on the ground. Good governance is key to activating the huge unexplored potentials within and across countries in XLIVIKMSRFIRI½XMRKXLIMVGMXM^IRWERHEXXLIWEQIXMQI WIVZMRKXLI)9´WIGSRSQMGWXERHMRKERHWIGYVMX] The recent re-emergence of massive illegal immigration ERHLYQERXVEJ½GOMRKJVSQERHXLVSYKLXLI[IWXIVR Balkans bears witness to the salience of good governance EXLSQIERHSJGSLIVIRXERHWYFWXERXMEP)9WYTTSVXJSV FSXLVIKMSREPERH)9[MHIHIZIPSTQIRX*MRHMRKTSWMXMZI answers to the challenges – shared by all countries of the region with regard to long-term growth and job creation – is vital to countering economic marginalisation and social I\GPYWMSR*EMPYVIXS½RHXLIWIERW[IVWVEMWIWXLIWTIGXVI of further migration abroad, and also radicalisation at home along national, religious and racial dividing lines. As political leaders noted at the Vienna Summit held in August 2015, economic growth and job creation are TVMSVMXMIWJSVGSYRXVMIWMRXLIVIKMSR-RTEVXMGYPEVWYTTSVX for youth entrepreneurship, coupled with enhanced cross-border educational and labour mobility, is viewed as essential for driving economic and socio-cultural change. Likewise ensuring free movement of goods, services and capital is crucial to regional integration and the creation of a common economic space, which can capitalise on regional ‘economies of scale’ and give the region a competitive edge vis-à-vis European and international market pressures. Leadership at the regional level ought to support a comprehensive cooperation agenda informed by clear and resolute political resolve and complemented by strategic QSFMPMWEXMSRSJVIKMSREPERH)9VIWSYVGIW,EVQSRMWEXMSR of policies and development of strategic cross-border projects are essential prerogatives for the western Balkans to tap into the region’s full potential in multiple economic domains, such as energy, transport, agri-business and tourism.

-RXLMWGSRRIGXMSRMRGVIEWIH)9JYRHMRKVIWSYVGIWERH instruments are needed to sustain reforms and projects that help build coherence and synergies. Goals and targets IRHSVWIHEXXLIVIGIRX:MIRRE7YQQMXWLS[XLEXXLI)9MW readying itself not just to ‘talk the talk’ but also to ‘walk the [EPO´7SQIºQMPPMSRLEWFIIRIEVQEVOIHJSVVIKMSREP infrastructure projects in energy, road and rail transport, and a further 24 projects worth about €7.7 billion have FIIRIRZMWMSRIHERHKEMRIH)9WYTTSVX[MXLEZMI[XS creating close to 200,000 jobs in the next 15 years. These ½KYVIWMRHMGEXIXLIMQTSVXERGIJSVXLI)9SJWYWXEMRMRKE credible integration agenda and suggest a new perspective for strategic development of the western Balkans. 8LI)YVSTIER'SEPERH7XIIP'SQQYRMX] )7'7 [LMGL IZIRXYEPP]HIZIPSTIHMRXSXLIFVSEHIV)9IQIVKIHMRXLI EJXIVQEXLSJXLI7IGSRH;SVPH;EV-XTVSZMHIWXLITVMQI example for the western Balkans of a far-reaching and lasting vision of economic integration and interdependence as a means of overcoming the legacies of war and building a common future. An increasingly interconnected and interdependent western Balkans region will overcome the LMWXSV]SJMRXIVIXLRMGZMSPIRXGSR¾MGXFIXXIVERHJEWXIVERH go on to build on regional cooperation for a prosperous and vibrant future. %WVIEJ½VQIHF]XLI&IVPMR4VSGIWWXLITEXLXS[EVHW)9 integration must go through genuine regional integration. Albania’s strategic geographical position, along with the presence of large Albanian constituencies, both in other VIKMSREPGSYRXVMIWERHMR)9QIQFIVWXEXIWQEOIWXLI country’s moderating and constructive role in the Balkans pivotal for the success of the regional and European integration processes

Further Reading 4VMQI1MRMWXIV´W3J½GI[[[OV]IQMRMWXVMEEPIRTVSKVEQ european-union-integration 1MRMWXV]SJ)YVSTIER-RXIKVEXMSRSJXLI6ITYFPMGSJ%PFERME www.integrimi.gov.al Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania: www.mfa.gov.al (IPIKEXMSRSJXLI)YVSTIER9RMSRXS%PFERME http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/albania and https://eudelegationalbania.wordpress.com

Regent’s Report 2015


148 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

%PFERMER-RZIWXQIRX(IZIPSTQIRX%KIRG] %-(%  www.aida.gov.al 8VERW%HVMEXMG4MTIPMRI4VSNIGX 8%4 [[[XETEKGSQXLI pipeline/building-the-pipeline/in-albania 3FWIVZEXSV]SJ6IKMSREP-RXIKVEXMSR 36- LXXT shtetiweb.org/observatory-regional-integration/ Europe: Ik E Ja by Majlinda Bregu (former Albanian Minister SJ)YVSTIER-RXIKVEXMSR 9)84VIWW4YFPMGEXMSRW ³%PFERME 4EVX- 0ERHSJ)EKPIW7TVIEHWMXW;MRKW´Business Special Edition-QEKI(MTPSQEG]ERHThe Daily Telegraph, 15 .YRI

Regent’s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: Albania Geography/demography %VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMX]TIVWUOQ 0MJII\TIGXERG]]IEVW Growth rate: 0.3%

TVSHYGXMSRIXLRMG%PFERMERHVYKXVEJ½GOMRKSVKERMWEXMSRW active and expanding in Europe. Vulnerable to money PEYRHIVMRKEWWSGMEXIH[MXLVIKMSREPXVEJ½GOMRKMRREVGSXMGW arms, contraband, and illegal aliens. 8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

Economy +(4FMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH Growth rate: 1.9% 1MPMXEV]I\TIRHMXYVI SJ+(4  4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI  IWX % of economy in Agriculture: 41.8% -RHYWXV] 7IVZMGIW

Foreign trade Exports: FMPPMSR XI\XMPIWJSSX[IEVQIXEPWERHSVIW GVYHISMPZIKIXEFPIWJVYMXWXSFEGGS Imports: FMPPMSR QEGLMRIV]ERHIUYMTQIRX JSSHWXYJJWXI\XMPIWGLIQMGEPW Main export partners: -XEP]'LMRE7TEMR/SWSZS-RHME Main import partners: -XEP]+VIIGI'LMRE8YVOI]+IVQER]

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Transnational issues 1ENSVGSRGIVRSZIVHIZIPSTQIRXSJ/SWSZSERHVIPEXMSRW [MXL7IVFMEEPWS[MXL1EGIHSRMEGSRGIVRMRKPEVKI%PFERMER minority.

Refugees 7,443 stateless persons.

Drugs and other criminality -RGVIEWMRKP]EGXMZIXVERWWLMTQIRXTSMRXJSVWSYXL[IWX Asian opiates, hashish, and cannabis transiting the Balkan route and cocaine from South America destined for [IWXIVR)YVSTIPMQMXIHSTMYQERHI\TERHMRKGERREFMW

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


Moldova’s EU Agenda: Running out of Steam? Bogdan Ivanel Researcher in International Public Law and Human Rights, Institut d’études politiques de Paris (SciencesPo), Law School, Paris

“Moldova can rightly boast that it is the most predictable, politically stable and democratic country not only in the Eastern Partnership, but also in comparison with most EU candidate or potential candidate countries” Bogdan Ivanel


Moldova 151

or some years now Moldova has been presented as XLI)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMT´WWYGGIWWWXSV]8[SMQTSVXERX factors have given the country its edge.

F

First and foremost, Moldova has had the most consistent HIQSGVEXMGTVEGXMGIEQSRK)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMTGSYRXVMIW organising free and generally fair elections that have produced several peaceful changes of government, and setting up a parliamentary system that has kept the country largely away from the autocratic tendencies of its neighbourhood. Secondly, despite lacking control of part SJMXWXIVVMXSV]XLITSWWMFMPMX]SJVIRI[IHGSRžMGXLEWYRXMP recently seemed slight. However, the heightened expectations of European integration and accelerated economic growth from its citizens, coupled with the political and economic pressures posed by a resurgent Russia, have brought the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s weaknesses to the surface in the past year. Endemic GSVVYTXMSRERHERMRIJ½GMIRXEHQMRMWXVEXMSRLEZIFIGSQI YREZSMHEFPIVIEPMXMIWSJ1SPHSZE4IEGIMXWIPJERHWSGMEP cohesion cannot be taken for granted any more either.

Overview of EU-Moldovan Relations 1SPHSZE´WVIPEXMSRWLMT[MXLXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR )9  has for many years followed a consistently upward trend. Every government in the past two decades has taken this VIPEXMSREWXITJYVXLIV8LI½VWXPIKEPJVEQI[SVOJSVXLI HIZIPSTQIRXSJ1SPHSZE)9VIPEXMSRW[EWSJJIVIHF]XLI 4EVXRIVWLMTERH'SSTIVEXMSR%KVIIQIRX 4'% [LMGL GEQIMRXSJSVGISR.YP] ;LIR:PEHMQMV:SVSRMRPIEHIVSJXLI'SQQYRMWX4EVX] FIGEQI4VIWMHIRXMRQER]JIEVIHXLIGSYRXV][SYPH JYPP]XYVRMXWFEGOSRXLI;IWXERHXLI)9,S[IZIVRSX only did Voronin attempt a balancing act between Russia ERHXLI)9FYXEPWSLIVERERH[SREWIGSRHXIVQSRE European integration platform. The semantics in the capital 'LMWMREYGLERKIHJVSQGPSWIGSSTIVEXMSR[MXLXLI)9 XSMRXIKVEXMSRMRXSXLI9RMSR[LMGLFIGEQI1SPHSZE´W number one objective. -R*IFVYEV]1SPHSZEWMKRIHXLI1SPHSZE)9 %GXMSR4PER[MXLMRXLIJVEQI[SVOSJXLI)YVSTIER 2IMKLFSYVLSSH4SPMG] )24 8LIHSGYQIRXWXMTYPEXIH WTIGM½GEGXMSRWERHSFNIGXMZIWQIERXXSFVMRK1SPHSZE´W PIKMWPEXMSRGPSWIVXSXLEXSJXLI)93RIQSRXLPEXIVEPP four parliamentary parties passed a declaration identifying European integration as an irreversible strategic choice.

8LI)9LEWEPWSSJJIVIHWMKRM½GERXEWWMWXERGIXS1SPHSZE MR½RHMRKEWSPYXMSRXSXLI8VERWRMWXVMERMWWYI%FVIEOE[E] VIKMSRWERH[MGLIHFIX[IIR1SPHSZEERH9OVEMRIERH effectively controlled by Russia, Transnistria has been a KVI]^SRISR1SPHSZE´WXIVVMXSV]WMRGIMRHITIRHIRGI-R 7ITXIQFIVXLI)9NSMRIHXLIRIKSXMEXMRKJSVYQSR 8VERWRMWXVMEEWSFWIVZIV-R2SZIQFIVXLI)YVSTIER 9RMSR&SVHIV%WWMWXERGI1MWWMSRXS1SPHSZEERH9OVEMRI

)9&%1 [EWPEYRGLIH*YRHIHF]XLI)9ERH[MXLXLI -RXIVREXMSREP3VKERMWEXMSRJSV1MKVEXMSR -31 EGXMRK EWMQTPIQIRXMRKTEVXRIV)9&%1MWQERHEXIH[MXL enhancing the border-management capabilities of Moldova ERH9OVEMRI[MXLXLISFNIGXMZISJWXSTTMRKMPPIKEPFSVHIV activities, especially on the border with Transnistria. 1SPHSZE´WEXXVEGXMSRXS[EVHWXLI)9[EWXLIRHVMZIRF] two main aspects. Firstly, both the people and the political IPMXIWMR1SPHSZEWIIXLI)9EWXLIMVSRP]GLERGIXSVIHYGI their economic and political dependence on Moscow. The Soviet economy had been a highly integrated one. Even after the Soviet state collapsed, Moldova remained largely reliant on its trade with the former Soviet countries and especially Russia. A huge chunk of Moldovaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s exports go to Russia, which has been using this situation for political PIZIVEKISZIV'LMWMREY-RMRVIWTSRWIXS1SPHSZE´W WXITWXS[EVHWJYVXLIVMRKMXWVIPEXMSR[MXLXLI)96YWWME imposed an embargo over Moldovan wine, the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s main export. For Moldova, that was the signal to start PSSOMRKXS[EVHWHMZIVWMJ]MRKMXWXVEHIMRJEZSYVSJXLI)9EW the most likely and most viable option for diminishing its economic reliance on exports to Russia. 7IGSRHP]ERHIUYEPP]MQTSVXERXP]1SPHSZERWWII)YVSTI EWETPEGISJ[IPJEVIERHEJžYIRGI2EXYVEPP]MRXIKVEXMSR MRXSXLI)9VITVIWIRXWJSVQER]SJXLIQXLIFIWXGLERGI for development their country has. The progress they have witnessed in the other eastern European states that joined XLI)9MRERHEJXIVGSR½VQWXLIGSVVIPEXMSRFIX[IIR prosperity and European integration.

The Romanian Dimension 8LIIJJIGXWSJ6SQERME´WMRXIKVEXMSRMRXSXLI)9MR were especially important. Moldova had been part of Romania before the Second World War and, as the two countries share a common language and culture, the WYFNIGXSJVIYRM½GEXMSRLEWFIIREVSYRHWMRGIXLIFMVXL of Moldova. While Romanians took full advantage of the FIRI½XWSJ)9QIQFIVWLMT1SPHSZERW[IVIPIJXGVEZMRK the same opportunities and many even felt left behind. The chance to work in a better paid job in the West particularly

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


152 Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

lured Moldovans, but the reality of new border restrictions after 2007 meant that they could not even cross the border into Romania, where many had family, without a hard-to-obtain visa. The immediate effects were two-fold. On the one hand, a tidal wave of applications for Romanian citizenship forced the Romanian authorities to change the citizenship law MRMRSVHIVXSJEWXXVEGO1SPHSZERVIUYIWXW3ZIV LEPJEQMPPMSR1SPHSZERWGYVVIRXP]LSPH HYEP 6SQERMER citizenship, while thousands of additional applications are currently being reviewed. Through this process Moldovans can de jure and de factoFIGSQI)9GMXM^IRWERHIRNS] XLIFIRI½XWSJXLMWWXEXYW[MXLSYXXLIMVGSYRXV]FIMRKE member state. On the other hand, the population has become restless and impatient with what they perceive to be a sluggish pace of formal European integration.

A New Start? 3REFVSEHIVJVSRX1SPHSZEERHXLI)9FIKERRIKSXMEXMRK MRERI[%WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRX %% MRGPYHMRK E(IITERH'SQTVILIRWMZI*VII8VEHI%VIE ('*8%  meant to upgrade the institutional relations between the two parties. This development was met with strong Russian STTSWMXMSRERHWYFWIUYIRXIGSRSQMGEW[IPPEWHMTPSQEXMG pressure. As negotiations on the AA/DCFTA were concluded, Russia imposed an embargo on imports of Moldovan wine in September 2013, hitting hard the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s main I\TSVXMRHYWXV]JSVEWIGSRHXMQIMRWIZIR]IEVW8LI)9 responded swiftly by fully opening its market to Moldovan wine in order to ease some of the economic costs of Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s embargo. Regardless of Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pressures, the AA/DCFTA was initiated in November at the Eastern 4EVXRIVWLMT´W7YQQMXMR:MPRMYW

One reaction to this was the violent street protests of April 2009, which brought a new government to power in Chisinau. The four parties that made up the new ruling coalition were separated by largely competing ideologies and agendas, but united by their pro-European discourse. The coalition styled itself accordingly as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;The Alliance JSV)YVSTIER-RXIKVEXMSR´ERHTVSQMWIHXSTYVWYIER accelerated agenda of reforms that would make the GSYRXV]VIEH]JSV)9QIQFIVWLMTMRXLIRIEVJYXYVI Their political rhetoric was characterised by heightened STXMQMWQXLEXVIMRZMKSVEXIHXLITSTYPEXMSR´WJEMXLXLEX)9 QIQFIVWLMT[EW[MXLMRKVEWT9RVIEPMWXMGHIEHPMRIW[IVI set and the popular expectations reached a new high.

Russian efforts to stop Moldova from signing the EKVIIQIRXMRXIRWM½IHERHHMZIVWM½IH2SXSRP]HMHXLI economic punitive measures continue with a new embargo on imports of processed pork meat products in April 2014, but political pressure was also increased. Moscow repeatedly threatened to expel Moldovan migrant workers JVSQ6YWWMEERHJYVXLIVJYIPPIHXIRWMSRWMR8VERWRMWXVME-X MWEPWSEGXMZIP]IRGSYVEKMRKERXM)9WIRXMQIRXWMR1SPHSZE by using its control over large parts of the media as well as by supporting parties and organisations that advocate the GSYRXV]´WMRXIKVEXMSR[MXLMRXLI)YVEWMER)GSRSQMG9RMSR

))9 PIHF]6YWWMEMRWXIEHSJXLI)9

And indeed Moldova did take some important steps XS[EVHWXLI)9-R.ERYEV]XLI)9'SQQMWWMSR WIXYTERSJ½GMEPEGXMSRTPEREMQIHEXIWXEFPMWLMRKE ZMWEJVIIVIKMQIJSVWLSVXWXE]XVEZIP[MXLMRXLI)9JSV Moldovan citizens. The conditions of the action plan were met by the government in Chisinau and at the end of April XLIZMWEVIUYMVIQIRXWJSVWLSVXWXE]XVEZIP[IVIPMJXIH

This propaganda war bore fruit, turning many against the European integration project and polarising Moldovan society over this issue. Gagauzia, an autonomous region within Moldova over which Russia holds considerable MRžYIRGIIZIRXLVIEXIRIHXSWIGIHIMRXLIIZIRXSJXLI GSYRXV]´WEGGIWWMSRXSXLI)9FVMRKMRKYTXLITSWWMFMPMX]SJ EWIGSRHEVQIHGSRžMGXSR1SPHSZE´WXIVVMXSV]

Another crucial development was starting the process of ensuring Moldovaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s energy independence from Moscow. -R1SPHSZEFIGEQIEQIQFIVSJXLI)RIVK] 'SQQYRMX]ÂŻER)9PIHSVKERMWEXMSRGSSVHMREXMRKTPERRMRK in energy matters â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and in practical terms it began to link its electricity and gas networks to those of neighbouring 6SQERME;MXL)9ERH6SQERMER½RERGMEPWYTTSVXWSQI connections have now been built and a number of further developments are planned or are under construction.

Despite all of this pressure, the Moldovan government went through with its commitment to European integration. 1SPHSZEWMKRIHXLI%%('*8%SR.YRIERH TVSQTXP]VEXM½IHMXSR.YP]GIPIFVEXMRKXLIIZIRXEWE historical turning point and a symbol of the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s TSPMXMGEPIZSPYXMSR-RVIXEPMEXMSR6YWWMEMQQIHMEXIP]FERRIH imports of canned vegetables and fruits, continued its ERXM)9TVSTEKERHEERHSR%YKYWXWYWTIRHIHXEVMJJ JVIITVIJIVIRGIWYRHIVXLI6YWWME1SPHSZE'-7*VII Trade Agreement for 19 categories of agro-food products.

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


Moldova 153

-RWTMXISJEPPSJ6YWWME´WIJJSVXWXSWGEVIE[E]XLI1SPHSZER TYFPMGJVSQXLI)9ERHLEPXXLIMQTPIQIRXEXMSRSJXLI%% DCFTA, the pro-European coalition was able to maintain its majority, albeit a slim one, after the November 2015 elections. The goal of the AA/DCFTA is to prepare Moldova IJJIGXMZIP]JSV)YVSTIERMRXIKVEXMSR-XYRHIVPMRIWXLIRIIH for Moldova to reform and modernise its institutions and imposes the obligation for Chisinau to approximate its PIKMWPEXMSRERHWXERHEVHWXSXLSWISJXLI)9JSPPS[MRKE detailed schedule. The DFCTA’s objective is the gradual GVIEXMSRSJEJVIIXVEHIEVIEFIX[IIRXLI)9ERH1SPHSZE The market will open asymmetrically in the advantage SJ1SPHSZEQIERMRKXLEXXLI)9[MPPGYXQSWXMQTSVX XEVMJJW[MXLMRXLI½VWXJI[]IEVW[LMPI1SPHSZE[MPPSTIR its market more slowly in order to protect its more JVEKMPIIGSRSQ]1SVISZIVXLI)9MWXSSJJIVWYTTSVXERH ½RERGMEPEWWMWXERGIXSLIPTMRGVIEWI1SPHSZE´WIGSRSQMG competitiveness. The agreement provides for its provisional application FIJSVIXLISJ½GMEPIRXV]GSQIWMRXSJSVGIMRSVHIVXSSJJIV the Moldovan economy fast relief from the effects of the 6YWWMERIQFEVKS%HHMXMSREPP]XLI)9HIGMHIHXSMRGVIEWI XLIXEVMJJJVIIUYSXEWSJJVYMXTVSHYGXWERHGYXXEVMJJWJSV these in August. These measures and the speedy application of the AA/DCFTA were able largely to compensate for the drop in sales to Russia. While exports to the Russian market decreased by 32.9% in 2014, plummeting to just 18.1% of all Moldovan exports by the end of the year, I\TSVXWXSXLI)9MRGVIEWIHF] FVMRKMRKMXWWLEVISJ the total to 53.3%.

Moldova’s Opportunities As Moldova continues its pursuit of stronger ties with the )9EMQMRKJSVIZIRXYEPQIQFIVWLMTXLIGSYRXV]GERGSYRX upon several strengths. Firstly, Moldova has shown the most consistent democratic TVEGXMGIEQSRK)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMTGSYRXVMIW;LMPIXLI GSYRXV]MWJEVJVSQHMWTPE]MRKE¾E[PIWWIPIGXSVEPERH democratic record, and institutional procedures have often been trampled upon, the justice system is politicised and the police have been known to commit abuses, Moldovan politicians have, by and large, stayed within the GSR½RIWSJXLI'SRWXMXYXMSRERHIPIGXMSRWLEZIFVSYKLX EFSYXJVIUYIRXERHTIEGIJYPGLERKIWMRKSZIVRQIRX Moldova can rightly boast that it is the most predictable, politically stable and democratic country not only in the

)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMTFYXEPWSMRGSQTEVMWSR[MXLQSWX)9 candidate or potential candidate countries. 7IGSRHP]1SPHSZEGYVVIRXP]IRNS]WWXVSRK)9WYTTSVX %JXIVXLI[EVMR9OVEMRIFVSOISYXERHMRXLI[EOISJ 6YWWMERTVIWWYVIWXLI)9LEWWXITTIHYTMXWWYTTSVXJSV 'LMWMREY³;ILEZIXSWXIEPEQEVGLSR4YXMRLILEWXS know that he cannot do in Moldova what he did in Crimea,’ WEMH.IER'PEYHI.YRGOIVFIJSVIFIGSQMRK4VIWMHIRXSJXLI )YVSTIER'SQQMWWMSR8LI)9LEWFIIRTVITEVIHXS³[EPO XLI[EPO´EW[IPPEW³XEPOXLIXEPO´-XSTIRIHMXWQEVOIXXS Moldova’s wine in 2013 and to its fruits and fruit products MR1SVISZIVXLI)9LEWJEWXXVEGOIHXLIWMKRMRKSJ the AA/DCFTA and inserted a clause on its provisional application with the intent of easing Moldova’s economic situation. The AA/DCFTA itself is designed to support Moldova’s development and is doubled by direct European funding. Moldova has an amazing opportunity to put the AA/DCFTA to work in building a competitive economy. 8LMVHP]XLIGSR¾MGXMR9OVEMRIRSXSRP]MRXIRWM½IHXLI)9´W backing for Moldova, but offered the country the chance XSTSWMXMSRMXWIPJIZIRQSVI½VQP]EWERMWPERHSJWXEFMPMX] MRXLIVIKMSR8LMWGERGSRWIUYIRXP]FSSWXXLIMRXIVIWXSJ foreign business and attract investment. Furthermore, with 9OVEMRIEX[EV[MXL6YWWME8VERWRMWXVME½RHWMXWIPJMWSPEXIH from its sponsor and sandwiched between two states that would both like to see democratic changes to the autocratic regime there. This brings a new element into the Transnistrian issue and potentially makes progress possible JSVXLI½VWXXMQIMREPSRK[LMPI Fourthly, and maybe most importantly, Moldova has the YRGSRHMXMSREPWYTTSVXSJSRI)9QIQFIVWXEXI6SQERME MRMXWUYIWXJSVQIQFIVWLMT8LIX[SWXEXIWWLEVIE common language, history and cultural identity, and the discourse in both Bucharest and Chisinau centres on the SFNIGXMZISJXLIX[SGSYRXVMIW³QIIXMRK´[MXLMRXLI)9*SV Romania, where opinion polls show that an overwhelming QENSVMX]SJXLITSTYPEXMSRJEZSYVWYRM½GEXMSR[MXLMXW JSVQIVTVSZMRGI1SPHSZE´WMRXIKVEXMSRMRXSXLI)9MWE national objective recognised by all political parties. 8LIEHZERXEKIWJSV1SPHSZESJ6SQERME´W)9QIQFIVWLMT cannot be overestimated. Chisinau is able to boast, as 4VMQI1MRMWXIV0IERGEHMHXLEX1SPHSZE´WPERKYEKIMWde factoEPVIEH]ERSJ½GMEPPERKYEKISJXLI)9YRHIVPMRMRKXLI country’s entitlement to be part of the European cultural project. More practically, through Romania’s representatives MRXLI)9FSHMIW[LIXLIVXLI'SYRGMPSVXLI4EVPMEQIRX

Regent’s Report 2015


154 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

1SPHSZE´W)9EKIRHEMWFIMRKZSMGIHERHEGXMZIP]TYVWYIH -XMWEWMXYEXMSR[MXLWSQITEVEPPIPWMRXLIVIPEXMSRFIX[IIR Greece and Cyprus in earlier years. 8LITVIWIRGIMRXLI)9'SQQMWWMSRSJE6SQERMER commissioner ensures that Moldovan issues are understood at the heart of European policy-making and SJJIVW1SPHSZEKVIEXFIRI½XW(EGMER'MSPSWXLI6SQERMER Agriculture Commissioner, was the one to propose the STIRMRKSJXLI)9QEVOIXXS1SPHSZER[MRIERHSXLIV EKVMGYPXYVEPTVSHYGXW)UYEPP]MQTSVXERXMWXLIJEGXXLEXE huge part of the Moldavian population already holds dual 6SQERMERGMXM^IRWLMTXLYWIRNS]MRKEPPXLIFIRI½XWSJ)9 GMXM^IRWLMT-XGSYPHFIWEMHXLEX1SPHSZERWLEZINSMRIHXLI )9[LMPI1SPHSZELEWRSX]IX

Moldova’s Challenges ;MXLXLIPS[IWXKVSWWHSQIWXMGTVSHYGX +(4 TIV capita in Europe, the major challenge Moldova faces is its fragile economy. Despite the anticipated application of the AA/DCFTA, the bulk of Moldova’s industry lacks the competitiveness needed to successfully export its products XSXLI)9QEVOIX1SPHSZE´WIGSRSQ]MWPMOI[MWIJVEMPHYI XSMXWGSRXMRYMRKLIEZ]VIPMERGISR6YWWME-J1SPHSZELEW succeeded in diversifying its exports to some extent, it still needs to pursue its energy independence by developing pipeline connections with Romania and by sustainably expanding its own electricity production. Moldova’s economy is moreover heavily dependent on remittances from its migrant workers. According to the ;SVPH&EROEWXEKKIVMRK SJ1SPHSZE´W+(4MWQEHI YTSJVIQMXXERGIW-RVIQMXXERGIWJVSQ6YWWMEEPSRI [IVIQMPPMSRVITVIWIRXMRK SJ1SPHSZE´W economy – a weakness Russia is willing to exploit by threats to block remittances or expel Moldovan migrant workers. The country is also dramatically plagued by generalised corruption. Serious corruption scandals have been revealed MRVIGIRX]IEVW-RXLIPEXIWXERHPEVKIWXSJXLIWIEPQSWXE FMPPMSR97HSPPEVW¯VITVIWIRXMRK SJXLIGSYRXV]´W+(4 – vanished from Moldova’s largest banks. Suspicions were cast upon high-ranking politicians from the pro-European coalition, and these suspicions coupled with the anticorruption discourse adopted by the pro-Russian parties HEQEKIXLI)9´WETTIEP Fighting corruption and the establishment of rule of law should become central objectives for Chisinau. However,

Regent’s Report 2015

MRWXMXYXMSRWWYGLEWXLI4VSWIGYXMSR3J½GIERHXLI'SYVXW are still largely under political control, with no sign that the current Moldovan political elite will change this situation. Romania’s example, where politicians who encouraged the development of an independent judiciary have ended up in jail themselves, convicted of corruption, understandably acts as an important deterrent for Moldovan politicians to risk doing the same. )ZIRXLILMKLTVS½PIEVVIWXMREYXYQRSJJSVQIV 4VMQI1MRMWXIV:PEH*MPEXSRGSVVYTXMSRGLEVKIWWTIEOW more about selective justice and political control over judicial institutions than about a move in the direction of a rule of law society. While the accusations against Filat might be true, his investigation seems to be singular and GSQTVSQMWIHF]GPIEVZMSPEXMSRWSJLMWTVSGIHYVEPVMKLXW-R this context, his arrest seems to be just the latest episode of his struggle with his political and business nemesis :PEH4PELSXRMYG[LSETTIEVWXSIJJIGXMZIP]GSRXVSPXLI 4VSWIGYXMSR3J½GIERHQER]SXLIVWXEXISVKERW 8LI8VERWRMWXVMERGSR¾MGXMWERSXLIVMQTSVXERXFEVVMIV EGVSWWXLIVSEHXS[EVHW1SPHSZE´W)9MRXIKVEXMSR-XMW LEVHXSFIPMIZIXLEXXLI)9[SYPHVITIEXXLI']TVMSX I\TIVMQIRXERHEGGITXERSXLIVJVS^IRGSR¾MGX[MXLMRMXW borders, especially as Russia has proved to be much more aggressive than Turkey. The political elite in Chisinau needs to pragmatically assess if Transnistria is worth such a high cost. Adding to this, Moldova needs to pay more attention towards the small autonomous region of Gagauzia, ensuring its better economic development and integration in order to discourage the creation of another secessionist entity backed by Russia. Georgia’s Adjara might serve as such a model of integration. 0EWXFYXRSXPIEWXXLI)9MXWIPJMWI\TIVMIRGMRKIRPEVKIQIRX fatigue. There is little popular support or chance of another PEVKIIRPEVKIQIRXER]XMQIWSSR8LI)9LEWWIXEWMXW ½VWXKSEPFVMRKMRKMRXLI[IWXIVR&EPOERWXEXIWFIJSVIER] decision on an eastwards expansion would be considered. Moldova has tried for years to obtain the status of potential candidate country, and, despite Bucharest’s strong support, has so far remained unsuccessful in doing so. There MWXLYWPMXXPIGLERGIXLEXXLIGSYRXV][MPPNSMRXLI)9MRXLI short term.

Prospects The main challenge now for Moldova’s government is to reform its justice system to ensure the rule of law in society. That means effectively tackling corruption and dismantling


Moldova 155

TSPMXMGEPGSRXVSPSZIVXLINYHMGMEV]9RJSVXYREXIP]EXXLMW point the politicians in Chisinau, even the self-titled proEuropean ones, seem to lack any commitment to do so, thus seriously undermining the country’s European path towards integration. As a result, the population seems to be losing patience with these politicians. Tens of thousands took to the streets in Chisinau to ask for action to combat corruption. They look at Romania, where anti-corruption VIJSVQWLEZIFIIRWYGGIWWJYPERHEWOJSVXLIWEQI-J strong enough, the pressure in the streets might force the government to start advancing these reforms or might give birth to a new political platform capable of advancing them. The people taking to the streets in Chisinau recently also WIIQXSLEZIFIIRPSWMRKTEXMIRGI[MXLXLIPIRKXL])9 integration process. More and more Moldovans are starting XSZMI[VIYRM½GEXMSR[MXL6SQERMEEWEWLSVXGYXXS[EVHW )9QIQFIVWLMT-JXLI)9JEMPWXSSJJIVETVEGXMGEPERH timely integration perspective, even more will rally to this idea. And yet some others, also in growing numbers, seem again lured by the idea of stronger ties with Russia. One way or another, more and more people see Moldova’s statehood project as a failed bet and are looking for alternatives. 8LI)YVSTIER9RMSRGERGSYRXIVFEPERGIXLMWXVIRH F]VIMKRMXMRKLSTI8LI)9WLSYPHYTKVEHI1SPHSZE´W status to at least that of potential candidate, and offer a clear schedule for membership, pending strong and clear GSRHMXMSRWJSGYWMRKSRXLIVYPISJPE[ERHXLI½KLXEKEMRWX corruption. Otherwise an unprepared Moldova might WXMPPXV]XSXEOIXLIWLSVXGYXMRXSXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR via Romania – or worse still, turn eastwards again to re-embrace Russia

Further Reading 8LI)\TIVX+VYT 'LMWMREYXLMROXERO ¯[[[I\TIVX grup.org/en/ – for economic analysis (especially ‘The Year of E0SSQMRK'VMWMW%VI[IEPP4VITEVIH#´F]%HVMER0YTYWSV )\TIVX+VYT*MVWX5YEVXIV?A 8LI4VSQS0)<VITSVXW¯[[[TVSQSPI\QH¯JSVVYPISJ law and the situation in Transnistria )9*SVIMKR4SPMG]ERH4SWX7SZMIX'SR¾MGXW7XIEPXL-RXIVZIRXMSR F]2MGY4STIWGY6SYXPIHKI

Regent’s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: Moldova Geography/demography

Drugs and other criminality issues

%VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMX]TIVWUOQ Life expectancy: 70.12 years Growth rate: -1.02%

Limited cultivation of opium poppy and cannabis, mostly for 'SQQSR[IEPXLSJ-RHITIRHIRX7XEXIW '-7 GSRWYQTXMSR trans-shipment point for illicit drugs from south-west Asia via central Asia to Russia and western Europe. Large black economy with widespread corruption.

Economy

8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

+(4FMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH Growth rate: 1.8% Military expenditure: 0.3% 4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI   % of economy in Agriculture: 15.7% -RHYWXV] 7IVZMGIW

Foreign trade Exports: FMPPMSR JSSHWXYJJWXI\XMPIWQEGLMRIV] Imports:FMPPMSR QMRIVEPTVSHYGXWJYIPQEGLMRIV] IUYMTQIRXGLIQMGEPWXI\XMPIW Main export partners: 6YWWME6SQERME8YVOI]-XEP] +IVQER]9OVEMRI Main import partners: 6YWWME6SQERME9OVEMRI+IVQER] -XEP]

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Transnational issues 1SPHSZEERH9OVEMRISTIVEXINSMRXGYWXSQWTSWXWXS monitor the transit of people and commodities through Moldovaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s breakaway Transnistria region, which remains under an Organization for Security and Cooperation MR)YVSTI 37') QERHEXIHTIEGIOIITMRKQMWWMSR GSQTVMWIHSJ1SPHSZER8VERWRMWXVMER6YWWMERERH9OVEMRMER troops.

Refugees ETTPMGERXWJVSQ9OVEMRIJSVJSVQWSJWXE]SXLIVXLER EW]PYQERHWXEXIPIWW

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


The European Union and Ukraine: Western Alignment Anthony Cary .WZUMZ+PMN LM+IJQVM\\W-`\MZVIT)‫ٺ‬IQZ[+WUUQ[[QWVMZ+PZQ[8I\\MV UK Ambassador to Sweden and High Commissioner to Canada

“As long as Russian forces continue to be QV^WT^MLQV\PMÅOP\QVOQVMI[\MZV=SZIQVM it is essential that the EU should hold the line on sanctions. Nor should it acquiesce in the ‘annexation’ of Crimea” Anthony Cary




9

kraineâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s appalling sufferings in the 20th century, including the mass starvation of the 1930s precipitated by Stalinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s policy of collectivisation, the elimination of the ³OYPEO´ JEVQS[RMRK GPEWW+IVQERSGGYTEXMSRERHXLIR the years of Soviet domination, have left a weakened and divided country which has suffered from deep endemic corruption over many years. This helps to explain why the opportunities of the 2004 Orange Revolution were so WTIGXEGYPEVP]WUYERHIVIH 9OVEMRIMWEPWSVMZIRF]MRXIVREPXIRWMSRW[LMGLEVIEPPXSS easily depicted, in what the Russians call the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;information struggleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, as a simple division between a predominantly 9OVEMRMERWTIEOMRK[IWXWIIOMRKGPSWIVMRXIKVEXMSR[MXL XLI)YVSTIER9RMSR )9 ERH2SVXL%XPERXMG8VIEX] 3VKERM^EXMSR 2%83 ERHEPEVKIP]6YWWMERWTIEOMRKIEWX with close cultural, economic and ethnic ties to Moscow. The true situation is more complex. 1SWX9OVEMRMERWWTIEOFSXLPERKYEKIWERHVIGIRXLMWXSV] HSIWRSXWYKKIWXXLEXXLIGSR¾MGXMR9OVEMRIMWEGXYEPP] EGMZMP[EVMREPPFYXREQI%WVIGIRXP]EW.ERYEV]E poll found that under 20% of the population believed that GPSWIV)9MRXIKVEXMSR[SYPH³HMZMHI9OVEMRMERWSGMIX]´RSV was this attitude restricted to the western parts of the GSYRXV]-RTEVXWYTTSVXJSVXLI)9MRGPYHMRKXLIEQFMXMSR JSVJYPPQIQFIVWLMTVI¾IGXWEGSQTEVMWSR[MXL4SPERH ;LIRXLI7SZMIX9RMSRGSPPETWIH4SPERHERH9OVEMRI were roughly on a par â&#x20AC;&#x201C; with gross domestic products

+(4W SJEFSYXTIVGETMXETIVERRYQ8LITIV GETMXE½KYVIMR4SPERHRS[WXERHWEXEFSYX ERH KVS[MRKJEWX [LMPIXLIIUYMZEPIRX9OVEMRMER½KYVIMW EVSYRHEHNYWXIHJSVTYVGLEWMRKTS[IVTEVMX] &YXXLIEXXVEGXMSRSJXLI)9MWRSXNYWXIGSRSQMG8LI hope of the majority is that closer European integration will help to develop democracy, the rule of law and good governance. -XMWXVYILS[IZIVXLEXEQMRSVMX]QEMRP]MRXLIIEWXJIIP threatened by increasing Western alignment. Their fears have been exacerbated by relentless Russian propaganda EFSYXXLIXLVIEXXLEXXLI]JEGIJVSQ³JEWGMWXW´MR/]MZMR PIEKYI[MXLERMQTIVMEPMWXI\TERWMSRMWX)9 8LIWXEXYWSJ'VMQIE¯[LMGLLEHFIIRKMZIRXS9OVEMRI F]/LVYWLGLIZMR¯LEWFIIRERSXLIVWSYVGISJ GSRXIRXMSR-RXLI6YWWMERPIEWILSPHSRMXW&PEGO7IE naval base at Sevastopol was renegotiated until 2042 with ERSTXMSRJSVEREHHMXMSREP½ZI]IEVWYRXMP&YXXLMW

9OVEMRI 159

was not enough for those (including the Russian leadership MXWIPJ [LS[IVIGSRGIVRIHXLEXXLIHVMJXXS[EVHWXLI )9ERH2%83[SYPHIZIRXYEPP]XLVIEXIRXLIFEWI8LI] had some cause for that concern: in 2009 the Yushchenko government had unwisely declared that the lease would RSXFII\XIRHIHERHXLEXXLI¾IIX[SYPHLEZIXSPIEZI Sevastopol by 2017.

EU and NATO Ambivalence 8LI)9JSVMXWTEVXLEWFIIRYRGIVXEMREFSYXMXWPSRK XIVQVIPEXMSRWLMT[MXL9OVEMRI%XSRIPIZIPMXMWOIIRXS encourage the political and economic development of its RIMKLFSYVW-RXLMW[E]MXLSTIWXSI\XIRHXLIMRXIVREXMSREP rules-based system while also helping to consolidate a zone of stability around itself. At the same time, however, XLI)9MW[VIWXPMRK[MXLJSVQMHEFPIMRXIVREPTVSFPIQW 8LIHMJ½GYPXMIWSJQEREKMRKEL]FVMHJIHIVEPREXMSREPTSPMX] EVIRS[JYVXLIVGSQTPMGEXIHF]XLI)9´WWLIIVWM^IERH heterogeneity. And there are many in the West who are persuaded by Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s contention that it should be allowed a droit de regardSZIV9OVEMRI[LMGL[EWLMWXSVMGEPP]TEVXSJ its heartland. )9EQFMZEPIRGIJSYRHI\TVIWWMSRMRXLI)EWXIVR 4EVXRIVWLMT[LMGLEPWSGSZIVW%VQIRME%^IVFEMNER&IPEVYW +ISVKMEERH1SPHSZE8LI4EVXRIVWLMT[EWPEYRGLIHMR EWEHMQIRWMSRSJXLI[MHIV)92IMKLFSYVLSSH 4SPMG]8LI)9SJJIVIH9OVEMRIER%WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRX that would give easier access to the single market, enable XLI)9ERH9OVEMRIXS[SVOXSKIXLIVSRMWWYIWSJ common concern such as energy, and help to align foreign ERHWIGYVMX]TSPMGMIW&YXXLI)9½RIWWIHXLIUYIWXMSR SJIZIRXYEP9OVEMRMERQIQFIVWLMTWE]MRKSRP]XLEXXLI %WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRXHSIW³RSXGSRWXMXYXIXLI½REPKSEP SJ)99OVEMRIGSSTIVEXMSR´ 8LI6MKE)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMT7YQQMXSJ1E]LEWMJ ER]XLMRKJYVXLIVHEQTIRIH9OVEMRI´WEQFMXMSRW7TIEOMRK to the Bundestag just ahead of the summit, Chancellor 1IVOIPWEMHXLEXXLI)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMT[EW³RSXTEVXSJ XLI)9´WIRPEVKIQIRXTSPMG]´ERHXLEXMX[SYPHFI³[VSRKXS foster false hopesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. 8LIVILEWFIIREWMQMPEVEQFMZEPIRGIMR9OVEMRI´WVIPEXMSRW [MXL2%839OVEMRI[EWXLI½VWXSJXLI'SQQSR[IEPXLSJ -RHITIRHIRX7XEXIW '-7 KVSYTSJJSVQIV7SZMIX6ITYFPMGW XSIRXIV2%83´W4EVXRIVWLMTJSV4IEGIMR%JXIVQER] HIGPEVEXMSRWSJMRXIRXXSNSMR2%834VIWMHIRX=YWLGLIROS ETTPMIHJSVXLI1IQFIVWLMT%GXMSR4PERMR.ERYEV] 8LMWGEYWIHEJYVSVI[MXLMR9OVEMRI[MXLXLISTTSWMXMSR

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


160 Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

boycotting parliament for a time. Russia asserted that 9OVEMRMERQIQFIVWLMTSJ2%83[SYPHFVIEOEWYTTSWIH promise at the end of the Cold War not to extend the alliance to countries on Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s borders. Within NATO, 4VIWMHIRX&YWLFEGOIHXLI9OVEMRMERETTPMGEXMSR[LMPI others were more cautious. The NATO summit of April 2008 decided not to offer QIQFIVWLMT[LMPII\TVIWWMRKXLILSTIXLEX9OVEMRI [SYPHIZIRXYEPP]FIEHQMXXIH4VIWMHIRX=ERYOSZ]GLXSSO 9OVEMRI´WETTPMGEXMSRSJJXLIXEFPI[LIRLI[EWIPIGXIH MRHIGPEVMRK9OVEMRIRSREPMKRIH1SVIVIGIRXP] LS[IZIV4VIWMHIRX4SVSWLIROSLEWEFERHSRIHRSR alignment and expressed his determination to hold a national referendum on NATO membership.

Recent Developments &IX[IIRERH4VIWMHIRX=ERYOSZ]GLXVMIH to steer a middle course, negotiating an Association %KVIIQIRX[MXLXLI)9[LMGLGEQI[MXL½RERGMEPLIPT while keeping Moscow on-side. Russia seemed complaisant: XLIUYIWXMSRSJXLI%WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRXXLEX[EWFIMRK RIKSXMEXIHFIX[IIRXLI)9ERH9OVEMRI[EWMRGPYHIHEW EREKIRHEMXIQEXWYGGIWWMZI)96YWWMEWYQQMXW[MXLSYX Russian expressions of concern. -R2SZIQFIVLS[IZIVEGVMWMW[EWTVIGMTMXEXIH[LIR the negotiations appeared to have reached a successful conclusion. Yanukovych was summoned to Moscow where â&#x20AC;&#x201C; under intense pressure â&#x20AC;&#x201C; he suddenly rejected the Association Agreement on the grounds that it would HEQEKI9OVEMRI´WXVEHI[MXL6YWWME -RJEGXQIQFIVWLMTSJ EJVIIXVEHIEVIE[MXLXLI)9[SYPHWXMPPPIEZI9OVEMRIJVII to set the terms of its trade with Russia, though it is true XLEXMXGSYPHRSXXLIRNSMRXLI)YVEWMER)GSRSQMG9RMSR ?))9A[LMGLMW[LEX6YWWME[ERXW  This volte face precipitated the so-called â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Euromaidanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; revolution against Yanukovych, with huge demonstrations MR/]MZ8IRWMSRWVIEGLIHETIEOIEVP]MREW HIQSRWXVEXSVW[IVI½VIHYTSRF]WRMTIVW[MHIP]FIPMIZIH XSLEZIFIIR6YWWMER8LI)9XVMIHXSQIHMEXI9RHIV MRXIRWI)9TVIWWYVI/PMXWGLOS[EWEQSRKXLI9OVEMRMER opposition leaders who bought into a deal whereby =ERYOSZ]GL[SYPHVIQEMR4VIWMHIRXSJEREXMSREPYRMX] government until early elections could be held. But /PMXWGLOS[EWLS[PIHHS[R[LIRLIXVMIHXSWIPPXLEXMHIE to the crowd in February 2014. Within hours, Yanukovych LEHžIH

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015

Six days later, unmarked military forces (now acknowledged to have been Russian, though Moscow HIRMIHXLMWEXXLIXMQI WYVVSYRHIHEMVTSVXWMRXLI 'VMQIER4IRMRWYPEMRGSPPYWMSR[MXLMXWWITEVEXMWX administration. Following a hurried referendum, Crimea was accepted into the Russian Federation. The vote purported to show 97% support for this step (though EWVIGIRXP]EWTSPPWF]XLI4I[6IWIEVGL'IRXVI had indicated only about 42% support for Russian membership among Crimeaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population, which was 58% 6YWWMEREXXLEXXMQI  The same tactic of support for separatist movements from unacknowledged Russian military personnel and supplies of IUYMTQIRXLEWFIIRYWIHQSVI[MHIP]MRIEWXIVR9OVEMRI ERHIWTIGMEPP]EVSYRH0YLERWOERH(SRIXWO'SRžMGXXLIVI GSRXMRYIHXLVSYKLSYXERHMRXS3ZIVPMZIW have been lost in the violence since March 2014, including the shooting down of a Malaysian Airlines passenger plane [MXLXLIPSWWSJEPPTEWWIRKIVW These events have triggered a crisis in relations between Russia and the West. By annexing Crimea and involving MXWIPJQMPMXEVMP]MRIEWXIVR9OVEMRI6YWWMEVSHIVSYKLWLSH over the principles of the post-Cold War settlement of )YVSTIWIXSYXMRXLI4EVMW'LEVXIVSJ-XLEWEPWS FVSOIRXLIYRHIVXEOMRKXLEXMXQEHIXSKIXLIV[MXLXLI9/ ERH97MRXLI&YHETIWX1IQSVERHYQXLEXMX[SYPH KYEVERXIIXLIFSVHIVWSJ9OVEMRIMRI\GLERKIJSV9OVEMRI´W HIGMWMSRXSVIPMRUYMWLMXWRYGPIEVWXSGOTMPI 8LIGSRWIUYIRGILEWFIIRERYRYWYEPHIKVIISJ;IWXIVR consensus to impose and maintain sanctions on Russian individuals and companies, including capital market restrictions and an export ban on military and dual-use goods. The sanctions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; which coincided with a collapse of the international oil price â&#x20AC;&#x201C; have seriously damaged the Russian economy. But Russian retaliatory measures have LYVXXLI)9XSS 1IER[LMPI9OVEMRIIPIGXIHXLITVS;IWXIVR4VIWMHIRX 4SVSWLIROSMRXLIWTVMRKSJ8LI%WWSGMEXMSR Agreement (including a Deep and Comprehensive Free 8VEHI%KVIIQIRX?('*8%A LEWFIIRGSRGPYHIHXLSYKL its full application has been postponed in an effort to allow time for tempers to cool. The German Chancellor ERHXLI*VIRGL4VIWMHIRXLIPTIHXSFVSOIVXLIX[S 1MRWO4VSXSGSPWSJ7ITXIQFIVERH*IFVYEV] XSXV]XSFVMRKERIRHXSXLI½KLXMRKMRIEWXIVR9OVEMRI %WLEO]GIEWI½VIXSSOLSPHEJXIVXLIWIGSRHSJXLIWI




but only after the separatists had taken further territory – and, in any case, the truce has been systematically breached. -RTVEGXMGIXLIVILEWFIIRPMXXPIEXXIRYEXMSRMRXLI½KLXMRK YRXMPZIV]VIGIRXP]8LMWMRXYVRLEWQEHIMXHMJ½GYPXJSV 4VIWMHIRX4SVSWLIROSXSTVSGIIH[MXLLMWHIGPEVIH MRXIRXMSRSJKMZMRKKVIEXIVEYXSRSQ]XSIEWXIVR9OVEMRI 8LEXXEWOMWMRER]GEWIGSQTPMGEXIHF] WSQIXMQIWZMSPIRX  STTSWMXMSRXSMXMR/]MZXLIJVE]MRKSJ4SVSWLIROS´WGSEPMXMSR and a growing perception that his assault on high-level cronyism is less than determined.

What Next? As long as Russian forces continue to be involved in the ½KLXMRKMRIEWXIVR9OVEMRIMXMWIWWIRXMEPXLEXXLI)9WLSYPH LSPHXLIPMRISRWERGXMSRW2SVWLSYPHMXEGUYMIWGIMRXLI ‘annexation’ of Crimea – the word used in the conclusions SJXLI6MKE7YQQMXSJ1E]-RXLITEWX6YWWMELEW WYGGIIHIHEPPXSS[IPPMRHMZMHMRK)9TEVXRIVWYWMRKIRIVK] threats and promises in particular. This time incontrovertible evidence of Russian orchestration of – and direct MRZSPZIQIRXMR¯GSRXMRYMRKGSR¾MGXMRIEWXIVR9OVEMRILEW QEHIMXVIPEXMZIP]IEW]JSVXLI)9XSQEMRXEMREGSQQSR PMRIERHXLIWERGXMSRW[IVIWYGGIWWJYPP]VIRI[IHMR.YRI &YXXLIVIMWEHERKIVXLEXXLIVIGIRXPYPPMR½KLXMRK may be no more than a tactical manoeuvre designed to induce a softening of sanctions (especially if there is progress in the parallel effort to develop co-operation with 6YWWMESZIV7]VME  8LI)9WLSYPHEPWSGSRXMRYIXSWYTTSVX9OVEMRIMRMXW determination to defend its integrity, just as NATO should maintain the credibility of its willingness to become more actively engaged – whether directly or indirectly – should this become necessary. Russia cannot be allowed to establish a right to ‘defend’ Russian-speakers wherever it unilaterally determines that they are threatened. That was XLII\GYWIKMZIRF]-XEP]XSMRZEHI0MF]EMRERHF] ,MXPIVJSVLMWEXXEGOWSR'^IGLSWPSZEOMEERH4SPERH The Baltic states are not unnaturally jumpy. Russia has used LMKLP]FIPPMKIVIRXPERKYEKI[MXLJVIUYIRXVIJIVIRGIWXSMXW nuclear capabilities. At a meeting in March 2015 between WIRMSVJSVQIVHIJIRGIERHWIGYVMX]SJ½GMEPWXLI6YWWMER representatives made clear that there was no prospect SJ'VMQIEVIXYVRMRKXS9OVEMRIXLEX6YWWME[ERXIHXS WIIIEWXIVR9OVEMRIFIGSQIEWIPJKSZIVRMRKIRXMX] PEVKIP]WITEVEXIJVSQXLIVIWXSJXLIGSYRXV]ERHXLEX Russia did not rule out any options, including the use of

9OVEMRI 161

force, to protect its interests in the Baltic states. We must not be intimidated by such language, or allow Russia to resurrect the notion that language and ethnicity, rather than citizenship and internationally recognised borders, should be the basis of statehood in Europe in the 21st century. 1IER[LMPIXLI)9QYWXGSRXMRYI¯ERHMJTSWWMFPI redouble – its efforts to support the development of a HIQSGVEXMGERHTVSWTIVSYW9OVEMRI-RQMHXLI European Commission established a Support Group JSV9OVEMRI[LMGLGSRGIRXVEXIWERHGSSVHMREXIWXLI )9´WVIWSYVGIWXSLIPT[MXLXLIMQTPIQIRXEXMSRSJXLI Association Agreement through deep and systematic VIJSVQ-XMWTVSZMHMRKQEGVS½RERGMEPEWWMWXERGIXS GSQTPIQIRX-RXIVREXMSREP1SRIXEV]*YRH -1*  TVSKVEQQIWXLEXEVILIPTMRK9OVEMRIXSQIIXMXWLYKI balance of payments problems. This assistance is conditional YTSRTVSKVIWWMREVIEWWTIGM½IHMRZEVMSYWQIQSVERHE SJYRHIVWXERHMRK¯RSXEFP]MRTYFPMG½RERGIQEREKIQIRX ERXMGSVVYTXMSRXVEHIXE\EXMSRERHIRIVK]ERH½RERGMEP sector reforms. -RXLI'SQQMWWMSREPWSETTVSZIHºQMR7TIGMEP 1IEWYVI KVERXW JSVMRJVEWXVYGXYVIERHWXEXIFYMPHMRK TVSKVEQQIWMRGPYHMRKTYFPMG½RERGIQEREKIQIRX public administration, budget transparency, judicial and constitutional reform and electoral legislation. This is accompanied by a €10 million Civil Society Support 4VSKVEQQIERHEJYVXLIVºQTVSKVEQQIHIHMGEXIH to local and regional government reform. There is also an %HZMWSV]1MWWMSR GMZMPYREVQIH XSLIPT[MXLWIGYVMX] services reform, as well as humanitarian assistance to 9OVEMRI8LI)9ERHMXWQIQFIVWXEXIWLEZIFIIRXLI biggest contributors to the Organization for Security and 'SSTIVEXMSRMR)YVSTI 37') 7TIGMEP1SRMXSVMRK1MWWMSR MR9OVEMRI[LMGLLEWXVMIHXSSZIVWIIXLIMQTPIQIRXEXMSR SJXLI1MRWO4VSXSGSPW All this is well meant, but sounds more impressive than it EGXYEPP]MW8LIJEGXMWXLEX9OVEMRIMWJEMPMRKIGSRSQMGEPP] ERHMWRIEVGVMWMWTSMRX-RPEXI%YKYWXMXWIGYVIHWSQIHIFX [VMXISJJERHVI½RERGMRKFYXXLMWLEWKEMRIHMXFVIEXLMRK space rather than representing a solution, and there is still a serious threat of default. Still more serious are the GSRXMRYMRKLMKLPIZIPWSJGSVVYTXMSRMR9OVEMRIERHXLI I\MWXIRGISJ[LEXLEWFIIRGEPPIHE³UYEWMGVMQMREPWLEHS[ WXEXI´[LMGLQEOIMXLEVHJSVXLI)9XSYRHIV[VMXIVIJSVQW [MXLSYXKMZMRK9OVEMRIJYVXLIVSTTSVXYRMX]XSHIJIVXLIQ We should do all we can to keep up the pressure for reform, viewing this as a strategic political commitment

Regent’s Report 2015


162 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

rather than just a technical problem to be left to the European Commission. %TEVXMGYPEVJSGYWSJ)9LIPTWLSYPHFIXSWYTTSVXXLI TVSXIGXMSRSJQMRSVMXMIWMR9OVEMRIERHSJXLI6YWWMER WTIEOMRKTSTYPEXMSRMRTEVXMGYPEV-XMWYRJSVXYREXIXLEXXLI IJJSVXXSHIZIPSTKVIEXIVEYXSRSQ]MRIEWXIVR9OVEMRI within a federal system is proving so controversial, as that MWWYVIP]XLIVSYXIXSPSRKXIVQWXEFMPMX]9OVEMRILS[IZIV WLSYPHRSXFIJSVGIHXSEGGITXXLI6YWWMERHI½RMXMSR of ‘greater autonomy’ in the east, which would include independent external trade and foreign policies. That would be tantamount to the break-up of the country. %WJSVIZIRXYEP)9QIQFIVWLMT[IWLSYPHVIWXYTSRXLI 8VIEX]SR)YVSTIER9RMSR 8)9 [LMGLTVSZMHIWXLEXER] )YVSTIERWXEXIXLEXVIWTIGXW)9ZEPYIWERHMWGSQQMXXIH to promoting them may apply to become a member. This is not something for the short term, but nor is it an option XLEXWLSYPHFIGPSWIHSJJJSV9OVEMRI-RXMQI[IQYWX LSTIXLEX6YWWME[MPPHIZIPSTWYJ½GMIRXP]RSXXSQIEWYVIMXW greatness in terms of its ability to dominate its neighbours. 8LIVIMWRSVIEWSR[L]9OVEMRMEREWWSGMEXMSR[MXLSVIZIR QIQFIVWLMTSJXLI)9WLSYPHMRXIVJIVI[MXLMXWXVEHI[MXL 6YWWME [LMGLMWPMOIP]XSVIQEMRF]JEVMXWFMKKIWXQEVOIX  unless the Russians choose to punish it for refusing their political tutelage. A crucial priority must be to communicate more effectively, and especially in Russian-speaking areas which are bombarded with Russian propaganda, as a result of which EKSSHRYQFIVSJ9OVEMRMERW ERH6YWWMERWMR9OVEMRI  KIRYMRIP]JIIPXLVIEXIRIH8LI)9LEWRSXHSRIRIEVP] enough to disseminate an accurate picture of what is going on, or to explain its own involvement and intentions. This last priority, to open up channels of public information, is one area in which Britain has particular strengths, and GSYPHTPE]EQSVIEGXMZIERHMQEKMREXMZIVSPI-RKIRIVEP XLSYKLXLI9/KSZIVRQIRXMWVMKLXXSFVYWLSJJXEYRXWXLEX MXWPEGOSJTVS½PISR9OVEMRIMWVITVILIRWMFPIIZMHIRGISJ MXWHIGPMRI-XWLSYPHFIWIIRVEXLIVEWEQEVOSJQEXYVMX] acceptance that on many foreign policy issues, and most European ones, Britain’s contribution is most constructively ERHIJJIGXMZIP]I\TVIWWIHEWTEVXSJXLI)9´WGSQQSR endeavour. We play our part in the Council in determining )9TSPMG]XS[EVHW9OVEMRI-XMWWIRWMFPIMRXLMWGEWIXLEX +IVQER]4SPERHERH*VERGI[LMGLEVIQSVIHMVIGXP] affected, should lead in the execution of that policy

Regent’s Report 2015

Further Reading Ukraine Crisis: What it Means for the West by Andrew ;MPWSR=EPI9RMZIVWMX]4VIWW Ukraine Diaries: Dispatches from KievF]%RHVI]/YVOSZ Harvill Secker, 2014 ‘A War of Narrative and Arms’F].EQIW7LIVV'LEXLEQ ,SYWIVITSVXSJ.YRISR8LI6YWWMER'LEPPIRKI chapter 4 Frontline UkraineF]6MGLEVH7EO[E-&8EYVMW¯ contains a wealth of useful detail and interesting analysis challenging what the author sees as complacent (and HERKIVSYW )YVS%XPERXMGKVSYTXLMRO 1ER][IFWMXIWMRGPYHMRKXLSWISJXLI9OVEMRI'VMWMW 1IHME'IRXVI.EQIWXS[R´W)YVEWME(EMP]1SRMXSVERHXLI Centre for European Reform, regularly publish interesting comment.


Facts and Figures: Ukraine Geography/demography %VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMX]TIVWUOQ 0MJII\TIGXERG]]IEVW +VS[XLVEXI 

9OVEMRI1SPHSZEFSVHIVSJ½GMEPP]HIPMQMXIHMR but not yet demarcated, due to breakaway region of 8VERWRMWXVME1SPHSZEERH9OVEMRISTIVEXINSMRXGYWXSQW posts to monitor transit of people and commodities through Transnistria, where the OSCE maintains a peacekeeping mission comprising Moldovan, Transnistrian, 6YWWMERERH9OVEMRMERXVSSTW

Economy +(4FMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH +VS[XLVEXI 1MPMXEV]I\TIRHMXYVI SJ+(4 4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI   % of economy in %KVMGYPXYVI -RHYWXV] 7IVZMGIW

Foreign trade Exports: FMPPMSR JIVVSYWERHRSRJIVVSYWQIXEPW fuel and petroleum products, chemicals, machinery and XVERWTSVXIUYMTQIRXJSSHWXYJJW Imports: FMPPMSR IRIVK]QEGLMRIV]ERHIUYMTQIRX GLIQMGEPW  Main export partners: Russia, Turkey, Egypt, China Main import partners: 6YWWME'LMRE+IVQER]4SPERH Belarus

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Refugees 1,381,953 internally displaced by Russian-sponsored WITEVEXMWXZMSPIRGIMR'VMQIEERHIEWXIVR9OVEMRI %GGSVHMRKXSXLI92,MKL'SQQMWWMSRIVJSV6IJYKIIW

92,'6 WSQI9OVEMRMERWLEZIWSYKLXEW]PYQ or other forms of legal stay in neighbouring countries due XSXLIGSR¾MGX%PWSEVIWXEXIPIWW

Drugs and other criminal issues Synthetic drug production for export to the West. The country is used as a trans-shipment point for opiates and other illicit drugs from Africa, Latin America, and Turkey XS)YVSTIERH6YWWME9OVEMRILEWMQTVSZIHERXMQSRI] laundering controls, resulting in its removal from the *MRERGMEP%GXMSR8EWO*SVGI´W *%8*´W 2SRGSSTIVEXMZI Countries and Territories List in February 2004, but 9OVEMRI´WERXMQSRI]PEYRHIVMRKVIKMQIGSRXMRYIWXSFI monitored by FATF. 9OVEMRIMWEWSYVGIXVERWMXERHHIWXMREXMSRGSYRXV]JSVQIR women and children subjected to forced labour and sex XVEJ½GOMRK9OVEMRMERVIGVYMXIVWQSWXSJXIRXEVKIX9OVEMRMERW from rural areas with limited job prospects, using fraud, coercion, and debt bondage. 8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

Transnational issues FSYRHEV]HIPMQMXEXMSR[MXL&IPEVYWRSX]IX HIQEVGEXIHHYIXSYRVIWSPZIH½RERGMEPGPEMQW Demarcation of land boundary with Russia began in 2012, interrupted by Russian incursions supporting separatists MRIEWXIVR9OVEMRI0MOI[MWIHMWTYXIHFSVHIVXLVSYKLXLI /IVGL7XVEMXERH7IESJ%^SZSZIVXEOIRF]XLI6YWWMER ERRI\EXMSRSJ'VMQIE8LI9OVEMRMERKSZIVRQIRXEWWIVXW XLEX'VMQIEVIQEMRWTEVXSJ9OVEMRI

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


Belarus – EU Relations Against the Background of the Ukrainian Crisis Juliya Slutskaya Belarus Press Club, Warsaw

“There is a noticeable shift towards ratcheting down tension in relations JM\_MMV5QV[S*Z][[MT[IVLIT[W Washington” 2]TQaI;T]\[SIaI


Belarus 165

ince Belarus gained independence in 1991, relations FIX[IIRMXERHXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR )9 LEZIFIIR IVVEXMGERHPEGOIHPSRKXIVQTPERWERHWXVEXIKMIW-RXLI early 1990s, when Stanislav Shushkevich headed the Belarusian state, there was a short honeymoon period in relations. However, at the beginning of the Lukashenka era – from 1994 to the present day – the values of the post-Soviet authoritarian ruler grated with the democratic ZEPYIWSJXLI)9

S

Over time, Lukashenka learned to manoeuvre between 6YWWMEERHXLI)YVSTIER9RMSRSFXEMRMRKQSRI]½VWX from one and then from the other. The vicious cycle of deteriorating relations began when political dialogue with XLI)9[EWVITPEGIH[MXL)YVSTIERWERGXMSRWEWEVIEGXMSR to violations of international electoral standards, human rights and freedom of the media. Today we are witnessing another ‘thaw’, which takes place in a new geopolitical environment.

New Geopolitical Environment 8LI9OVEMRMERGVMWMWLEWRSXSRP]LEHEWMKRM½GERXMQTEGX on regional security, but Belarus has used it well. Belarus’s TIEGIQEOMRKIJJSVXWLEZIMR¾YIRGIHMXWMRXIVREXMSREP VITYXEXMSRJSVXLIFIXXIV*SVXLI½VWXXMQI&IPEVYWERH XLI)9LEZIJSYRHEQYXYEPP]EGGITXEFPIQYPXMJEGIXIH negotiating agenda, which substantially increases and deepens opportunities for communication. The new geopolitical situation in the region has prompted both sides to seek new ways to normalise relations and to make compromises. Amid escalating recession in Belarus and a notably weaker economy in Russia, which has always been the main sponsor for Minsk, Belarus’s enthusiasm for economic assistance from the West has increased. However, the emphasis on stability and security in the region has meant discussion of the issue of democratisation – which earlier had dominated relations FIX[IIRXLI)9ERH&IPEVYW¯LEWFIGSQIPIWWWEPMIRX8LI rhetoric used by both sides when discussing the situation in Belarus has become considerably more constructive XLERFIJSVIXLIGVMWMWMR9OVEMRI*SVIMKR1MRMWXIV9PEH^MQMV 1EOIMWTIEOMRKEXXLI)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMT7YQQMXMR Vilnius, said that relations between Belarus and the )9MRLEHFIGSQI³HMWXMRGXMZIGSRWXVYGXMZIERH slightly more predictable’. The parties have even begun negotiations on visa liberalisation and opened consultations on modernisation.

Overall, in 2014 there were four rounds of consultations SRQSHIVRMWEXMSRMWWYIW%XXLI½VWXQIIXMRKXLI development problems of small and medium-size business, macroeconomic policy, economic governance, privatisation, ERHXLIVIWXVYGXYVMRKSJXLI½RERGMEPW]WXIQSJ&IPEVYW were discussed. The second round was dedicated to issues of trade and investment. The third round was devoted to water resources management, waste recycling, bio-diversity, improving radiological control, developing energy and transport systems and using alternative energy sources, EW[IPPEWXLIGSYRXV]´WEGGIWWMSRXSXLI)9XLIQEXMG programmes. On the agenda of the fourth round of consultations were education, regional development and WSGMEPTSPMG]MR&IPEVYWERHXLIXSSPWSJ)9EWWMWXERGIMR these areas were also discussed. Since the main objective of consultations on modernisation is to determine future forms of cooperation between Minsk and Brussels, it is too early to talk about any GPIEVVIWYPXWEW]IX-XWLSYPHEPWSFIRSXIHXLEXXLIWI GSRWYPXEXMSRWEVIEGXYEPP]QIEWYVIWXSIRLERGIGSR½HIRGI in the course of which the sides avoid touching upon painful political problems, and discuss essentially practical issues that can be solved without any corresponding TSPMXMGEPGSRGIWWMSRW-RXLMW[E]1MRWOERH&VYWWIPW are trying to develop a positive relationship while not embarrassing each other. %WVIKEVHWZMWEPMFIVEPMWEXMSRXEPOWWXEVXIHMR.ERYEV] ERHEVISRKSMRK-R2SZIQFIV&VYWWIPWLSWXIHXLIWIGSRH round of formal talks on visa issues and readmission. The meetings were held behind closed doors and it is hard to say what progress was achieved. Belarusian representative, %PIRE/YTGL]REGSQQIRXIH ³-XMWUYMXIHMJ½GYPXXSGEVV]XLIRIKSXMEXMSRTVSGIWW forward. We believe, and this is our compelling stand, that the agreement on visa liberalisation should FIFEWIHSRXLITVMRGMTPIWSJIUYEPMX]ERHRSR HMWGVMQMREXMSRWMQMPEVXSXLI)9EKVIIQIRXW[MXL other countries.’ 1ER]LSTIW[IVIPMROIH[MXLXLI)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMT 7YQQMXMR6MKEMR1E]FYXYRPMOI9OVEMRI+ISVKMEERH Moldova, Belarus did not sign a visa facilitation agreement.

Bilateral Contacts in the Eastern Partnership Framework During 2014, there was a considerable increase in diplomatic and political contacts. While in 2011–12 the

Regent’s Report 2015


166 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

consultations between the Foreign Ministries of Belarus and XLI)9XSSOTPEGIQEMRP]EXXLIPIZIPSJSJ½GMEPWMR Belarus was more often represented by deputy ministers. -RPEXI*IFVYEV]1MRMWXIVSJ*SVIMKR%JJEMVW9PEH^MQMV 1EOIMTEMHEZMWMXXS0EXZMEQIIXMRKXLI0EXZMER4VIWMHIRX Foreign Minister and Minister of Transport. Makei also visited Lithuania and met with Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius. Ministers once again stated that further UYEPMXEXMZIGLERKIWMRVIPEXMSRWFIX[IIR&IPEVYWERHXLI)9 [IVISRP]TSWWMFPIMJFSXLWMHIWQIXQYXYEPVIUYMVIQIRXW the Belarusian authorities freed political prisoners and the )9PMJXIHWERGXMSRWEKEMRWXWSQIXEVKIXIH&IPEVYWMERGMXM^IRW and enterprises. (IWTMXIQMWYRHIVWXERHMRKWMR.YP]XLI*SVIMKR1MRMWXIV HMHXEOITEVXMRXLIQIIXMRKSJXLI)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMT countries in Brussels. Ministers discussed prospects for developing relations in the light of the situation in the region, as well as the signing by Georgia, Moldova and 9OVEMRISJ%WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRXW[MXLXLI)9 A landmark event was a visit by Linas Linkevicius, to Minsk MRPEXI.YP]8LMW[EWXLIWIGSRHSJ½GMEPZMWMXSJE JSVIMKRQMRMWXIVJVSQER)9QIQFIVGSYRXV] XLI½VWX was Latvian minister Edgar Rinkevics in Viciebsk in April  WMRGIXLIMRXIRWM½GEXMSRSJ&IPEVYW´WVIPEXMSRW[MXL XLI)9EJXIVXLIIPIGXMSRW(YVMRKXLIXEPOWEVERKI SJFMPEXIVEPMWWYIW[IVIHMWGYWWIHMRGPYHMRK&IPEVYW)9 relations and prospects for the development of the Eastern 4EVXRIVWLMT8LEXWEMHSRISJXLIOI]MWWYIWSRXLIEKIRHE [EWXLIWMXYEXMSRMR9OVEMRI -RIEVP](IGIQFIV9PEH^MQMV1EOIMVIGIMZIHE delegation of the political directors of foreign ministries of XLIQIQFIVGSYRXVMIWSJXLI:MWIKVEH+VSYT¯XLI½VWX time such a group had come to Minsk. The next day, the LIEHWSJHMTPSQEXMGQMWWMSRWSJXLI)9QIQFIVGSYRXVMIW were invited to the Foreign Ministry to be informed by %PIRE/YTGL]REEFSYXTVSFPIQWMRVIPEXMSRWFIX[IIR Belarus and Russia and about the development of the Eurasian integration process. 8LMW[EWTIVLETWXLI½VWXXMQIWMRGIXLEX1MRWO LEHWSSTIRP]WTSOIR[MXLXLI)9MRQEXXIVWVIPEXMRKXS Belarusian-Russian relations – amid restrictions on the supply of Belarusian meat and dairy products to Russia. The situation was somewhat reminiscent of 2008–10 when Minsk also tried to use its ambiguous relationship [MXL6YWWMEEWEPIZIVXSRSVQEPMWIVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)9

Regent’s Report 2015

underlining the threat to the country’s sovereignty and its own stand then on Georgia. Representatives of the Belarusian leadership have repeatedly expressed their interest in the Eastern 4EVXRIVWLMTMRKIRIVEPERHMRIWXEFPMWLMRKJYPPWGEPIVIPEXMSRW [MXLXLI)9,S[IZIVXLI]LEZIEP[E]WYRHIVPMRIHOI] principles, which they consider essential: ˆ8LIRIIHXSVIXLMROXLI)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMT development prospects with regard to the 9OVEMRMERGVMWMWERHTVSFPIQWMRGSRRIGXMSR[MXL XLIWMKRMRKF]+ISVKME1SPHSZEERH9OVEMRISJ %WWSGMEXMSR%KVIIQIRXW[MXLXLI)9 ˆThe importance of an individual approach to all member countries with regard to their national interests, priorities and needs ˆ9RGSRHMXMSREPSFWIVZERGISJXLITVMRGMTPISJ IUYEPMX]SJEPPQIQFIVGSYRXVMIWVIKEVHPIWWSJXLIMV integration aspirations ˆThe need to ensure the practical effect of the )EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMTMRGPYHMRKXLIWXVIRKXLIRMRKSJ FYWMRIWWQIEWYVIQIRXERHMRXIRWM½GEXMSRSJTVSNIGX cooperation in transport, trade, energy and border control ˆThe importance of dialogue and interaction between the two integration associations – the )YVSTIER9RMSRERHXLIJYXYVI)YVEWMER)GSRSQMG 9RMSR

The Background Effect of Ukraine For more than a year, relations between Belarus and the )9LEZITPE]IHSYXEKEMRWXXLIWLEHS[SJXLIHVEQEXMG IZIRXWMR9OVEMRI,EZMRKRSSXLIV[E]SYXSJEHMJ½GYPX JSVIMKRTSPMG]WMXYEXMSR1MRWOXSSOETSWMXMSRSR9OVEMRI UYMXIWITEVEXIJVSQXLI/VIQPMR´W[LMGL[EWWYTTSWIHXS make clear to the West that Belarus had her own interests, different from Moscow’s. This message was immediately VIGIMZIHF]&VYWWIPWERH4SPMWL4VMQI1MRMWXIV(SREPH8YWO EW)YVSTIER4VIWMHIRXWTSOI[MXL%PIOWERHV0YOEWLIROE in April. According to the press service of the Belarusian 4VIWMHIRX PEXIVXLIMRJSVQEXMSR[EWVIQSZIHJVSQXLI SJ½GMEP[IFWMXIJSVWSQIVIEWSR XLITEVXMIWHMWGYWWIHXLI MRXIVREXMSREPWMXYEXMSRGEYWIHF]XLI9OVEMRMERIZIRXW A major diplomatic event of 2014 was undoubtedly the WYQQMXQIIXMRKGSRGIVRMRK9OVEMRIERHXLI)9LIPHMR 1MRWOSR%YKYWX8LIEMQ[EWXSMRMXMEXIXLITVSGIWWSJ WIXXPIQIRXSJXLIGVMWMWMR9OVEMRI3RXLITEVXSJXLI)9 the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security


Belarus 167

4SPMG]'EXLIVMRI%WLXSRXLI)YVSTIER'SQQMWWMSRIVJSV )RIVK]+YRXLIV3IXXMRKIVERHXLI)98VEHI'SQQMWWMSRIV /EVIPHI+YGLXEPPXSSOTEVX'EXLIVMRI%WLXSREPWSLEHE bilateral meeting with Aleksandr Lukashenka during which WLIXLEROIHXLI&IPEVYWMER4VIWMHIRXJSVLMWMRMXMEXMZIMRXLI search for peace. The meeting in Minsk was only possible in the context SJXLI9OVEMRMERGVMWMWERHXLIJEGXXLEXWYGLLMKLPIZIP GSRXEGXWXSSOTPEGIMR1MRWOXIWXM½IHXSXLIWYGGIWW SJ&IPEVYWMERHMTPSQEG]4SXIRXMEPP]MXSTIRIHYTRI[ opportunities for the development of relations between &IPEVYWERHXLI)9 For instance, almost immediately after the Minsk Summit SR¯%YKYWX9PEH^MQMV1EOIMEVVMZIHMR4SPERHSRE working visit. He met both with his counterpart Radoslaw 7MOSVWOMERH[MXLXLI4SPMWL1MRMWXIVSJ)GSRSQ].ERYW^ 4MIGLSGMRWOM8LIOI]MWWYIW[IVIXLIJSPPS[YTXSXLI talks in Minsk and prospects for a resolution of the crisis MR9OVEMRI;LMPIXLIQIHMEXMSRIJJSVXWSJ&IPEVYWHMH not lead to a breakthrough in relations between Minsk and Brussels – let alone Brussels and Moscow – the 9OVEMRMERGVMWMWMRKIRIVEPERH&IPEVYW´WEXXIQTXXSLIPTMR its settlement, became a ‘catalyst for cooperation’, in the words of Tomasz Orlowski, Deputy Head of the Foreign 1MRMWXV]SJ4SPERH[LSZMWMXIH1MRWOMRPEXI3GXSFIV Another catalyst was the sanctions that Russia imposed against European food producers.

Russian Sanctions -RXLIEYXYQRXSEZSMHXLIIJJIGXSJ6YWWMERVITPMIWXS )9WERGXMSRWTSPMXMGEPERHFYWMRIWWVITVIWIRXEXMZIWSJ XLIRIMKLFSYVMRK)9GSYRXVMIWWXITTIHYTXLIMVEGXMZMXMIW in Belarus. For example, the 10th Belarusian-Lithuanian Forum, held in Mahiliou in early November, was visited by XLI4VMQI1MRMWXIVSJ0MXLYERME%PKMVHEW&YXOIZMGMYWERH according to the Vice-Chairman of the Lithuanian Chamber of Agriculture Bronius Markauskas, ‘thousands of tons of [dairy products] were taken out during some three weeks’. 4VSGIWWMRKERHI\TSVXMRKXLVSYKL&IPEVYWGPIEVP]FIGEQI an alternative. On New Year’s Eve Aleksandr Lukashenka, while introducing XLIRI[,IEHSJXLI4VIWMHIRXMEP%HQMRMWXVEXMSR%PIOWERHV /SWMRMIGWYQQIHYT&IPEVYWMERTSPMG]XS[EVHWXLI)9EW follows: ‘We border with the West and don’t want any collisions – either political or economic. Half of

SYVXVEHIMWXLIVI-JXLI;IWXKMZIWYWELERHSJ cooperation, we should take it. We will seek to RSVQEPMWISYVVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI;IWX-JXLI][ERX XSGSSTIVEXI[MXLYWSRIUYEPXIVQWERHKMZIYW positive signals, we will accept them. We have always said: Let’s sit down to talk and negotiate.’ -RHMTPSQEXMGGSRXEGXWVIQEMRIHMRXIRWIFIX[IIR &IPEVYWERHXLI)9ERHMXWQIQFIVWXEXIWIWTIGMEPP]XLSWI closest to it. This was largely due to the neutral position of &IPEVYWMRVIPEXMSRXSXLIGVMWMWMR9OVEMRIERHTVSQSXMSRSJ a peace-building process. Owing to the diplomatic efforts SJSJ½GMEP1MRWOERHXLIJEZSYVEFPIKISTSPMXMGEPGSRXI\X XLI)9XSSOTEVXMRXLIHMEPSKYISRELMKLIVPIZIPXLER previously with the Belarusian government. The Belarusian side, limiting itself to rather symbolic steps, did not agree XSQIIXXLIVIUYMVIQIRXW WYGLEWXLIVIPIEWIERH rehabilitation of all political prisoners and improvements MRXLITSPMXMGEPVMKLXWWTLIVI EWOIHJSVF]XLI)9EWE precondition for the dialogue, but the door was opened. -R&IPEVYWERHXLI)9TEWWIHSRXSXLIRI\XWXIT which included negotiations on visa liberalisation and readmission, as well as consultations on modernisation, while still avoiding confrontation on the issue of human rights. -RXLIHMEPSKYIFIX[IIR&IPEVYWERHXLI)9 expanded against the background of the situation in 9OVEMRIERHXIRWMSRMR;IWXIVRVIPEXMSRW[MXL6YWWME Despite progress regarding visa liberalisation and readmission, future prospects remain uncertain. -RPEXI%YKYWXXLI&IPEVYWMEREYXLSVMXMIWVIPIEWIH political prisoners, including Nikolai Statkevich, one of the presidential candidates in the 2010 elections. The VIUYMVIQIRXXSVIPIEWISTTSRIRXWSJXLIEYXLSVMXMIW had been the main obstacle to further normalisation of relations between Minsk and Brussels. A positive response JVSQXLI;IWX[EWMQQIHMEXI)9,MKL6ITVIWIRXEXMZI JSV*SVIMKR%JJEMVWERH7IGYVMX]4SPMG]*IHIVMGE1SKLIVMRM )YVSTIER4EVPMEQIRX4VIWMHIRX1EVXMR7GLYP^)YVSTIER 'SQQMWWMSRIVJSV2IMKLFSYVLSSH4SPMG].SLERRIW,ELR and Council of Europe Secretary General Thorbjørn .EKPERHEPPI\TVIWWIHWEXMWJEGXMSREWHMHXLI977XEXI (ITEVXQIRX'PIEVP][MXLXLMWKIWXYVI1MRWOSJ½GMEPHSQ ERXMGMTEXIWEGLMIZMRKWMKRM½GERXQSHM½GEXMSRWXS;IWXIVR policy, such as the lifting of sanctions, recognition of the October 2015 presidential elections, and obtaining important loans.

Regent’s Report 2015


168 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

The West, amid threats from Russia, has updated its strategy SJHVE[MRK&IPEVYWMRXSMXWSVFMX8LI)9MRZMXIH&IPEVYWERH Armenia to conclude separate economic agreements, which would not contradict their membership in the Eurasian )GSRSQMG9RMSR8LI)EWXIVR4EVXRIVWLMTJVEQI[SVOLEW RSX[SVOIHSYXFIGEYWIGSYRXVMIWWIIOMRKXSNSMRXLI)9 WYGLEW9OVEMRI+ISVKMEERH1SPHSZE[IVITYXXSKIXLIV in the same category with countries that had not expressed such an intention, or had already integrated with Russia. 8SHE]PSSOMRKJSVRI[ETTVSEGLIWXLI)9LEWTVSTSWIH a fresh version of these agreements, which will bind these GSYRXVMIWERHXLI)9F]JEV[IEOIVXMIWXLERXLI%WWSGMEXMSR %KVIIQIRXEGGSVHMRKXS.IER%WWIPFSVR*SVIMKR1MRMWXIVSJ 0Y\IQFSYVK[LMGLGYVVIRXP]LSPHWXLIVSXEXMRK4VIWMHIRG] SJXLI'SYRGMPSJXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR³)YVSTIQYWXRSX QMWWXLISTTSVXYRMX]XLEXLEWSGGYVVIH MRMXWVIPEXMSRWLMT  [MXLXLMWGSYRXV]2SRIIHXSXLMROEFSYXXLIVIKMQISRI should think about the population,’ he said. There is a noticeable shift towards ratcheting down tension in relations between Minsk, Brussels and also Washington. However, as experience shows, it would be premature to VIKEVHXLMWXVIRHEWEHI½RMXMZIWMKRSJJYXYVIERHHYVEFPI GLERKIMRVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)9 With acknowledgement to the article by Dzianis Melyantsou in the Belarusian Yearbook 2014: http://nmnby. eu/yearbook/2014/en/index.html

Further Reading 'YVVIRXEREP]WMWSJ&IPEVYW)9VIPEXMSRWSR&IPEVYW(MKIWX http://belarusdigest.com/category/free-tags/belarus-eurelations Belarus in Focus: http://belarusinfocus.info/cat/international_ relations &-77*SVIMKR4SPMG]-RHI\ &IPEVYW´WJSVIMKRTSPMG] QSRMXSVMRK LXXTFIPMRWXMXYXIIYIREREP]XMGWGSQQIRXW belarus-foreign-policy-index ³&IPEVYW)96IPEXMSRW%H,SG%GXMSRWZW4VIHIZIPSTIH 7XVEXIK]´F]/MV]P/EWGMERBelarusian Review Working Paper, #2, November 2014: http://thepointjournal.com/fa/library/ brwp-02.pdf ³8LI0MQMXWSJXLI)9+SZIVRERGI&IPEVYW´6IWTSRWIXS XLI)YVSTIER2IMKLFSYVLSSH4SPMG]´F])%/SVSWXIPIZE Contemporary Politics,:SP  TT¯.YRI

Regent’s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: Belarus Geography/demography

Drugs and other criminality issues

%VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMX]TIVWUOQ Life expectancy: 72.15 years Growth rate: -0.19%

Limited cultivation of opium poppy and cannabis, mostly for HSQIWXMGQEVOIXXVERWWLMTQIRXTSMRXJSVMPPMGMXHVYKWXS and via Russia, and to the Baltics and western Europe. Antimoney-laundering legislation does not meet international WXERHEVHW[IEOIRIHJYVXLIV[LIRORS[]SYVGYWXSQIV VIUYMVIQIRXW[IVIGYVXEMPIHMRJI[MRZIWXMKEXMSRWSV prosecutions of money-laundering activities.

Economy +(4FMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH +VS[XLVEXI 1MPMXEV]I\TIRHMXYVI SJ+(4  4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI  % of economy in Agriculture: 7.3% -RHYWXV] Services: 55.7%

Foreign trade Exports:FMPPMSR QEGLMRIV]ERHIUYMTQIRXQMRIVEP TVSHYGXWGLIQMGEPWQIXEPWXI\XMPIWJSSHWXYJJW Imports:FMPPMSR QMRIVEPTVSHYGXWQEGLMRIV]ERH IUYMTQIRXGLIQMGEPWJSSHWXYJJWQIXEPW Main export partners:6YWWME9OVEMRI2IXLIVPERHW Germany. Main import partners: 6YWWME+IVQER]'LMRE9OVEMRI

Belarus is a source, transit, and destination country for [SQIRQIRERHGLMPHVIRWYFNIGXIHXSWI\XVEJ½GOMRK ERHJSVGIHPEFSYV[SQIRERHGLMPHVIREVIXVEJ½GOIH to European and Middle Eastern countries. Belarusians and other nationalities are found in forced labour in the construction industry and other sectors in Russia, Belarus, ERHSXLIVGSYRXVMIW9OVEMRMER[SQIREVIWI\XVEJ½GOIH in Belarus. The government has a written plan that, if MQTPIQIRXIH[SYPHGSRWXMXYXIEWMKRM½GERXIJJSVXXS[EVH meeting the minimum standards for eliminating human XVEJ½GOMRK 8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Transnational issues Boundary demarcation with Latvia and Lithuania, both QIQFIVWXEXIWXLEXJSVQTEVXSJXLI)9´WI\XIVREPFSVHIV 4SPERHLEWMQTPIQIRXIHWXVMGX7GLIRKIRFSVHIVVYPIWXS restrict illegal immigration and trade along its border with Belarus.

Refugees ETTPMGERXWJVSQ9OVEMRIJSVJSVQWSJPIKEPWXE] SXLIVXLEREW]PYQWXEXIPIWW

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


Europe, Russia and the Politics of Memory Rodric Braithwaite Former UK Ambassador to the Russian Federation

“Many of Russia’s European neighbours would enthusiastically agree that Russia is not European but ‘Asiatic’, by which they mean ‘barbarian’ ” Rodric Braithwaite


Russia 171

However you abase yourselves before her, Europe will never give you her respect: For in her eyes you always will remain Not servants of enlightenment, but serfs. *]SHSV8]YXGLIZ You are mere millions. Our numbers are uncounted. 'SQIEXYW8V]XS½KLX[MXLYW We are the Scyths! Yes, we are Asiatics, 7PMXI]IHERHE¾EQI[MXLKVIIH

whether they should turn away from Europe entirely, and adopt a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Eurasianâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; civilisation which more truly represents Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s intrinsic values and destiny. The debate goes back 350 years at least, to the days [LIRXLI8WEVW%PI\IM1MOLEMPSZMGLERH4IXIVXLI+VIEX had to suppress opposition to their Westernising policies F]FVYXEPJSVGI-XGSRXMRYIHMRXLIRMRIXIIRXLGIRXYV] when the Slavophiles decried the decadence, coldness and godlessness of the Western bourgeoisie, sentiments loudly voiced by Solzhenitsyn when he returned from the West SRXLIGSPPETWISJXLI7SZMIX9RMSR

Alexander Blok, 1918 he Russian people are now in the grip of a nationalist emotion fed by myths, memories and resentments from the distant as well as the recent past, which colour their perceptions of the outside world and are both shared and exploited by Russian politicians. The rest of us may regard these memories as unreasonable, exaggerated, or just plain wrong, but Europe will not make good policy towards Russia unless we understand them. To understand does not, of course, mean to forgive â&#x20AC;&#x201C; if he was indeed the author of this saying, Tolstoy was wrong, as he was on so many other things.

T

Memory and Myth

One alternative, people such as Dostoevsky argued, was a TYVM½IH6YWWMER3VXLSHS\KIRYMRIP]'LVMWXMERGMZMPMWEXMSR 3XLIVW[IRXJYVXLIV-RXLIWEWGLSSPSJXLSYKLX grew up that argued Russia was not part of Europe at all. The theory of Eurasianism held that Russian civilisation [EWYRMUYIXLEXMXLEHMXWS[RZEPYIWEREQEPKEQSJ Christianity, European culture and an unexplained â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Asianâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; dimension. Windy and unconvincing, unencumbered by evidence, the ideas were revived in the last years of the 7SZMIX9RMSR8LI]LEZIKEMRIHMRGVIEWMRKTSTYPEVMX]MRXLI last 20 years. They colour the pronouncements of some of XLIMHISPSKYIWWYVVSYRHMRK4VIWMHIRX4YXMR Many of Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s European neighbours would enthusiastically agree that Russia is not European but â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Asiaticâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, by which they mean â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;barbarianâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. But however passionate the debate, it is almost entirely sterile. Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s interests and attitudes are of course heavily shaped by XLIZEWXXIVVMXSVMIWMR%WMEMXEGUYMVIHJVSQXLIXL century onwards. But Russia and Europe are intimately bound together. Russia has a 1000-year experience of Christianity. Russia has helped to shape European history JSVGIRXYVMIW6YWWMERWSPHMIVWLEZIJSYKLXEWJEVE½IPHEW *VERGI+IVQER],SPPERH-XEP]ERH7[MX^IVPERH&VMXMWL *VIRGL4SPMWL+IVQERERH7[IHMWLWSPHMIVWLEZIMRZEHIH 6YWWMEXMQIERHEKEMR-XMWMQTSWWMFPIXSMQEKMRIQSHIVR European culture without the contribution of Russian literature, music, and painting.

Russia is not the only place where politics are driven by memory and myth, or where both are exploited by unscrupulous politicians. Milosevic deliberately conjured up the Serbian peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ancient myths about their defeat EXXLILERHWSJXLI8YVOWMRSRXLI½IPHSJ/SWSZS 4SPNIWSXLEXLIGSYPH[LMTYTWYTTSVXJSVLMWTVSNIGXSJ Greater Serbia. When the Greeks recently voted â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;noâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; to the European austerity package, they were remembering the resounding â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;noâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; with which their leader, General Metaxas, rejected Mussoliniâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ultimatum of 28 October ÂŻEKPSVMSYWQSQIRXSJREXMSREPHI½ERGIXLEXXLI] have celebrated ever since. Those who do not share these Q]XLW½RHMXLEVHXSETTVIGMEXIXLIMVJSVGI8LI-VMWLEVI beginning to forget Cromwellâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s depredations in the 17th century: the English have never understood why it has taken them so long.

Post-Communist Russia and the West

The verses that Fyodor Tyutchev addressed to his GSPPIEKYIWMRXLI6YWWMER*SVIMKR1MRMWXV]MR accurately express the frustrated and ambiguous feelings of Russians who can never decide whether their country is part of Europe or not, whether they wish to adopt Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s liberal ideas or a set of values entirely their own,

The fraught relationship between Russia and Europe today is heavily conditioned by the memories and myths that TVIGIHIHERHJSPPS[IHXLIGSPPETWISJXLI7SZMIX9RMSREX the end of 1991. Russians attribute many of their present woes, and the decline in their relationship with the West, to what they see as a long-term plan by the West to destroy XLIMVGSYRXV]4YXMRLMQWIPJQE][IPPWLEVIXLIWIFIPMIJWERH

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


172 Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

these myths. He has certainly exploited them to rally his people behind them. The idea that the West is trying to destroy Russia is of course a paranoid fantasy. On the contrary, the principle XLEXETVSWTIVSYWWEXMW½IHMRHITIRHIRXFYXGSSTIVEXMZI Russia is in the Western interest has underlain Western policy proposition ever since the Soviet collapse. At that time there was great sympathy for Russia. The aid that was then offered was genuinely intended, even if much of it was misplaced and irrelevant.

NATO But Western policy towards Russia in the last two decades has also, too often, been incompetent, misinformed, arrogant, and sometimes dishonest. The Russians take particular exception to the expansion of XLI2SVXL%XPERXMG8VIEX]3VKERM^EXMSR 2%83 VMKLXYTXS their border. The West has argued in vain that, by stabilising Europe, NATO enlargement is in the Russian interest too. Were that so, the Russians counter, the smaller countries of eastern Europe would not have been so keen to become members. Logically speaking, they believe, enlargement has only Russia as its target. Their anger and grievance is exacerbated because Western politicians gave them assurances that this would not happen â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and they believe that those assurances have been violated. Many in the West reject the accusation, but the Russians have a well documented point. They were never given written assurances, and no responsible Russians have claimed otherwise. But they were given oral assurances, which proved worthless. The great prize for the West in the last years of the Soviet 9RMSR[EWXLIVIYRM½GEXMSRSJ+IVQER]ERHMXWMRGPYWMSRMR NATO. When the negotiations began, it was not at all clear that Gorbachev, then the Soviet leader, would or could agree to either. His negotiating position was weak. He may have realised that he would in the end have to concede. But he also feared that domestic opposition to a deal might destroy his regime. The Western negotiators were acutely aware of that too, and they were anxious to nail XLIHIEPHS[RFIJSVIXLMRKWJIPPETEVXMR1SWGS[-RXLSWI circumstances neither side had an interest in raising the possibility of further NATO enlargement, and neither did. But the story did not stop with the signature of the VIYRM½GEXMSREKVIIQIRXMR7ITXIQFIV:EGPEZ,EZIP

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015

XLI'^IGL4VIWMHIRXXLIRGEPPIHJSV'^IGLSWPSZEOME4SPERH ERH,YRKEV]XSIRXIV2%83-RXLIWTVMRKSJXLI &VMXMWL4VMQI1MRMWXIVERH*SVIMKR7IGVIXEV]TVMZEXIP] assured Soviet ministers that there was no such intention. Manfred Woerner, NATOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Secretary General, added publicly that enlargement would damage relations with XLI7SZMIX9RMSR8LI6YWWMERWXSSOXLIWIWXEXIQIRXWF] VIWTSRWMFPI;IWXIVRSJ½GMEPWEXJEGIZEPYI The Russiansâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; belief that NATO policy was directed against them was reinforced by NATOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s bombing of Serbia in 1999. The West saw the bombing as essential to prevent XLI7IVFWJVSQVITIEXMRKMR/SWSZSXLIEXVSGMSYWTSPMG]SJ ethnic cleansing they had earlier pursued in Bosnia. But the Russians saw the most powerful alliance in history ruthlessly bombing a weak European country into submission, and XLIRHIXEGLMRKSRISJMXWLMWXSVMGEPTVSZMRGIW-QTVSFEFPI as it may seem to a Western observer, they wondered if, in their weakened state, they would be next.

Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s View of the EU 8LI6YWWMERW´EXXMXYHIXS[EVHWXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR

)9 [EWSVMKMREPP]QYGLPIWWLSWXMPIXLERMX[EWXS[EVHW 2%838LI][IVITVITEVIHEX½VWXXSEGGITXXLEXXLI X[SSVKERMWEXMSRW[IVIUYMXIWITEVEXIERHXLEXXLI )9KIRYMRIP]GSR½RIHMXWIPJXSXLITYVWYMXSJ)YVSTIER economic interest and better cooperation among )YVSTIERREXMSRW-RXLI]WMKRIHE4EVXRIVWLMTERH 'SSTIVEXMSR%KVIIQIRX[MXLXLI)9ERHERYQFIVSJ detailed cooperative arrangements followed later. Relations began to sour as disputes multiplied over matters such as Russian energy supplies to Europe, anti-monopoly cases taken out by the European Commission against Russian companies, and above all the strains caused by XLIHMWTYXISZIV9OVEMRI8LIWILEHFYFFPIHJSVEHIGEHI ERHGEQIXSELIEH[MXLXLIVS[SZIVXLI)99OVEMRI Association Agreement of October 2013. A month earlier, an economic union with Russia was still favoured by almost XLIWEQIRYQFIVSJ9OVEMRMERW  EWERIGSRSQMG YRMSR[MXL)YVSTI  &YXYRHIV6YWWMERTVIWWYVIXLI 9OVEMRMER4VIWMHIRX=ERYOSZ]GLVIJYWIHEXXLIPEWXQMRYXI XSWMKRXLIEKVIIQIRX[MXLXLI)9%RXMKSZIVRQIRX TVSXIWXWIVYTXIH=ERYOSZ]GLžIHXS6YWWME4YXMRERRI\IH XLI'VMQIEERH½KLXMRKWXEVXIHMRIEWXIVR9OVEMRI Moscow and Brussels strongly disagree over what lay behind the breakdown. The negotiation of the Association %KVIIQIRX[EWYRHIVXEOIRSRXLI9OVEMRMERWMHIF]E ZIV]WQEPPRYQFIVSJSJ½GMEPW3RXLI)YVSTIERWMHIXLI


Russia 173

RIKSXMEXMSRW[IVIHVMZIRF]SJ½GMEPWJVSQXLI)RPEVKIQIRX Directorate, supported by the External Action Service. The negotiations were dense and technocratic. They were IRXMVIP]MR)RKPMWLXLIVI[EWRSXI\XMR9OVEMRMERSV6YWWMER YRXMPEZIV]PEXIWXEKI8LI6YWWMERWGPEMQIHXLI]½VWXWE[ one in August 2013. Whether or not the Russians were kept informed, as the )9WYFWIUYIRXP]GPEMQIHXLI]QE]LEZIFIIRPYPPIHMRXSE false sense of security by the obscurity of the negotiations, until someone translated all the jargon into plain Russian, and they suddenly woke up. They complained that they had not been consulted about potential damage to Russian economic interests. And they noted in particular that Article 10 of the text talked of exploring ‘the potential of military-technological cooperation’ and establishing ‘close contacts to discuss military capability improvement, including technological issues’. They inevitably interpreted WYGLPERKYEKIEWGSR½VQMRK[LEXLEHFIIREKVS[MRK WYWTMGMSRXLEXXLI)9[EWPMXXPIQSVIXLERXLIIGSRSQMG arm of NATO. To make a point they imposed restrictions SR9OVEMRMERMQTSVXW8LIVIWXJSPPS[IH The best that one can say is that, wherever the substantial rights and wrongs, neither side conducted itself with much HMTPSQEXMG½RIWWI8LIGSRWIUYIRGIMWXLEXQSWX6YWWMERW LEZIPSWXMRXIVIWXMRXLI)YVSTIER9RMSR[LMGLXLI]WII EWMRXLVEPPXSXLI9RMXIH7XEXIWERHQMVIHMRMRXIVREP GSRJYWMSR4VIWMHIRX4YXMRHMWQMWWIWXLI)9EWERMQTSXIRX ‘hamster’. Not surprisingly, he is deliberately exploiting differences between member states to promote what he sees as the Russian national interest.

The Pivot to the East -RXLIPEWXJI[]IEVW1SWGS[LEWEXXIQTXIHXS compensate for its increasingly unsatisfactory relationship with Europe and America by ‘pivoting to the East’, building economic and political relationships especially with China. A senior Russian commentator has remarked that given 6YWWME´WLMWXSVMGEPIEWX[EVHI\TERWMSRMXWYRMUYI³)YVEWMER´ geography and fusion of cultures, and the inescapable HIQSKVETLMGERHIGSRSQMGVMWISJXLI%WME4EGM½GXLI SRP]JYXYVIJSV6YWWMEMWEWE³)YVS4EGM½G´TS[IV4YXMR is apparently ambitious to stake out a place in a new world order where Western power is balanced or even RIYXVEPMWIHF]XLIRI[GSRWXIPPEXMSRSJ'LMRE-RHMEERH hopefully Russia as well. How far this idea can be carried is doubtful. The ‘pivot’ makes some objective sense for a number of reasons.

Russians have long worried about their sparsely populated Far Eastern provinces, which they see as vulnerable to Chinese political, economic and demographic, and – who ORS[W#¯TIVLETWIZIRQMPMXEV]TVIWWYVI-X[SYPHSFZMSYWP] be preferable to develop a more cooperative relationship, hopefully based on China’s need for increasing supplies of energy and Russia’s interest in diversifying the markets for its oil and gas. The two countries have signed a number of relevant deals, though it is unclear how much economic advantage they bring to the Russians. Russia risks falling into the same unsatisfactory neo-colonial relationship with China as it has long had with the West: exchanging commodities for the sophisticated manufactures XLEXMXGSRXMRYIWXSFIYREFPIXSQEOIJSVMXWIPJ-RXLIIRH Russia, in the words of Fiona Hill and Bobo Lo, ‘is more PMOIP]XLERRSXXS½RHMXWIPJHMWMPPYWMSRIHSRGIQSVIGEYKLX between an East to which it does not belong and a West in [LMGLMXHSIWRSXIEWMP]½X´

Conclusion Some people argue that it is high time the Russians ceased to pick away at their grievances, and adopted a calmer and more rational attitude towards their place in the [SVPH9RJSVXYREXIP]Q]XLERHXLIQIQSV]SJLYQMPMEXMSR WMKRM½GERXP]EJJIGXGSYRXVMIW´FILEZMSYV¯XLMROSRP]SJ France after 1871 or Germany after 1918. Many Russians did indeed feel humiliated by the collapse of the Soviet 9RMSRXLIPSWWSJMRXIVREXMSREPTVIWXMKIXLITSPMXMGEPERH economic chaos of the 1990s, and the brush with famine. 8LI]FIPMIZIXLEX4YXMRLEWKSRIJEVXSVIWXSVI6YWWME´W domestic coherence, prosperity and place in the world. They are probably too optimistic. Russia’s economy is still MREQIWWERHSZIVHITIRHIRXSRGSQQSHMX]I\TSVXW-XW HSQIWXMGTSPMXMGWEVIJVEKMPIHIWTMXIXLI/VIQPMR´WGVEGOHS[R the possibility of a resurgence of the wave of dissatisfaction SJGERRSXFIVYPIHSYX-X[MPPTVSFEFP]FIWSQIXMQI FIJSVI6YWWMEWIXXPIWHS[RERHVIWYQIWXLIUYIWXJSVE more productive relationship with the rest of Europe. But Russia is not going to go away. Most Russians still live in the European part of the country, the Russian economy is still strongly linked to Europe, and Europe is where the Russian middle classes wish to travel and to educate their children. The rest of us need sensible policies to cope with XLIWLSVXXIVQHMJ½GYPXMIW8LIWIMRGPYHIHQEREKMRKXLI GSR¾MGXSZIV9OVEMRI[MXLEQM\XYVISJWXMGOWERHGEVVSXW ¯ERHXLEXMWFSYRHXSFIHMJ½GYPXIZIR[MXLSYXEHIWGIRX into further violence.

Regent’s Report 2015


174 Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

&YX[IEPWSRIIHXS[SVOGSRWGMSYWP]ERH[MXLSYXMRžEXIH rhetoric about â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;strategic partnershipsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, towards a more cooperative relationship with Russia in the longer term. 8LEX[MPPVIUYMVIHIXIVQMRIHTEXMIRGIERHEPSXPIWW ignorance about Russian reality than European politicians ERHSJ½GMEPWLEZIHIQSRWXVEXIHLMXLIVXS

Further Reading Russia and the New World Disorder by Bobo Lo, Brookings, 2015 Mr Putin: Operative in the Kremlin by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, Brookings, expanded edition 2015 The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union by Serhii 4PSOL]3RI[SVPH ³4YXMR´W4MZSX;L]6YWWMEMW0SSOMRK)EWX´F]&SFS0SERH Fiona Hill, Foreign Affairs,.YP][[[FVSSOMRKWIHY VIWIEVGLSTMRMSRWVYWWMEGLMRETEGM½GTMZSXLMPP ³6YWWME9OVEMRIERHXLI;IWX´F]6&VEMXL[EMXIRUSI Journal, Vol 159, No 2, April 2014

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: Russia Geography/demography %VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMXTIVWUOQ 0MJII\TIGXERG]]IEVW Growth rate: -0.03%

Russia claims responsibility for the interests of Russianspeaking minorities abroad, particularly numerous in Estonia and Latvia, causing tension with these governments. Demarcation of the land and maritime boundaries with 9OVEMRILEWFIIRWYWTIRHIHHYIXSXLIVIGIRXERRI\EXMSR SJ'VMQIEF]6YWWMEERHMRGYVWMSRWMRXSIEWXIVR9OVEMRI

Economy +(4XVMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH Growth rate: 0.5% 1MPMXEV]I\TIRHMXYVI SJ+(4 4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI  IWX % of economy in Agriculture: 4% -RHYWXV] Services: 59.7%

Foreign trade Exports: FMPPMSR TIXVSPIYQERHTIXVSPIYQ products, natural gas, metals, wood and wood products, GLIQMGEPWQMPMXEV]LEVH[EVI Imports: FMPPMSR MVSRWXIIPQEGLMRIV]ZILMGPIW TLEVQEGIYXMGEPTVSHYGXWTPEWXMGWIQM½RMWLIHQIXEP TVSHYGXWQIEXJVYMXWRYXWSTXMGEPQIHMGEPMRWXVYQIRXW Main export partners: 2IXLIVPERHW+IVQER]'LMRE-XEP] 9OVEMRI8YVOI] Main import partners: 'LMRE+IVQER]9OVEMRI&IPEVYW -XEP]97

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW 

Transnational issues 8LIWSZIVIMKRX]HMWTYXISZIVXLI7SYXLIVR/YVMPMWPERHW RS[EHQMRMWXIVIHF]6YWWMEFYXGPEMQIHF].ETERMWXLI primary block to signing a peace treaty ending World War Two hostilities.

8LI6YWWMER(YQELEWRSXVEXM½IHXLI&IVMRK7IE 1EVMXMQI&SYRHEV]%KVIIQIRX[MXLXLI97 The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

'0'7 LEWVIGIMZIHWYFQMWWMSRWF](IRQEVO +VIIRPERH  and Norway concerning claims in the Arctic. A clash of interests is likely to materialise. China and Russia have demarcated the once disputed islands in rivers along their border in Siberia, in accordance with the 2004 Agreement, and thus ended their centurieslong border disputes.

Refugees EW]PYQWIIOIVWERHETTPMGERXWJSVSXLIV forms of legal stay, resulting from separatist war in eastern 9OVEMRI%XPIEWXMRXIVREPP]HMWTPEGIHTIVWSRW -(4W  VIWYPXMRKJVSQEVQIHGSR¾MGXERHLYQERVMKLXWZMSPEXMSRWMR North Caucasus, particularly Chechnya and North Ossetia.

Drugs and other criminality issues The Russian government has an active illicit crop eradication programme, but the country is a transshipment point for Asian opiates and cannabis, and a HIWXMREXMSRJSV0EXMR%QIVMGERGSGEMRI-XMWEQENSVWSYVGI of heroin precursor chemicals and a major consumer of opiates. Russia remains a transit and destination country for men, women and children subjected to forced labour and WI\XVEJ½GOMRK'SVVYTXMSRERHSVKERMWIHGVMQIMRGPYHMRK cybercrime, are important concerns. 8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

6YWWME´WQMPMXEV]WYTTSVXERHWYFWIUYIRXVIGSKRMXMSRSJ Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence following war with Georgia in 2008 continue to sour relations.

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


The EFTA countries: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland Graham Avery St Anthony’s College, Oxford, and European Policy Centre, Brussels

“This report is published in the United Kingdom at a time when a referendum on EU membership is in preparation. Would \PM-.<)--)NZIUM_WZSJMXW[[QJTM for Britain? “ Graham Avery




LI)YVSTIER9RMSR )9 LEWGPSWIVVIPEXMSRW[MXL 2SV[E]-GIPERHERH7[MX^IVPERH¯QIQFIVWSJXLI )YVSTIER*VII8VEHI%WWSGMEXMSR )*8% ¯XLER[MXLER] other of its neighbours. These countries apply much of the )9´Wacquis in their national law, they have privileged access XSXLI)9´WWMRKPIQEVOIXERHXLI]TEVXMGMTEXIMRSXLIV )9TSPMGMIWWYGLEWXLI7GLIRKIRTEWWTSVXJVIIEVIE8LIMV VIPEXMSRWLMT[MXLXLI)9MWXLIQSWXEHZERGIHJSVQSJ )YVSTIERMRXIKVEXMSRSXLIVXLERJYPP)9QIQFIVWLMT

T

Small, Stable and Rich -RTSPMXMGEPERHIGSRSQMGXIVQWXLIWIWQEPPGSYRXVMIWEVI stable and rich, with deep-rooted democratic traditions and ELMKLWXERHEVHSJPMZMRK-R2SV[E] TSTYPEXMSRQMPPMSR  EZIVEKIMRGSQIMW LMKLIVXLERXLI)9EZIVEKIMR 7[MX^IVPERH QMPPMSR MXMW LMKLIVERHMR-GIPERH  QMPPMSR MXMW LMKLIV%PPXLVIIEVI[IPPUYEPM½IHJSV)9 membership, and have in the past applied for membership, but did not complete the process. The close relations of these countries with European neighbours have a long history. Britain was the prime QSZIVMRXLIIWXEFPMWLQIRXSJ)*8%MREWER EPXIVREXMZIXSXLI)YVSTIER'SQQYRMX] )' PEYRGLIH MR8LI½VWXWMKREXSVMIWSJ)*8%[IVI%YWXVME (IRQEVO2SV[E]4SVXYKEP7[IHIR7[MX^IVPERHERHXLI 9RMXIH/MRKHSQMX[EWNSMRIHPEXIVF]*MRPERH-GIPERHERH Liechtenstein. EFTA eliminated tariffs between its members JSVMRHYWXVMEPTVSHYGXWFYXRSXJSVEKVMGYPXYVIERH½WLIVMIW 9RPMOIXLI)9)*8%MWRSXEGYWXSQWYRMSRERHLEWRS GSQQSRI\XIVREPXEVMJJMXWQIQFIVWGER½\XLIMVS[R tariffs and make trade agreements separately with other countries. Over the years, most members of EFTA have HIGMHIHXSPIEZIMXMRSVHIVXSNSMRXLI)9ERHXSHE]XLI SRP]VIQEMRMRKQIQFIVWEVI2SV[E]7[MX^IVPERH-GIPERH and Liechtenstein.

2SV[E]-GIPERH7[MX^IVPERH 177

)*8%TMPPEVSJXLI))%RS[GSQTVMWIW2SV[E]-GIPERHERH Liechtenstein. The EEA Agreement gives these countries privileged access to the single market, and in return they accept its â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;four freedomsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; (free movement of goods, capital, services ERHTISTPI ETTP]WMRKPIQEVOIXVYPIWMRXLIMVREXMSREP PE[[MXLEYXSQEXMGEHSTXMSRSJRI[)9PIKMWPEXMSRERH MQTPIQIRX)9TSPMGMIWMRXLI½IPHWSJIQTPS]QIRXWSGMEP EJJEMVWIRZMVSRQIRXVIWIEVGLERHHIZIPSTQIRX-REHHMXMSR they make a substantial budgetary contribution to the )9F]QIERWSJKVERXWSJ½RERGMEPEWWMWXERGIXSVIHYGI WSGMEPERHIGSRSQMGHMWTEVMXMIW[MXLMRXLI)98LIWIKVERXW totalled about â&#x201A;¬2 billion in 2009â&#x20AC;&#x201C;14, with Norway making E½RERGMEPGSRXVMFYXMSRXSXLI)9IUYMZEPIRXXSEFSYXº per head of population. 8LIEGGIWWSJ2SV[E]ERH-GIPERHXSXLIWMRKPIQEVOIXMW privileged, but not unrestricted, since they are not in the )9´W'YWXSQW9RMSR8LI]QEMRXEMRXLIMVREXMSREPTSPMGMIW for agriculture (they have higher agricultural subsidies XLERXLI)9 ERH½WLIVMIW JSV[LMGLXLI]LEZII\XIRWMZI XIVVMXSVMEP[EXIVW FYXXLIMVI\TSVXWSJEKVMGYPXYVEPERH ½WLIVMIWTVSHYGXWXSXLI)9EVIWYFNIGXXS)9VYPIWERH GLEVKIWERHXLI]LEZIXSMQTPIQIRXQER])9PE[WIZIR MRXLIWIWIGXSVW8LI)9LEWETTPMIHGSYRXIVZEMPMRKHYXMIW to imports of Norwegian salmon several times since 1997. -RXLIGEWISJ-GIPERHERH2SV[E]XLI))%EKVIIQIRX[EW accompanied by the signature of agreements for access of )9½WLMRK¾IIXWXSXLIMV[EXIVW The institutional framework of the EEA includes a council EXQMRMWXIVMEPPIZIPERHENSMRXGSQQMXXIIEXSJ½GMEPPIZIP*SV enforcement of EEA rules by EFTA members of the EEA, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court have tasks similar to the tasks of the European Commission and XLI)YVSTIER'SYVXSJ.YWXMGIMRVIPEXMSRXS)9QIQFIVW

European Economic Area -RXLIW[LIRGSQTPIXMSRSJXLIWMRKPIQEVOIX[EW planned, EFTA members were concerned by the ECâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s growing economic power. Cooperation between EFTA and the EEC led to the creation in 1994 of the European )GSRSQMG%VIE ))% GSRWMWXMRKSJ)9QIQFIVW XLI³)9 TMPPEV´ ERH)*8%GSYRXVMIW XLI³)*8%TMPPEV´  ;LIRGSYRXVMIWEGGIHIXSXLI)9XLI]LEZIXSPIEZI)*8% ERHMRXLI)9XLI]EYXSQEXMGEPP]FIGSQITEVXSJXLI))%´W )9TMPPEV8LMW[EWXLIGEWIJSV%YWXVME7[IHIRERH*MRPERH [LIRXLI]NSMRIHXLI)9MR1IER[LMPIMR 7[MX^IVPERHHIGMHIHRSXXSNSMRXLI))%'SRWIUYIRXP]XLI

9RHIV³HIGMWMSRWLETMRK´TVSGIHYVIW2SV[E]-GIPERHERH Liechtenstein have access to committees of the European 'SQQMWWMSRXLEXTVITEVI)9VIKYPEXMSRWERHXLI]LEZIXLI right to submit comments on draft legislation. But as nonQIQFIVWXLI]GERRSXXEOITEVXMRXLI)9´WHIGMWMSRQEOMRK MRXLI'SYRGMPERHXLI4EVPMEQIRX-RTVMRGMTPIXLI]GER VIJYWIXSETTP]RI[)9acquis, but the fact that this could PIEHXLI)9XSWYWTIRHETTPMGEXMSRSJGSVVIWTSRHMRKTEVXW of the EEA agreement serves as an effective deterrent. -RXLIPEWX]IEVWXLI))%LEWTVSZIHXSFIEPEVKIP] XVSYFPIJVIIJVEQI[SVOJSVXLI)9´WVIPEXMSRW[MXL

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178 Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

the countries concerned. However, its importance has HMQMRMWLIHEWEVIWYPXSJXLI)9´WIRPEVKIQIRXXLI)9 side of the EEA has grown from 12 states to 28 with a population of over 500 million, while the EFTA side has shrunk from six states to three with a population of 14 million. Moreover, in the years since the creation of the single market, to which the EEA is essentially related, the )9´WEGXMZMXMIWLEZII\TERHIHMRXSSXLIVMQTSVXERXEVIEWSJ policy. Nonetheless the EEA remains attractive as a model for VIPEXMSRWFIX[IIRXLI)9ERHRIMKLFSYVMRKGSYRXVMIWXLEX have a high level of political and economic development FYXHSRSX[MWLXSFIGSQIJYPPQIQFIVWSJXLI)9

Norway 2SV[E]EJSYRHMRKQIQFIVSJ)*8%ETTPMIHMR ERHXSNSMRXLI)'EPSRK[MXL&VMXEMRERHMR signed an Accession Treaty. But membership was rejected MREVIJIVIRHYQF]EQENSVMX]SJ -R2SV[E] ETTPMIHXSNSMRXLI)9EPSRK[MXL%YWXVME7[IHIR and Finland, and again signed an Accession Treaty, but membership was again rejected, this time by a majority of 52.5%. As a result of these divisive experiences, Norwegian TSPMXMGMERWLEZIFIIRVIPYGXERXXSVISTIRXLIUYIWXMSRSJ )9QIQFIVWLMT Meanwhile Norwayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economic situation is strong. Through its management of oil and gas resources it has accumulated XLI[SVPH´WPEVKIWXWSZIVIMKR[IEPXLJYRHX[SXLMVHWSJMXW I\TSVXWKSXSXLI)9ERHMXMWXLI)9´W½JXLPEVKIWXXVEHI partner.

TVSGIWWIWXLEXLEZIHMVIGXGSRWIUYIRGIWJSV2SV[E] ERHRIMXLIVHS[ILEZIER]WMKRM½GERXMR¾YIRGISR XLIQ1SVISZIVSYVJSVQSJEWWSGMEXMSR[MXLXLI)9 dampens political engagement and debate in Norway ERHQEOIWMXHMJ½GYPXXSQSRMXSVXLIKSZIVRQIRXERH hold it accountable in its European policy.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; The report continued: ³8LIVILEZIFIIRXIRWMSRWERHGSR¾MGXWFIX[IIR)9 EEA rules and Norwegian traditions and restrictions, [LMGLLEZIFIIRGLEPPIRKIHMRERYQFIVSJ½IPHW However, given the large number of adaptations that have had to be made, there have been relatively JI[GSR¾MGXWERHQER]SJXLIQ[IVIVIWSPZIHMRE way that has made it possible to continue to pursue 2SV[IKMERTSPMG]EMQW-RSXLIVGEWIWMXLEWFIIR necessary to make changes in order to harmonise Norwegian law. But on the whole, the Norwegian social model has been safeguarded and developed in a way that has won the support of a broad majority SJXLI2SV[IKMER4EVPMEQIRX´ 2SV[E][MXLMXWEGXMZIMRZSPZIQIRXMRXLI9RMXIH2EXMSRW

92 MXWQIQFIVWLMTSJ2%83MXWJVSRXMIV[MXL6YWWMEERH long experience of relations with that country, is a valuable TSPMXMGEPTEVXRIVJSVXLI)9´W'SQQSR*SVIMKRERH 7IGYVMX]4SPMG]2SV[E]EPWSTEVXMGMTEXIW [MXLSYXZSXMRK VMKLXW MRWIZIVEPSXLIVMQTSVXERXEVIEWSJ)9EGXMZMX]WYGL as Schengen, the European Defence Agency, Frontex and Europol.

Iceland From the Norwegian point of view, the EEA serves as a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;waiting roomâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; that offers a close relationship with the )9[MXLSYXSFPMKMRKMXXSEHHVIWWXLIXLSVR]UYIWXMSRSJ QIQFIVWLMT2IZIVXLIPIWWMXMWRSX[MXLSYXTVSFPIQW-R 2013 the Norwegian government asked an independent GSQQMXXIIGLEMVIHF]EPE[TVSJIWWSVXSIRUYMVIMRXS XLITSPMXMGEPPIKEPWSGMEPERHIGSRSQMGGSRWIUYIRGIWSJ XLI))%-XWVITSVXGSRGPYHIHXLEXEWEVIWYPXSJXLI))% Schengen and other agreements, Norway has implemented ETTVS\MQEXIP]XLVIIUYEVXIVWSJ)9PE[-XGSQQIRXIHXLEX â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;the most problematic aspect of Norwayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s association [MXLXLI)9MWXLIJEGXXLEX2SV[E]MWMRTVEGXMGI FSYRHXSEHSTX)9TSPMGMIWERHVYPIWSREFVSEH range of issues without being a member and without voting rights. This raises democratic problems. Norway is not represented in decision-making

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015

-GIPERH[EWEJSYRHMRKQIQFIVSJ)*8%ERHSJXLI))% 8LVIIUYEVXIVWSJ-GIPERH´WI\TSVXWKSXSXLI)9ERH LEPJSJMXWMQTSVXWGSQIJVSQMX8LI)9MW-GIPERH´WQSWX important trading partner, followed by Norway. ,MWXSVMGEPP]-GIPERH´WEXXMXYHIXSXLI)9LEWFIIRWMQMPEV XSXLEXSJ2SV[E]*MWLIVMIWMR-GIPERHEVIIZIRQSVI MQTSVXERXXLERMR2SV[E][MXL½WLERH½WLTVSHYGXW accounting for 40% of its exports, so the potential impact SJXLI)9´WGSQQSR½WLIVMIWTSPMG]MWGSRWMHIVEFPI-X[EW RSXYRXMPXLEX-GIPERHETTPMIHXSNSMRXLI)9ERHSRI of its main motivations then was the desire to replace the -GIPERHMGOVSRE[MXLXLIIYVSEJXIVXLIHMWEWXVSYWFEROMRK crisis of 2008 when the krona lost half of its value. ,EZMRKMQTPIQIRXIHEPEVKITEVXSJXLI)9´Wacquis as EQIQFIVSJXLI))%-GIPERH[EW[IPPUYEPM½IHJSV)9




membership, and accession negotiations in 2010â&#x20AC;&#x201C;13 QEHIKSSHTVSKVIWWXLSYKL[MXLSYXVIEGLMRKXLIHMJ½GYPX UYIWXMSRSJ½WLIVMIW&YXMREGLERKISJKSZIVRQIRX MR-GIPERHPIHXSXLIWYWTIRWMSRSJEGGIWWMSRRIKSXMEXMSRW ERHMRXLI*SVIMKR1MRMWXIVWIRXEPIXXIVXSXLI)9 withdrawing its membership application, though this was HMWTYXIHWMRGIMX[EWRSXEYXLSVMWIHF]XLI4EVPMEQIRX -GIPERH´WVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)9EVIRS[QEMRP]GSRHYGXIH in the framework of the EEA. -RXLEXGSRXI\XI\TIVMIRGI[MXL-GIPERHLEWKIRIVEPP] been satisfactory, though it has sometimes lagged behind MRMQTPIQIRXMRK))%SFPMKEXMSRW8LIQSWXHMJ½GYPXVIGIRX TVSFPIQLEWFIIRXLIHMWTYXIGSRGIVRMRK-GIWEZIERSRPMRI savings account operated in Britain and the Netherlands by -GIPERH´W0ERHWFEROM%JXIVXLIFEROVYTXG]SJ0ERHWFEROMMR XLI-GIPERHMGKSZIVRQIRXKEZIHITSWMXKYEVERXIIWXS HSQIWXMGMRZIWXSVWFYXRSXXSJSVIMKRMRZIWXSVW-RVITP]XLI British government froze Landsbankiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s assets in Britain. After ENYHKIQIRXSJXLI)*8%'SYVXXLMWUYIWXMSRLEWRS[ been settled. *MWLMRKUYSXEWMR-GIPERHMG[EXIVWIWTIGMEPP]JSVQEGOIVIP LEZIEPWSFIIREHMZMWMZIMWWYI[MXLXLI)9&YXEPXLSYKL HMWTYXIWSJXLMWOMRHLEZIEJJIGXIH)9-GIPERHVIPEXMSRWJVSQ time to time, they have not seriously disrupted them.

Switzerland Switzerland was a founding member of EFTA, took part in negotiations for the EEA, and like other EFTA GSYRXVMIWETTPMIHJSV)9QIQFIVWLMTMR,S[IZIV after a referendum rejected the EEA by a majority of 50.3%, the Swiss government suspended its application JSV)9QIQFIVWLMTERHMRTPEGISJXLI))%GSRGPYHIH EWIVMIWSJFMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXW[MXLXLI)91SVIXLER 100 agreements are now in force, covering the single market and related areas such as taxation, social policy, environment and transport. Switzerland makes an annual ½RERGMEPGSRXVMFYXMSRXSXLI)9IUYMZEPIRXXSEFSYXº per head of population. -RKIRIVEPXLIFMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWLEZIJYRGXMSRIH[IPP until recently, and the Swiss economy is closely integrated [MXLXLI)97[MX^IVPERHMWXLI)9´WWIGSRHFMKKIWX IGSRSQMGTEVXRIVEJXIVXLI97%,S[IZIVXLI³FMPEXIVEP approachâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; has caused problems on both sides. The Swiss LEZIGSRWXERXP]XSQSRMXSVGLERKIWMR)9PE[XSWII [LIXLIVXLI]TVIWIRXHMJ½GYPXMIWJSV7[MX^IVPERH8LI] EVIJVYWXVEXIHF]XLI)9´WHIWMVI[LIRRIKSXMEXMRKRI[ EKVIIQIRXWXSQEMRXEMREFEPERGI TVMRGMTPISJ³TEVEPPIPMWQ´ 

2SV[E]-GIPERH7[MX^IVPERH 179

*SVXLI)9XLIEFWIRGISJEYXSQEXMGEHSTXMSRSJ RI[)9acquisF]7[MX^IVPERHERHXLIMREHIUYEG]SJ supervision and enforcement of its obligations, results in PIKEPYRGIVXEMRX]JSV)9½VQWERHGMXM^IRWERHEPEGOSJ â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;homogeneityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in the single market. -RXLI)9´W'SYRGMPSJ1MRMWXIVWWXEXIHXLEX â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;issues related to the dynamic adaptation of agreements to the acquis, their homogeneous interpretation, independent surveillance, enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms, need to be VI¾IGXIHMR)97[MX^IVPERHEKVIIQIRXW´ -RXLI)9VIWSPZIHXSQEOIRSQSVIEKVIIQIRXW with Switzerland unless it accepts a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;new institutional approachâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; â&#x20AC;&#x201C; in other words an approach that is more automatic and more like the EEA. Switzerland is willing to discuss a new institutional set-up, but reluctant to accept automaticity or supranational control mechanisms, arguing that it needs a margin of manoeuvre â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;to safeguard national independenceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. 3RXSTSJXLIWIHMJ½GYPXMIWGEQIXLI7[MWWVIJIVIRHYQSR mass immigration in February 2014, when a majority of  ZSXIHXSMRWXVYGXXLIKSZIVRQIRXXSMQTSWIUYSXEW SR[SVOIVWJVSQXLI)9F]*IFVYEV]-JWYGLUYSXEW are implemented, a crisis in Switzerlandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relations with the )9MWMRIZMXEFPIJSVXLI][SYPHGSRXVEZIRIXLIFMPEXIVEP EKVIIQIRX[MXLXLI)9SRJVIIQSZIQIRXSJ[SVOIVW-J that lapses, the other agreements giving Switzerland access to European markets will automatically fall. Switzerland has traditionally relied on immigrant labour, ERHRIXMQQMKVEXMSRMRVIEGLIHIUYMZEPIRX to 1% of the Swiss population. But there is little evidence that it is causing serious economic or social problems in 7[MX^IVPERH-RHIIHQMKVERXPEFSYVMWSRISJXLIJEGXSVW that assist Swiss economic success. Asylum-seekers, on the other hand, are not easily accepted in the areas to which they are allocated. The referendum has already caused a JVII^IMR7[MX^IVPERH´WVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)9XLI)VEWQYW student exchange programme was halted, talks on Swiss EGGIWWXSXLI)9IRIVK]QEVOIX[IVIWXSTTIHERHER]XEPO of new agreements with Switzerland is suspended until the MQQMKVEXMSRUYIWXMSRMWVIWSPZIH 3TMRMSRMR7[MX^IVPERHMWHIITP]HMZMHIHSRXLI)9 UYIWXMSR7SQIEVKYIXLEXXLIFMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWQYWXFI preserved. Others say the country should move forward

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


180 Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow

ERHNSMRXLI)9SVEXPIEWXXLI))%3XLIVWEVIMRJEZSYVSJ TYPPMRKFEGOJVSQXLI)9EPXSKIXLIV1IER[LMPIWMKREXYVIW are being collected for a new referendum to cancel the earlier one. 7[MX^IVPERH´WVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)9LEZIVIEGLIHER MQTEWWIERHMXMWHMJ½GYPXXSTVIHMGXLS[XLITVSFPIQ[MPP be resolved. On the one hand, Switzerland is an important IGSRSQMGTEVXRIV[MXL[LMGLXLI)9RIIHWXS½RHE modus vivendi. On the other hand, free movement of workers is a principle of the single market in which many )9GMXM^IRWLEZIEHMVIGXMRXIVIWX Experience suggests that in practice Switzerland, with its population of 8 million, geographically surrounded by the )9[MXLMXWTSTYPEXMSRSJQMPPMSRYWYEPP]LEWPMXXPIGLSMGI FYXXSEGGITX)9VYPIWERHWXERHEVHWIZIRMRWIRWMXMZIEVIEW such as migrant labour, taxation, and banking where it has been forced to reform its banking secrecy laws.

Europe’s Mini-States 0MIGLXIRWXIMR TSTYPEXMSR MWEQIQFIVSJ)*8% and of the EEA, but that is not the case for the other )YVSTIERQMRMWXEXIW%RHSVVE  1SREGS   ERH7ER1EVMRS  [LSWIVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)9 EVIKSZIVRIHF]FMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXWGSZIVMRKWTIGM½G issues. The situation is rather incoherent, and Andorra and San Marino, which need modernisation and economic integration to replace their ‘tax-haven’ status, are reported to be interested in a more structured relationship. -REXXLIVIUYIWXSJXLI)YVSTIER'SYRGMPXLI )YVSTIER'SQQMWWMSRI\EQMRIHXLI)9´WVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI QMRMWXEXIWMXXSSOXLIZMI[XLEXEWIGXSVEPETTVSEGL[SYPH be too complicated and would not address the main issues, [LMPI)9QIQFIVWLMT[SYPHRSXFIJIEWMFPIWMRGI³XLI)9 institutions are currently not adapted to the accession of such small-sized countries’. The Commission concluded that membership of the EEA, or Association Agreements, could FIZMEFPISTXMSRWJSVXLI)9´WVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLIQMRMWXEXIW but no decisions have yet been taken on these matters. 1IER[LMPI2SV[E]LEWWMKRM½IHMXWVIPYGXERGIXSEGGITX these countries as members of the EEA.

Britain in EFTA? 8LMWVITSVXMWTYFPMWLIHMRXLI9RMXIH/MRKHSQEXEXMQI [LIREVIJIVIRHYQSR)9QIQFIVWLMTMWMRTVITEVEXMSR WSXLI)9´WVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)*8%GSYRXVMIWEVISJ particular interest. Would the EFTA/EEA framework FITSWWMFPIJSV&VMXEMR#9RXMP[IORS[XLIVIWYPXSJXLI

Regent’s Report 2015

&VMXMWLVIJIVIRHYQXLIUYIWXMSRMWWTIGYPEXMZI2SX WYVTVMWMRKP]XLI)9MRWXMXYXMSRWLEZIXEOIRRSTSWMXMSRSR JYXYVIVIPEXMSRWMJ&VMXEMRWLSYPHHIGMHIXSPIEZIXLI)9 More strange is the British government’s silence on the UYIWXMSR%OI]GSRWMHIVEXMSRMRXLIVIJIVIRHYQ[MPPFIXLI GSRWIUYIRGISJWE]MRK³RS´ERH&VMXMWLZSXIVWGERLEVHP] make an informed decision unless they know the reply to XLIUYIWXMSR³;LEXLETTIRWMJXLI9RMXIH/MRKHSQPIEZIW XLI)9#´ 1SWXGSQQIRXEXSVWGSRWMHIVXLEXWMRGIXLI)9MWMXWQENSV trading partner (taking 45% of exports of British goods ERHWIVZMGIWMRERHWYTTP]MRK SJMXWMQTSVXW  Britain’s priority objective would be to obtain the best possible access to the single market. So the ‘Swiss model’ or ‘Norwegian model’ are often suggested. The idea of RIKSXMEXMRKFMPEXIVEPEKVIIQIRXW[MXLXLI)9EW7[MX^IVPERH LEWHSRIMWEXXVEGXMZIWMRGIMXGSYPHSJJIV¾I\MFMPMX][MXLSYX XLIEYXSQEXMGMX]MRLIVIRXMRXLI))%&YXXLI)9MW increasingly frustrated by the Swiss model, and is unlikely XSSJJIVWYGLEVIPEXMSRWLMTXSXLI9/1SWXTVSFEFP]XLI ))%[SYPHFIXLI)9´WTVIJIVVIHSTXMSR;SYPHMXFI ETTVSTVMEXIJSV&VMXEMR# Some British eurosceptics consider the EEA to be MRXIVIWXMRK%REREP]WMWSJEPXIVREXMZIWXS)9QIQFIVWLMT published by the Bruges Group suggested that the EEA would be the best option, and former Cabinet Minister 3[IR4EXIVWSRLEWGEPPIHJSVXLI9/XSPIEZIXLI)9ERH EHSTXE2SV[IKMERWX]PIETTVSEGLXSXLI)9 1IQFIVWLMTSJ)*8%MWETVIGSRHMXMSRJSVRSR)9WXEXIW XSNSMRXLI))%'SRWIUYIRXP]&VMXEMR[SYPH½VWXLEZI XSVINSMR)*8%[LMGL[SYPHVIUYMVIXLIEKVIIQIRXSJ all the EFTA member states. While this would appear in principle to be easy, in practice it could present problems, for Norway would not welcome being dislodged from its present role as the biggest member of the EFTA ‘pillar’. *SVXLI)9QIQFIVWXEXIWXLI))%MWE[IPPIWXEFPMWLIH and well-tried framework which they would not wish to VIQSHIPSVVIRIKSXMEXIJSVXLI9/2SV[E]ERH-GIPERH for their part, would not accept more favourable treatment JSV&VMXEMRMRXLI))%XLERJSVXLIQ7S[LEXXLI)9 would probably offer to Britain is the EEA in its present GSR½KYVEXMSRMRGPYHMRKEYXSQEXMGETTPMGEXMSRSJXLIacquis, JVIIQSZIQIRXSJ)9GMXM^IRWERHEGSRXVMFYXMSRXSXLI )9FYHKIX From Britain’s point of view, such a relationship could




LEZIWSQIEXXVEGXMSRW-X[SYPHKMZITVMZMPIKIHEGGIWWXS the single market, without participation in the common EKVMGYPXYVEPTSPMG]SVXLIGSQQSR½WLIVMIWTSPMG]&VMXEMR´W FYHKIXEV]GSRXVMFYXMSRXSXLI)9[SYPHTVSFEFP]FI reduced: at present its net contribution is about £135 per LIEH[LMPIMRXLI))%2SV[E]´WGSRXVMFYXMSRXSXLI)9 budget is about £78 per head. But membership of the EEA involves an important loss of sovereignty. The British parliament would not easily ratify a XVIEX]YRHIV[LMGL&VMXEMREGGITXWXSETTP]XLI)9´WWMRKPI market decisions without having an effective say in the QEOMRKSJXLSWIHIGMWMSRW8LI-GIPERHMGEREP]WX.SLERRE .SRWHSXXMVLEWSFWIVZIH³*SVERSMW]REXMSREGGYWXSQIH to a place at the table and having its voice heard, that could feel like a very un-splendid isolation.’ The Norwegian TSPMXMGMER2MOSPEM%WXVYTLEWI\TVIWWIHMXMRERSXLIV[E]³-J ]SY[ERXXSVYRXLI)9WXE]MRXLI)9-J]SY[ERXXSFI VYRF]XLI)9JIIPJVIIXSNSMRYWMRXLI))%´

2SV[E]-GIPERH7[MX^IVPERH 181

doing_things_by_halves_-_lessons_from_switzerland_and_ norway_cbi_report_july_2013.pdf The UK and the EU: Alternatives to EU Membership, Senior )YVSTIER)\TIVXW.ERYEV][[[VIKIRXWEGYO QIHME7))&EGOKVSYRHTETIV½REP*IFTHJ ³)9)\TERWMSRERH;MHIV)YVSTI´F]+VELEQ%ZIV]MR The European Union: How Does It Work? XLIH 3\JSVH 9RMZIVWMX]4VIWW Suisse-Union Européenne: L’Adhésion Impossible? rQIqH  F]6IRq7GL[SO4VIWWIW4SP]XIGLRMUYIWIX9RMZIVWMXEMVIW Romandes, 2015 The European Union’s Non-Members: Independence under HegemonyIHMXIHF])3)VMOWIRERH.)*SWWYQ Routledge, 2015

-R&VMXEMRXLIVIMWEKVS[MRKVIEPMWEXMSRXLEXMRVIPEXMSR XSXLIWMRKPIQEVOIXPIEZMRKXLI)9[SYPHVIWYPXMRE loss rather than a gain of sovereignty. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons has commented XLEX³GYVVIRXEVVERKIQIRXWJSVVIPEXMSRW[MXLXLI)9 maintained by Norway or Switzerland are not appropriate JSVXLI9/-RFSXLGEWIWXLIGSYRXV]MWSFPMKIHXSEHSTX some or all of the body of single market law without XLIEFMPMX]XSWLETIMX-JMXMWMRXLIMRXIVIWXWSJXLI9/ to remain in the single market, it should remain in the )9SVPEYRGLERIJJSVXJSVVEHMGEPMRWXMXYXMSREPGLERKIMR Europe to give decision-making rights in the single market to all participating states’. But there is no chance that the )9[SYPHEKVIIXSRSRQIQFIVWXEXIWXEOMRKTEVXMRMXW internal decisions: after all, the right to vote is essentially what distinguishes membership from non-membership

Further Reading Outside and Inside: Norway’s agreements with the EU, Norwegian Government, 2012: www.eu-norway.org/Global/ SiteFolders/webeu/Nou2012_2_Chapter%2013.pdf The European Economic Area revisited by Graham Avery, )YVSTIER4SPMG]'IRXVI1EVGL[[[ITGIY documents/uploads/pub_1428_the_european_economic_ area_revisited.pdf Doing things by halves? Alternatives to UK EU membership: Lessons from Switzerland and Norway, Confederation of &VMXMWL-RHYWXV].YRI[[[GFMSVKYOQIHME

Regent’s Report 2015


Facts and Figures: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland Norway

Refugees JVSQ7SQEPMEJVSQ)VMXVIEJVSQ-VEU JVSQ%JKLERMWXERWXEXIPIWW

Geography/demography %VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMX]TIVWUOQ 0MJII\TIGXERG]]IEVW Growth rate: 1.19%

Economy +(4FMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH Growth rate: 1.8% 1MPMXEV]I\TIRHMXYVI SJ+(4  4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI9REGGSYRXIH % of economy in Agriculture: 1.7% -RHYWXV] 7IVZMGIW 

Drugs and other criminality issues According to the Norwegian Customs, most amphetamine MR2SV[E]GSQIWJVSQMPPIKEPPEFSVEXSVMIWMR4SPERH and the Baltic states, while crystal methamphetamine is more likely to have been produced in the Czech Republic. Cannabis resin mostly comes from Morocco via the Netherlands or neighbouring Nordic countries. A substantial amount of herbal cannabis detected by the 2SV[IKMER'YWXSQWGSQIWJVSQ7[IHIRERH4SPERH Heroin comes from Afghanistan via Hungary, countries in the western Balkans, and along the Silk Road via the northern European countries. Most recent data indicates that cocaine enters Norway through postal consignments JVSQXLI)YVSTIERGSRXMRIRX 4SPERHERH7TEMR )GWXEW] like cocaine, reaches Norway in postal consignments, mainly from the Netherlands but also from Belgium, Germany and Spain.

Foreign trade Exports: FMPPMSR TIXVSPIYQERHTIXVSPIYQ TVSHYGXWQEGLMRIV]ERHIUYMTQIRXQIXEPWGLIQMGEPW WLMTW½WL  Imports: FMPPMSR QEGLMRIV]ERHIUYMTQIRX GLIQMGEPWQIXEPWJSSHWXYJJW Main export partners: 9/2IXLIVPERHW+IVQER]*VERGI 7[IHIR97 Main import partners: 7[IHIR+IVQER]'LMRE9/ (IRQEVO97

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Transnational issues Norway and Russia signed a comprehensive maritime boundary agreement in 2010. Both Norway and Denmark

+VIIRPERH LEZIGSRGIVRWEFSYXVMZEPGPEMQWMRXLI%VGXMG and, like Russia, have submitted data to the Commission on 0MQMXWXSXLI'SRXMRIRXEP7LIPJ '0'7 

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015

8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

Iceland Geograpy/demography %VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMX]TIVWUOQ Life expectancy: 81.22 years +VS[XLVEXI

Economy +(4FMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH Growth rate: 2.9% 1MPMXEV]I\TIRHMXYVI SJ+(4  4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI % of economy in %KVMGYPXYVI -RHYWXV] Services: 71.7%


Facts and Figures: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland Foreign trade Exports:FMPPMSR ½WLERH½WLTVSHYGXW EPYQMRMYQ ERMQEPTVSHYGXWJIVVSWMPMGSRHMEXSQMXI Imports: FMPPMSR QEGLMRIV]ERHIUYMTQIRX TIXVSPIYQTVSHYGXWJSSHWXYJJWXI\XMPIW  Main export partners: 2IXLIVPERHW+IVQER]9/2SV[E] 97*VERGI Main import partners: 2SV[E]97+IVQER]'LMRE&VE^MP Denmark

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 MR¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Refugees

Imports: FMPPMSR QEGLMRIV]GLIQMGEPWZILMGPIW QIXEPWEKVMGYPXYVEPTVSHYGXWXI\XMPIW  Main export partners: +IVQER]97-XEP]*VERGI9/'LMRE Main import partners: +IVQER]-XEP]*VERGI'LMRE97 Austria

Government budget 6IZIRYIFMPPMSR )\TIRHMXYVIFMPPMSR 4YFPMGHIFX SJ+(4 -R¾EXMSRVEXI EZIVEKISZIVXLVII]IEVW  

Refugees VIJYKIIWWXEXIPIWWEW]PYQWIIOIVW The Swiss government is expecting over 30,000 asylum applications in 2015 due to the crisis around the Mediterranean.

119 stateless.

Drugs and other criminality issues 8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

Switzerland Geography/demography %VIEWUOQ 4STYPEXMSR (IRWMX]TIVWUOQ Life expectancy: 82.39 years Growth rate: 0.78%

Transit country and consumer of South American cocaine, south-west Asian heroin, and western European W]RXLIXMGWHSQIWXMGGERREFMWGYPXMZEXMSRERHPMQMXIH IGWXEW]TVSHYGXMSR%QENSVMRXIVREXMSREP½RERGMEPGIRXVI vulnerable to the layering and integration stages of money PEYRHIVMRKHIWTMXIWMKRM½GERXPIKMWPEXMSRERHVITSVXMRK VIUYMVIQIRXWERSR]QMX]ERHWIGVIG]VYPIWTIVWMWXERH non-residents are permitted to conduct offshore business through various intermediaries. 8VERWTEVIRG]-RXIVREXMSREPGSVVYTXMSRMRHI\

Economy +(4FMPPMSR +(4TIVLIEH Growth rate: 2% 1MPMXEV]I\TIRHMXYVI SJ+(4  4STYPEXMSRFIPS[TSZIVX]PMRI   % of economy in Agriculture: 0.8% -RHYWXV] Services: 72.5%

Foreign trade Exports: FMPPMSR QEGLMRIV]GLIQMGEPWQIXEPW [EXGLIWEKVMGYPXYVEPTVSHYGXW

Regentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Report 2015


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Europe’s Neighbours: From Morocco to Moscow. The Regent’s Report 2015  

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