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Review of Food Fraud Vulnerabilities within the Meat Sector R.D.D. Anderton* * Corresponding author. Coal Pit Barn, Stonelands Farm, Ribchester Road, Hothersall, Preston, Lancashire, PR3 3XA roger@brendanandertonbutchers.co.uk


Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1 1.1. Background of food fraud ............................................................................................................ 1 1.2. Food fraud .................................................................................................................................... 1 1.3. Vulnerability ................................................................................................................................. 2 2. Materials and Methods ....................................................................................................................... 3 3. Results and discussion ........................................................................................................................ 4 3.1. Substitution/adulteration ............................................................................................................ 4 3.1.1. Substitution with different meat species.............................................................................. 4 3.1.2. Substitution with lower meat quality / spoilt meat .............................................................. 6 3.1.3. Adulteration of meat with illegal processing aid / toxic materials ....................................... 7 3.2. Lessons learned from major meat producing companies ........................................................... 8 4.2.1. Brazil...................................................................................................................................... 8 3.2.2. China ..................................................................................................................................... 9 3.2.3. Poland ................................................................................................................................. 11 3.3. Cultures and Behaviour.............................................................................................................. 12 3.3.1. Halal Integrity ...................................................................................................................... 12 3.4. Vulnerabilities ............................................................................................................................ 13 3.4.1. Vulnerability assessment and control measures ................................................................ 13 3.4.2. Lack of Technical Controls................................................................................................... 17 4. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 17 5. Acknowledgments............................................................................................................................. 19 6. References ........................................................................................................................................ 19


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1. Introduction 1.1. Background of food fraud The adulteration and mislabelling of meat, is not a new phenomenon. Within the 1200's, food fraud substitution was reported for the very first time by Thornton, in Florence, Italy. Fraudsters mixed minced beef and buffalo meat together to mislead the consumer and command a premium return for lower priced cheaper meat (Bhat, Mantoo, Salahuddin, Adil, & Pal, 2016). Currently within the modern world of food production, counterfeit food has developed into an increasing worldwide concern, with occurrences of blatant food fraud of certain meats considerably damaging customer faith within the meat industry. Emphasis on customer safety is paramount and occasionally the food consumers love and count on for good health are contaminated/adulterated by fraudsters (Uyttendal, De Boeck, & Jacxsens, 2016). Adulterated meat/food is food that is impure/tainted, harmful, unwholesome and that has befallen to being made inferior in quality, specifically by having supplementary components added, along with not meeting lawful standards. (Collins Dictionary, 2019).

1.2. Food fraud In 2011, the description of food fraud was publicised by Spink and Moyer. The communal phrase was applied to incorporate the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering, or misrepresentation of food, food ingredients, food packaging and false or misleading claims made about a product for economic gain. Spink and Moyer's investigation led them to propose 7 types of food fraud including “adulterant-substance, counterfeit product, diversion of products outside of intended markets, over-run, simulation, tampering and theft” (Spink & Moyer, 2011). Manning theorises that the concept of the motivational side of food fraud needs to be completely understood before appropriately combating the problem. They also suggest that “the desire for gain with low risk of getting caught” is the main motivation behind fraudulent activity within the food supply chain and especially the meat sector. Furthermore, the levels of monetary gain will vary on conditional factors such as the precision of techniques used within the fraudulent operation (Manning, 2016). Furthermore, it is understandable that when there is a food fraud incident there is elevated risk of exposure to a products wholesomeness and integrity; raising the likely hood of an economic hazard. When there is an macroeconomic hazard to the country or countries reputation it causes severe damage to the eminence of it in the global meat supply chain (Spink, 2015). The horse meat incidents in 2013 and 2019 in Poland highlighted this; creating stigma within the meat trade towards the integrity and authenticity of Polish beef. The key terminology to be used is "a fraudster" and not "a criminal", because fraud may not be a violation of a criminal statute but could be a civil violation of a contract thus making it fraud and therefore rendering the individuals/instigators as fraudsters (Spink, 2015).


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1.3. Vulnerability Ritchie reports that the meat trade has grown to almost five times more than the 1960's, growing from 70 million tonnes to above 330 million tonnes in 2017. In the 1960's there were approximately 3 billion people worldwide and this has risen to more than 7.6 billion and these figures are indicative when assessing vulnerability along with time, place and lack of technical and managerial controls (Ritchie, 2019). A vulnerability within the meat sector is a weakness within the supply chain that can be manipulated. This can encompass unintentional and intentional adulteration or terror attacks (Casciani, 2018). Exposure to fraud or lack of overall process control regardless of whether it is deliberate creates severe ramifications along the entire food network and forms vulnerability points in a supply system. Occurrences of this nature leads to a lack of transparency, potential adverse allergic reactions and food borne illnesses to the unexpected contaminant. Vulnerability, as identified by The World Health Organisation (WHO), should be measured and built upon “scientific, economic, political, and social circumstances” of a continent or nation in order to understand and rank the threats and vulnerability (The WHO, 2004). An example of scientific factors would be the lack of availability to technological advances for identifying speciation. Economic factors could relate to lack of funding for research and examples of political factors may be corruption and fraud at senior levels. Social factors could be the views of the population of a country that impact on the beliefs of another such as consuming halal meats, horse meat and dog meat that are considered the normality for edible food in certain countries. This will also help meat supply chains authenticate their vulnerability assessments which must be undertaken as a multidisciplinary task, by means of contribution from “legal, intelligence, medical, scientific, economic and political sectors” (Manning, Baines, & Chadd, 2005). Vulnerabilities can be measured with the implementation of a vulnerability assessment. These strategies are comparable to that of a hazard analysis risk assessment but instead measure the potential for a vulnerability to occur in the supply chain. For example, a product from a developing country would be measured a higher risk prone to vulnerability to that of a product sourced from a developed country such as the United Kingdom (UK) (International Monetary Fund, 2018). Many developing countries lack the resources to participate in international trade because of the difficulties in complying with the requirements of the food safety standards. The underlying reasons for this are outdated laws, lack of knowledge in terms of limited coordination between organizations handling food safety issues, under-funding of national research institutes and lack of awareness for standards and quality. In moving towards the development of standards, consumer participation to demonstrate their concern over the quality and safety of food is correspondingly on the rise (Rahmat, Cheong, & Rizal, 2016). Rahmat, Cheong, and Rizal (2016), reports the challenges in developing countries contributed to the wold wide food fraud scandals and the primary explanations for this are: obsolete regulations, absence of knowledge in terms of inadequate harmonization amongst establishments, management/food safety issues along with underfunding of general research organizations and nonexistence of awareness for standards and quality (Rahmat, et al., 2016). The findings clearly state a link between a country’s culture and social status and the risk of vulnerability to increase in the specific country, due to species tests not being implemented by the buyer.


Page |3 Spink et al suggests that it is impossible for vulnerabilities to be totally eradicated. However, once you have identified the potential vulnerabilities by trying to nullify and prevent weaknesses within the meat industry supply chain, this can help reduce or eliminate the likelihood of the event of fraudulent acts occurring (Spink, Ortega, Chen, & Wu, 2016). Examples of vulnerabilities in the meat sector include: • • •

Opportunities in time and place regarding Polish abattoirs slaughtering unfit and diseased animals at night in order to avoid official supervision (BBC News, 2019). Economically motivated adulteration in cases such as the horse gate scandal of 2013 (Sheil, 2013). Lack of control measures in developing countries including Brazil (Leite, Freitas, & Freitas, 2018).

Absence of understanding throughout the world regarding the purchasing of safe and wholesome meat and it is therefore imperative that food businesses take all reasonable steps to ensure the supply lines remain unjeopardized from adulteration and other fraudulent activity. The foremost way to avoid these sorts of vulnerabilities in the supply chain is to identify them and understand why they happen once they have been set in motion. Therefore, food safety controls can be implemented, monitored and verified along with the implementation of adequate training (van Ruth, Huisman, & Luning, 2017). This literature review set out and identified the vulnerabilities that the meat sector faces daily. It addressed the stringent vulnerability key elements defined by van Ruth et al; these are: opportunities, motivations, lack of control measures and use of previous cases of fraudulent activity in order to identify vulnerabilities (Everstine, Spink, & Kennedy, 2013).

2. Materials and Methods A methodical systematic literature review was conducted by means of visiting numerous libraries along with use of web-based search engines. The key words searched for related to food/meat fraud vulnerabilities in order to find peer reviewed scientific journal articles i.e. food control, food protection, meat science, food policy, British food journal and reliable newspaper articles. Furthermore, articles from The Telegraph, BBC News, governing body institution publications i.e. Food Standards Agency reports (FSA) were reviewed. To ensure a contemporary review was conducted the sources chosen were published between 2004 and 2019 vis-à-vis food fraud vulnerabilities within the global meat supply chain. The use of scientific journal articles allows insight to legitimate information; unfortunately, these articles are published after a substantial delay post-incident. The usage of reliable newspaper and news articles allow access to information and are particularly relevant as food fraud cases are typically identified in the media first. Governing body publications will allow access to information which will allow for more precise conclusions to be drawn.


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3. Results and discussion 3.1. Substitution/adulteration Food fraud is a combined term used to cover the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition, tampering or misrepresentation of food. Merriam Webster defines the term adulteration as: to corrupt, debase or make impure by the addition of a foreign or inferior substance or element; especially preparing for sale by replacing more valuable with less valuable or inert ingredients (Spink & Moyer, 2011). European food authenticity has been scrutinised from 2013 when the horsemeat scandal was reported in an article by the European Consumer Organisation, Bureau EuropĂŠen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC). This account confirmed that in Brussels, meat products were often mislabelled and typically found that the meat content and species were different than what was presented on the label packaging. Adulterated meat was sold unwittingly to consumers through the European Union (EU) that had undergone processing to enhance the products natural weight with excessive and undeclared amounts of water. Along with additional food enhancers such as sulphites in minced beef and chicken disguised as veal in kebabs demonstrated a lack of traceability and pinpointing the deceit. BEUC director Monique Goyens said in an announcement: "consumers buying roast pork or grilled sausages should know from the label how much meat they really contain. No one wants to buy water for the price of meat!" The investigation results correspondingly exposed the practise of utilising unlawful food additives along with the exploitation of manufacturing products (News 24, 2015).

3.1.1. Substitution with different meat species Howell (2018) reports that meat products such as curries, pork sausages, pork ribs, kebabs, mince beef and lamb failed investigations carried out in Scotland. The Food Standards Agency Scotland carried out 631 tests in 2017 and identified that 48 (8%) contained meat that were not present on the label. The studies exposed the vulnerabilities such as the lack of control measures and one case included poultry and minced lamb sold around Glasgow containing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from both species. The investigation could not explain the elevated levels due to cross-contamination (Howell, 2018). Within the United Kingdom, the FSA exposed that contaminated/adulterated meat fraud was prevalent. BBC news reporter Hamish Mackay confirmed that in 2017 a fifth of the meat that had been tested uncovered DNA from animals that was not expected or declared on labelling information (Mackay, 2018). The investigation was taken from 665 samples from England, Wales and Northern Ireland and confirmed that 145 samples (22%) contained meat that had partially or entirely been prepared from meat that was not mentioned on the label. Beef (bovine) was discovered to be the most adulterated protein mainly with pork meat. Nonetheless, pork, chicken, lamb and turkey were also found to contain hidden proteins that were not expected within the products. Regularly adulterated meat was exposed as mincemeat (burgers, sausages and kebabs) derived from all the meat species. Takeaways and restaurant curries similarly highlighted significant regular occurrences. Supplementary detailed analysis made by the FSA exposed that 73 (50%) of the corrupted meat products originated from superstores. Restaurant investigations unearthed 50 (35%) nonconformances and the remaining 22 (15%) arose from food processing plants. The FSA stated that substituting lavish meat alongside a substandard inexpensive product is widespread and the habitual


Page |5 motive behind the duplicitous actions is economically motivated (BBC News, 2018). Technical control measures can also detect fraudulent activities in the meat industry not just with label misconducts. Scientific DNA testing undoubtedly highlights fraud or unintentional mistakes as shown with pork in Italian horse meat sausages (Di Pinto A. , Forte, Conversano, & Tantillo, 2004) and in beef and pâté products (Cavani & Petracci, 2004). Mansoor et al (2015), states that around 30% of meat, traded within India, had been adulterated and this is echoed around the rest of the world, thereby severely damaging the reputation of the meat sector. Unfortunately, when meat is exposed to fraudulent activities, the wholesomeness and dependability can be jeopardised. Mansoor et al affirms that due to higher demand, together with rising costs, endangers meat as a likely target for substitution, dilution and mislabelling along with other forms of defilement. The report clarified that meat from various species were identified using serological analysis and were successful in uncovering adulteration in meat (Mansoor, et al., 2015). 3.1.1.1. Horse Gate The UK DEFRA Review scrutinised the veracity of the supply chain after the horse-meat scandal of 2013 and deemed it as a textbook case of extensive food fraud (Sheil, 2013). It implicated the use of horsemeat in meals instead of minced beef. Horsemeat was innocently bought by unsuspecting businesses throughout the UK after a group of individuals clandestinely blended it with beef products and then fabricated regulating control records and placed it on sale as “100% beef” to producers that manufacture foods for large scale retailers. Most wrongdoing was inspired by economic gain and built upon lies and deception (Sheil, 2013). An account of the food scares in Europe reported by Humphrey (2011), inferred that the horse gate scandal of 2013 had transformed the meat trade forever. Horse meat consumption was only prohibited in Norway, Iceland and Sweden (Humphrey, 2011). This led to an identified vulnerability in the cultural and behavioural aspect of Vulnerability Assessment and Critical Control Points (VACCP) (Banu, 2009). The fraudulent activity was the transparency of the product leading it to break compulsory legislative requirements (Banu, 2009). The desire for monetary gain was the motivator for fraudulent activity along with the cultural and behavioural aspect of the fraudsters lack of comprehension of food fraud. Due to horsemeat being acceptably consumed in the majority of Europe, the naïve fraudsters could have underestimated the consequences of their fraudulent activity. The most severe vulnerability point was further down the supply chain when it was later mislabelled as beef. IKEA befell to Europe’s food scandal and removed its signature Swedish meatballs from sale across its European stores because traces of horsemeat was discovered. Following on from the authorities carrying out more comprehensive tests, the findings signified that food adulteration might be a more common and prevalent practice than initially thought. Simon Coveney, the agriculture minister for Ireland reported: “clearly there has been fraud on a colossal scale across multiple countries in the E.U.” This fraudulent activity has advanced reservations towards the worth and administration of Europe’s supply network of abattoirs, meat producers, meat distributors and retailers. Clive Black, a retail analyst at Shore Capital, stipulates “the extensiveness of the contamination identifies that there has been a considerable amount of deceitful fraudulent activity and that Ikea was unaware of the dishonest actions” (Higgins & Castle, 2013).


Page |6 Ikea decided to cease selling the produce to maintain customer faith, even though unquestionable DNA testing had been carried out on products for numerous weeks. This incident affected an assortment of countries as follows: Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, France, Britain, Portugal, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Ireland. DNA tests carried out within the UK identified that one percent of beef products remained contaminated with horse meat (contamination being gross adulteration at or exceeding the 1% legal threshold (FSA, 2013)); the case highlighted issues with regards to the mislabelling of meat products (Higgins & Castle, 2013). Willy Selten, a meat wholesaler in Amsterdam deceptively labelled horsemeat as beef and sold it to unsuspecting customers for financial gain (News 24, 2015). This inevitably caused thousands of tonnes of meat being withdrawn from sale and Selten was sentenced to two and a half years in prison. Nonetheless, prior to Seltons' sentencing between the years of 2011 and 2012, Selten bought and manufactured in excess of 330 tonnes of horsemeat and sold it as beef (News 24, 2015). This was severely damaging to the country’s economic standing in the meat industry as the entire nation was tarnished by the scandal. Farming is vital to the economy of the Netherlands and with a population of only 17 million, it is the second largest agricultural international exporter; sadly, this was not an isolated incident (News 24, 2015). In January 2013, the horse gate scandal detected evidence of horsemeat in burgers traded at two British superstores. Furthermore, contaminated beef goods were exposed throughout Europe, with traders in France and the Netherlands mislabelling horsemeat as beef. The business maintained it was a careless mistake and was unintentional, but the courts ruled otherwise highlighting that financial records and invoices without doubt showed that the business intentionally and deceptively traded and distributed in horsemeat. Selten's firms paid for more than 300 tonnes of horsemeat from traders in the Netherlands, Ireland and Britain during 2011 and 2012 and then trading it on to around 500 businesses throughout Europe. This meat scandal ended with 50,000 tonnes of meat being withdrawn (News 24, 2015).

3.1.2. Substitution with lower meat quality / spoilt meat Minced meat is an alluring victim used for adulteration by substitution or partial replacement of subordinate meat or ingredients. Unapproved misconduct poses a significant public health risk because certain people may react to the adulterant due to food allergies or intolerances. Identification is problematic to find with this type of food fraud vulnerability because by mincing meat, the morphological structure is altered and many company's do not have the scientific technologies to analyse them (Kamruzamman, et al., 2015). Macauley (2013), gave an account of a meat scandal involving dog food being consumed as human food. The scope of the fraudulent revenue on 1,000 tonnes of meat uncovered stood to be in the region of ÂŁ3 million. The economic motivations within this case help us understand the actions of the fraudsters. The article also revealed that countless identified incidents within crime networks were not pursued. This is severely damaging to the meat industry and demonstrates the inherent problems associated with lack of funding for control measures. Similarly, the FSA are finding it difficult to tackle the increasing vulnerabilities of food crime within the meat sector (Macauley, 2013). A study in 2016 carried out in the US on 258 burgers identified unforeseen supplementary meat along with a lack of key ingredients within the burgers tested. The supplementary meat was identified


Page |7 through laboratory DNA analysis to be rat meat. Following on from the horse gate scandal, many customers in burger and hot dog restaurants have had their faith restored in manufactured products. The possibility of a burger containing horse meat had been lowered due to manufacturing plants routinely implementing technical controls to identify the presence of horse DNA. At the commencement of the investigation it was never imagined that scientific analysis would uncover a much more sinister meat than just rat meat; disturbingly, it identified one case of human DNA. The report stipulated that the occurrence of human DNA was most likely to be due to physical contamination from saliva, other bodily fluids, human hair, skin or fingernails that had unintentionally been processed during manufacturing. Along with the meat-based burgers, nearly a quarter of vegetarian burgers contained other components not stipulated on the label. This illustrated that vegetarian burgers had traces of beef and black bean burgers were manufactured without any black beans. Approximately 6 percent of burgers had been contaminated or the meat substituted for a cheaper alternative. Food safety obligations were breached on numerous occasions and the findings confirmed that 4.3 percent of burgers tested positive for pathogenic DNA leading to food safety epidemics and food poisoning. The pathogens found in the meat could lead to tuberculosis (TB), gastroenteritis and foodborne illness's such as Escherichia coli blood disease (Revesz, 2016).

3.1.3. Adulteration of meat with illegal processing aid / toxic materials Melamine, when added into protein rich foods such as meat, can increase the protein content and have significant visually aiding properties. Although it has benefits, the compound used within food is a clear threat to the consumer as melamine is toxic to humans when combined with other contaminants. The Inglefinger report states that melamine was still being used within agriculture and as a result, unintentionally passing into the meat supply chain through agricultural feeds that had been produced with goods comprising of melamine such as fertilizers or pesticides/herbicides (Inglefinger, 2008). It was found that in 2009 melamine had breached into the meat supply chain in Oman. Kadim stated that the meat contained melamine levels of serious concern. With 8 out of 16 poultry companies' products containing melamine in the range of 25.6 - 73mg/kg, this was considerably high, as it is deemed less than 0.015mg/kg does not pose a public health threat. The results indicated that the contamination in poultry products may have originated from feed which was contaminated with melamine (Bhattacharjee, 2011). This incident prompted many countries and regions worldwide, including China, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Canada and the European Union to establish action limits for the presence of melamine and/or melamine and its analogues in foods (Kadim, 2009). Within this incident the vulnerability point is not in the meat preparation/processing stage, it is the beginning of the agricultural phase of the supply chain where the animal feed is substituted with a lower priced bulking agent containing melamine. China's police force detained $12,300,000 of perilous meat that was drenched in bleach. People thought to be affiliated to criminal organisations were arrested at the scene with police discovering 1,000 tons of meat and offal. These products had been shipped from global supply chains including Thailand, the United States (US) and Brazil. The Chinese authorities stated that the meat seized was from all species and was saturated in a hazardous substance to cleanse the meat and add weighted value to the products. The hazardous


Page |8 substance (bleach) was highly toxic. Police officials warned that if the meat had been consumed it would undoubtably have caused “serious harm to health and wellbeing”(Campbell, 2016).

3.2. Lessons learned from major meat producing companies Globalization is simply a network of countries which supply each other with goods, as the world has developed these networks have become larger and more intercontinental, this in turn has revolutionised the meat sector but not without encountering numerous problematic vulnerabilities throughout the supply network (Fukuda, 2015). Globalization is a vulnerability, because it allows meat which has been a victim of fraud to be transported around the globe at an effortless rate (Inglefinger, 2008). It has been identified by Moyer et al that the greater the amount of food a country produces, the more the supply chain is exposed to potentially fraudulent activity (Moyer, DeVries, & Spink, 2017). Other factors to consider when assessing countries or regions meat supply chain are whether the country is classed as having an “emerging and developing economy” or more recently been declared as a “newly industrialized country” by the International Monetary Fund (International Monetary Fund, 2018). These factors which connect the country to having a large and increasing population along with social and political instability form the perfect environment for vulnerability to occur in the meat supply chain according to the United States Pharmacopeia (United States Pharmacopeia, 2016). Various countries were chosen to illuminate the globalised meat supply chain and vulnerabilities within the specified country. These countries include Brazil and China and were chosen for the review as they are a diverse sample of the world's leaders in meat production. They have also succumbed to being at the forefront of major food fraud incidences in recent years thus making them ideal for this research. Poland was also chosen in order to add another dimension to the research to offer a view from a European country. Poland has been subject to meat fraud vulnerabilities in a continent which is deemed to have higher standards of control measures in place from being part of the EU.

4.2.1. Brazil The World Trade Organization (WTO) state that Brazil alone is the third major country exporter of agricultural goods in the world (World Trade Organization, 2017). There are many cases which highlight how vulnerable the meat supply chain is within a country where it has become an open market for deceptive fraudsters. Dong et al reports that every stage within production, from the purchasing of raw materials to the distribution of the product is subject to a variety of vulnerabilities (Dong, Luo, & Luo, 2016). Felkl reports the replacement of chicken in pork sausage and Ducatti et al investigated the replacement of soy protein in beef burgers (Felkl, 2014). It has been established that using numerous methods such as declaring false information on the label, the injection of excess water, the addition of water to frozen meat, the manipulation of the country of origin, along with the use of illegal chemicals during the production phase; these methods of fraud are highly lucrative to fraudsters (Ducatti, Pinto, Sartori, & Ducatti, 2016). The reasons behind why animal-based food is so susceptible to vulnerabilities were investigated by Tibola, Silva, Dossa, and Patrício. They suggest that the complexity involved within the Brazilian supply chain creates many parameters to be examined. They also advocate the improvement of the following parameters and infrastructure to help prevent vulnerabilities:


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Effective execution of governing management systems Improved testing and monitoring Education of food manufacturers and handlers The enhancement of accurate, swift, and cost-effective means to detect deception The readiness of dynamic means to recognise the compound elements of foods

In 2017, Brazil had to suspend exports over accusations of businesses selling and exporting hazardous meat (BBC News, 2017). This gave rise to China banning the imports from Brazil and prompted the EU to cease purchasing from businesses incriminated. This meat fraud case triggered large scale investigations and resulted in undoubtable proof that businesses had befallen to selling rancid meat for a considerable amount of time for financial gain. It was found that acid and additional substances were used to disguise meats and in certain cases, these additional substances were carcinogenic. Brazil is the world's largest red meat and poultry exporter and the cases stated have furnished global apprehension about the limitations of their meat supply integrity in a market worth 9.7 billion pounds a year (BBC News, 2017). The Brazilian poultry industry had recently been subjected to another food-safety investigation with a strong indication that there was extensive fraudulent activity committed. This stretched to senior management at BRF S.A between 2012 and 2015 implicating three of its processing factories and executives including former Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Pedro Faria. The police investigation found that inadequate hygienic conditions and occurrences of salmonella beyond the prerequisites stipulated by specific importers were constants. Up to five laboratories accredited by the Agriculture Ministry along with an unidentified business, fabricated results of scientific analysis on meat that they had tested. The scandal was identified and branded as: 'weak flesh probe', in March 2017 and the Brazilian police found considerable evidence that 21 meat establishments enticed government officials to accept sales and exports knowing that the meat was tainted or rancid; thus, the company in question had evaded sales restrictions and penalties. (Leite, Freitas, & Freitas, 2018).

3.2.2. China The United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Service has estimated that China is the fourth biggest beef farming country in the world following the US, Brazil and the combined countries of the EU. The Chinese beef market in 2018 was calculated at 7.3 million metric tons along with an approximate cattle herd of 96.85 million (Peel, 2018). China has morphed into an international industrial unit used for authentic and counterfeit products (Liu, Yannopoulou, Bian, & Elliott, 2015). Cases highlighted that substitution is the uppermost recurrent kind of fraudulent activity in China and recounted approximately 60,000 counterfeit food cases amassing to around 15,500 tons of inadequate food seized. Furthermore, 180 food manufacturers were publicised for intentionally using appalling components to manufacture meat products (Veeck, Yu, & Burns, 2010). Economic development and the increased worldwide population have placed significant demands to various industries along the global supply chain from farmers to manufacturers (Worldbank, 2017). China is one of the world’s leading food-producing and consumption countries and has grown into a hotbed of counterfeit and soiled meat with cases such as rat, dog, horse and camel meat all being used as substitutes for products such as beef or sheep meat (O'Brien, 2017). China continuously undergoes never-ending upsurges for fraudulent activities although it is correspondingly a country that spawns growing technologies to counter meat/food fraud (O'Brien, 2017).


P a g e | 10 There are many reported cases of food fraud associated with meat products from China. A factory in Liaoyang, substituted duck meat containing sodium nitrite for beef. Notably, consumption of 3 grams of sodium nitrite can cause adverse effects to human health including death (Zhu, 2013). Cases such as this, continue regardless of evidence that customers would be prepared to pay a premium for safer meat guarantees if it is approved by the authorities. The report by Ortega et al (2011) states that the Chinese customers have little faith in the monitoring structure that it can keep contaminated meat out of the food supply chain. Notwithstanding, breaches of food safety incidences occur more commonly in developed areas because inner-city food supply assemblies are more multifaceted, consequently generating added chances for meat to succumb to contamination (Ortega, Wang, Wu, & Olynk, 2011). The report on food contamination which uses the melamine case as an example illustrates how one incident which occurred in a single country can result in worldwide incidents being reported (Inglefinger, 2008). Fast food giant McDonalds suppliers Shanghai Husi Foods were found to be mincing, mixing and processing meat that had expired into new products and falsifying production dates leading to the Chinese police force arresting five individuals as part of the investigation into the fraudulent activity. McDonalds stated that in China, beef, chicken and pork dishes were contaminated throughout the country, nonetheless the level of impact varied across the nation including health, economic, regulatory penalty and loss of brand value. This led to all the adulterated products being recalled from the suppliers (News 24, 2014). Reports found that Huang Fuping, had been running a feline abattoir for decades in Chengdu. On face value, Huang Fuping was seemingly an animal enthusiast, saving and nurturing stray cats. Nevertheless, the reality of the situation unearthed that in fact Fuping slaughtered and butchered the cats ahead of wholesaling them to Chinese restaurants. Regulatory enforcement officers have since closed the production warehouse, after seizing around two tons of feline carcasses. Images have arisen displaying many decapitated cats that were in a freezer in the depot in Chengdu, south-west China. The magnitude of the activity exposed that on the same day, the abattoir traded 13 tons of cat meat before the authorities raided the business. Covert findings by Chengdu Business Daily exposed that because of the physical similarity in carcases and the motivation of economic greed, the fraudsters were able to sell the cat meat as rabbit meat. The financial rewards in rural China is 20 yuan per kilogram (ÂŁ2.30/Kg) or 28-32 yuan per cat (ÂŁ3.20-ÂŁ3.70 per cat) (You, 2016). The food safety arrangements in China are exemplified by extensive under-enforcement of regulatory controls that are demonstrated by high-profile food safety occurrences (Amin, Hamid, & Ali, 2016). China's size and sheer magnitude, along with the inadequacy of official authority and the low level of control measures in place mean that minor manufacturers are diverse enough to evade audits (Holtkamp & McGuire, 2014); in order to avoid penalties, some food businesses ceased trading (Zhang, et al., 2015). Accreditations do not necessarily prevent food fraud; they offer indicators to the purchaser and authorities that enables them to validate the quality of goods and manufacturing controls (Mol, 2014). Kendall, et al state that the drivers counterfeit or adulterated meat is that many people who succumb to buy lower priced goods are from lesser socio-economic standing, do so because they do not have enough money for better authenticity guarantees (Kendall, et al., 2018). It was identified that people


P a g e | 11 with lower socio-economic standing had similar views towards food fraud and that they were willing to accept cheap, potentially unsafe meats to ensure food security. In these cases, basic human needs such as food dependence and thus survival is more important than that of authentic meat (Kendall, et al., 2018).

3.2.3. Poland Poland generated 558,500 tonnes of beef in 2017 and was positioned as seventh in EU beef manufacture and that 85% is exported internationally. On researching fraud cases, it was clear that Poland is often subjected to fraudulent activity relating to horse meat substitution. This nature of substitution is the main type of fraudulent activity and had been going on long before it was exposed. Poland is the largest exporter of horses in the EU, making up 45 per cent of the 65,000 horses distributed throughout Europe annually. The sheer quantity replicates the country's magnitude and the plethora of horses available from its farming communities (Duffin, 2013). The adulterated beef products were typically lower value goods sold for inexpensive lines. For instance, adulterated frozen burgers were sold for around 25 pence per quarter pound whilst the standard for authentic beef burgers was 43 pence. Product recalls where attempted but it was done in vain as the authentic traceability documents had been tampered with to deceive officials thus making product recalls difficult and inaccurate (Lawrence, 2017). The recent beef scare reported by the BBC News identified a corrupt Polish abattoir had processed 9.5 tonnes of ailing beef cattle. The cattle in question once slaughtered were processed in a way that visual ailments of the animal's disease were physically removed and then the cattle mixed in with healthy beef cattle to dilute the supply chain with lower price goods. This is a vulnerability point in the production phase. There is the opportunity in time and place which is using the ailing beef cattle due to greed and the desire for gain is the motivation behind this point. There are also the technical failings with lack of regulatory control measures and scientific tests. This example can be used as a lesson to implement future controls such as increased audits as the animals enter the lairage and abattoir to support identifying vulnerabilities from farm to abattoir. There were no scientific tests carried out on the ailing cattle to determine if it was safe. It was then distributed to 11 EU countries, including 2.5 tonnes being exported. It was only when the fraud was exposed by covert filming that an attempt to recall the beef was made. The footage showed the beef cattle being dragged into the abattoirs. Poland's main veterinary officer, Pawel Niemczuk, reported that the "illegal activities, such as slaughter was carried out deliberately at night, in order to avoid official supervision," highlighting the vulnerability of opportunities in time and place as this dishonest activity would never have been condoned in front of officials (BBC News, 2019). This fraudulent activity identifies that there are many vulnerabilities that officials are unable to trace with the lack of control measures i.e. breaching welfare rules as dragging animals unable to walk into the abattoir is forbidden. Many of the unethical practices uncovered at the beginning of the meat supply chain linked the farmer and abattoir as mutually corrupt for overlooking this sort of behaviour (BBC News, 2019). Chris Elliott states that the consequences of food fraud can be devastating and are continuously inherited by the customer/consumer along with the entirety of the meat industry (Elliot, 2014). Bad publicity of any kind will damage a country’s supply standing. It can also be disastrous to the economic wealth of the country; food fraud is a catalyst for high media coverage as people find it a captivating topic (Spink J. , et al., 2015).


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3.3. Cultures and Behaviour Organised criminality is moving towards large-scale food fraud adulteration for financial gain (Tähkäpää, Maijala, Korkeala, & Nevas, 2014). The dubious activity in Poland was carried out at night to avoid officials finding out about the fraud. This activity was done during unregulated hours because there are controls in place as expected from a country which is part of the EU. In the Brazil case there was nothing specifically noted about when the deceitful activities occurred and that the officials themselves where involved in the corruption. Presenting a rationalisation as to why a developing country's culture influences people to carry out these frequent activities on such a large scale remains an ongoing issue. The lack of technical and monitoring resources over large and multiple states of some countries such as Brazil and China mean control measures for identification and detection are somewhat lacklustre. Charlatans have distinguished that the consequences of food fraud in some countries are more lenient than that of other crimes i.e. drug smuggling and production, human trafficking and arms dealing. Conversely, in China the perpetrators involved in the melamine fraud were executed (Lord, Elizondo, & Spencer, 2016).

3.3.1. Halal Integrity Muslims worldwide exercise the religion of Islam and obey dietary laws. These laws characterise foodstuffs that are halal, representing permitted food. The Arabic word, Haram represents “prohibited by God, unwholesome, and foul.” The legitimacy of halal food has elevated concern amid Muslim customers through the food supply chain (Fadzlillah, Che Man, Jamaludin, Rahman, & Al-Kahtani , 2011). Premium Halal Meat Poultry Limited (PHMP Ltd) had to recall numerous halal products from the largest wholesaler of poultry in Preston, Lancashire, Direct Poultry Products Ltd because PHMP Ltd did not have the authorisation, accreditation and certification to supply halal goods to their customers. As such, it could not be guaranteed that the products conformed to religious obligations and were therefore unacceptable for halal consumers (Food Standards Agency, 2018). The vulnerability point in this case occurred during the purchasing phase of the supply chain where lack of understanding and technical controls from Direct Poultry Products Ltd were not fully conforming to that of the halal supply chain. The opportunity was there for PHMP Ltd to sell produce that was not fully halal authenticated; whether it was naïve or deliberate on their part is unknown. An investigation regarding Illegal activity in the UK halal (sheep) supply chain by McElwee, Smith and Lever, 2017, reports that fraudsters intentionally exploited one of the meat industries controversial specialised product lines regarding authentic halal goods for their personal economic gain, this was the motivation for the vulnerability to occur. They sold lamb/sheep products to trusting Muslim consumers as legitimate halal produce, although the products and process did not meet the requirements necessitated with the Islamic religious standards. The vulnerability point occurred at multiple stages including deliberate mislabelling, mis-selling and the purchasing of the meat. Furthermore, the whole operation was arranged as part of a vast operation masterminded by a criminal organisation. The report recognised that this specific example of halal integrity is not a customary case of this sort of adulteration and that there are a lot of minor violations of halal slaughter laws that make up most halal adulterated products. the report states that these smaller violations that


P a g e | 13 occurred on a large scale are carried out unintentionally by people of multi-faiths who are trying to comply with Islamic law but for various reasons, contaminate the product with Haram or do not meet the religious obligations needed to supply authentic halal meats (McElwee, Smith, & Lever, 2017). In the report by Tola 2018 it is evident that in advance of reviewing comprehensive food deception tendencies, it is an essential consideration to be well versed in food safety, food protection and food security. Instances of vulnerabilities within the meat sector include: fraudulent label claims pertaining to halal integrity and also promoting battery reared caged birds as free animals in line with ethical standards (Tola, 2018). Soon et al (2016), identify that integrity of halal meat is essential as the halal market continues to grow. There are numerous cases of haram contamination or the false claims surrounding halal product certification. Fraudulent activity within the halal supply chain can compromise the integrity of a transparent supply network and is undoubtedly a vulnerability within the halal meat sector (Bonne, Vermeir, Bergeaud-Blackler, & Verbeke, 2007). The most obvious is that of the economic drivers of fraudsters: Soon, Chandia and Regenstain continue to state that "the drive for profit should not lead to compromising halal integrity" (Soon, Chandia, & Regenstein, 2016). This is a vulnerability to which Aida et al (2005) recognises when reiterating that some food processors might use pork meat or gelatine to substitute or dilute the original meat foodstuffs, or even use the same meat but a non-halal version in order to cheapen the product (Aida, Che Man, Wong, Raha, & Son, 2005).

3.4. Vulnerabilities The VACCP process is used to ensure safety and authenticity. It is the testing of products for signs and intelligence connecting to adulteration, substitution and supply chain integrity. To help this, food business owners and officials must think with the mentality of a felon to recognise opportunities for fraud and fraudulent activity. VACCP and threat analysis and critical control point (TACCP) application is used for identifying deliberate adulteration and preventing fraudulent activities. HACCP's emphasis is on defending products from accidental hazards occurring. Implementing all three food safety management systems within the meat supply chain should ensure everything that is reasonably practicable is done to maximise the successful safeguarding of the supply chain's integrity but will never totally eradicate potential vulnerabilities (Spink J. , et al., 2015).

3.4.1. Vulnerability assessment and control measures Once the vulnerabilities have been identified the key is calibrating the risks across a business /enterprise. This is recognised as enterprise risk management and is taught at academic level across all business sectors. This technique can be used not only within business but at a national level to manage a countries risk (Spink, 2015). The way to reduce a crime is in two ways; • •

Increase the risk of the fraudster getting caught Increase the cost of conducting the crime

The goal is not to catch food fraud; the goal is to prevent it. To enable this to occur, food businesses need to publicise that their company has a food fraud strategy in place and that the organisation is part of a food fraud network (Spink, 2015).


P a g e | 14 In a global supply chain, there will be numerous vulnerability assessments covering all types of fraud and these will likely be done as separate assessments; if there is one type of assessment it is impossible to calibrate the risk per vulnerability. Nevertheless, if numerous simple risk assessments for vulnerability are conducted it can help view the larger scale. What you do with this information and the cross over into the resource allocation decision is referred to as enterprise risk management (Spink, 2015). The prevention of food fraud may be grasped and finds that the core stage is to regulate the probability of a vulnerability of a raw material/ingredient (United States Pharmacopeia, 2016). This can be done by studying the elements which are recognised to aid in the prediction of fraudulent incidences and implement them in the culture of a company or risk management strategy by means of reducing or preventing the opportunity for the vulnerability to transpire (Moyer, DeVries, & Spink, 2017). Tibola et al conclude that the legitimacy of meat supply chains are subjected to rigorous enforcement throughout the lifespan of a product aid in the reduction of the possibility of a vulnerability occurring (Tibola, da Silva, Dossa, & Patrício, 2018). The WTO recognise that debates are ongoing at senior international level, on what can be done to measure vulnerabilities within the meat sector and the suitability of the mechanisms that can be used to combat fraud (World Trade Organization, 2017). Food regulations are intended to ensure food safety; this is achieved by appropriate implementation procedures such as hazard analysis and critical control point (HACCP) that governs traceability and labelling etc. These regulators identify corrupted goods, and therefore can help to easily remove produce from sale or recall it if its integrity has been compromised (Martinez, Verbruggen, & Fearne, 2013). The EU legislation endorses the European consumers’ entitlement to be wholly informed about the produce of which they buy. Consequently, investigative approaches for speciation/contamination recognition of meat/food is vital in order to remain transparent and compliant with essential legislative requirements. Di Pinto et al ascertain that by using technical control measures such as duplex polymerase (an enzyme that identifies a specific polymer) is vital to identify and foster the relationship of unwanted meat groups. This is a significant aspect of technical control measures because it undoubtedly supports and exposes adulteration or fraudulent replacement of meat (Di Pinto A. , Forte, Conversano, & Tantillo, 2004). 3.4.1.1. Traceability Mapping of supply chains and mass balance checks along with traceability are important steps in mitigating against fraud and is imperative in the meat sector to protect the public health and welfare from vulnerabilities. It is required for food safety, food defence, emergency planning and can be fragmented into four points: awareness, response, recovery and prevention. The modern food chain is a dynamic, complexed global maze and commences from farming followed by manufacturing, packaging, storing and delivery. The intricate challenges include globalization of industrial trade, varying manufacturing methods and customer predispositions for fresh and minimally treated and processed meats. No traceability procedure is faultless especially if adulteration is purposely done as the people behind the fraud may have access to means to manipulate traceability documents to their benefit. Procurement teams must be mindful to source meats with unsophisticated supply networks to help foster and reduce vulnerabilities in the meat sector. The meat industry holds the potential for


P a g e | 15 immense financial gain and has befallen as one of the foremost food groups largely imperil of food fraud (Cavin, Cottenet, Coopr, & Zbinden, 2018). Another vulnerability in the meat supply chain is directly post-slaughter, when an animal is dressed and butchered and broken down into a carcase and cuts removed, presenting a phase where traceability can be lost. Every stage needs to be efficiently performed and identification data kept with the carcase with the original information attached to it, allowing continuous traceability (Ozawa, Lopez-Villalobos, & Blair, 2005). Heaton et al reports that 9.5 percent of liver did not partner the carcase it came from. This happened within the original processing plant ahead of product dispatch (Heaton, Keen, & Clawson, 2005). Shackell notes that, the reliability supply traceability system can frequently be lost both intentionally and consciously at varied points (Shackell, 2008). The continued review of the FSA's investigation into the Russell Hume Scandal highlighted the serious issues of noncompliance in the build up to the closure of the catering butcher. The company had to end all manufacturing, processing and sale of meat throughout its multiple sites and restrain its manufactured meat (sausages and burgers etc) along with all its fresh and frozen products. Jason Feeney, FSA CEO said: "we don’t take decisions to stop production, instigate product recalls or withdrawals lightly. Our job is to ensure that food produced by a business is safe; clearly, we must take a proportionate approach. We do recognise the potential impact of our decisions on business and people's livelihoods." The unannounced audit of Russell Hume at one of its sites triggered concern about the noncompliance towards regulatory controls, particularly abuse of durability dates and transparent traceability, although the report stipulates that the public's health was never placed at peril and no reports of ill-health had been given. Furthermore, the investigation into the rest of the business, that was a national meat supplier, established that the nonconformity was mirrored throughout the organisation to such an extent that the FSA directed Russell Hume to commence a product recall for various meats effective immediately. The company could not demonstrate that it had a proficient, well-documented, controlled, safe and transparent food safety management system in place. This was the catalyst for the business directors to cease trading at all sites in early 2018. For Russel Hume to continue operations they would have had to start selling its meat to its customers in a legitimately/authentic manner. Being already locked into low-prices throughout numerous contracts this would mean losing money until the contracts elapsed or renegotiated as their business model for numerous years had been built on trading unethical and mislabelled meat to win contracts in a dubious manner (Food Standards Agency, 2018). 3.4.1.1.1. Traceability Technologies It is imperative for a verification and authentication procedure to be implemented to reduce the vulnerability of fraud within the meat supply chain (McKean, 2001). The dual drivers of this being food safety or risk management and authentication through transparent traceability systems. Systems need to safeguard meat and must be implemented at every stage of the system along the supply chain and down to the original farm where the animals where born and reared. Effective traceability can undoubtedly defend against and deter fraudulent labelling and substitution of inferior meat or meat components or animal heredities (Shackell, 2008).


P a g e | 16 Detection methods depend on what the investigation is looking for and an influential technique examines the DNA for speciation identification. However, there are other methods used to identify types of speciation detection that assesses the sequences of proteins (Floren, Wiedemann, Brenig, SchĂźtz, & Beck, 2015). Myoglobin (Mb) is a sarcoplasmic heme protein that is current in meat types and is the molecule that causes red meat to be red. Therefore, myoglobin is present in both beef and horse meat, but the structures vary by 18 amino acids distributed at several points throughout a molecule. The key to identification is to select peptides that are existing in either meat species but comprise of one or more series variation. Providing increase to diverse peptide masses along with distinctive shifts, that can be effortlessly distinguished by MRM-MS (Suman & Joseph, 2013). It is notable that some animals have matching myoglobin with horses, donkeys and zebras. Beef myoglobin is identical to bison and yaks. Further investigation would therefore be required for defilement of a beef burger with horse meat because it would present the same findings as adulteration of a yak burger with zebra (Watson, Gunning, Philo, & Kemsley, 2017). Companies in Australia are using PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) technology when they pack meat for distribution; this technology consists of the use of nanoscale silicon dioxide (silica) particles dispersed onto the meat in question during the processing stage. The use of silica is commonly used globally within food production and imprints a distinct fingerprint onto the product/meat. The silica can withstand harsh temperature conditions that enables the fingerprint to remain intact even when it has been sold and cooked for the final consumer (Marshall, 2018). Food safety management systems present businesses with the structure to make sure that the safety of a product is met. These mechanisms also improve customer faith in the food in which they buy. That said, some businesses fail to enforce these systems correctly and as a result, fail to instil the public with confidence (Kendall, et al., 2018). As industries evolve there is growing practise of using DNA designed for tracing different cuts of meat, or for auditing traceability systems (Tomlinson, Smith, & Radosta, 2006). 3.4.1.2. Control measures for Halal produce Although control measures are necessary for all meat species, the processing and logistical phases of the halal meat supply chain need to have specialised control measures implemented in order to reduce the risk of vulnerability and contamination of haram meat. Managerial control measures for products are key to their integrity (Nakyinsige, Che Man, & Sazili, 2012). Soon states that the logistics service provider plays a vital part in ensuring that the “raw materials, ingredients, packaging materials, storage and transportation of productsâ€? are completed in a way to safeguard integrity (Soon, Chandia, & Regenstein, 2016). This can only be done with the correct managerial control measures in place, by means of third-party verification and regular audits, thus, helping to manage meat supply chains. These should be implemented throughout every stage of production and transport in addition to constant monitoring and record keeping (Kamaruddin, Iberahim, & Shabudin, 2012).


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3.4.2. Lack of Technical Controls Technical controls within the meat supply chain consist of two types that work in tangent with each other in order to reduce the risk of likelihood to vulnerabilities. There are managerial control measures that consist of policy, practice and procedure and include intake procedure, supplier approvals, training and traceability records. The other type of technical controls is science based that include microbiological testing, temperature control, speciation, meat content testing and DNA traceability. The fewer technical controls there are the more susceptible the meat supply chain is to vulnerabilities (Dalmeny, 2018). On 12 September 2017, Birmingham Halal Abattoir Ltd unlawfully dispatched 41 ewes without having antemortem inspections. Birmingham Magistrates Court fined the business £12,000 and ordered it to pay the FSA’s costs of £6,767 along with a supplementary cost of £170 per victim; the total cost was £18,937. Violations of food safety and integrity laws are a danger to the population and the FSA hailed this as a considerable fine. Cases such as this send a clear message that food safety breaches will not be tolerated and perpetrators will be investigated and prosecuted within the UK (Food Standards Agency, 2017). Catering butchers, Fairfax Meadow voluntarily recalled meat from clients following an unannounced audit conducted by the FSA that exposed fears around policies, practices and procedure regarding use by dates. This case mirrored the non-conformances relating to the 2 Sisters and Russell Hume meat scandals. Technical controls have now been implemented and the FSA were content with the amendments to the processes and limits being set by the company. The technical and managerial controls include authentic laboratory shelf life testing along with retraining and instruction of staff, particularly, compliance with the legal requirement 852/2004 Annex II Chapter XII: point 1 of the Meat Industry Guide (Food Standards Agency, 2017). Articles within the meat industry have identified a vulnerability specifically regarding the correct adherence to use by dates on vacuum packed meats. Food business operators must be able to demonstrate they have robust food safety management systems that adheres to mandatory legal requirements thus ensuring due diligence and the wholesomeness of meat supplied (Food Standards Agency, 2018).

4. Conclusion The articles reviewed in the literature review demonstrated that animal-based foodstuffs to which intricate supply networks are constants on the route to the final consumer are susceptible to vulnerabilities within the meat sector. Most articles indicated that the main fraudulent activities for meat fraud are adulteration and substitution. There appeared to be a connection between the types of countries susceptible to vulnerabilities occurring within the supply chain and their economic stature within global affairs, although not all cases were entirely limited to this connection. Notably, the research evolved and congregated around high-profile international cases such as the horse gate, melamine case and an array of Brazilian substitution/dilution scandals. It was evident that adulterant substances were the main type of fraudulent activity carried out globally within the meat industry. To combat this kind of fraud within the meat supply chain, it was identified that it is essential to recognise the variances in the vulnerabilities in supply chains concerning adulteration. Mainly the adulterated meats had been processed and no longer recognisable (the


P a g e | 18 morphological structure changed), so the ‘point of adulteration’ regularly transpires throughout the mincing, blending and processing phase. Reviewing the various incidences has highlighted that the raw materials and ingredients poses an integral vulnerability; with many opportunities for charlatans to intentionally substitute meat products. This is due to being motivated by the desire for monetary gain. Furthermore, this has been found to be the common denominator for most of the case studies that where reviewed. Nonetheless, some instances where due to the naivety of food business operators who unintentionally contaminate products through their basic ignorance of product safety, authenticity and consideration for religious beliefs is apparent. As the world evolves, the controlling regulators are intensifying and vulnerabilities within the meat supply chains are being exposed. However, as scientific technology advances, so does the knowledge of fraudsters to manipulate technological advances. This review highlights key drivers and vulnerabilities within the meat industry supply chain and without doubt, presents cause for concern in weaknesses within the global supply chains. The key vulnerabilities for meat fraud susceptibility is propelled by three principal features: opportunities, motivations and lack of control measures. Owing to the varied categories of globalised meat fraud, prevention is by no means a solitary activity. It is essential to become a regular fundamental occurrence within the entire supply chain. With a united global attitude to protect against fraud drivers, the enhancers and appropriate regulatory actions across the food network and actors can be distinguished and evaluated in enhanced research. Food safety is a shared responsibility within the supply chain and part of the duty is to safeguard against components of fraudulent behaviour. Vulnerability assessments and critical control point identification within a food safety management procedure ought to ensure robust approaches to support the recognition of vulnerabilities within the meat supply chain. VACCP utilises HACCP philosophies to combat vulnerabilities in the meat industry as well as the general food industry against fraud and adulteration. Further research is needed within this subject area, especially to identify industry specific vulnerabilities. There appears to be a gap within published articles and news articles regarding specific processes pertaining to the process by dates for various minced meat products. A further research investigation associated with permitted raw materials for minced meat would be recommended for further analysis. When prepared from chilled meat, minced meat must be prepared within a specific time frame from the date of the animal's slaughter. This time frame change is dependent on the species of animal and is the legal requirement for European member states. Current enforcement of regulations is jaded, and this is without doubt amplified with the lack of implementation of the regulation regarding mince by dates, thus why it is recommended for further analysis.


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5. Acknowledgments Professor Chris Elliott, OBE, Institute for Global Food Security, School of Biological Science, Queen's University, Belfast, chris.elliott@qub.ac.uk Keith Fisher, Chief Executive of the Institute of Meat, kdfisher@instituteofmeat.org Bill Jermey, BSc, Chief Executive of the Food and Drink Training and Education Council and Chairperson of the Institute of Meat, bill.jermey@steersman.co.uk Dr Jan Mei Soon, MIFST, FHEA, Mentor: Lecturer, University of Central Lancashire, Food Safety Management Systems, JMSoon@uclan.ac.uk.Professor John Spink, Director and Assistant Professor, University of Massachusetts, Food Fraud Initiative, spinkj@msu.edu This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

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P a g e | 21 Felkl, G. S. (2014). Autenticidade molecular de produtos carneos´. Master’s dissertation, Universidade Tecnologica´ Federal do Parana,' Ponta Grossa. Retrieved February 7, 2019, from https://repositorio.utfpr.edu.br:8080/jspui/bitstream/1/1550/2/PG_PPGEP_M_Felkl%2c% 20Gabriela%20Sartori_2014.pdf. Floren, C., Wiedemann, I., Brenig, B., Schütz, E., & Beck, J. (2015, April 15). Species identification and quantification in meat and meat products using droplet digital PCR (ddPCR). Food Chemistry, 173, 1054 - 1058. doi:org/10.1016/j.foodchem.2014.10.138 Food Standards Agency. (2017, September). Meat Industry Guide. Retrieved July 1, 2019, from https://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/media/document/chapter16-food_traceabilityfinal_version-2.pdf Food Standards Agency. (2017, February 14). We welcome Birmingham Halal Abattoir Ltd fine. Retrieved March 11, 2019, from Food Standards Agency: https://www.food.gov.uk/newsalerts/news/we-welcome-birmingham-halal-abattoir-ltd-fine Food Standards Agency. (2018, February 11). Fairfax Meadow begins voluntary withdrawal of meat products. Retrieved March 11, 2019, from Food Standards Agency: https://www.food.gov.uk/news-alerts/news/fairfax-meadow-begins-voluntary-withdrawalof-meat-products Food Standards Agency. (2018, December 10). Premium Halal Meat Poultry recalls several chicken products as they have been produced without approval. Retrieved March 11, 2019, from https://www.food.gov.uk/news-alerts/alert/fsa-prin-64-2018 Food Standards Agency. (2018, January 26). The Food Standards Agency has taken action to stop any product from leaving sites operated by Russell Hume because of concerns about noncompliance with food hygiene regulations. Retrieved March 11, 2019, from Food Standards Agency: https://www.food.gov.uk/news-alerts/news/update-on-russell-hume FSA. (2013, June 13). Report of the investigation by the Food Standards Agency into incidents of adulteration of comminutedbeef products with horse meat and DNA. Retrieved April 7, 2019, from https://www.reading.ac.uk/foodlaw/pdf/uk-13014-horse-meat-summary.pdf Fukuda, K. (2015, April 1). Food safety in a globalized world. Bull World Health Organ, 93(4), 212. doi:10.2471/BLT.15.154831 Heaton, M. P., Keen, J. E., & Clawson, M. L. (2005). Use of bovine single nucleotide polymorphism markers to verify sample tracking in beef processing. Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, 226, 1311–1314. Retrieved February 5, 2019 Higgins, A., & Castle, S. (2013, February 25). Ikea Recalls Meatballs After Detection of Horse Meat. Retrieved March 11, 2019, from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/world/europe/ikea-recalls-its-meatballs-horsemeat-is-detected.html Holtkamp, N., & McGuire, W. (2014). The Regional Determinants of Food Safety in China. Washington: University of Washington Tacoma. Retrieved March 7, 2019


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Meat Industry Food Fraud Vulnerabilities by Roger Anderton  

Roger looks at all the literature around one of the biggest issues within the global meat industry - Food Fraud - and explains where the vul...

Meat Industry Food Fraud Vulnerabilities by Roger Anderton  

Roger looks at all the literature around one of the biggest issues within the global meat industry - Food Fraud - and explains where the vul...

Profile for qguild
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