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The Future of Queen’s Counsel 153
dispelled onlookers’ fears that political considerations enter into the appointments process. The Lord Chancellor’s absolute discretion over appointments to silk can only damage the effectiveness of the QC label as a recognition of extreme merit, in the eyes of both legal professionals and the general public. This is particularly important given the fact that many of these QCs will ultimately become judges. Just as a Cabinet Minister should no longer hold the initiative for the appointment of new judges,35 he should not have patronage over the judges of the future either – especially since the intervening time between appointment to silk and appointment to the Bench is well within the potential lifespan of a government. Accordingly, we propose that the selection of QCs should be the responsibility of the Judicial Appointments Commission rather than a Cabinet Minister. The Commission would put forward a list of appointments to the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, leaving him with no choice or veto; he would then formally recommend them to the Queen.36 Such a model would present a neat symmetry of transferral of responsibility from the Government to an independent body for appointments both to the Bench and to silk. As discussed above, controlling both in the same place means that those appointing judges are able to use QC selection as an invaluable ‘talentspotting’ process. Of course, the Commission would hardly be involved in the lengthy sifting process, just as the Lord Chancellor hardly scrutinises each individual QC candidate now.37 The benefit comes rather from the common pooling of information in those who do carry out the process on a day-to-day basis: the civil servants. The Commission should retain an absolute discretion as to appointments – so that, like 35 36 37
See pp. 117–119. The need for a minister make the formal recommendation to the Queen for Crown Appointments is explained at pp. 120–121 See p.122, n.20.