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Designing better surveillance programs with plant biosecurity practitioners Mark Stanaway

Scientist, Biosecurity Queensland DAFFQ Supervisor: Kerrie Mengersen, QUT biosecurity built on science Cooperative Research Centre for National Plant Biosecurity

Surveillance provides one input into actions

Surveillance Technical Pest Knowledge


Decisions & Biosecurity Actions

Outcomes Growers / Consumers biosecurity built on science

National Surveillance Policy  Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB)  National Plant Biosecurity Strategy (NPBS)  Subcommittee on National Plant Health Surveillance (SNPHS) - under Plant Health Committee - to develop guidelines and plans that satisfy national biosecurity policy objectives - Strategic and response plans biosecurity built on science

Determination of pest status in an area





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1 All surveillance should be delimiting to a useful level of “confidence�. biosecurity built on science

Surveillance provides information for management 

IGAB “target biosecurity resources to those areas of greatest return from a risk management perspective” - Risk = Probability x Consequences - Risk Return = Risk0 – Risk1

Surveillance doesn’t directly reduce probability or consequences

Surveillance resources

- Provides information to do things like regulation and control - Return depends upon surveillance improving the risk choices - More is better but how much better and is it cost effective - Policy advice is needed to define how useful

biosecurity built on science

Pest Status and Decisions Pest Information


Control Decisions Pest Information

Pest Status of Areas

Policy Containment Decisions


Decision makers want to know - numbers (costs) - level of confidence from surveillance


Surveillance planning requires - confidence needed for decisions biosecurity built on science

Assimilating Surveillance Pest Information

Pest Status of an Area

information ISPM 8 The determination of pest status requires expert judgement concerning the information available on the present-day occurrence of a pest in an area.

Pest information provides some probabilities - How strong are the pathways from other areas? - Can the pest establish?

Surveillance - Positive → contain, control, recover - Negative → play the pest information against the quality of evidence biosecurity built on science

Quantitative Assimilation Model for Pest Risk 

Pest information on arrival

Spread rates

Surveillance data over time

Assimilate - residual probability maps to target surveillance Stanaway et al (2011) Environmental and Ecological Statistics

biosecurity built on science

Implementing Risk-based Surveillance

 Extending methods developed to - Banana industry - Review fruit fly trapping

biosecurity built on science

Value from Surveillance Data 

Targeted towards risks (eg. black Sigatoka history, value of industry)

Justify on expected eradication benefits from detection

Getting as much mileage as possible out of data

Getting tangible benefit for pest status of an area and market access

biosecurity built on science

Surveillance for Market Access Pest Status in Source Area Survey

Pest Info

Carrier Probability Regulation

Pest Status in Target Area Survey

Pest Info



ISPM & IGAB - cooperation in controlling pests of plants, phytosanitary measures should be technically justified

   

Surveillance to demonstrate target area free and therefore at risk Surveillance to demonstrate source area free and therefore no risk Many uncertainties to balance Answer is >ALOP then regulation

biosecurity built on science

Myrtle rust Surveillance to justify restricting 



45.0% 40.0%


35.0% Probability


30.0% Without survey


Survey 300


15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0









9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

No. Infected Nurseries

 

1500 nurseries in jurisdiction 1/1000 probability that any one is infected (uncertain)

Risk-based prior Pr. of area freedom in jurisdiction is 40% Survey 300 updates probability of area freedom to 47% Cost $60 000 What is a useful low prevalence?

biosecurity built on science

Getting Research into Quantitative Surveillance Plans  Can we communicate expectations with decision makers - Surveillance will not give a definitive answer - There is no “right” number to survey

 Can we define how much information is useful for decisions - Changing market access regulation - Changing eradication plans - Independent arbiters of ALOP (WTO, IGAB dispute resolution)

 Can we incorporate risk (and its uncertainty) into surveillance guidelines and plans - True freedom requires more epidemiology information - Designed for timeframes, simple solutions for complex systems biosecurity built on science

Designing better surveillance programs with plant biosecurity practitioners  

Surveillance programs for invading plant pests must provide utility for the biosecurity organisations conducting them. Utility from surveill...

Designing better surveillance programs with plant biosecurity practitioners  

Surveillance programs for invading plant pests must provide utility for the biosecurity organisations conducting them. Utility from surveill...