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ment d’être, cette frustration d’être que le Pour-soi a à être.’1 (L’Être et le Néant, p. 183) Nåmar¨pa = r¨pa and r¨pa-given-r¨pa [nåma] repetition of this is r¨pa and r-g-r and r + r-g-r given r + r-g-r. [r-g-r is not-r] nåmar¨pa which is r¨pa and r¨pa-given-r¨pa and r-g-r2 and (r-g-r given r-g-r). This now is asserted afresh, wherefore r-given-r is r’ (i.e. not-r, but on the same level). Given the straightforward hierarchy of experience. In Immediate Experience attention rests on the world. This requires no effort. In Reflexive Experience attention moves back one step in the hierarchy. It does not, however, move back spontaneously: it requires to be pulled back by an intention that sees both the fundamental (or ground) level and the first step. This intention is located on the second step. A deliberate intention to enter upon reflexion requires a further intention on the third step; for deliberate intention is intention to intend (= volition). Double attention is involved. But though, in Immediate Experience, attention rests at ground level, the entire hierarchy remains ‘potential’ (it is there, but not attended to), and Immediate Experience is always under potential reflexive observation (i.e. it is ‘seen’ but not ‘noticed’). The added complication of ‘self’ is not, despite philosophical opinion, an essential feature of this structure. Sartre’s reflet-reflétant (p. 118) is a brave (but inadequate3) effort to describe the structure of ‘self’; but he is quite wrong to reject Spinoza’s idea-ideae-ideae-…to infinity. In the puthujjana both are found. Suppose that the principle of self-reflexion is false. If the principle of selfreflexion is false it follows that the statement, ‘To demonstrate that the principle of self-reflexion is necessarily true it is essential to show that the supposition of its falsity assumes its truth’ is false: for the statement assumes the truth of the principle of self-reflexion. Is it necessarily true that a true unrestricted proposition is an argument to itself? There are three possibilities: 1.  ‘Each dimension is the For-itself’s way of projecting itself vainly toward the Self, of being what it is beyond a nothingness, a different way of being this fall of being, this frustration of being which the For-itself has to be.’ (B&N, p. 137) 2.  But r-g-r without r given, itself is r (i.e. asserted by itself). 3.  S.’s ‘Self’ is an ‘itself’, not a ‘myself’ – an objective ‘self’ instead of subjective ‘self’. A mere negative is not enough.


Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  

Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...