p. 401/25-26 p. 404/21-23 p. 405/5-10
p. 407/29-32 p. 415/1-19
not merely ‘leave out of account’ what does not fit his scheme, he denies its existence. Thus only what fits his scheme is an occurrence. [But if nature exhibited a type of order of unimaginable complexity, finite minds could not discover it.]: What, pray, is a ‘finite mind’? [there seems to be a deep-rooted tendency in the human mind to seek what is identical, via the sense of something that persists through change.] noted [The demand for continuity is closely bound up with the demand for persistence and identity. There must be no sudden breaks, no arbitrary discontinuities. The appearance of such discontinuities presents a problem; the discovery that, in spite of appearances, something identical or conserved is felt to be an acceptable solution.]: Confusion! There cannot be identities without discontinuity. It is continuity that presents a problem. [‘the feature of the whole development of theoretical physics, up to the present, is the unification of its systems which has been obtained by a certain elimination of the anthropomorphous elements, particularly the specific sense-perceptions.’ In accordance with the principle of unity, or simplicity, the complex has been reduced to the simple.]: Unfortunately for this ideal, space is a specific sense-perception. [Now this change of attitude is never experienced with regard to propositions that have been validly deduced from propositions accepted as axiomatic.] noted [… the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides, or … three times five is equal to the half of thirty … these propositions follow from the initial concepts and the axioms or primitive propositions, which determine a given abstract system. To assert that they are true is to assert that they are validly deduced. But to assert that propositions concerning matters of fact are true is to assert that they express facts with regard to what exists. Such propositions cannot be deduced from initial concepts and axioms with regard to the relations of such concepts. Hence, the denial of such propositions cannot be demonstrated to be false; hence, either of two contradictory propositions with regard to matters of fact might be true.] noted
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...