seeking the path
p. 174/31-33 p. 176/33-36
about a class.]: Agreed, so we must choose which of these is meaningful: (1) stones exist (2) that stone exists. The choice is crucial. [Mr. Russell suggests that a logical type may be defined as follows: ‘A and B are of the same logical type if, and only if, given any fact of which A is a constituent, there is a corresponding fact which has B as a constituent, which either results from substituting B for A, or is the negation of what so results’.] noted [From the common sense point of view we may say that if it is true that A is red, then A can be regarded as possessing the quality of being red independently of any reference to any other object.]: This is a mistake. A red thing implies not-red things. If red is present, it is so absolutely and alone: not-red is absent and plural—i.e. not-reds. Red is related to—i.e. is not—each not-red individually; and when all these relations or negatives are taken together we have singular (or present) red related to plural (or absent) not-red. This is simply the Principle of Identity—A must be given before not-A can appear. But this does not make A independent of not-A, it simply states that ‘an irreducible multiple relation’ cannot be given (or exist) without a point of view (or orientation). This is an ontological necessity, hidden from the eye of the non-existing logician. (A is A = A or not-A exclusively). [Self-evidence is a relative notion. What we are able to doubt depends upon our previous knowledge and our mental capacity.]: Rubbish! [The necessity of logical principles is nothing but the necessity of constructing systems. The construction of such systems may be the expression of the thinking of rational beings. But this would not establish the necessity.]: This assumes that ‘the thinking of rational beings’ is a fortuitous and arbitrary quality of certain beings, like having blue eyes, or red hair: man + blue eyes = blue-eyed man; being + thinking = thinking (or rational) being. But cogito ergo sum: thinking implies being. [We … deny that any significance can be attributed to the notion of absolutely necessary principles and absolutely indemonstrable propositions.]: Wrong. Absolute principles
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...