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marginalia

p. 70/23-26

p. 121/2-5

is given on pp. 160-1: ‘“Lions exist” means “the property of being a lion belongs to something”.’ From the passage above and Appendix A it seems that you maintain that a given property ‘belongs to something’ if the descriptive phrase of which it is the referent ‘applies to an individual existing in the actual world’. Thus the assertion ‘lions exist’ cannot be true—and in general no assertion of existence can be true—unless individuals exist, that is to say, by your own statement, unless the property of being an individual belongs to something. Thus neither ‘the property of being a lion belongs to something’ (i.e. ‘lions exist’) nor ‘the property of being an individual belongs to something’ (i.e. ‘individuals exist’) can be true unless ‘the property of being an individual belongs to something’ (i.e. ‘individuals exist’) is true. But whereas ‘lions exist’ need not be true even if ‘individuals exist’ is true ‘individuals exist’ must be true (by the Principle of Identity—p implies p—p. 472). Applying the criterion of logical types of p. 162 to the foregoing sentence, it becomes clear that ‘lions’ and ‘individuals’ are of different logical types. Thus, from the discussion on p. 162 the word exist in ‘lions exist’ does not mean the same as in ‘individuals exist’. Thus, in your definition of existence as ‘the belonging of the property of being an individual to something’, you are assuming this other meaning of existence, viz. ‘the belonging of the property of being an individual to something’. To be lion is to be an indivudual to which the property of being a lion belongs. Had you not better quickly find out what it is to be an individual? [It is not usual to interpret the “or” in an alternative proposition as expressing the exclusion of one alternative. That is, “or” is consistent with “perhaps not”. If “or” be interpreted exclusively, then p or q includes not both p and q. Some logicians hold that it must be so interpreted.]: On p. 191 you say ‘any proposition is either true or false’. Does this mean that it is ‘perhaps both’? Evidently not, since you go on to say ‘Not any proposition is both true and false’. This makes chaos of the Excluded Middle. [As Prof. Whitehead puts it: ‘Operations of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle—they are strictly limited

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Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  
Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  

Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...

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