Furthermore what is the use of affirming that Nothingness provides the ground for negation, if it is merely to enable us to form subsequently a theory of non-being which by definition separates Nothingness from all concrete negation? … I say, “Pierre is not there,” “I have no more money,” etc. Is it really necessary to surpass the world toward nothingness and to return subsequently to being in order to provide a ground for these everyday judgements? And how can the operation be affected? To accomplish it we are not required to make the world slip into nothingness; standing within the limits of being, we simply deny an attribute a subject. Will someone say that each attribute refused, each being denied is taken up by one and the same extramundane nothingness, that non-being is like the fullness of what is not, that the world is suspended in non-being as the real is suspended in the heart of possibilities? In this case each negation would necessarily have for origin a particular surpassing: the surpassing of one being toward another …] noted: These criticisms of Heidegger are partly justified and partly not. Two negations are in fact necessary, one for self-and-the-world, and one for negations within the world. (Only the first has to do with ta~hå or craving, and this can be brought to an end without affecting the other.) Neither H. nor S. sees this. p. 19/38-39 [a sort of geometrical place for unfulfilled projects] u/l: Oxford! p. 22/26-28 noted. p. 32/6-8 noted. p. 33/41-34/3 noted. p. 36/21-22 noted. p. 37/39-38/1 noted. p. 38/9-10 noted. p. 38/13-14 noted. p. 40/37-42 noted. p. 44/6-7 noted. p. 48/42-43 noted. p. 49/7-9 noted. p. 50/14-18 noted. p. 51/29 [Pierce] c/o: Peirce p. 55/6-9 noted.
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...