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marginalia

which is painful, but the sensation, that is to say, the experience of the sensible object.] ‘sensible object’ and ‘experience … object’ u/l: These two expressions are synonymous; we do not have on the one hand, a sensible object, and on the other, experience of it—if an object is sensible it is experienced. The word ‘sensation’ is superfluous. p. 162/7-8 [The continuity of appearances at very small distances from the thing] u/l: A close-up view of a thing can make, at best, only a relative difference. p. 162/8-11 [It is probable that the common-sense conception is not capable of complete precision. Let us therefore concentrate our attention upon the conception of the persistence of matter in physics.]: On the contrary, it is the physical conception of persistence that cannot be made precise. p. 162/13-16 [… if time and space form compact series …]: Series consisting of points or instants (or point-instants) can never be ‘compact’. p. 162/20 [intermediate] u/l: How is ‘intermediate’ defined? What is intermediate between red and blue—is it anything other than a combination of red and blue? p. 166/23-29 [it is significant and true to say ‘My present sense-datum exists’, and it may also be true that ‘x is my present sensedatum’. The inference from these two ‘propositions to ‘x exists’ is one which seems irresistible to people unaccustomed to logic; yet the apparent proposition inferred is not merely false, but strictly meaningless.] last 12 words noted: The word ‘merely’ implies that it is both false and meaningless. This is clearly impossible. p. 167/22-25 [Concerning the immediate objects in illusions, hallucinations, and dreams, it is meaningless to ask whether they ‘exist’ or are ‘real’. There they are, and that ends the matter.] ‘It is … exist’ and ‘they … matter’ u/l: If the assertion ‘they are’ can be made, then why not the assertion ‘they exist’? What is the difference between being and existence? p. 174/29-175/3 [… No two instants are contiguous, since the time-series is compact; hence either the cause or the effect or both must, if the definition is correct, endure for a finite time …]: But see p. 124. p. 175/3-15 [… if the cause is a process involving change within itself, we shall require (if causality is universal) causal relations

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Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  
Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  

Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...

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