Page 224

seeking the path

p. 86/14-17

p. 87/14-15 p. 88/17-19 p. 89/3-4

p. 89/10-16


Consciousness (feeling, etc.). They differ in that one is, and the other is not, accompanied by consciousness. They are alike in that they are both mental events. The question would then be, ‘Other than by introspection can they be distinguished?’ But is this quite what is intended here? A different question is assumed in the following pages. [The process in the course of which a mental event may occur, a process apparently beginning in a stimulus and ending in an act, is what we have called an impulse.]: On p. 83, ‘the mind is a system of impulses’. It follows that ‘mental events’ may occur in the course of the processes called ‘mind’. There is therefore more to ‘mind’ than ‘mental events’. All this account is unsound. Matter may be described ultimately in terms of perception, but perception cannot be ultimately described in terms of matter. How can blue be described in terms of neural changes? A more satisfactory hypothesis, at least for purposes of this chapter, is that mental (= conscious) events (better, ‘occurrences’) and neural events have a one to one correspondence (less misleading than ‘are parallel’)—but this statement needs considerable expansion (a mental event is only known introspectively, for example, and a neural event extrospectively). [Stimuli are only received if they serve some need of the organism] u/l: Does the accidental sight of e.g. a cow serve a need of mine? [the conscious characters of the mental event, include evidently both sensations and feelings] after ‘sensations’: saññå [Every mental event has, in varying degrees, all three characteristics.] (the three are cognition, feeling, and conation) u/l: Even unconscious mental events? These, by definition (p. 86), are without feeling. The cat is out of the bag. [The advantage of substituting the causation, the character and the consequences of a mental event as its fundamental aspects in place of its knowing, feeling and willing aspects is that instead of a trio of incomprehensible ultimates we have a set of aspects which not only mental events but all events share.] ‘incomprehensible ultimates’ u/l: Why not? You must stop somewhere: you cannot describe everything in terms of something else; for if you do, you are simply playing with words. Finally you must say, ‘By “X” I mean

Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  

Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...