tention aroused. But the spiritual relationship to God in truth, when God refuses to deceive, requires precisely that there be nothing remarkable about the figure, so that the society man would have to say: ‘There is nothing whatever to see’. When God has nothing obviously remarkable about Him, the society man is perhaps deceived by not having his attention at all aroused. But this is not God’s fault, and the actuality of such a deception is at the same time the constant possibility of the truth. But if God had anything obviously remarkable, He deceives men because they have their attention called to what is untrue, and this direction of attention is at the same time the impossibility of the truth. In paganism, the direct relationship is idolatry; in Christendom, everyone knows that God cannot so reveal Himself. But this knowledge is by no means inwardness, and in Christendom it may well happen to one who knows everything by rote that he is left altogether ‘without God in the world’, in a sense impossible in paganism, which did have the untrue relationship of paganism. Idolatry is indeed a sorry substitute, but that the item God should be entirely omitted is still worse.]: Here, when applied to the Buddha’s Teaching, is what or where the position of samatha bhavanå comes in. It is ONLY with the initiation and development of samatha bh. that a puthujjana can even develop any anulomikåya khantiyå samannågato (see SN, sakkåya (b)). With the increase of samatha bh. towards the samådhi degree these pa†isotagåmi vertiginous views of the nature of existence can be developed and held longer and steadier finally with the possibility of culmination at first jhåna, that is if anulomikåya khantiyå samannågato has been developed. Without it samådhi guarantees nothing as far as attainment. It is only the necessary ‘allower’ for the mind to have such views if it wants. In short, ONLY samatha bh. allows anulomikåya khantiyå samannågato; only samådhi allows the ambiguity to subside once for all, tout court. [But the subjective thinker is not a poet, though he may also be a poet; he is not on ethicist, though he may also be an ethicist; he is not a dialectician, though he may also be a dialectician. He is essentially an existing individual,
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...