Page 196

seeking the path

p. 436/9-14

p. 438/fn.1

p. 445/17-19

p. 446/3-18

same as ‘not taking things seriously’—cf. Kierkegaard, CUP pp. 450-1.51 [If Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, regain understands itself in its own superior power, the power of its finite freedom, which ‘is’ only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can take over the powerlessness of abandonment to its having done so, and can thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed.] ‘its having done so’ u/l: i.e. its having made a choice. [… The idea seems to be that in resolute repetition one is having, as it were, a conversation with the past, in which the past proposes certain possibilities for adoption, but in which one makes a rejoinder to this proposal by ‘reciprocating’ with the proposal of other possibilities as a sort of rebuke to the past, which one new disavows…] noted: What is disavowed is surely the value (or anti-value) of the past as such (i.e. in comparison with the present). See pp. 445-4. [That which is familiar pre-scientifically in Dasein as disclosed Being-in-the-world, gets projected upon the Being which is specific to it.] noted: I.e. it is not projected upon this or that possibility (as it is in the normal way), i.e. as for this or for that; but upon its own specific mode of Being, i.e.; as for being what it is. It thus appears as an object for science. See second note on p. 447. [Remains, monuments, and records that are still present-athand … can turn into historiological material only because, in accordance with their own kind of Being, they have a world-historical character. And they become such material

51.  Irony is a specific culture of the spirit, and therefore follows next after immediacy; then comes the ethicist, then the humorist, and finally the religious individual. But why does the ethicist use irony as his incognito? Because he grasps the contradiction there is between the manner in which he exists inwardly, and the fact that he does not outwardly express it. For the ethicist does indeed reveal himself, in so far as he pours himself forth in the tasks of the factual reality in which he lives; but this is something that the immediate individual also does, and what makes him an ethicist is the movement of the spirit by which he sets his outward life inwardly in juxtaposition with the infinite requirement of the ethical, and this is something that is not directly apparent. In order not to be distracted by the finite, by all the relativities in the world, thereby insuring himself against becoming comical … (rest of passage is to be found at L. 129, 18.v.65)

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Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  

Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...