‘complacification’ and ‘complacency’) p. 298/13-16 [It is already a matter of public acceptance that ‘thinking about death’ is a cowardly fear, a sign of insecurity on the part of Dasein, and a sombre way of fleeing from the world. The “they” does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death.] noted. p. 298/19-21 [In anxiety in the face of death, Dasein is brought face to face with itself as delivered over to that possibility which is not to be outstripped.] noted: A bugbear. p. 298/24-28 [What is ‘fitting’ according to the unuttered decree of the “they”, is indifferent tranquillity as to the ‘fact’ that one dies. The cultivation of such a ‘superior’ indifference alienates Dasein from its ownmost non-relational potentialityfor-Being.] noted (and ‘tranquillity’ changed to ‘complacency’): Cf. Camus, Noces, ‘Le Vent à Djéwila’. p. 302/26-27 [Thus the “they” covers up what is peculiar in death’s certainty—that it is possible at any moment.] noted. p. 309/31-310/1 [Holding death for true (death is just one’s own) shows another kind of certainty, and is more primordial than any certainty which relates to entities encountered within-theworld; or to formal objects; for it is certain of Being-in-theworld. As such, holding death for true does not demand just one definite kind of behaviour in Dasein, but demands Dasein itself in the full authenticity of its existence.] noted: Camus. p. 310/1-11 [In anticipation Dasein can first make certain of its ownmost Being in its totality—a totality which is not to be outstripped. Therefore the evidential character which belongs to the immediate givenness of Experiences, of the “I”, or of consciousness, must necessarily lag behind the certainty which anticipation includes. Yet this is not because the way in which these are grasped would not be a rigorous one, but because in principle such a way of grasping them cannot hold for true (disclosed) something which at bottom it insists upon ‘having there’ as true: namely, Dasein itself; which I myself am, and which, as a potentiality-for-Being, I can be authentically only by anticipation.] noted: That I am (that Dasein exists) as a totality—disclosed in anticipation—is taken for granted when any question about the ‘I’ is raised. Asmimåna underlies attavåda, ‘I am’ before
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...