as this one, which is present-at-hand.] noted: as (this one, which is) present-at-hand. [just as Dasein is already its “not-yet”, and is its “not-yet” constantly as long as it is, it is already its end too. The “ending” which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-an-end, but a Being-towardsthe-end of this entity. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. “As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die.”] noted: Sartre (L’Être et le Néant, pp. 615-638) criticizes H.’s Sein zum Ende (or Tode), not altogether in good faith. But both H. and S. assume that death is annihilation, an assumption that they do not attempt to justify. (But see p. 292.) Granted this assumption, S.’s argument has some weight; but since in fact the assumption is mistaken, H.’s argument turns out in practice to be more effective. We do not and cannot shrink from the possibility of an absolute blank (which is wholly unimaginable)—and here S. is right—, but we can and do shrink from change, and a fortiori from the possible radical change of death (which to some degree is imaginable)—and here H. is right, in that he says that we shrink from ‘our death’. But H. is wrong in supposing that we shrink from an absolute blank, and S. is wrong in supposing that we do not shrink from ‘our death’. If we shrink, says S. (in effect), it is not from our death that we shrink. It is our death that we shrink from, says H. (in effect), and our death is complete blankness. (S. actually says that we do shrink from death, but not from our death. But if death is not in some way ‘ours’, why should we shrink? S.’s concept of what constitutes ‘my possibility’ is also inadequate. [Only when death is conceived in its full ontological essence can we have any methodological assurance in even asking what may be after death; only then can we do so with meaning and justification. Whether such a question is a possible theoretical question at all will not be decided here. The this-worldly ontological Interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation.] noted: Perhaps so; in which case, modify marginal note on p. 289. But to what extent is it justifiable to define death as the ‘end’ of Dasein if it is ‘not the end’? In this
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...