general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare mood’. Pure beholding, even if it were to penetrate to the innermost core of the Being of something presentat-hand, could never discover anything like that which is threatening.]: ‘Bare mood’ is more or less asm⁄ti. (See NoD, SN, phassa (b). Things concern me or matter to me because ‘I am’.—This is the puthujjana’s view.) p. 182/16 [Understanding always has its mood.] u/l: Not with the arahat. p. 194/4-195/27 noted. p. 194/6-9 [All interpretation, moreover, operates in the fore-structure, which we have already characterized. Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted.] double noted. p. 195/22-24 [An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.] double noted. p. 207/27-32 [Admittedly, when what the discourse is about is heard ‘naturally’, we can at the same time hear the ‘diction’, a the way in which it is said, but only if there is some counderstanding beforehand of what is said-in-the-talk; for only so is there a possibility of estimating whether the way in which it is said is appropriate to what the discourse is about thematically.]: Cf. Kierkegaard, CUP, pp. 151-2.46 46. And furthermore, it is evident that when the subject thinks his own death, this is a deed. For a man in general, for an absent-minded individual like Soldin or a systematic philosopher, to think death in general is indeed no act or deed; it is only a something in general, and what such a something in general really is, is at bottom a very difficult thing to say. But if the task of life is to become subjective, then the thought of death is not, for the individual subject, something in general, but is verily a deed. For the development of the subject consists precisely in his active interpenetration of himself by reflection concerning his own existence, so that he really thinks what he thinks through making a reality of it. He does not for example think, for the space of a passing moment: “Now you must attend to this thought every moment”; but he really does attend to it every moment. Here then everything becomes more and more subjective, as is quite natural when the task is to develop the subjectivity of the individual. In so far it might seem as if communication between man and man were abandoned to an unhampered freedom in lying and deception, if anyone so desires; for one need only say: “I have done so and so,” and we can get no further with him. Well, what of it? But suppose he has not really done it? What business is that of mine? Such a deception would be worst for himself. When we speak about something objective it is easier to exercise a control over
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...