[It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world to remain totally veiled from view,] ‘to remain’ u/l: i.e. that [it] should remain (?) p. 97/n.1/7-10 concerning the term Zeug, which has no precise English equivalent, [For the most part H. uses the term as a collective noun, so that he can say that there is no such thing as ‘an equipment’; but he still uses it occasionally with an indefinite article to refer to some specific tool or instrument—some item or bit of equipment.]: utensil. p. 101/14-31 concerning utensils (p. 97), [The kind of being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, as if we were talking such ‘aspects’ into the ‘entities’ which we proximally encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were ‘given subjective colouring’ in this way. Such an Interpretation would overlook the fact that in this case these entities would have to be understood and discovered beforehand as something purely present-at-hand,… To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must first penetrate beyond what is-ready-to-hand in our concern. Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, ‘is there’ anything ready-to-hand. Does it follow, however, granting this thesis for the nonce, that readiness-to-hand is ontologically founded upon presenceat-hand?]: Present-to-hand entities are, each absolutely and alone. Immediate intention, taking any one, posits (as it were) [see (a), next page] that there is ‘another’—and hence ‘others’ (see NoD, FS). The others, being there already, now appear as others—i.e. appear in relation to the present entity as absent entities. At the same time, now that they all appear ‘together’, preference takes place, raising the pleasant absents and lowering the unpleasant. The whole is new a ready-to-hand entity. Further intention (in depth) spreads this scheme horizontally, and a hierarchy of (closed) worlds of ready-to-hand entities then appears. But intention is a conclusion that is ethically deceitful and metaphysically unclear, by imposing upon me the duty of existing.
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...