more and no less, is meaningless. And for anything to imply merely itself is, to my mind, nonsense. The result of the above … is that the ground in a whole, in which the thing to be grounded must be included. It is a whole pervaded essentially by connection and implication, and is, in some sense, a system which throughout justifies its contents.]: Yes. p. 633/24-31 [If this is the ‘ground,’ what then (we have next to enquire) is a ‘condition’? A condition appears (we must reply) to be a partial ground. Where anything is included in a whole which is its ground, there any other part of the ground, beyond this thing itself, is called its condition. And this element will be one among our thing’s many conditions, unless at least we can assume or show that no further element is contained in the ground.] first ‘condition’ u/l: Saπkhåra—a ‘determination’. p. 633/32-634/3 [Hence the ‘because’ of anything may be called that by which it is conditioned. Its full ‘because’ implies the presence of the entire whole of its conditions, and includes in this whole the thing’s own nature, so for as grounded. This, and no less than this, is the true and real ‘because.’ But we can use ‘because’ again in a less complete sense where we take the thing as conditioned partly. Here we single out and refer merely to one selected element, one part of the whole of those connections which one involved in the ground. Such an imperfect use of ‘because’ is unavoidable and necessary in practice, but, indefensible in the end, it is even in practice a constant source of grave and insidious error. p. 634/4-12 [In proceeding from the above to ask next for the meaning of ‘if,’ we may be said, leaving the conditioned, to pass on to that which is merely conditional. The first of these gave us a judgment which actually is mediated. S here is P because of M. We had, in other words (we saw), a whole which includes and supports and guarantees at once S and P and also their actual junction. This is what is implied, and this is what we should mean when we call a judgment conditioned.]:The point is that a thing’s determinations are its significances or possibilities, and it may become one (and in Judgement it does become one, but in imagination) of
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...