Page 149

marginalia

p. 286/21-22 p. 287/5-6 p. 288/35-36 p. 288/36-40

p. 289/fn.

p. 290/1-2 p. 290/5-6 p. 293/8-10

p. 293/13 p. 294/6-9

and qualifies one individual Universe.]: No. [We next, in any particular case, have to do also with some subordinate individual whole.] ‘next’ c/o: Yes. [Likeness and sameness should never be confused, for the former refers properly to a general impression.]: Quite. [… I am waiting, and have been waiting for years, to be told what is meant by an ‘exact likeness.’]: Very good! [… if we say that inference rests on the principle that what seems the same is the same …] after ‘the same is’: so far after ‘the same is the same’: Yes. [… the same is the same, and can not be made different by any diversity, and that so long as an ideal content is identical no change of content can destroy its unity. The assumption in this principle may be decried as monstrous …] ‘The assumption … monstrous’ u/l: Only if it is not seen that experience is an absolute system. Far from being monstrous, it is necessary. [Not only, for instance, must spaces related be more than a mere relation in space, but they must also have a difference in quality.]: This takes space as featureless, which it is not. But if it were this would be correct. [It is not possible to contemplate points in relation unless you distinguish them by a qualitative reference to the right or left or upper or lower sides of your body … It may be objected that in certain cases the difference of quality is only one aspect of the whole relation. … The ultimate connection of quality and relation is a most difficult problem.] last sentence noted: Only because of the false assumption noted above. [… the content of the given has always two sides, sensible qualities and relations …]: Cittasaπkhåra and cetanå. [I do not say that these two elements are metaphysically irreducible …]: They are. [It sounds terrible to say that Identity is an ideal synthesis of differences, and that this identity is real fact.]: This is the quite unnecessary distinction that constitutes ‘Idealism’. [… the change that is past is no fact of sense.] u/l: On what ground? [It is frivolous to say that identity may be real, where exist-

467

Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  

Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...

Advertisement