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I do not make any inference, and that I do not generalize. And how than can my assertion fail to be true?]: I am not so sure. p. 94/5-8 [The fact, which is given us, is the total complex of qualities and relations which appear to sense. But what we assert of this given fact is, and can be, nothing but an ideal content.] ‘an ideal content’ u/l: which is necessarily a discursive generalization. p. 95/12-16 [Such naive assurance of the outward reality of all mental distinctions, such touching confidence in the crudest identity of thought and existence, is worthy of the school which so loudly appeals to the name of Experience.]: All right, but an idea is still a discursive generalization. p. 95/23-27 [… thought in the end is the measure of things, yet at least this is false, that the divisions we make within a whole all answer to elements whose existence does not depend on the rest.]: No—all knowledge is ultimately intuitive. p. 95/38-39 [The whole that is given us is a continuous mass of perception and feeling …] ‘continuous mass’ u/l: An ‘organized complex’ would be better. p. 97/3-8 [In the religious consciousness God and Man are elements that are given to us in connection. But, reflecting on experience, we make distinctions, and proceed as above to harden these results of analysis into units. We thus have God as an unit on one side, and Man as an unit on the other: and then we are puzzled about their relation.]: Quite. p. 99/13-22 [The difficulty is insuperable. … No possible mind could represent to itself the completed series of space and time; since, for that to happen, the infinite process must hate come to an end, and be realized in a finite result. And this can not be. It is not merely inconceivable psychologically; it is metaphysically impossible.]: It is insuperable because it rests on false assumptions about the nature of time. p. 99/39-100/5 [… the statement … rests in the end … upon a ‘because,’ which, although unknown, is none the less real. … But even this claim it is impossible to admit.]: This is Bradley’s Idealism. To correct this read Sartre’s L’Être et le Néant, pp. 11-14. p. 117/12-16 [But in negative judgment … we do not say what there is in A which makes B incompatible. We often, if asked,


Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  
Early Writings (Seeking the Path - Ñāṇavīra Thera)  

Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...