p. 129/24 p. 145/14-20
intentions can modify the material circumstances (the easiest example is a conversation between myself and another, where the (material) speech I hear affects my thoughts and my thoughts affect the (material) speech I utter); but it is because this is so that we can afford to ignore the word ‘circumstances’ (which implies an outside view) and speak of being ‘en situation’—which puts the account on Realism. There is no mention at all in his work of paranormal phenomena. [… ‘when I deliberate, the die is cast’.]: i.e. it is already cast. [… my consciousness of something and implicit awareness of this consciousness, which is the foundation of all, is not awareness of me and can never reach me; the pour-soi as pure flight and pursuit can never know itself as flight and pursuit, and therefore the principle which ingeniously furnishes the ontological description from within could never produce the reflective consciousness which carries out the description.]: This criticism is just. Sartre rejects Spinoza’s infinite regression—idea, ideae, ideae—for no good reason, and is thenceforward unable to give a satisfactory account of reflexion. [Simone de Beauvoir … her Pour une Morale de l’Ambiguité …]: This book, when one comes to read it, is a disappointment: it is rhetoric, not philosophy, and takes us no further than Sartre. [‘The business of any morality is to consider human life as a match which can be won or lost, and to teach men how to win.’]: No, in the match of human life one is defeated in advance. The choice is between looking this fact in the face and running away from it, and in neither case does one escape defeat. At best one delays the inevitable decision. The only victory is to stop the match. [The natural order of this human existence is willed and becomes a moral order; he is no longer explained, he is justified: he justifies himself.]: To see that one is justified is not to justify oneself. One only justifies oneself in ceasing to be justified, which means ceasing to be, tout court. One is reflexively justified in seeing that one is immediately unjustified, certainly; but one is still unjustified. In other words, we again encounter an ambiguity. And to
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...