seeking the path
p. 102/36 p. 104/9-11
really exist: they are only thought to exist by the ignorant.— Prajñåpåramitå. [These meanings answer the questions what, what for, how, as, …]: What is the question ‘as?’ [Nothing is not merely a notional negation, not-any-thing, and thus the counter-concept opposed to Being. It can be experienced and is itself the source of all forms of negation and negativity.] last 9 words u/l [The intelligible world constructed by personal existence, in which man feels safe and at home, the world of meanings, is nihilated and he is plunged back into the sheer ‘is-ness’ of what is, his ship on which he is riding and voyaging disappears in the night and he finds himself in the deep waters and tastes their saltness.]: See Sartre’s criticism of this in L’Être et le Néant, pp. 54-55. Heidegger’s Nothing is certainly the counterpart of the world, but not of meanings in the world. With the arahat, there is no more world (in this sense), but things remain meaningful or significant of other things. on J.-P. Sartre [These two modes of being, consciousness and its object, the pour-soi and the en-soi, are not merely in contrast.]: Sartre’s fundamental mistake is to assume that the soi (self) of pour-soi and en-soi is unambiguous. It is not. In pour-soi, ‘soi’ means ‘oneself’, whereas in en-soi it means ‘itself’. The first is self as ‘subject’, the second is simply the self of ‘self-identity’. These are not the same. [Knowledge is necessarily intuition, the presence of consciousness to the object which it is not.]: A mistake. Consciousness is not present to the object which it is not; it is the presence of the object (which, of course, it is not). Otherwise, consciousness would be the subject. What, then, is the subject? Answer, no-thing is the subject—sabbe dhammå anattå. This is a costly error. [… (a possibility which raises a metaphysical problem beyond the scope of ontological description).]: In spite of his claim to steer midway between Realism and Idealism (cf p. 112) Sartre is sometimes something of an Epiphenomenalist—not openly, of course, but in his assumptions he will cheerfully allow that material circumstances can modify our intentions, but finds difficulty in understanding that our
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...