seeking the path
désolé.]23: Can one not live authentically in prison? This arbitrary assumption is necessary in order to justify the doctrine of (political) action that follows. p. 44/3-6 [Une liberté ne peut se vouloir sans se vouloir comme mouvement indéfini ; elle doit absolument refuser les contraintes qui arrêtent son élan vers elle-même …]24: What exactly does this mean? It seems that the freedom that I have (or am) is not, after all, the freedom that I have to will (p. 35 seq.): the former is absolute and totally unaffected by any constraint, whereas the latter can be opposed and frustrated. The passage from the one to the other is carried out by abusing the former as ‘abstract’ and praising the latter as ‘concrete’ (p. 37). But the former freedom is concrete in that I am always found with a concrete choice, and willing this consists in recognizing at every moment that I am totally responsible for whatever I choose, that my choice is perpetually revocable. But this is not enough for S. de B., who carries a gun. She interprets her freedom to choose as freedom to choose freely, i.e. without outside interference, and then wills this instead. At once it becomes a duty to fight opposition to our projects and, by extension, to everybody else’s projects as well. This is tub-thumping, not philosophy. p. 118/22-26 [… sa mort même n’est pas un mal, puisqu’il n’est homme qu’en tant qu’il est mortel : il doit l’assumer comme le terme naturel de sa vie, comme le risque impliqué par toute démarche vivante.]25: To say that death is simply a risk is just mauvaise foi. p. 121/24-122/5 [Il y a donc deux manières de dépasser le donné : il est très différent de poursuivre un voyage ou de s’évader de prison. Dans les deux cas le donné est présent dans son dépassement 23. ‘However, such a salvation is only possible if, in spite of obstacles and failures, a man retains the disposition of his future, if the situation still opens possibilities to him. If his transcendence is cut off from his aims, if he does not have any more hold of the objects which could give him a content of value, his spontaneity disperses without founding anything. It is then forbidden for him to positively justify his existence, and he feels the contingency of this with a desolate disgust.’ 24. ‘Freedom can only be willed as indefinite movement; it must absolutely refuse the limits which stop its movement towards itself.’ 25. ‘Even his death is not a bad thing, since he is a man only as a mortal: he must assume it as the natural end of his life, like the implicated risk for all living processes.’
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...