seeking the path
other human beings?]: For all this see NoD, paramattha sacca para a5. From a puthujjana’s point of view, Balfour’s objections are valid—‘self’ cannot be divided into separate ‘selves’, and yet the Sally Beauchamp case requires it. The same dilemma occurs in the puthujjana’s reflexion—see a note on pa†iccasamuppåda para 24. This paradox cannot be resolved in the sphere of the puthujjana. If Gurney is right, that is only because he has, in fact, failed to appreciate Balfour’s dilemma. Gurney is right for the wrong reason; Balfour is wrong for the right reason: neither is right for the right reason. [… when some one, hesitating what course of action he shall adopt, says, ‘I was in two minds about it’ … nobody would seriously suggest that an interaction between two distinct selves is involved. The duality is in the thought, not in the thinker …]: This won’t do. Who or what is the thinker? [Among these other selves it occupies a position of primacy, and in normal conditions is in supreme control of the organism.]: This is quite mistaken. Each individual (which for Balfour is a ‘self’) is a totality, and there cannot be primacy amongst totalities. Balfour has simply re-introduced in another form the problem (the ‘paradox’ of p. 306) he is attempting to solve. [but unless the modification appears to the primary self to be impressed upon it from without by something other than itself, its thoughts will be for it its own thoughts, and will carry with them no objective significance.]: All thoughts have objective significance, i.e. the expression ‘its own thoughts’ in this context is meaningless. More exactly, all thoughts are objective and all thoughts are ‘mine’, and it is not legitimate to divide thoughts into those that are objective and those that are mine. The notion of subjectivity (i.e. reflexively) created thoughts is a pure invention. All that reflexion can do is to bring potential (or latent) thoughts (i.e. images) into actuality. How can a thought be created ex nihilo? But this does not mean that all images are recovered memories of reality. Imaginary things exist in their own right, no less than real things, and both are objective.
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...