p. 226/28-30 p. 256/7-10 p. 263/1-23
p. 270/18-19 p. 272/34-39
past, present and future is potentially accessible to each individual, what need of a World Soul? (See NoD, r¨pa and FS II/10.) [… the inmost sanctuary of mysticism … the most holy place …]: The Christian idea that heaven is a holy place (no doubt because God is supposed to live there). [… the horns of a duality … a conception of the selves as separated in such a way as to amount to 2 entities. But I was not to be impaled.]: Right. But see pp. 308-9. : J.-P. Sartre’s chapter (in L’Être et le Néant) on mauvaise foi, which adversely criticizes Freud’s doctrine of the ‘unconscious’, can be profitably studied in connexion with the distinction between the ‘Supraliminal’ and the ‘Subliminal’. [to be unconscious of each other’s action, or even to engage in a conflict of wills and in acts of mutual hostility.]: If they are unconscious of each other’s action, how can they engage in a conflict of wills and acts of mutual hostility? [it is evidently essential to come to a clear understanding of what we mean by a ‘self’] u/l: See NoD, attå and sakkåya. All the muddle of this chapter comes of the puthujjana’s failure to distinguish personality from individuality. Personality as ‘self’ is indivisible. Individuality is as divisible as you please; that is, within the individual. The word individual does not exclude internal divisions; it simply means that you cannot treat these internal divisions as a collection of individuals. ‘Individual’ is opposed to ‘class’. [no less a thinker than William James] u/l: W. J.’s thinking was never very profound. [It seems … that our moral nature is as easily split up as our intellectual nature, and that we cannot be any more certain that the minor current of personality which is diverted into some new channel will retain moral than that it will retain intellectual coherence.] noted. [My own instinctive conviction is that my true self is the ‘me as I know myself’.] u/l: Within limits, this is well said. The rationalist pays no attention to this instinctive conviction, and in consequence makes things too simple. This ‘instinctive conviction’ is asmimåna, based on avijjå. It is the kernel of the problem. But Balfour’s solution of the problem is hopelessly mistaken.
Published on Jun 26, 2013
Part B includes two early essays (Nibbana and Anatta and Sketch for a Proof of Rebirth) as well as notes from a Commonplace Book and Margina...