c) Armed drone deployment considerations China faces a range of internal and external security challenges, any of which could see drones deployed in response. Maintaining sovereignty over China’s autonomous regions is of great importance to Beijing. Regions such as Tibet are crucial for resource security (oil, gas and water) and force projection. Drones are an ideal tool for surveillance and monitoring of these areas. Given Beijing’s consistent characterisation of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and World Uyghur Congress as terrorist organisations and its lack of criticism of US drone strikes in Pakistan, the PLA may also be leaving the door open for use of UCAVs in Xinjiang and Central Asia for counterinsurgency against such groups. China is undoubtedly considering UCAVs for use in other security roles. For example, in February 2013, the Ministry of Public Security reported that a drone strike was considered to target a leader of one of the largest armed gangs in the Golden Triangle who was hiding in northeast Burma (Myanmar). The Ministry reportedly decided against the option and the suspect was instead apprehended alive in Laos. In general, though, it is more likely that UCAVs will be used in maritime and territorial disputes and form part of China’s A2/AD arsenal. One of China’s primary mid-term objectives is to push US naval forces out of what it regards as its backyard. PLA planners have not overlooked deploying UCAVs as a component of A2/AD and a means to limit the effectiveness of the United States’ AirSea Battle strategy. As an example, China may be building up its drone capacity to undertake surveillance operations over Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits in order to monitor US/Taiwan military installations and preparedness. Increasing numbers of drone systems may also emerge as the critical enabler for PLA long-range precision strike missions within a 3,000 km radius of Chinese shores. As such, drones may become a critical (even key) component in the accuracy of the PLA Air Force’s long-range strike capability. A2/AD is not restricted to China’s western Pacific coastline. Their String of Pearls strategy is aimed at establishing key commercial and military port developments adjoining Indian Ocean sea lanes of communication, which carry 70% of China’s African and Middle Eastern oil imports. China is likely to be building considerable anti-piracy capabilities in these sea lanes, which may eventually include a UCAV fleet. Surveillance and monitoring of contested maritime space in the South and East China Seas is also likely to increase. This could be a significant escalatory risk if both China and Japan deploy drones over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the threshold for engaging them is deemed lower than for manned aircraft. The same risk applies between China and India over the potential use of drones above the disputed border regions Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin and the Line of Actual Control between the two countries.
Remote control war
5