THE RUSI JOURNAL
KINGDOM’S END? Malcolm Chalmers
Should the Scots vote Yes in the announced referendum on independence, what would the consequences be for the two successor states? Malcolm Chalmers explores the potential implications of an independent Scotland for the security and defence of the British Isles.
efence planners try to think in terms of decades, not just years. Yet, they cannot be sure that the UK will even exist, at least in its current form, by 2016. As a result of its victory in the 2011 elections, which gave it an overall majority in Scotland’s Parliament, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has called for a referendum on independence to take place by autumn 2014. Negotiations on the exact form and timing of the vote are not yet concluded; but the UK government has agreed that a referendum will be held, and has made clear that it would accept the result. Opinion polls still show a majority against independence. Some surveys, however, suggest a margin of as little as 6 per cent in favour of staying in the Union. Economic factors weigh most heavily for those favouring the status quo. However, most Scots, according to one recent poll, believe that independence would have a positive effect on Scotland’s culture, education, health and environment.1 The SNP’s calculation seems to be that, after two more years of Londondirected austerity, voters will reject the argument that things could get even worse economically if they opted for secession. It could be a tough fight. If the SNP’s opponents fail to make a strong enough case for staying in the Union, and the Scottish people vote Yes as a consequence, the process of dissolving the United Kingdom could be under way less than three years from now. Such a process, were it to take place, would be emotionally charged on every side. The institution of a shared monarchy would provide an element of stability, further helped by the care with which both the Queen and the Prince
of Wales have emphasised the royal family’s Scottish roots and identity. In the event of a Yes vote, however, politicians in Edinburgh and London could find themselves forced to make decisions on issues that they have never had to consider before, but which would shape the nature of politics and society on these islands for decades to come. Two of the most consequential issues would be to decide what the name of the UK’s main successor state would be, and how its citizens would identify themselves. In logic, a UK without Scotland could simply rename itself the United Kingdom of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (UKEWNI). People in both successor states could still call themselves British, just as those on both sides of the border on the neighbouring island still call themselves Irish; but would this still be acceptable to those affected in the wake of a referendum that had decided to reverse the Act of Union that created ‘Great Britain’ in the first place? Even as Scotland’s Nationalists celebrated their success, many others (both inside and outside Scotland) would be experiencing a sense of unease – and perhaps anger – as they adjusted to a new reality that they did not choose. Millions of individuals of ‘mixed’ nationality, on both sides of the new border, would want to know how they could choose which passport to carry, and what this would mean for themselves and their families. In Northern Ireland, the end of the Union could cause heart-searching amongst the Unionist community, many of whom are of Scots descent. These and many other difficult issues would have to be resolved in order to move from an in-principle Yes vote in
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a referendum to a detailed agreement on how two states could be created from one. Technocratic wisdom and cool heads would be vital in order to ensure that this process took place in a timely yet considered fashion. However, success could not be guaranteed. As emotions rose on both sides, and with politicians in both Edinburgh and London focusing on imminent elections, prolonged deadlock would be entirely plausible. A declaration of ‘self-determination’ is a unilateral act; but the process of secession that follows it is, by its nature, one that involves more than one state.
Independence, the UK and the World
Concerns as to the material impact of Scottish independence on the UK’s ability to remain a major power should not be overstated. Scotland accounts for less than a tenth of the UK’s total GDP. As a result, if it were to leave the UK, the state that remained would still be one of the world’s eight largest economies. It would retain a defence budget comparable to that of France, and an aid budget amongst the largest in the world.2 If measured purely in such material terms, therefore, Scottish independence would have no more impact on the UK’s ability to operate internationally than did the 2010 Spending Review’s decision to cut the defence budget by 8 per cent over the four years to 2014/15. As with that review, the impact would be uncomfortable and serious; but it would not be catastrophic. Yet the UK’s international influence has never been simply about its material wealth, or even its willingness to spend money in pursuit of foreign DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2012.695156
A boy waves the Scottish flag as 45 Commando Royal Marines march through Arbroath, 2009. Photo courtesy of PA/Danny Lawson.
policy objectives. The UK’s weight on the world stage is also rooted in how others view its political stability, and in particular a history of continuous and constitutional government that is longer than for any other major power. Even as others have struggled to regain their internal balances after the traumas of dictatorship, occupation and dissolution, the UK’s internal continuity has given its elites the self-confidence to make a disproportionate contribution to international governance. The UK’s confidence in itself has, in other words, helped secure the confidence that others place in the UK. The departure of Scotland from the Union would be a body blow to that confidence. It is now conventional wisdom that devolution of power, combined with a strong commitment to individual and language rights, is the key to providing political stability in a multinational state, thereby avoiding the costs and risks involved in the endless redrawing of international boundaries. The programme of devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland within the UK was informed by this analysis, as were comparable decentralisation processes in Spain, Belgium and Indonesia. It is true that recent history has seen several examples of state break-up in more fragile states, notably the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in
the early 1990s, and the emergence of Eritrea and South Sudan after long civil wars in post-colonial East African states. Yet the nearest that any stable longstanding democracy has come to breakup in the last half-century was in Canada in 1995, when a referendum on Quebec’s independence was defeated by 50.6 per cent to 49.4 per cent.3 Independence for Scotland, however, could erode international confidence in democracy’s ability to provide an effective antidote to separatism. Precisely because there is no recent precedent for Scottish independence, one can only speculate as to how other states would respond in such a scenario. Confidence in Europe’s traditional political elites is now at a post-war low, with voters increasingly turning to other political forces to provide answers to deepening social and economic problems. Several EU member states, facing their own separatist movements, would worry about how the Scottish precedent could affect their own countries. The UK would have to work very hard to repair the reputational damage that a prolonged secession crisis would inflict. The nature of such a crisis, and its impact on the UK’s international role, could be further complicated by the important role that Scots have always played in the United Kingdom. After the creation of Great Britain from the union of Scotland with England in 1707, Scots
benefited disproportionately from the new employment opportunities that the British Empire provided: as colonial administrators and settler farmers, as engineers and as doctors.4 Two centuries later, the shared experience of fighting together in two world wars further deepened a collective consciousness of what it meant to be both Scottish and British. Up to the present day, Scottish representation in the UK armed forces, and in the UK’s security and political apparatus more generally, greatly exceeds the 8 per cent share of Scottish residents in the UK population. Of the twenty-two British prime ministers that have held office since 1900, for example, seven have been Scottish and two more (including David Cameron) had a Scottish parent. Without Scotland, therefore, might the UKEWNI simply lose the will to remain a great power? Over the last decade, in particular, both the Labour and Coalition governments have pursued interventionist foreign policies, deploying more military forces to Iraq and Afghanistan and spending more on defence than any other European ally. Yet these military operations have proven to be much less popular amongst the general public than they have been with political elites. Public admiration for the bravery and talent of the UK’s armed forces is at an unprecedented high; but it is not associated with support for what
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they are being asked to do. Scottish independence, in these circumstances, might be the straw that finally breaks the back of the UK’s fragile commitment to a global military role. The existential crisis that would face a post-Yes vote UK could be made even more complex if it were to coincide with increased instability in its relations with the European Union. Growing antiEU sentiment in the ruling Conservative Party (encouraged by growth in support for the UK Independence Party) already seems set on a slow-motion collision course with the strengthening of federalist momentum in continental Europe as a result of the eurozone crisis. An increasing number of anti-EU Conservatives now argue for yet another constitutional referendum, but this time for the independence of the UK from the EU. It is possible that, in the event of a Scottish Yes vote, the forces of Conservative Euro-scepticism could be blunted by the strong element of Unionism that still exists in the party. Even after independence, tight economic and social interdependence would make policy-makers wary of steps (such as separate currencies) that would add further confusion to what would already be a highly disruptive process. It might therefore be harder, on this logic, for the UKEWNI to leave the EU if Scotland were to be accepted as a member. Nevertheless, politics is a game of party contingency as much as policy logic. In the aftermath of a Scottish vote to leave the UK, it is hard to imagine how David Cameron could resist pressure to resign his position in the wake of one of the most serious political failures of any prime minister in modern history. If he did so, an election for leadership of the Conservative Party would follow in which attitudes towards Scotland, and probably also towards the European Union, would be at the top of the agenda. Candidates would find it hard not to respond to the strongly English-nationalist views of Conservative Party members on these two issues. Moreover, since the general election would then have to take place by May 2015, there would not be time to conclude independence negotiations
before it took place. The first postreferendum UK election, therefore, would still elect MPs to Westminster from Scotland, almost all of whom, on current polling patterns, would come from either the Labour Party or the SNP. It is quite possible that a Labour government could return to power in 2015, but be reliant on the votes of Scottish MPs who would have to give up their seats as soon as separation negotiations were finalised. The famous ‘West Lothian question’ would have had its last laugh.5
A Small State in a Big World
So what would independence mean for Scotland’s defence?6 Most of what governments do is, by its nature, about delivering local services: policing and justice, health and education, planning and transport; and, with the creation of Scotland’s Parliament in 1999, most of this is already under Scottish control. However, defence, along with the conduct of foreign affairs, is different. Having independent armed forces is at the heart of what it means to be a sovereign country. In a world in which the British Isles at present face few direct military threats from other states, the primary role of the military personnel now in Scotland is to contribute to the UK’s capability to project military power at distance. Yet an independent Scotland could face other significant demands for the provision of military and security forces. The growing economic role of the Arctic, both as a transit route to Asia and as a site of oil and gas production, could have profound security implications for the nations of Europe’s ‘High North’, fuelling new investments in maritime capabilities over the coming decades. There is also likely to be a range of fastevolving risks to Scotland’s economy and citizens from hostile cyber-activities, driven by a mixture of commercial and security motivations. Given the close links between Scotland and Northern Ireland, it is possible that the UKEWNI authorities could press for Scotland to make some military contribution to support the civil power there. Terrorists (in either a jihadist or, possibly, an Irish variant) might also seek to take advantage of any indication of a ‘weak link’ in the
security of the British Isles. It will be in Scotland’s interests to work closely with the UKEWNI to combat this perception, and to acquire intelligence and rapidresponse capabilities that enable it to react to developing threats. However, there will be limits to this co-operation. If Scotland does decide to become an independent state, with its own seat at the UN, integrated United Kingdom armed forces and intelligence services could not survive. Possession of independent armed forces remains the foundation of national sovereignty in international law and in practice. A small number of states – such as Iceland, itself a NATO member – have chosen not to have any armed forces. Many states rely on others, at least partially, for their protection; but not a single one of the 193 members of the UN shares its armed forces with another. The reason is simple. Independence of action – the right to say no, or yes, to military action – is universally viewed as being part of what it means to be a sovereign state. If it could no longer rely on Scottish armed forces being there ‘on the day’, however, the UK would want to ensure that the armed forces that remain in its possession are fully capable of acting on their own, without Scotland’s assistance. Scotland may well want the right to say no to new military interventions and to nuclear weapons. The UKEWNI, by contrast, would want to retain the right to be able to say yes to both of these. A period of considerable disruption and reorganisation is bound to follow as a result of this basic logic. Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond was right to point out that, as a result of the UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, there will soon be one major army base, one major navy base and one major airbase in Scotland; but these are not freestanding units, able to be rebadged as Scotland’s armed forces in the way that schools or hospitals or police forces have been. They are part of an integrated whole, organised on a Union basis. The British Army has several thousand soldiers, based around a brigade headquarters, in Scotland. Yet the transport aircraft and helicopters needed to carry them around, the staff colleges needed to train them, the organisations
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that buy and maintain their weapons, and the strategic headquarters needed to command them are all in the rest of the United Kingdom. All these functions would have to be newly created for Scotland to have a functioning national army. A new Scottish Ministry of Defence and military headquarters would need to be established and staffed in order to organise procurement, payroll and planning. New training and exercise facilities would be needed, and probably also some new bases. Tough decisions would also have to be made, in the negotiations that would follow a Yes vote, on how to divide up the military assets and liabilities of the Union’s armed forces. The UK still maintains a range of cutting-edge military capabilities, able to operate alongside the US on a global scale, albeit at low numerical levels. Its capabilities for power projection are, as a result, much greater than those of any other European country, with the exception of France. A country with a GDP only a twelfth as large, by contrast, would not be able to play in this game. An independent Scotland could not afford to maintain any of the seven Astute-class nuclearpowered submarines, all of which are due to be based in Faslane as they come into service through the next decade, and all of which are capable of worldwide deployment. Nor would it make sense for Scotland to acquire any of the dozen or so new globally capable Type-26 frigates that are due to enter service in the 2020s as the backbone of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet, and most of which could, on current plans, be built on the Clyde. A comparison with similarly sized European states suggests that the projected unit cost of £400–500 million, plus more for equipment, is much more than an independent Scotland could realistically afford without greatly distorting the overall shape of its limited defence budget.
The NATO Question
A central driver for the defence policy of an independent Scotland would be how much, and in what form, it decided to contribute to European collective defence. The Scottish National Party has a policy of opposing NATO membership for
Scotland; but there is growing pressure within the party to rethink this position, given the signals it might send to countries on whose sympathy (or at least tolerance) Scotland would depend in the event of independence. It is one matter, like Sweden and Ireland, never to have been a member of NATO, for historical reasons which everyone has long come to understand. It would be quite another to make a deliberate decision not to join an alliance which has been responsible for the protection of one’s territory since its formation in 1949. Nor would this only be a problem with Scotland’s European neighbours. Close historic and personal links with Australia, Canada and the United States could be an important asset for the new state, helping it consolidate its place in the international order. None of these countries would understand what message Scotland was seeking to send by opting out of an alliance that has been the central player in Atlantic security for the last six decades. The reaction of US opinion, in particular, would likely be hostile, with potentially serious consequences for Scotland’s hopes of a smooth transition to being recognised as a ‘normal’ member of the international community of states. Scotland’s NATO European neighbours – not least the UKEWNI – would also be on their guard against what they might see as a Scottish attempt to free-ride on their security protection. A decision not to join NATO would be seen as a signal that the new Scotland was stepping out of the European mainstream (notwithstanding the Irish exception). It would make it more difficult to maintain good relations, and technical co-operation, with the UKEWNI armed forces. It might even raise questions about an independent Scotland’s application for EU membership, the success of which will be critical for its economic prospects. If an independent Scotland were to be a member of NATO, however, it would have to endorse a Strategic Concept that states that ‘as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance’ and goes on to agree that ‘the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided
by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States’.7 Denmark and Norway, both NATO members, endorsed this statement despite their long-standing refusal to base nuclear weapons on their own territories. It would, nevertheless, be hard to square Scotland’s acceptance of the Strategic Concept with an expulsion of the UKEWNI’s nuclear force from its bases at Faslane and Coulport. There would be a fundamental inconsistency in accepting the role of nuclear weapons in NATO’s security, but demanding their rapid removal from one’s own national territory. Even Germany, which has made clear that it wishes to remove US nuclear weapons from its territory, has also made clear that it would co-ordinate this with NATO allies and would not act unilaterally.8 Given the lack of alternative locations, and the UKEWNI’s likely strong commitment to maintaining a nuclear force, Scotland would be under even greater pressure to delay any action until a negotiated agreement could be reached.
Scotland’s Fair Share
In formulating an independent defence policy, Scotland would have to make hard choices about what sort of armed forces would best suit its needs and, importantly, its budget. If Scotland were to become a member of NATO, it would be expected – like Denmark and Norway today – to make a contribution to collective NATO capabilities; but it would have some considerable latitude in deciding what shape this contribution would take. The most fundamental choice would be a budgetary one. An independent Scotland could decide to spend as much on defence, proportionately, as the UK is expecting to do. The UK now has one of the highest defence budgets, as a percentage of GDP, of any of the European NATO member-states: 2.7 per cent of GDP in 2010, due to fall to around 2.2 per cent by 2015. Scotland could decide to match this, with an annual defence budget of between £2.6 billion and £3.1 billion (in 2010 prices) in 2015.9 Given the many competing demands that would face the newly independent country, however, it seems unlikely that
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its government would give defence such a high priority. At the other end of the spectrum, Scotland could reduce its defence budget to the level of low NATO spenders like Belgium (1.1 per cent of GDP) or Lithuania (0.9 per cent), or even that of non-NATO member Ireland (0.6 per cent). Given the absence of threatening states in its neighbourhood, Scotland could choose to focus most of its small security budget on countering threats – like cyber-crime and espionage, as well as terrorism (in both its Islamist and Irish varieties) – which are closer to home, and which also require strong domestic capabilities. In relation to Europe’s wider responsibilities – for example, contributing to ‘Responsibility to Protect’ missions such as Libya and Sierra Leone – such a Scotland would have to free-ride on the efforts that other NATO member states were making. Nonetheless, it could perhaps fulfil its humanitarian instincts, like its Nordic neighbours, by spending more on overseas aid. A more likely course, taking account of its limited financial resources but also its martial tradition, might be for Scotland to adopt a defence budget comparable to other small NATO member states in its immediate neighbourhood. Denmark and Norway, for example, spent 1.4 and 1.5 per cent, respectively, of their GDP on defence in 2010: a level that corresponds to the overall norm for NATO European states, excluding the UK and France. If an independent Scotland had done the same – spending 1.45 per cent of its GDP on defence – it would have had a 2010 defence budget of between £1.7 billion and £2.1 billion. However, because its GDP would be comparatively small, an allocation of this size would leave Scotland with one of the lowest defence budgets in NATO Europe. Denmark (£2.8 billion), Belgium (£3.3 billion) and Norway (£4.2 billion) all spend significantly more, reflecting the greater overall size of their economies. None of these states, moreover, are facing the considerable start-up costs that Scotland would have to incur in order to pay for new headquarters and other facilities, together with the expenses involved in moving people and kit north and south across the border.
Expectations that Scotland could quickly obtain military capabilities on a par with those of other north European states, therefore, are likely to be over-optimistic.
The Scottish government’s ‘National Conversation’ White Paper argued in 2009 that the UK’s nuclear deterrent could not continue to be based in Scotland after Scottish independence, while accepting that the two countries would have to work together ‘to ensure an appropriate transition and relocation’. In practice, however, relocation of these bases would be very difficult, if not impossible, to implement.10 The UKEWNI government, as a consequence, would be almost certain to press for a longerterm foreign basing guarantee, similar to that agreed with Ireland during its independence negotiations in 1921, and more recently in relation to Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Ukraine. Scotland’s negotiators would probably have to accept such an arrangement, despite the domestic controversy that it would cause, in order to secure the broader co-operation with the UKEWNI on which the future economic livelihood of its citizens would critically depend. This need not mean that Scotland would have to keep UK nuclear weapons on its territory for perpetuity; but recent historical precedent suggests that they could remain for some considerable period of time, likely to be measured in decades rather than years. Under the British-Irish treaty of 1921 that established the Irish Free State, the Royal Navy was given the right to maintain three ‘treaty ports’ in Ireland. It did not agree to withdraw its ships from these ports until 1938 when, fearing that their presence might compromise his objective of maintaining neutrality in the coming war with Germany, Irish leader Éamon de Valera insisted on their closure. Russia’s Black Sea fleet has been in Sevastopol since Ukraine became an independent state in 1991. In 2010, after a close vote in the Ukrainian parliament, the two countries signed an agreement extending the Russian naval lease until 2042. Moving Trident from Scotland may be even harder than leaving the Irish treaty ports. The UK might
possibly be able, given a few years and sufficient financial compensation, to find alternative berths for the Trident submarines themselves. However, it would be much more difficult, and perhaps politically impossible, to find a suitable alternative location for the warhead storage facility, currently based in Coulport. Until this happens, therefore, an independent Scotland might well decide that it had no alternative but to trade flexibility on the timing of Trident removal for UK concessions on matters that are much more central to its own security, such as support for Scotland becoming an EU member.
The Nationalisation of Defence
Once the emotions generated by a Yes vote had dissipated, goodwill on both sides should reinforce the clear mutual interest that both an independent Scotland and the UKEWNI would have in maintaining close links between their, now separate, peoples. Even as new citizenship rules were introduced, ways would probably be found to ensure that people could still move freely between the two states, and gain access to employment without discrimination on the basis of nationality. In the UK armed forces, the long tradition of having Commonwealth and Irish citizens serving in their ranks would provide an important precedent for Scottish independence, enabling Scots to continue to serve as they have done for centuries. Scotland could return the favour, drawing on English, Welsh and Irish talents and experience in order to help it meet the challenge of building new armed forces from scratch. Given the disparity in size and ambition between the two countries, however, many of the most ambitious and talented Scots would probably opt to stay in the UKEWNI’s armed forces, just as many served in the English Army before 1707.11 Where there is a clear common interest in territorial defence, a settled pattern of long-term co-operation could also be institutionalised in bilateral agreements. Both Scotland and the UK, for example, would have a clear interest in providing integrated capabilities for air defence of the British Isles. In this context, and as part of NATO’s integrated
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air defence arrangements, one could see RAF Lossiemouth becoming a centre for joint operations, in which UK RAF and Scottish air forces are collocated, and which might also provide surveillance and resupply capabilities for use by the US and other NATO partners. An independent Scotland might also want to sub-contract significant elements of its military support functions, such as the training currently provided by the Defence Academy at Shrivenham, to the UKEWNI. The picture is likely to be more competitive when it comes to other military capabilities and defence industrial suppliers. Both countries will rely on each other to keep their forces running in the short term. As time passes, however, UK decision-makers will come under strong pressure to buy British where possible, just as defence companies reliant on UK contracts, but currently based in Scotland, may feel that it is better in business terms to relocate southwards. This could have considerable implications for Scotland-based defence companies, currently estimated to employ 12,600 personnel, and to have
annual sales in excess of £1.8 billion per year.12 The decision to proceed with the aircraft carrier programme during the last Labour government was strongly influenced by a desire to maintain jobs in Scotland. If the people of Scotland were to decide in favour of independence, however, its defence industry would no longer enjoy such political protection. The future location of work on the Type-26 Global Combat Ship could be particularly sensitive in the event of an early referendum, with a decision not yet made as to whether this should take place in an English shipyard or on the Clyde. Once Scotland is independent, there will not be many in London who speak up for maintaining contracts with shipyards on the Clyde rather than in England. An independent Scotland would be capable of maintaining small, but capable, armed forces; and, in time, these forces could make a useful contribution to international efforts to support peace and security. However, the costs of achieving this transition would be significant, with the separation into two militaries creating more organisational
disruption than in any other arm of the public services. There would always be the prospect of a future security crisis, the character of which we cannot now predict, where Scotland could no longer assume the automatic support of its southern neighbour. A Scottish decision in favour of independence, moreover, cannot simply be about the next ten or twenty years. Insofar as anything ever can be, it would be permanent. In a world in which the security of states is increasingly interdependent, it is hard to imagine why the prospect of having independent armed forces could, in itself, be a good reason to support independence. Some might think that the disruption involved in military break-up will just have to be borne in pursuit of other, wider benefits of independence. Others might feel that such complications strengthen the case for maintaining a Defence and Security Union that has served Scotland well. Professor Malcolm Chalmers is Director of Research and Director, UK Defence Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.
STV, ‘Survey Finds Split of Opinion over Scottish Independence’, 5 February 2012, <http://news.stv.tv/scotland/296397survey-finds-narrow-split-of-opinionover-scottish-independence/>, accessed 11 May 2012.
Assuming that defence and aid budgets remained at roughly the proportions in UKEWNI GDP which they would have had if the UK had survived.
BBC News, ‘SNP Speak to Quebec Nationalists about Independence Referendum’, 23 April 2012.
For a powerful account of the origins of British identity, see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). This question refers to the current right of Westminster MPs from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to vote on issues that, because of devolution of powers to these three countries, only
affect English residents. Tam Dalyell, the then-MP for West Lothian in Scotland, first pointed to this as a consequence of devolution during the debate on efforts (subsequently unsuccessful) to introduce Scottish devolution in the late 1970s. 6
These sections are adapted from Malcolm Chalmers, ‘The End of an “Auld Sang”: Defence in an Independent Scotland’, RUSI Briefing Paper, April 2012. NATO, ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, November 2010, para 18. George Perkovich, Malcolm Chalmers, Steven Pifer, Paul Schulte and Jaclyn Tandler, ‘Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit: Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2012.
Scottish GDP in cash terms in 2010 was £120 billion including a population share of extra-regio (offshore) activity, and £142 billion if the share of UK extraregio activity occurring off Scotland is included. See Scottish Government, ‘Key Economy Statistics’, <http://www. scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/ Browse/Economy>, accessed 11 May 2012.
10 For further discussion, see Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, ‘The United Kingdom, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question’, Nonproliferation Review (Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2002). 11 I am indebted to Professor Hew Strachan of Oxford University for this point. 12 Statistics from Scottish Development International, ‘Aerospace, Defence and Marine’, <http://www.sdi.co.uk/sectors/ aerospace-defence-marine/adm-subsectors/defence.aspx>, accessed 11 May 2012.
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