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Journal for Effective Schools

Volume 11, Number 1

The estimate of between-principal variation in commitment to teaching due to principal efficacy measures obtained from model 4 was (0.0945 - 0.0756)/ 0.0945 = .2 or 20%. This translated into 0.10 x 0.20 = 0.02 or 2% of the total variation in commitment to teaching explained by the three principal efficacy measures. Thus, the three teacher efficacy measures and the three principal efficacy measures together were able to explain 16% of the total variation in commitment to teaching. However, model 4 showed that the inclusion of teacher and principal efficacy predictors in the model resulted in disappearance of the difference in commitment to teaching between groups 3 and 4. The inclusion of principal efficacy measures did not have any impact on the estimate for teacher efficacy measures. The coefficient estimates and significance pattern for the teacher efficacy measures were identical in models 3 and 4. Of the three principal efficacy measures, only curriculum and standards influence was found to be a significant predictor of commitment to teaching (p < .01). However, the magnitude of the effect was small. A one standard deviation increase in curriculum and standards influence was found to raise commitment to teaching by a mere 0.02 standard deviations. Model 5 allowed level 1 partial slope coefficients to be specified as functions of level 2 predictors. However, this did not result in any change in the significance pattern observed in model 4 results. All new parameters estimated for model 5 were found not to be statistically significant while the magnitudes of significant coefficients remained unchanged. In order to assess the effect of different types of rewards for meeting school performance standards on commitment to teaching, model 6 was estimated. Since like model 5, a very large number of coefficients emerged as not significant, the model was re-estimated with only significant predictors included. Results showed a significant effect for only one type of reward, cash bonus or additional resources for teachers. It was found that there was a significant difference in mean commitment to teaching between the group of schools that was awarded such performance bonus and the group that was not (p < .001), with commitment to teaching being higher for the latter group. The effect of classroom management efficacy on commitment to teaching was also found to be significantly different between these two groups (p < .01). In order to assess the effect of different types of punishments for not meeting school performance standards on commitment to teaching, model 7 was estimated. Results showed that the group that was penalized by reduction in resources had a higher mean commitment to teaching as compared to the group that did not receive such punishment (p < .05). It was also found that the requirement to provide additional supplemental educational services had a negatively moderated the effect of teacher efficacy to enlist administrative support on commitment to teaching. In other words, the stipulation to provide extra, supportive services to low-achieving 49

Journal for Effective Schools - Spring 2013  

Vol. 11, #1

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