7. Getting the institutions right? ETBs in the light of common-pool resources theory
Figure
9
The three levels of rules / Linking levels of analysis
Constitutional Choice Level
Action Situation
Collective Choice Level
Physical
Action Situation
Action Situation
Community
Constitutions Rulesin-Use
Monitoring and Sanctioning
Operational Level
Laws
Outcomes Rulesin-Use
Monitoring and Sanctioning
Source: Ostrom et al., 1994.
In other words, resource users play several games in parallel: they play within the rules and they make moves about modifying the rules. As Figure 9 shows, the changes in rules are played out by the users in view of how the operational rules affect the outcome. The central assumption here is that users who compete in appropriating the resource can cooperate to change the rules of that competition in order to obtain better collective outcomes. It must be underlined that in a CPR perspective, this is not just an assumption for analysis, it is also the formula for action towards sustainability. A CPR-inspired blueprint for improving the use of ETBs for biodiversity will have to rest on expecting that biodiversity stakeholders will make a cooperative effort to introduce new operational rules and tools bearing on their activities, so as to improve jointly desirable biodiversity outcomes. How can ETB experts help them on that route?
September 2014 / Tools for what trade? / Š AFD
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