Sawsan Al-Assaf I Ali Dhahir I Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen
A Failure in Strategic Conflict Intelligence: The US-led War in Iraq The failure of the United States government and its agencies (political and military) in the field of strategic conflict analysis and understanding of the situation in Iraq had a catastrophic impact. An almost complete breakdown in proper conflict intelligence and the failure to develop accurate understanding of the situation on the part of both military and political administration played a major role in shaping policies which directly contributed to the escalation of war and violence which otherwise could have been avoided or significantly mitigated. These lessons critically need to be learned. While the presence of external occupation forces would likely have provoked resistance by some sectors of the Iraqi population under almost any circumstances, this could have been significantly reduced. Clear opportunities to do so were missed —often due to faulty intelligence, imposed agendas and limited understanding of the situation. The systemic failure to properly plan, prepare for, and implement transition, to gain an accurate understanding of dynamics on the ground, to authentically and respectfully engage the Iraqi population and its leadership, as well as the inability to learn from previous war/post-war and regime transitions, combined with the use of escalatory policies and measures which poured fuel onto the fire created a context which contributed to breakdown, destabilisation, and wide-spread escalation of violence, war and sectarian strife1. It is this context which led to the forced displacement of millions of Iraqis, the deaths and injuring of hundreds of thousands more, and widespread psycho-social trauma. Most of this —even following the initial invasion and occupation of the country— could have been avoided. Pre-war planning and the early phases of the occupation of Iraq exhibited2: 1. Policy and decision-making extensively guided by ideology and wishful thinking rather than clear and accurate understanding of the situation on the ground3; 2. A focus on ‘elite’ politics and events in the ‘green zone’ to the neglect of events on the street, the Iraqi population, and dynamics at the grass-roots level (in villages, mosques, neighbourhoods)4; 3. Excessive focus on ‘deadlines’ and ‘milestones’ / targets devoid of accurate understanding of process, dynamics, and actual impact and developments on the ground; 4. Over reliance on often poorly trained / poorly prepared ‘experts’ who were not familiar with Iraq and had limited knowledge of the country’s social, historical, economic and political dynamics, or knowledge of Arabic or Kurdish; 5. A failure to properly understand or respect the differing needs, perspectives and interests of Iraq’s various population groups or how to engage with them; 6. A failure to grasp / comprehend the impact of the previous decades of war, sanctions, and authoritarian leadership on Iraq’s state institutions and social fabric5; 7. A failure to understand the emerging insurgency and resistance to US occupation; 8. A failure to understand how actions and decisions taken by the occupation would be perceived by different population groups and sectors in Iraq While much of this and its negative impacts has gradually come to be recognized and addressed, their prevalence in the early phase of the war / occupation played a significant role in shaping the dynamics of post-invasion Iraq. US forces hoped and expected to be greeted as liberators upon their entry into Iraq6. Prior to the war, planners had assumed that military intervention could remove Saddam Hussein and other the top level leadership without seriously impacting the functions of the state at large and stability in the country7. Opposition to US presence was presented as opposition to the ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ and ‘liberty’ that presence was believed to be bringing —and responded to with military force. Opponents were labelled as ‘Anti-Iraqi Forces’. Ensconced in the Green Zone or with lightning quick trips to other areas of the country, policy and decision-makers showed little ability or willingness to understand how US presence was experienced in the streets in Iraq. This extended to limited understanding of the feelings, needs and interests of the population. Very many of those responsible for taking decisions had little or no previous
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