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Superior Court Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit/ Probate Court There has been no final disposition in Superior Court concerning the Probate Appeal and Motion to Set Aside Judgment of Probate Court’s Original Judgment.1 Civil Action: 05-cv-13909-9 Appeal From Probate Court and Motion to Vacate or Set Aside Original Judgment December 22, 2005, Stegeman filed Appeal from Probate Court’s November 28, 2005 Summary Judgment Order and Motion to Vacate Judgment on Probate Court’s original judgment2 in Superior court, case no.: 05-cv-13909-9 (App.Brf.pp.11,12,13; App. Reply Brf.pp.5,9; R1-1-31,-#38; R1-1-32,-39). The case is still open. II.

ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITIES “Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever their position in government, are subject to federal law: ‘No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.’ United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. [196,] 220 [(1882)]. 438 U.S., at 506. “Every person in Georgia has a constitutional right of unfettered access to the courts” Ga. Constitution 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I, (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.); Par. XII (“No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by


The Superior Court action is directly related to and concerns Officer Porter’s, Lt. Hughett’s, Dennis Carlock’s, DFACS’ Probate Court’s, Judge Rosh’s, Superior Court’s, and State of Georgia’s actions. 2 Probate Court case no.: 2002-1161 A - A-1

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an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.”)” Rice v. Lightmas, 259 Ga. App. 380, 577 S.E.2d (Ga.App. 2003) SCHEDULED EVENTS Although the Docket Report shows Notice on May 28, 2008 and Scheduled Event for 9:00 a.m., June 5, 2008 Peremptory Calendar Hearing in Room 6A, attached hereto is the Docket Report as “Exhibit A” Stegeman received no Notice as mandated by law to ensure due process. Uniform Superior Court Rule 20. Peremptory Calendar Periodically the assigned judge may cause to be delivered … and published …civil actions … discovery period has expired … upon reasonable notice requiring the parties … to announce … are ready for trial … Failure to appear at the calendar sounding or otherwise to advise the judge may result in the following disposition: (A) In civil actions, the dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff’s action or defendant’s answer, counterclaim, or cross claim; and, (B) In criminal cases, the acquitting of the accused defendant or the dead docketing of the case. Although Stegeman never received an Order, according to the Docket Report, the case had been dismissed March 8, 2006 by granting opposition’s Motion to Dismiss for “failure to state a claim, lack of subject matter jurisdiction…” O.C.G.A.§5-3-2(a): “An appeal shall lie to the superior court from any decision made by the probate court, except an order appointing a temporary administrator.” See also:

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In Re Estate of Clarence E. Thomas, Ga. App. LEXIS 603, (2007) which held at n3: “An appeal shall lie to the superior court from any decision made by the probate court, except an order appointing a temporary administrator.” The computer used to access DeKalb County On-Line Judicial site had been blocked, the only way to get information was to call the Clerks. (R1-1-32¶135). Stegeman had filed Notice of Intent to Appeal on February 22, 2006 (R1-132¶134). Stegeman, blocked from internet access to the Judicial site (R1-132¶135), never heard anything else from the Court, he called and was told nothing has happened (R1-1-32¶134 \fn35/), there had been no activity. Stegeman then filed Motion for Order on Appeal and Motion For Order on Void Judgment March 24, 2006 (see attached Exhibit A), he still heard nothing from the Court, and has never received the Order Dismissing the case. O.C.G.A. §15-6-21 (c) “When he or she has decided, it shall be the duty of the judge to notify…of his or her decision…” (d) “If any judge fails or refuses…,such conduct shall be grounds for impeachment and the penalty therefore shall be his removal from office.” A. Civil Action File No.: 07-cv-11398-6 Filed November 2007 3 The current Superior Court civil action continues with violations of Rights and Constitutional issues. As was done by the Probate Court in the cases before that court, and by the Superior Court in the previous Superior Court case


McDonald/Stegeman v. Georgia Power Co., et., al., (App.Brf.p.12) A - A-3

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Stegeman/McDonald v. Wachovia Bank et., al., the Court held documents before filing them until it was too late to matter. Stegeman has literally had to hand deliver every filing in case 07-cv-11398-6 to have it filed. Superior Court Judge Becker named as a defendant in 1:08-cv-1971-WSD, the day after being served with Summons and Complaint, with no hearing beforehand, Dismissed with prejudice the suit against Georgia Power, et., al. She held the Order for exactly ten days mailing it on a Saturday to Stegeman preventing a motion to set aside. Having a personal interest in the case, Judge Becker should have disqualified herself. Motion to recuse had been filed earlier in the case, and the only ruling Becker made on any Motion filed by Stegeman, the Motion was denied. O.C.G.A. §15-6-13 (a) When from any cause a judge of the superior court is disqualified from presiding in a matter, he shall procure the services of another superior court judge to try the matter, even if he has to call for a special term of the court for that purpose. (b) Failure of a judge to comply with subsection (a) of this Code section within a reasonable time, when it is in his power to do so, is a ground of impeachment. O.C.G.A. §15-6-21 (b) “In all counties…it shall be the duty of the judge of the superior, state, or city court,…to decide promptly,…motions of any nature.” (c) “When he or she has decided, it shall be the duty of the judge to file…with the clerk…and to notify…of his or her decision…” (d) “If any judge fails or refuses…,such conduct shall be grounds for impeachment and the penalty therefore shall be his removal from office.” A - A-4

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IOP4 DeKalb County Superior Court 8C. Duties of Court Clerk and Calendar Clerk “…The scheduling and calendaring of any hearing or trial in each assigned action shall be the responsibility of the assigned judge’s calendar clerk, acting under direction of the assigned judge.” 2.


The Defendants all argued that tolling of the statute of limitations were not applicable to the case. Stegeman has shown that this is a perfect and proper case for tolling, one reason is the theory of “continuing tort” exists in this state. In support of this claim, see the following: Corp. of Mercer Univ. v. National Gympsum Co., 258 Ga. 365 (368 SE2d 732) (1988). “Under Georgia law, a cause of action for a tort that is continuing in nature accrues at the time of continuance. [Cit.]; Tucker v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 28 F3d 1089, 1090-1091 [1] (11th Cir. 1994) See also: City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724, 727 (28 SE 994) (1897): (“[w]here a nuisance is not permanent in its character, but is one which can and should be abated by the person erecting and maintaining it, every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh action will lie. [Cit.]”; Southfund Partners v. City Council of Atlanta, 221 Ga. App. 666 (3) (472 SE2d 499) (1996). In Tucker supra, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this was a continuing tort and not a permanent nuisance. Tucker, supra at 1091.


Internal Operating Procedures DeKalb County Superior Court Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit Revised July 2007 A - A-5

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Clearly, without a final judgment by Superior Court directly involving the original Probate Court judgment which was based upon fraudulent claims by Porter, Hughett, DFACS, and Rosh who because of being friends with DFACS’ Al-Khaja had a personal interest and further was without jurisdiction in criminal matters, the statute of limitations must be tolled and immunity is not available. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871); Rhodes v. Houston, D.C., 202 F.Supp. 624 (1962) held that when “a judge has acted in ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter’ he may be sued for damages.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1872) Over 130 years ago, Supreme Court offered a classic example and held: “if a probate court, invested only with authority over wills…estates…, should proceed to try parties for [criminal] offenses, jurisdiction over the subject of offenses being entirely wanting in the court,…his commission would offer no protection to him in the exercise of usurped authority.” …whereas a probate court judge would not be immune from liability if he tried a criminal case because he clearly lacked all subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352). 3.


Stegeman has clearly shown that Probate Court and Judge Rosh were acting without jurisdiction to do so when she judged Stegeman guilty of criminal acts. Stegeman previously showed to the Court that Rosh was prejudicial and part of a conspiracy to inflict harm upon Stegeman, and that the conspiracy succeeded.

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The results of Probate Court and Judge Rosh’s actions are discrimination and willful corruption. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) shows the following: Page 414 U.S. 503; “Judges who would willfully discriminate…would willfully deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights, as this complaint alleges, must take account of 18 U.S.C. §242. See Greenwood v. Peacock, supra, at 384 U.S. 830; United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 383 U.S. 793-794 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 383 U.S. 753-754 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 325 U.S. 101-106 (1945)United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).” “Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 u.s. 167, 365 u.s. 187 (1961). That section provides: ‘Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State…to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secure or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or…imprisoned…’” “…we have never held…performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization…criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach ‘so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress…’ Gravel v. United States, at 408 U.S. 606, 408 U.S. 627 (1972).” 4.


“A judgment is void if the rendering court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2862.

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“A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). “[T]he constitution, by prohibiting an act, renders it void, if done; otherwise, the prohibition were nugatory. Thus, the warrant is a nullity.” Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 217 (1821) “No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party.” Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 (1970). “A court should be cautious in exerting its inherent power and ‘must comply with the mandates of due process” First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 21117, -25; 2002 FED App. 0356P (6th Cir. 2002); In Re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2002) “A district court’s inherent powers are not infinite…the use of inherent powers must comport with procedural fairness.” Lockart v. Kayfetz, 974 F.2d 1166, 1170 (C.A. 0(Cal.), (1992); In Re: Rimsat, 212 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir., 2000); In Re: Kujawa, 256 B.R. 598, 611-12 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 2000). See also: Rouse v. Arrington, 641 S.E.2d 214, 283 Ga. App. 204, 07 FCDR 127, (2007) [14] “Clearly a dismissal with prejudice, as opposed to a dismissal without prejudice, goes to the very heart of the substantive rights of the plaintiff. See Parks v. Suntrust Bank, 248 Ga. App. 846, 847 (545 SE2d 31) (2001); see also Capital Cargo, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 245 Ga. 12, 13 (262 SE2d 783) (1980)” The concept of substantive due process remains an important part of constitutional jurisprudence, as it plays an important role in the protection of individual liberty. A - A-8

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See Tunn v. Whitticker, 398 F.35 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2005) at 902: “the essence of substantive due process is protection of the individual from the exercise of governmental power without reasonable justification.” “[i]t is most often described as an abuse of government power which ‘shocks the conscience.’” Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). “…Where a defendant has ‘the luxury of proceeding in a deliberate fashion…deliberate indifference may be sufficient to shock the conscience.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 2005)); conduct “intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest.” “most likely to rise to the conscienceshocking level.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 at 849; see also: Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 286 F.3f 1007, 1013 (7th Cir. 2002); Neal v. Fulton County Bd. Of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000). Clearly, Superior Court Stone Mountain Judicial Circuit, has shown a pattern of due process violations against Stegeman.

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PDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0 Probate Court’s original judgment 2 in Superior court, case no.: 05-cv-13909-9 Motion to...